Deng Xiaoping The Politician

Deng Xiaoping: The Politician
Author(s): David Shambaugh

Source: The China Quarterly, No. 135, Special Issue: Deng Xiaoping: An Assessment (Sep.,
1993), pp. 457-490
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies
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David Shambaugh
"DengXiaopingis a manwho excels in politicalaffairs,andveryfew peoplecan matchhim

in thatrespect."
"Dengis a raretalent.He is knownin bothmilitaryandciviliancirclesfor this.He is like a
needlewrappedin cotton.He has ideas.He does not confrontproblemshead-on.He can deal
withdifficultproblemswithresponsibility.
His mindis roundandhis actionsare square."
MaoZedong'
The Contradictionsof Deng Xiaoping

Any politicianwith a careeras long and diverse as Deng Xiaoping
defies simple designation.Deng Xiaoping the politician has been a
complex figure. He has embodiedcontradictorytendenciesand beliefs.
While Deng was a comprehensivereformer,therewere limits to each
of his reforms. His intoleranceof liberalismand direct challenges to
CommunistPartypoliticalhegemonyalwaysco-existedwith his desireto
loosen the Party'scontrolover the economy. It was Deng, an old-style
Partyorganizationman rearedon the Soviet model of commandistrule,
who personallyinitiatedthe processof politicalreforTn dunngthe 1980s,
only to recoil and tightenthe Party'sgrip on the instrumentsof coercive
powerin the l990s. He would not balk at the necessityof using force or
coercion in certain instances, yet did much to curtail the arbitrary
repressionof the Maoistera and enliventhe social andprofessionallives
of Chinesefrommanywalksof life. Dramaticallyimprovingthe standard
of living and diversity of life for one-fifth of the world's population,
while denying them fundamentalpolitical and human rights, will no
doubt be Deng's most enduringlegacy. In policy-makingDeng was
pragmaticand made the deals necessaryto achieve his domesticgoals,
yet was often uncompromising in statecraftwhenhe perceivedmattersof
principle and national interest to be at stake. He was consistent in
advocatingeconomic reformthat adoptedmarketmethods,yet he still
soughtprotectionof the state sector.Like Gorbachev,Deng believed in
*Aspectsof this articlewere previouslypresentedat Keio University(Tokyo),Institut

Francaisdes RelationsInternationales (Paris),the Associationof Asian StudiesAnnual
Meeting(Los Angeles),the Universityof California(Berkeley),andthe Schoolof Oriental
and AfricanStudies(London).I gratefullyacknowledgethe many useful commentsand
suggestionsofferedby participantsat these sessions.I also particularly
wish to thankKen-
neth Lieberthal,FrederickTeiwes and GordonWhitefor theirtrenchantcommentson a
previousdraft.The BritishAcademy/Economic & Social ResearchCouncilof the United
Kingdomand the School of Oriental& AfricanStudies(Universityof London)provided
fundingforresearchin Chinaon thisproject,wheretheInstituteof Marxism-Leninism-Mao
ZedongThoughtof the ChineseAcademyof SocialSciencesservedas my host.I also wish
to thankKatieJukesandHu Hangfor theirresearchassistance.Finaljudgmentsanderrors
are,of course,my own.
1. Firstquotationfrom"late1974"as cited in Departmentfor Researchon PartyLitera-
tureof the CentralCommitteeof the ChineseCommunistPartyandXinhuaNews Agency
(eds.), Deng Xiaoping (Beijing:CentralPartyLiteraturePublishers,1988), p. 93; second
quotation,undated,citedin HarrisonSalisbury,The New Emperors (Boston:Little,Brown,
1992), p. 328.
C)The ChinaQuarterly,1993
458 The ChinaQuarterly
socialism and CommunistParty supremacy,althoughhe did much to

undermineboth.
Like so many other Chinese reformersdating from the late Qing
dynasty,Deng sought to borrowa vanety of methodsand technologies
from foreign nationsand graft them to indigenousstructures.Yet what
sets Deng apartfrom his reformistpredecessorsis that he was able to
breakout of the confinesof the ti-yong strategyof selective borrowing
(ong) while attemptingto protectChinese culturalessence (ti). Deng
was far more preparedto import anythingthat would ennch China's
productivebase withoutmuchconcernfor its corrosiveeffect on Chinese
culture. His Four CardinalPrinciples notwithstanding,Deng adopted
eclectic methodsin his attemptto lift Chinaout of povertyandits feudal
past and deliver it into the modernera, with all the attendantaccoutre-
ments of greatpower status.
StudyingDeng Xiaoping'sPolitical Behaviour

This articleexaminesDeng's politicalbehaviourover time in orderto
explain this complexity.It intentionallydoes not adoptthe approachof
analysingDeng's policy pronouncements on vanous issues as indicative
of his political style, as there is frequentlya disjuncturebetween word
anddeed amongpoliticiansworld-wide.In some cases Deng's speeches2
do reflectthe contentof his politicalprogrammeandphilosophyandthey
will be drawnupon in such cases, but on the whole the aim is to study
Deng's politicalbehaviour:his administrativeworkstyle,policy agenda,
strategiesandtacticsof rule,sourcesanduses of power,interactionswith
colleagues,subordinatesand would-besuccessors,and methodsof deci-
sion-making and policy implementation.This multi-factor analysis
requiresstudyingdifferentpenods and events in Deng's career,drawing
upon multiplesources of information.3A straightforward chronological
2. Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and
Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, SelectedWorksof
DengXiaoping(1975-1982) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984); and DengXiaoping
wenxuan(1938-1965) (SelectedWorksof Deng Xiaoping)(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe,
1989); Deng Xiaoping, FundamentalIssues in Present-DayChina(Beijing: Foreign Lan-
guages Press, 1987); Deng Xiaoping, Lun dang de jianshe (Theoryof Party Building)
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1990).
3. Many of these sources are primary data, but use has also been made of the existing
biographies of Deng. In English these include Uli Franz, DengXiaoping:China'sReformer
(New York: Harcourt,Brace, Jovanovich, 1989); David Bonavia, Deng (Hong Kong: Long-
man, 1989); David Goodman, Deng Xiaoping (London: Sphere Books, Ltd., 1990);
Salisbury, TheNew Emperors;Chung Hua Lee, Deng Xiaoping:TheMarxistRoadto the
ForbiddenCity (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1985); and Chi Hsin, TengHsiao-ping:A Polit-
ical Biography(Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1978). Biographies in Chinese include:
Department for Research on Party Literature of the Central Committee of the CCP and
Xinhua News Agency, Deng Xiaoping;Department for Research on Party Literatureof the
Central Committee of the CCP, Deng Xiaopingzhanlue(TheStrategyof Deng Xiaoping)
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988); Han Shanbi, Deng Xiaopingpingzhuan(A Critical
Biographyof Deng Xiaoping),Vols. 1-3 (Hong Kong: East and West Culture Company,
1984, 1987, 1988); Balike Daineishi, Deng Xiaoping(translated from Hungarian) (Beijing:
Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1988); Zhou Xun, Deng Xiaoping (Hong Kong: Guangjiaojing
chubanshe, 1983); Lin Qingshan, Fengyunshinianyu Deng Xiaoping(A StortnyTenYears
Deng Xiaoping:The Politician 459
approach will not suffice analytically, although it might reveal a learning

curve in the conclusions that Deng drew from previous experiences for
his subsequent workstyle.4
The focus is therefore on Deng as an individual politician. While his
political behaviour must be viewed in the context of his time in power,
this is not necessarily an essay on the Deng era in Chinese politics (1978
onward), his reform programme, or even his political legacy from this
period.5 Deng's career in Chinese Communist politics has spanned more
than six decades, and his entire professional record is the subject of this
analysis. However, because Benjamin Yang's contribution to this volume
concentrates on Deng's pre-1949 years, and others assess Deng along a
variety of other professional dimensions, this analysis is largely limited to
Deng's post-1949 political career.
As the other assessments attest, Deng' s career was professionally
diverse - working on Communist Party political and organizational mat-
ters, the economy, social policy, foreign relations, military affairs,
science, technology and educational issues. This professional diversity
gave him substantive experience in a variety of issue areas, accumulating
the skills of a political generalist necessary for advancement to the
pinnacle of Chinese Communist politics.6 Once at the top Deng displayed
footr2(7te cl)tltinlted
withDengXiaoping)(Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989); Yang Guoya et al., Ershibanian

qian:cong shi zhengweidao zongshuji(Twenty-Eight Years:FromCityGovernment Com-
mitteeto GeneralSecretary)(Shanghai: Wenyi chubanshe, 1989); Yang Pengyu, Weidade
gaigejia Deng Xiaoping(The Great RevolutionaryDeng Xiaoping)(Beijing: Zhongguo
xinwen chubanshe, 1989); Yao Chuanwang et al., Deng Xiaopingzhuzuozhuantiyanjiu
(SpecializedResearchTopicson Deng Xiaoping'sWritings)(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe,
1988); Yang Chunchang, DengXiaopingxin shiqijianjunsixiangyanjiu(Researchon Deng
Xiaoping'sArmy-Building ThoughtDuringtheNewPeriod)(Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe,
1989); Gao Zhiyu and Li Yanqi (eds.), Deng Xiaopingyu dangdaiZhongguogaige (Deng
Xiaopingand Contemporary ChineseReforms)(Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chuban-
she, 1990); Yao Ping (ed.), Xin shiqi Deng Xiaopingzhanluesixiangyanjiu(Researchon
Deng Xiaoping'sStrategicThinkingDuringtheNew Period)(Shaanxi: Renmin chubanshe,
1989); Jin Yu and Chen Xiankui, DangdaiZhongguodasilu(TheGreatTheoreticalRoadof
Contemporary China)(Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1989); Qing Ye and
Fang Lei, Deng Xiaopingzai 1976 (Deng Xiaopingin 1976) (Shenyang: Chunfeng wenyi
chubanshe, 1993).
4. For two extremely useful chronologies of Deng's life and career see: Li Xinzhi and
Wang Yuezong, Weidadeshixian,guanghuide sixiang:Deng Xiaopinggeminghuodong
dashiji(GreatAchievements, BrilliantThought:Chronologyof DengXiaoping'sRevolution-
aryActivities)(Beijing: Hualing chubanshe, 1990); and Zhong Hao (ed.), DengXiaopingde
lilunyu shixianzonglan,1938-1965 (BroadViewson DengXiaoping'sTheoriesand Prac-
tice) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1991).
5. To some extent this is done in the other contributions to this volume, but also see
Michel Oksenberg, "The Deng era's uncertain political legacy," in Kenneth Lieberthal et al.
(eds.), Perspectiveson ModernChina(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 309-340.
6. This is a characteristic noted as generally necessary for upward mobility in Chinese
elite politics. See, for example, David M. Lampton, Paths to Power: Elite Mobilityin
ContemporaryChina (Ann Arbor: Michigan Monographs on Chinese Studies, Vol. 55,
1986); Michel Oksenberg and Yeung Sai-cheung, "Hua Guofeng's pre-CulturalRevolution
Hunan years, 1949-1966: the making of a political generalist," TheChinaQuarterly,No. 69
(March 1977), pp. 3-53; David Shambaugh, The Makingof a Premier:Zhao Ziyang's
ProvincialCareer(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), ch. 7.
460 The China Quarterly
some similar tendenciesto China's previous pre-eminentleader, Mao

Zedong,7which, as well as the differences,will be contrasted.
Three Paradigms of Analysis

This analysis of Deng's political behaviour draws upon three
paradigms,each of which emphasizesdifferentdimensionsof leadership
style. These models provide a useful frameworkto study Deng as an
individualpolitician,and in additionit is hoped the case study will be
able to refinethemin a Chineseand comparativecontext.It is important
to note at the outset that these approachesto studying elite political
behaviourare not mutuallyexclusive;just as leaders employ different
methodsof rule simultaneouslyso too must analystsemploy different
paradigmsin tandem.
The first paradigmis the traditional"power base" approach.This
methodis useful for analysinghow a politicianmoves up throughthe
organizationalhierarchies(Party,Army,State)anddevelopsa leadership
domain. In China, it is arguedthat power bases are of four principal
varieties:credentialist,personal,institutionalandtemtorial.A credential-
ist power base derives from a politician'srise throughthe ranks.How
was he recruited;how did he rise to the top of the system;whatskills and
credentialsdid he amassalong the way; whatwere his definingsocializ-
ing experiences,and what effect did they have on his subsequentelite
mobilityandpoliticalstyle? Personal powerbases in the Chinesepoliti-
cal system are of two principaltypes: patron-clientand issue-based
factionalnetworks.Institutional power bases in Chinaare rootedin the
Party,state and militarybureaucracies.Lastly, with a territorial power
base, power derivesfrom particularregions of the country.
The second paradigmis the "paramount leader"approach.This is a
termoftenused to describeDeng, particularly insofaras he neverheld the
official portfolio of President,Chairmanor General Secretaryof the
CommunistParty,or Premierof the StateCouncil,althoughhe did serve
as GeneralSecretaryof the CentralCommittee,Chairmanof the Central
MilitaryCommission,and Vice-Premierof the State Council. This ap-
proachseeks to understandDeng's style as supremeleaderof the nation,
even thoughhe did not hold the paramountofficialpositions.It is perhaps
more appropriateto describeDeng's role as a patriarch,not unlike a
Mafiagodfatherrulingfrombehindthe scenesthrougha networkof loyal
lieutenants.8But the questionhere is not so much whetherDeng was a
paramountleaderor patriarch,but how he exercisedsupremeauthority.
7. For studiesof Mao's politicalstyle see RichardSolomon,Mao's Revolutionand the

ChinesePoliticalCulture(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1971);LucianW. Pye,
Mao Tse-tung:TheManin theLeader(New York:BasicBooks, 1976);MichelOksenberg,
"Mao's policycommitments,1921-1976,"Problemsof Communism (November-December
1976), pp. 1-26; Michel Oksenberg,"Thepolitical leader,"in Dick Wilson (ed.), Mao
Tse-tungin the Scales of History (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1977), pp.
7s116.
8. See LucianPye's contributionforanextendeddiscussionof thisaspectof Deng's style
of rule.
461
Did he have a dictatorialstyle - issuing commands,rulingby fiat, inter-
vening in a varietyof policy arenaswhen he saw fit, and brookingno
opposition?Or did he act more as an arbiter- standingabove the fray,
reconcilingcompetinginterests,seeking conflictingopinions,and enter-
ing into the policy processin orderto resolve stalemate?Did he adopta
consensualandcollectivedecision-makingstyle thatplayeddownconflict
among subordinates,instead seeking consensus and the most rational
choice of policy alternatives?Or did he utilize a combinationof these
methodsat differenttimes?These questionsare examinedin contra-dis-
tinctionto China'sotherparamountleader,Mao Zedong.
The thirdparadigmfocuses on agenda-setting.It is an approachthat
examinesthe nationalpoliticalagenda,and looks both at its contentand
at the degree to which a given leader sets that agenda.How did Deng
seek to set the nationalagenda,what were his methodsfor doing so and
how successfulwas he? If rivalelites "captured" the agendaor movedin
a directionnot to Deng's liking, how did he respond?How did he seek
to regainthe initiative?Did he workthroughbureaucraticchannels?Did
he call a Politburomeetingto makehis case? Did he, as Mao often did,
appealdirectlyto the masses when he encounteredresistanceat the top?
In general,did Deng favouran institutionalist,populist,or machiavellian
approach,or some combinationthereof?This paradigmalso explores
ways in whicha leadermanipulatesthe agendato pursuespecificpolitical
goals. For example,can issues and policies be used to bolsterpolitical
allies or undermineenemies?
An integral part of the agenda-settingparadigmis how a leader
bargainsandbuilds a coalitionto adoptandimplementa given policy or
packageof policies. Only in the most totalitarianof political systems is
policy decided by the complete dominanceof the supremeleader and
implementedby a subserviantbureaucracy.In most political systems-
including authoritariansocialist ones - leaders must lobby their col-
leagues and subordinatesto supporttheir policy initiatives.They must
build, in William Riker's phrase, "winningcoalitions."9Bargainingis
necessaryto build elite coalitionsto adoptpolicy, but also to implement
it at national,regionaland local levels. A recent emphasisin studying
Chinesepolitics adoptsthis approachand arguesthatin a systemcharac-
terized by "fragmentedauthoritarianism" bargainingis the defining
characteristicof political life and takes place at every level of the
system.l?
To what degree does Deng Xiaoping fit this bargainingparadigm?
Whattrade-offsdid he makeat key juncturesto have his policies adopted
and implemented?Who did he bargainwith and what was the quid pro
quo? Of importancein this contextare the channelsof policy implemen-
tationthat Deng preferred.Did Deng preferto work throughtraditional
9. WilliamH. Riker,The Theoryof Political Coalitions(New Haven:Yale University

Press, 1962).
10. See, forexample,KennethG. LieberthalandDavidM. Lampton(eds.),Bureaucracy,
Politics,andDecisionMakingin Post-MaoChina(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,
1992).
bureaucratichierarchies(xitong); did he adopt the campaign(:yundong)

style of his predecessorMao; did he use a "test point" (shi dian)
approach;did he dischargeresponsibilityto a clusterof key advisers;or
did he even concernhimself with issues of implementation?
These threeparadigmsandtheirconstituentpartsoffer a frameworkto
dissect and analyse Deng Xiaoping's career in the Chinese political
system. By examiningthem sequentiallyit will be possible to ascertain
whichhavethe greatestexplanatoryvalue,andin whatcombinationDeng
employed differentstratagemsand tactics, drew upon differentsets of
politicalresourcesandestablishedpatternsof interactionwith otherelites.
Deng Xiaoping's Power Bases

The Right Revolutionary Credentials
Deng Xiaopingbelongedto the firstgenerationof ChineseCommunist
revolutionaryelites (lao yidai de gemingJia). This fact alone may be the
most importantof all power bases as it confers a legitimacythat other
more objective measurescannot match. Mere participationin the epic
events of the Chineserevolutionarystruggleand the personalties Deng
forged with otherleading CCP figuresin the process guaranteedhim a
place amongthe elite once politicalpower had been attained.
Deng Xiaopinglljoined the ChineseCommunistPartyin 1924'2at the
age of 20 while working in a Renaultfactory in Billancourt,France.
While in FranceDeng establishedone workingpartnershipthat would
help shapehis entirecareer- with ZhouEnlai.ZhouhelpedrecruitDeng
into the CCP and becamea life-long patron,althoughMao provedmore
centralto Deng's political ascent.Zhou was quick to recognizeDeng's
organizationalabilities.WhenZhoureturnedto GuangzhoufromParisin
1924, he entrustedthe publicationof the French cell of the General
EuropeanBranchof the CCP,Red Light, to Deng. Deng had no expen-
ence as an editoror wnter,but was well-versedin the mechanicsof early
"desktop" publishing.Red Light was pnnted in mimeographform, and
Deng acquiredthe nom de plume "Docteurdu Duplication."Another
colleagueof Deng's Pansiandays was Li Weihan,a notableCCP figure
who later workedclosely with Deng on united front matters,and upon
11. Deng's given nameat birthwas Deng Bin. In Francehe wentby Deng Xixian.There
is some discrepancyas to whenhe changedit to Xiaoping.In manyof his Westernbiogra-
phies (e.g. Goodman)it is dated from 1925, but one chronologicalbiographydates it
specificallyas June1927 in Wuhanso thathe couldmaintaina false identityandhide from
local Kuomintangpolice; see Li XinzhiandWangYuezong,Weidadeshixian,p. 6. For a
discussionof Deng's Hakkaoriginsandearlylife in Sichuansee BenjaminYang's contribu-
tion to this volume and MaryErbaugh,"The secret historyof the Hakkas:the Chinese
revolutionas a Hakkaenterprise,"The ChinaQuarterly,No. 132 (December1992), pp.
937-968.
12. Deng had previouslybeen a memberof the Chinese CommunistYouth Partyin
Europeas well as the FrenchCommunistParty;Li Xinzhi and WangYuezong,Weidade
shixian,pp. 34. Also see NoraWong, "DengXiaoping:the yearsin France,"The China
Quarterly,No. 92 (December1982),pp. 698-705. Wong'sis the mostcompleteaccountof
this periodin Deng's life, and is basedon Frencharchivalsources.
Deng Xiaoping, The Politician 463
whom Deng called to directthis spherewhen he reorganizedthe Central

CommitteeSecretariatin 1956.l3
Deng left Paris for Moscow in January1926, travellingvia Berlin.
He stayed nearly a year studyingMarxism-Leninismat the University
of the Toilers of the East and Sun Yat-sen University.l4However
he was never really fond of the classroomor Marxisttheory,and after
eight years abroad was anxious to returnto make a more practical
contributionto the revolutionin his native land. In his absence the
Republichadbeen furtherfracturedby rivalwarlordsanda sense of crisis
grippedthe nation.
Deng returnedto China in early 1927, apparentlyaccompanyingthe
warlordFeng Yuxiang(the "ChristianGeneral'').lfFeng was at thattime
co-operatingwith the KMT-CCPunited front, and he headed the Sun
Yat-sen MilitaryAcademy in Xi'an. He was in Moscow in search of
Cominternfundingfor the Academy.Deng returnedto Feng's Academy
andwas put in chargeof politicaltraining.He organizedpoliticaltraining
for officers,thus beginninga long involvementwith commissarwork in
the armed forces, and was also appointedresident CommunistParty
secretaryat the Academy.Followingthe April 1927 Shanghaimassacre
andabrogationof the firstCCP-KMTunitedfront,Feng Yuxiangpurged
his forces of known and suspectedCommunistsin an effort to show his
supportfor ChiangKai-shek.Deng was one of over 50 CCP members
expelled from the Academy, but whose lives were spared (one can
speculatethatit was Feng's Christianitythatpreventedhim fromfollow-
ing ChiangKai-shek's1927 reign of white terror).
Deng thenmadehis way southto Hankou.Thusbeganhis inclusionin
the inner circle of CCP leaders. At first he was appointedas a lowly
secretaryof the CentralCommittee,buthis rankandstaturegrewrapidly.
By the end of the summerof 1927, following the secretrelocationof the
Party headquartersto Shanghai,Deng was appointedchief secretary
(zongmishu)for the CentralCommittee.This was a plum assignmentfor
Deng as he was responsiblefor handling all inner-party"documents,
orders,communicationsandassignments.''l6 It also gave him the opportu-
nity to renewacquaintancewith Zhou Enlai andothercomradesfromhis
Pansiandays as well as to meet otherkey CCPleadersfor the firsttime.
13. DengandLi alsohadtheirdifferences,includingthefactthatLi apparentlypersuaded

Deng's firstwife to leave him. Havingdivorced,Jin Weiying(A Jin) andLi Weihan(Lo
Man) had Li Tieying- whom Deng has promotedin high Partycouncilsin recentyears.
14. Both "universities"were establishedby the Cominternfor the purposeof training
would-berevolutionaries. Theformerwas intendedfor thosefromtheMiddleEastandAsia,
while the latterwas headedby CominternagentPavelMif andestablishedwith Comintern
fundsin 1925 specificallyto trainyoungChineseradicals(bothCommunistsandNational-
ists) in the theoreticaland practicaltools of revolution.Many of the so-called "28
Bolsheviks"who returnedto Chinato constitutethe "internationalist" wing of the Party
studiedthere, but it is unclearwhat-if any- relationsDeng had with them. One key
"returned Bolshevik"wasYangShangkun,withwhomDengwouldsubsequently forgeclose
ties, who arrivedat the universitya year afterDeng's departure.
15. Not coincidentally,Deng had befriendedFeng's daughterwhen classmates in
Moscow.Li Xinzhi andWangYuezongdateDeng's returnas March1927.
16. Li XinzhiandWangYuezong,Weidade shixian,p. 6.
Deng's sensitive work quickly broughthim to the attentionof Mao

Zedong.
Followingthe "whiteterror"of 1927 and split in the CCP leadership
in 1928 the Partywent underground, but Mao's factionfled Shanghaito
establishthe Jingganshanbase area(genjudi)in the centralmountainsof
Jiangxi province. Deng arrivedin Jingganshanin October 1930 after
spendingmuchof 1929 in Guangxitryingto organizepeasantuprisings.
On the way he joined the guerrillaforcesof PengDehuaiandparticipated
in the August 1930 ChangshaUprising.Perhapsas a rewardfor his role
in the Changshaseizure,Deng was appointedPartysecretaryof Ruijin
district in 1931, and subsequentlysecretaryof the Jiangxi provincial
committee.This broughthim into close contactwith Mao. Deng chose to
supportMao at the stormyRuijinmeetingof 1932 when the lattercame
undersharpattackby Cominternagentsand the urban-oriented, interna-
tionalistwing of the Party.Deng's supportat this juncturewas of key
importanceto his subsequentcareer.Deng was censuredalong with Mao
followingthe meetingand againin 1933 afterthe Luo Ming affair.As a
resultof both, in January1934 at the Fifth Plenumof the Sixth Central
Committee,Deng enduredthe firstof threepurgesin his careeras he was
denouncedtogetherwith Lu Dingyi for engagingin "anti-Party factional-
ism" and was relieved of his post as RuijinParty secretary.There are
conflictingaccountsof Deng's actualfate in the wake of Ruijin,but he
apparentlyspentsome time incarcerated.l7 Mao was not to forgetDeng's
allegiance at these crucialjunctures,and his subsequentpatronageof
Deng can clearly be tracedto Ruijin.
When the Communistforces embarkedon the Long Marchin 1934
Deng was designatedsecretary-general of the GeneralPolitical Depart-
ment (GPD)of the FirstFrontArmy.In this capacityhe servedas editor
of the PartyjournalRed Star and oversawpropagandawork amongthe
troops.Littleis knownaboutDeng's activitieson the LongMarchbeyond
the fact that he servedin the GPD of the First Army Corps(underLin
Biao and Nie Rongzhen)and then the reorganizedEighthRoute Army
(underRen Bishi). Deng was one of the 4,000 weary soldiersto reach
Yan'an in early 1937. En route he participatedin the importantZunyi
meeting in his new capacity as secretaryof the Central Committee
(Zhonggongzhongyangmishuzhang).He dutifully sat in the corneras
designatednote-takerat this pivotalmeeting.l8AfterZunyi,the remainder
of the marchwas unremarkable for Deng (who roderatherthanwalked),
except that he fell ill with typhoidfever in Shaanxi.'9
The Japaneseinvasion of China in 1937 occasioned an important
periodin Deng's career,the pivotalphaseaccordingto DavidGoodman.20
17. For interesting,if not necessarilyaccurate,accountsof the RuijinaffairandDeng's

fate, basedon participants'reminiscences(includingYang Shangkun),see HarrisonSalis-
bury,TheLongMarch:TheUntoldStory(New York:Harper& Row, 1985),pp. 139-142;
and TheNew Emperors,pp. 4s43.
18. Ibid.;andinterviewwith Mao's formersecretaryLi Rui, 1 June 1993.
19. Ibid..p. 143.
20. Goodman,Deng Xiaoping,pp. 47-53.
Deng Xiaoping: The Politician 465
Deng's experiencein the Taihangbase area in the Shanxi-Hebeiregion

was important,Goodman argues, because it brought him into close
associationwith otherkey elites (notablyLiu Bocheng),andalso because
of his economicprogrammeof putting"productionfirst."2'Deng's ties to
Liu Bocheng would last a lifetime, and the "Liu-Deng forces" would
become an importantpart of CCP and PLA lore. Liu and Deng subse-
quently commanded the famous 129th division which defeated
Nationalisttroops in the decisive Huai-Haicampaignof the civil war.
Thereafter,known as the Second Field Army,they pushedsouthwardto
routChiangKai-shek'sforces along the middleand upperreachesof the
Yangzi River, and then togetherwith forces commandedby He Long
"liberated"all of south-westernChina- Sichuan,Guizhou,Sikang and
Yunnan.
Thus by the time the CCP came to powerin 1949 Deng Xiaopinghad
alreadyexperienceda variedcareerin Partyand militaryaffairs,andhad
built up an importantnetworkof colleaguesandpatronsamongthe CCP
seniorelite.22His revolutionarycredentialswere impeccable:workingin
the CCP undergroundat home and abroad,especially in organizational
and propagandaaffairs,and commandingRed Army forces.
Deng's Personal Power Base: Patrons, Clientsand Colleagues

Many of the personal ties Deng forged during the revolutionary
struggleenduredafter 1949 and generallyservedhim well in subsequent
years. Both Mao and Zhou Enlai promotedDeng at differenttimes, but
his ties to other first-generation
revolutionaryelites also provedimpor-
tant.
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Mao was Deng's principal patron
throughouthis career.He was primarilyresponsiblefor Deng's ascent
from Ruijin until the early 1970s. Mao saw to it that Deng was given
importantmilitarycommandsduringthe civil war, andput him in charge
of the sensitive South-westAdministrativeRegion (Xi-NanXingzheng
Qu) in 1950. Mao also sanctionedDeng's transferto the Centrein July
1952, afterwhich he was appointedsuccessivelyas Vice-Premier,Vice-
Chairmanof the FinanceandEconomicCommission,andmemberof the
State PlanningCommission(all in 1952), Ministerof Finance (1953),
Secretary-General of the CentralCommitteeSecretariatand Directorof
the CCP OrganizationDepartment(1954).
Following the debacle of the GreatLeap, Zhou and Deng began to
work more closely togetherin fashioningthe economic recovery pro-
gramme.Deng's workingrelationswith ChenYun, Liu ShaoqiandPeng
Zhen also became closer duringthis period, althoughthey had worked
21. See the excellentanalysisin David S. G. Goodman,"Theconstructionof the party-

statein Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu,
1937-1945,"paperpresentedattheconferenceon "Construction of the
Party-Stateand StateSocialismin China,1936-1965,"ColoradoCollege,June 1993.
22. Also see BenjaminYang'sandJuneTeufelDreyer'scontributions for moredetailof
Deng's militaryexploitsduringthe Sino-Japaneseandcivil wars.
togetheron the Secretariatdurlngthe mid-1950s. Liu and Zhou both

supportedDeng's appointmentas acting Premierof the State Council
(1963-64). Liu andDeng were purgedtogetherin 1967 as the Number1
and 2 "capitalistroaders,"but were treatedvery differentlyand suffered
differentfates. Zhou intervenedon Deng's behalf as he did many other
cadres,althoughMao also soughtto protectDeng.
When Lin Biao issued OrderNo. 1 in October 1969, both Liu and
Deng were transferredout of Beijing, Liu to Kaifeng(where he subse-
quentlydied an ignominiousdeath)and Deng to a May Seventh Cadre
School in Jiangxiprovince.Duringthis periodMao kept trackof Deng.
In 1971 he reportedlyaskedWangZhen to pass a messageto Deng that
Mao would considerhis rehabilitationif Deng appealedby letter and
confessed his "revisionist"errors.23Deng sent Mao two letters from
internalexile, the first in November 1971 and the second in August
1972.24Mao then personallyapprovedDeng's rehabilitationand recallto
Beijing on 2 March1973.
Deng's rehabilitationno doubt came with Zhou Enlai's blessing, as
of cadresandreconsti-
Zhouwas at this time overseeingthe rehabilitation
tutionof the party-stateapparatus.Deng's returnmustthereforebe seen
as partof a broaderpatternof rehabilitationsengineeredby Zhou at this
time, even though Deng was the most senior victim of the Cultural
Revolutionto be returnedto powerandthe Chairman'simprimateur was
necessary.25
Knowingthat he had cancer,Zhou groomedDeng to succeed him as
Premier,turningover the daily managementof the StateCouncilto him
in 1974.Whileundergoingcobaltradiationtreatmentfor his cancer,Zhou
relied on Deng to manageaffairsof state. Zhou dispatchedDeng to the
United Nations in Octoberto deliver a majorpolicy addresson world
affairs(in which Deng outlinedMao's "theoryof the threeworlds")and
Deng stood in for Zhou on a numberof occasions.One of Zhou's last
publicacts was to announcethe "FourModernizations" programmeat the
23. Interview,CentralCommitteePartyHistoryResearchOffice,25 May 1991,Beijing.

Littleis knownaboutthis periodin Deng's life. The best sourceis Lin QingshansFengyun
shinian yu Deng Xiaoping, neibu. Also see the reminiscencesof Deng's daughterMaoMao
(DengRong),"Myfather'sdaysin Jiangxi,"Beijing Review, No. 36 (3 September1984),pp.
17-18. Like Liu Shaoqi,Deng andhis wife ZhuoLin wereevacuatedfromBeijing(where
theyhadbeenunderhousearrestfor the previoustwo years)underLin Biao's OrderNo. 1.
They spentthe next threeyearsin a formerinfantryacademyturnedMay SeventhCadre
School in XinjiancountynearNanchang.Deng workedin a tractorfactoryunderarmed
guard.Deng andhis wife werepermittedto maintaina gardenandraisechickens,in which
theyinvestedmuchtime.Accordingto his daughter'saccount,Deng readbookson Marxist
theoryand Chinesehistorylate into the night. This accountinformsmany of the other
secondarybiographies.See, for example,Han Shanbi,Deng Xiaoping pingzhuan, ch. 16.
24. LinQingshan,ibid. p. 267. Thefirstlettercornmented on therelationshipbetweenthe
Partyandthe masses;in the secondDeng admittedthathe hadmademistakesbutremained
loyal to "MaoZedongThought."Thisbroughthimreinstatement. Similarly,in March1977
Deng wroteto HuaGuofengpledginghis allegianceandadmittingpastmistakes.
25. Forfurtheron the rehabilitationprocessat this time see EarlAnthonyWayne,"The
politicsof restaffingChina'sprovinces,"Contemporary China (Spring1978),pp. 11S165;
andJurgenDomes,China After the Cultural Revolution (Berkeley:Universityof California
Press, 1977).
FourthNationalPeople's Congressin January1975; Deng draftedthe

speech and craftedthe programme.Fittingly,it was Deng who read the
eulogy at Zhou'smemorialserviceon 15 January1976. In a macabreturn
of Politburopolitics Deng's orationwas to spell his own politicaldeath
and would be his last public appearanceuntil 1977. Within six weeks
Zhou's arrangements for the successionwere overturnedby the Gangof
Four (with Mao's acquiesence)and Deng was purgedfor the thirdtime
l1S career.
. .
Mao's supportwas thus crucialto Deng's careerduringthe 1950s and

early 1960s, althoughit seems that the Chairmanhad misgivings about
Deng during the commune movement of 1958 and again during the
SocialistEducationMovementin 1964.26However,it was Deng's power
base in the Secretariat,and the policy programmeto emerge from that
body duringthe early 1960s, that gave the Chairmanprimarycause for
concern.As early as November1956 Mao beganto take note of Deng's
dominanceof the Secretariat,referringto it as his "nest."27As the
alarmingreportsof faminein the countrysidebeganto reachthe leader-
ship in early 1960 Deng audaciouslybeganto distancehimselffromMao
and the GreatLeap (which he had earliersupported)by giving several
speeches aroundthe countryto criticize "problemsin Mao's thinking"
(Mao Zedongsixiang de wenti).28When Mao withdrewto the "second
line" after 1960 the Secretariatunder Deng became a key locus of
decision-makingand targetof the Chairman'sire. Mao reportedlychas-
tised Deng in 1964 for not keeping him informedof state policy and
buildingan "independent kingdom"(duliwangguo)in the PartySecretar-
iat.29Mao was particularlyupset with the "60 Articles on Promoting
HigherEducation,"which Deng had takenchargeof draftingbut appar-
ently had not shown to him. "Who was the emperormaking such a
decision?"queriedthe Chairman.30 It is not surprisingthat those who
worked closely with Deng on the Secretariatbecame early targets of
Mao's CulturalRevolution purges and the institutionitself was dis-
banded.
Mao clearly had serious ideological differenceswith Deng and other
Politburomembersduringthis time as he perceivedthemto be instituting
revisionistcapitalistrestorationin severalpolicy spheres(particularlyin
ruralpolicy and education)underthe guise of economic recoveryfrom
the Great Leap.31Deng was singled out by Mao during the Cultural
26. Dengs oppositionto the pace of communizationat this time is notedin ZhongHao,
Deng Xiaopingde lilunyu shixian,1938-1965, pp. 4244.
27. Mao Zedong,'4Speechat the SecondPlenumof the EighthCentralCommittee,"in
JohnK. Leungand MichaelY. M. Kau (eds.), The Writingsof Mao Zedong,1949-1976:
VolumeII (Armonk,NY: M. E. Sharpe,1992), p. 169.
28. ZhongHao, Deng Xiaopingde lilunyu shixian,p. 83.
29. "ThemajoraccusationsagainstDengXiaoping,"Ba-er-wuzhanbao(August25 Battle
Report),14 February1967, Selectionsfrom ChinaMainlandMagazines,No. 574 (1 May
1967),p. 15.
30. Ibid.
31. It was duringa series of Politburomeetingsin December196VJanuary1965 on
managementof the SocialistEducationMovementthat Mao's distrustof Deng and Liu
Revolutionas the "number2 person in authoritytaking the capitalist

road,"andencounteredthe Chairman'swrathagainin 1976, whenhe was
purgedfollowing the TiananmenIncident.32
But in the pre-1949periodandthroughoutthe l950s Mao was primar-
ily responsiblefor Deng's rapidrise throughthe higherPartyranks.In
1954 when NikitaKhrushchevvisited Beijing Mao pointedto Deng and
said: "See that little man there?He is highly intelligentand has a great
futureaheadof him."33 Coincidentallyit was Deng whomMao dispatched
to the Soviet 20th PartyCongressin 1956, only to hear Khrushchev's
tiradeagainstStalin.Mao subsequentlycalled uponDeng to help manage
Sino-Sovietrelationsduringthe disagreementsof 1960-63.34Mao also
entrustedDeng with administeringthe Anti-Rightistcampaignin 1957
(for which Deng never showed contrition).
Liu Shaoqi. Deng's ties to Liu Shaoqi were never as close as it has
been assumedfromtheircommonfate in 1967. They were morecontem-
porariesthan in a hierarchicalpatron-clientrelationship,althoughthey
worked in a mutually supportivefashion. Deng's opposition to Gao
Gang's power play to usurpLiu's position as Party Vice-Chairmanin
1953 was importantin foiling the plot, and it was Deng who issued the
full indictmenton the "Gao Gang-RaoShushi anti-Partyclique"at the
March 1955 NationalPartyConference.Liu and Deng togetherdrafted
and deliveredtwo of the key speeches at the 1956 Eighth PartyCon-
gress.35They also collaboratedin 1961-62 to "reversethe verdicts"on
improperly-labelled rightistsin the Partyand to acceleratetheirrehabili-
tation,36and worked closely during the 1962-65 period on Party
rectification,ruralpolicy, educationalreform,and generallyformulating
the post-GreatLeaprecoveryprogramme.It was largelyfor this collabo-
footzlotecontinued
Shaoqicrystallized.For analysisof this periodsee the discussionin FrederickC. Teiwes,
PoliticsandPurgesin China(Armonk,NY:M. E. Sharpe,1979),ch. l l; andRichardBaum,
Preludeto Revolution:Mao, the Party,and the Peasant Question(New York:Columbia
UniversityPress, 1975).
32. Despitethe fact thatMao was largelyincapacitatedat this time, havingreportedly
sufferedtwo strokesandtheeffectsof Parkinson'sdisease,knowledgeablesourcesclaimthat
he approvedthe Gangof Four'sinitiativeto removeDeng frompower.
33. Strobe Talbott(trans.and ed.), KhrushchevRemembers(Boston: Little, Brown,
1974),pp. 252-53.
34. See Michael Yahuda'scontributionin this volume; and Steven M. Goldstein,
"Nationalismand internationalism: Sino-Sovietrelations,"in ThomasW. Robinsonand
David Shambaugh(eds.), ChineseForeignPolicy: Theoryand Practice (Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress, 1993),pp. 22>265.
35. Deng deliveredthe "Reporton Revision of the PartyConstitution"and Liu the
"PoliticalReportof the CentralCommittee,"andtogetherthey took chargeof the drafting
of thesekey documents.See EditingGroup,MianhuaiLiu Shaoqi(Cherishthe Memoryof
Liu Shaoqi)(Beijing:Zhongyangwenzhaichubanshe,1988),p. 12.
36. At the time Deng believedthatthe purgeof non-Partyintellectualsandsoldierswas
warranted, but in the 1980s confessedthatthe scope of the movementhadbeen too broad
althoughhe refusedto repudiatethecampaignitself.See ';Talkwithsomeleadingcomrades
of the CentralCommittee,19 March1980,"SelectedWorks,p. 279.
ration that they drew Mao's wrath during the CulturalRevolution,

althoughtheir joint "mismanagement" of the work teams in the early
phase of the CulturalRevolutionalso contnbutedto theirdownfall.
None the less, Liu Shaoqi's and Deng's collaborationwas more by
virtueof positionandproximitythanpatronage.Theyhadcomplementary
expertise,as Liu was more the theonst and Deng the organizationman,
but their relationshipwas never as conspiratonalas the Red Guard
matenalssuggest.
Peng Zhen. In contrast,Deng and Peng Zhen had a longer and closer
relationship.They workedclosely togetheron the Secretanatduringthe
mid-1950s.Peng was appointedDeng's second in commandat the First
Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress, and they were the only two
Politburomembersservingon the Secretanatat the time.Deng frequently
dischargedimportantresponsibilitiesto Peng,particularlyin the legal and
public secunty spheres.37They made inspectiontours together,38were
bndge partnersand their families were close fnends.39Togetherwith
Kang Sheng, Deng and Peng were centrallyinvolved in managingthe
detenoratingrelationshipwith the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and
early 1960s.4?
Deng's relationshipwith Peng apparentlycame understrainin 1964
dunng the Four Clean-upscampaignwhen work teams dispatchedto
Beijing Universityby Liu Shaoqiattackedthe universityPartysecretary
Lu Ping, a close ally of Peng Zhen. This situationbnefly pitted Liu
againstPeng, with Deng siding with Liu, but earnedPeng the supportof
Mao who was increasinglydissatisfiedwith Liu andDeng. Liu, Deng and
Peng soon found themselves allied again in 1965-66 over the Luo
Ruiqingaffair.Togetherthey tned (unsuccessfully)to defendLuo against
the Chairmanand Lin Biao dunng a senes of Central Committee
"workinggroup"sessions in March1966. WhenPeng Zhen came under
attackand becamethe firstmajorcasualtyof the CulturalRevolutionin
Apnl-May 1966, Deng abandonedhis old ally. He joined in cnticizing
the "FebruaryOutlineReport"(a documentlargelydraftedby Peng but
disseminatedwith Deng's explicitapproval)andpresidedover the crucial
9-12 Apnl 1966 Secretanatmeetingthat accusedPeng and opened the
way to his subsequentpurge. Liu Shaoqi did not attendthis decisive
meeting(as he was in Burmaon a statevisit), butDeng votedwith others
37. PengZhenwas put in chargeof overseeingthe su-fancampaignandpublicsecurity

policy more generally.See Peng Zhen wenxuan(Peng Zhen's Selected Works)(Beijing:
Renminchubanshe,1991), pp. 240-317. Also see FrederickC. Teiwes, "Mao and his
lieutenants,"TheAustralianJournalof ChineseAffairs,No. 19/20 (1988), pp. 68-69.
38. ForexampleDeng andPengmadefive inspectionstogetherin Hebeiprovinceduring
AprilandMay 1960,in orderto ascertainthe seriousnessof the situationin the countryside
in the aftermathof the GreatLeap. See ChenXuewei, Lishi de qishi- shinianjiansheshi
yanjiu (HistoricalRevelations-Researchon Ten Years(1957-1966) of HistoricalCon-
struction)(Beijing:Qiushichubanshe,1989),p. 132.
39. "DragoutDengXiaopingfromtheblackdenas a warningto others,"XinBeida(New
Beida),25 February1967,Surveyof MainlandChinaMagazines,No. 177 (19 April 1967),
p. 4.
40. See Goldstein,"Nationalismandinternationalism."
in favourof criticizingPeng for "opposingChairmanMao"and dissolv-

ing Peng's initial five-man "CulturalRevolution Group."Thus Deng
abandonedPeng at the time of his greatestneed, althoughgiven the tenor
of the times it would have been most difficultto do otherwise.Deng
atonedby helpingto rehabilitatePeng in 1979.
Once back in power Deng drew importantsupportfrom Peng Zhen.
Peng backedDeng's bid to oust Hua Guofengand promoteHu Yaobang
and Zhao Ziyang and proved a crucial supporterof Deng's reform
programmevia his positionas Chairmanof the NationalPeople's Con-
gress (an appointmentthatDeng also arranged).Duringthe decadeDeng
also entrustedoversightof the legal andpublicsecuritysystemsto Peng,
at least untilPeng's protegeQiao Shi took controlof these spheresin the
late 1980s. Peng Zhen was also one of the key Partyelders to support
Deng's proposalfor martiallaw and the crackdownin June 1989.
Peng Dehuai. Deng's relationshipwith Peng Dehuai was a largely

professionalone confined to militaryaffairs. Their contact during the
revolutionarywar was limited to the 1930 ChangshaUprising and
"HundredRegimentscampaign"in 1940.41DuringDeng's time as Vice-
Chairmanof the CentralMilitaryCommissionfrom 1954 to 1966, Deng
and Peng Dehuai workedtogetheruntil Peng's purge in 1959. In fact,
Deng absentedhimselffromthe LushanConferencein 1959 wherePeng
Dehuai confrontedMao,42apparentlybecause he had broken his leg
playingbilliards.43
Deng maintaineda low profilethroughoutthe year,but
his public appearancesbegan to pick up again with the NationalLitera-
tureandArtWorkConferencein December1959. No doubtDeng shared
many of Peng Dehuai's views on the catastropheof the Great Leap,
althoughhe was not presentto witnessthe MaPeng clash.44Comment-
ing in 1980 on the LushanPlenumDeng assertedthat "ComradePeng's
views were correct"and "the way his case was handled was totally
wrong.
Chen Yun. Deng and Chen Yun have had a long and ambiguous
relationship.Both abhorredthe Maoist approachto economic develop-
mentwithits voluntaristemphasison moralincentivesandthe "big-push"
41. See Peng Dehuai, Memoirsof a ChineseMarshal(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,

1984), pp. 43y1 147.
42. See Jiang Huaxuan et al., Zhongguogongshangdanghuiyi zhaiyao (Shenyang
chubanshe, 1991); and Kenneth Lieberthal and Bruce Dickson, A ResearchGuideto Central
Partyand Government Meetingsin China,1949-1986 (Annonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989).
Hamson Salisbury claims that Mao ordered Deng to remain in Beijing to run the government
during Lushan, but then changed his mind and required Deng to attend. Salisbury, TheLast
Emperors,p. 176. This is not corroboratedby other sources, including Li Rui's account. See
Li Rui, Lushanhuiyishilu (Henan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1988), p. 26.
43. Interview with Li Rui, 2 June 1993.
44. A Hong Kong biography of Deng asserts that Deng knew in advance of Peng's plans,
as Peng had informed Huang Kecheng of his intention during June 1959 and Huang had told
Deng. See Han Shanbi, Deng Xiaopingpingzhuan,Vol. 2, pp. 11F15.
45. Deng Xiaoping, "Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, 1 April
1980," SelectedWorks,p. 280.
strategy,insteadgenerallyfavouringmaterialincentivesand incremental
development.Yet they have held different views on the pace and
modalityof economicreform.Theirdifferenceswere apparentduringthe
post-Leaprecovery,46 but becameparticularlymanifestin the mid to late
1980s when Chen Yun's moderateeconomicreformprogrammedid not
embracethe bolder proposalsof Deng, Zhao Ziyang and the economic
think tanks and advisersto Zhao.47While it is importantto recall that
Chen supportedDeng's reformpush duringthe early 1980s, he headeda
faction within the leadershipthat increasinglysoughtto blunt the more
radicalreformsof 198S88 and 1992-93. Afterthe deathof Ye Jianying
and the illness of Li Xiannianin the late 1980s, Chen Yun was the only
leader of enough statureto challenge Deng and the two increasingly
becamerivals in their later years.
YangShangkun.Anotherseniorleaderwith whom Deng was particu-

larly close was Yang Shangkun-at least until 1992-93 when Deng
forced Yang to relinquishthe state presidencyand all militaryposts.
Deng and Yang first met in 1932 in Ruijin, the capital of the Jiangxi
soviet, and thereaftertheir careersclosely paralleledone another.Both
are Sichuannatives;both studiedin Moscow (althoughDeng preceded
Yang by a year);both served as politicalcommissarsin the Red Army
duringthe Long March;both workedtogetheron the CentralCommittee
Secretariatduringthe 1950s (Yangwas one of Deng's key deputies);both
were purgedin the early stages of the CulturalRevolution;and the two
men have been bridge partnersfor many years. One of Yang's sons
reportedlymarriedone of Deng's daughters.
In 1979, with Ye Jianying'sbacking,Deng was responsiblefor Yang's
rehabilitationand reinstatementto leadingpositions.Yang becamea key
ally of Deng's throughoutthe 1980s. They served as the two senior
rankingmemberson the CentralMilitaryCommission(CMC) and to-
gether oversaw the restructuringof the PLA duringthe decade. With
Deng's support,Yang succeededLi Xiannianas Presidentof the republic.
The Deng-Yang combinationwas particularlyvital in mobilizing the
militaryto suppressthe Tiananmendemonstrations in 1989. Yang played
a centralpartin overcomingoppositionfrom otherretiredgeneralsand
senior commanders48 and managingthe logistical aspects of the crack-
down.
Yang andhis youngerhalf-brotherYangBaibingsubsequentlycapital-
ized on the Beijing massacreto build their own personalnetworkof
supportin the armedforces. Yang Baibingoversawthe "cleansingof the
46. See DavidBachman,ChenYunand the ChinesePoliticalSystem(Berkeley:Institute

of East Asian Studies,China ResearchMonographNo. 29, 1985); Nicholas Lardyand
KennethLieberthal(eds.), Chen Yun'sStrategyfor China'sDevelopment:A Non-Maoist
Alternative(Armonk,NY: M. E. Sharpe,1983).
47. For a comparisonand analysis of these differencessee HarryHarding,China's
SecondRevolution:ReformAfterMao (Washington,D. C.: Brookings,1987), particularly
chs. 4-5.
48. See the 21 May 1989 letter addressedto Deng and the CMC and signed by Nie
Rongzhen,Xu Xiangqian,ZhangAiping, Ye Fei, Chen Zaidao,Yang Dezhi and others.
ranks,"court martialsand intense indoctrinationcampaignfollowing 4

June.49In the process,he movedmanycommandersand commissarsinto
key centralandregionalmilitarypositions.YangBaibingwas reportedto
have convenedseveral secret meetingsof loyal commandersduringthe
summerof 1992 to plan for the aftermathof Deng's death, including
(accordingto Hong Kong sources)a plot to "reversethe verdict"on the
Tiananmenmassacreby blamingit on Deng (which,of course,wouldbe
a correctinterpretation).Sensinga powerplay, at the 14thPartyCongress
in October1992 Deng strippedboth Yangs of all theirpositionson the
CMCand at the EighthNationalPeople's Congressin March1993 Yang
Shangkunwas relievedof his post as statePresident.Thus,Deng turned
on his old comradewhen he sensedthatYang Shangkunwas attempting
to build a rival base of power in orderto positionhimself to emergeas
paramountleaderin the post-Dengera. By strippingthe Yangs of their
commandsand power, Deng played to a powerfulconstituencyamong
militarymodernizersin the PLA, centredaroundGeneralsZhangAiping,
ZhangZhen and Yang Dezhi, and AdmiralLiu Huaqing.Yet it remains
to be seen whetherthe purge of the Yangs will be effective, as Yang
Shangkuncontrolsa powerfulpatronagenetworkin the armedforces-
and the Army will prove centralin the successionstruggleafterDeng.5?
TaoZhu.Anotherelite with whomDeng maintainedclose ties was Tao

Zhu. They maintainedgood working relations during the 1950s and
1960s when Deng ranthe SecretariatandTao Zhu was GuangdongParty
chief. During this time Deng also became well acquaintedwith Tao's
deputyZhaoZiyang,andhe put him in chargeof the provincewhenTao
Zhu was promotedto the Centrein 1965.5'
ZhaoZiyang.Deng turnedto ZhaoZiyangas Partyleaderfollowinghis

ouster of Hu Yaobangin 1987, but their relationshipgoes back much
earlier;in fact some circumstantialevidence dates it from the 1940s.52
Deng supportedZhao during the 1960s and has cultivatedhim as a
potentialsuccessorat least since 1974 when he arrangedZhao's transfer
fromGuangdongto Sichuanas provincialPartychief. Zhaoused Sichuan
as a laboratoryto experimentwith hereticalagriculturaland industrial
reformpolicies. Some- such as the "threefreedoms,one contract"(sanzi
yibao) agriculturalresponsibilitysystem-had been favouredby both
49. For an analysisof YangBaibing'spost-Tiananmen manoeuvringssee DavidSham-

baugh,"The soldierand the state in China,"The China Quarterly,No. 127 (September
1991), pp. 527-568.
50. For an analysisof the post-14thPartyCongresspoliticalequationandthe impactof
the Yangs'purge,see David Shambaugh,"Losingcontrol:the erosionof stateauthorityin
China,"CurrentHistory(September1993),pp. 252-58.
51. For discussionof Deng's andZhao'srelationshipsee Shambaugh,TheMakingof a
Premier,pp. 105-106, 118, 122.SomesourcesindicatethatDeng was responsiblefor Tao's
elevationto the Centrein orderto facilitateZhao's promotion.See Han Shanbi,Deng
Xiaopingzhuan,Vol. II, pp. 25S57; and'sDragoutDengXiaopingfromtheblackden,"pp.
5-7.
52. Zhao Wei, Zhao Ziyangzhuan(Biographyof Zhao Ziyang)(Hong Kong:Wenhua
jiaoyu chubanshe,1988),ch. 4.
Deng andZhaoduringthe early 1960s,but others- particularlyindustrial

incentivesystems- were new. Deng gave Zhao permissionand political
protectionto experimentboldly at a time when neo-Maoistpolicies were
still in vogue in Beijing. During Zhao's tenure in Sichuan Deng fre-
quently visited to monitor the reforms and consult him.53Zhao's
"productionfirst"policies paralleledDeng's laissez-faire economicphi-
losophy.The reformswere so successfulthey were dubbed"theSichuan
miracle"54 and helped propel Zhao Ziyang to nationalprominenceand
appointmentas Vice-Premierin 1979. This promotioncould not have
occurredwithoutDeng's backing,althoughthe successof Zhao'sSichuan
policies helpedovercomeany resistance.A year laterZhaoreplacedHua
Guofengas Premierof the State Council.
With this appointmentit became clear that Zhao was one of Deng's
two hand-pickedsuccessors.Deng's patronageof Zhaolasteduntil 1989
when the two clashedover the implementationof martiallaw. Zhao also
made the tactical mistake of criticizingDeng in a public session with
MikhailGorbachev,claiming that a secret Politburoruling referredall
majordecisionsto Deng - thus in effect passingthe blamefor economic
overheatingto his mentor.Zhaoalso opposedthe harsh26 Aprileditorial
that condemnedthe studentdemonstrationsas "unpatriotic," which was
specificallyorderedandapprovedby Deng.55Zhao' s real though,
mistake,
was to have been in power when open demands for democracy were
made.
This is where Deng consistentlydrew the line throughouthis career.
With the exception of the 1978 DemocracyWall Movementwhen it
temporarilyserved his political objectives, Deng never toleratedopen
advocacyof politicalliberalism,democracyor criticismof CCPpolitical
hegemony.Thus,for the secondtime in as manyyearsDeng abortedhis
well-laidsuccessionplansand sackedZhao.Havingdone so, however,it
is clear that Deng went to greatlengthsto protectZhao from hardliners
in the leadershipwho wished to punishhim more severely.
Hu Yaobang.Deng's other hand-pickedsuccessor,Hu Yaobang,fell

from power in early 1987 following the pro-democracystudentdemon-
strations in December 1986. Deng had groomed Hu Yaobang
considerablylonger than Zhao Ziyang. Their relationshipdated from
1937 whenbothwere affiliatedwith the ResistanceUniversity(Kang Da)
in Yan'an- Hu as a student and Deng as a young lecturer.56This
teacher-student/patronslient relationshipendureduntil 1987, and even
thenDeng ensuredthatHu Yaobang'spoliticalcareerwas not terminated
by permittinghim to retainhis Politburostatus.It was unusualin Chinese
53. Shambaugh,TheMakingof a Premier,ch. 6.

54. See "ZhaoZiyang's 'SichuanExperience':blueprintfor a nation,"ChineseLaw &
Government(Spring1982).
55. See "Themakingof thebig lie:contentandprocessin theChinesepropagandasystem
during1989,"ChineseLaw & Government(Spring1992), pp. 31-37.
56. See Yang Zhongmei,Hu Yaobang:A ChineseBiography(Armonk,NY: M. E.
Sharpe,1988), p. 113.
Communist history for a purge not to consign an individual to political

oblivion.57
Deng's and Hu's careers intersected at several points after Yan'an. Hu
served with Deng as political commissar in the Second Field Army that
"liberated" south-western China. In fact, Hu Yaobang was personally
responsible for northern Sichuan and oversaw the conquest of Deng's
native village of Guang'an. Hu subsequently served in Sichuan under
Deng's and Liu Bocheng's command until 1952 when he and Deng were
transferredto Beijing at the same time.58Hu went on to a lengthy career
as head of the Communist Youth League before being purged in 1967.
Perhaps coincidentally, perhaps not, Deng and Hu were both rehabilitated
in March 1973. As Deng set about structuringthe "Four Modernizations"
programme in 1975, he called upon Hu Yaobang to reconstitute the
Academy of Sciences. Hu's September 1975 "Summary Report" on the
Academy was the basis for the subsequent rehabilitation of thousands of
researchers purged during previous campaigns and the assertion of
"expertise" over "redness." A close working alliance for reform was
forged. They shared a common purpose of rolling back the Cultural
Revolution. Unfortunately, their work was abruptly interruptedby Zhou
Enlai's death and Deng's subsequent dismissal. With Deng's return in
1977 Hu stood ready to assist him, and a decade-long partnershipensued.
Patrons,clients, colleagues and enemies.Thus, throughout his career

Deng had two principal patrons- Mao and Zhou, with Mao by far the
more longstanding and important one. Liu Bocheng also served as a
patron of sorts during the civil war, which was important to Deng's
cultivation of a career and power base in the armed forces.
Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, Peng Dehuai and Chen Yun
must all be considered close colleagues of Deng's, though without the
attributes of patronage. Later in their careers Chen Yun turned from
colleague to competitor, but in retrospect their disagreements were more
a matter of degree than substance. Similarly Deng's long-time ally Yang
Shangkun also turned into a competitor of sorts, although much of the
overt scheming against Deng must be credited to his half-brother Yang
Baibing.
Throughout Deng's long career he also worked closely with numerous
other central, provincial and military leaders. His position as Secretary-
General of the Central Secretariat(and later General Secretary) during the
1950s and 1960s, and his position in the State Council and on the PLA
General Staff and Central Military Commission during the 1970s and
1980s brought him into contact with virtually all senior state and Party
leaders, provincial and military officials.
It is interesting to note that Deng had few real enemies during his
57. There are a few precedents for purged leaders retaining their Central Committee seats
(e.g. Wang Ming, Peng Dehuai and Hua Guofeng), but only in pro forma fashion.
58. It is possible that Deng brought Hu to Zhou Enlai's attention at the time and arranged
for his transfer to the capital.
career.This is not to say thathe was not ruthless,as he did purgemany

and was responsiblefor numerousruinedcareersfrom the 1942 Yan'an
rectificationto the 14th Party Congress and Eighth National People's
Congress in 1992-93. But rivals, adversariesand enemies must be
distinguished.CertainlyDeng had manyadversarialrelationships,includ-
ing at times with Mao, Lin Biao and Hua Guofeng, and he even had
ratherformidabledisagreementswith Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang, Zhao
Ziyang, Li Peng and Jiang Zemin, but none can really be considereda
politicalenemy.Certainlynone approachedthe contempthe felt for Jiang
Qing and her erstwhileally ZhangChunqiao.
Deng's trueclientsin the Partywere Hu YaobangandZhaoZiyang.In
the militaryDeng had a broadnetworkof ties stemmingfromhis Second
Field Army connections.Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqingwere two of the
most prominent,apartfrom Yang Shangkun,as they protectedDeng in
internalexile in the southduring1975-77. JiangZemin,Li Tieying,Zhu
Rongji and Wang Zhaoguo must all be consideredlatter-dayclients.
Deng personallypromotedthem all. Indeed,individualssuch as Qiao Shi
and Li Ruihuancould not have risen to the top (nor could Li Peng have
stayedthere)withoutDeng's approval.But none of these was a client of
Deng's in a true sense of the term.He did not cultivatethem over time
and each owed as much, if not more, personalloyalty to other senior
elites. In a sense they all benefitedfromDeng's reformprogrammemore
thanfromDeng himself.Yet, as was the case underMao, it is difficultto
rise to the pinnacleof power withoutthe blessing of the patriarch.
Deng's Institutional Power Bases

Deng did not rule throughintimidationor coercion, terrorizingthe
populace with draconiansecurity services (the 1989 Beijing massacre
beingthe obviousexception).Nor did he lead the nationby greatpersonal
charisma,althoughhe certainlypossessed prestigeand commandedre-
spect. Nor did ideology serve as a tool of his leadership- his disdainfor
it was barely concealed.Deng's preferredmodus operandi was to ma-
noeuvrebehind the scenes but, having taken a decision, to implement
policy throughestablishedbureaucratic channels.In otherwords,he was
a backroompoliticianwho dependedon Partyinstitutionsand Leninist
norms to implementdecisions. This was true throughoutmost of his
career.
UnlikeMao, Deng was an organizationman.For most of his careerhe
worked in, and believed in working through,bureaucraticstructures.
Laterin life, however,like Mao, he becamefrustratedwith an organiza-
tional approachto rule and began to rely on the voluntaristimpulsesof
the citizenry.
In 1991-92 Deng experienced the frustrationsof being a retired
patriarch.He encounteredentrenchedbureaucraticinterestsand desig-
nated successorswho pursuedtheir own agendas.Unable to kick-start
economic reformthroughnormalbureaucraticchannels and seemingly
surroundedby disloyallieutenants,Deng adoptedthe Maoistapproachof
takinghis case straightto the people duringhis famous February1992

SouthernSojourn (nan xun). By bnnging pressure from below and
reinjectinghimself into the limelight, Deng trappedhis opponentsand
seized back the political initiative. This leap-froggingtechnique was
employedrepeatedlyby Mao in similarcircumstances.
Despite his preferencefor institutionalrule, like any leader Deng
exhibitedintoleranceof bureaucratic inertiaandincompetence.As Martin
KingWhytes contnbutionto this volumemakesclear,Deng championed
meritocracyand streamliningof bloatedbureaucracy.Deng's conceptof
"politicalreform"(zhengzhigaige) was really one of administrative
reform(xingzhenggaige). The devolutionof decision-makingpowerand
removal of the state and Party bureaucracyfrom guiding economic
activity was a centre-pieceof his reform package. Deng was very
supportiveof ZhaoZiyang's 1984 and 1988 overhaulof the StateCouncil
apparatus,as well as Zhu Rong.ii's1993 reforms.But it is importantto
keep in mind that these streamliningefforts were actually aimed at
strengtheningthe bureaucracy,thereby enhancing the party-state' s
capacities,ratherthan dismantlingthe Leninistapparat.
Since Deng believed in leadershipvia organization,it must also be
asked whetherhe used certainorganizationsto build a personalpower
base. Deng neverworkedin a functionalministerialsystemor in a mass
organizationlike the CommunistYouthLeague,but he did build power
bases in the PartySecretanatand PLA for lengthypenods.
To head the Secretariatwas an extraordinarily sensitiveand powerful
position.Informationis an importantsource of power in a bureaucratic
environment-and Deng had a near-monopolyon it. He had ultimate
control over the ten functionaldepartmentsof the CentralCommittee:
propaganda,organization,united front work, finance and economics,
industryandcommunications, ruralwork,foreigntrade,investigation(i.e.
intelligence),militaryaffairsand internationalliaison (externalCommu-
nist Party relations).This was a very powerfulcluster of institutions.
Deng had overall responsibility,assisted by the other membersof the
Secretariat59
andthe headof the staffoffice (YangShangkun).Thesewere
powerfulindividualsin their own nght as each was responsiblefor a
departmentand its constituentministerialsystem (xitong), and each
departmentfunctioned quite independently.60 Each member thereby
served as the "opening"(kou) in his assignedissue area to the Central
Committee,Politburoand its StandingCommittee.Still, from the Eighth
PartyCongressto the aftermathof the GreatLeap the Secretanatwas
pnmarily a body for policy lmplementation(not formulation)and
staffing. During these years (1956-62) its principalpurpose was to
process documentsand disseminatepolicy decisions taken by Mao, the
59. After the Secretariatwas reorganizedat the First Plenumof the EighthCentral
CommitteeandDengwas appointedGeneralSecretary,theothersecretarieswereas follows:
Peng Zhen, Wang Jiaxiang,Tan Zhenlin,Tan Zheng, HuangKecheng,Li Xuefeng, Li
Fuchun,Li Xiannian,Lu Dingyi, KangShengandLuo Ruiqing.Alternatesecretarieswere
Liu Lantao,Yang ShangkunandHu Qiaomu.
60. Interviewwith Li Rui of the CCPOrganization Department,2 June 1993.
Politburo,its StandingCommitteeor the entire CentralCommitteevia

these departments,andto monitorimplementation. The Secretariatliaised
in particularwith Partyauthoritiesand counterpartfunctionalorgansat
the provinciallevel. In fact, Deng probablydealtas muchwith provincial
Party secretariesas he did with other members of the Centralelite.
However,beforethe EighthPartyCongressand afterthe GreatLeap,the
Secretariatenjoyeda statusequalto the PolitburoStandingCommittee;it
was very much a policy-makingorgan.6'
In the wake of the GreatLeap debacle and Mao's "retirementto the
secondline"Deng beganto asserthimself as CCPGeneralSecretaryand
the powerof the Secretariatgrew significantly.Deng supervised,via the
Secretariat,the draftingof a comprehensivenationaldevelopmentpro-
gramme.62 These included the 60 Articles on People's Communes;70
Articleson Industry;14 Articles on Science; 35 Articles on Handicraft
Trades;Six Articleson Finance;EightArticleson Literatureand Art;60
Articleson HigherEducation;and 40 Articleson CommercialWork.
It is true that variousleaderswere involved in this process,but Deng
held the power of co-ordination.He took chargeof the 60 Articles on
HigherEducationhimselfandhada significantinputto the documentson
commerce,finance, science, industryand communes.Taken together,
these programmaticdocuments served as the basis not only for the
recoveryfrom the GreatLeap but, more importantly,the relativeexclu-
sion of Mao from the policy process.
Deng, Liu, Zhou, Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen, Li Fuchun,Li
Xiannian,Zhou Yang and Lu Dingyi collectively took control of the
Partyandgovernment.Deng's powerandprestigedefinitelygrew,butnot
disproportionate to others'.WithMao in the "secondline"the leadership
was remarkablycollectivist.Deng workedwell with his colleagues.
This is certainlynot the pictureof Deng's Secretariatportrayedby Red
Guardsduringthe CulturalRevolution.One diatribeclaimed:"Duringthe
period Deng Xiaoping was in charge of work at the Secretariatof the
CentralCommittee,he consistentlymonopolizedpower, made arbitrary
decisions, and met ChairmanMao on equal termswithoutceremony."63
As notedabove, Mao was particularlydistressedaboutDeng's education
programme.The 60 Articleson HigherEducationproposedthe restora-
tion of academicdegrees,titles, and salaries;the abolitionof "absolute
leadershipof the Party"(dang de juedui lingdao) over institutionsof
higherlearning;an end to class strugglein universities;and curtailment
of Mao's work-studyprogramme(shixi) for universityfaculty aIld stu-
dents. The Chairmanwas also angry with the draft 60 Articles on
People's Communeswhich sought to introducethe sanzi yibao ("three
61. I am indebtedto FredTeiwes on this point.

62. This discussiondrawsupon KennethLieberthal,"TheGreatLeapForwardand the
in RoderickMacFarquhar
splitin theYan'anleadership," andJohnKingFairbank(eds.),The
CambridgeHistoryof China,Vol. 14 (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1987),pp.
323-24.
63. "Ten majoraccusationsagainstDeng Xiaoping,"Ba-er-wuzhanbao,p. 15. This
documentis drawnfroma speechgiven by JiangQing.
freedoms,one contract")policy, changethe basic accountingunit to the

productionbrigade, and alter the size of communalmess halls. Mao
counteredwith the "FirstTen Points,"to which Deng and Liu Shaoqi
respondedwith the "SecondTen Points."
Indeed, the entire series of policy documentsdraftedunder Deng's
aegis eventuallydrewMao's ire duringthe CulturalRevolution.Mao was
troublednot only by the contentof the documents,but by the fact that
Deng, allegedly, did not consult him throughoutthe draftingprocess.64
Deng evidentlytook the Chairman's"retirement to the second line" too
seriously.
When Deng was returnedto power in the early 1970s he tended to
work throughthe State Council and its constituentministriesand com-
missions. As ranking"firstVice-Premier"he set aboutreorganizingthe
State Council and promulgatinga series of programmatic documentsto
guide nationalconstruction.In so doing he encounteredstiff resistance
from Jiang Qing and her minions.65
Deng also used his positions as chief of PLA General Staff and
Vice-Chairman of the CentralMilitaryCommissionto use these bodiesto
overturnLin Biao's influence in the military.Indeed, as June Teufel
Dreyer'scontributionillustrates,he hada strongconstituencyin the PLA.
This was basedon a networkof personalties growingout of the Second
complex.66
Field Army,as well as institutionallyin the military-industrial
After Deng outmanoeuvredHua Guofeng and became paramount
leader during the 1980s he came to rely more on individuals than
institutions.Duringthis time Deng tendedto rule in traditionalimperial
fashionby makingbroadpolicy pronouncements, monitoringthe overall
progressof policy, but restrictinghis interventionsto momentswhen his
policies or politicalallies were flagging.
Territorial Power Bases

WhileDeng hadbases of poweramongindividualsandinstitutions,he
did not possess a territorialpowerbase duringhis career.Of course,he
often makinginspectiontours
took greatinterestin his native Sichuan,67
of the province,andtogetherwith Liu Bochengruledthe south-westfrom
64. Deng refutesthis and statesthatpriorto the Beidaihemeetingof July-August1962

Mao expressedapprovalof these documents.Deng Xiaoping,"TaLkwith some leading
comradesof the CentralCommittee,1 April 1980,"SelectedWorks,pp. 28s81.
65. A detaileddescriptionof the Gangof Four'smanoeuvringandsabotageat this time
(albeita historicallyrevisionistand,in places,inaccurate,account)canbe foundin GaoGao
and Yan Jiaqi, "Wenhuada geming"shinian shi, 1966-76 (A Ten-YearHistoryof the
CulturalRevolution,1966-76) (Tianjin:Renminchubanshe,1986), ch. 8.
66. Also see the excellentstudyby MichaelSwaine,TheMilitaryand PoliticalSucces-
sion in China:Leadership,Institutions,Beliefs (SantaMonica,CA: RAND Corporation
ReportR-4254-AF,1992).
67. Deng did have close ties with Li Jingquan(who ruledSichuanpriorto the Cultural
RevolutionandheldPolitburostatus)andto some extentservedas Li's patronduringthese
years,butLi owedhis positionmoreto MarshalHe Long,underwhomhe servedin theFirst
Field Army.
1949 to 1952,68but it cannotreallybe said thatDeng derivedpowerfrom

this region.Similarly,whenhe was sent into internalexile in Guangdong
and Guangxifrom 1975 to 1977 he enjoyed the protectionof regional
militarybaronsXu ShiyouandWei Guoqing,as well as Ye Jianying,but
neverdevelopeda territorialbase of power.Deng's poweralwaysderived
from institutionsand personalitiesat the Centre.
Deng as ParamountLeader
Deng's positionas paramountleaderneverrivalledMao's. Deng never
soughtthe absoluteauthoritythatMao possessedand wielded,as he was
convinced that Mao's dictatorialstyle and cult of personality(geren
chongbai) were the principal reasons China endured economic and
political crisis for much of the period after 1957. "Generallyspeaking,
ComradeMao Zedong'sleadershipwas correctbefore 1957, but he made
moreandmoremistakesafterthe anti-rightiststruggleof thatyear,"Deng
opined in 1980.69Much of Mao's workstyletroubledDeng deeply, and
upon ousting Hua Guofeng and becoming China's paramountleader
himself in 1982 he was committedto rulingdifferently.
The majordifferencebetweenMao andDeng as paramountleaderwas
the mannerin which they dealt with other leaders and subordinates.
Deng's style was far more consensus-oriented and decisionswere taken
more collectively. This is partly because Deng tended to approach
problemsmethodicallyand delved more deeply into the specifics of a
case (induction),whereasMao often soughtto formpolicy fromideolog-
ical doctrinein an arbitraryand dialecticalfashion (deduction)."Seek
truthfrom facts,"was Deng's watchword.Anotherreasonis that Deng
was not afraidto delegateauthority;thatis whathe had done throughout
his career.Deng himself reflectedon how he ran the Secretariatfrom
1956 to 1966, in a speech to the Fifth Plenum of the 11th Central
Committeein 1980 (which resurrectedthe Secretariat):"I thinkit is fair
to say that the formerSecretariatof the CentralCommitteewas quite
efficient,partlybecauseonce the relevantdecisions were made, specific
tasks were assignedto particularpersons,who were given broadpowers
and allowedto handlemattersindependently."70 Mao, on the otherhand,
avoideddelegatingauthontyand alwayssoughtto retainkey decisionsin
his own hands.71 To some extentDeng soughtto makethe key decisions-
68. For an excellent study of the south-west during this period see Dorothy J. Solinger,
RegionalGovernment
and PoliticalIntegrationin SouthwestChina,1949-1954 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1977).
69. Deng Xiaoping, "Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, 1 April
1980," SelectedWorks,p. 280.
70. Deng Xiaoping, "Adhere to the Party line and improve methods of work," Selected
Works,p. 267.
71. See the description of this trait in Michel Oksenberg, "The political leader," in
Wilson, Mao Tse-tungin the Scales of History,pp. 95-98.
particularlyon foreignpolicy- but, on the whole, he broadlydelegated

authority.72
Nor did Deng fostertensionsamongsubordinatesto test theirloyalties
as did Mao, and while Deng had to removetwo groomedsuccessorshe
did not haveto fearthatHu Yaobangor ZhaoZiyangweretryingto usurp
his own power.73 Deng knew who his enemieswere andwho opposedhis
policies, and he manoeuvredeffectively to isolate and then overcome
them.Deng's manoeuvnngagainstHua Guofeng,the "whateverists" and
"SmallGangof Four"between 1977 and 1983 illustratedhis methodical
mannerof overwhelmingopposition.Sometimesmore concertedaction
was calledfor, as in the cases of Hu YaobangandZhaoZiyang.No doubt
Deng fully concurredwith Ye Jianying'sforthrighthandlingof the arrest
of the Gang of Four,as he despisedthe Gang.74
Thus, Deng learnedmuch from Mao by negative example.Until his
"retirement" in 1990 Deng remainedengaged, whereasMao was more
detachedand withdrawnfrom active participationin decision-making.
Deng regularlyreadandcommentedon documentsandmet Partyleaders
(Maodid as well, butto a lesserextent).Deng insistedon beinginformed,
sought and listened to conflicting opinions, and pressed briefers on
details. In contrast,Mao's subordinatesoften remainedsilent in the
Chairman'spresencefor fear of the consequencesof speakingout. Deng
insistedon precisionand substancefrom his advisers,and Deng himself
was not one to waste words.75Mao stoppedattendingregularPolitburo
meetingsafter 1959,76while Deng attendedon occasioneven into retire-
ment. The Politburo and its Standing Committee were important
institutionsof rule to Deng, whereasMao held disdainfor them, consid-
ering them to be packed with enemies. Deng tried to ensure that they
containedhis allies. The CentralMilitaryCommissionwas also of great
importanceto Deng. He retainedthe chairmanshipof the CMC until
1989, having servedas a membersince 1954.
Therewas, therefore,a certaincollegiality,decisivenessandactiveness
72. ZhaoZiyang'sstatementto Gorbachevthatall majordecisionswerereferredto Deng

may have been correct,but thatdoes not meanthatDeng actuallymadethe decisions.
73. Again,see Oksenberg'sdiscussionof this propensityof Mao's,n. 71. In 1992 Deng
reflectedon the reasonsforhavingto sackHu YaobangandZhaoZiyang,"Twomenfailed,
andthey failednot becauseof problemsin the economybutbecausethey stumbledon the
issue of opposingbourgeoisliberalization."
CCPCentralCommitteeCircularon Transmit-
tingandStudyingComradeDengXiaoping'slmportantRemarks(CentralDocumentNo. 2,
1992),ForeignBroadcastInformation Service,DailyReport- China:Supplement (hereafter
FBIS-CHI),1 April 1992, p. 6.
74. Foran intriguinginsider'saccountof Ye's arrestof the Gangof Foursee FanShuo,
Ye Jianyingzai 1976 (Ye Jianyingin 1976) (Beijing:Zhonggongzhongyangdangxiao
chubanshe,1990).
75. HereDengandMaoarenotdissimilar.Reflectingin 1992,Dengsaid:"Whenyou turn
on the television,the programmesare full of meetings.Thereare too manymeetings,too
many long articles,and too many long speeches.... We should speak less and do more.
Chairman Maodidnotlike to holdlongmeetings,his articleswereconcise,andhis speeches
wereto the point.ChairmanMao [once]instructedme to draftPremierZhou'sreportto the
FourthNationalPeople'sCongress.He set a wordlimitat under5,000. I didit, 5,000 words.
Was thatnot useful?"FBIS-CHI,1 April 1992, p. 6.
76. Interviewwith CCPhistorianLiao Gailong,25 June 1991, Beijing.
in Deng's workstylethat was absentin Mao's. Deng sought consensus

when possible and was certainlymoretolerantof dissentingopinions.In
generalDeng purgedbutprotectedhis men;Mao attackedthem.This was
one of Deng's most endunnglessons from the CulturalRevolution.No
colleagueof Deng's met the fate thatbefell Gao Gang,Peng Dehuai,Luo
Ruiqing,Tao Zhu or Liu Shaoqi.Therewas an intoleranceof opposition
in Mao thatDeng did not share.77 WhenDeng toppledHuaGuofeng,Hua
was not pilloried in the press and there was no nationalcampaignof
criticism.When Hu Yaobangfell from power Deng insisted that he be
permittedto retain his Politburo seat and voting rlghts. After Zhao
Ziyang's fall Deng intervenedto protecthim from the hardlinerswho
soughtstiff punishment,andensuredthatZhaowas not expelledfromthe
Party.Indeed,Deng stoodbehindZhaoat severalcriticaljuncturesduring
1987-89 when Zhao and the radical reform programmecame under
attackfrom conservatives.
There were furtherdifferencesbetween Mao and Deng. Mao never
travelledabroad(except the two tripsto the Soviet Union);Deng did so
morefrequently.Deng enjoyedtalkingto the foreignpress;Mao did not.
Mao madeno effortto learna foreignlanguage;Deng knew Frenchand
apparentlyspentmany years tryingto learnEnglish.Deng also received
manymoreforeignvisitorsin Beijing.Deng had a far bettergraspof the
intricaciesof world affairs and was much more tolerantof a foreign
presencein China.Mao was suspiciousof the West;Deng held a certain
envy of it. Deng was no less nationalisticthan Mao, as both were
socializedwith similarviews of the needfor a stronganddignifiedChina,
but Deng soughtthe West as an ally in this quest while Mao was more
distrustful.
In theirpersonallives, Mao sought the symbolictrappingsof power;
Deng lived more frugally.Mao lived in the Zhongnanhai;Deng moved
out. Abuse of official privilegewas of concernto both Mao and Deng,78
but it must be said that Deng tolerateddegreesof corruptionunimagin-
able dunng the Maoist era. Deng abhorredthe Maoist personalitycult
(geren chongbai) and was determinednot to start one of his own
(althoughhe assentedto the publicationof his own Selected Worksand
those of Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi,Zhu De, Chen Yun and Peng Zhen as
well).79Mao kept concubinesand ceased living with Jiang Qing in the
l950s, while Deng trulyenjoyedfamilylife with his numerousgrandchil-
dren.Deng played bridgeand fraternizedwith his colleagues;Mao was
a loner.Both enjoyedreading,and apparentlyboth were devoteesof the
Shi Ji (Recordsof the Historian)and other classical Chinese writings.
77. Deng's philosophyof dealingwithoppositionandcriticismis evidentin "Strengthen

Partyleadershipandrectifythe Party'sstyle of work,"SelectedWorks,pp. 23-26.
78. See Deng'slectureon abuseof privilegein section1 of "Seniorcadresshouldtakethe
leadin maintainingandenrichingthe Party'sfine traditions,"SelectedWorks,pp. 208-213.
79. With or withoutDeng's blessing,an outpouringof sycophanticworkspraisinghis
achievementsappearedafterhis 1992 SouthernSojourn,and his "thought"was officially
proclaimeda "magicweapon"at the 14thPartyCongressandenshrinedin the CCPConsti-
tution.
Thustherewere numerousdifferencesin leadershipstyle betweenMao

andDeng. In comparingthe two, diffenngmodesof leadershiphavebeen
examined out of the context of the national policy agenda. But no
leaders- even paramountones - operatein a vacuum.Leadersare, after
all, chief executives and as such they shape the agendaof the nation.
Deng the AgendaSetter

Thereare differentkeys to power for politicians.80The importanceof
variouspower bases has been noted above. Controllingthe substantive
agendaof the nationis anothersource.To do this politiciansmust first
have an agendaof theirown. Deng certainlyhad one. It was centredon
enhancingeconomic productivityand social vitality, and maximizing
China'snationalsecurity.However,Deng was no liberal.He soughtto
makeChinastrong,butnot democratic.He definedstrengthin demonstra-
ble terms-economic productivity,technologicalprowess and military
muscle. He believed that creative,entrepreneurialand productiveforces
could be unleashed(the Prometheanimpulse) withoutthe concomitant
loosening of political hegemony.On the contrary,Deng believed tight
politicalcontrolto be vital to achieve his economicgoals. In this sense,
he sharesa view of modernizationdrawnfrom the expenence of South
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and other newly industrializedcountries
(NICs).
The operativeresearchquestionis not so muchthe content of Deng's
agenda, which numerousstudies have examined,81but the mannerin
which he went about pursuingit. In substantiveterms, the origins of
Deng's reformistagendain the 1980s and 1990s can be tracedto the
Liu-Deng-ChenYun programmeof the early 1960s. It was the series of
80. Poweris one of the mostextensivelyanalysedyet elusiveconceptsin socialscience.

In the Chinesecontext,we have examinedseveralsourcesof powerbases above;also see
LowellDittmer,"Basesof powerin Chinesepolitics:a theoryandanalysisof the fall of the
Gangof Four,"WorldPolitics(October1978),pp.2S60. Ininternational politicstheRealist
paradigmholds thatpoweris the abilityto int!uence.See, in particular,HansMorgenthau,
Politics AmongNations (many editions).In comparativepolitics, elite power has been
definedin a numberof ways. In a classic studyArthurBentleyalso adoptedan influence-
baseddefinition.See his TheProcessof Government (Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,
1908). Anotherclassic view is thatof HaroldLasswelland AbrahamKaplan,who define
poweras "participation in decision-making": PowerandSociety(NewHaven:YaleUniver-
sity Press, 1950). This view gave rise to the bureaucraticpolitics paradigmof the 1960s
whichcontinuesto hold some currencyandis particularly pertinentto the studyof Chinese
politics. See, for example,KennethLieberthaland Michel Oksenberg,Policy Makingin
China(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988).RobertDahlintroduceda moreplural-
istic definitionin which considerablecompetitionexists over the controlof the political
agenda.See his Dilemmasof PluralistDemocracy(New Haven:Yale UniversityPress,
1982).Manyscholars,particularly in the fieldof Americanlegislativepolitics,haveadopted
andrefinedDahl's approach,andit seems thatan agenda-settingapproachhas unexplored
utilityfor studyingChineseleaders'distributionof power.
81. Amongthenumerousstudieson theDengreformssee HarryHarding,China'sSecond
Revolution:ReformAfterMao (Washington,D. C.: Brookings,1987);CarolLee Hamrin,
Chinaand the Challengeof the Future(Boulder:WestviewPress, 1990);GordonWhite,
Ridingthe Tiger:ThePoliticsof EconomicReformin Post-MaoChina(London:Macmillan,
1993).
documents promulgated under Deng's aegis - the 60 Articles, 70 Articles,

14 Articles, and so on - that served as the point of departure. Similarly,
the three major policy documents produced under Deng's instruction in
1975 - which Jiang Qing labelled the "three poisonous weeds" - also
helped to constitute the overall programme.82
Of importance to this analysis is the fact that when he returned to
power in 1977 Deng had a preliminary agenda for change. Much more
needed to be fleshed out in due course, but the essentials were in place.
So was Deng's mandate for change. Like a newly-elected President or
Prime Minister, Deng enjoyed a popular mandate for sweeping reform.
Many in China recognized that Hua Guofeng was not up to the task, and
only Deng had the requisite combination of skills, vision and experience
to move the nation.83There was an acute leadership vacuum in the wake
of the death of Mao and arrest of the Gang of Four, and the Communist
Party faced a severe crisis of legitimacy. The society was numbed by
years of campaign politics, and permeated by a deep sense of alienation.
The economy remained stagnant, frozen at 1957 levels of production, and
was falling further behind the rapid growth of China's East Asian
neighbours. In foreign affairs, China had opened a relationship with the
United States but it was not consummated, lacking full diplomatic
relations and the benefits that normalization would bring.84China contin-
ued to face a pressing military threat of conventional and nuclear
proportions from the Soviet Union, and remained locked in hostilities
with India and Vietnam.
Benefiting from this kind of implicit mandate, it was not difficult for
Deng to seize, set and control the national agenda - particularly once he
had disposed of Hua Guofeng, the "whateverists" and "Small Gang of
Four." Deng's aim of demolishing the Maoist edifice was essentially
accomplished in three years, between 1979 and 1982. During this time
Deng moved on many fronts to discredit the Cultural Revolution era and
the beneficiaries of it.
Deng first set his sights on Hua Guofeng, Mao's chosen successor. At
the Tenth Party Congress in August 1977 and National People's Congress
of March 1978, Deng was more than pleased for Hua to reveal his
unabashed loyalty to Maoism and naivety about economic growth (ironi-
cally Hua's target growth rates were very similar to Deng's own in 1992).
Having exposed Hua, Deng then manoeuvred to outflank him on person-
nel and policy issues at the key Third Plenum of December 1978 and the
preceding work conference. Several Deng allies were added to the
82. "Some Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development," prepared by the State

Planning Commission; "Outline Report on the Work of the Academy of Sciences," prepared
under the direction of Hu Yaobang and Hu Qiaomu; and "On the General Programme of
Work for the Whole Party and Nation," prepared by Deng Liqun and others.
83. On this point see the discussion in Roderick MacFarquhar,"The Succession to Mao
and the End to Maoism," in MacFarquharand John King Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge
Historyof China,Vol. 15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 388-393.
84. Deng closely monitored and personally engaged in the final round of negotiations in
1978 that led to Sino-American normalization. Interviews with knowledgeable officials in
the U.S. and Chinese governments.
PolitburoandDengistideas dominatedthe policy agendato emergefrom

the Plenum.The agriculturalresponsibilitysystem- alreadybeing suc-
cessfullytestedby Deng protegesWanLi andZhaoZiyangin Anhuiand
Sichuanprovincesrespectively85 - was adoptedas nationalpolicy andthe
decollectivizationof agriculturewas endorsed. "Class struggle" was
replacedby "economicmodernization"as the principalnational goal.
Deng also moved to take commandof the armedforces (althoughHua
technicallyremainedChairmanof the CentralMilitaryCommission)and
beganthe processof comprehensivereorganization at a CMCmeetingin
December1977. He also took the initiativeto reassureintellectualswith
an assertivespeechto the NationalScienceConferencein March1978. It
was in this speech that Deng served notice there would be no more
Maoist-style political campaigns, that theoreticalresearch should be
unfetteredby politics, and scientific exchanges with foreign countries
would be a high priority- all at directvariancewith Hua's preferences.
Secondly, during 1979 Deng set about revampingthe ideological
legacy of Maoism and extractingretributionfor CulturalRevolution
excesses. The "twowhatevers"86 were denouncedandreplacedby Deng's
campaignsfor "practiceis the sole criterionof truth"and "FourCardinal
Principles."87Deng's attack on the "two whatevers"brought further
pressureon Hua and his associatesthe "Small Gang of Four"(Wang
Dongxing, Ji Denggui, Chen Xilian, Wu De). The Small Gang were
removedfrom the Politburoat the Fifth Plenum.Hua now lacked any
support among the leadership.Under Deng's new principle of "the
separationof Partyand government"(dang-zhengfenkai), Deng forced
Huato give up his post of Premierof the StateCouncilto Deng's protege
Zhao Ziyang, and then the Partychairmanshipto Deng's otherprotege
Hu Yaobang (whom Deng had alreadymoved on to the reconstituted
Secretariat).Deng himself took Hua's third post as Chairmanof the
MilitaryAffairs Commission.
Thirdly,and simultaneouswith the campaignto unseat Hua, Deng
called to accountthe Gang of Four and vestiges of Lin Biao's military
clique by arranginga well-publicizedshow trialfromNovember1980 to
January1981. Althoughno doubtof some consolationto victims of the
Gang,the trialmoreimportantlyrepresenteda symboliccleansingfor the
nationalbody politic. Deng continuedthis process by rehabilitating-
often posthumously-leading victims of the CulturalRevolution,and
compensatingthose in society who had sufferedso severely. Similarly,
Deng and Hu Yaobang arrangedfor victims of the 1957 anti-rightist
campaignto be "uncapped"more than 20 years after the event and
permittedthemto resumework.Deng also permittedDemocracyWall to
85. The use of experimental"testpoints"(shi dian) was a favouredmethodof Deng's

datingto the l950s.
86. This was a slogan put forwardby Hua that whateverMao did or said shouldbe
adheredto.
87. Adherenceto the socialistroad,dictatorshipof the proletariat,the leadershipof the
CommunistParty,andMarxism-Leninism-Mao ZedongThought.By relegatingthelatterto
only one (andthe last) of fourelements,Deng dealtMaoistideologya severeblow.
flourishin 1978-79, as it servedhis purposesin his struggleagainstHua

becausethe contentof wall posters,publicationsand speechesall sharply
criticizedthe Maoist era (from which Hua sought to draw legitimacy).
The last step in this cleansingprocesswas the issuingof the Resolution
on CertainQuestionsin the Historyof OurParty Since the Foundingof
the People's Republicof China at the Sixth Plenumof the TenthParty
Congress in July 1981. Deng personallyoversaw the draftingof this
documentand severaltimes expressedhis dissatisfactionwith the content
of early drafts.88His goal was to strikea balancebetweenpreservinga
positivelegacy for "ComradeMao Zedong"priorto 1957 anda negative
one thereafter,withoutjettisoning the Great Helmsmanaltogetheras
Khrushchevhad done to Stalin. As Deng told ItalianjournalistOnana
Fallaci in a 1980 interview:"We will not do to ChairmanMao what
Khrushchevdid to Stalin."89 The attemptto stnke a balancewas evident
in the way the Resolutiondealt with the Anti-Rightistcampaign-in
which Deng played no small part and specificallyorderedits essential
correctnessaffirmed.90 The Resolution stated that "It was ... entirely
correctand necessaryto launcha resolutecounter-attack. But the scope
of this sttuggle was made far too broadand a numberof intellectuals,
patrioticpeople and Partycadres were unjustifiablylabelled 'rightists,'
with unfortunateconsequences.''9l
Fromlate 1982 Deng then proceededto roll back the core normsand
policies of the Maoist era, togetherwith fashioningnew programmesin
virtuallyall policy spheres.Therewere manyhiccupsalongthe way, and
the reform programmedemonstrateda distinct start-stopquality that
paralleleda boom-bustcycle in the economy.92 Therewas resistancefrom
entrenchedbureaucraticinterestsas well as Politburoadversarieswho
disagreedaboutthe pace andmodalitiesof reform,buton the whole Deng
and his principalallies dominatedthe nationalagenda throughoutthe
remainderof the decade.At no time did Deng reallylose control,andon
occasions, such as in January1987 and October1988 to May 1989, he
withdrewsupportfrom individuals(Hu Yaobangand Zhao Ziyang re-
spectively93)in orderto retainit.
88. See "Remarkson successivedraftsof the 'Resolutionon CertainQuestionsin the

Historyof our PartySince the Foundingof the People's Republicof China',"Selected
Works,pp. 276-296.
89. SelectedWorks,p. 329.
90. DengXiaopingwenxuan(1975-82) (Beijing:Renminchubanshe,1983),p. 258. I am
indebtedto KeithForsterfor bringingthis to my attention.
91. Resolutionon CPCHistory,(1949-81) (Beijing:ForeignLanguagesPress,1981),p.
27.
92. The economiccycle was moreone of expansion-retrenchment, withthe latterphase
being intentionallyinducedto cool off overheating,ratherthana real businesscycle.
93. In pointof fact,Deng beganto withdrawhis supportfor boththesesuccessorsnearly
a yearbeforetheirfall frompower.In Hu's case, by the middleof 1986it becameclearthat
he hadoffendedDeng overhis desireto acceleratetheretirementen masse of theremaining
elders on the CentralCommittee.Hu was also distrusted6y the militaryhigh command.
Deng apparentlyconfrontedHu at an August 1986 Beidaihework conferenceand at the
subsequentSixth Plenumin September.By the time studentdemonstrationseruptedin
DecemberHu's fate was sealed. Similarly,in the case of Zhao Ziyang, Deng began to
withdrawactive supportat the August 1988 Beidaihe work conferencethat led to the
When Deng sensed that the agendahad been capturedor was being
undulyinfluencedby othershe adoptedvarioustactics- some straight-
forward, some surreptitious - to regain control. Like Mao in similar
circumstances,Deng knewthathis best weaponwas his personalprestige.
He wouldventureinto the publicarena,makeremarksthatwouldbecome
the new tifa of the time, have thempublishedin the newspaper,airedon
televisionanddisseminatedas CentralDocumentsfor studyby all cadres.
Perhapsthe best exampleof this tactic was in early 1992. Deng was
discontentedwith the slow pace of economicreformand politicaldomi-
nance of what he termed"leftists,"and decidedto try and recapturethe
agendaby visiting the ShenzhenandZhuhaiSpecialEconomicZones in
Januaryand February.94 This was his first public appearancein over a
year and, after initial blockage by his opponents(who controlledthe
propagandaapparatus)his trip was widely publicizedin China and his
commentsmade mandatorystudy for all. Deng's foray into the south
launcheda fierce intra-leadership struggleleading up to the 14th Party
Congress, but he succeeded in reorientingthe national agenda and
leadershipmoreto his liking.It putpressureon Li Peng andotherleaders
who favoureda much more controlledapproachto economicreform.It
also put pressureon the PLA, a conservativeinstitutionnot particularly
in favourof acceleratedreform.Deng knew that the PLA was the key
playerin his succession,and for good measurehe took severalleading
active and retiredmilitaryofficials to the south with him.
SometimesDeng wouldtry to influencethe agendamoreindirectlyvia
the media.In February1990, in an effort to reignitereformin the midst
of the post-Tiananmen crackdown,he arrangedto have severalreformist
articles published in the Shanghai newspaperLiberation Daily. His
interventionwas short-livedhowever,as the conservative-controlled CCP
PropagandaDepartmentrefusedto replaythemnationally.Deng had lost
controlof both the nationalagendaandhis designatedsuccessors.Under
such circumstanceshe was left with no alternativebut to invest his
personalprestigein his heraldedSouthernSojourn.
At othertimes Deng would supportindividualsto regaincontrolof the
politicalagenda.In the springof 1987 he intervenedpersonallyto shore
up Zhao Ziyang and his programmefor acceleratedeconomic and
politicalreformin the run-upto the 13thPartyCongress.He knew Zhao
lackedthe personalclout to push a radicalagendathroughthe Congress,
footnote continued
economic retrenchmentprogramme. Despite his lack of open supportfor Zhao I do not think
Deng was convinced that Zhao had to go until the spring of 1989. Zhao's contradiction of
the 26 April People'sDaily editorial, which Deng had explicitly authorized, in his speech to
the Asian Development Bank and his wait-and-see attitude toward the student demonstra-
tions was bad enough, but his statements to Gorbachev was the coupde grace as far as Deng
was concerned.
94. See Zhonggong Shenzhen shiwei xuanchuanbu (ed.), Yijiuernian chun:Deng Xiao-
ping yu Shenzhen(TheSpringof 1992: Deng Xiaopingand Shenzhen)(Shenzhen: Haitian
chubanshe, 1992); and David Shambaugh, "Regaining political momentum: Deng strikes
back," CurrentHistory(September 1992). pp. 257-261.
particularlyat a time when the conservativeswere in the ascent,and so

lent his authorityto Zhao.
Deng was, to some extent,vulnerableto his ideologicalcritics- Wang
Zhen, Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu- who repeatedlyrailed against the
"erroneoustendencies"that had croppedup as a resultof reforms,such
as cnme, corruptionand dissent. Deng never failed to endorse their
campaigns.This shows some tacticalmanoeuvreon his part,but is more
indicativeof his own intoleranceof politicalliberalism.
Early on Deng establishedhis limits for political and ideological
expressionin his 1979 speech "Upholdthe Four CardinalPrinciples."95
Yet he personallyputpoliticalreformon the nationalagendain 1980 with
his speech"Onthe Reformof the Systemof Partyand StateLeadership"
(whichhe essentiallydefinedas administrative reform).96
Less thana year
laterDeng orderedthe closing of DemocracyWall afterpostersbeganto
call for Western-styledemocracy,and he ensuredthat Wei Jingsheng
receiveda stiff 15-yearsentencefor advocatinga "fifthmodernization."
In 1983 Deng launchedthe inner-Partyrectificationcampaignagainst
CulturalRevolutionbeneficiaries(the "threekinds of people" or san
zhong ren97)Simultaneously(at the Sixth Plenum),Deng endorsedthe
campaignagainst"spiritualpollution."Withintwo monthshe hadquietly
withdrawnhis endorsementof the campaign, but still endorsed Hu
Qiaomu'sattackon the proponentsof "humanism"and "alienation"in
1984.
In 1986 Deng thoughtit a propitioustime to push for furtherpolitical
reform.98He again began calling for "politicalstructuralreform"- the
separationof Partyand govemment(dang-zhengfenkai).99But with the
outbreakof studentdemonstrations in DecemberDeng once more shifted
his position, sacking Hu Yaobang as CCP GeneralSecretaryand ex-
pelling dissidentintellectualsFang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang,Liu Binyan,
Wu Zuguangand othersfromthe CommunistParty.By late spring1987
Deng was again speakingof political reform, and he supportedZhao
Ziyang and Hu Qili in revivingthe dang-zhangfenkai discussions.The
separationof Party and governmentwas subsequentlyplaced as a top
95. SelectedWorks,pp.166-lgl.
96. SelectedWorks,pp.302-32s.
97. "Beaters,smashers,and looters"duringthe CulturalRevolution.
98. At a meetingof provincialgovernorsin AprilDeng calledfor renewedattentionto
"reformof the politicalstructure."
In Junehe instructedthe CentralCommitteeSecretariat
to formulateconcretepoliticalreformproposals.See Deng Xiaoping,"Reformthe political
structureandstrengthenthepeople'ssenseof legality,"Fundamental Issuesin PresentDay
China,pp.14548.This endorsementof Deng's led to a summer-longseries of political
reformseminarsandformationof a leadershipsmall groupunderthe directionof Hu Qili,
untiltheconservativescounter-attackedat theAugustBeidaiheworkconference.Fordetails
of the debatesee ChengHsiang,"NewsFromBeidaihe,"WenWeiPo, 8 August 1986,in
Summaryof WorldBroadcasts:Far East, 12 August 1986,pp.B24. In the wake of the
Beidaihemeetingit is unclearwhetherDengbackedZhaoZiyang's formationof thePolitical
StructureReformOfficeunderthe CentralCommitteein October1986or whetherhe began
to withdrawhis support.
99. On Deng's supportfor a new roundof politicalstructuralreform,see Hou Dongtai,
"DengXiaopinghe zhengzhitizhi gaige,"Da GongBao (HongKong), 16 July 1986, pp.
5-7.
priorityin Zhao Ziyang's reportto the 13th PartyCongressin October

987.100
Deng's views of the Tiananmendemonstrationsof 1989 are clear
enough.Fromhis meetingwith Yang ShangkunandLi Peng on 25 April
to his 6 Junespeech,he took decisive anddrasticaction.'?lFor Deng, the
demonstrations representeda directthreatto the survivalof the CCP and
PRC. No doubt memories of CulturalRevolution anarchywere also
presentin his mind.To save the party-staterequiredfirmandintimidating
action.At first Deng watchedas his designatedsuccessorsfactionalized
and proved indecisive. Then he took mattersinto his own hands. He
ralliedthe remnantsof the Old Guard,mobilizedthe main force units of
the PLA (withthe assistanceof Yang Shangkun),andcalledin the tanks.
FollowingTiananmenDeng initiallyacquiescedto the ideologies and
hardliners,yet by 1991 showedsigns of frustrationwith the conservative
leadership.l02This was expressedin variousways, but ultimatelyin his
SouthernTour.Deng's decisionto emergefromretirementto re-energize
the reformprocess had much to do with the lessons he drew from the
collapse of Soviet and East EuropeanCommunism.Deng apparently
concludedthat Communistrule crumbledin these countriesbecause it
had failed to deliverthe goods, becausepoliticalreformadvancedahead
of economic reform,and because the regimes concerneddid not have
adequatecontrolover theirmilitariesand securityservices.Deng decided
thatfor the CCPto survive,the materialwell-beingof the populacemust
be rapidlyimproved;politicalreformmust be postponedand the forma-
tion of any groupsthatcould challengethe hegemonyof the Communist
Partymust be suppressed;and the absoluteloyalty of the militaryto the
Partymust be ensured.
Thus, in termsof agenda-setting,Deng Xiaopingdemonstrateddiffer-
ent strategiesand tactics throughouthis career. At times- during the
1950s and 1960s- he tendedto work within and throughcentralParty
and state institutions,althoughhe becamequite assertivein 1963-64. In
the mid-1970s,with the blessingof PremierZhouandChairmanMao, he
gained an authorityand independencehe did not possess before the
CulturalRevolution. During the 1980s and 1990s Deng employed a
combinationof these andothertactics.Generallyspeaking,though,Deng
controlledthe nationalagendathroughclassic balancingtactics.l03Deng
bargainedthrough balancing, and vice versa. His proclivity was to
100. Zhao Ziyang, "Advance along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics,"
Documentsof the Thirteenth
NationalCongressof the Communist
Partyof China(Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 1987), pp. 4240. I am indebted to Fan Cheuk Wan's analysis of
this period; Fan Cheuk Wan, "Reform to separateParty and government: an abortive attempt
to undermine Party domination over the state between 1986 and 1989," M. A. seminar paper,
School of Oriental and African Studies, 1992.
101. Cf n. 55.
102. For an analysis of this period see Shambaugh, "Regaining political momentum:
Deng strikes back";and David Shambaugh, "Chinain 1991: living cautiously," AsianSurvey
(January 1992), pp. 19-31.
103. For a useful discussion of this propensity see Harding, China'sSecondRevolution,
pp. 90-93.
supportradicalreform,and he would push it when he could, but Deng's

pragmatismmore often made him occupy the middle ground.
By adoptingvaryingleadershipstyles Deng has actednot unlikeother
politicians.Compromiseandcoalitionbuildingare necessarypartsof the
political process. So is bureaucracy;bureaucraciesimplementpolicies,
but they also sabotagethem.A leaderneeds to workthroughinstitutions,
but also needsto circumventthemat times. Institutionscreatepaperwork,
and much of the governmentalprocess is consumedwith draftingand
promulgatingdocuments.Makingspeeches,using the powerof the press
and makingforays into public to take one's message to the masses are
standarddevices for politicalagenda-settingin most countries.Deng has
provedChinesepolitics not very differentin these respects.
Conclusion
In summarizingthe political style of Deng Xiaoping, it may be
instructiveto recall the typology of leadershipoffered in 1978 by
AmericanpoliticalscientistJamesMacGregorBurns.l04 Burnselaborated
nine distinct leadershipstyles, but arguedthat they clusteredinto two
principal types: transformationaland transactional.Transformational
leaders,Burnsargued,seek to transformsociety throughideas. They are
generallyintellectualswho pursuean ideologicalagendaof comprehen-
sive social reform.Revolutionariesare one sub-typeof transformational
leader,andBurns- writingbeforeDeng's ascendance- was quickto note
the inclusionof MaoistChinain this category.He observedthatleaders
of developingcountrieswere often of the transformational type.
Burns found transactionalleadership,on the other hand, to be more
rootedin developedpolities.Transactionalleadersfit withina structural-
functionalist interest aggregation model where public opinion is
mobilized,interestgroupsact as a two-way channelfor communicating
politicalinterest,and political partiesaggregatediverse public interests
and convey them to governmentfor conversioninto public policy.
Justas with Mao Zedong,the transformational leadershipmodel helps
to describeandunderstandDeng Xiaoping'sleadershipstyle andpolitical
behaviour.This probablysays more, however, about the natureof the
Chinesepoliticalsystemthanit does aboutDeng. Whileopinionclusters,
interest groups, and intra-governmentalbargainingcertainly exist in
China, and Deng Xiaoping's reformshave done much to stimulatethe
rise of rudimentarycivil society (andhence the publicsphereapproachto
studyingChinesepolitics),Chinaremainsa developingcountry.Chinais
an unparalleledpolitical mass, excepting perhapsIndia. To "move a
nation"(to quote John F. Kennedy)transformational leadershipis re-
quired. As the East Asian experience has shown, the state can be a
powerfulforce for socio-economicchange if its leadershiphas a strong
mandate,clear agendaand motivatedworkingclass. Deng had all three.
By initiatingeconomic reform, however, Deng Xiaoping unleashed
104. JamesMacGregorBurns,Leadership (New York:Harper& Row, 1978).

powerfulcentrifugalforces that threatento overwhelmthe Communist

party-statehe soughtto preserve.Deng studiedthe East Asian develop-
mentalmodel carefully,but learnedincompletelessons. He did not, or
refusedto, recognizethe inevitablepoliticalpressuresthat well up from
below as a result of economic growthand wealth accumulation.These
inexorablybreedpopulardemandsfor meaningfulpoliticalparticipation
andan improvedqualityof life (in, for example,environment,education,
health care). To accommodatethese demands devolution of political
poweris necessary,leadingin time to an erosionof the hegemonyof the
party-stateand the beginningsof democracy.Deng failed to recognize
this linkage, and failed to create the institutionalmechanismsfor im-
proved political participation.It is the most vexing problem he will
bequeathto his successors.In the end, Deng failed to grasp the most
fundamentalof all Marxistprecepts- the influenceof the economicbase
on the political superstructure-andhis successors may have to pay
dearlyfor this obstinacy.

Deng Xiaoping The Politician

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Deng Xiaoping: The Politician

Author(s): David Shambaugh

"DengXiaopingis a manwho excels in politicalaffairs,andveryfew peoplecan matchhim

The Contradictionsof Deng Xiaoping

*Aspectsof this articlewere previouslypresentedat Keio University(Tokyo),Institut

socialism and CommunistParty supremacy,althoughhe did much to

StudyingDeng Xiaoping'sPolitical Behaviour

approach will not suffice analytically, although it might reveal a learning

withDengXiaoping)(Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989); Yang Guoya et al., Ershibanian

some similar tendenciesto China's previous pre-eminentleader, Mao

Three Paradigms of Analysis

7. For studiesof Mao's politicalstyle see RichardSolomon,Mao's Revolutionand the

9. WilliamH. Riker,The Theoryof Political Coalitions(New Haven:Yale University

bureaucratichierarchies(xitong); did he adopt the campaign(:yundong)

Deng Xiaoping's Power Bases

whom Deng called to directthis spherewhen he reorganizedthe Central

13. DengandLi alsohadtheirdifferences,includingthefactthatLi apparentlypersuaded

Deng's sensitive work quickly broughthim to the attentionof Mao

17. For interesting,if not necessarilyaccurate,accountsof the RuijinaffairandDeng's

Deng's experiencein the Taihangbase area in the Shanxi-Hebeiregion

Deng's Personal Power Base: Patrons, Clientsand Colleagues

21. See the excellentanalysisin David S. G. Goodman,"Theconstructionof the party-

togetheron the Secretariatdurlngthe mid-1950s. Liu and Zhou both

23. Interview,CentralCommitteePartyHistoryResearchOffice,25 May 1991,Beijing.

FourthNationalPeople's Congressin January1975; Deng draftedthe

Mao's supportwas thus crucialto Deng's careerduringthe 1950s and

Revolutionas the "number2 person in authoritytaking the capitalist

ration that they drew Mao's wrath during the CulturalRevolution,

37. PengZhenwas put in chargeof overseeingthe su-fancampaignandpublicsecurity

in favourof criticizingPeng for "opposingChairmanMao"and dissolv-

Peng Dehuai. Deng's relationshipwith Peng Dehuai was a largely

41. See Peng Dehuai, Memoirsof a ChineseMarshal(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,

YangShangkun.Anotherseniorleaderwith whom Deng was particu-

46. See DavidBachman,ChenYunand the ChinesePoliticalSystem(Berkeley:Institute

ranks,"court martialsand intense indoctrinationcampaignfollowing 4

TaoZhu.Anotherelite with whomDeng maintainedclose ties was Tao

ZhaoZiyang.Deng turnedto ZhaoZiyangas Partyleaderfollowinghis

49. For an analysisof YangBaibing'spost-Tiananmen manoeuvringssee DavidSham-

Deng andZhaoduringthe early 1960s,but others- particularlyindustrial

Hu Yaobang.Deng's other hand-pickedsuccessor,Hu Yaobang,fell

53. Shambaugh,TheMakingof a Premier,ch. 6.

Communist history for a purge not to consign an individual to political

Patrons,clients, colleagues and enemies.Thus, throughout his career

career.This is not to say thathe was not ruthless,as he did purgemany

Deng's Institutional Power Bases

takinghis case straightto the people duringhis famous February1992

Politburo,its StandingCommitteeor the entire CentralCommitteevia

61. I am indebtedto FredTeiwes on this point.

freedoms,one contract")policy, changethe basic accountingunit to the

Territorial Power Bases

64. Deng refutesthis and statesthatpriorto the Beidaihemeetingof July-August1962

1949 to 1952,68but it cannotreallybe said thatDeng derivedpowerfrom

particularlyon foreignpolicy- but, on the whole, he broadlydelegated

72. ZhaoZiyang'sstatementto Gorbachevthatall majordecisionswerereferredto Deng

in Deng's workstylethat was absentin Mao's. Deng sought consensus

77. Deng's philosophyof dealingwithoppositionandcriticismis evidentin "Strengthen

Thustherewere numerousdifferencesin leadershipstyle betweenMao

Deng the AgendaSetter

80. Poweris one of the mostextensivelyanalysedyet elusiveconceptsin socialscience.

documents promulgated under Deng's aegis - the 60 Articles, 70 Articles,

82. "Some Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development," prepared by the State

PolitburoandDengistideas dominatedthe policy agendato emergefrom