IWPR Insight

Khartoum's Controversial Darfur Peace Process

By Assadig Mustafa Zakaria Musa - International Justice - ICC
4 May 11
Since conflict erupted in Darfur in 2003, several agreements have been put in pl
ace, but none has brought lasting peace to the region. The latest initiative, th
e Darfur Political Process, comes from the Sudanese government.
Assadig Mustafa Zakaria Musa, a reporter for Radio Dabanga and a contributor to
Fi al Mizan, an IWPR-produced radio programme about justice issues in Darfur, ex
plains what the Darfur Political Process is and where it might be going.

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What is the Darfur Political Process, and how does it differ from other peace ef
forts that have been launched?
When it unveiled this latest initiative last August, the government in Khartoum
referred to it as “Darfur Peace From Within”. Unlike other strategies, developed out
side Darfur by external actors and rebel movements, the idea behind this plan is
to engage with players within the region – namely civil society and elected polit
ical representatives.
There are five prongs to the strategy – security (which means ending the rebel ins
urgency), development (providing new schools, hospitals and roads), Darfur dialo
gue (negotiating directly with the people of Darfur rather than through rebel re
presentatives), the Doha talks (these internationally-backed peace negotiations
with rebel groups are to continue, but the people of Darfur should have the fina
l say on any agreement), and an end to inter-communal conflict.

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Isn’t the Darfur Political Process simply an attempt by Khartoum to sidetrack the
ongoing Doha talks and impose a local process which it can manage and manipulate
?
This certainly seems to be what the government is doing. Over the years, Khartou
m has become frustrated at not being able to influence the Darfur discussions as
it would like to. Moving the debate closer to home gives it greater control ove
r an eventual solution.
As a result of last year’s election, 90 per cent of elected politicians in Darfur
come from Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party, NCP, and many of the rest are li
nked to the party in some way. By engaging solely with them, the government can
be sure that it has a loyal support base, one that is unlikely to be fully repre
sentative of the people of Darfur.

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How can one talk of a meaningful and lasting peace if none of the rebel groups s
upports the DPP?
It is indeed very difficult to imagine a lasting peace agreement that excludes t
he rebel movements, but this is one of the core purposes that lie behind the DPP
. Khartoum cares far less about arriving at a political solution than it does ab
out crushing the rebel movements. The DPP initiative takes the negotiations away
from rebel leaders and gives the government greater control over who it’s going t
o talk to.
It’s also important to remember that the rebels are still armed militia groups, an
d have not yet managed to form themselves into coherent political entities able
to conduct decisive talks with the government.

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Meanwhile the Doha talks go on, but only two rebel groups are taking part in the
m, while the SLM/A of Minni Minnawi, who signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, DPA –
the first of its kind – with Khartoum in 2006, says the deal is off and his group
is back at war with the government. What are the chances of any kind of negotiat
ed settlement with some or all of the rebel groups?
When Minni Minnawi signed the DPA, commentators warned that without the backing
of other rebel groups, the agreement would have only limited impact in the regio
n. Now Minnawi has pulled out of this agreement, since he realises it has achiev
ed very little in terms of peace and unity for Darfur.
There is a huge danger that without broader support, the Doha talks will go down
the same path. There’s been a lot of pressure for other movements to join the tal
ks, but at this point that doesn’t seem likely to happen. Very little confidence e
xists between the government and the rebel movements. And if an agreement is rea
ched with only one or two of the rebel groups, how can that really be called a p
eace settlement?

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Why does the US appear more critical of the DPP than it was previously?
The US was never overtly supportive of the DPP. Its position has always been – and
still is – that any mechanism within Darfur should be an extension of rather than
a replacement for the Doha talks. But when the Sudanese government started talk
ing about the DPP at the end of last year, it was clear that the Obama administr
ation’s priority was the referendum on South Sudan’s future, not the simmering confl
ict in Darfur. Washington was therefore prepared to stay quiet on Darfur and go
along with the DPP, as long as Khartoum didn’t seek to disrupt the referendum in t
he south.
Now that the South Sudan referendum is over, there are signs that Washington is
changing tack and becoming more outspokenly critical of DPP, which it sees as a
way for Khartoum to plaster over the problems in Darfur.

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How does Khartoum benefit from pressing ahead with the DPP, at a time when confl
ict continues within Darfur?
If we look at the talks taking place in Doha and also within the DPP framework,
and then compare that with the government’s behaviour on the ground, it’s easy to co
nclude that Khartoum doesn’t want peace. It talks about peace on the one hand, but
at the same time persists with attacks on civilians. It wants internally displa
ced people, IDPs, to return home, yet it continues to destroy villages, thereby
displacing even more people.
By developing the DPP, Khartoum is hoping to create legitimacy for its actions i
n Darfur. But it’s difficult to see this initiative as anything more than cover fo
r a government-designed and -imposed solution.
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Khartoum favours dividing Darfur into five constituent parts instead of three, w
hich would make a divide-and-rule policy even easier to pursue. Meanwhile, many
people in Darfur would prefer to see their region unified into a single territor
ial unit. How can these differences be reconciled?
Prior to 1994, Darfur counted as a separate region, but it was subsequently divi
ded into three states by Khartoum, which wanted to weaken it to prevent it threa
tening the newly-formed Islamic government.
It is now clear that the government wants to further fragment the region, which
would make it even harder for Darfur to speak with a single voice. Others do not
want this, and are calling for the region to be unified.
The solution being proposed is to hold a referendum on the issue. If, as Khartou
m hopes, the population of Darfur does not vote in favour of unity, then the gov
ernment will be able to justify its decision to further divide the region. Since
the overwhelming majority of elected representatives in Darfur come from the NC
P, some are wondering how representative a referendum can really be.