Professional Documents
Culture Documents
KERALA ‘MODEL’
M.A.Oommen
Malcolm.S.Adiseshiah Chair Professor
Institute of Social Sciences
Thiruvananthapuram
M.A.Oommen
PART I
This Paper is part of a larger Project on Kerala and Cuba sponsored by the SSHRC
(Canada)
1
In particular I may mention Sen (1987, 1992, 1999)
2
For an insightful account of the interrelations and implications, see Sabina Alkire (2003).
capabilities refers to the real ability of a person to achieve those
functionings considered as important to lead the life that he/she has
reason to cherish and value. Capability is essentially the freedom to
choose the life that one values. The two concepts are there fore closely
intertwined.
PART II
3
One important criticism of Sen’s capability perspective is that the process aspect is not
adequately elaborated [See Omkarnath (2007)]. Sen is well aware of the process aspect.
He is more concerned with the evaluative aspect of the approach of development as
freedom. Using the capability approach in a historical context may probably help to
clarify the process aspect. [See section 2.0]
4
Sen elaborates five types of instrumental freedoms viz. political freedom, economic
facilities, social opportunities (arrangements that society makes for education, health
etc., which enable people to live better), transparency guarantees and protective
securities. [See Sen (1999)].
2.0 The Essence of Kerala Model: A Freedom Perspective
In this section I try to capture the essence of the ‘Kerala Model’ from
the capability/freedom perspective. That a small linguistic region in India
(with only 1.18% of its area) holding a population size as big as Canada (at
the same time with less than 1/25 of its per capita income) could achieve
somewhat comparable levels of life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy
rate and so on along with social justice in a society which once suffered
the worst forms of caste class oppression is a rare experience in human
history. Definitely not the result of any exante model or pre-designed
growth strategy5, the Kerala Model signifies a trajectory of experience
historically evolved by ‘public action’. Following Dreze and Sen public
action6 is understood in this paper to mean not only state initiatives but
also social actions taken by the members of the public-both collaborative
and adversarial [See Dreze and Sen, (1989)]. From a freedom perspective
the ‘Model’ may be said to epitomize the social actions7 of a community to
fight successfully the caste, class unfreedoms and capability deprivations
they suffered for centuries. The abolition of agrarian slavery, the inhuman
practice of unseeability, unapproachability and untouchability, the
successful fighting for the right to worship the god you value, the right to
wear the clothes of your choice (women were even prohited to cover their
breasts), the right to use metal wares in your house, to tile and put a gate
to it, the freedom to choose your mate or partner 8, and the walk on roads
exclusively meant for the upper castes9, and so on were indeed great
efforts towards improving the functionings of citizens and the expansion of
their capabilities.
The land reforms of Kerala despite the many criticisms against them
are the most progressive and equitable reform that radically altered the
structure of production relations in one of “the most oppressive and rack-
rented region on the face of the earth”10. Here it is not wide of the mark
to examine a related question raised recently by Pulapre Balakrishnan: “As
5
The view of a foreign scholar that “unlike most developing economies, Kerala’s policy
makers followed a ‘basic needs first strategy” [Justino (2006):1255-56].
6
I am aware of the limitations of using a generic concept like this, but use it for its
heuristic value [See K.P.Rammohan (2008)].
7
In 1903 Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana (SNDP) Yogam was started for the upliftment
of the Ezhava Community and in 1907, Ayyankali (belonging to the Pulaya caste, the
lowest in the caste hierarchy) formed the Sadhu Jana Paripalana Sanghom and they were
in reality the strident voices of the oppressed of the times. In 1906, Vakkom Abdul
Khadder Moulavi established the Islam Dharma Paripalana Yogam for the upliftment of
the Muslims. Almost during this time all the major low castes like Kuravas, Thandars,
Parayas, Arayas and Kammalas formed their own associations. These are social actions
for their progress collective.
8
Kumaran Asan, the poet laureate of Kerala angrily asks in one of his poems: ‘Is the body
of Chandala girl barren to the sperm of a Brahmin’?
9
When Ayyankali in 1893 drove a cart drawn by two white Oxen with ringing bells around
their necks through the streets exclusively meant for the upper castes he signalled the
trumpet of freedom to ring out the old. [See Chentharassery (1985): 10].
land reforms are considered the one outstanding achievement of the so-called Kerala Model, the obvious
question to ask is why this has not solved the food problem once and for all” [Balakrishnan (2008): 15]. I think
this question is wrongly posed for a variety of reasons. For one, land reforms are not ‘the one outstanding
achievement’ of the Kerala Model although it is an important plank of its egalitarian capabilities. Two, land
reforms of Kerala is the outcome of a long drawn out struggle for land rights and freedom from the days of the
Travancore Royal Proclamation of 1867 (hailed as ‘the magna carta of the Travancore Ryots’11) through the
Land Reform (Amendment) Act, 1970. The emphasis never had been to augment food grains output but to
secure freedom and valued functionings. A truly ‘land to the tiller’ project of redistributing land to the former
agrestic slaves probably would have contributed to food production. Then the quality and texture of the Kerala
Model also would have been eminently better. Even so, it is difficult to imagine that Kerala would have
emerged as a food secure state. As far back as 16th century there was mention about the strategic ‘rice roads’
that brought food to Kerala from outside the State. [See Sanjay Subramanyam (2004)]. Third, the real
outstanding achievement of Kerala Model is in the field of education and health that acted as the foundational
capabilities of Kerala’s human development achievements.
The social reform movements that triggered a public action process in the State owe a great deal to
Kerala’s educational attainments especially female literacy with virtually very little gender gap. The significant
demographic transition, better schooling of children, low infant mortality rate and such achievements in
capabilities and freedom owe much to women’s agency. The matriliny of Kerala although not a universal
practice surely might have helped to reduce gender gap and in facilitating the agency of women. For the
socially and economically deprived, the only important means to substantive freedom have been via education.
The Christian Missionaries who promoted Malayalam language and education of lower castes (making
knowledge accessible to the poor as against Sanskrit a close preserve of the elites and men folk from ancient
times) also linked their activities with the development of health facilities and expanding their access to the
poor. The Royal Rescript of 1817 by the Queen of Travancore (in all probability written by the British Resident
10
This opinion of a British Revenue Officer is given in Varghese (1970). In this respect see also Daniel Thorner (1956: 35, and
Oommen (1971) among others].
11
See Velu Pillai(1940), Vol III: 191
James Munro) which enjoined that “the state should defray the entire cost of the education of its people……….”
was way ahead of the times and laid the foundations of the cent per cent literate state that Kerala has become
today. The buoyant export trade economy (coir, plantation crops etc) of the 19 th century provided the needed
revenue support to the rulers who could launch their strategic initiatives fairly comforably. By 1899-1900, the
expenditure on education of Travancore government was as high as 5.3 per cent and that on health a little over
4 per cent [Kabir (2003)]. The steady increase in the budgetary allocation for these sectors since then is fairly
well known.
Two policy choices made also need be mentioned before we close this discussion on the capability
perspective of the Kerala Model. One relates to the public distribution system with a vast outreach and near-
universal coverage that started in mid-1940s. Although the system has considerably weakened since the
economic reform, that at one point of time this helped to provide the food security and nutrition intake of the
poor needs to be stressed12. The other relates to the vast net work of social security entitlements covering
most vulnerable categories like agricultural labour, widows, aged, destitutes, physically handicapped,
washermen, tree climbers and so on. This is not brought in a day or at one stroke. It is the result of
competitive politics and organized public demand. These are mentioned to show that they exemplify
protective freedom and capability.
In sum, what we have tried to show in this Part was that the Kerala ‘model’ of the earlier vintage tells a
saga of fighting unfreedoms and trying to enhance the functionings and capabilities of a community long
subjected to traditional caste class oppression and inequities
PART III
12
As far back as the 1970s, in a well-argued and well-documented Paper P.S.George points out that subsidised public distribution
reduced the skewness in consumption levels among the different strata of consumers in Kerala and that the gains to the producers
and consumers exceeded the direct cost of government subsidy [See George P S(1979)].
The scholarly euphoria that celebrated the Kerala Model since the publication of the UN/CDS (1975) study
which discovered the unconventional experience of this ‘low income state’ in reducing infant mortality,
achieving high literacy, without much gender gap and that too with social justice as the defining concern in
policy choices, within a decade or so yielded to despondency. Some characterized the ‘Model’ as ‘stagnant’,
while one saw it having reached ‘the end of its tether’ and another went to the extent of calling it
‘antigrowth’13. In 1990, a two volume special produced by Economic and Political Weekly (Nos.35, 36 and 37)
was titled ‘Kerala Economy at the cross roads’ was meant to address the question of poor economic
performance “against the background of its achievements in the social sphere”. The ‘crisis of the Kerala Model’
was the dominant theme of the International Congress on Kerala Studies, organised by the AKG Centre for
Research and Studies, Thiruvananthapuram in August 1994. In 1998 the Bulletin of concerned Asian Scholars
(Vol.30, Nos.1.3 and 4) devoted special issues to debate on Kerala’s ‘development debacle’. The common
refrain of most of the scholars who upheld the stagnation thesis was that Kerala failed to translate her human
development attainments into economic growth a phenomenon which has come to be referred in the literature
as “lopsided growth”. Belying all the negative prognostications the situation has changed and infact has been
reversed14. Some scholars have tried to show that this ‘lopsided growth’ syndrome has turned into a ‘virtuous
cycle of growth’ [For e.g. See Achin Chakraborty (2005), K.P.Kannan (2005)]15. In what follows I try to evaluate
Kerala’s human development attainments under four heads. They are (a) poverty and inequality (b) education,
health and social security (c) participatory democracy and (d) some unfreedom issues.
Table 1: All India and State wise Trend in estimates of Poverty (HCR) and Gini
Coefficient
Head Count Ratio Gini
1987- 1993- 2004- 1987- 1993-
States / Year
1983 88 94 05 1983 88 94 2004-05
R U R U R U R U R U R U R U R U
26. 41. 21. 41. 15. 38. 10. 27. 29. 33. 30. 36. 29. 32. 29. 37.
Andhra Pradesh 8 2 0 1 9 8 8 1 7 2 9 1 0 3 4 6
44. 25. 39. 11. 45. 21. 20. 26. 23. 31. 17. 29. 19. 32.
Assam 6 9 4 3 2 7.9 7 3.7 0 1 0 0 9 0 9 1
65. 40. 52. 34. 62. 26. 42. 20. 27. 30. 26. 32. 23. 32. 22. 35.
Jharkhand 5 5 8 6 3 5 9 7 2 9 6 1 4 5 7 5
64. 61. 54. 63. 56. 40. 42. 38. 25. 28. 25. 26. 22. 28. 20. 33.
Bihar 7 6 2 8 6 7 2 1 9 5 2 6 2 2 7 3
28. 41. 28. 38. 22. 28. 19. 14. 26. 28. 26. 27. 24. 29. 27. 31.
Gujarat 9 9 3 5 2 3 4 2 8 5 1 8 0 1 3 0
21. 26. 15. 18. 28. 16. 13. 15. 28. 34. 29. 28. 31. 28. 34. 36.
Harayana 9 4 3 4 3 5 6 6 5 8 2 7 4 4 0 5
Himachal 17. 11. 16. 30. 10. 35. 27. 29. 28. 46. 31. 32.
Pradesh 0 0 7 7.2 4 9.3 9 5.0 - 8 1 2 4 2 1 6
36. 43. 32. 49. 30. 39. 20. 33. 30. 34. 29. 34. 27. 31. 26. 36.
Karnataka 3 6 6 2 1 9 0 3 8 2 7 0 0 9 5 8
39 48 29 38 25 24 13 20 32 38 32 36 30 34 38 41.
Kerala .6 .0 .3 .7 .4 .3 .2 .6 .0 .9 .1 .9 .1 .3 .3 0
50. 50. 46. 36. 44. 44. 42. 40. 24. 32. 24. 32. 21. 30. 29. 44.
Chattishgarh 6 7 7 0 4 2 0 7 4 2 5 1 7 6 8 0
Madhya 49. 56. 40. 50. 39. 49. 35. 42. 31. 29. 30. 33. 30. 33. 26. 39.
Pradesh 0 1 1 0 2 0 8 3 5 8 6 3 0 6 8 7
Maharastra 45. 41. 40. 40. 37. 35. 30. 32. 29. 34. 31. 34. 30. 35. 31. 37.
9 1 9 5 9 0 0 8 1 6 2 8 7 7 2 8
68. 54. 58. 42. 49. 40. 46. 43. 27. 29. 26. 31. 24. 30. 28. 35.
Orissa 5 0 7 6 8 6 9 7 0 0 9 0 6 7 5 4
14. 22. 12. 13. 11. 10. 10. 29. 33. 29. 28. 28. 28. 29. 40.
Punjab 3 9 8 7 7 9 0 5.0 2 9 7 8 1 1 5 3
35. 41. 33. 37. 26. 31. 19. 28. 34. 33. 31. 34. 26. 29. 25. 37.
Rajasthan 0 2 3 9 4 0 0 5 7 9 5 6 5 3 1 2
54. 51. 46. 40. 32. 39. 22. 24. 36. 35. 33. 35. 31. 34. 32. 36.
Tamil Nadu 8 9 3 2 9 9 7 1 7 1 0 8 2 8 2 1
25. 22. 13. 20. 24. 12. 14. 17. 29. 30. 28. 35. 24. 27. 28. 32.
Uttranchal 2 4 2 4 8 7 9 0 2 5 3 1 4 5 5 9
47. 52. 43. 46. 43. 36. 33. 30. 28. 31. 28. 33. 28. 32. 29. 36.
Uttar Pradesh 8 7 3 4 1 1 9 7 9 5 5 5 3 6 0 9
63. 33. 48. 33. 41. 22. 28. 15. 30. 33. 25. 34. 25. 33. 27. 38.
West Bengal 6 5 8 7 2 9 5 4 0 5 8 6 4 9 4 3
46 43 39 38 37 32 28 25 30 33 29 35 28 34 30 37.
All India .5 .6 .0 .7 .2 .6 .7 .9 .4 .9 .9 .0 .6 .4 .5 6
[Source: Based on Himanshu (2007) Tables 1 and 2]
R – Rural and U - Urban
Table 1 presents the all-India and state-wise trend in the estimates of income poverty (HCR) and Gini
coefficient estimated by Himanshu (2007) based on comparable NSS data (uniform reference periods) for 1983,
1987-88, 1993-94 and 2004-05 using the official poverty line methodology16. The Table shows that in rural
Kerala HCR in 1987-88, a clear pre-reform period is 10.3 percentage points lower than in 1983. But for the
11years spanning the post-reform period from 1993-94 to 2004-05 the reduction is only 12.2 percentage
points. The KSSP which uses the same official poverty line approach and with a larger sample arrives at an
HCR number of 22.9 for rural areas (2004-05) as against the lower official figure of 13.2 (which is much below
the urban ratio) and 20.8 for urban areas as against the official estimate of 20.6 which is surprisingly very close
to each other [KSSP figures from Aravindan (2006)]. The large sample size, wider coverage and closer
supervision and scrutiny by KSSP volunteers, make the KSSP numbers more reliable. There is no special reason
for a sharp fall in rural poverty while the fall in urban poverty ratio was only just 3.7 percentage points from
24.3 in 1993-94 to 20.6 in 2004-05. Thus the post-reform poverty reduction even by official poverty line
16
The author is well aware of the serious limitations and contradictions of the calorie-based measure of income poverty. (In particular
the recent papers by U.Patnaik (2007) and Mahendra Dev and Ravi (2008) may be mentioned).
estimates is not spectacular despite Kerala’s triumphant entry into the ‘virtuous growth’ regime. Not only that,
inequalities have widened in absolute and comparative terms (See Gini in Table 1). While there is a marginal
decline in the Gini coefficient for rural Kerala in 1993-94 compared to the earlier years, there is a quantum
jump to 38 per cent and is the highest number compared to all-India and all other states. The urban Gini
coefficient for Kerala (41%) is also equally disturbing. The apparent ‘comfort’ is that Kerala’s first position is
taken over by Chattishgarh.
Admittedly, agricultural labour and SC/ST categories belong to the most vulnerable and disadvantaged
groups. The matrixes presented in Tables 2 and 2(a) show the average monthly per capita consumer
expenditure (MPCE) of households by economic categories and by social groups in two periods 1999-2000 and
2004-05 based on the 55th and 61st NSS rounds for rural and urban Kerala respectively. We give in brackets the
relevant real values deflated by consumer price index relevant for each category in order to gauge the change
in real magnitudes. The Tables show very clearly that the consumer expenditure situation of Kerala of all
categories by household types or by social groups or by rural urban differentiation is way ahead of their all-
India counterparts. (This is but natural in a state that attracted on an average over 5 to 7 billion dollars per
annum since the Gulf oil boom in the mid 1970s buttressed by an accelerated inflow of foreign exchange since
the inauguration of the economic reform). The adverse changes in the conditions of the really poor among the
economic and social categories within the is disturbing, since Kerala has the highest per capita consumption
among the India States since 1993-94 and has been increasing over the years.
Although the average MPCE of agricultural labour in nominal terms increased by 21 per cent in 2004-05
compared to 1999-2000, in real terms the growth was only by 6.3 per cent. The worst affected are the
scheduled tribes among the agricultural labour households. Their average MPCE even in nominal terms
declined over 13 per cent and their real value as deflated by agricultural labour consumer price index by 23.86
per cent which is an abysmal fall for a group of households whose position was already vulnerable. The
agricultural labour belonging to ‘others’ improved their MPCE by 41.62 per cent and in real terms by 24.11 per
cent. Apparently they have other sources of income to sustain them on a higher level of consumption. The
position of SC category agricultural labour although improved in nominal terms, there was a fall in their MPCE
reckoned in real values.
Table 2: Average MPCE of different social groups and household economic category of
Kerala and all India in1999-2000, and 2004-05 (Rural)
1999-2000 2004-05
AgriSelf employed in Non
labourOther
Agri Labour
Agri Labour
o/
Others
Others
Eco
Agri
nom
All
All
ic
Clas
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
429.3 - 906.1 1033.
494. 674. 459.75 679.0 518.
ST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6 13.1 1 43 -23.15
18 11 (402.1 - 4 - - - 05 (-
(376.2 2 (593.9 (792.5 (903.8 (453.1
2) (- 32.78)
9) 2) 3) 9) 1)
23.86)
646.3 13.8 720.9 16.5 654.7 1325. 753.
834.14 26.14
568. 618. 597. 9 0 3 5 7 93 11
SC 0.00 0.00 0.00 (729.5 - - - (10.33
01 58 03 (566.5 (- (630.5 (1.94 (572.7 (1159.7 (658.7
8) 6) 1) )
0) 0.27) ) 0) 3)
1128.0 44.5 720.4 24.9 780.5 25.2 1202. 30.6 1248. 47.4 995. 37.46
780. 576. 623. 920.9 846.2 724. 8 1 3 3 1 5 74 0 04 8 62
OBC (20.23
60 66 16 6 2 28 (986.6 (26.4 (631.3 (9.49 (682.6 (9.55 (1051.9 (14.2 (1091.6 (29.0 (870.8
7) 2) )
8) 0) 9) ) ) 8) 3) 0) 0)
1199.3 42.7 805.2 41.6 887.5 22.4 1420. 48.2 1432. 22.8 1191. 36.81
Othe 839. 568. 724. 958.1 1166. 870. 5 8 9 2 5 4 22 2 85 2 32 (19.66
rs 97 64 87 9 59 77 (1049.0 (24.8 (705.7 (24.1 (776.3 (7.09 (1242.2 (29.6 (1253.2 (7.4 (1041.9
0) 9) )
1) 9) 6) 1) ) 0) 4) 4) 3)
1134.2 690.7 792.8 20.9 1296. 40.1 1307. 28.6 1013.1
41.86 21.2 32.34
799. 569. 655. 925.4 1016. 765. 8 7 1 0 53 0 72 7 5
All (24.0 9 (886.1 (15.75
56 50 77 6 30 57 (992.1 8) (605.3 (693.4 (5.74 (1134.0 (22.5 (1143.8 (12.5
(6.30) 3) 5) )
0) 9) ) 1) 3) 0) 5)
All India
495.2 17.8 358.4 404.8 443.9 658.3 16.6 429.
7.79 3.52 7.04 10.70
420. 332. 391. 414.7 564.5 387. 2 5 8 0 2 5 1 19
ST (- (- (- (-
21 58 02 2 6 69 (426.4 (1.48 (309.4 (348.5 (382.2 (566.9 (0.4 (369.5
6.97) 8)
10.85) 7.83) 8) 4.67)
4) ) 1) 6) 1) 2)
497.8 14.3 407.9 486.1 10.9 505.2 14.2 702.8 20.7 474.
7.82 13.43
435. 378. 438. 442.2 581.8 418. 5 3 1 1 6 0 4 2 9 72
SC (- (-
46 31 09 2 7 51 (428.7 (- (352.0 (418.5 (- (435.0 (- (605.2 (4.0 (408.7
6.93) 9) 9) 2.32)
0) 1.55) 8) 4.45) 3) 1.63) 1) 1)
591.1 19.4 428.4 545.7 568.1 16.4 760.4 28.6 556.
7.90 9.98
495. 397. 496. 488.0 591.2 473. 9 1 4 1 8 3 7 3 72 17.54
OBC (- (-
09 08 18 2 3 65 (509.0 (2.83 (369.8 (469.9 (489.2 (0.26 (654.8 (10.7 (479.4 (1.21)
6.87) 2)
5.29)
0)
8) ) 0) 7) ) 5) 6)
720.4 29.2 458.6 592.8 682.9 13.3 972.7 32.5 685.
9.36 6.96
Othe 557. 419. 554. 602.8 733.6 577. 1 9 0 8 9 0 9 9 31 18.73
(- (-
rs 19 35 31 1 8 22 (620.3 (11.3 (395.8 (510.5 (588.1 (- (837.6 (14.1 (590.1 (2.24)
5.61) 4)
7.90)
3)
5) 4) 3) 3) 2.44) 8) 8)
604.4 20.3 415.6 519.8 583.4 12.3 818.1 25.4 558.
502. 385. 482. 519.5 652.0 485. 7.69 7.68 15.00
All 1 3 5 1 8 1 9 8 78
28 98 74 3 5 88 (- (- (-
(520.4 (3.62 (358.7 (447.6 (502.4 (- (704.5 (8.0 (481.1
7.05) 1)
7.28)
7) 0.97)
6) ) 6) 4) 3.29) 5) 5)
Prepared from 55th and 61st NSSO Household Consumer Expenditure survey Reports.
Source: Figures in brackets are deflated values in 2004-05 compared to 1999-00. The deflation is done by average consumer price
index (1986-87 = 100) for the respective categories based on consumer price index series published by Labour Bureau, Ministry of
Labour and Employment, Government of India, Simla.
14
Table 2 (a): Average MPCE of different social groups and economic category household
of Kerala and all India in1999-2000, and 2004-05 (Urban)
1999-2000 2004-05
Other households
Regular wage /
increase over
All house holds
Regular wage /
Self employed
Self employed
Casual labour
Casual labour
All households
Other households
Socio / salaried
salaried
Econom
00
ic
Class
99-00
%
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1121.9 3.33 525.9
-11.86 1937.04 1515.74 90.24
ST 1085.8 596.7 796.7 3 (- 8
0 - - - (- (1547.5 - (1210.9 (51.9
1 7 5 (896.32 17.45 (420.2
) 29.59) 3) 4) 9)
) 1)
644.2
914.67 1267.58 766.19
SC 852.11 7
- - - - - - (730.74 - - (1012.6 - (612.12 -
(680.76) (514.7
) 9) )
2)
1376.5 779.5
1402.34 35.37 2.88 1187.79 42.37
OBC 868.2 1016.8 621.6 834.2 61.51 2 2 25.41 1161.82
1129.34 (1120.35 (8.15 (- (948.94 (13.7
5 7 0 7 (29.04) (1099.7 (622.7 (0.19) (928.19)
) ) 17.81) ) 5)
2) 7)
1830.5 1229.
1624.92 48.31 2088.60 48.28 1671.81 51.96
Others 1072. 1234.3 769.5 1100. 51.50 9 08 59.72
1408.58 (1298.17 (18.4 (1668.6 (18.4 (1335.6 (21.4
55 1 3 20 (21.04) (1462.4 (981.9 (27.60)
) 9) 1) 6) 3) 0)
8) 3)
1513.6 830.9
1455.92 34.09 1430.20 13.65 1290.89 38.44
All 1128.8 653.0 932.4 53.34 5 1 27.23
949.5 1258.46 (1163.15 (7.12 (1142.6 (- (1031.3 (10.6
7 6 8 (22.50) (1209.2 (663.8 (1.65)
) ) 1) 9.21) 1) 0)
7) 2)
All India
1034.8 500.6
37.13 7.99 78.17 857.46 40.85
ST 542.6 463.5 608.7 783.77 44.43 9 3 1157.19
754.69 649.49 (8.47 (- (40.9 (678.29 (11.4
8 8 9 (620.00) (14.25) (818.64 (396.0 (915.39)
) 14.57) 4) ) 2)
) 2)
SC 662.1 834.94 424.5 808.09 690.5 659.15 -0.45 932.27 11.66 530.9 25.07 972.87 20.39 758.38 9.83
(- 4
(- (737.47 (- (599.91 (-
4 2 (521.42) 11.67 (420.0 (-1.06) (769.58)
21.25) ) ) 4.77) ) 13.12)
0)
1039.5 582.4
20.97 -4.24 37.55 870.93 18.52
OBC 674.9 608.2 734.8 796.60 18.02 8 2 1183.86
859.34 860.69 (- (- (8.81 (688.94 (-
7 3 2 (630.15) (-6.64) (822.35 (460.7 (936.49)
4.30) 24.25) ) ) 6.24)
) 2)
1431.8 658.8
30.04 1709.55 41.55 1306.10 29.99
Others 1101.0 548.6 1004. 1213.15 27.30 3 9 20.09
953 1207.74 (2.87 (1352.3 (11.9 (1033.1 (2.83
5 5 75 (959.66) (0.70) (1132.6 (521.2 (-5.00)
) 3) 7) 8) )
4) 1)
1212.6 579.6
23.55 7.21 1444.97 40.18 1052.36 23.13
All 812.9 540.6 854.7 982.35 20.84 6 3
981.49 1030.82 (- (- (1143.0 (10.8 (832.46 (-
6 6 0 (777.08) (-4.41) (959.27 (458.5
2.26) 15.19) 4) 9) ) 2.60)
) 1)
Source: See Table 2.
It is important to examine whether the yawning gap between the ST
agricultural labour and that of all households and ‘others’ largely
comprising the forward community households enjoying the highest MPCE
has widened or narrowed over the five years understudy. In 1999-2000,
the absolute difference in monthly MPCE between ST, agricultural labour
households and those comprising ‘others’, with the highest MPCE was
Rs.673 and the gap between the two groups 2.36 times. Even with all
category households the gap works out to 1.5 times with an absolute
difference of Rs.272. The situation worsened when we examine the
scenario in 2004-05. The absolute difference between the ST agricultural
labour households and ‘others’ rises to Rs.1004 and gap 3.3 times. With
reference to ‘all’ household the difference works out to Rs.584 and the gap
widened to 2.36 times. This is a classic case of growing marginalization.
However this is not something beyond redemption. Table 2 shows that ST
households self-employed in agriculture has a MPCE of Rs.906 which is
better than the average for all ST households. The SC households
engaged in ‘other’ labour activities do have a higher level of MPCE. This is
also true when we turn to the urban sector in Table 2(a) where ST
households engaged in regular wage or salaried employment enjoy a
relatively higher level of per capita consumption in 2004-05. Even so when
we compare all social groups both in rural and urban sectors the only
group that suffered nominal and real income loss are the scheduled tribes
[See Table 2 and 2(a)]. The casual labour, SC/ST households in urban
areas also continue to languish. In the urban areas OBCs also have
suffered loss in real consumption. Another factor to be noted is the sharp
increase in the consumption levels between the poorest and richest
groups in 2004-05 compared with 1999-2000 in the urban sector. In 1999-
2000 the gap between ST casual labour households which have the lowest
MPCE (Rs.597) and ‘others’ with the highest MPCE levels (Rs.1409) is 2.36
times and the absolute difference was Rs.812. In 2004-05 the gap yawned
4.06 times with an absolute difference of Rs.1575. This has happened in a
short span of five years in the urban sector. The growing inequality in
consumption is alarming.
17
As per the NSS 61st round, the consumption of rice from PDS in rural Kerala in 2004-05
was only 35 per cent as against 79 per cent in Tamil Nadu and 62 per cent in Andhra
Pradesh, states which provide the major share of rice to Kerala market [See NSSO (2007)
(a)].
Table 3 (a)
Expenditure on Education, Health and other social services
as a percentage to total expenditure (1980-81 – 2006-07)
Social Services
Educatio Health &
other than Exp on
n family Growt
Growt Growt Education, Health
Year Expenditu welfare % h
h Rate h Rate & Family welfare%
re % to T. to Total Rate
to Total
Exp Expenditure
Expenditure
1980-81 27.01 10.37 11.34
1981-82 27.33 11.10 8.20
1982-83 29.28 10.94 7.23
1983-84 25.80 11.67 5.70
1984-85 26.73 10.54 9.02
-0.97 -1.59 -0.07
1985-86 25.23 8.50 9.70
1986-87 25.79 9.11 9.69
1987-88 26.38 9.58 8.19
1988-89 25.85 10.13 8.09
1989-90 25.15 9.94 8.79
1990-91 25.17 9.34 8.01
1991-92 23.87 8.60 7.00
1992-93 23.17 7.89 6.58
1993-94 24.60 8.20 6.38
1994-95 24.51 8.07 6.00
1995-96 22.46 8.13 6.65
1996-97 21.83 7.54 8.09
1997-98 19.61 7.30 8.31
1998-99 19.82 -2.04 7.34 -2.46 7.56 -0.17
1999-00 21.36 7.33 6.29
2000-01 21.04 6.86 6.20
2001-02 20.22 7.27 6.35
2002-03 19.20 6.47 7.46
2003-04 19.09 6.72 5.68
2004-05 18.23 6.63 8.58
2005-06 17.97 6.36 7.01
2006-07 18.59 5.24 6.54
Table 3(b)
Expenditure on Education, Health and Social Security as a
proportion of NSDP (1980-81 – 2006-07)
Educatio Health Social Services
n, & family other than
Growt Growth Growt
Year Expenditu welfare Education,, Health
h Rate Rate h Rate
re % to % to & family welfare %
SDP SDP to SDP
1980-81 4.26 1.63 1.79
1981-82 4.50 1.83 1.35
1982-83 4.25 1.59 1.05
1983-84 4.22 1.91 0.93
1984-85 4.28 1.69 1.44
0.91 0.29 1.83
1985-86 4.74 1.60 1.82
1986-87 4.82 1.70 1.81
1987-88 4.59 1.67 1.42
1988-89 4.64 1.82 1.45
1989-90 4.45 1.76 1.55
1990-91 4.70 1.75 1.50
1991-92 4.08 1.47 1.20
1992-93 3.91 1.33 1.11
1993-94 4.35 1.45 1.13
1994-95 4.24 1.40 1.04
1995-96 3.70 1.34 1.10
1996-97 3.64 1.26 1.35
1997-98 3.56 1.32 1.51
1998-99 3.48 -1.94 1.29 -1.94 1.33 0.15
1999-00 4.17 1.43 1.23
2000-01 3.75 1.22 1.11
2001-02 3.41 1.23 1.07
2002-03 3.66 1.23 1.42
2003-04 3.44 1.21 1.02
2004-05 3.24 1.18 1.52
2005-06 3.10 1.10 1.21
2006-07 3.56 1.00 1.24
Fig 1
Expendit
35
Fig 2
30
Expen
6
25
It is not only the reduced budgetary allocations for education and
health, but the accelerated commercialization of these sectors under the
Reform regime that materially weakened the Kerala model. The unaided18
private schools and colleges which were not a strong presence in the state
mushroomed under liberalization. In 1990-91, out of a total student
population of over 5.9 million, private unaided schools (which are
considered to offer better quality coaching and courses) accounted for
only 2.5 per cent of the student strength. By 2006-07, this proportion rose
to nearly 8 per cent while the student intake in government schools
declined from 39 per cent in 1990-91 to 30.5 per cent in 2006-0719. Only
those who can afford to pay high fees go to these unaided schools.
Another striking aspect to be noted here is that while Kerala succeeded in
reducing gender gap in education, inequalities in schooling between SC/ST
and other categories have continued to persist. This is well exemplified in
Kochar (2006) using NSS (55th round) data for 1999-00. Taking 10 year
age cohorts of the population, Kochar study analyses the proportion of
each cohort, from oldest to youngest that has completed 8 years of
schooling, distinguishing cohorts (SCs and ST, versus other castes), and
shows that persistent caste gap exists in schooling at this level, with
almost no reduction in this gap across age cohorts.
Table 4
Distribution of Children by economic categories and by the
type of schools attending
Economic
Government Aided Unaided
Group
I 47.0 49.6 3.4
II 40.3 49.4 10.3
III 30.9 39.0 30.1
IV 14.2 30.2 55.5
[Source: K.PAravinden, ed (2006):75]
18
Government aided private educational institutions have the same fees, salary, pension
and syllabus compared with their government counter parts. But the unaided ones are
self-financing institutions.
19
These are based on data from the office of the Director of Public Instruction and
Economic Review for various years.
During the last ten years, self-financing professional colleges have
mushroomed in Kerala. About 82 per cent of engineering seats and 45 per
cent of medical college seats are now in the self-financing sector. There is
considerable communal appeasements and probably corruption in this.
The present LDF government’s efforts to rationalize the fees structure and
admission rules to enable the vulnerable sections of society to get a fair
deal (what is justice if not fairness?) has met with serious opposition from
vested interests. Surely, the constitutional protection given to the
minority communities (Christians are the dominant interest groups in
education) should not be discriminatory to the more deprived and those
excluded due to the lack of purchasing power to buy professional
education. While commercialization of knowledge production itself is
questionable, the moot question is whether any group (minority or others
who enjoy constitutional protection) can trade education and health to
make profit on the strength of constitutional protection alone? Affordability
and accessibility which were the hall-mark of the Kerala model seem to be
jettisoned under the new dispensation.
20
This fabulous increase is obviously not due to inflation.
21
Broken into six phases from identification of felt needs at the gram sabha (the assembly
of voters at the village panchayat level) to the project formulation and final scrutiny by
voluntary expert committees the process of planning is sought to be made really
participatory.
priorities and improve the quality of public services. Indeed, participating
in social choice is a valued capability and freedom.
Apparently taking the cue from Franke and Chasin (1999)22, Rene
Veron (2001) also has projected a “New” Kerala Model based on
“comprehensive” community-based, environmentally sensitive
programmes ‘that offer important lessons for sustainable development in
India and elsewhere’. Elaborating certain differences between the ‘old’
Kerala Model and the ‘new’ Kerala Model, Veron asserts that the ‘old’
model “preoccupied with redistributive strategies failed to induce
economic development [Veron (2001): 601]. While it is difficult to accept
any such classification of Kerala’s development experience especially
when they are based on hasty generalizations, it is important that he
underscores people’s participation as the defining characteristic of the
decentralization process. In the rest of this section, we may offer a few
comments on the experience of decentralized planning and participatory
democracy in Kerala during the last decade of decentralized governance.
We focus more on the positive aspects and the value of capabilities23.
One, the euphoria of the People’s Plan Campaign has died out. The
innumerable successful initiatives in different fields in several panchayats
have not become a central tendency. Although the quality of democratic
practice has not been totally lost, local democracy has yet to become a
sustained way of life. In most places gram sabha has degenerated into a
routine and weak institution. A gram sabha that becomes an assembly of
beneficiaries is a poor reflection of capability or freedom. Despite the
widely trumpeted stress on agricultural production, efforts to mobilize
people, expertise and resources to augment production have failed to get
off the ground. Transparency guarantees and initiatives to root out
corruption (for e.g. the Beneficiary Committee system legally yielded to
the contract system in road and building construction) have not
succeeded.
22
Franke and Chasin have published a modified version of the same paper in Govindan
Parayil, ed, (2000).
23
No documentary proof is provided although the author in his capacity as Chairperson of
a committee constituted by the government of Kerala to evaluate the experience of
decentralized planning in the state has a lot of empirical data with him.
Two, Kerala’s capability to lead a healthy life is fairly well
documented. In section 3.2 we have documented strong evidences to
show that this capability is seriously under threat. Certainly an
empowered local government has the responsibility and the potential to
provide adequate preventive and curative health care to the local
community. In practice however public health performance leaves many
things to be desired. The utilization levels of public health centres (PHCs)
and sub-centres are deteriorating due to the lack of facilities. A well
documented study based on extensive field work by D.Varatharajan, etal
(2004) show how the tremendous potential of the health care system has
not been fully utilized. To quote their findings:
“Panchayats in Kerala allocated a lower proportion of resources than that
allocated by the state government prior to decentralization; while
panchayat resources grew at an annual rate of 30.7%, health resources
grew at 7.9%. PHCs were funded to the extent of 0.7-2.7% of the total
cost. An additional 2% in PHC resources was associated with improved
patient load (63.5%), cost effectiveness (50.8%), medicine supply (49.4%),
information (32.8%) and patient satisfaction (12.7%)…..Decentralisation
brought no significant change to the health sector. Active panchayat
support to PHCs existed in only a few places, but wherever it was present
the result was positive”. (D.Varatharajan etal (2004):p.41]. A quote from
a recent field study of 245 households affected by Chikungunya during the
spread of the epidemics covering 14 gram panchayats in the districts of
Pathanamthitta, Alappuzha and Kottayam districts is also revealing: “We
could not gather evidence to believe that any of these GPs have taken any
concerted efforts for health sanitation and vector control with a long term
perspective. This is an activity that can be effectively carried out only by
the GPs” {Itty (2007): 36]. Indeed decentralization has yet to become an
essential agenda of the public care system of the state. Even today 36
gram panchayats do not have public health centres. It is important to
build on the positive linkage of panchayats and public health care
systems.
I do not propose to spell out in detail the political deficits that this
state of public action fame encounters today. For a state that has seen
around 60 political parties on the political chess board game in the past
half a century, 18 of them are now aligned on both sides. It is not certain
how, many of them grown out of partisan or personal interests can foster
larger democratic values and substantial freedom. The ‘old’ demand
politics are often in conflict with constructive ideas and projects. For Olle
Tornquist who has studied extensively Kerala politics the “most
challenging” task is “the lack of a strong public sphere for autonomous
debate and discussion among independent citizens. This is strange, given
all the speeches and papers about ‘public action’ in the ‘Kerala Model’ and
about the transparency and public space that would be generated by the
People’s Plan Campaign. Yet, media and other forums for public discourse
seem to be based on the primacy of the narrow interests rather than the
argument” [Tornquist (2007): 39]. In the context of the freedom
perspective that this paper highlights it is important to listen to another
observation he makes. “You can’t talk about everything publicly” is the
standing answer I get in Kerala’ [Tornquist (2007): 39]27. Any keen student
of Kerala society will be pained by the reality that collective choice and
respect for truth (the basis of a scientific and purposive society) is at a
colossal discount.
Fig-3
Atr
10000
9000
8000
7000
Appendix A
Road Accidents in Kerala
No. of No. of
No. of No. of No. off
No of Persons Persons
Year accidents Persons Persons
Accidents killed / injured /
/ day killed injured
Day Day
1980 7064 19.35 1186 3.25 9913 27.16
1985 10348 28.35 1560 4.27 14441 39.56
1990 20900 57.26 1717 4.70 27972 76.64
1997 34661 94.96 2698 7.39 49713 136.20
1998 32837 89.96 2534 6.94 46198 126.57
1999 33979 93.09 2600 7.12 47193 129.30
2000 37072 101.57 2789 7.64 49403 135.35
2001 38357 105.09 2707 7.42 49669 136.08
2002 38762 106.20 2873 7.87 49460 135.51
2003 39496 108.21 2934 8.04 48640 133.26
2004 41219 112.93 2154 5.90 51228 140.35
2005 42295 115.88 3161 8.66 51217 140.32
2006 41728 114.32 3627 9.94 49799 136.44
2007 39861 109.21 3802 10.42 47951 131.37
Source: Statistics for Planning 2001, National Crime Records Bureau
Appendix B
Atrocities committed against women - Kerala (1991-2007)
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 200
Offences/ Year
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Rape 211 227 211 197 266 389 588 589 423 552 562 499 394 480 478 601 512
116 156 177 164 169 194 212 194 226 233 254 262
569 523 468 679 810
Molestation 6 1 3 3 5 2 3 7 0 9 3 4
Kidnapping 99 86 85 120 110 149 160 130 123 89 97 91 102 142 129 202 177
Dowry death 13 12 8 9 21 25 25 21 31 25 27 17 33 31 21 25 27
Cruelty by
107 167 212 248 241 256 283 293 322 328 370 399
Husband or 237 290 380 551 787
9 5 5 8 8 1 6 0 2 3 8 9
relatives
Other offences 130 212 322 273 298 277 217 183 175 141 166 174
733 939 737 986 NA
against women 5 2 7 9 5 3 1 3 4 3 2 4
18 20 18 25 33 49 73 74 77 76 74 75 72 76 80 90 760
Total 67 78 94 45 13 70 06 73 43 21 41 01 28 81 87 45 1
Source: Statistics for Planning 2005, Figures for 2003, 2004 and 2005 to 2007 collected from the Crimes
Records Bureau
References