A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute

Author(s): Niall M. Fraser, Keith W. Hipel, John Jaworsky, Ralph Zuljan

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 652-677
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174183
Accessed: 15/04/2010 09:42

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of
Conflict Resolution.

http://www.jstor.org
A Conflict Analysis of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute

NIALL M. FRASER
KEITH W. HIPEL
JOHN JAWORSKY
RALPH ZULJAN
Universityof Waterloo

The Armenian-Azerbaijaniconflict in the Soviet Union is modeled and analyzed using

conflict analysis methodology.To allow a conflict analysis approachto be conveniently and
expeditiously applied to the dispute, DecisionMaker:the ConflictAnalysis Program is em-
ployed. After acquiringthe backgroundinformationpertinentto the conflict, DecisionMaker
was used to develop two conflict models at differenttimes, in termsof decision makers,options,
and preferences. Based on the conflict model, DecisionMaker calculated the equilibrium
resolutionsto the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Several otheranalyses were then carriedout
on the basis of the equilibriagenerated.The overall resultsmatchwell what has happenedin the
dispute.

The objectives of this article are (1) to demonstratehow conflict analysis

methodology can be employed to study, systematically,an ethnic dispute
such as the Armenian-Azerbaijaniconflict over Nagorno-Karabakhin the
Soviet Union; and (2) to derive from the conflict analysis some predictions
about the future development of the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict. Further-
more, DecisionMaker: the Conflict Analysis Program' was used to research
the conflict models and execute all calculations necessary for a conflict
analysis.This exercise in formalizationwas found to be helpfulboth in terms
of analyzing the dispute and as a means of rapidly discovering plausible

1. DecisionMaker:the ConflictAnalysisProgramconstitutesa comprehensivedecision sup-

portsystem which can be employed for modeling and analyzingreal-worldconflicts. The pro-
gram is availablefor use on a microcomputerfrom WaterlooEngineeringSoftware(22 Dupont
Street East, Waterloo,Ontario,Canada,N2J 2G9; telephone:519-885-2450). The copyrightis
owned by N. M. Fraserand K. W. Hipel.

JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION,Vol. 34 No. 4, December 1990 652-677

(? 1990 Sage Publications,Inc.
652
 Fraser et al. IARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI
DISPUTE 653

resolutionswhich had not been considered previously.Therefore,conflict

analysis is seen as a useful tool to be appliedto ethnicconflict research,and,
due to its generality,conflict analysisis consideredapplicableto any conflict
situation.

CONFLICT ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

Conflict analysis is a game-theoretic solution concept tailored to the

practicalstudy of conflicts; it was developed by Fraserand Hipel2as an im-
provementon the metagame analysis procedurecreatedby Nigel Howard
(1971). Any conflict situation,where it is possible to specify a set of rational
actorswith meaningfuloptionsand at least ordinalpreferences,can be studied
using the conflict analysis method. The procedurebegins with at least the
preparationof a historicalaccountof the conflict in question.A model based
on this history is formulatedby specifying actors,options, and preferences.
Possible resolutionsof the conflict are determinedfrom the model by apply-
ing the Fraser-Hipelsolution concept. Finally, various sensitivity tests are
used to ascertainhow stablevarioussolutions are following relativelyminor
changes to the model. Consequently,a set of solutions judged to be stable
resolutionsto the conflict can be revealed.
The first step in developing a conflict model is to decide on the actorsand
options. An actor, hereafterreferred to as a decision maker, may be an
individual or a group of people representedby an organization.To be in-
cluded as a decision makerin a conflict model, he/she/it (hereafter,it) must
have some power to influence the conflict; the power of the decision maker
is expressed in terms of options or courses of action which are under its
control to initiate in orderto alterthe conflict situation.
The final type of informationrequiredto complete the conflict model is
the relative preferencesof each of the decision makers.Specifying prefer-
ences for a given decision makercan be brokendown into two stages. At the
firststage, the options availableto all decision makersareorderedfrom most
importantto least importantfor a particulardecision maker. Second, the
decision maker has a preference as to whether it would want the option
always to be taken,always not be taken,or sometimes takenand sometimes
not taken. The third case is referred to as conditional preferences. By
2. For a comprehensivedescriptionof conflict analysis, the readercan referto the book by
FraserandHipel (1984) as well as referencescited therein.Articlesdealingwith conflict analysis
have appearedin InternationalStudies Quarterly(Hipel, Wang, and Fraser1988) as well as in
otherjournals.
654 JOURNALOFCONFLICTRESOLUTION

specifying each decision maker's relative preferencesfor options, one is

actually stating the decision makers'ordinalpreferencesover the possible
outcomes.
An outcome in conflict analysis is any particularcombinationof options
resultingfrom each decision makerchoosing which optionsit wants to take.
There are at most 2' possible outcomes (where n equals the number of
options). However, some combinations of options may be judged to be
infeasible;it is necessaryto removesuchoutcomesfromconsiderationbefore
carryingout the searchfor conflict resolutions.
Generally,a feasible outcome is stable for a decision maker if it is not
advantageousfor the decision maker to unilaterallymove away from the
outcomeby changingits selection of options.In such a situation,the decision
maker may be able to move to a more preferredoutcome by selecting
differentoptions underits control,but other decision makerswould be able
to put it in a less preferredsituationby choosing other options. Therefore,
the outcome is stable and the decision makeris betteroff to stay where it is.
An outcome is unstable for a decision maker if it can move to a more
preferredpositionby changingits selection of options to formwhat is called
a unilateralimprovement.It is impossible, in this case, for other decision
makersto block the improvementby changing theiroption choices.
If an outcome is stable for all of the decision makers,it is referredto as
an equilibriumand is a possible resolution to the conflict. In any specific
situation,if an equilibriumis reachedduringthe evolutionof a conflict from
an unstableinitialoutcome,the conflictwill remainat the equilibrium,unless
the conflict model changes because of changes in preferences or other
alterationsin the conflict model. If one were closely modelinga conflict over
time, one would update the model as soon as new informationbecame
available.
The process of buildingthe conflict model provides a convenientmeans
for communicatingabout any complex dispute. The structurefurnishes a
languagefor discussingthe conflict anda notationfor recordingit. However,
a manual stability analysis (i.e., the calculation of equilibria), becomes
unmanageable in some conflicts because of the exponential growth of
outcomes as the numberof options increases. Hence a computerprogram
was designed thatis capableof carryingout the stabilityanalysisprocedure.
This programis called DecisionMaker:the ConflictAnalysisProgramor, in
short,DecisionMaker.
DecisionMakeruses the conflict model to carryout a stability analysis.
By carefully examining the many possible moves and countermoves that
can be exercised by the decision makers,DecisionMakercan decide if an
 Fraser et al. IARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANIDISPUTE655

outcome is stable for a particulardecision maker.Furthermore,in a status

quo analysis, DecisionMakercan be used to explain how a dispute evolves
from the currentsituationthroughsome transitoryoutcomes to an eventual
equilibrium.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Duringthe past few years, there have been dramaticoutburstsof nation-

alist unrestwithin the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which
underscorethe extentto which the multinationalnatureof this statecontinues
to pose many difficult problems.Most of the disturbanceshave takenplace
in the non-Russianrepublicslocated along the peripheryof the USSR. Of
particularinterestare the massive demonstrationsand violent clashes in the
Transcaucasianrepublics (Armenia, Azerbaijan,and Georgia), where the
most dramaticconflict has centeredarounda long-standingterritorialdispute
between the Armeniansand Azerbaijanisover the political, socioeconomic,
and cultural future of an area called Nagorno-Karabakh,an autonomous
oblast falling entirely within the AzerbaijanSoviet Socialist Republic and
populatedpredominantlyby ethnic Armenians.
Many Armenianshad migratedto TranscaucasiaafterRussia'swarswith
PersiaandTurkey,and the first majorArmenian-Azerbaijani clash occurred
in 1905 in the ethnically mixed city of Baku, on the Caspian Sea. Here,
cultural-religiousdifferenceswere exacerbatedby the animosityof the local
Azerbaijanis,who were largely of peasant background,toward the more
affluent, urbanizedArmenians and, according to some reports,by the at-
temptsof the Russiantzaristadministrationto exploit Armenian-Azerbaijani
hostility (on the whole, the ChristianArmenians were favored over the
Moslem Azerbaijanisby the Christiantzaristregime of the nineteenthcen-
tury). The conflict soon spreadbeyond Baku, and intercommunalviolence
led to the deathsof several thousandArmeniansandAzerbaijanis.3
During the turmoil of World War 1, Armenia and Azerbaijan briefly
achieved independence.However,the complex demographyof Transcauca-
sia made it impossibleto createethnicallyhomogeneousstates,andthe focus
of the Armenian-Azerbaijaniconflict shifted from Baku to the area known
as Nagorno-Karabakhwhere, at the time, Armenians formed the great
majority(over 90%) of the population,althoughmany of them had come to
3. See Altstadt-Mirhadi(1986), 303-13, and Swietochowski(1985), 38-46.
656 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

this areain the nineteenthcenturyas immigrantsfromTurkeyand Iran.This

mountainous"island"of Armeniansin an Azerbaijani"sea"was separated
from the rest of easternArmenia,and it was fiercely contested throughout
the shortperiodof independenceof the Caucasianstates.4
The populationof this area opted clearly for Armenia, and after Soviet
rule was established in the Transcaucasusin 1920, the new revolutionary
authoritiesdecided initially to place Nagorno-Karabakhand Nakhichevan
(anotherdisputedterritory,populatedlargely by Azerbaijanis)underArme-
nian administration.They reversed this decision in 1921, and placed both
territoriesunder Azerbaijan's administrativecontrol. In 1923, Nagorno-
Karabakhbecame the Nagorno-KarabakhAutonomousOblast (NKAO) of
the AzerbaijanSSR (Soviet Socialist Republic),while in 1924, Nakhichevan
became the NakhichevanAutonomousSSR of the AzerbaijanSSR.5
Although reasons for this change in jurisdictionare not perfectly clear,
developmentsin Soviet-Turkishrelationspossibly played a certainrole, for
KemalistTurkeywas one of Soviet Russia'sfirstandclosest allies. Allocating
Nagorno-Karabakhand Nakhichevanto Azerbaijanmay have been a con-
cession to the new Turkishstate,which, the Soviet leadershiphoped,would
play an importantrole in leading the anticolonial,revolutionarystruggle in
Asia (Walker 1980).6 However, commentatorsin the central Soviet press
usually claim that the change in jurisdiction was motivated primarilyby
economic considerations.7Regardless,the decisions on territorialjurisdic-
tion of the early 1920s have been a constantsourceof dissatisfactionamong
Soviet Armenians.8
Armenian attemptsto change the status of Nagorno-Karabakhcan be
traced back to the 1930s. Various petitions and appeals demanding the
transferof this area to Armeniawere made in the 1960s and 1970s with no
positive response from Moscow. By this time, the autonomy of Nagorno-
Karabakhhad been highly restricted,and deterioratingsocioeconomic con-
4. On the complicateddevelopmentsin this areaduringand immediatelyafterWorldWarI,
see Kazemzadeh(1951) and the relevant sections of Hovannisian'strilogy (1967, 1971, esp.
chap. 6, 1982, esp. chap. 7).
5. An autonomousoblast (province)is supposedto have considerableculturaland adminis-
trativeautonomyand is distinguishedby a particularnationalcompositionandway of life, while
an autonomousrepublic,which is structuredas a semisovereignstate,is supposedto havegreater
political clout and prestige. In reality,both autonomousoblasts and autonomousrepublicsare
highly dependenton the republicto which they are subordinated.
6. See also the comment by Polyakov (1988), 15, and Reese (1988a). Most Armenian
commentatorsstrongly stress this Turkishfactor and Stalin's role in the decision to change
jurisdictions(e.g., Kaputikyan1989). Foran Azerbaijanipoint of view, see Aliev (1988).
7. See, for example, Pravda (21 March1988).
8. See, for example, Kaputikyan(1989), 30.
 Fraser et al. IARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI
DISPUTE 657

ditions combined with Azerbaijan'sinsensitive culturalpolicy which dis-

criminatedagainst Armenians and favored Azerbaijanisin the NKAO. In
addition,the percentageof Armeniansin the NKAO was slowly changing
(from 91.2% in 1939 to 80.5% in 1970), and Armeniansconsideredthis to
be the result of intentionalpopulationmanipulation(Glasnost Information
Bulletin 1989; Lang 1988, xi; Walker1988).9

A CONFLICT ANALYSIS OF THE NKAO CONFLICT

Inthefollowingsections,a comprehensiveconflictanalysis,usingDecision-
Maker,is presented.Two separatepoints in time have been chosen to model
the conflict.The firstmoment,18 October1988, precedesthe centralgovern-
ment's imposition of a "special administration"for the NKAO in January
1989, after escalating tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis;the
second momentselected, 30 January1990, coincides with Moscow sending
in large-scale militaryforces to end a massive outbreakof intercommunal
violence throughoutArmeniaand Azerbaijan.Each conflict model is intro-
duced by a historicalbackgroundsection. After the model is specified and
the resultsare determined,a discussion of the resultsfollows.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO 18 OCTOBER 1988

Protests by Armenians concerning the NKAO increased dramatically

between 1985 and 1987.1' The notable rise in activity was clearly linked to
the greaterease of voicing pent-up grievances because of the new Soviet
policy of glasnost or openness, and it was naturalthat, under these new
conditions,ArmeniansrenewtheirKarabakhcampaignin a vigorousfashion.
Another importantfactor which contributedto public activism in Armenia
was growing concern over ecological issues.1"In fact, several of the mass
demonstrationsin Yerevan calling for the unification of the NKAO with
9. Accordingto Walker(1988), fromthe early 1970s on, the late foreignministerof Armenia
used to raise the Karabakhissue at the annualmeeting of foreign ministersof the Soviet Union.
10. The CentralCommitteeof the CPSU (CommunistPartyof the Soviet Union) and the
USSR Council of Ministersreceived thousandsof individualand collective letters addressing
this issue.These lettersincludeddemandsthat,at a minimum,televisionbroadcastsfromYerevan
(the capitalof the ArmenianSSR) to the NKAO be permitted,thatroad links between the two
areas be improved,and that Azerbaijaniharassmentof Armeniansin the NKAO cease. Many
petitionersalso demandedthe unificationof Nagorno-Karabakhwith Armenia(see Muradyan
1989, 19-20, 22).
11. See Fuller(1986, 1987a) and the commentby Kaputikyan(1989, 31).
658 JOURNALOFCONFLICTRESOLUTION

Armenia followed immediately on the heels of demonstrationsprotesting

environmentalpollution(Fuller 1987b, 1988a, 1988b).
In late 1987 and early 1988, several delegations from the NKAO met
with senior party officials in Moscow to discuss the status of the NKAO
and otherArmeniangrievances.12However,no concreteprogresswas made,
and in February1988, a stream of telegrams from the NKAO, as well as
resolutions passed at meetings held in various local enterprises,began to
arrive in Moscow demandingthat the autonomousoblast be reunitedwith
Armenia.On 10 February,the AzerbaijaniInformationAgency announced
that Azerbaijan would never agree to such demands,13 and Azerbaijani
officials increasedtheirpressureon Armenianactivistsin the NKAO to stop
raisingthis issue. Nonetheless, the overwhelmingmajorityof Armeniansin
the NKAO supportedunificationwith the ArmenianSSR, and they looked
to Moscow for a favorable resolution to this issue. On 22 February,they
began to holdstrikesprotestinga CPSU CentralCommitteeresolutionwhich
stated that separatingthe NKAO from Azerbaijanwas not in the interestof
the ArmenianandAzerbaijanipeoples.
At approximatelythe same time, daily demonstrationsand strikescalling
for the returnof Nagorno-Karabakh began to be held in Yerevan,and soon
they paralyzedthe city. Attemptsby officials from Moscow to mollify the
protesters were unsuccessful. By 26 February 1988, nearly one million
people were reportedon the streets. On this date Gorbachevmet with two
prominentArmenianactivists, and listened carefullyto their arguments.He
promisedthat a "justsolution"would be found to the problemof Nagorno-
Karabakh(althoughhe is also reportedto have complainedthat the Arme-
nians were "stabbingperestroikain the back")and statedthat in the course
of the next monththe situationin the NKAO would be thoroughlyreexam-
ined. The next day, the organizersof the demonstrationsin Yerevanagreed
to end protestsuntil 26 Marchin orderto allow a special commission newly
struckby the CPSU CentralCommitteeto come to its conclusions.
The calm in Armeniadid not spreadto Azerbaijan.Therehadbeen earlier
reports of scattered, nonlethal violence, but on 27 February,Baku radio
reportedthe deaths of two Azerbaijaniyouths in connectionwith unrestin
the NKAO, and on 27 and 28 February,retaliatoryviolence occurredin the
Azerbaijanicity of Sumgait.This incidentcontributedto an alreadysizable
12. Unless noted otherwise, the chronicleof events presentedis based primarilyon Soviet
and North American press reports,the articles and chronologies found in the Radio Liberty
Research Bulletin and its successor, Report on the USSR, and Glasnost InformationBulletin
(1989, 12-17).
13. This was followed by manysimilarstatementsin the Azerbaijanimedia.
 Fraser et al. /ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI
DISPUTE 659

flow of refugeeswho crossedthe borderbetweenArmeniaandAzerbaijanin

both directionsto escape intercommunalviolence.
The centralSoviet press initially blamed the Sumgait tragedyon "hooli-
gan elements," but Armenian sources claim that it was a well-organized
"pogrom"which was aimed only at Armeniansand conductedin complicity
with local Azerbaijanipartyofficials."4Armeniandespairandangerover the
events in Sumgait were compoundedwhen, by the end of March 1988, it
becameclear thatthe authoritiesin Moscow continuedto oppose any change
in the territorialstatus of the NKAO. Although the federal government
announcedan eight-yeardevelopmentprogramfor the NKAO, this clearly
did not satisfy manyArmenians'demands,which hadbecome moreinsistent
in the wake of growing intercommunalviolence.
To prevent furtherdisturbances,several prominentArmenian activists
were arrested,and large numbers of troops and police were deployed in
Yerevanandthe NKAO. Althougha generalstrikeat the end of Marchclosed
down Stepanakert,the capitalof the NKAO, for several days, it seemed that
a returnto a situationof relativecalmmightbe possible.However,Armenians
were convinced that Moscow was taking a consistently anti-Armenian,
pro-Azerbaijanistance, and felt betrayed.'5
The relativecalm in Aprilsoon provedto be deceptive, andthe Armenian
and Azerbaijani governments' inability to prevent new disturbances in
May led to the "retirement"of the Communistpartyheads of Armeniaand
Azerbaijan,and their replacementby individualswho were expected to be
more amenableto negotiationandcompromise.Even so, mattersagaincame
to a head in June 1988, when the ArmenianSupremeSoviet, the republic's
legislature,voted to incorporatethe NKAO into Armenia."6 Two days later,
14. For Armenianeyewitness reportswhich may not be fully reliable, since they include
rumorsabout what happened to other people, see Glasnost InformationBulletin nos. 16-18
(1989), 26-28, andDetente no. 13 (1988), 8-11.
15. See Kaputiyan(1989). Many Azerbaijanisclaim that Armenianshave a great deal of
influence in circles close to Gorbachev,and also have the strongmoral andfinancialsupportof
Armenianemigres. See, for example,the commentsof an Azerbaijaniwriterquotedin theNew
YorkTimes,11 March 1988.
16. Its claim was justified by Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution,which affirmsthe right
to self-determinationof the peoples of the USSR. In fact, this recognitionof the principle of
self-determinationis only partof a generaldeclaratorystatementabout the natureof the Soviet
federation:"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republicsis an integral,federal,multi-nationalstate
formedon the principleof socialist federalismas a resultof the free self-determinationof nations
and the voluntaryassociationof equalSoviet Socialist Republics.The USSR embodies the state
unity of the Soviet people and drawsall its nations andnationalitiestogetherfor the purposeof
jointly buildingcommunism."Thereis no mechanism,otherthanthe rightof the unionrepublics
to secede (Article72 of the constitution),throughwhich to expressthe rightof self-determination.
660 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

the AzerbaijanSupremeSoviet endorsed a resolution on the unacceptabil-

ity of such a transfer."7
This situationwas not resolved at the NineteenthAll-Union PartyCon-
ference at the end of June. Proposalswere made to transfercontrol of the
NKAO to a thirdparty (e.g., by making it part of the Russian republic or
handingover control to the USSR Supreme Soviet); anothercompromise
solution-granting the NKAO the moreprestigiousstatusof an autonomous
republicinsteadof autonomousoblast-generated little interestandsupport,
although it seemed to provide a logical solution."8Azerbaijan'sdelegates
rejected all these proposals,and Gorbachevagain stated that no change in
the territorialstatusof the NKAO would be permitted.The NKAO Soviet of
People's Deputies decided, in a dramaticmove on 12 July, to secede from
Azerbaijan,but on the same day, the Presidiumof the Supreme Soviet of
Azerbaijandeclared this decision null and void. When the issue was pre-
sented before the Presidiumof the USSR Supreme Soviet on 18 July, it
repeatedits argumentthata change in borderswas impossible.
Althougha numberof strikesanddemonstrationstookplace in the NKAO
andArmeniathroughoutthe summerof 1988, tensionsmountedconsiderably
in September.The NKAO was the scene of renewedstrikesand demonstra-
tions, as well as intercommunalviolence involving firearms.This led finally
to Moscow declaringa "stateof emergency"in the NKAO on 21 September
andthe deploymentof troopsandarmoredvehicles in the NKAO andseveral
Armeniancenters.

A CONFLICT M(OI)ELANI) ANALYSIS FOR OCTOBER 1988

The analysis presentedin the forthcomingsection was conductedon 18

October1988. No changes were madeto the modelingandanalyses afterthe
historicalfacts became knownso thatthe resultscould be fairly comparedto
what eventuallytook place.
17. It referredto Article 78 of the Soviet Constitution,which statesthatboundariesbetween
union republicscan be changedonly with the agreementof both republicsconcerned.
18. Accordingto one analyst(Field 1988):
Therecan be little doubtthatthereis a strongcase forchangingthe constitutionalposition
of the oblast, on the basis of the internallogic of the Soviet constitutionalsystem. It is
patentlyinequitablethatNakhichevan,as a territoryinhabitedby Azerbaijanisseparated
territoriallyfrom Azerbaijan, possess the status of an autonomous republic within
Azerbaijanwhile Karabakhis refusedanalogousstatus.If the Soviet authoritiestaketheir
constitutionalsystemseriously,the Karabakhareashouldbe permitteda statusequivalent
to that of Nakhichevan(i.e., as an autonomousrepublic within the ArmenianUnion
Republic).(P. 3)
 Fraser et al. IARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANIDISPUTE661

The decision makersand options selected for the Armenian-Azerbaijani

conflict on 18 October 1988 are listed in Table 1. Commentsopposite each
decision makerand option explain who the decision makeris andwhat each
option means, respectively. As can be seen, the conflict consists of six
decision makers and a total of ten options. Notice that the main types of
decision makersappearin groups.For example, the decision makersrepre-
sentingthe Armenianfactions appearas decision makersnumbered2, 3, and
4, whereasthe Azerbaijanidecision makersare numbered5 and 6.
Two sets of options are mutually exclusive. First, the decision maker
Moscow can select only one of its threepossible optionsat anypoint in time;
thatis, options 1, 2, and3 areall mutuallyexclusive. Second, the Azerbaijani
Governmentis able only to maintainthe status quo or integrateNKAO-it
could not do both. Thus options 7 and 8 are mutuallyexclusive. Preferences
for each decision maker are expressed in terms of options, as shown in
Table 2. The importanceof optionsis indicatedin a verticallist of the option
numbers rankedfrom most importantat the top to least importantat the
bottom. A negative sign before an option numbermeans that the decision
maker prefersthat the option not be taken. Option preferencescan also be
conditional-the decision maker can prefer that an option be taken or not
only if certainother options are takenor not-although conditionalprefer-
ences do not arise in this conflict model.
Notice thatfor the Armeniandissidents,option 5, in which the Armenian
people demonstrate,is of second highest importanceand the preferencefor
taking this option is unconditional.One may think that the preferencefor
invoking option 5 shouldbe conditionalon Moscow not transferringNKAO
to Armenia,since demonstrationswould not be needed if Moscow allowed
this transferto take place. The preferenceis consideredto be unconditional
because it is believed that the dissidents do not think Moscow would ever
allow NKAO to be transferredto Armenia,so the dissidentspreferdemon-
strationsregardlessof what happens. In other words, even if Moscow did
give in to the demandsto transferNKAO to Armenia,the dissidentswould
not believe that Moscow was sincere and would actually continue to carry
out its promise.
A single, very strong equilibriumwas determinedfor the Armenian-
Azerbaijaniconflict. It is the situationwhere Moscow maintainsthe status
quo (option 2), the Armeniangovernmentsupportsthe Armeniandemands
for incorporatingNKAO (option 4), the Armenianpeople demonstrate(op-
tion 5), the Armeniandissidents agitate openly (option 6), the Azerbaijani
governmenttries to integrateNKAO (option 8), and the Azerbaijanipeople
both apply slow pressure and retaliate (options 9 and 10). A number of
662 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

TABLE 1
Decision Makersand Optionsfor the October1988 Conflict Model

Decision Makerand Options Comments

1. Moscow Central Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics(USSR) which is underthe controlof the Com-
munistparty
1. NKAO to Armenia NKAO (Nagorno-Karabakh AutonomousOblast)is a re-
gion located within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan.
Because NKAO is inhabitedmainlyby Armenians,Mos-
cow could transferNKAO to thejurisdictionof the Soviet
Republicof Armenia.
2. Statusquo NKAO remainsunderthe controlof Azerbaijan.
3. ImproveNKAO conditions For Armenians living in NKAO, improve cultural, lan-
guage, education,andotherconditions.However,NKAO
would remainwithin Azerbaijan.
2. Armeniangovernment Governmentof the Soviet Socialist Republicof Armenia
4. Supportdemands Support main demand of Armenians to incorporate
NKAO into Armenia. The Armenian Government did
support these demands previously in spring 1988 but
dropped its support under pressure from Moscow. Not
taking this option means ignoring the demands of the
Armenian people. Moscow, of course, would have to
approvethe annexationof NKAO by Armenia.
3. Armenianpeople Refersto Armeniansliving in Armeniaand also NKAO
5. Demonstrate The Armenianscan demonstratein the streets of major
urbancenters. A vast majorityof Armenianswould like
NKAO to become partof Armenia.
4. Armeniandissidents Thesepeopleorganizeandleadmostof thedemonstrations.
6. Agitate openly The dissidents can speak openly about incorporating
NKAO into Armenia. In addition, they can encourage
mass demonstrations.If agitationis not carriedout openly,
it will be done covertly.
5. Azerbaijanigovernment Governmentof the AzerbaijanSoviet Socialist Republic
7. Statusquo Keep NKAO within Azerbaijan.At most, the Azerbaijani
governmentmay make some culturalconcessions to the
Armeniansliving in NKAO.
8. IntegrateNKAO Tryto absorbNKAO as muchas possible into Azerbaijan.
This would mean de-emphasizingArmeniancultureand
encouragingArmeniansto leave NKAO.
 Fraser et al. IARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANIDISPUTE663

TABLE 1 Continued

Decision Makerand Options Comments

6. Azerbaijanipeople Azerbaijani people living in the Soviet Republic of

Azerbaijan
9. Slow pressure From cultural, economic, and other viewpoints, the
Azerbaijaniswould make life uncomfortablefor Arme-
nians living in NKAO. The objectiveof this pressureis to
try to encourageArmeniansto leave NKAO.
10. Retaliate This option refersto coercive action takenagainstArme-
nians living in NKAO. This action includes physical at-
tacks on Armenians.

sensitivity tests were performed,and these showed that several other equi-
libriacan occur.However,none alterthe conclusionsdrawnfrom the present
model.

A STATUS QUO ANALYSIS

The statusquo, or currentsituation,identifiedby Jaworsky,is the situation

where Moscow maintainsits policy towardNKAO (only option 2 is taken
by Moscow), the Armenian government does not support the Armenian
people's demands to annex NKAO (option 4 is not taken), the Armenian
people do not demonstrate(option 5 is not taken),the Armeniandissidents
agitateopenly (option 6), the Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsits current
status quo policy ratherthan trying to integrate NKAO into Azerbaijan
(option 7 but not 8), and the Azerbaijanipeople apply slow pressurebut do
not retaliate(option 9 but not 10). This statusquo is shown on the far left in
Figure 1. In this figure,a letterY opposite an option means "yes"it is taken
by the decision makercontrollingit, while N signifies "no"it is not selected.
In Figure 1, arrowsare used to indicatewhich options can be changedto
allow the decision makercontrollingthem to take advantageof its unilateral
improvementsto move to a morepreferredoutcome.For example,in Figure
1, notice the arrowsjoining options from the statusquo outcome to the first
transitoryoutcome. Because there are arrowsbeside options controlledby
the Armeniangovernment,Azerbaijanigovernment,andAzerbaijanipeople,
each of these decision makers can move to a more preferredoutcome and
other decision makerscannot block the unilateralimprovement.An expert
664 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

TABLE2
Decision Makers'Preferencesand
Their Meaningsfor the October1988 Conflict Model

Decision Maker
and Preferences Meaning

1. Moscow
2 Moscow maintainsthe statusquo.
-5 The Armenianpeople do not demonstrate.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
-8 TheAzerbaijanigovernmentdoesnottryto integrateNKAOintoAzerbaijan.
-1 Moscow does not transferNKAO to Armenia.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
-9 The Azerbaijanipeople do not applypressureon theArmeniansin NKAO.
-4 The Armeniangovernmentdoes not supportthe demandsto incorporate
NKAO into Armenia.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
2. Armeniangovernment
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
4 The Armeniangovernmentsupportsthe demandsto incorporateNKAO
into Armenia.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
I Moscow transfersNKAO to Armenia.
-8 TheAzerbaijanigovernmentdoes nottryto integrateNKAOintoAzerbaijan.
-9 The Azerbaijanipeople do not applypressureon theArmeniansin NKAO.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
-5 The Armenianpeople do not demonstrate.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
2 Moscow maintainsthe statusquo.
3. Armenianpeople
1 Moscow transferNKAO to Armenia.
4 The Armeniangovernmentsupportsthe demandsto incorporateNKAO
intoArmenia.
-8 TheAzerbaijanigovernmentdoesnottryto integrateNKAOintoAzerbaijan.
5 The Armenianpeople demonstrate.
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
-9 The Azerbaijanipeople do not applypressureon the Armeniansin NKAO.
-2 Moscow does not maintainthe status quo.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
 DISPUTE
Fraser e al. /ARMENIAN-AZERBAUJANI 665

TABLE2 Continued

Decision Maker
and Preferences Meaning

4. Armeniandissidents
1 Moscow transfersNKAO to Armenia.
5 The Armenianpeople demonstrate.
4 The Armeniangovernmentsupportsthe demandsto incorporateNKAO
intoArmenia.
-8 TheAzerbaijanigovernmentdoesnottryto integrateNKAOintoAzerbaijan.
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
-7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentdoes not maintainthe statusquo for NKAO.
-2 Moscow does not maintainthe status quo.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
-9 The Azerbaijanipeopledo not applypressureon the Armeniansin NKAO.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
5. Azerbaijanigovernment
-1 Moscow does not transferNKAO to Armenia.
2 Moscow maintainsthe statusquo.
8 The Azerbaijanigovernmenttriesto integrateNKAO into Azerbaijan.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
9 The Azerbaijanipeople apply pressureon the Armeniansin NKAO.
-5 The Armenianpeople do not demonstrate.
-4 The Armeniangovernmentdoes not supportthe demandsto incorporate
NKAO into Armenia.
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
6. Azerbaijanipeople
-1 Moscow does not transferNKAO to Armenia.
8 The Azerbaijanigovernmenttriesto integrateNKAO into Azerbaijan.
-3 Moscow does not improveconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
9 The Azerbaijanipeople apply pressureon the Armeniansin NKAO.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
2 Moscow maintainsthe statusquo.
10 The Azerbaijanipeople retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
-5 The Armenianpeople do not demonstrate.
-4 The Armeniangovernmentdoes not supportthe demandsto incorporate
NKAO into Armenia.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.

must decide which of the threedecision makerswould move first. Jaworsky

determinedthat the decision makermost likely to move first would be the
666 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

Decision Maker Transitory Transitory Transitory Equilibrium

and Options StatusQuo Outcome 1 Outcome2 Outcome3

1. Moscow
1. NKAOtoArmenia N N N N N
2. StatusQuo Y Y Y Y Y
3. ImproveNKAO
conditions N N N N N
2. ArmenianGovernment
4. SupportDemands N N - Y Y Y
3. ArmenianPeople
5. Demonstrate N N N N - Y
4. ArmenianDissidents
6. Agitate Openly Y Y Y Y Y
5. AzerbaijaniGovernment
7. StatusQuo Y- . Y .- Y - N N
8. IntegrateNKAO N -. N -. N -. Y Y
6. AzerbaijaniPeople
9. Slow Pressure Y Y Y Y Y
10.Retaliate N -. Y Y Y Y

Figure 1: Progression from the Status Quo to the Very Strong Equilibrium in the
Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Azerbaijanipeople, and this is indicated by the solid arrow in Figure 1

showing the option thatwas changedto resultin the first transitoryoutcome.
This means that the Azerbaijani people can improve their situation by
deciding to retaliateand therebycause the conflict to evolve from the status
quo to the first transitoryoutcome.
From the first transitoryoutcome, the Armenian government and the
Azerbaijanigovernmentcould makeunsanctionedunilateralimprovements.
In this case, it was determinedthatthe Armeniangovernmentwould be the
firstto move, leadingto the second transitoryoutcomein which theArmenian
governmentdecides to renew its supportfor the demandsof the Armenian
people. The only decision maker able to change options from the second
transitoryoutcome is the Azerbaijanigovernment,leading to the thirdtransi-
toryoutcome.To accomplishthis, the Azerbaijanigovernmentstops support-
ing the statusquo and decides to tryto integrateNKAO into Azerbaijan.For
the status quo and transitoryoutcomes 1 and 2, the Armenianpeople had a
unilateralimprovementto demonstrate(option5) thatwas sanctionedby the
 Fraser et al. IARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANIDISPUTE667

possibility that the Azerbaijanigovernmentwould react to demonstrations

by proceeding to integrate NKAO (option 8). In this last transition,the
Azerbaijanigovernmentfinally tookthisaction,leaving theArmenianpeople
an unsanctionedunilateralimprovementto demonstrate.Takingthis option
leads to the equilibriumoutcome, as illustratedin Figure 1.
The predictiongiven by the model at the time it was developed is thatthe
Armenian-Azerbaijaniconflict will escalate. The first party to change its
course of action will be the Azerbaijanipeople who will begin to retaliate
against the Armenians. Following this, the Armenian governmentwould
renew its supportfor the demandsof the Armeniansfor Nagorno-Karabakh
to be joined to Armenia.The Azerbaijanigovernmentwould reactby trying
to integrateNagorno-Karabakhinto Azerbaijan.Finally the Armenianpeo-
ple would begin demonstrating.The Soviet Union would continue to try to
maintainthe statusquo relationshipsamong the otherparticipants.
This sequence of events coincided with Jaworsky'sview of how this
complex dispute might evolve. The DecisionMakerresults, therefore,pro-
vided credible support to the expert for his opinion that the Armenian-
Azerbaijaniconflict would intensify as the various partiesentrenchedtheir
positions.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO JANUARY 1990

The prediction that the decision makermost likely to move first would
be the Azerbaijanipeople (transitoryoutcome 1) was borne out in mid-
November 1988 when a series of demonstrationsin Baku, lasting eighteen
days, grew to include several hundredthousandindividuals.The protestors
demandedthatthe NKAO lose its statusas an autonomousoblastby coming
underthe routineadministrationof Azerbaijan.These demonstrationscoin-
cided with growing intercommunalviolence and the first mention of a new
organizationknown as the PopularFront of Azerbaijan,which was set up
supposedly by Azerbaijani intellectuals to further perestroika(USSR 25
August 1989).
These events likely increasedthe Armeniangovernment'sdetermination
to supportactively public demandsto annexthe NKAO (transitoryoutcome
2). However,there is no solid informationon the steps which the Armenian
governmentplannedto takein responseto the demonstrationsin Baku, since
a meetingof the ArmenianSupremeSoviet on 22 Novemberwas prematurely
adjournedbecause of the worseningsituationin Azerbaijan.The earthquake
in Armeniaon 7 DecemberfurtherdisruptedtheArmeniangovernment'splan
of action.
668 JOURNALOFCONFLICTRESOLUTION

However,even the massiveearthquakewhich devastatedpartsof Armenia

failed to bringabouta diminutionof tensionsin the area,andthe Soviet press
notedthatsome Azerbaijanisopenly rejoicedover this tragedy.Soviet troops
maintaineda heavy presence in Yerevanto preventfurtherdemonstrations,
while more members of the dissident KarabakhCommittee, who were
accused of exploiting the disruption following the earthquaketo spread
rumorsand furtherdestabilizethe situation,were arrested.
Given the rapiddeteriorationof the situationin the Transcauscasusin late
Novemberand Decemberof 1988, any strongmeasurestakenby the Arme-
nians would have certainlyled to the Azerbaijaniactions which were pre-
dicted in transitoryoutcome 3. However, in the aftermathof the Armenian
earthquake,the central authoritiesintervenedto break this action-reaction
cycle in an unprecedentedmanner.
In January1989, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declared
that Nagorno-Karabakh would be temporarilyplaced underthe controlof a
special administrativecommitteedirectly responsibleto the centralauthori-
ties, although it would maintain its status as an autonomous oblast in
Azerbaijan.This possibility had first been proposedby Armeniandelegates
to the June 1988 All-Union Party Conference (RL 295/88). More careful
considerationof this information,as well as greatersensitivity to the impli-
cations of allowing the Armenian-Azerbaijaniconflict to escalate, would
have led to a more accuratemodeling of the situationin fall 1988, and this
would have generateda solid predictionof the developmentsin earlyJanuary
1989.
Despite attemptsto "normalize"the situationin the NKAO, and improve
interethnicrelations in the Transcaucasus,the stalematecontinued, and in
April 1989, hundredsof thousandsof Armenians combined officially ap-
provedcommemorationsof the 1915 massacreof theirpeople in Turkeywith
protestsagainstthe detentionof leadersof the KarabakhCommittee.There
were furtherdisturbancesin May,when the capitalof the NKAO was closed
down by strikes expressing dissatisfactionwith the work of the committee
appointedto runthe territory,andlargenumbersof Armeniansdemonstrated
in Yerevan, demanding the annexation of the NKAO by Armenia. The
Azerbaijaniand Armenianpartyfirst secretariesmet with the Soviet leader-
ship in mid-Mayand they agreedto the continuationand "strengthening"of
the NKAO's special administration(USSR 29 December 1989); however,
demonstrationsand scatteredviolence eruptedpersistentlyin the NKAO, as
well as in Armeniaand Azerbaijan,throughoutthe summerof 1989. Arme-
nians renewed their demandfor the transferof the NKAO to the Armenian
SSR, while the Azerbaijanigovernmentcontinuedto refuse to acquiesce.
 DISPUTE
Fraser et al. /ARMENJAN-AZERBAIJANI 669

Perhapsthe most significantdevelopmentin the conflict over the NKAO

during 1989 was the growthof the PopularFrontof Azerbaijan.Beginning
in August 1989, mass demonstrationsin Baku, organized by the Popular
Front,called on the Azerbaijanigovernmentto officially recognizethe group
(USSR 25 August 1989). The Azerbaijanigovernmentrefusedto do so, and
the PopularFrontcalled on Azerbaijanisto join in strikeswhich were quite
successful in achieving the PopularFront'sgoals.
In particular,the PopularFrontsought recognitionfrom the Azerbaijani
government and it opposed the NKAO's special administration.Strikes
during August and September,1989, sponsored by the PopularFront, in-
cluded railway workers who managed nearly to isolate Armenia from the
remainderof the Soviet Union. Some observershave suggestedthatthe "rail
blockade"was a responseto the Armenianattemptin late July to cut off rail
trafficto the NakhichevanASSR (which belongs to Azerbaijanbut is sepa-
rated from it by Armenia) (USSR 13 October 1989). Although no causal
relationshipcan be established, the Azerbaijanigovernment did call on
Moscow to abolish the NKAO special administrationin September;the
Popular Front called on workers to end the strike in mid-October;and
Moscow eliminated the special administrationon 28 November (USSR 8
December 1989).
At the same time thatMoscow restoredthe NKAO's previousadministra-
tion, it decreedthatan "organizationalcommittee"be createdthatwould give
Armenianseffective controlof the NKAO, and the Azerbaijanigovernment
was explicitly orderednot to interferewith the NKAO's autonomy(USSR8
December 1989). Neither the Armenians nor the Azerbaijanisresponded
positively to the new situation.In December,the Armeniangovernmentonce
again declaredits preferencefor transferringthe NKAO to Armenia,andthe
Azerbaijani government rejected Moscow's decree as "unconstitutional"
(USSR29 December 1989).
The situationcame to a head in January1990, when the PopularFront,
which had begun to advocate increasingly radical measures in late 1989,
protestedthe Azerbaijanigovernment'sposition on the NKAO. It organized
a mass rally on 13 Januaryat which speakerscalled for a referendumon the
secession of Azerbaijanfrom the USSR. Following the rally, there were
numerousincidentsof anti-Armenianviolence in Baku.The conflict contin-
ued to escalateuntil Moscow declareda "stateof emergency"on 15 January,
and several thousandmilitarytroopswere deployed in Azerbaijanto restore
order (USSR 26 January1990). By 23 January,the Azerbaijangovernment
demandedan end to the state of emergency and the withdrawalof Soviet
troops; it also threatenedto secede (Globe & Mail 23 January1990). The
670 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

arrestof several PopularFrontleaderswas reportedtwo days later(Globe &

Mail 25 January 1990), though there are rumors that the Popular Front
attemptedto encouragestrikes in Azerbaijanas of 30 January.Azerbaijani
and Armenian nationalists are said to have agreed to a truce around 28
January.The death toll to 30 Januaryis estimatedat 197 (Globe & Mail 30
January1990).

A CONFLICT MODEL AND ANALYSIS FOR 30 JANUARY 1990

In the fifteen monthssince the first model of the conflict over the NKAO
was developed, a numberof substantivechanges occurredin the real-world
conflict which are accountedfor in a revised model and analysis presented
here. This model was constructedbased on informationavailable on 30
January1990. Note thatDecisionMakeris sufficiently flexible to allow for
a virtuallydaily revision of the conflict model in orderto account for new
information,andthis allows the conflict models to have a dynamicstructure.
Table 3 indicates the new set of decision makersand options available.
Notice that in contrastwith the first model's decision makersand options,
formalpopularoppositiongroups now exist in both republics.In the Arme-
nian SSR, the duality of dissidents and the people supportingthe dissident
positionhas been replacedby a single decision maker,the Karabakhsupport-
ers, which representsArmeniansoutside the governmentseeking to change
the NKAO's status. The PopularFront of Azerbaijanreplaces the earlier
model's Azerbaijanipeople decision maker;this is in recognitionof the fact
that an organizedoppositionhas formed aroundAzerbaijan'sintelligentsia,
who were not considered in the original model. The three government
decisionmakerspresentedin the firstmodel remainunchangedin thisrevised
model. Some considerationwas given to the possibility of including other
decision makers,such as Turkeyand Iran,which have ethnic and historical
ties to the CentralAsian republics.However, such externalactors have no
identifiable options which could be considered viable. Furthermore,it is
believed thatsuch decision makers'influences can be presentedadequately
in termsof adjustmentsto Moscow's relativepreferences.
While an effortwas madeto changethe decision makersso thatthey were
more representativeof the real-worldsituation,the centralaims in revising
the options were greater precision in specifying particularoptions (e.g.,
options 14, 15, and 16) and considerationof some radicalpossibilitiesbased
on historicalprecedents(e.g., options 4 and 13). Consequently,the analysis
results were expected to yield superiorconclusions aboutpossible conflict
resolutions.
 Fraser et al. LARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI
DISPUTE 671

TABLE 3
Decision Makersand Optionsfor the January1990 Conflict Model

Decision Makerand Options Comments

1. Moscow The centralgovernmentof the USSR

1. Maintaintroops Soviet troopsenforce"peace"andlimitthe republicgovernments'
actions
2. Special administration Returnthe NKAO to centralcontrolas per January1989
3. TransferNKAO MakeformalborderchangesgivingArmeniacontrolof theNKAO
4. Resettle Move the Armeniansin the NKAO to Armeniaor elsewhere
2. Armeniangovernment Governmentof the ArmenianSSR
5. Discuss NKAO Enterformaltalkswith the Azerbaijanigovernmentregardingthe
futureof the NKAO
6. Crackdown Silence Armeniansseeking the transferof the NKAO
3. Karabakhsupporters Armenianswho want the NKAO to be partof theArmenianSSR
7. Legal means Attemptto get the NKAO transferredthroughpolitical lobbying
8. Demonstrate Encouragemass demonstrationsin Armenia
9. Strike Attempt to make Armenia ungovernable in order to extract
concessions regarding the future of the NKAO
4. Azerbaijanigovernment Governmentof the AzerbaijaniSSR
10. Seek normality Get Moscow to pull out Soviet militaryforces
11. IntegrateNKAO Changethe demographiccompositionof the NKAO to achieve
an Azerbaijanimajority
12. Discuss NKAO Enterformal negotiations about the NKAO with the Armenian
government
13. Secede Attemptsecession fromthe USSR by votes or violence
5. PopularFront Azerbaijaninationalistswith anti-Armeniansentiments
14. Protest Hold mass rallies in supportof PopularFrontpositions
15. Strike Shut down Azerbaijanioil fields and the rail network
16. Violence OrganizeattacksagainstArmenianpersonsandproperty

One immediateimplicationof enhancingthe precision of options is the

requirementto place a largernumberof restrictionson feasible outcomes.
For Moscow, options 2, 3, and 4 are mutually exclusive. Some action on
Moscow's partis necessary,so Moscow musttake at least one of its options.
The Karabakhsupporters'options 8 and 9 are also representedas mutually
exclusive in orderto model the inherentlyescalatorynatureof moving from
672 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

TABLE4
Decision Makers'Preferencesfor the January1990 Conflict Model

Armenian Karabakh Azerbaijani

Moscow Government Supporters Government Popular Front

6and12 3 3 11 11
1 2 2 -3 -3
5 6 and 12 7 -2 -2
-11 -14 8 -1 -1
2 -15 9 5 5
-13 -16 6and 12 10 14
7 1 if 14/15/16 -11 6 and 12 15
-9 -11 -14 -9 16
-8 10 -15 -8 13
10 7 -16 -7 -9
-16 8 1 if 14/15/16 14 -8
-15 9 -5 15 -7
-14 5 -4 16 6and12
-4 -4 -10 13 10
-3 -13 -13 4 4

occasional protestrallies to strikesaimed at shuttingdown Armenia'secon-

omy. As for the Azerbaijanigovernment,seeking a returnto normalityand
attemptingto secede (options 10 and 13) are clearly mutuallyexclusive, as
is a willingness to discuss the NKAO situationandsecession (options 12 and
13). Finally,the PopularFront'soptions are consideredmutuallyexclusive
(options 14, 15, and 16) for the same reasons as the similar restrictionson
some of the Karabakhsupporters'options. Preferencesfor each decision
makerare listed in Table4.
After completing the design of a revised model, it was entered into
DecisionMaker and a stability analysis was performed.Two very strong
equilibriaand 241 strongequilibriawere found. Several suggestive conclu-
sions canbe derivedfromtheseresults.Inall of the equilibria,theAzerbaijani
governmentattemptsto integratethe NKAO by changing the demographic
situation(option 11) and it never attemptssecession (option 13).
The very strongequilibriaboth have Moscow maintainingtroops(option
1) to enforce peace between ArmeniansandAzerbaijanis,while it adminis-
ters the NKAO (option2); the Armeniangovernmentis willing to discuss the
future of the NKAO (option 5); the Karabakhsupportersagitate for the
transferof the NKAO throughlegal means and demonstrations(options 7
and 8); the Azerbaijanigovernmentseeks the removalof Soviet troopsand
 Fraser et al. IARMFNIAN-AZERBA!JANI DISPUTE 673

the integrationof the NKAO (options 10 and 11); and the PopularFront
protests against developments (option 14). The noteworthydifference be-
tween the two very strong equilibria depends on whether the Armenian
governmentattemptsto silence the Karabakhsupporters(option 6). When
Armeniadoes crackdown (i.e., it takesoption6), the Azerbaijanigovernment
is preparedto discuss the future of the NKAO (option 12). Otherwise,
Azerbaijandoes not negotiate with Armenia. However, Armenia's crack-
downwill notguaranteethatAzerbaijanwill negotiate,since one of the strong
equilibria is identical to the very strong equilibrium whereby Armenia
suppressesthe Karabakhsupportersbutthe Azerbaijanigovernmentdoes not
respond(i.e., takes option 12).
Another result of the stability analysis with substantiveimplications is
thatthe PopularFront'sbehaviorcannotbe determinedwith any accuracyin
any given situation.In fact, one reasonwhy so many equilibriaexist is that
each of the four possible PopularFrontstrategies,given a fixed strategyfor
each of the other decision makerswhich generatesan equilibrium,happens
to be an equilibrium.Therefore,the attemptto ascertainwhat the Popular
Front'sstrategywill be in the NKAO conflict did not succeed; this suggests
thatits preferencesareuncertain.Severalotherattemptsto modelthe Popular
Front's preferences also produced this result. Consequently, there is no
certaintyaboutwhat Azerbaijan'spopularoppositionwill do in the NKAO
conflict.
Finally, it should be noted that in several strong equilibria, Moscow
chooses to resettle the Armenianspresentlyliving in the NKAO to another
partof the Soviet Union (e.g., Armenia;option4). Thatsuch an actionwould
lead to a stable situationand, possibly, a resolutionto the NKAO conflict,
implies thata radicalsolution should not be dismissed. Resettlementwould
not necessarily be a forcible action; hence there is no reason to believe a
Stalinist system would be a prerequisiteto implementing a resettlement
program.Rather,Moscow could offer economic incentivesfor Armeniansto
leave the NKAO.

CONCLUSIONS

The Armenian-Azerbaijanidispute over the NKAO poses a difficult

problemfor the centralauthoritiesin Moscow. As noted earlier,the Soviet
Constitutionprovides no mechanismfor handlingconflicts when republics
clash over territorialchanges, and thereis no mention in the constitutionof
settling conflicts by arbitrationor by using third-partyprocedures.Minor
674 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

concessions to the Armenianpopulationof the NKAO have been ineffective

in bringingpeace to the area, and transferringthe NKAO to the Armenian
republic would provoke the Turkicpopulationof Azerbaijanand possibly
other republics. Placing the NKAO under federal jurisdiction, the option
chosen in January1989 was only a temporarysolution to the problemand
made little sense in constitutionalterms. Likewise, the present solution of
stationinga large contingentof Soviet militarypersonnelin the region is at
best a short-termsolution.
The conflict over the NKAO also has much broaderimplications,for the
Soviet leadershipis deeply concernedaboutrestivenessamongothernational
minorities with territorialclaims. Gorbachevhas clearly implied that the
situationof Nagorno-Karabakhis not unique, and thatfor Moscow to set a
precedentby agreeing to transferthe NKAO to Armeniawould encourage
groupswith similargrievancesto agitatefor comparableconcessions."9It is
interestingto note, in this context, thatin October 1988, therewere clashes
in southernGeorgiabetween Georgiansand Azerbaijanis,who are heavily
concentratedin this area (Fuller 1988b). In addition,one reason for large-
scale demonstrationsin the Georgiancapitalof Tbilisi in April 1989, which
were put down by force, was a campaignby the Abkhaz intelligentsiaand
partyleadershipfor the detachmentof the AbkhazASSR from the Georgian
SSR and its upgradingto union republicanstatus (Fuller and Ouratadze
1989).2) In a clear response to the threat that such disturbancescould be
duplicatedelsewhere in the Soviet Union, the consequences of the recent
conflicts in the Transcaucasushave frequentlybeen raised by the central
leadershipin attemptsto intimidateother nationalrightsactivists.
No matterhow broadits support,nationalrightsactivity in manypartsof
the countryhas often been blamedby the centralmedia on small groups of
"extremists"who areoften "aidedfrom abroad,"and the violence accompa-
nying the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakhhas been cited in argumentsfor
strictlyenforcinglegislation"OnCriminalLiabilityfor StateCrimes."2'Thus
disturbancesin the Transcaucasusmay providethe centralSoviet authorities
19. See, for example, his comment about "the abuse of 'glasnost' in an attemptto recarve
internationalboundaries,"in a speech to the PartyConference(Pravda, 29 June 1988).
20. Concernsaboutthe broaderimplicationsof the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have proba-
bly been the main reason for the lack of promptand reliable informationon this issue in the
Soviet press (see Reese 1988b).
21. Consider,for example, the following excerpt fromPravda (12 April 1989):
The slogansof democratisation,glasnostandthe expansionof humanrightsandfreedoms
are increasinglyoften exploited by sundrysmall groupsof those who, while portraying
themselves as supportersof restructuringare in fact its frenziedopponents.... Certain
self-styled leaders-extremists andnationalistshidingtheirtruenaturebehinda maskof
 Fraser et al. /ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI
DISPUTE 675

with a convenient rationale for clamping down on other groups agitating for
greater national rights. Certainly, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and
the difficulty of resolving this conflict have very significant implications for
the multinational Soviet state.22As Gorbachev noted in a television address
on 1 July 1989, ethnic tensions and violence threaten his entire reform
program, "as well as the destiny and unity of our state" and the Soviet Union's
reputation abroad.
Conflict analysis is probably the most thoroughly formalized method-
ology based on rational actor assumptions and, as demonstrated by the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, conflict analysis methodology can be used
successfully for modeling and analyzing ethnic disputes. Besides furnishing
a prediction of what would take place in the NKAO conflict, conflict analysis
provides a better understanding of the dispute. DecisionMakerprovides a
comprehensive and flexible mechanism for the formulation and analysis of
a complex real-world conflict.
At the modeling stage, the conflict model is efficiently formulated in terms
of decision makers, options, and relative preferences:

* The key participantsare identified. In the early model, six main participants
were recognized,and in the latermodel, five.
* The importantactions availableto each of the participantsare identified.The
available actions are expressed as options for each of the decision makers.
Special relationshipsamong these options are also identified.
* The interests, goals, and aspirationsof each of the individual parties are
capturedin the preferences.For each decision maker, these preferencesare
expressed by listing options from most importantto least importantand by
stipulatingwhether or not a given option should be taken. If necessary, the
conditions underwhich the decision makerwishes the option to be taken or
not can be described.

Whatever conclusions develop from the computer analysis, they rep-

resent derivations from a clearly specified set of assumptions, that is, the
conflict model structure, and a solution concept, the conflict analysis meth-
odology, which is well founded on logic and set theory. While several
avenues of criticism exist for those who disagree with the conclusions of a

commitment to restructuring-have on their conscience the events in Armenia and

Azerbaijan... and the nationalistactions in the Baltic, Moldavia and otherregions....
Nationalistphenomenahave increasinglyandnoticeablybegunto takeon an anti-Soviet
and anti-socialistcomplexion.
22. Soviet scholarshave begun to respondto this problemby devoting more attentionto the
experience of other multinationalstates in dealing with ethnic conflict. See, for example, the
recent articlesby Bromlei and other scholarsin the journalSovetskaiaetnograflia.
676 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

conflict analysis, such criticism can be presentedin ordinarylanguage by

expertswho arenot necessarilyfamiliarwith conflict analysis,andit is likely
to stimulatefurtheranalysis. In fact, alternativemodels may be constructed
in orderto accommodatecritiques.This situationis in sharpcontrastto other
game-theoreticanalysis,such as thatbasedon expectedutilitymodels,where
the focus can degenerate from substantive problems to debates on the
appropriatemeasurementof a hypotheticalvalue. Consequently,the compre-
hensiveness of conflict analysis methodologytends to discouragepolemical
commentary.
Computer analysis produces a domain of possible equilibria for the
conflict, basedon the assumptionsspecified in the model. A criticalappraisal
of the resultsgeneratedby DecisionMakercan (a) furnishnovel insightsinto
the conflict, (b) reveal flaws or contradictionsin the analyst's knowledge
about the conflict, and (c) in certaincases, can uncoverunexpectedresolu-
tions to the conflict.

REFERENCES

Aliev, 1. 1988. Spravka(v sviazi s sobytiiami v NKAO). Materialy Samizdata44/88; Arkhiv

Samizdatano. 6283.
Altstadt-Mirhadi,A. 1986. Baku:Transformationof a Muslim town.In Thecity in late imperial
Russia, edited by M. F. Hamm.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress.
Field, F. 1988. Nagorno-Karabakh: A constitutionalconundrum.Radio LibertyResearchBulle-
tin 313/88 (15 July):3.
Fraser,N. M., and K. W. Hipel. 1984. Conflict analysis: Models and resolutions.New York:
North Holland.
Fuller, E. 1986. Is Armenia on the brink of an ecological disaster?Radio LibertyResearch
Bulletin307/86 (5 August).
. 1987a. USSR ministerof health cites data on infantmortalityand infectious diseases
in two transcaucasianrepublics.Radio LibertyResearchBulletin419/87 (16 October).
. 1987b.Armeniansdemonstratefor returnof territoriesfromAzerbaijan.RadioLiberty
ResearchBulletin 441/87 (20 October).
. 1988a. More demonstrationsin Armenia.Radio LibertyResearchBulletin 79/88 (22
February).
. 1988b. Marneuli:Georgia's potential Nagorno-Karabakh? Radio Liberty Research
Bulletin477/88 (18 October).
Fuller,E., andG. Ouratadze.1989. Georgianleadershipchanges in aftermathof demonstrators'
deaths.Reporton the USSR 16:29.
Glasnost InformationBulletin. 1989. A chronicle of events 1920-1988 in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Nos. 16-18 (January):11-13.
Hipel, K. W., M. Wang,andN. M. Fraser.1988. Hypergameanalysisof the Falklands/Malvinas
conflict. InternationalStudiesQuarterly32:335-58.
Hovannisian, R. G. 1967. Armenia on the road to independence. Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress.
 DISPUTE
Fraser et al. IARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI 677

. 1971. The republic of Armenia: The first year, 1918-1919. Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress.
. 1982. The republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920. Berkeley:
Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Howard, N. 1971. Paradoxes of rationality: Theory of metagames and political behavior.
Cambridge:MITPress.
Kaputikyan,S. 1989. An open letter.GlasnostInformationBulletin nos. 16-18:30.
Kazemzadeh,F. 1951. Thestrugglefor Transcaucasia.New York:PhilosophicalLibrary.
Lang, D. M. 1988. TheArmenians:A people in exile. London:Unwin Hyman.
Muradyan,I. 1989. GlasnostandNagorno-Karabakh: The public speaks. GlasnostInformation
Bulletin nos. 16-18:19-20, 22.
Polyakov,Y. 1988. The turbulentyears in the Caucasus:On the sources of national contradic-
tions in NagornyKarabakh.Moscow: Novosti PressAgency PublishingHouse.
Reese, W. 1988a. Turkishclaims to a say in the statusof Nakhichevan.RadioLibertyResearch
Bulletin 136/88 (28 March).
. 1988b. Situationin ArmeniaandAzerbaijansaid to be exacerbatedby lack of informa-
tion. Radio LibertyResearchBulletin532/88 (14 December).
Swietochowski,T. 1985. RussianAzerbaijan,1905-1920: Theshaping of national identityin a
Muslimcommunity.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
WalkerC. J. 1980. Armenia:Thesurvivalof a nation. London:CroomHelm.
. 1988. Between Turkeyand Russia:Armenia'spredicament.The WorldToday(Aug.-
Sept.): 142-43.

Call for Proposals

The Foundationforthe Promotionof Social Science Researchon World

Society (WorldSociety Foundation)funds selected proposals for re-
searchprojectson the structureand change of world society. The next
deadlinefor applicationsis 1 February1991. We especially appreciate
receiving proposals for researchon the (classical) highly developed
countriesas well as EasternEuropeanstates.
For details and applicationforms please contact:
WorldSociety Foundation
c/o Sociological Institute
Universityof Zurich
Ramistr.69,
CH-8001 Zurich,Switzerland