John DiMatteo

Minds, Machines, and Persons

Instructor: Dr. Peter M. Asaro
May 8, 2008

N O N - R E P R E S E N T AT I O N A L T H E O R I E S O F M I N D

Introduction

In Herbert and Stuart Dreyfus’s paper “Making a Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial

Intelligence Back at a Branch-point,” there is shown a historical favoritism towards the Physical

Symbol Systems Hypothesis as a framework for studying artificial intelligence (AI). In

“Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search,” Allen Newell and Herbert A.

Simon state the empirical hypothesis:

Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis. A physical symbol system has the necessary
and sufficient means for general intelligent action. (116)

This hypothesis has guided AI researchers to expect that any intelligent system is necessarily a

physical symbol system. A physical symbol system is an abstraction of computers in which

physically instantiated symbols are explicit representations. These representational symbols are

systematically manipulated, ordinarily making use of a structure in the symbols. By stating the

hypothesis as empirical, Newell and Simon mean that it very well could be false and that

empirical evidence can be used to demonstrate the truth of their hypothesis. Dreyfus describes

connectionism as an alternative paradigm for AI researches and says “both approaches looked

1
equally promising...Yet the result of the internal war between the two research programs was

surprisingly asymmetrical” (4). The Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis proponents basically

won, and Dreyfus quotes Jerry Lettvin who gives a typical disposition that this approach is “the

only straw afloat” (16).

The theory of mind originating from the Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis is still

dominant, but there continues to be alternatives proposed. It will be discussed how–much like

the situation described by Dreyfus–these alternatives are not treated on equal ground to the

dominant view. In “What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?”, Tim van Gelder lists some

of the alternatives of the dominant theory of mind: connectionism, neurocomputational

approaches, ecological psychology, situated robotics, synergetics, and artificial life (345). Some

of these alternatives question the fundamental concept of representation in a theory of mind. In

“Doing Without Representing?”, Andy Clark and Josefa Toribio say there is “a growing distrust

of Representationalism displayed by active practitioners of Cognitive Science; a distrust rooted

in the practical attempt to model and understand intelligent, adaptive behavior” (401). This

distrust of representation is epitomized by Rodney Brooks’ development of the subsumption

architecture in which he says “representations and models of the world simply get in the

way” (Brooks 1990, 140).

This paper will examine anti-representational elements of the subsumption architecture

developed by Brooks and the dynamical hypothesis defended by van Gelder. The two

frameworks will be outlined, the representation related arguments will be analyzed, and a

2
conclusion will discuss why non-representational theories of mind are viable alternatives that

deserve to be further studied and evaluated.

Subsumption Architecture

In 1990, Brooks described the subsumption architecture in “Intelligence without

Representation.” Brooks calls the new approach a “behavior based approach,” but Rolf Pfeifer

says the architecture is now appreciated as a part of “Embodied Cognitive Science” (Pfeifer

201). In contrast to typical AI research, Brooks believed that intelligent systems should be built

as wholes, even if very simple, instead of retreating “into specialized subproblems, such as ways

to represent knowledge, natural language understanding, vision or even more specialized areas

such as truth maintenance systems or plan verification” (Brooks 1990, 140). Brooks developed

the subsumption architecture while building robots designed to work in messy and unpredictable

environments, like an office.

Instead of the traditional notion of input and output, the subsumption architecture makes use

of layers. Each layer consists of a short perception/actuation loop. To elucidate the use of

layers, Clark describes Brooks’ first mobile robot with three layers: the first layer avoids

obstacles by halting if an object is dead ahead and orienting to an unblocked direction, the

second layer wanders randomly, and the third layer explores distant targets. This architecture is

3
contrasted with the more dominant paradigm in the following figure:

shows different ways of decomposing an agent. figure 7.1 from Pfeifer 1999

In the subsumption architecture, the layers work largely independently and influence each other

through inhibition and overriding. In contrast, the typical representational scheme is a single

serial input-output loop involving perception, model building, planning, and finally acting on the

environment through motor control.

Brooks claims that his approach has no representations. Clearly, there is no central

representations since the layers work largely independently. While Brooks concedes that to a

certain level actions are represented, he stresses that there are neither represented goals nor

explicit planning:

the goals are implicit in the coupling of actions to perceptual conditions, and apparent
execution of plans unroll in real time as one behavior alters the robot’s configuration
in the world in such a way that new perceptual conditions trigger the next in a
sequence of actions (Brooks 1997, 292)

4
Brooks presentation of the subsumption architecture is clearly a case of strong rejection of

representations.

Dynamical Hypothesis

Van Gelder presents the dynamical hypothesis as an alternative to what he calls the

computational hypothesis. He asserts that the computational hypothesis encompasses the

dominant framework for theory of mind. Van Gelder characterizes computational as having

representations, calculations, meaningful symbols, discrete operations, deterministic sequences,

and homuncularity (i.e. functionally broken into sub-systems, each sub-system being viewed as a

relatively stupid homunculi) (van Gelder 1995, 351). Van Gelder’s dynamical framework is not

usefully described as having any of these components (although he sometimes makes a partial

exception for representations).

Van Gelder’s dynamical hypothesis states that cognition is a dynamical system, and should

be described and analyzed in the same language of dynamics and differential equations used to

describe the Watt centrifugal governor. The governor solves the problem of keeping the speed of

5
a flywheel constant by controlling a valve that lets in a variable amount of steam.

Watt centrifugal governor. figure 1 from van Gelder 1995

As shown in the figure above, the wheel is connected to two arms with attached weights. As the

wheel and weights spin faster, the arms are pushed out and up. The system is set up so that as

the arms move up, the valve closes. Closing the valve reduces the amount of steam driving the

flywheel. This effectively keeps the speed of the flywheel constant as the amount of steam

varies and the load of the flywheel varies. Differential equations describe the dynamic

relationship between the arm angles, flywheel speed, and valve opening. The Watt centrifugal

governor contains none of the computational properties.

Van Gelder stresses that the centrifugal governor is not usefully described by representations.

For example, the arm angle and engine speed, while at first glance one may appear to represent

6
the other, van Gelder explains how the relationship is too complex to be described as

representational (van Gelder 1995, 352). Showing the anti-representationalism of dynamics, van

Gelder says,

Unlike digital computers, dynamical systems are not inherently representational. A

small but influential contingent of dynamicists have found the notion of
representation to be dispensable or even a hindrance for their particular purposes.
Dynamics forms a powerful framework for developing models of cognition that
sidestep representation altogether. The assumption that cognition must involve
representations is based in part on inability to imagine how any nonrepresentational
system could possibly exhibit cognitive performances. Within the dynamical
approach, such systems can not only be imagined, they can be modeled and
constructed (van Gelder 1998, 622).

Unlike Brooks, van Gelder partly condones representations in his alternative theory of mind;

however, the notion of representations in dynamics is very different from in more dominant

theories and dynamics suggests that representations are not the focus of a theory of mind.

Representation Debate

There are many responses to an anti-representational theory of mind. There is much

discussion over the meanings and boundaries of the terms symbols, representations, and

computational. However, many of the arguments against non-representational theories of mind

focus on what the theories have so far failed to accomplish and also on what the theories can in

principle (supposedly) never accomplish.

7
 In “Doing without Representing?”, the most pressing argument Clark has against the

dynamical hypothesis and behavior based approaches is related to what he calls “representation-

hungry” problems. Clark argues that the application of non-representational approaches are

impressive, but have failed to show any ability to perform well in tasks that prima facie require

internal representations or storage in memory of knowledge (419). Clark assumes that there are

obvious examples of “representation-hungry” problems by saying they are “familiar

enough” (419), but if counter-examples were so obvious there would be no debate to begin with.

Further, Clark’s whole argument seems rather circular. By starting with the notion of

“representation-hungry” problems in building intelligent systems, Clark is assuming what he is

arguing: that cognitive systems require representations. Clark seems so prejudiced against non-

representational theories of mind that it seems difficult for Clark to make a fair argument.

Along the same line of thought as Clark’s “representation-hungry” argument, others argue

that there is no reason to assume that non-representational approaches will be successful beyond

what they see as very primitive levels of intelligence. In “Today the earwig, tomorrow man,”

David Kirsh states “I am not yet convinced that success in duplicating insect behaviours such as

wandering, avoiding obstacles, and following corridors proves that the mobotics approach is the

royal path to higher-level behaviours. Insect ethologists are not cognitive scientists.” Kirsh is

criticizing Brooks’ robots (here called mobots and related to insects) as not being sufficiently

complex to count as work in cognitive science. It is interesting that Brooks is equally, if not

more, critical of the the simplistic aspects of behavior based approaches, but Brooks does not see

this as a sign that the approach has no potential. In a comprehensive review, Brooks analyzes

every one of the publications in the journal Adaptive Behavior by MIT Press, which Brooks

8
identifies as most closely aligned to the behavior based approach (Brooks 1997). Brooks

concludes from his review that the behavior based approaches in the publications focus on

movement and navigation and are overwhelmingly simple and trivial when compared to human

like cognition. Brooks coolheaded analysis is especially praiseworthy given the notorious sort of

exaggerated claims that has embarrassed AI researchers in the past. However, in direct

opposition to Kirsh, Brooks says, “Yes, exactly!” from earwigs to humans (Brooks 1997, 301).

Pfeifer summarizes Brooks position by saying, from earwigs to humans “we don't know, but we

have good ideas about how to make progress toward higher levels of intelligence in artificial

systems” (Pfeifer 1999, 223).

It does not seem that representational approaches to intelligent systems has a strong enough

track record to make such high demands of alternative approaches. While many have strong

feelings about the need for representations in a theory of mind, there is much progress being

made without representations and it seems like poor judgement to dismiss these new approaches

too quickly. Van Gelder says that the dynamical hypothesis “has been starved of attention” (van

Gelder 1998, 617); proponents of dynamics and behavior based approaches deserve a fair chance

to prove themselves.

Conclusion

It was not the intent of this paper to make radical claims towards completely abandoning

representational approaches in theory of mind. I share the cautious temperament often

demonstrated by the proponents of these anti-representational paradigms. Van Gelder himself

warns that his arguments for the dynamical hypothesis are not “knock down arguments” (van

9
Gelder 1998, 623). Brooks concludes one of his papers saying, “Only experiments with real

Creatures in real worlds can answer the natural doubts about our approach. Time will

tell” (Brooks 1999, 158). Like the low level of support of connectionism described in Dreyfus’s

“Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branch-point,” these alternative approaches do not have the

same level of support as the more mainstream approaches. Perhaps this time around these

alternative approaches will get a fair chance without being hastily dismissed like connectionism

was.

These alternate approaches demand attention partly because they are such radical departures

from the mainstream. There is a sentiment that mainstream AI is a degenerative research

program. I recently heard an AI researcher refer to the ‘60s as the time “when we thought it

would work.” I think the following two quotes illuminate how much Rodney Brooks and Tim

van Gelder believe a change is necessary, and I think this attitude is rightfully sympathized by

many who have an open mind and want to understand intelligent systems:

“perhaps at this point we simply do not get it, and that there is some fundamental
change necessary in our thinking in order that we might build artificial systems that
have the levels of intelligence, emotional interactions, long term stability and
autonomy, and general robustness that we might expect of biological systems. In
deference to the elixir metaphor, I prefer to think that perhaps we are currently
missing the juice of life” (Brooks 1997, 301)

“insofar as the DH [dynamical hypothesis] is false, it will be superseded by some

form of theoretical framework whose elements are being pieced together by unheard-
of mathematicians laboring under the illusion that their ideas couldn't possibly have
any application to reality” (van Gelder 1999)

10
 WORKS CITED

Brooks, Rodney A. "From Earwigs to Humans". Robotics and Autonomous Systems 1997; Jun

Vol 20 291-304.

Brooks, Rodney A. "Intelligence without Representation". Artificial Intelligence 1991; Vol 47

139-159.

Clark, Andy and Josefa Toribio. "Doing Without Representing". Synthese 1994; Dec 101:3

Dreyfus, H. L. & Dreyfus, S. E. (1988) "Making a Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial

Intelligence Back at a Branch-point." Daedalus, Winter 1988, 117(1), 15-44.

Kirsh, David. "Today the earwig, tomorrow man". Artificial Intelligence 1991; Vol 47 161-184.

Newell, Allen and Herbert A. Simon. "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and

Search". Communications of the ACM 1976; Mar Vol 19(3).

Pfeifer, Rolf, and Christian Scheier. Understanding Intelligence. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.

van Gelder, Tim. “The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science”. Behavior and Brain Sciences

1998; Vol 21 615–665.

van Gelder, T. “Revisiting the Dynamical Hypothesis”. Preprint No. 2/99, University of

Melbourne, Department of Philosophy. 1999.

van Gelder, Tim. "What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?". The Journal of Philosophy

1995; Jul Vol 92(7) 345-381.

11