Mission NO. 17S FLOWN cony xo, 42 POC XX! BOMBER COMMAND PUT Et LESTREN TIAL‘Refer to annex Ay Fort 1) ts Ghorts ‘Tine over target for te ivon ao 2617050 1enbseee ‘be 1617082 - 1619582. Rorerond ‘This Tactical Mission Report eovsrs 2og Bomber Corman’ Mission No. X76, T10D 16 ~ 17 tay. Tho dames assessront Wo. 17he also directed against the Nagoya Urtan Area flow 1h Moy. Exact separae tion of damage was not possible due to the absence af photo cover between the Mission No. 175 nae 2 special mission and will receive special distribution. a TET So savas qataiss¥1330 GESREDqatsissy1930 Tactieal Marrative s+ see essere eee Annex A= Operations sess eee eee Annex B - Weather, Annex 0 - Cormuniestions .. 5. ++ esses Annex D - Intelligence «++ +++ Annox @ - Distribution «++ + 16 - 17 May 1945 Table of Contents port I - Mvigstion Track Chart. Fort II - Aiming Points... + « Port IV - Flight Engincoring Cl Part V- Radar and Radar Chart port VI - Gunnery. + s+ « Fart VII - Airea Rescue Chart. Gort J ¢ Voother Sumory « Boe Port I - Chart - Forecast Weather vs. Observed Weather «++ e+ + gart III ~ Prognostic Imp. Port IV = Synoptic Ip . « Fart I - Rader Counter Meacures. . + + Port Il - Raion «+ + + Fart I - Bueny Air Opposition. « fart 11 ~ Enemy Antlairerstt nd Alrsto-Air Bonbing sss ee es yort IIT - Damage Assessment Reparts « «+ Section A ~ Igoya.Gity ++ es ee Section B - Target 19% (iatsubsehi Airerett Werks) « goetion ¢ - target 197 (uteuta Factory. Mgoya Arsenal) + ese ees ‘annex E + Consolidated Statistical Sumary «+++ +++ Annox F XE Bomber Command Field order sss ee ees Prepared By: 4-2 Section S2RRSE EF Ser UY SIR ARG PB SEEFEBES + fe aoe ce J 7 SECRETSEOREZ + SECRET + d ‘By auth, of the 004: 7 Pi Botber Command’ + | 1 Bmly 5 IDG + Date inithale’* 4 HEADQUARTERS xt BOLBER.COMLAND 4 a0 236 8 suly 1945 suase0n, Report of Operations, 16 = 17 May 1945, 03 Commanding General, Twentieth air Foreoy Washington, 25, D.C, ON OF uISSION: . Pield Ord Morbar 76, Hoadquartors XXI Bonber Command, Gated 16 May 1945, directed the S8thy 73rd, 313th, and S1éth Bomb- ardnent Wings to take part in a naximun-effort incendiary attack on tho South Nagoya Urban Aron in lisoion Number 176, >, Sargets Spesifiod: (1) The primary visual and radar target was to be the o South Wagoya Urban Area, (2) Mo secondary or last resort targets wore specified, _ 2, SURATEGY iND PLAN oF ont a, Stratery snd Solestion of DéDoy: (1) A low-lovel attack at night wos planned against the southern part of Nagoya for the following reason (a) The area selected afforded a good radar target | for all aiming points, (>) Te loss rate on similar type missions had not boon oxsceeive and the raatilts hed haen aatisfactory. (2) patheinder force was to use the best rader ran to pinpoint cach aiming point, although the pathfindere’ route was more heavily defended than that to be used by tho main foroo, (2) the main-feres route wae also to be downwind fn ordor to onable aircraft to bond prier to entering the smoke and ‘thermal. (4) The altitude for the kst half of the sain force ag raised by 6000 fect in order to avoid tho severe thermals experienced Tn previous similar missions, (5) spoettie target attack tines wore plamod in such a.voy of £0 provent airplanes at higher altitules from bombing through Qi, Ob Tonbr“attietacs, 1g throtg! (4) Tha weather forooast for the night of 19 = 17 May ‘eresonted favorable conditions for the planned striie and fira decision e fas nade to attack, | ae SS9RETSECRET >, Imortanca of the Target: Due to the offest of the 3 Previous incendiary attacke against Nagoya (seo XXT Bomber Comand Taotienl Mission Reporte for Missions Wo, 41, 4, and 174), thie strike was planned on Ube urea aterting ot tho south central water= front and oxtonding north to approximately the center of the city, This area included urban tone targets S611, 3614y $609 and 3612 (seo chart of tho city in Annex Dy Part III), In addition to numerous ‘Small industrial targets within this everell aren, the following Anportant targots were included in the area to be attacked: Target 197% Thu Ateuta Pactury of the Nagoya Aroonaly Targot 242, the Nippon Vehicle Companys Target 194 The Witsubisht Aircraft works; Targots 2470 and 2470, the Daido Electric Stael Conpany Plants: Target 2010/198, Tho hichi Aircraft Coupany*s Atsuta Plant; and Target 2040, The Sumitono Durcluminun Mill. @Q) Bombing: (a) Detorminstion of Boob Loads 2, Atreraft wore to carry incondiary bombs and clusters, 2, Tho pathfinder force wai WaTAz bombs, fuzod instantaneously Pollowing reasons: ‘to carry A= 12 multiple suspended, for tho g. The immediate appliance fires which this bomb is capable of starting would mark the recomended aining points fer the succeeding plan bs Tho Clre-apreading sapcbilities of ‘thie type of boub was believed to bo cufficiont to tie up fires Fighting equipment and thas incroase the effectivencss of the boubs aropped by the min force, g, Tho bonb was believed to be suitable for penetration of the various targets in the ures under attack, d. An intervaloaoter setting of 100 feat was specified between each station release of 6 Donbs since the result- The pattern doneity would bo oufficinet to stort inaediate eppliance fires covering an area of 2500 to 3000 fest, |S. Airplanes of the nain force were to carry Ueital aimable clusters, containing 1iS0A2 and USOXAS incondiary boabs, Those woro selected as the best munitions for this target for the Pollewing reasons: ‘a. Tho pengtration characteristics of ze bombs were suitable for the Idghtly constructed buildings the (d the industrial targets in the area, th dock orca! b. Tho multiple hits from this cluster (210 bobs per cluster) wore expected to saturate fire defeSEQRET 2, Magnesium boabs were selected since ‘the change from Us9 to WSO bombs was expected to forse fire fighters te adopt new tactics, The spread of fire was oxpected to be enhanced due to the fap? that 20 por cent of the individunl bombs were to inolude explosive oharges in tho nosey fused for variable delay times to prevent unrestricted fire fighting, Tho magnesiun bombs wore expected to vo ospectally offective because of their high burning temperatura, Gunventionad firefighting defensoe would not bo able to offeetively oxtinguish the burning magnesium. fg, Tho clusters were to be set to open 3000 fect above the torget sf released below 11,000 fest or at S000 foot above tho target if reoloased above 11,000 fest, Thoso sottings ‘wore planned for proper penstration ond density, for a muximun function~ ing ratio of clusters and bombs, and for uso cf the bombing tables without interpolation, f, A S0efoot intorvaloneter setting wat aposieind ainne individual plane pattern density would bo sufficient to start appliance fires. (>) Bonbine Dato: JL. The planning for the axis of attack on thie misoion was based primnrily on the best radar approach and the best approach from an antiaircraft standpoint, 2, Pour aiming points were solosted as follows (noo annex 4, Part II) the 314th Ming on the Mitsubishi Aircraft Yorkey the Sth ng approximately 7000 fect north of the Mitsubishi Aircraft ores, the 73rd iling on the south edgy uf the AMehS aireraft Company, wed tho SiSth Ning on the ateuta Factory ef the Nagoya Arsenal, In Sach instance, probable circular orrers of 4000 fect would assure 300 fons of Donbs per square mile of the general target ar S$. Provioas misatons proved that the best qodar epproach to the alming points (from tne south across Rageys Faitor) wos through the heaviest antiatreraft defenses, Por that Bethon the segend best radar approach was ohoson for the main fore remem proach was fron a point on Diva Leke and on en exis of spprox~ Teilay os dogrese to the target (ace Annox Ay Part 1¥, for radar saeren chart). Tt waa predicted that surface winds would be fron see GSO degrees, watch would carry sncke avey fren the target in the event that visual benbing was possible, 4, Conprossibility of aireraft across the target wes omphasized to all Wings, On past missions this had b tee ee important factor in conducting a successful attack, S, Conforming to the Coumand's policy of casing 2 pathfinder fores on tho best posatblo radar run, each Ting wee send € puthfindor siroraft on e Madegrce axis of attack from Was Sf eial point a€ S436H ~ 136388 to the Ming's eesigned aiming pointydae DR, SEORET G, Designated altitudes of attack wore as feltows: Ming Part Half of Foros Snoond Halt of Perse sath 8000 - 8800 fect 15,000 = 15,800 fact 7328 9000 - 9800 feet 14,000 - 14,800 foot sista 10,000 + 10,800 fect «15,000 ~ 15,800 rest iste 7000 = 7600 foot 12,000 = 12,800 feet, (2) Narigation: (See snnox dy Parts I and IV), (a) The route for the main fores to the target was seasons for Choice Dace to Tw Jinn Tactical Nactrine to S850N + 135352 Landfall was 0 Shima, an sesily identified to redar point, S500% = 15S53H Initial Point —Initicl point was the southern tip of Biwa Lakvp an cusily identified te roder point for a turn te the target, Target (p) The route for the pathfinder force to the tarest mas os follows: outs easona for Chotea Base to Iwo Jima ‘Tactical Doctrine Si1o% - 358452 Landfall wae an onsily identified radar chook point, to. BedN + IS630E Initicl Point This point was an easily identifica radar check point for a turn to the to target after coming off the landfall point, Target (c) The route from the target to bases for the main ond pathfinder forces was as follows? Route ‘Ransona for Choice Target te Zeisn - 137208 This point was to bo used for a turn off tho target & to avoid hoary antiatreratt det SScor = 130128 Thin wae designated as land's Too Jima to Base —-—‘Taotical Doctrine, SECRETSECRET (3) Biieht Baeinsering: (a) ZLight plan: Autstutes and epecde were t ‘eed for axiimm fis) eoonary on safety. karenhiien eee" fs' beans GY fe cemmrese the siriting foraesy ‘Attock was 40 be nade by ieaieLe ual aircraft Vike (0) Loading: . pigs Ttel, Tegerve data indicates that atreratt of ‘the 50in, 73ra and 313th Wings would require no becb bay tanics aad would GREY ¢ total fuel load of approximately 6700 gallons, Airplanes of fre Sulth Wing would carry, in addition to the loed ef the other Wings, qgartielly filled bob bey tank for a totel fuel load of eppreximtely 7200 gallons, 2. No maximum or minimum bob losde were speci= fied. It wap estimated that donb loads would be 16,000 pounds far each of the 58th, 73rd, and 313th Wing aircraft, and 11,000 pounds for the 3Uith sling oireraft. ‘the ammunition load vas estinated at 300 pound: (4) Radar: (ee Annex A. Ere vp. (a) ‘Thin vas an excellent target fore night incen- e Asary strike, with mny excellent rader eheck points, Landfsil, initied Points, and offsct aiming points vere chosen due to their easy identi- fication characteristics, Landfall vas to be mde at 0 Shima, an easily identified, distinctively shared peninsula, and the insticd peluty tee southern tip af Bima Leke, gave a land-nater contrast, ‘The cffeet eiming % Point was a pair of bridges crossing the Kise Gawa River at imana, For the target ares around the Mitsubishi Aireraft works « dircet ader release was the best, (b) The pathfinder force ras to fly the best radar approach, up Tee By, ond was to use a separate initicl point, The heavy defenses along the Bay and the expected heat thermals ruled out this route for the nein forec. cnatssv1 (o) the river west of the aiming points afforded a | e008 cffsct aiming point, copecially for the units uttaeting the scush= u orn part of the target area, he jetty in Mgoya Harbor wea ancther excellent offset aiming point. (5) Hadar Counter Measures: Sixtecn AGM Observers were to search for carlysnarning and gun-laying radars nd to conduet & gene eral search in the sogion of 40-000 nogacyeles, dividing tt anvo the following bands; 40~100, 100-240, 140-300, 300-1600, and 1000-3000.meg= acyeles, Search receivers, pulse anelysers, and dircetica-finding cntea= S mere to de employed. Observations vere to be mode throushout ‘the ielonde on route to th targot, aa vell as in the target areas “It nas planned to have each plone Gispense *ropo (winiex) fer protection ageinst aoarehliahts snd antiairerars. (6)_AdrsSen Rescuer the Navy and the 10 Bomber Command were to provide rescue facilities as indieated on the chart in Anuex hy fart We 4, Detatie of Planning. atntel dicen a Q) mB ter Reaction: Cn the basis of tho previous e papers uiseiowsand toteletgeese Seeaese nice Setionted Guat ake ones een no snorease in the eneny fighter foreus assigned to the Nageya area, Se vas eatinated thet the fighter opposition to a night attack sould oe ineffective. es SERED(a) Hight Blan: Altitudes and specds mere to be I Sart £5" meximum fuel coonony and sefetys Assemblies were'to be mac GUY bo camress the striking farass. Attack was to be nade by iedighe jual airerart,, t (®) Losasag: : 2s Tuel reserve data inticated thet aizeratt of ‘the Seth, 73eq and 319th Wings would require no benb bay tanks and would ERzY,2 fetal tue1 load of approximately 6700 gallons. Airplanes of fhe Suith ‘ing would carry, in addition to the load of the other Hines, jpgrtteliy £111ed bond bday tonk for a total fuel load of eppreninately 7100 gallons. 2. No maximum or minimum borb leads were speci= Fpcd._ Ie was eatimted that vonb loads would be 16,000 pounds for esoh of the S8th, 73rd, and 313th Wing aircraft, and 11,000 pounds for the 3Uth ving sireraft, ‘the ammunition lend waa estimated at 300 pounds (4) Rada (See Annox A. tet v) (e) ‘This was an excellent target for a night ineen- Giery strike, with many excellent radar check points, Landfsil, initial Points, and offact aiming points vere chosen due te their easy identi- fication characteristics, Inntfall was to be mide ot 0 Shim, an easily Montifiea, distinctively shared peninsula, and tho initicl peluty the southern tip of Biva Lake, gave a land-water contrast, The offeet eiming Point vas a pair of bridges crossing the ise Gara River at Rirana, For the target erca around the Mitsubishi Aireraft Works @ direst vader release was the best, (hb) The pathfinder forec was to fly the best radar approach. up Ise Bay, and vas to use a separste initial point, the heavy defenses slong the Bay and the expected heat thermale ruled ou this route for the main forece. (e) Tho Fiver west of the aiming points afforded a 2008 of fant aiming point, cspesially for the units attaeting the soush= orn part of the target area. ‘The jetty in Nagoya Harbor wes ancther excellent offact aiming point. (5) Redox Counter Measures; Sixteen ROM Observers were to search for earlyavarning and guneloying redars and to contuet a gen- eral search in the region ef 40-3000 mogacycles, dividing 4¢ 4nto tee folloring bands; 40-100, 100-140, 140-300, 300-1000, and 1000-3000.meg= acyeles, Search receivers, pulse analyzers, and dircetion-finding unte= nas were to be employed. Observations vere to be mide throushout ‘the ielonds en route to the target, as vell as in the target area. Tt vas planned to have each plane Gisponse "rope (windon) for protection agsinok bourchlighte ond antiaireraft. (6) AirsSea Reseuer The Navy and the XXI Bomber Camand were to provide rescue facilities os indicated on the chart in Samer iy pert WI. tas “on ntelicens (1) Meny Righter Reaction: on the basis of the previous | niageye misoiomand intelligenes roports which indicated that thas nes deen no ineresse in the eneny fighter forees aauigned to the Nagaya area, 4S vos eatimated that the fighter opposition toa night attsck would oe ineffective. a SEcaET|, ‘There are 204 heavy guns in the with approximately 100 of them concentrated in the ac ter group would be rithin effective range of the main op the planned route and axis of attack. 2. Automatic weapons defenses were to be effective at the reeammenied tase altitude of 7000 fect and less effective at higher altitute J+ Approximately 50 scerchlights were believed to be in the Nagoya arca with an extension along both sides of Nagoye and Tse aya to the south. It was estimated thet cloud undercast and ‘smoke Tould decrease searchlight effect ivene: 4, ‘There were no reports of barrage balloons flying at the recommended base altitude, cia previous Nagoya mission ‘here had been 1 barrage balloon reparted at an eltitude of 6000 fect. (>) Recamentations: 1, Tt was recommended thet aircraft attack from ‘the west on courses of 60 to 90 degrees true to avoid searchlight def enses and to bring aircraft under fire for the shartest time fren the Similest munber of guns, On previous Nagoya night missions, searchlight and flak offectiveness had ineressed when aircraft approsched from the south. 2. ddreraft were to fly directly to the vicinity of Biva lake to avoid the korn antiaircraft defenses and vere to ti=m Torara nageys st the luhw, ‘This vould bring the B-CO'e within the =x trene outer limits of the Kyoto defenses, where only mesger and insccur= ate flak had been eneountored previously. Js A alight breakanay to the northeast vas reconnenied after the ettaek in order to get aircraft out of the heary Bntisireraft area and to avoid therm: uctivity. Following the tresk- auay, @ coursy east, then aouthesst to Suruga ian ves recemmended to avoid Tayohashi ond emanate. 44. In order to saturate tho entinireraft defenses and thereby reduce offdstivenoas, it nas recamended that the attack te compressed into 1 nour. ‘Se Tt was recommended thet airerart deaynchro- } nize 2 engines from the initial point until the searchlight defense | pea beon passed and that all aircraft drop ‘rope (wintor)« | &. A paso eltitute of 7000 fect nas recamentad » with aircraft of oach Wing to be staggered within en 800-foot bracket. SECRELqauaiss’ 58th yo. 1610052 1611592, + 1 161005 1611342. Bin 3 ioe: = euahae 2 Bakth a ooo plastid war Bros tom, Sie 10052 115% * The total does not include 6 Super-Dumbe aircraft. D, Route ut: Lung range navigntion was secomplisnea ss briefed using celestial end Loren as aids, with time control presenting the major problem, Several aircraft arrived in the target area after Gaylight and bombed targets of opportunity. Aparorinetely 30 airplanes: were 1 to 30 mites late, while others reported increasing their eel= ibrated air speed to 205 miles per hour to conply vith the planned time control, ‘he combination of navigntion crrors am, in some instanced, poor erew discipline was responsible for the timing mistskes mde. ce Qver Target: (1) primary target: Target area navigation ves accom plished by radar ond no difficulties were encountered. st 14,000 feet winds vere from 260 degrees at 55 knots and at 9000 feet fron 270 degrees at 10 kncta, 4 total of 457 airerart (75 bonbing visuslly and 382 by radar) dropped 360942 tens of bombs betueen 1617052 and 1619562 at altitudes ranging tron 6600 to 18,340.fect « (2) Targets of Opportunity: Eleven aireraft dropped 67.5 tons of tonbs between 1615122 and 1619302 at altitudes fran 7000 te 16,75 fect on 10 different targets of opportunity. (3) Forty-cight aircraft vere inoffective due to mechani~ a) anf other reasons. 4. foute Beek: Retupn to base ves accomplished vithout aifri- culty. Fiftcen aireraft lunded at Ivo ima. e+ [pdings; landings were mado at hane bases under fair weather conditions as follows: Wing «Firat ajrerott Last Aircraft 58th x7o0042, 2702yen, | 73rd 1629332 3702392 agen iéeaiea, 3702302 aaith 00 ypoyses itesst Yrooza f. Lpgsee: Three oigeraft were lost due te mechanical failure : as folions: i (2) one oircrart hea an ongine sateh fire after toks-oft, 42) 11 ere members abandoned ‘the airereft before it crashed. 1 SERED(3) one sireraft was taxiing for take-off when the 41 verter failed and the plane ran off the runmay, crashed ard a e Wo ono was injured. > Operations (1) Mevigation: (Sce Annex Ay Fort I, for navigation chart. (2) Bombing: (See Annex A, Pert III, for Bombing Report.) (3). Blight mginoering: (Sec Annex A, Part IV, for charts and annex E, Consolidated Statastice! Summry, for’ fuel consumption ‘and weight deta). (a) mrrative of Mission as Flecn: 2, The initial cruise wes flom at altituies between 5000 and 10,000 fest and at calibrated aix speeis of 195 to 205 miles per hour in an effort to have all aircraft bomb in 70 mine e utes, Compression vorkea successfully for ssngs, tut the tots] beab= ing tine for tho Bomber Comand vas 173 minutes. 2, Cruise Over Target: Cruise ever the target yas mde ot bombing altitudes fran 6600 to 18,310 fect, rith the last helf of ouch Wing force striking at the higher altituics. J+ Return to Mise: The most economical returns ‘to base vere ot 8000 feet oe a reault of the toil rind at that altitude. (b) Comments on the Results of the Mission: 1. Slightly more fuel than predicted vas used to the target becouse of unexpected head tins. 2. Bonk locdg in most aircraft vere the meximm for the type of bombs carricd. (4) Radar: (See Annex A, Part Vy for rader report). (5) Guanery: (See annex (6)_sdv-Sen Rescuer Five cron members of ¢ B29 thet jeter landed at vo Jim bailed out gt 2710¥-1)035E when the aireraft doveloped mechanical Airficulties. four of the crew manbers were picked up by ® surface vessel. Fort WI, for gunnery repart)e he Venther: (See Annex B for dctoils). The weather encountered was generally as briefed. (2) Hadar counter woamures: (See Annex Cy Fart I, for actails). 4 total ef 103 signals was intercepted and 1ogged. ‘ (2) padier (Soe nner Cy Fart Ty for details). ‘Thirty. fore eight strike Sopecta vere Seecived ty the Ting Ground Stetiense a 4 i ea ! gECRaE‘qauaissv1930 9) (0) Damge to Nagoya fran Missions 17), and 176 97 square miles or about 13.7 per cent of the City's area. OF this total, 3.15 square miles were destroyed by Mission 17% and 5,82 by losin 176, Tho total danago to Nagoya resid ting from” A missions 1s°1%,57 aquare milcs oF 24,4 per cont of the (0), terget 194, the mitsubishi Aircraft works, had 39-5 per cont of its total roof area damged, raising the total damage caused to date (including removal) to 68.) por cont. ; (+) Torget a97, tne atsura gaetory or the Nagoya ‘esenal, has hnd 3) per cent of its total ares damiged by the Command's 4 incendiary strikes against mgoya. Heed Lunn, CURTIS E. Laur Wn jor General, US. ‘comming = SEQ aRD16 = 17 mhy 1945 10" SEoRED Part I - Navigation Track Chart Part V - Radar Ropart and Reder Chart Part II - Aiming Points Part IV - Flight Bngineering Charts Fert 112 - Dembing neport Fart VE Guiry Rept Part VII - idr-Sca Roseue chart DECLASSIFIED ¥ sothority NNO TUS 005. ‘SSyaana Date.05-1341l B By SSR es(xiuaws woe os sak Giant HRT BOMBER COMMAND —LaNos £m \eioasz ‘ersere verses etre terrese| veirsaz verre egCONFIDENTIAL UNCONTROLLED MOSAIC PRE- PARED BY 949TH ENG. FROM 3H oueee2, idveraft that reached the target arcs later then J climb to 15,000 fect to bonb due to underoast conditions. Be Eight B29's of the 73rd Wing axpericnced malfunctions of O-1 auto pilot and ly aircraft had aiffiewlty with the pneumatic bond bay doors. ‘Tho 3lith Wing reported malfunctions of the phewmatie tonb ‘bay door on 4 irplanes and shackle malfunctions on 9 aircraft. UL, ‘The mitiel Point in Bive Lake was easily picked up on radar by ell aircraft, iverage arift on the terget run was 2 degrees right. SEQRIT& (SUN) out fang rue icy 790%. § a2) nay LER au 4204. 2 Tez hh E “aniost 261 f wold wv0 & [Lone Gey ALTITUDE £200)... 70,000 | /$0002, 1aVsQ-13 performance folios: takonott, fag operative over targsty ant kee operative, ‘The average meximum range of AI/LPQ-13 was 64 nautica ‘at 13,000 fect. 4. ‘The average raximm range of radar beacon reception was. 127 nautical miles at fram 5000 to 10,000 feet. y tho average maximum range of {IVAPQ-19 on the landfall point ras 50 nautical miles. f, There was 1 SCR-695 failure reported. 2 2. Radar avigation: There were 4965 Loran fixes reported, vith ‘the average mximm range being 579 mutieel miles for ground vaves end 1063 nautical miles for sky maven. Je Comments: a. ‘There Were 360 radar relenses repartad, with both direct synchronous and offsct bombing procedures used. b. ‘Twelve eireraft bonbed by using a redar run with visual corrections. Ianifoll, initial, end aiming points mare ell reported fo have becn good to cxeollont for radar bombing. “1s SEQEED“Bos of z : 3 2, demettien Toad 400 rounts per turret, on an | per uN Be 3. Method of Loading Guns: Hot and cold. 4s Route of imgunition Tired in Genbot firing. 5. Jest Firing: ‘here was no test firing on this night mission 6. Average Rounds Bxpend: et in 2 Bog a z Bb ay 20 16 ho. ° ° ‘7. ‘Byuimont Performance; There were no malfunctions of equip~ mem. © ised on Wing Gunnery Officer's Reports. SEQREDO- srrAce vessen An ouneo A= sureR oumeo NOTE ee \ resioz ‘omc oma ——-+-—-=Part I - Wether Sumary pert II - hart ~ Forecast Weather Woe Obnorved Toather yart III + Prognostic ap Fart IV ~ Synoptic 1p 26 + Talley 1965 20.qauaissv1936 @ 4/10 ow cloud, base 1600, tops 5000 ft with scattered shoners; scattered middie cloud clearing to 3/10 low el only ty 180K. xe 20 Toei: go 27H. sume as basse 10/10 lor cloud, tase 1000, tops mith layered mid- @le cloud to 20,000 ft and continuous rain. 5/10 low cloud, base 2000, tops 6000 mith 5/10 Dande of middle cloud, base 14,000, tops 16,000 ft. To coast: 10/10 loy snd middle dowd in cold front with tops. te 20,000 ft ond rein extending te ona over Japan yest of 136°R, ‘tops 6000 ft. 16,000 ft. nest of 136°R. TARGETS Nagoya: 3/10 low cloud, Guoua, puse 24,000, lps 36,000 TL, C/20 high odoud ‘breaking to 5/10 low, base 2000, 4/10 middle cloud, base 14,000, tore ‘vase 2000, tops 5000 ft; 4/10 middle ( above 26,000 ft. after 200K. (gperation Forecast Base at Take Off: 1/10 low clowi, sther Encountered 2/20 low elovd, base 2000 ft, top base 1600, top 6-8000 ft; 3/10 middle 5000 rt; 6/10 high cloud at £5,000 tt. cloud, base 12,000 ft, top 13,000; 4/10 high cloud at 30,000 ft; visibil- sty 15 miles, lowering to 2 miles in showers. Route out: To 18°N: Sone as bases. (18 to 26%; 4=5/10 low cloud, base 1600, top 6-700 ft; occastoml top 35,000 ft; 1/10 middle cloud at 12,000 Ft; 4/10 high cloud at 30,000 ft; scattered Light showers. BEN to 29°N; 8/10 low clout, bese $050, top 3000 ft with ocensicna] tops to 16,000 ft; 10/20 middie cloud, base 30,000 ft, top 15,000 t; 8/10 high ‘Noud st 26,000 #¢; yiaibility 10 mies 1 Bile. GOrering to'l-2 miles in showers; light 269% to Tine ice above 12,000 ft. Boe to 33°": 5-6/10 lov clouds bese TBG0 Tey top 7600 ft; 6/10 middle cloud 320 to teraet ares: 19 20: 4/10 Low cloudy base 2000 ft, top 5-6000 ft; 6/10 high cloud Jat 25,000 ft. ‘to 26%: 7/10 low cloud, base {500 fe, top 6000 ft sith cocasional ‘tops t0'15-20,000 ft, beeaning 4/10 top 5000 ft at wud af zone; 6-10/20 middle eloud in layers between 10,000 ‘and 20,000 ft; thunderstarms; rain reduecd visibility fren 15 miles to 4/0 low cloud, base Fo00 Tes top 5000 fy visibility 10 files in ight hozes 3/10 lor cloudy saee Thoao: top 15,600 ft; 2/10 high base 2000, top 4000 ft; 8-20/20 mid— cloud at 27,000 ft. to tangst area: 3/10 lov cloud, Petite rr, top 5000 Tt; 4/10 middle Cloud at 15,000 tte qorget: Wgo}e: 3/10 low cloud, base Book, top 5000 ft; 4/20 middie cloud 3e 16,000 ft; visibility 12 niles. Route Retiening: Samo as Routo Outgoing. ae QQNEIDEURLAL Gie cloud, base 9000, top 12,000 tts visibility 12 miles in haze fagova; 3/10 1ow clout, base 2000, Pep hoco Ft; 9/10 middie cloud, base 9000, top 11,000 ft; visibility 10 utes in tazo; winds at 8000 #t vere Byo degrees at 35 knotse ‘sane as Route OutgoingBase on 4/10 lov cloud, base 1800, Return; top 6-10,000 ft; vieibirity ooo rt; 15 miles. ft. 295/395 -20 250/65 -22 250/70 -2h 230/30 -09 250/55 -11 250/60 1h Bos te Big“ Beso a 2eg20 2 2 5 ses 1g eyes Me ome 190/15 22 300/207 290/20 1h 2 2/6 9 ERBRS Winds Aloft = observed mse to 2500 252" to 300 = Target 18,000 250/25 20/2 a € 3ay000 == 240/33 265/38 74000 270/40 ae ae QONELDENMIGLER CLT a = Efe £, 2 a Deas Mb °%\ 0005 000'0! x =f IP @3A¥3S60 Es NgOe 1) £ ie pm eo ee ee Sane LFA <3 Og ra ae S = <= | 0000! 00'S! 0002 Re (00'S. ‘Q00°0E. 7 CeCe SFO AVW 2/-9/ "7 WaHavam 1sv23uos a T eZ ase! SNO(SSI ® »bh | = 0 MA i oo ] AEE PME | 1200 ee ase : 2art I - Rader Counter Measures yert I - Radio haste: 26 = 27 my 1945 SECRET2. Method: a, Sixteen observers participated and uscd the followi ‘equip- seat to eters tho tures SEAR MAD, Pee eae nd ehPRSe ‘bs Atroraft aisponsed rope at tho rate of 3 bundles seconds when considered necessary 3 ee 3. Results: a, Severn) orem roparted that upon dlopensing rope when 2 9-29 yoo Too TES GENES BPPScarcnttgpea"ene sonrensngnea fa3 Wlaat and in sone ences tracked aimlessly. b. Radar search regulted in the following intercepts: _ onsnacteristion coordinates Date ‘Tine At pO Sse Tipe s 86098 BAB &B 2a up QoS ake BT 122 Bo mt alt we J cooto ons 28 3300N Iabise OBIGS Obo3 21 121 S Bi GEE 228 Gooye 462 2h 3505 125\GE OBIGKS O35 ZL 2 P BH GH a Coe Gdoo af 3300N 195USR OBUGLS 0942 21 12 F Bi CHT coor Mine 26 9IG0N 1964SE O61GL5 0318 2) a2 P EW CH C007 Shng 10 SuigN 19600E 051645 0328 22 lel S GL anies GoDve cE 30 S320N 13600 O526h5 Was 5) GH sete ikea 08 3500n 12635 O516i5 ial S @ omo3 Doorg 0505 28 3912N 19510 051645 ie Pw Ooo7e 1860 05 BuIA 136O5R 053645 ie P & O03 Gooye 1900 67 3450N 13600 O5N6K5 yl S @_ 0OrK03 & O007S O47 42 3430N 13550E 05164 wei 6 Bi ORE 0079 ogo U2 324oN 236KOE O526K5 as Br OOH oor ope0 03 3500" 136008 052645 tal S$ GL oTA03 - Goose ogo ho 32hon A36I5E O56L5 is Hf GT e080 1860 05 3455 19505 051685 lee > G@ On3 20080 eo cy heme isehor 05265 40 2. 122 P GL GAC> conn 2660 3 Séeen Igsqur ususns seo fi ia S i OH C008 tree 35 pieON 13720R o516i5 0326 2 121 S Bt CH | 2008, OHS 22 doisN assur 51h 0059 2) 122 P Bi Cr 2oe) GUE th ISON ANOLSE O526K5 ce00 aL ize HE | 008 Gis a4 3900 A9600E 051645 0250 22 22 O Cpe) ee 36 3a00N 19555E a5NGUS YO 22 121 | cook 3050 35 Joc SageoE ob1645 0527 22 Jal S | G00%% 1870 10 3456N 1asscE O516K5 O20 21 1 F } ooake 1270 3p Zana igegmn op16hs akz5 21 122 F cose OH to Suan ig7aOE O51sks 0820 St 12 S once 950) by gos igeio o5n6l5 0259 2 12 S A 0083 095 36 3333" 13593E 052645 O35, 21 122 P Br CHT #} cogs 195 22 32mm isezen osiels onc a al 6 Boo ow 7 voesh 25) Go jgom issise oust uae 21 ses 2B! Soe ones O43 33 {yom ucase upieks Gpue 21 we BB Come goose O57 3 aouon uuzove osie4s omg 21 122 G B omoionee ek = Orgin; B = Method; C = Reliabiity one 4 gEgREt ae©0089 0096, 0091, ‘0092 0092 (00093 90093 00095 00095, 00087 0098 00096, ‘00098 20098 90098 00088 0100 00103 00105 0106 00106 00106 00106 00106 con10 00143 00114 001k? 01k? oi 019 og 00149 00150 00150 0350 00850 00353 00153 00153 00153, 00153, 00155 0057 00157 00158 ob 0182 00190 00190 ong 00195 00195 00195 00195 035 oka: obi 1030 495 490 0488 ayo 0500 0700 ‘9500 460 0352 1030 0359 0335 1030 0735 0478 0900 0u95 0495 0496 oy ago 0750 (500 0495 0195 0495 495 095 1030 2000 0495 0500 0500 1030 0000 0750 1070 (0900 1088 14600 0000 2000 7 5 7 08 08 06 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 ca 00 % 30 3 oy 08 06 3 95 ah oF 24on SukSt 34300 3240n 3510N 3320N 3a5K Shan BUSN B4SON 3L00N 351511 3300N 3iocN 33450 Seon 3520N 26a 2 700K 3205n 32008 3300 (55200 332cR aig 3525N 3350 3525N 29u5N 33208 3320 32008 32008 34300 32kaN Sekont 33300 322m 33078 sua Jalon 31208 325a 51001 30588 Basan 3250 35008 SUL 351501 3iase 5000 isc 3351 34308 136108 198308 x 136108 136408 i370E 145508 iyeose 337008 235505 137308 137308 23555E 138008 138258 135555 137508 0352 1j030E 138508 136U5E 136255 13558 136208 138308 135308 196055 13555E 13815, 136208 136208 197008 137008 136458 13605E a6ser 13537E 139h72 13958 199208 339208 135408 136008 138152 337358 138508 aasese 137008 13615E 137308 238358 137208 13750" 338552 135508 051645, 051645, 051615 coe 052645 51645 05165 051615 051645, Op 16> 051645, 051645 052645 052645, 053665 os 165, 052615 051615 052645, 051645 052645 51645 051645 052645 51645 052645 052645 051645, O56 051615, 052645 o> 1645 051645, 052645 052645 051645 052605 052645 053645 5265 051645, 052645, osnbus O45 ones ‘Time 0320, on 25 527 O47 a a 2 0406 21 O19 o9ca 0339 435 0326 olz7 0329 1235 os 0236 0430 100 og 250 0319 039 0334 302 (0506 340 0322 410 0152 0251 0255 0250 onl 0355 0305 0300 0345 0348 0323 0348 0323 once one oun 025 0130 0350 one 0337 au 0425 0339 0503 048 0340 2 2 a aL a a 21 2 a 2 a 2 a 2 2 21 a. 2 en a 21 By 2 2. a 21 2 aL a 2 2 2h a. a a a a a a a au a a aa a 2 2 a a © A= Orging B - Methods ¢ - Reliability yi 32a ia qa. ia crs 31 ore a2 1. 32 a2. aea qa. ae aaa qt wr a2t 21 22h 32h wi 21 122 yee 12 aan 32. 42 31 aah ah a2 422 ret 121 wa 321 hee a2. uO MB AUADO DOAN OHH ADHOHDMBEBAADO Pepaaee HEE PODER PRE YOEe woe ees ota v He ‘901010002 ‘co1slo2c2 ‘ooxoioz02 ‘01010002 ‘onici00c2, ‘areiceap oororceo2 ‘ooxe0202 ‘cote1o2c2 ooioLezce ‘oo1010002 vuneiuese coio10zce oo1c1c202 ‘oc1ciocc2 ‘oo1o1ezoz oorere202 001030003 001030003 (001030003 (002030003 (001030003 (001030003 001030003, 1001030003, 060.0003, (001030003, (001030003, 1001030003 (001030003 060i}0004 006040004, (001030003 06040003, ‘006040003, ‘201030003 ‘oyoe ayes ‘oayoe oayoe orc SczaL0002 ayo da 137k2E 136105 135558 aoose 135505 136258 13615 136208, 138258 136355 0358 137OOE 051645 Olé 21 121 S peeeeseeenee ounoane owe BSG ISSEERRSSE BE B » Be Method ce Reliebility Me ems ‘as 4 3000/2800/08 signal was heard at 3450-13700. A number of signals in the 300 megecyeles region ware hoard. be at least 8 ship-barne radars were located by D/F cuts, Of these, nad CHI churauturisticse ‘PART_IT_- RADIO 1. strike Reports: Thirty-eight strike reports mere receive! by the wins Ground Stations. 11 strike frequencies were utilized for the teenonittel of the bombs anay messages. 2. Fox Tranmissions: In addition to the usuel veather asd tine signals twananittea iron the Ground Stations to aircraft, Two Tina since coulitions were transmitted via the Fax method. The 73rd wing Toperted tint 191 operaters out of 137 in the air received the 7irst Fer'tronaniesion, ‘The second nas received by 129 operstors. Reasons Jiven for not resolving the 2 messages ty the Fennining operstors $n, srata inoperative equipment, inability to hear the Ground Stations off cedh for wuriuus reasons, afd working Two Tine ACS at time of trans 34 Frequencies: moderate to heavy attonpts at jemning were reper tet co alt atvike frequencies. ‘The 56th ving reparted the strenath of fed on nd Stations'e siguls as grectly improved cver previous missicnes ite Gia uing revealed that an anti-aircraft battery was using their, Me Biceyeies wirske frequency far prectice firing. After Att Defeans 2uie Si Genter waa notified of this fact, the interference ceased Comte crag 10.4 percentage breakiown of traffic par frequency: 1A Per Fol eap 5 megacyeles; 62 per cent of 7 megncyclea; ami 2h par cent on 3h meppeyoles. -29- SEORETTwo requaate for VE/DP besrings were e120 0 . neo! air-tovair honing satisfactorily, Tho Tinian homing ‘the Saipan OWI broudonst station were used extensively, The he ener Wns used at a distance of 1600 miles, Tho OWI station was used effectively at a maximum distance of 1300 mil 5 reported by the Tard Ming as not boing as relicble os on previous Othar rangsa and homers were also usod offoctivaly, 5, Mot Diseiptine ond Seowrity: The 73rd, $8thy and g1Ktn wings | reportea Heeb act Siseipline waa moh inqrovea over previous sisstonse Tae Slbtn peared net siseipline es poor in thet too meny Eoquests Tue mate for gesther, airereft vere breaking in on other transmissions, Ter oker cruscduro ves net wood in several instanesn. Corrective action bos been taken an each ease. No viclations of security were reported. 6, Deny Transmissions, ‘The folloving ineidente of jeming and eneny ¢renaniasions vere encountered: € a, 515 Kitooyoless (2) ci from 14002 to 1528, vas partially effective. (2) Gi at 17000 was very effective ond blocked out the Ground Station. 2. 6055 Kilocycles: ec a (2) Buzz sow jaming fron 1900 to 14532 vas partially tes effective. (2) sep ca net fran 15002 to 17302 vas partially effec tives cS (3) stetion using call *GpiR* at 1905% to 19202 as = sncftoctive. & (u) C2 interference at 19302 vas very effective emi plockid out the Ground Station. a (5) Unidentified CW them Ground Staticn voula start a | sronanisaion OY 158s 18572, and 19232 was effoctiv (6) Bnony voice tranamissions at 19. c+ 11080 B.oeyciess (2). Steady tone at 18572 was very effective ai out the time tek. nl bLooked (2) Umidentiriea rive Jottar code groups st 0015 wore eftective. (3) Lewd atenay tone fram 18502 to 19002 was affetives f | (4) Ves ang cull sign * ME" were ineffeotives