sesso cd VM Le ttt) ay MissioN NO. 193 | | FLOWN 2 9 | copy No. 132 | ( & asosmrat ‘ PTC f : XXI BOMBER COMMAND , APO 234 | BOER CU vetPiola order no. 79 Torgct: Tokyo Urban Arca 25 uy 1945 able of Contents Tactical Narrative sss see e Annex 4 = Operatiens Fart I - Navigation Track Chart» 2.4 ese Part, TE a ivan PAGMn oPlmpact 2 oe Seem © Part III - Flight Engincering charts. . +s 6 « Pert IV ~ Radar Report and approach Chart ss Fort V ~ Gunnery Report «sea ee . Fart VI ~ sir-Sea Rescuc Charts se eee eee Annex B= Woother «2 esses eset ese Fart I - Weother Sumary. . 46. + Fart II + Chart - Forcoast woathar va« Observed leather. ge ay Fart ITT ~ Prognostic Wop ss se eee eee Sey Part TV - Synoptia Map. se se ee Pa Bia Annex G -Commmications s+ es sstee ese eeee Ree Fert I ~ Radar Counter Measures oss see Bart IT = Radio's. «buss wcsa a+ wag s Annex D = Intelligence seers s eee Fert I ~ Bueny Air Opposition « | Part II ~ Enny Antieiroreft. « Port III - Domge Assessment. « Annox E - Consolidated Statistical Sumary. 4S ® ERBY BRA VR 8S BSEBES Annex F - X01 Bomber Command Field Orders +++ e+e Annex G - Distribution, SECRET‘APO 234, SUEJIET: Report cf Operations, 25 Wy 19k5 TO: Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, iashingten 25» D.Ce 2. ADAWIeIoATION oP MMsszON: a, Ficld Order Munber 79, Headquarters 2x1 Benber Conmandy || dated 25 May 1945, directed the 58th, 73rd, 313th, and 31\th Bombard— | nent Wings to take part in a maximun-effort incenliary attack on the Tokyo Urbon Ares in 02 Doctor Gonnend Micoten Ihmbor 183- be. Targets Specified: 4 (1) The Tokyo Urban Area was the primary visual and radar target. ‘a (2) No secondary or last rescrt targets vere specifica. Weg 2. SURATEGY AND OPARATION: ee aa uy Surutery aud Selection of DeDay: This attack was plane zag ned in conjunction with Mission No. 282 since it was belicved thet BE greater potential domage would be caused by executing 2 night incon= EB diary attacks within a minimum tine interval. The ar@isclected for ottack vas a band apnrorintely 16,000 fect wide and 24000 fect long fo the weal of the waterfront Ligedict ely south cf the Imperial Pal s nee. (Gee XXT Bomber Counant Tactical, Mission Reperts for dctoils ct | Missions Now 37, 38, 40, 69 and 161.) cn the sis cf a faverable meather forceast for the night of 25-26 May, firm decisicn wes mde to attack. b. Inportence of the Target: The target to be attacked in eluded industri] ond residential districts, as nell as part of the finonesol, govermental, ond cenmercial sections of Tokyoe It algo included the Shinogcwa Raiirond yards, the largest marshalling yards Gn Jopan, and the worchousing essential far the storage of supplica : heed in connection vit that activity. Many mashine-tc0l snd cles ‘ronie factories end seatterod ndustr iol plents were algo in the torget ares e+ Details of Planning <= Opgration: Q) Bompangs (@) Detensination oat Barb Lond A, 421 aircrart vere to carry ineandiary pens and clusters. ae SECREZ i eT eeTet-so: “SMSHL WE qausissv1990 ‘pathfinder aircraft from each | i were to carry 500-pound AN-I76 bonds, fuzed instantaneous 4 non~delay teil, ‘these bonba wore sciectes as @ oathfinier mnseion ‘ore expostod to start imofinte large-ecale appliance Su tus hare! red ci Ul oack' neon geunen oe tapes feo excellent ballistic properties of this bonb were expected to enable the pathfinder cress to obtain mxinumaccuracy. Construction with= in the area of 2 noan points of impact assigned the pathfinder force included 10- and 12-story fire-resistant concrete and brick buildings. Single ant double-story wooden avellinns, noreantile centers. and typical intustricl installations. ‘The AN-M76 benb was belicvod to have sufficient weight end striking velocity to penetrate each type of structure in the area. The instantancous nose and nen-dolay tail fuzings were selected to allow the bombs to burst several foct bencath Toofs, thereby assuring miximun fire sotting offcct. Pathfinder bombs Wore to be released at 25-fcot intervols in order to obtain meximum concentration, 3. The first third of the min force, assigned ‘the some 2 mean points of impact ss the pathfinder force, was to carry 500 pound 127 aimable inccndicry eluotcre fused te ofon 5000 fact above the target. Tho M50 magnesium bob in this cluster was considered the dest available incendiary with which to strike tho wooden industrial, and fire-resistant structures in the area, The desigmted 5000-foct opening vas expected to obtain maximum efficiency in the functioning of both oluctore and individual tonto. 4, ‘The ramining tvo-thinis of the min forces ‘assigned the l. other mean points of impact, vere to carry approximately one-half M-47 incendiary barbs fuzed instantaneous nose and one-half clusters of M-69 bombs fuzed to open 5000 fect above the target. (There wero to be no mixed loads in any aireraft.) The 2 different types of bonbs selected had buen most effective in previous missions against sinilor targets, Ss ‘The N-7 incendiary bonbs carried by the mln furce were to be Folenecd at 100-fcct intervals Between ersups of 6 bonds. All clusters wore to be released at 50-foot intermls, ‘These scttings had been effective on previous sinilar missions. (>) Boobing Data: Yoxinun effart was specified for this nis sion in order to obtain a ground density of 225 to 250 tons of incene @iary bonba por square nile of the target ares 2. Six nean points of inpret were selected Yor the pathfinder ond main foreoo (Sea Annex 4, Port IZ). Qs Because of mintiaireraft considerations, tne dost radar appronehy an axie of apzwroximately 315 degrees across Togo my, wos clininated for the min force. (Sco Mission Report wefan for further details.) Interrozaticn of erevs who had pare Nos patel in Miocion NO, 48] andicated hot sn anitind point 2ocatea te REehSosi (G5IR-199IGE) ma actiefa ctary for a radar turn to the Treat, aren this point on aria of apmreximtely 60 dogroca eculd be SOTGeES che taract, © donn-vina run coud be mde, and antlasrerart Rogiace rere weaker on thio thon on any other appronch. oa SEOREReats Se 't to the target arce by approxinttely ond 315-dogree axis of ee fron their initial point, The wos considered tho best possible radar rms Se Bnphasis was ayain placed on comps ity of the forec, with all Wings being instructed te act the unber of cireraft over the target in the shortest possible tine. — lL bonbing was to be done fren altitudes: of 9000 to 11,800 foot. It wos cotimnted that drift would be 2 de= Gees right. Bombing ras to bo done at on inticated ground epecd of 307 to 309 miles per hour and the oxes of attack for the min force ere to be from 78 to 61 degrees. 6 (2) Mirlssbion, (Cee Anncx Sy Forts T oud Te) (a) The route for the mthfinders was as follows: 4 Route Reasons for Choice 2 “il Rises to Ivo Jinn ‘Tactical Doctrine. to : 34.,0N-11,000E ‘This cheek point was to keop nevigntors to the gI to left of course en route to targct. a 451825N-140258 Jandfoll was on casily identified radar point 4 2 to for 2 turn to initial point. a 3532N-1400,8 (IP) Initial peint wes an casily identified point on 6 =e the ccast across the tay fren Tokyo. BR Target & to a 3555N-139h08 A point usod to avoid flak defenses. < 28 1-142 008 This point was solocted to avoid ontiaireraft a conesntrationa at Cheek Poiat. Imo Jims to Bases ‘Tactical Doctrines (b) The route for the main foree was ag, follewer poute Reasons for Ghotoe 4 pnaoe to Ine sin -TagtLenl Dostrino. i ag Dem rture und ianifel2 point vos on saakly 4 See {dentificd peninsula on the edge of Suruga Wane a to : se) Initial point was enaily Adontsssea 5 niles trex, a ened in mle 8 tore ee re iret ieariog sue Sertotee tiey tea eee made to avoid flak coneentraticns ond thernals ‘a with the exit to be mde north of Chosi Point. gno gim to Bases. Tetieal Dectrize ve = SECRET} omc rN er v “ERITH ITT avaiaissv19 } (a) Flight Plan: Aatitudes ona m for maximm fuel eeohccy and scfety. Assemblics were to be mde eS © compress striking forecs. Large fucl reserves were recuauended bo= cause of expected poor weather at Ino Jima and home bases. (>) Loading: as Fuel reserve data indiented that none of the am Wingo would require pod bay tonks. Fuel lond of approximately 6700 gallons was to be corricd. 2+ No raxirun or minimin bomb loads were spec- ified, The 58th, 73rd, and 313th Wings were expected to carry poten= tiel vob loads of 15,000 pounds qr aircraft ond the JUMth Wing was expected to corry 11,000 pounds. ‘The cnuuniticn load yas estinated at 300 pounds. (4) Hodar: (Sco annex Ay Part IV.) (2) 4s on Mission No. 161, departure point was to be the distinctive peninsula at 3)36%-1361KE. The initial point, aleo easily identifica by radcr, vos 5 nautical miles southvest of Hachiojig Fr the assembly point to the initial point, accurate radar navigaticn could be performed by using Surug: Boy,¥ okosulm Peninsula, Mount Fuji, and the western half cf the Tokyo Peninsula as ehecX point: (b) ‘The mean points of impset were projected along the northern Toyo dock line. The coastline definition of Tokyo Bay. was expected to reduce rate errors ani those errors that would ocour were expected to result in bonbs folliag on mean points of impact of other Wings. To toke advantage of this course, the axis of attack . was mode as mich to the east as possible. (c) Wit-vey fron the departure point to the initial point. both the initial point and the entire target area would be jithin ronge of radar, After the turn ct the initial point, the narth- vestarn corner of Tokyo Bay md the northern Tokyo dock line would be available for refurence points. (2) Tt vos expected that the 2 northwestern cining points would be the most difficult to bond accurately by radar (e) Pathfinders were to go into the target over tokyo Bay fron tho cast to insure hitting the nean points of inpsets Thich wore ensily identified from that aircetion, This redveod tho osesbility of deflection errors, It waa cosentinl that the pathe Fumera hit the exnet points in order te prevent main foree bonbs fren falling on areaa burned out by previous missions, (5) Rader Courter Monsurcg: It was plamed to have 13 rou Observers goaren for wicly-wirming wid guiedaying radars cial to Rom joct 2 genera} scarch in the region af 40-3000 mogneyelea, divide TREE into the folloving tania; 40-1 00, 100140, 1140m3004 300-2000, £ng Yp90-3000 negneyelcs. Search rece ivers, pulse analyzeray and Girection-finding entonnas were to be onployed and observations were e * SEORED‘to be made throughout the islands en route to the target as well. ‘the target area. It was planned to have each aixplane garry : ee for use as protection agninst searchlights and antiaureraie (6) AirsSea Rescue: The Navy and xc Bonber Command . Details of Planning -- Intelligence (1) Suony Fightor Reaction: Maximum fighter strength in the Tokyo area was estine ted et 378 operational sircraft, but the eo Right fighter strongth vas cotinctod at approximately 56 twin-engine Nicks and 27 single-cngine planes. Day fighter-seerchlight eanbina~ ‘tion technique had shen an improvement in the Tokyo area (2) Eneny Antisireraft: (a) Defenses: 1. In Tokyo proper there were 480 heavy qunsy of which approximtely 545 would be within effective range of the B-29's on tho planned route ond axis of attack. In addition to the greater Tokyo defensos, there wore 24 heavy guns at Tachikawa, 18 at Zana, and 10 ot Chite, nernsa Talya Fay. Tt was ectimted there would be moderate fire fron Tachikawa and meager fran Chiba, and that ‘the Zom defenses vould bo within range for a very limited period. ¥ : 72g 2. HY the reccamente bee aBtitude of 9000 aa fect, it saa eatimted that autcentic reapons would have nly slight Brn effectiveness. | BBE 4p Approxinctely 150 to 200 sonrehights baa | ES ke been reported in the Tokyo area and their tactics hnd improved on recent missions. Sneke and cloud covor that might be encountered was expected to reduce scarchlight effectiveness. T- 4s No barrage balloons had been reported at ‘the proposed altituic of attack, §. Seno ercund-to-air rockets hed been rem ported in tho aren, but these had been inaccurate and ineffostivos (o) Beconpeniat ions: J, Due to the increased searchlight activity on Chiba Peninsula and ‘singe the axis oF attack frum thy east deros fowo Bay na boon used on several previous night missions, it was some aomied thot Tokyo be appreached fron the vest, A similar route cee omaie of- attack had bien used on Mission No. 181; horevur, no Changes were believed te have buen made in the Tokyo defenses to cpengeenen then against a repeat attack. Following benba away, 2 sirciomaya had been Fecorended, northeaet through 2 emp in tho wrige defenses ona nozth to Choss Point to lends end, or southeast Pokies ghibe Peninsula if anoke and thernal activity vere net too antense«. a ee A base altitude of 9000 fect SNe ot the aeevints nutcartio Wont Ea Cn ‘At lower altitudes, Ge To snturate antininerntt defenses, it was Teconmended that each Wing compress its attack into 2 ‘W-ninute periods Ay Since most f1ak on night miseions hel been encountered by aircraft coned by searchlights, it was reeemmended that renee oe "rope" (window) and desynchronize engines as defen= 3+ EXSCUNION oF THE It Ae Pake-off: Take-off yas accomplished as follows: Jdroroft hirborne First last Wing min Force Pathfinder qake-off Tekenoff 58th 120 2 eso7i2z = 2508480 Tra 190 2 asomox ——-a50R5 Rx & 313th b n 2507312 © 250857 oe wee a 2506542 508407 2 Bae 45ze 46 e5065uz 25085 EE = Ke # This total does not inclu | Super-Dunbo Aireroft. zeal d. Route Out: sMireraft ureeeeded to the target smdivsduatay 2368 at bricfcd sltitudce and cir cpocdo, with eclectial, Loran, and radar FS being used as navigational aids, Comnressibility of the Wing forces é Ke on this miccicn yoo superior to that of any other previous missicn RB & due te good excoution of tining by the navigatars. BR es Over Targets Q) imary Target: Target area navigation was acecn- piiohea by radar, with © for visunt corrections boing mde on the Sonbing run, Forty-four pathfinder and 420 min-force aircraft drop- pod 2 fetal of 3262 tons of benbs on the prinnry target. Tho pithe Peldera beabed between 251438 ond 2515zMz at aititudes ranging few F515 to 22,000 fect, and the nain foree benbed between 2524202, and TRbage ax'aititutes ranging fron 8950 to 20,000 feet, Visual box w tjene by 9 pathfindera and 155 main fore B-29ta, and za8Ar ang ras 20% athe wy 35 pothfandars end 265 main farce aicerafte (2) ‘Targets of Opportunity: Six B-29's aropred 39.8 tons of bonbs between 2514152 and 2515192 st altitudes ranging fran Gigs to 12,300 fact on different targets of opportunity. (3) Twenty-six minaforec ond 2 pothfinder aireraft were non-effortsve, chivfly due tu uvehionios) aizticultioas a. Route Baek: Navigation to hone bases was accomplished qathout sneident. Ono B-29 landed at Ivo Timms 6. SEQRE2EET=ST ana VON CHSAL OWN qanatss¥'1990. 3OT BAC. fs Lossose Twenty-six B29 ang reosons: (2) Bheny Antiairorart: 3 (2) mreny sirercft ond artinirerctt: (3) Other: 2 (Crows bailed out over Two Jina due to inability to land their planes because of tad weathers) z (4) Unknown: 20 G+ Operations Sumarys (1) Mevigetion: See Annex a, Part I, for track chart. (2) Bombings (a) The greatest difficulty encountered on this nis- sion was the sncke ani fire over the target. This made it difficult to identify mean points of impaet for aircraft making visual runs or having radar malfunctions. (b) The Jlhth Wing hed 10 sireraft report bend re~ looge malfunctions. Four additional aircraft hed difficulty with the pneumatic bork doar system. The other Wings ropartcd fow nalfunctionsy {e) all Wings reported that the axis of attack ms satisfactory, Average arift reported mas 2 dosrecs left. Tho tin Ing wos good with the entire force being over the targct within a g5-ninute pericds (3) Blight Msincering: (Gee Anmx A, Part TIT, for charts and Annox F, Gonsolidated Statistical Surnary, for fuel consumption am weight data.) (o) Norsetive of mission ag Flom: 2, QLimb ond Initiol Cruise: 2 Clinbs to cruising mititude were ccociplished imodiately after take-off, Compression ausituae Tping forees woo obtined ty having the firet airplanes te OF eeee Fly at altitudes as lov as 2000 fect and st a calibrated fekerotta ch 195 nilee per how ond the last aizplancs to tokecoft fay at 22! ‘situdes as high a2 10,000 fect and at a calibrated air Bpeed of 200 mies por hours iTEs oa Ne W “SRUSHL WT qauaissv 1990 2 Rets Return altitudes varied aes +0 20,000 feet. The best return was made at 10,700 feet at a trated ix apecd of 185 niles yor hour untii a 140 foot per minute : ~tomn maa nade into the traffic pettorns By thio provoture the afr eraft uscd 1961 gallons from the target to Guam, (b) Gomonts on the Mission: Ls Connrossion of forces worked sells 2, Sone of the 58th and 913th Wing cirplanes carried M\7A2 bombs which could not be loaded to greatest capacity on the B-29's, accounting for tho lov banb load average for the 2 Wings. + Just before airplanes took off on this nis~ Sion, prediction of poor weather was rade for Ivo Jina on the roturn routes One group of the S8th fing offleaded 2 bonbs fron cach plano and added an oquivalant weight in fuel. The 73rd Wing added 200 gl ons of gesoline per ciroraft, The 3lkth Wing renoved bombs to make Yoon for an estinated 900-gllon reserve for its plone: (4) Radar: See Annex &, Part IV, for rader reperte (5) Gunnery: Sco Annox 4, Part Vy for gunnery reports (6) air-Sen Resone: (Gee Annex A, Part VI, for sites of Aitchings.) Four B-29's wore lost off Ivo Jim, with crows bail~ ing out of 3 Sireraft oni the fourth ditching in Ivo Harbor. All crew manbere execpt 1 man vere rescued, (Figures are based on later information and vere not cvailable for inclusion in the Consclidated Statistical Summary.) One B-29 ditched at 31h@i-21,2138 duc to dam age sustained over tho target, Nine of the 11 crew menbers wore Fi seusd, although 1 of tho rescued men later dicd, another ditehing had teen reparted at 3310N-1)2302, but negetive searches were made . on 27 and 26 May. he Weather: (See Annex B for details.) Weather encount- ered on thie Hiagsion was alnost as tricfeds 4. Communications: (1) Radar Counter Measures: (Seo Annex Cy Part Is for actails.) Thirtoon observers participstel and 95 intercopts vere Gutaineds Rope was @ispenscd when it was considered necessarys (2) Rodse: (ee Annox C, Port II, for detail totar of 33 strike reports was received ty Ground Stations. 4 j= Intelligencer (2) Bury Air oppositions (See Annex D, Part Ts for actesis.) oisty cmuny fighters intrmtepted tho 3-298 and mode 9b sete.) cians wore 17 destroyed and 4 damgote (2) antisireraft ona air-towie 2 (Seo annex ps fort Uy for detoile,) “Alok uivountered ip the target aren waa prc most intense to dates 8 SERED(b) Tais damage, together with damge caused by ‘the Comand's 5 other missions ageinst Tokyo (Noa. 37, Te 384 40, 67 $9), raicca the total city urben erca destroyed ond daneged to ‘Square miles, or 50.8 per cent of the city areay Ge hele sn jor Goncret¢ US Ooomanting rere vrnnse A eae sin aauatssv1990 3. SESEEL.semarrors Part I - Mvigetion Trask Chart Part II = Mean Points of Impact Port III - Flight Engineering Charts Port IV = Radar Report and Approach Chart Fort V ~ Gunnery | Fost VE ~ Air-Soa Rosoue Chant Mission No. 183 25 May 1945 ~10- SECRET33m Ban | | 7 | | RY Ay ST RA VHA ae Lanorat. / TARGET \Sorg asiassz |) 25issez|25i6i3z i35ez |asioise || 25i35e2|e5iseo2 |) 251405 Bsisire || 2sisare|zsez0e | 2514032 foaz|asia5Ke || 2513432 2515382 es GARGR CHART XI BOMBER COMMAND” a en ee ONS Ee Se Se—— 21K DAE aittegtieeseeeet BWM ele OY/ W Horst ete ©e Doma Ar i7abe Ce) Foe£ Feserve 92s Blwiment performance: Se AN/AEQ~13 was operative as follows: on take-cff, 426 over the target, ond 421 on return, Se ? ‘bs Azimith statilizetion was used on the c ‘ 13 sea bombing run by 308 ©. The average moximum range of AIVAPQ-13 vas 5945 nautical miles ot a 10,000-Bot altitude. ad. The evexege maximum range cr ragar beacon reception was es ‘UG noutical milesat 7000 fect and 133 nautienl miles at 13,000 fe: » The everage moximm range of AN/APQ-13 on landfall point ange was 48 nautical miles. £. There were no AN/AFQ-13 failures reported by lead aircraft. “eT ona VUNG Failures reported wore 12 AN/APN-+h, 1 SoRA695, and none ScR-718. 2. Loran: The average maximm range cf oquipment woo 521 nowt- ical miles for ground waves end 1091 nautical miles for sky waves. OWT sey “SvISHL qaiatssv1930 3+ Comment: 1H a, There were 299 inlividual redar releases reported. b. The identification of landfall, initinl, and aiming points by rader was reported as from gocd to very good. 4 e+ Both direct and off-set radar bonbing methods were used on the mission. -- SEOREDEs part T - Weather Summary part IT - Chart - Forecast Weather vs. Observed weather part III - Prognestic Map yart IV - Synoptic Map Mission Nos 263 25 may 1945, -19- gouELRENMIALEATER part I - Weather Summary : Part II - Churl = Forceact Weather vs. Observed weather 4 part IIE = Progostic ep 7 ort 1 ~ Synoptie top 3 -19- GQuELDERBIALSawa TUNE HL INN “ ‘aastssy1930 WET Bses: Eanes As bases Rae in oreas west of 136°E+ To ccast: 7/10 low cloudy Targeta: Tokyo and Nagoya: 3/10 low ‘by 120K with middle and hii opsrational Foresnst Base at 4/10 ler cloud, base 2000 Take off: ft. top 6=12,000 #t; 5/10 middle elowl, base 12,600 ft, top 13,000 ft} 8/10 migh cloud et 30,0005 Visibitity 20 miles, lorering to 2 miles in showers. Route Do 20%: Sume as bascow out: 20oN to ZN: 4/10 low cloudy tase 1600 fe, top B-15,000 ft; 2/10 pebaie clovd, base 12,000, top 13,000 ft, visibility 15 miles, lovering to 2 ‘mites ip shoverse 22°N to 2kN: 4/10 low cloud. base Sooo tt, top 4000 ft; 2/20 middle Sioud, bage 12,000, top 13.000 ft G/10 high cloud at 28,000 ft 2yon to 21%: 8/10 lo clouds base Fego-Fry op 10-15,000 fe; 10/10 *Oyane cious in layors between magioo and 18,000 ft; 6/10 high toeia at 28,000 ty Light rime tees slow saity 10 miles, lovering to 2 nije 3m shgrerse Bp soso 6/20 3 eiovt, base 5 middle cloud LH Sep 5000 ft; 4/10 madd base glow ct 27,000 ft 1 me sai, ep ten has ae 0 high cloud oa 1000 Ts. 3/ 2o0ey 269 Hey yastuity Oto mites Sn bazee ao son touds base 2000 3°}a0 bien, ston oF 1 3 uP anno males an poraets ‘top 4000 p.00 ft ‘naz. route ni gs aame 08 Hauke outgoing Foburnsna 426/10 ror cloud, vase 1400 ft, top 8-20,000 £1 Cloud, thin at 11,000 ft and 4/10 high cloud oF 3o.coo £¢ wath shorere in morning slowly decreasing during 40y~ 0/10 low and middle cloudy ft with 8/10 high cloud from 22-26,000 ft; pase 1600, tops gh cloud increasing slowly # the day to 10/10 in many leyors 5/0 msaade ase 1000 ft, tops 384000 eqtenaing te coast 6000 rt (E of 136E)+ cloud in morning increasing t° ‘from 11-30,000 ft~ figather mneoustered Soipan; Tinian: 10/10 low clouds 5 ‘yase 2000 #t; 1/10 middie cloudy ; tase 1,000 rt Guan: 6-8/10 low cloudy base 1600 Tt, top 7000 ft; widely seattered Light shovers in the arode po 2ik: 4/10 dor elon, base, 1800 Fey top 8-10,000 ft; 2/20 middle cloud, bese 1,000 ft, top uninorns feoening 5/10 at the end of the Zones Dic to 261; 5/10 tow clout beccm— Be ioeath tops at 9000 ft; 3/20 Rijabe e1oud, Duse 12,000 Bosening 9/10- Been to 40%: 10/10 lor cloud, base Gnknowny top 8-10,000 ft, with o few tops to 20,000 ft; 10/10 middie Eioua, base 12000 with top at 20,000 fey B/t0 high cloud at 244000 £0; Fiisviiity 10 miles lovering to 0-2 ile in rain; moderate rine icing fabove 14000 fe BON to target: 9/10 low clouds Ge Eton, top 8000 ft beecming 1/10 wecast; @/Ae middle cloud, base Ye,000 f¢ beecming 14,000 Ft: 8/20 high cloud at 23,000 ft; severe Fimo icing at 15,000 ft, light at 20,000 ft 4/20 low cloud, base unknom, top $000 ft; 6/10 midd2e clouds tase 344,000 tt, top unknown; 9/10 high Zioua at 23,000 ft; visability 35 miless Sane 08 Route Outgoing. eOUELRENTIAL ;F E & a ¥ = 220/15 090/13, 150 z z 260/28 aR ofa 140/08 Winds Wloft = observea 2s0n_to 35° Base _to 20% 030/20 130/25 20° to. 240/30 on 240/35, a “22 a2 a 2 16 21DwANS LRLET ETE pron oer rr "2 a WAHAVaM AsvoauOS GGl AVY 92-52 £8! : NOISSIV= PROG bs pop 1242 r WHE a |COMMUNTCAT TONS, yart I ~ Radar Counter Measures Part TT - Radio 8 BESREEcM oo awa VAN Bampose: as to D/P early-aerning and gun-laying radars. be To continue radar search in 38-3000 me regions ° 2. method: as Thirtocn observers participated and wet the following cautpnent fo accomplish the seareh: 13 - UMahy 12 = APicMLy 3 ~ APAS2h, 2 ~ APRS, and 1 - SPA-6s ‘To confuse enery ralar ty the woo of rope. be Rope wes Aispensed at the rate of 3 bundles per 10 sec~ ends vhen considered necessary. be Rocutter ae Many crews reported tint rope wis effective and in many enscs the searchlights were observed tracking the rope after it sas Aispensed, be Tadur search reoulted in the following 95 intareeptsr Characteristics Comrdintes Date Mime ot Be UPUPEUPEDUPUIADNA YEE REE BEE et i 0068 0600 25 35yon 139902 o52645 Oly3 22 222 00068 cys Ha 3107 IO0OSE 52645 252 21 12) 20069 0500 50 3505N 1ho25E oSebh5 030 21 Let (00070 0495 30 3YO7™N 14030E o526k5 OL} 22 12% Doyo oko 45 352en Uydaks ose6k5 3525 21 12d oom: okoo 20 42m 138263 o5e55 1225 21 12) 00073 0560 3h 3307 140352 052645 0209 22 122 00074 OBc2 1¢ S5NON 13953 O5e6K5 O52 22 17 00075 1900 06 S5USN 199978 O52645 O107 21 12h cooys o160 20 3340 139308 052545 159 21 122 Comye ago 20 “3gocn 13690E 052645 0035 22 22) 00079 0ng0 25 SASEN 1380 O52645 coc 21 121 Coorg pag os ASuGN I39U5E O52645 cue 2b 122 So0G0 o4go YO 3p10N 2Z6LSE O5254> 2345 22 2b e060 450 35 A5EN IBOLT 05255 2320 22 122 Oc0B0 1900 05 3529N 13940E o526\5 OZ 21 12) D008 0497 42 350M 19947E 52645 oor Zl 9° 00080 O73 3h BhGIN 19655E 052615 oceh 21 128 Boose ohn ie as0m™ Laph7e 052645 Q0el 2) 122 Goose 770 ky 2705N IbelZE o526N OURS 2. 12 Coos ogee 30 asian 1g6s2n 052645 20ke 21 122 ooTee aoe 20 GA5ON 1u0RSE O56 TAO 22 22h Gongs Oso1 2h 5230N WOKE O526A5 c11e 22 122 Genel Obg5 12 ASUN 19977 52645 107 22 12% Goree Oh 30 ag25N 139KOE O5ekA5 O20 22 12 soe res 13 ZeuGN AOSOE Upe6U5 0058 2 12) Sones 1055 12 guosN union 052645 O1N5 2 13% Gene O9p7 08 S436N LiNOOR 0595u5 cn5z 2d 12d Geueg ogcy 12 5028N LNOLSE 052545 1230 2) 122 cote fees 30 SUION NORTE 0525x5157 eh 2Ab se esgin be Methed = ev Rolanbslity RAGRARGRA RARER ® E onso3 car om cnr cry oouenceca 0r020202 oono1e202 por1ez02 (001010262 ‘oro100ce (002020002 ooroacece: ‘oor010002 corarece. UYOUENOUBYHYIANOEDEMhs Hanno -26- SEgnanqasissy1930 00105 0106 oo107 ‘0108 ‘00108 ‘00105 00110 0110 cone 013 00130 00135 0138 016 oo1y7 oon? 018 019 0019 0150 0150 20151 00152 00153 0152 00155, 00155 00156 0157 00157 00158 ooxéo 00160 ‘00180 0285 cis? 00190 0190 oon60 0190 n199 019k, 00195 00295 00395 00195 ‘0195 00396 00196 00196 00197 00198 0200 00200 ‘00200 on20l 0590 353 0490 0350 0506 0365 20 0550 0350 572 0430 0000 0340 1000 ouse ange 0450 ose 0485 op S O5L5, 0497. 1000 0490 0920 0387 1000 ous ug 0578 300 1900 0490 0490 1025 000 aygo uso 0180 cao 1090 0800 0518 0956 abso 1460 ‘e000 1950 0960 020 0335 0379 490 0310 0900 ‘2000 pe orsein Ghoraeteristies a0 by al, 32 38 28 4b 20 50 36 25 08 a0 09 oh 08 05 08 5 95 40 08 6 7 0 8 09 o 6 7 08 08. 65 5 "3 9 5 05 20 05 26 uy 20, 6 06 06 % ey 20 ol 08 5 5 10 08 we Cooraintes, 3500N 33058 33008 3530" 33158 3325N 3350N 3hOON 3545" Bh250 3345" 3420N, 34308 3e30n eye5t 3507" 3520N 3h06N 3u10N 35200 35330 Sk15N 3535" 33038 33450 35300 3320N 3h02N 33078 3100N 3055 3330N 35308 9530N 3ea0u 3,001 3540" SALON 3355" ‘2bhON Seow BACON Siecn Buy LN 34300 3535N Face 3530" 35308 35k0N Sonar 35W2N a5ien Sheen O5N 35308 fiothed ayohos 157508 137508 4o4oE 1035E 13832E 140308 138308 140528 rose 138328 140258 33915 139008 ajo 139473 338h0E 139528 Bice uyi208 159528 ayo57e ay28e 14015e 138155 10308 UjL3OE 37205 1g9uTe 139508 339h08 138355 139305 139305 339308 13815E 135558 ayo1ss 1g9hoe uses UAzeE up2ce 150L0E 140308 13805 139318 aiaior 40308 140308 159508 gees 139528 339308 else iy.00E 140308 = szGRED Bate Tine 052545 052515 052515 052545 052615, 052645 52645 052515 oats 05265 052645 52545, 052545 052545 052545 052545 52515 952509 052645 052545 052645 052615 052515 ose645 052645 52645 52645 052645 052545 52545 052515 052545 052545 052645, 052545 052545 052545 052545 052545 052645 052645 052645 052645 ogee 52615 OB 2645 52645 o52645 052645 o526S 52585 5264.5 5265 -27- SEORED 135 nag 1000 1126 o1ze 030 0130 3220 nah ouno 1215 0135 ust 2350 225 2229 2240 2310 a290 0030 1300 ons, oot 2357 0035 0243 cals 1025 0027 2310 2335 0016 3230 3231 aus 3255 rie 3330 1d 2206 0225 cect o3h5 oy23 on 3h ase 405 0359 320 0335 125 12s 1235 axes 2400 e# Rol sability ER aa 122 aa. a yt qi qi 122 32a we. a. yh x) wi aa wa yr a2. yal 421 at at 42. ya. 321 a2. wa aad aa qa 42 wh a 32 2) owns nana adm com amo PHVU EER RRURPALY EEE NY AMUMEe Eg EW ee BOOB OOH REVO BOBO DADO OUEY HOUBWE EE OE EMO HE E poyUON Be Re EE 8 j 001030003 002030003, 002030003 2600003, 006040003 (901030003 conce00ee 203 eexezonce oxaecoce oxceooce 901630003, aoxceocee 00600003, gexaanoce oxe2cce2 oagce ogee 00402 006040002 coke okce cayee oncacce ooxez00t2 eoxc20ct Sexcanoce goiceoece ooneg0o0e‘a Grand YAN SHS INN“ ‘amiaissv1940 aaeee 1393) geaos 2ete 23 en seise seeks one O0Y69 O75 15 35051 IKOISE O52ELH OOS peeeNpes Pn ne gue BI he Regarks: A oigmal vith the characteristics 469/475/15 was. intercepted on this mission, 4 similer signal, probably ‘the some one, Gas hesrd on misaien No. 161 in the sone oprrorinate loeation. No ute Tere obtained. ‘PART_IL_= RADIO 1. Strike Reports: A total of 33 strike report messeges was received by the Ving Ground Stations. Ten reparts were received by ‘the 58th Wing; 8 by the 73rd; 7 by the 3liith; and 6 by the 313th. 2s Fox Teonamiocions: The only Aiversion fran the usual Ueopas yjeather ond Tine Signals transmitted from the Ground Stations to the aircraft during this mission vas the transmission of the weather et Tro Jima on the hour ard half-hour for 2 hours after Bombs Aray« 3. Exeguencies: ericl redio operators reported that atmospheric interfurence was heowy on all strike frequencies during this mission. ‘The 11 megreycle frequeneics in ali Wings proved the nost effectives There vere several encuy attempts at jamming on noarly oll frequenciess Folieving is a percentage Wrenkiom of traffic per frequency: 15 Pee Gent en 3 mogneyeles; 35 per cent on 7 megacyeles; end 50 por cent on 11 megnoyeles. he Javigationsl Aide: Tventy-four requests for HF/DF bearings were mide of the Ground Stations. 12 tut 2 vere cbtaineds Ta 1 Sases the ACS D/P station ould not pick up the aircraft signe) s94, Gn the other interference fron onother aircraft blocked the oiresnrt's pecend attenpt, Mires VIF/DF bearings were requested ead wore, cpesne! eeoreonder Bree, Saipans Rangers, hancts, and brondeast stations ware used effectively 4b, Not Discipline ama Security: Only 1 vielation of socurdty 102 reported uring tis nisaton. The 713th wing reported that an aria} creeryor used 4 wrong CSP. et Giociyiina improved. en See wakes TS Jorn wing reported thot sane operators continua te break 48 98 SU0Se Jrenenisstons, failed to clear the aix for weant troffie, bawl mOld vrenentieatien, end noked far weather just before an sight after & senguled weotnar beendoact, The 73rd Wing hod only 2 bronch of 328 Qiseipline, tho emergency trananigsion of 2 airersft waa Broken OY aie Pittleraft, Cerrestive action was taken in onch instance 24s¥ed ‘shove to prevent Fceurrences -28- QEGRED6, many tronsntasionst te foltering ‘ loos eee alee ws. 215 hess (1) Top cH between 15002 ond 19002 was pertially (2) Jap Gi between 1300% and 13302 was very effective. (G) GW sagnai FAP from 13008 to 19952 was partially of fective to effective. ve 6055 hese (2) Inevy voiee at 1057% and 16002 was ineffuctives s (2) sep of at 13202, 15302, ona 16052 was partially ef- ectives (3) Steady tone near Ivo Jima mas partially effectives (4) oW betncen Ivo ond Saipan vas very offectives (5) c¥ and steady tone at 19302 vere very effective and blocked out the ground stations (6) ci am dashes at 1609% and 17042 were offectives sa Eagana WN Ce ANT (7) Heavy unidentitiea o¥ at 12562 was very offectives cs 11080 kes; Intentional civ between 15300 and 16072 was portially effective. a. 3020 kes: (1) ow fram 16502 to 17302 was very effective. qaugissv1990 @ (2) mepipe fran 14152 to 15002 was partially effective es 10305 kes: Negligible. f. 3990 kes: Unidentified cii at 09252 wes very cffectives g» Tui5 kes: Intermittent Ci between 10572 and 12452 was vory offectives he 10820 kee: Spark coil jamming fron 12452 to 12052 was vary offectives A. U1. 7310, amd 12260 kes: Neglictb 7. Distress: Tho 73rd Ving reported that 2 energency essAges, were srocrved by the Wing Ground Stations The first was Fecesyal 58 nn ahreraft indicating a possible ditching due to the loss of 2 ongensae Gefore attenpting contoct with the ing Growl Otetion, the atrerady seat ise queraency mensego 40 Tao bin.cea Recvan Gn [0a Menem inne course 40 otcer) wos Frequostod wy thia airersft fran As-Soe sete ae Ivo, he boaring was not obtainal, The afrexaft operas ss Tnee Switched ‘to 11080 Kea and transmitted the above mentioned message 29; sacnateng ae Dial mest a ras received P stating that itching was poss ble duc message mis received in clear text due to the aircraft to the ficld, Suprad vas notified, ACS D/F vas also tron conraea te ateer vore given to the tude of the airersft vero forwarded to the obtaining a radar fix in tho ovent that the a3 Communications vero mintained ntl the sircroft landed safely Seipan, he 56th Wing logged the folloring messages: ee GAL mr rouse 6754 «Engine trouble and positions? 1icéz 675, "Engine out, continuing course 1650z «6752 *Ship aitchcd, cnorguney TF Ole" Reece EV7SL_—tia 2 onthened ana ponition.® 18152 “S0v7S2_-—«=«stNo 2 featherod, position, ETA Tintan."(Re~ ceived 3 additional position reports fran this airerafts) ase 15752 «B29 in water, burning, position.* 20152 —-SYV752__—*Poaition (2 adaitiom} positions reported by this aireraft). 20352 © «-AY7Oh_-—=*Positticn of aurvivers.® 22002 © -24V753_-—=«“NPossible ditching and position. 8. Muigment Malfunctions: AWaRN-7: 5 sense antemmas broken; 1 control Ee ene eet ig toer antecan becky 2 mena antennas broken. 02-622: 2 inoperative. RO=3: 2 antenna broken; 2 indeatcre flaghing continuous. B¢-36; 1 inoperative; 3 micro- Phone smitehes inoperstive. JAD-1}: 2 inoperative; 1 no Sidotonce PO=Gs5: 1 inoperative, Rlali2: 22 inoperative. =30- SEQREI