MISSION NO. 1) FLOWN 10 MAY 1945 COPY NO. HEADQUARTERS XXII BOMBER COMMAND CT tes RESTACHADSECRET HEADQUARTERS 20cr BORER COMMAND ‘APO 23h ‘TACTICAL MISSION REPORT Field Order Now 73 ‘Missions Now 163, 164, 165 and 166 Targets; vel Fucling Station (Nargot 90.32-673), Coal Liauefaction and Briquotte Factory (Target 9032-674) at Tokuyana, Obake 011 Refinery (Target 90.30-2121) and 0 Shima Oi] Storage (margot 90.32-1861). 20 my 1945 able of Contents Tactical Mrratives sss ees eee ee Annex A= Operations, + +4 sees eee art I - Mvigation Track Ghert . part Ir - Bombing. +--+ + + Fart IIT - Plight Shgincoring charts. Port IV -Radar ss. +e sees Port V - Gunnery... ‘Annax 3 = Wowteatlaseuaesencaue Watergi na Fort I - weather Sumery, . 2: >a en Port II - Chart, - Predicted vs, Observed Weathar 18 Fart IIT - Prognostic Map « Part IV - synoptic IBps + Annox ¢ - Gommuniestions, . 2+ + 02+ ++ Part I - Radar Counter Measures « Part If -Radio. s+. - eee Annex D = Intolligonsos ss ses ee ees Fort I - ney Air Opposition » . + oo. ae . 3 Fert Tt ~ Bemy,antioireraft and Alr=voraie Bombing ss esse + Port III ~ Damge jissesment, + Soction 4 = Targot 673/647 Section B » Target 212). « Section ¢ > Target 1804. Annex E - Consolidated Statistical Sumary. Annex F = XX Bomber Common Fiold order. « Annex G = Distribution, 6. sees yee oe 28 Ao Prepared By: SECEET As2 Section XXT Bomber Commandsereaassere SEQRET tereatets 1 SEORET : + By uth, of the 0,0, 1 A Bomber Command) whdudy 1945 sh + Date Initiale + HE.DQuARTERS 2A1 BOMBER CORLAND #20 24 4 sany 1945 SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 10 May 1945,* 10: Gonmanding General, Twentioth tr Force, Yashingtons 25, D.C. 1, IDENTIFICATION oF uIsstons; a, Pield Order Number 73, Hecdquarters XT Bonber Connandy 9 May 1965, directed the 58th, 78rd, and Sldth Bombardment Wings to particivate in attacks against 4 oil-storage targets on Honshu in XXT Bomber Command Missions No, 163 through 165, Q) Eximary Visual Torests: Force Lission Toreet Ming Assisned 163 Tokuyama Naval Fueling Station = 90,3&673 73ra 6 Squadrons 164 Tokuyoma Coal Liquefaction and Briquette Factory - 75rd 6 Squadrons 90,32-674 165 Otake Oi] Refinery = 90,50-2121 sieth 12 Squadrons 166 0 Shima Oi1 Storage ~ 90,32-1684 Seth € Squadrons (2) 806 2 Kure Hoval arsenal (Target 9030-6574), (3) Mo last resort targets were named, 2 STRATBOK alD PLANS OF OPERATION: a, Selection of D-Day: Intelligence sources indicated that ‘this Conmend could more Tully support the Okinawa Gumpaign by striking cilestorage centers ae woll as Eyushu airficlds, Indications wero that ‘the bulie of the fuel and oil being used at the Kyushu airfiold staging ‘pases wae boing stored in the Tokuyana and Otoko eroas, It was planned therefore, to strike 4 Kyushu airfields and tho 4 of2-storage targets on the same days with the airfield missions to bo dispatchod os a diver~ sionary measure 1 hour and $0 minutes prior to the ofl-storage strikes, The wather foresast for 10 May indicated favorable conditions in the Kyushu and Tokuyama areas for daylight precision bombing and firm de~ cision was mado to attack, » Amportonse of Tareste: (1) The 2 targots assigned to the 73rd Wing - the aval Fueling Station (Target 90,32=673) and the Coal Liquefaction and * S00 Foreword SEQRELSECRET Briquette Pactory (Target 90,52-674) wore considered as 1 target since — ‘the inotellations of the former had expanded and/er absorbed most of ‘the latter, The targets are lo¢atod on the Tokuyama waterfront in an area cpproximately 1500 by 4000 fect and are tho lorgest naval fueling station and the third largest oil refinery in Japan, In addition to aynthetic oll production, the extonsive of storage cepacity was osti= nated at 6,500,000 barrels, (2) the target assigned to the 316th Wing ~ tho Otake O42 Refinory (Target 90,30-2121) is looated on the bay north of Twakuni and 20 niles west of Kuro in an area approximately 5700 by 4000 fest, This targot was one of the largest crud of} refinerios and storage areas in Japony having extensive surfuce and underground storage. (3) The target agsigned to the S8th Wing - the 0 Shima 011 Storago (Target 9082-1684) - is located on tho south shore of Toicuynaa Boy and covered an area 5500 by 1000 foot, Tt was the largest known ofl-storage unit in Japan's Inner Zone and the estimated total Capacity was 2,000,000 barrels in both surface and underground storoge, Details of Planning = Onerational: (2) Bombing Panss (a) Determination of Bomb Load: 2, All aircraft wore to carry 500-pound general~ purpose borbs, These bonbs were selected since they have better stor- age characteristics than tho 250-pound bomb and the munber of direct hits required on the mony separate units in the target areas precluded the use of larger size bombs, These bonbs were also considered the most offective against surface storage tanks, estimated at approximately 120 fost in dlanetor, On tho basis of expericnce in other theaters of operation, it was indicated that tho charge weight of 250) Bombing Data: 1, Two aiming pointe wore solected for Missions No, 163 and 164, Ono aiming point was the large furnace building on ‘tho onstorn edge of the refinery area, Prom this point a probable oir= cular orror of 1000 feet included all main installations in the western section and all ofl storage of the eastern section of the plant, The other aiming point selected was a large centrally lecated building in “2 SECRETSESEEL tho plont area wost of the river, where « probable circular error of 1000 feet included all of the important factory installations, 2, For Mission No, 165, 1 aiming point was selecte ea = the center of the plant in the cracking unit area, A probable ~ troular error of 2000 feet included «li storage tanks and other plant nstallations, B. Two aiming points were selected for Mission Yio, 166, one about two-thirds of the distsnce down from the north edge of the northern tank area and ene on the northernmost tanks of the south= orn dettery, On the former, a probable circular error of 1500 fect in- cluded ell remaining tanks in tho northern areny and in the latter the Sane probable circular error included all tanks and a majority of the other installations in the southern area, 4, Tt was decided to attack from the south for the following rensons: initial potnts would bo casily identifiable; on Us Uasiv of predicted ground winley sucke would be carried away at right angles to the axes of attack; such an attack would provide the dost possible axes for maximum bomb pattern coverage of the targets] nindmun entintreraft fire would be encountered; and on Missions 163, 164, ond 166 the sun would not hinder vision of the bonbardi S, The specified altitude of attack was 15,000 te 10,000 fect, S, A minimum intervalonoter setting was specified for maximum bomb density on the targets, 1, axes of attack, drift, ond other pertinent ombing data were as follows: Wesion axis of Bokb Run Tine of lumber, attiock Drift Mind Ground Snood Boab Bap gs. nip. dee. ret, dog/moh” “mph dinates. 163-164 34-30 AS 5/65 270 6 165 74 00 5 235/65 290 6 16s 3600 235/65 270 = (2) Navigation: The 4 ferees were to use Iwo Jima en route out ond on return per ZXI Bonber Commant Teotical Doctrino, From Iwo Jime to the target and return, route plons were cs follows: (0) Missions 163, 164, and 165: S255N + 183155 beth Wing assembly aren, 3235 ~ 183008 73rd Ying assonbly aren, 382080N = 131368 Departure point was a good chock point in the bay and wat to be used to mko a turn on to the initial point, '554030N - 13130308 (IP) This point of land on the upper part of the Peninieula wae selected in order to obtain the best axis of attack, Target - (675, 674, 1884) 4 right turn vas to be mode after bombing in order to avold antiairorat concentrations, ay SEQRET