MacIntyre and Green Economics

Reading Brian Milani's article, "Beyond Environmental Protection: Ecological Alternatives &
Education for a Green Revolution," one versed in Alasdair MacIntyre's project is immediately
struck by a remarkable number of similarities between the two theorists. Milani argues that
only from the perspective of a local community and a local economy - and a consideration of
the human goods which are achieved in such a form of life - is it possible to develop an
ecologically sustainable economy. But equally, I would argue, it is only from a realist
perspective like that of MacIntyre and Bhaskar, can such a project of a sustainable economy
be developed. Briefly, Milani needs an account of 'nature,' both human nature, because he
needs an account of the goods which can be achieved in such communities - it is from such
an account of the human good and goods that he can critique global capitalism (more on
this below) - as well as an account of the way in which ecological systems function. This
must be a realist account of such systems, which, he must argue, when properly understood
enable communities to interact with the environment in such a way that both human goods
can be consistently achieved and the ecological systems in question can be preserved, so
that such communities can continue to achieve those goods necessary to human life. In a
remarkable way, Milani has offered an account of the way in which, by focusing on human
goods, the environment can be preserved. It is a scientific and moral realism, specifically
an Aristotelianism, rather than any sort of Heideggerian account, which, I would argue
provides the theoretical framework for working out the concepts necessary to Milani's
project.
Turning to the article itself, I will note several items of interest. Milani questions the
"mindset [that] assumes a basic conflict between humanity and nature. It presumes an
intrinsically destructive human economy from which nature must always be shielded." I
think we should not overlook the significance of Milani's claim that human life is not
intrinsically destructive of the natural world. This may seem far-reaching but ultimately, I
think this is a rejection of the Cartesian notion of subjectivity which has exerted such
influence in modern philosophy. To see human life as not opposed to but as a part of the
natural world, is to see the world as an ordered whole in which human life is situated. It is
also to take an Aristotelian position in political philosophy. Liberal theory has tended to see
politics as a matter of convention, going back to Hobbes and stretching to John Rawls'
project. Milani's position puts this in question, in an Aristotelian fashion, by arguing that
various human goods, achieved in local communities provide the basis for directing human
activity. But it is also to see human life itself as a natural process. This is just what
Descartes did not do with his account of the radical difference between the res cogitans and
the res extensa. And Descartes view was foundational for the tradition that followed
stretching from Kant to Heidegger. It is not coincidental that both of these positions are put
into question by Milani's approach for they reciprocally inform each other. Another striking
similarity to MacIntyre's , is Milani's recognition that such an approach must be both
theoretical and practical. As he says, " Our focus is at once visionary and practical. We try
to highlight the principles that reveal the ultimate potentials of eco-development, and also
guide the practical activity that is already taking place in every sector." This shift in
practice must be informed by an ethical perspective, one that offers an account of the goods
in question as well as an ecological and economic theory which can provide an account of
the way in which various practices serve to achieve these human goods and preserve the
ecological systems with which communities must interact for this purpose. The need for an
ethics and politics that can give an account of the goods in question derives from Milani's
own economics and is not an extrinsic requirement.
One of the most striking features of Milani's theory and one where a fruitful interchange
with MacIntyre's philosophy is most likely is his claim that a green economy must be more
knowledge intensive than global capitalism. Milani states, "OISE sociologist David
Livingstone (2001) has been showing that our highly-touted corporate-global economy is by
no means “knowledge-based”. Truly high-skill jobs are concentrated in a fairly narrow band
of the work force. Many more low-skill than high-skill jobs are being generated, and most
people in the developed countries are far more educated and skilled than they need to be
for the available jobs." Milani claims that such higher skilled jobs are necessary to develop
innovative ways of interfacing with the natural world in order that both human goods can be
achieved and the natural world can be preserved so that those goods can be consistently
achieved. This is a sustainable economics. Milani says, "Others have insisted that a
knowledge-based economy requires new forms of craft, as well as the recovery of many
older forms. The craftsperson typically combines design and execution on a high level." It
is Alasdair MacIntyre's account of 'practices' first offered in After Virtue which can provide a
theoretical perspective for the way in which such high-skilled jobs and crafts can contribute
to political organization as well as the way they contribute to a rational account of the
human good and such an account is exactly what Milani must presuppose. Like MacIntyre,
Milani claims that such a politics will be much more participatory than what passes for
politics in contemporary society.
Because Milani is attempting to address one of the major problems of the modern world -
the way global capitalism has tended to destroy the environment - and because MacIntyre's
neo-Aristotelian ethics and poltics (as well as the philosophy of science and metaphysics
necessary for his project) offers such support to Milani's project, Milani in turn offers
MacIntyre a way of demonstrating that such a neo-Aristotelianism is not a step back to an
archaic world but rather a vital way of ensuring the continuing well being of humanity.
Though Milani does not state this explicitly, it can be gathered from his account, that it is
the consistent disregard for the human good by global capitalism that is placing the natural
world at such risk. We should not forget that MacIntyre was at least partly inspired by
Walter Miller's, A Canticle for Leibowitz. Milani states,

Green economic education is not, however, simply glorified trades training. It is based on new forms of knowledge
about ecosystems, and about community needs and capacities. Communities and regions need to know much more
about their natural systems and their resources, both renewable and non-renewable. An ecological economy would
attempt to be like nature in that there would be no waste: every output of a process would be an input for some
other process. Industrial systems would be designed to make this happen, but this requires lots of knowledge
combined with great imagination. Because an ecological economy depends so much on human creativity, and
because resource conservation depends on directly targeting human need, much more would also have to be
known about community skills and needs. Universities, therefore, would have a crucial place in developing both
specialized and generalized knowledge necessary to both green work and green planning.

It the necessity for innovative ways of interacting with the natural world, which creates the
need for a shift from low-skilled industrial economy to an economy that is much more
practice (in Macntyre's technical sense) based. As noted above this would include a greater
reliance on crafts, which have been something of a paradigm for MacIntyre. By
disregarding both the destructive effects of capitalism on the environment and the way in
which a more local economy can contribute to the preservation of the natural world,
philosophers and other working from a Macintyrean perspective disregard one of the
strongest arguments in support of neo-Aristotelianism.
An equally striking area of fruitful interchange is Milani's insistence on developing ways to
evaluate real wealth, in order "to displace money as the measure of real wealth in economic
life." Milani, without using such language, is speaking about the human good. This should
be understood as a 'form of life,' where various goods can be consistently achieved in way
that is rationally ordered. Milani states, "Some of the most important indicators [of real
wealth] are very objective: biophysical measures of ecosystems and of human production
and consumption. They give us some idea of how nature works and how we are affecting
nature. Other objective indicators are social: measurements of crime rates, violence
against women, income disparities, education levels, etc. But some indicators are more
subjective, giving us some sense of what our communities value and why." It is an
Aristotelian perspective which can provide the language and concepts for understanding
these issues, and no other contemporary philosopher has given more powerful arguments
for the importance of an account of the good for politics than Alasdair MacIntyre.
One other aspect must be pointed to though these could easily be multiplied. In "What is
Green Economics" (http://www.greeneconomics.net/what2f.htm) Milani offers 10 principles
of a green economy. The first is:

1. The Primacy of Use-value, Intrinsic Value & Quality: This is the fundamental principle of the green economy as a
service economy, focused on end-use, or human and environment needs. Matter is a means to the end of satisfying
real need, and can be radically conserved. Money similarly must be returned to a status as a means to facilitate
regenerative exchanges, rather than an end in itself. When this is done in even a significant portion of the
economy, it can undercut the totalitarian power of money in the entire economy.

This principle is strikingly similar to Aristotle's account of the genesis of the use of money in
the Book 1 of the Politics. Initially money was used to facilitate the exchange of necessary
things. Aristotle's picture is that of a more localized economy, much like Wendell Berry's
picture of the same thing. Here families as part of local political communities would engage
in the sort of activities necessary to provide for the needs of those involved. The activities
had a direct finality in that the provided for the necessities of life. Practices like medicine
and ultimately politics served the same goal, that of living, more exactly living well. Money
served as an instrument to facilitate the exchange necessary to serve this same goal.
Aristotle's point is that in the context of the household situated in a localized economy and
local political community, the desires of the various members could be ordered by the
context. The various physical, biological, psychological and rational / spiritual needs of
members would be clarified and provided for in ways that were ordered through earlier
experience and through political debate. But, Aristotle says, through the expansion of
commerce, money became detached from its finality in the household, local economy and
political community. Keep in mind, that this context provided a framework of meaning
ultimately rooted in the needs and desires of the people involved. When the use of money
was so detached it became a quasi-universal that stood alone. Money was considered to
have a value independently from its ability to serve the needs of people. Through this
process the desires of individuals became detached from this same context, and the point of
reference for an individual's desire was money itself. But, since money is merely an empty
universal, and is only good insofar as it can serve some goal, the individual who seeks
money for its own sake is left with her or his needs unfilled and ultimately with no direction
for her or his fundamental desires. Milani wants to critique this understanding of money by
focusing on the goods for which money is useful. Aristotle is arguing for the importance of
economia or household management for politics and economics; Milani shares this
perspective. In his book Designing the Green Economy, Milani states, Greens have argued
that the creation of ecological communities depends on making homes and residences
places of production for food, energy, water and so on and not simply places of passive
consumption" (74).
I have said very little about what Milani's green economics actually entails. But sufficient
for the comparisons which I have drawn, is an understanding of the way in which Milani
relates local communities and the goods achieved in such communities and the possibility of
a sustainable economy. Milani rejects the idea that human economic activity is intrinsically
destructive of the environment. He thinks that local communities are necessary for building
a sustainable economy. Amongst other reasons, this is so because it is within a small
community that human needs can be articulated and achieved. It the finality of human
needs, the goods necessary for human life, which can overturn the hegemony of money
which drives the global economy, much of which is detrimental to both the environment and
the types of local community where human goods can be achieved. It is by properly
understanding the goods which are necessary for human life, and I think Milani would say,
not only for human life but for a good life, as well the various eco-systems with which
human beings must deal, that communities and others are able to develop sustainable
economic activities that both provide for those various goods necessary to a good life and
can preserve the eco-systems in question so that those goods can be achieved consistently
over time. This, Milani argues, requires a more knowledge based economy that relies on
higher skilled labor and a greater prevalence of crafts. This account as I have argued both
provides great resources for a neo-Aristotelianism informed by MacIntyre's work and is
greatly supported by such a neo-Aristotelianism.