Consciousness: Emergence and maturation through evolution

Ryan Lariviere

PSYC 713, Spring Semester

April 16, 2010

 The term consciousness describes the whole of subjective experience. As such, it is

difficult for the individual, whose very considerations and analyses are made possible through

consciousness, to achieve a complete and distinct idea of the concept through the conventional

strategies of reduction and synthesis. Nonetheless, human understanding of the objective reality

has flourished during the last century through the advancement of science and mathematics to the

point where fields typically stratified as “hard” and “soft” sciences can now be reconciled,

offering great insight into many of the as yet unexplained natural phenomena. In many ways this

has been true in regards to our understanding of consciousness, enabling scientists and

philosophers alike to approach old questions with new methods. This paper seeks to explore the

origins of consciousness, the definition and manifestation of consciousness, and finally the future

of consciousness in light of modern theories. Ultimately, it should become apparent that

consciousness is an emergent abstraction of self that is simultaneously a psychological and

sociological phenomenon and that the apparent future evolution of consciousness is a departure

from biologic hosts into inorganic systems.

I. EMERGENCE

Theories on the origin of consciousness are analogous to theories on the origin of life

itself in that there is no one, complete theory and the exact mechanism creation of the

phenomena themselves remain largely unknown. However, it is worth understanding the

specific intentions of these individual theories not only because they highlight similarities that in

effect support the same basic principles but also because many argue valid points in their own
right. This section presents several studies with the intent to explore the origin of consciousness

as the emergence of intricately layered system of symbols that relate self to reality.

Primatologist Nicholas Humphrey developed a social intelligence theory that can be used

to describe the societies of early hominids that precluded consciousness (Humphrey, 1976). The

interactions between individuals in these societies would place a selective pressure on social

behaviors and the ability for the individual to manipulate their peers advantageously. This

translates to an evolutionary bias towards those individuals who were able to study and draw

strategic inferences from the behavior of their peers. Humphrey refers to this ability as the

practice of natural psychology (Humphrey, 1982). Suppose an individual in this society of

“natural psychologists” were to gain the ability to monitor their own internal states and behavior.

Humphrey states that this would confer the added benefit of being able to infer the behavior of

one's peers based on one's own observed, or even predicted, behavior in comparable situations.

Humphrey's theory provides a reasonable explanation for why introspection might evolve as a

useful tool in social behavior.

However, Humphrey makes two important oversights. First, there is no attempt made to

suggest how early man would formalize an idea of self and internal states without symbolism or

language. Second, the theory fails to consider the distinction between “the I and the me” of the

truly conscious self as put forth in the symbolic-interactionism theory of George Herbert Mead.

Mead proposes that the “I” is the part of self that experiences subjectively and while the “me”

part is the objective self; how “I” thinks one's self is perceived by others (Mead, 1934). The

function of the self as described by Humphrey is accounted for by the ability to feel empathy and

does not necessitate an understanding of one's self as the subject of unique experiences or the

product of external perceptions; the “I and me” of consciousness. Thus, while a degree of
limited introspection may likely have been one of the earliest vestiges of consciousness in so far

is it encouraged the development of societies, further explanation is required for a true

understanding of how the conscious self has come to pass.

Social grooming is a practice especially important to primates, used to establish trust and

strengthen relationships (Lawick-Goodall, 1968). Anthropologist Robin Dunbar contends that

once the population of early hominid societies reached approximately 150, social cliques were

too large to reasonably afford the time required by grooming to maintain social connections.

Instead, the use of crude vocalizations was developed allowing social contact over distances

(Dunbar, 1996). Nowak et al. (2000) demonstrates how given sufficient repetition and learning

ability, variations in simple vocalizations, alarm calls in response to predators for example, could

develop into a lexicon of arbitrary “event” calls. Furthermore, if the lexicon is larger than a

given ratio between learning ability and probability of perceived relevance, the pairing of noun

and verb vocalizations to form syntactic communication is selectively favored over the

persistence of non-syntactic communication (Nowak, 2000). This presents a model for the

emergence grammar through basic subject-predicate syntax, giving rise to the development of

the first true languages. The primary function of this early language, and perhaps even of our

modern manifestations, was to maintain social bonds, and yet, as the lexicon grew the language

was able to adapt to describe a variety of novel experiences. It is important to note here that

Nowak et al. (2000) concludes that the shift in the above mentioned ratio leading to a selective

advantage for syntactic communication was most dependent on the probability that a given

syntactic pairing of words in the lexicon would effectively communicate a relevant event. They

go on to suggest that a period of dramatic social change would coincide with a significant

increase in the number events relevant to the lexicon, thereby providing an opportunity for
selective advantage (Nowak, 2000). The formation of language gives rise to a complex model of

objective understanding through the use of symbolism and marks an important step in the

development of consciousness; however, it does not predicate the emergence of the complete

conscious self.

Psychologist Julian Jaynes (1976) posits that consciousness itself did not actually exist

until as recently as 3000 years ago. Prior to this time, consciousness was divided between the

right and left hemispheres of the brain. The action of the right hemisphere is parallel and makes

decisions on the basis of intuition while the left hemisphere processes serially and employs

analysis in decision making. The Wernicke's region both hemispheres are known to produce

language although the right Wernicke's region is only active in modern humans if the left

Wernicke's region is damaged. Through rigorous analysis of ancient texts Jaynes (1976) asserts

that that per-conscious man received audible instructions from the now dormant right Wernicke's

region to which the left hemisphere willfully obliged, believing the intuitive advice to be the

wisdom of a protective spirit. Jayne (1976) terms this the bicameral, or two chambered, mind.

The bicameral man lived in a society where he was primarily a member of a group and only an

individual in form. Emergent consciousness resulted from the breakdown of the bicameral mind

with the rise of culturally integrated empires and the proliferation of the written word, which

both changed the perception of time from cyclical to linear and diminished the need for intuitive

knowledge. Jaynes (1976) attributes the rise of organized religion, the will to submit to authority

and schizophrenic hallucinations to lingering sensations of the bicameral mind.

While making some controversial and unorthodox suggestions, Julian Jaynes theory of

the bicameral man makes several key points that are essential to the understanding of the

emergent consciousness: first, that the development of language necessarily precluded the
development of consciousness, second, that consciousness is a social construct that emerges as

an equilibrium between the subjective “I” and the objective “me,” and lastly, that likely as a

result of dramatic changes in social structure.

An alternative theory that supports many of the same tenants is Jay Early's (2002) social

evolution theory which is based on the shifting balance of the respective qualities inherently

expressed by participatory and reflexive consciousness. Early (2002) defines participatory

consciousness as a relation to the world through intuition and in the immediate present. Reality

is described as animate and spiritual, expressing what Early (2002) refers to as ground quality.

Reflexive consciousness is based on ideas and conceptual analysis. Reality is mediated through

images and is said to have emergent qualities. Early (2002) explains that over the course of five

distinct historical stages the predominant form of consciousness shifted from participatory to

reflexive as societies aggregated and the role of the individual became increasingly specialized.

He closes by warning that the current stage has reached the limits of an emergent consciousness

and that the transition to a new, sixth stage is imminent (Early, 2002).

One of main themes expressed through all of these theories are that consciousness, and

all of the accompanying phenomena including qualia, free will and the awareness of internal

states, are the incidental results of the evolution of integrated societies that have progressively

encouraged the coevolution of a consciousness through an awareness of the relationship between

the “I and me” of self. Additionally, the development of consciousness has been catalyzed by

two distinct yet vaguely defined periods of heavy selective pressure as a result of radical social

change. The first of these two periods brought about the emergence of early grammar which

would be able to gradually develop greater complexity and specialization in the time leading up

to the second catalytic period. This second period of rapid development began with the advent
delocalized societies as a product of culturally diffuse empires and gave rise to novel concepts of

self. The present situation reflects the struggle between the individual and society in resolving

the dynamic equilibrium of subjective and objective realities.

II. MATURATION

The future of consciousness is likely to once again be reflected in radical social change.

It would seem that our society has already begun to assume the characteristics of a transition

state in light of major developments of the last century. Revolutionary advancements in almost

all fields of science and technology have given humanity hope for salvation and prophecies of

doom. By examining societal trends and the impact of technology on society it is possible to

speculate as to the consequences in store for consciousness. It is the purpose of this section to

establish a probable cause for the continued evolution of consciousness and to suggest a viable

route for the expansion of consciousness through technology.

Several major events of the last century have forcefully altered the ethical perceptions in

regards to the roles and responsibilities of the individual and society. The outbreak of not one

but two global wars provoked a new and profound sense of social responsibility on the part of

the individual. The rise of autocratic and dictatorial regimes demonstrated the weaknesses of the

individual psyche to be manipulated to think in terms of common group perceptions. In the

decades following World War II a great deal of research in regards to this apparent will to

conform was studied in the hopes of providing an explanation. The most famous Milgram

studies demonstrated that an individual will use the perceived behavior of the group as a model

when there is perceived lack of ability or expertise on the part of the individual. This is

especially true in the face of stress or crisis. The second conclusion is that an obedient individual
will consider himself a tool of the instructor, thereby alleviating personal responsibility for their

actions (Milgram, 1963). The effect of this study, and the World Wars even more so, was to

empower the individual in deciding his role in society and to question the intentions and ethics of

those in charge of society.

With the end of World War II came the dawning of the nuclear age. The inception, use,

and subsequent proliferation of nuclear arsenals had presented humanity with the first real threat

of complete annihilation. This not only forced an entirely new approach to politics but has

forced the global society to acknowledge its own mortality and with that, a new level of

responsibility.

The industrial revolution and American civil rights movements also reflects changing

attitudes about what an individual is in relation to his society. Other contemporary issues

including overpopulation and the possibility for global climate change have left society

struggling to adapt to a series mounting troubles. However, perhaps the greatest agent for social

change during the last century has in fact been the creation of artificial societies through the

invention of the internet. The unrestricted access to nearly infinite stores of information has

engendered a unique opportunity for the individual to not only educate oneself with minimal

effort, but also to unabashedly explore the aspects of personality and self interest that define us

as individuals while being exposed to a global culture, promoting acceptance and familiarity of

diversity. While all of the above factors have either contributed to and/or been the result of an

increasingly unified and global society, it is the internet alone enables individuals of one society

to freely interact with individuals of another in an entirely novel context.

 The overall effect of the events just described has been to ultimately affirm the

importance of the concept of “I.” Following a continued trend of social conglomeration and

integration, the individual is forced to create a unique identity from personal insight rather than

simply referencing himself as part of a group based on race, nationality or ethnicity. While we

are still far from the ideal of a completely integrated society where arbitrary differences of race

and origin do no account for what defines a man, it is abundantly clear that we are on this path.

While it is possible that humanity will reach this goal through decades if not centuries of cultural

diffusion by means of global trade and immigration, suppose it were possible to circumvent the

limitations imposed by life as we now know it. As mankind faces a multitude of problems as a

result of the biological condition, the benefits and opportunities for transitioning from a carbon

to a silicon based life form are both urgent and increasingly realistic.

Currently there are two approaches being taken to model consciousness. The first is a

bottom-up approach being pursued by cognitive neuroscientists who seek to explain

consciousness by understanding the discreet function of the brain. This approach has proven

successful in some ways, especially as it relates to the field of medical science; however this

approach, testable largely through observed behavior, lacks the depth and specificity required to

explain the intricacies of consciousness. The other way in which consciousness can be

engineered uses a top-down approach and is employed by computational neuroscientists who

seek to explain consciousness through algorithms that model data processing in the brain. The

ability to reverse engineer an actually working model of the brain resides in the ability to unify

these two approaches so that processing algorithms can be applied to functioning networks of

physical circuitry. While such endeavors are in the making, they are in their early stages of

development. One example is the Blue Brain Project at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology in Lausanne, where a wide variety of research is being done to reverse engineer the

mammalian brain. This is being done using a software simulation called NEURON which

models the physiological function of neurons, pairing their action to processors which simulate

parallel processing (Hines et al., 2008). Knowledge of the circuitry of the brain is increasing

daily and the processing capabilities of technology are growing in stride. It is seems inevitable

that sooner rather than later scientists will develop a functional, dynamic model for the

mammalian brain.

While the first generation of such inorganic brains will likely possess only rudimentary

function, it will be possible to refine the abilities of a true artificial intelligence through induced

evolution if not by direct modification of the model itself. It would then follow that, by the

assumptions laid out in Emergence portion of this paper, a sufficiently intelligent model of the

mammalian brain will give rise to consciousness given the appropriate social cues leading to a

symbolic representation of the world and, eventually, self. While this is a ground up approach to

deriving artificial consciousness holds the promise of developing a de novo form of

consciousness, we might also hope that the progress of science will one day yield a schematic of

the brain so detailed that it may be used in conjunction with an incredibly robust processing

algorithm to provide the ability to interface organic and inorganic constructs of the mind.

However, the concept of a transferable interface remains largely the speculation of science

fiction while the “big question” of what constitutes the properties of qualia remains a mystery.

Perhaps through studying the development of formerly described inorganic models we will be

able to say that qualia are just arbitrary discriminations between the effects of physical stimuli on

our sensory organs that allow us to communicate the distinction between said stimuli. If this is

so, perhaps a plural, intersubjective consciousness is possible for a given sensory input. The
most dramatic implication of this theory is that conscious self could then be expressed as a

delocalized set of serially processed sensory data capable of existing entirely in the network

interactions between hard disks. However, such exciting and sensational possibilities rest largely

on the currently untestable hypothesis that qualia are incidental to consciousness and that their

exact nature is entirely the product of interpretation.

In conclusion the evolution of consciousness has been the story of the rise of the self-

deterministic individual from humble beginnings as the “natural psychologist” of the animal

kingdom. While there is still a great deal of mystery surrounding the “when and how” of the

emergence of consciousness, it is fair to assume that it came about as the result of the ability to

use language to describe the realization that while the subjective experience of the individual is

at the center of consciousness, it is the realization that self exists objectively that creates true

conscious awareness. As the modern individual is able to gain a more complete and accurate

perspective of the objective world, he is made aware of the solidarity that exists on the basis of

common principles while maintaining his perspective as an individual. With the advent of

functional models for human consciousness and the technological capabilities for delocalized

consciousness, it may be possible for individuals to experience intersubjectively, sharing the

same qualia of an experience while maintaining unique identities. In a way, photography acts as

a predecessor to this hopeful future, allowing us to share a single frame of our memories with

others. Still, science and technology have a long way to go before they are able to define

consciousness let alone artificially mimic its biological construction. Yet if there is hope for a

future it is in the fact that major societies of the world encourage the advancement of these

essential ideals and that they continue respect the sovereignty of the individual while

acknowledging that there can be no self without others.

References

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Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, Self and Society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.

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