MISSION NO. 29 FLOWN 10 FEB 1945 copy No. &7 PUT ty XXI BOMBER COMMANDSEGRE SADQUARTERS cor BOER COBAND ABO 22h, TACTIOAL MISSION REPORT Fio1a crcora Nos 28 Mission Now 29 ‘Target: Nakajima Aararart Faevory ora, ZAPAN 20 Feteusry 1945 ‘Tabb of Contents | = Zectical larrative Report mnos 4 Operations Reperte Part IeNavigaticn, Port I1-Bonbardior : Port I1lePlight Bugiucurius FLOR Soy Port 1J=-Roder L 5 g aLAISsv oe S095" : OnaT ‘ ; Tay arth, of tho GGe + 5 $Y Bombor Comers 4 ‘29fplus, IDE’ o rg HBgDQHLRTSRS: : cor BOUER CCERED ‘480 234, SUBIDOTe Roport of Oporations, 10 Fotruary 19h5e 70 + Commanding Gonoraly Twontioth Ax’ Foresy Washington 25e DeGe Le XDGNRERLOUTION OF MISSTON: he Fiold Ordor Noy 285 Hoolguartors 20K Boubor Commnd » dated 6 Fotrucy 1945, dizcetes tho 73rd ami igth Mombardse me Wings to partieipato in cn cttcok oa tho Nekajim Mroraft Factory at Otoe € be Torsote Specified: (1) Primary Torects Woke jima sirereft Foetory, at Ota AMF Objective Poldcr 90s13, targct 15tke (Refer to IKE Bomber Coma Lithosnosaicy oxabtit 1, horctee) (2) Soeondory Terasts Port anf urbe cress of Tokyo! Lu Objcotive Tolar 99e1T+ (3) Jost Rosort Torsot: Any industricl oity $2 Mawowny. SRL 505 apone 2. STRAPRRY AED PLAN Of OPERATIONS: a, Selection of D-Day: The weatho to the Coamanding General on 9 February predicted good vis conditions at the target and good base and route conditions. 1 irs decision was nad W “Toke jime airercet Pastory on 10: SUSE AauoWnY aussviaa, SHORES ©. Details of Plonning--Oporctional: Q) Bonbing Plan (n) Determination of Bosh Loads (2) The Ot plant prosants compacts nearly square target, with o majority of the buildings boing modern in construction, Tho administraticn and inspection buildings are of reinforced conererste with peckod roofs, Less than 20 por cont of the roof aren ic belioved susceptible to incendiary attntl, This typo of targot necessitated concentration upon a bomb lead that would cause the greatest domag>, The S00-pound general-purpose Doub, HE type, tho best available fcr building domclition, was resom= nended eines it mas of sufficiont size to danse effectively in stalintions of this type. Tho load selected was a mixture of 60 vor cent $00-pound GP ani 20 per cont U-76 incendiary bonbe. This Fotis was planned 99 thet if hits wore scored fires would spread and grenter damage would rosult, (2) The gonoral-purp fusod with on instenteneous teil and «0,1 delay nose for deton~ iden tn the event that the tefl tans riled tf Instantaneous setting for the tail fuse would caus the boabs boforo they penetrate: building floors, effect to near misses would bo cscurod, Furthermore, if tail fuses wore notivater by building rocf's, air bursts would result. (3) Tho 2:76 Ancundtary bomb het tnetant smoous nego and tail fusing in order to sproaé the fire as quickly as possible, (4). iniman intovatonster settings P woro usc” to inerease the Jensity of bombs, A (>) Boubardier!s Planning: (2) the north tip of Lake asumiga was solected as the initial point since it is the best visual 4 for Wis target on either an upwind or dewowind run, Tt Hos for ‘enough fron the target to give the bonberiicr an 1S—ninute ran, Appreach mas made ‘so that the lower groundSECRET seater of Tnobndiary gone Ko. 2, This sone Ss epeneaintene alae sere cteror the dose of the *v" formed by the month of tis Sumida River at Tokyo Bay. The Inndawater contrast woul mnike a eped radar chook and aiming peinty and this zone would be vulnerable fox She fombinetion generel-purpose snd incendiary boub lends ecrried. (2) Hovigetion Planning: Reasons for Chotes Route Base roo = 145152 Departure point. 2900 - 135458 ‘This point cLlows’ the groups to ein in wing formetion more than 35 aflos cway from Iwo Jina, thoreby climinsting danger of boing 4ot~ Soto? by enemy Futur on that delant. This mote uso of Mishinc-Shine 271si - 140588 Island co a radar check point, S000" - 140535 ‘® northerly heading was planned to prevont hondvind. easton 140008 Thie permitted uso of Namo Shoto Tslante as check pomnts. sstay - roses HeGiagn seteuot evar me re nilcs west of Chosi Point, it prow tgs. lanes tron pushing ba the cast without making lonafall. Eneumtgn Leake was the best véswal and rede initial point in the res fon, The route was also north of ‘onc River» which 1s also identified, A right turn planned after bombing. S0O8N - rs0198 (IF) TPAITS 28a vw unaissy193¢ = 141008thon proceed on a course of approxinately 120 degree true to Teky2 and bemb the ecccndary target, Tho ox.ct aiming point in Tokyo was i ignnted on enlarge? seope pictures in the radar mission folder, (5) Radar Counter Monsurss: (e) Te was doeited to sond out seven ROM search atrersft of the 75rd Wing ct H-hour ninus 65 minutes. 2 twoetrplane ettcck wae to be made on Kememctsu to alert Tokyo aefon— ses and feint cn cttack tovaré the Negoye cron, The two eiroraft Groppoi rope (GER=2 typo which is offeetive cpainst most Japanose cerly warning racer) 100 niles from the watulant, stopping when reaching the target (Fonamteu), | (b) Routine soarch ms to bs ante for enoay ratar signals on frequencies betucon 100 me nt 3000 me nn enony voles Comtnieations in channels tetwoon 28 mc an¢ 100 mc, AD] enony converentions were to bo recorded on cir-torne rego tars AN/aNG-S, Tho work wns porforncd by four Radar Observers on this mission. (6) Aln=Sen Rescue Planning: (a) The Navy wns furnichod with the details of the mission and requested t> furnish avaiicble racisities ror ee air-con rosous purposes, The following surface facilities wore fe J made available; jee 4 (1) & submarine wos stationed ot 50° Tees aol — 14e%2etn during the mitre mization ond another submarine wt mi 2 stationed nt 20°00'N = 144245! & fron 0925452 to 1014002, FP &| (2) one destr-yor ws at 20000%% = 140 fe! 45'8 from 1010182 to 1014002. (3) Crash voats were ussigned as follower ¥ Oac in Usgiscienc Bay from 0920552 tc 1022302; one in the betwcen Saipan an? Tinian fron 0920552 to 10225025 and one to southwest of ilorth ficl? at Tinian from 1010002 until al? (b) This Comnant assigne’ the follo (1) Two super Dumbo ‘to fly over tho submarine positions tes! ihe) A g-n4 See DE(2) Enemy _pntheireratt: Based on sverage winds For ahd actrees nt 100 Knots, the best route of approssh 220 deer oot Tire was vowwerned ms ons heading bebteen saree bo anpress, Hemever, tha, atvengin of be AStieiaaaae 2 a Rrawy cane, aid not warrant making enemy entiairecel’ sre imine consideration in selecting the axis of attasks 5, 301 S510N: a, Takecoff+ The first group of the Tord Wing was sons led to take-off at 0920052 and the firet group of the 31th Ming we 0920362, Actual take-off was accomplished a2 follows: aireraft First ast Ming AGorne gisoraft Takecott Aircraft Takenstf ara os og 21052 oonsea e sh opaizen oo : totals us op2i062 ooaisez wo asceably difficulties were experienced, Sighteen eiroradt nme 1 veattective, detailed reasons being given in Annex Es Par§ Ze Consolidated Statistical Summary. be Route out: The course Flom was generally 69: vriefed, vee of sevarcl isianis en route as navigational obaok Posts Gets Qhe savigators several Fadar wind runs before resching ORs snitiel stints Mroract of the 73rd Wing nade lendfell se bedstes. end went Ryend on the axis of attack a5 briefed in a mA, The 513th Wing's airoreft also made lendfel] Pee centien aun pace blow cetera vo Chee’ Patni iziaiag Fe oe sad, oosead toes vo Fiy 42re0tly eae Se ae e Tinutes, Weather on the route out wes good, ce. Qvor Target: (2) Primary Jergot: With visibility owes the target peing ontimated at 30 miles and with weather conti sons being bet ter than predicted, 0 effective aircraft ‘bombed the primary target, These aireraft bonbed in 9 formssishs ‘with 70 ar: ‘their bombs on the 9 leaders and S making indivi JA wore 4/10 strat ‘to 2/10 coverage over the # wel purpose boabs and 49.5 tons of raititudes of 26,000 te 29,400 5 Ey Part Ty