The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Preliminary Assessment of Its Positions On Religious Freedom, Women and Religious Minorities

“The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Preliminary Assessment of its Positions on
Religious Freedom, Women and Religious Minorities”
By: Alejandro J. Beutel♦

Minaret Freedom Institute
www.minaret.org
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to provide a preliminary assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood’s

(MB) positions on freedom of religion and belief and their implications for US policy. I use
their public statements on six key issues to measure the MB’s commitment to religious
freedom. They are: 1) the role of Sharia in society; 2) the status of Coptic Orthodox and
other Christians; 3) attitudes toward Jews; 4) the public role of women in society and within
the Muslim Brotherhood; 5) citizenship and public identity of Baha’is; and 6) attitudes
towards Shi’as, non-conforming Muslims and followers other faiths. Overall, the MB has
undergone a significant evolution in its thinking, but it seems to not yet have accepted
international human rights standards. The organization continues to show a strong trend
toward greater acceptance of political pluralism and the democratic process. This includes
some issues of religious freedom, women and religious minorities, but not all. A pattern
seems to exist where the clearer the public statement is on a particular issue, the more
pragmatic or liberal leaning its tends to be, while unclear/contradictory statements include
intolerant statements from some individual members. However, in some instances the
Brotherhood unambiguously takes intolerant positions. Finally I find that religious freedom
is not mentioned in any policy statements directly connected to the Brotherhood.
♦
I wish to thank Dr. Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad of the Minaret of Freedom Institute (MFI) for his patience and
valuable comments and insights on the paper. I also wish to thank Dr. Dwight N. Bashir and Angela
Stephens of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and Brian
Katulis of the Center for American Progress (CAP) for their guidance and support. This paper is the
opinion of the author alone and does not necessarily reflect the official positions of MFI, USCIRF or CAP
or any of their employees.
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Section I. – Background Information
Brief History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
The Muslim Brotherhood (known as Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimûn, in Arabic) was founded

in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949). Its motto is “God is our objective. The Prophet is
our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of God is our hope.”
The Brotherhood began as a religious society focused on educating Muslims on Islam,
reading, and writing while constructing a sense of solidarity and altruism within and society
as a whole. In the early 1930s it expanded into a religious welfare organization, engaging in
small-scale social work among the poor, building and repairing mosques, and establishing a
number of Muslim religious schools.1
As the organization’s social welfare activities increased so did its involvement in
politics. The Brotherhood’s first political activities were taking anti-colonial positions: against
British control of Egypt and the Brotherhood’s perceived colonization of Palestine by the
Zionist movement (supporting the 1936-39 Arab rebellion with money and
demonstrations).2
The ideology of the Brotherhood was initially based on a liberal Salafiyya creed that
believed that, “…Muslims ought to return to the original textual sources of the Qur’an and
the Sunnah (precedent) of the Prophet [Muhammad].” By returning to these original sources
early Salafis felt, “Muslims ought to re-interpret the original sources in light of modern needs
and demands without being slavishly bound to the interpretational precedents of earlier
Muslim generations.”3
Over time, the MB’s growth also led to splits within the organization over the
methods of achieving the group’s ultimate objective – establishing an Islamic state. These
splits were largely centered on whether or not an armed wing should be formed, what the
purpose of the armed wing was and what types of violence, if any, should be directed at
which particular types of targets.4 Due to a variety of factors, cleavages within the
organization grew and the Brotherhood’s liberal orientation shifted to become more
conservative, radical, and militant. The primary factors include: 1) a combination of corrupt,
undemocratic and violently repressive policies of colonial and post-colonial governments; 2)
the rejection of juristic precedent and apologetic approach of the liberal Salafiyya; and 3) co-
optation by ultraconservative Saudi-based Wahhabis.5 The fate of liberal Salafiyya was sealed
first with the assassination of Hassan Al-Banna in 1949 and then with the execution of
Sayyid Qutb in 1966.6
The MB was officially barred from politics in 1954 when President Gamal Abdel-
Nasser accused the organization of attempting to assassinate him. Since then it has existed as
a “banned-but-tolerated” organization. Cooperation, toleration, and confrontation with the
Egyptian state have fluctuated – some periods being extremely repressive, other periods
more tolerant and occasionally cooperative. Fluctuations were mostly dependent upon the
domestic and international interests of the state at a particular time.7 In the 1970s, the MB
began to evolve away from its conservative, and at times, radical militant rhetoric of the
1960s and moved toward ideological moderation, or at least a solidly non-violent
pragmatism.8
Although the rhetoric of the MB demonstrates it politically supports HAMAS and
Hizbullah’s opposition to Israel,9 the Muslim Brotherhood definitively renounced the use of
violence within Egypt in the early 1970s.10 Since this time it has progressively increased its
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involvement in civil society, winning control of several student unions, professional

syndicates, and parliamentary seats.11 In the most recent November 2005 Parliamentary
elections, the MB won 88 out of a total of 454 seats, up almost six-fold from only 15 seats.12
As a result, many regional experts and commentators regard the Brotherhood as the most
viable and powerful opposition group in Egypt.
Overview of US Policy on Religious Freedom and Egypt
Official American policy on international religious freedom centers on The

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998. It is a piece of federal legislation that,
among other things, intends “To express United States foreign policy with respect to, and
strengthen United States advocacy on behalf of, individuals persecuted in foreign countries
on account of religion, to authorize United States actions in response to violations of
religious freedom in foreign countries…”13 IRFA is extremely important in shaping
American religious freedom foreign policy because it has established the basic policy
guidelines and bureaucratic structures for promoting the numerous international legal
frameworks supporting religious freedom.14
However Federal legislation is not the only variable affecting American religious
freedom policy. Other competing interests such as regional stability, the war on terrorism
and economic factors can, and have led to, an inconsistent and/or “inadequate” advocacy of
religious freedom enshrined in international legal documents. This has certainly been the
case in Egypt, where in spite (or because) of $490 million in economic aid and $1.3 billion in
military assistance granted in 2006,15 as one U.S. government analyst flatly stated, “The U.S.
Embassy in Cairo appears to raise some of the less visible religious freedom concerns with
Egyptian government officials, rather than address some of the deeply entrenched systematic
problems, such as the interference of the state security services in the affairs of all religious
communities.”16
SECTION II. – ASSESSING THE BROTHERHOOD’S COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM OF

RELIGION AND BELIEF
The Measurements
The central objective of this paper is to assess the extent to which the Muslim
Brotherhood respects and values freedom of religion and belief in Egyptian society. Below I
have come up with six issues that will help gauge the MB’s commitment to freedom of
religion and belief. Although the MB’s ideology has significantly evolved on certain issues,
other areas have not changed, which has troubling implications for religious freedom.
The following findings were based on research and analysis from a variety of English
and Arabic language media sources.*
*
Arabic language sources used in this document were primarily taken from and translated by the Open
Source Center (www.opensource.gov) and Nexis (www.nexis.com). Other Middle East-based media
sources such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Ahram Weekly, Ikhwanweb and Asharq Al-Awsat were directly used, but
only their English sections were accessed. Arabic sections of the aforementioned sources were also used,
but translated by the Open Source Center and Nexis. English languages sources include The Daily Star
3
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1) Role of Sharià in society. What is their definition of Sharià? Do they

advocate an Islamic state or a civil society? What is the nature of an Islamic state or
civil society? How does this government impact issues such as apostasy and freedom
to proselytize? How would the Brotherhood govern if it came to power?
Publicly, the MB advocates for the establishment of an Islamic state based on a civil
society governed by the rule of law and reject and type of a theocratic state.17 When asked
about how the two seemingly contradictory concepts are reconcilable, members say that an
Islamic state is a civil society, or a democracy within a religious framework (marja’iyya).18
The MB advocates for Sharià, or divine law.** One of the central questions
concerning the MB’s notion of an Islamic state is what defines “Sharià”? Although this has
never been clearly defined by MB members, based on some of their positions and past
statements, it can be inferred that they use: 1) the Qur’an, 2) hadith, and 3) an occasional and
selective referencing from the large corpus of juristic literature built up over 1400 years of
Islamic history. Yet this still does not provide a clearer answer, because these religious texts,
like many in other religions are subjected to a wide degree of interpretation. The MB’s
official website reports that Deputy Supreme Guide Muhammad Habib publicly rejected the
notion of any amendment to Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution which establishes Islam
as the religion of the state and Sharià as the main source of legislation.19 In an interview with
Egypt Today, the leader of the MB, Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef asserted that he would
implement hudûd punishments, but also cautioned his statement by noting that its application
is virtually impossible in practice.20 A similar statement was echoed by Muhammad Habib.21
For example, the MB attempted in the past to pass legislation publicly banning the sale and
consumption of alcohol; however, Akef recently stated that tourists could now drink alcohol
inside private hotels.22
Different members directly involved or affiliated with the MB hold different views
on apostasy. Apostasy itself has been a hotly contested issue in modern Islamic law that
reignited intense debate among jurists and intellectuals in light of the Abdul Rahman case.23
In a case involving the legal recognition of Baha’is in Egypt, one MB parliamentarian,
Gamal Akl, denounced members of the religion as infidels, “who should be killed on the grounds
that they had changed their religion.”24 Taking what appears to be the exact opposite view, when
asked whether or not a Muslim could choose another religion, or no religion at all, Mahdi
Akef responded “‘of course.’”25 Straddling between these two positions is the prominent
Muslim jurist Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who, although not a member of the MB, is highly
respected and influential within the organization.26 Qaradawi recently published an article
opining that only “major apostasy,” as opposed to “minor apostasy” warrants capital
punishment:
“Major apostasy, which the apostate proclaims and openly calls for in
speech or writing, is to be, with all the more reason, severely punished by
Egypt, The British Broadcasting Corporation, Washington Post, New York Times, and many others.
Admittedly, by not directly accessing the Arabic sources this is my methodological weakness, but I have
attempted to compensate for it by using reputable translation services and corroborating the translations and
reporting of English language Middle East-based media publications with experts.
**
With certain exceptions, for the remainder of this paper, shari’a will be replaced with “fiqh” or
jurisprudence. In classical Islamic discourse, shari’a is the ideal, and only attainable by God, whereas fiqh
is the human (and therefore imperfect) intellectual struggle to work towards achieving this ideal.
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the death penalty […] Apostates who call for apostasy from Islam have
not only become disbelievers in Islam but have also become enemies of
Islam and the Muslim nation. They, by doing so, fall under the category of
those who wage war against Almighty Allah and His Messenger and
spread mischief in the land.”27
The one thing that the seems to be consistently held by the organization, which also
distinguishes them from more politically radical (and violent) Islamist organizations is that
they have explicitly rejected the practice of takfîr, or declaring a Muslim to be a non-
believer.28
Related to the issue of conversion and apostasy is proselytization by other faiths.
Based on the limited information found in this study, it appears the Brotherhood is very cool
to the idea. According to an article in the Islamist outlet Al-Sha’b, Sayyid Tantawi, head of
Al-Azhar University, reportedly signed a document that permitted limited, but mutual,
proselytization between Muslims and Christians.29 This ignited controversy among MB
parliamentarians as well as other members of Al-Azhar.30 Furthermore, in an interview with
Islamonline.net, when asked whether evangelical Christians would be permitted to preach in
a government ruled by the Brotherhood, he “unequivocal[ly]” rejected the notion.”31 Serious
questions about the MB’s position on proselytization by non-Muslim faiths, especially in an
“Islamic state” need clarification.
It is unclear how the Muslim Brotherhood would govern if in power. There are
several variables to consider which would prevent hard-line legislation of Sharià being
passed: 1) the MB is not a monolithic organization, rather it has strong divisions based on
age and interpretation of ideology and as such the definitions and implementation methods
of Sharià may significantly differ; 2) it lacks experience in running a government and passing
legislation; 3) the future strength of other secular opposition groups is unclear – this can
change with a change in their approaches to politics (grassroots, as opposed to elitist) as well
as the success of the MB in competently running a government; 4) economic factors such as
revenues from tourism would be negatively affected should hard-line interpretations of
Sharià be passed and implemented.32
2) Views toward Coptic Orthodox and other Christians.33 Are they to be

viewed as citizens with full civil and political rights, including the right to run for all
political positions? Or are they considered as dhimmiyya, which would relegate them
to a second-class political status? What is the MB position concerning the right to
build and repair churches?
The MB has explicitly rejected the idea of dhimmiyya. The recent increase of the
Brotherhood’s power within parliament has caused fears and concerns among some
prominent Coptic public figures,34 which the organization has sought to soothe.35 For
example, they have explicitly rejected the notion of categorizing Coptic Christians as
dhimmiyya,36 and have repeatedly made non-discriminatory and vague statements about Copts
as “full citizens,” and “equal partners.”37 Until recently the MB made contradictory public
statements over whether or not a Christian could theoretically run and become head of state.
These statements appeared to split along age differences, with older activists such as
Muhammad Habib, not in favor of the notion of a theoretical Coptic head of state (or silent
on the issue) and younger activists like First Deputy Supreme Guide Abdel-Moneim Abul-
Futuh taking the opposite view.38
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Another issue that affects Christians is their ability to repair and build Churches.39
Thus far little has been mentioned, but what has been said thus far is concerning from the
perspective of international legal frameworks. The MB’s official Arabic website reported that
Muhammad Habib announced the organization was conducting a study of the number of
mosques and churches in Egypt as part of “the proposed law for the unification of the
construction of the houses of worship.” The story ends noting, “…that the final result after
this study could be that the number of the churches that currently exist in Egypt is much
more than the real need.”40
3) Views toward Jews. Does the MB view Jews as productive citizens of

Egyptian society? Is a connection made between Egyptian Jews, global Jewry and
the events of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
Some members’ statements and literature of the MB blur the distinction between
policies of the State of Israel and all Jews. Without a doubt, the Brotherhood’s political
platform posits itself against Israel and its existence as an ethnic majority Jewish state.41
Furthermore, some MB members have reportedly made several anti-Jewish remarks that
have had little or nothing directly to do with political developments between Israelis and
Palestinians. For example, MB members recently spoke out against selling pharmaceutical42
companies to “Jews,”43 as opposed to rallying support for a more nuanced position like an
economic boycott with Israel due to the MB’s sharp opposition to Israeli policies toward
Palestinians and/or other Arabs. Some recent media reports have alleged that Mahdi Akef
has made statements denying the Holocaust. Although Akef immediately denied these
allegations, he still disputes the total number of Jews killed during the Holocaust.44
However other members and other pieces of literature make more nuanced
observations, distinguishing between Jews and the policies of the State of Israel. According
to the findings of analysts from the Nixon Center,45 the MB has made both types of
statements and possesses both types of literature. Furthermore in a recent interview with
Helena Cobban, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh stated, “‘We as the Muslim Brotherhood know
that the Jews in Israel are human beings and we know they should live, and should not be
killed […] The Jewish people can go or stay, but whatever they do, the Palestinians should
win their rights.”46 Later in the same interview he strongly implied that he was open to the
idea of a two-state solution, but he strongly preferred a single “secular, democratic state.”47
Based on the limited information at hand, this paper makes the emphatically provisional
and tentative observation that nuanced distinctions tend to be taken by members of the
“reformist” wing, such as Abul-Futuh, and appear to be more recently published. In
contradistinction, blanket anti-Semitic remarks and literature that conflate Judaism and
Zionism appear to be older and coming from the older, more conservative figures like Akef.
At the time this paper was written nothing could be found concerning the MB’s positions or attitudes
specifically toward Jewish citizens of Egypt. However this absence of information is perhaps due to
at least one of two problems: 1) I simply did not find the necessary information and/or 2)
they do not have a position. If the latter case were true, then this would be extremely
problematic. One must remember that the MB’s violence against the Egyptian Jewish was
part of the reason for its mass exodus to Israel, in spite the community’s lack of interest and
support for Zionist movements.48 With the Jewish community only a sliver of what it was
before the creation of Israel, it could be that the Brotherhood may not see the small
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presence of Jews in their country as an issue. However due to the lack of solid information
and the evolving nature of the Brotherhood, this observation is highly speculative.
4) Views toward women. Does the MB believe wearing the hijab is a personal
choice, or do they believe in public legislation mandating women to wear it in
public? Are women allowed for all political positions, including as head of the
organization – the Supreme Guide? What is the level of female political involvement
(as opposed to involvement in its social services) within the organization?
The notion of a woman serving as head of state is a highly contested issue.

According to a widely disseminated document allegedly published by the MB, women: 1) are
spiritual equals of men; 2) are religiously exhorted to cover all parts of their bodies except
for the face and hands; 3) can elect and hold any office,49 although there is debate on
whether or not women can be judges and they are barred from becoming head of state.
Concerning this, it appears that the Brotherhood’s position is evolving, from not allowing
women to hold high office50 to “‘a highly debated subject.’”51
In addition, the hijab (veil) is seen as a religious obligation, but cannot be legally
imposed on women. Akef reportedly directly remarked to a female Arab journalist that she
was “naked” because she was not wearing the hijab.52 Nevertheless, he, along with other MB
members, feel that the “Hijab is an Islamic obligation but we as human beings cannot
impose anything on women. We have the duty, however, to advise that it is a religious
obligation.”53
Furthermore, there is a lack of overall female political involvement and leadership
within the MB’s organizational structure. Although the MB unsuccessfully ran a female
candidate in the parliamentary elections, Maykarm Al-Deiri, she is their only female
candidate. When putting this in comparative perspective, it should be noted that that
women’s political participation is poor in most political parties. For instance, the secular
Nasserist Party, also only fielded one female candidate.54 There is much speculation over the
intentions of her candidacy – whether or not it was a tactical move, or whether the group is
sincere in attempting to open its leadership positions up to more women.55 Furthermore, in
spite of assurances from Al-Deiri that women may occupy any position within the
organization, including that of Supreme Guide,56 “Most female Muslim Brotherhood
members contribute in social areas…while few have real representation in political and legal
areas within the group.”57 Furthermore, Al-Deiri and Muhammad Habib and Abdel-Monem
Abul-Futuh claim that the MB tried to field 25 female candidates, however they cited fear of
harassment from security forces and social pressures as the main reason for the lack of
female candidates and other political leadership positions within the Brotherhood.58
Finally, Al-Deiri has received strong criticism for some of her more intolerant views
about women’s public participation and rights, including her opposition to Egyptian
women’s right to divorce without consent of the husband (khul).59 However again, when put
in comparative perspective, it is worthwhile to note that even the liberal secular opposition
leader, Ayman Nour was against the current divorce law because he felt it will, “instigate
women to be corrupt.”60
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5) Views toward Baha’is. Do they support the legal recognition of the Baha’i
community? What is their overall social/religious attitude toward the religion? How
would Section 98(f)*** of the Egyptian Penal Code apply?
MB parliamentarians do not recognize the Baha’i faith as a “heavenly religion.” On

April 4, 2006 a lower Administrative Court decision granted Baha’is to identify themselves as
a separate religion on national identification cards.61 However on May 15, the Supreme
Administrative Court struck down the lower court’s decision – a move that was hailed by
members of the Brotherhood. Supporting the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision
Abdel Monem Abul-Futuh, who spoke in reference to the Baha’i case, commented, “‘We
have no issue with people describing themselves as followers of beliefs not recognized by
Islam…However, what must be appealed is the ruling that allows followers of unrecognized
faiths to describe themselves as followers of a religion in official documents when it’s not
technically a religion.’”62 Furthermore, one MB Parliamentarian implied that Baha’is were an
instrument of Israeli policy designed to undermine Egypt by claiming they are “‘moved by
Israeli fingers.’” In addition, as already noted, other MB parliamentarians have labeled them
as apostates who must be killed.63 The Baha’i community made an immediate appeal of the
Supreme Administrative Court’s decision, but lost their case.64
6) Views toward Shi’as, non-conforming Muslims and other faiths. How

would Section 98(f) apply? Would the MB support the legal recognition of other
faiths?
While very little has been mentioned on the subject, it is extremely worrisome. In
past years the Egyptian government has restricted the rights of “non-conforming” Muslims,
such as the Qur’anite sect,65 and Shi’as to openly practice their beliefs. Concerning Shi’as in
Egypt, the MB thus far has mentioned nothing. Little has been mentioned of the Shi’as
outside of Egypt. Some ignorant views about Shi’as in Iraq have been made66 however it
appears that MB members emphatically try to minimize sectarian differences (perhaps due to
ideology), but also based on mutual opposition to Israeli policy.67 There currently is no
information about the MB’s opinion on non-conforming Muslims or other faith communities outside of Islam,
Christianity, Judaism and Baha’ism.
SECTION III. – ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS
This section attempts to distill some key observations from the findings already presented.
The MB’s reform agenda differs from one issue to another, from clear to vague. The
differences between clarity and vagueness tend to correlate with how tolerant or intolerant
their statements on various issues are.
***
Is an ordinance prohibiting that criminalizes, “Any person who exploits religion in order to promote or
advocate extremist ideologies by word of mouth, in writing or in any other manner with a view to stirring
up sedition, disparaging or belittling any divinely-revealed religion or its adherents, or prejudicing national
unity or social harmony…”. Source: “Yasser Mohamed Salah et al. v. Egypt, Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention.” University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, (2002), Available online at:
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/wgad/7-2002.html.
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The positions the MB is most specific on are also the ones most conducive to a
liberal democracy. Brotherhood members have taken specific positions on greater separation
of powers and stronger checks and balances, as well as a more overall liberalized political
system that strengthens long-term changes. Its members have pushed for specific reforms
and supported groups such as the Judges’ Club that are attempting to limit executive
authority, allow for fairer and freer elections, and establish stronger checks and balances.68
Furthermore, they formed the bulk of the failed parliamentary opposition attempting to vote
down an extension of the state of emergency that legally allows civil liberties to be curtailed
with Parliamentary approval.69
Yet, other aspects of the MB’s reform agenda remain couched in vague and/or
contradictory positions.70 When this is the case, various members on different issues make
many intolerant statements. Regarding religious freedom, the Brotherhood remains vague
and contradictory, thus it not surprising some of its members have made highly intolerant
statements.
However finding a correlation between clarity and liberality of positions is only part
of what needs to be understood when analyzing the Brotherhood’s statements. It is also
important to know why the Brotherhood is clear on some issues and less clear on others,
including religious freedom. A recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (CEIP) on the vagueness of Arab Islamist movements sheds some light:
“The existence of such gray zones [vagueness and contradictions] could

be construed as the result of duplicity, a deliberate refusal by mainstream
Islamist movements to declare what they really think about key sensitive
issues in order to not alarm the West and lose their reputation as
moderates. But the existence of gray zones can also be explained by the
ongoing development in the thinking and strategies of Islamists as well as
on going contests within each group over the proper direction of the
movement.”71
The findings of this paper point toward the latter analysis given. Reasons for this are
as follows:
First, the Brotherhood is not an ideological monolith – significant differences and
disagreements exist within the organization.72 The differences are not solely based on
ideology per se, but also on age gaps that affect ideological outlook. Several studies of the
MB show younger generations of activists tend to be more flexible and liberal leaning in
their political outlook.73 Based on the findings of this paper, that also includes issues of religious freedom.
This split is best personified by two main figures of the organization: 1) The 78 year-
old and current Supreme Guide, Mahdi Akef who is considered a member of the “old
guard” and described by one Egyptian columnist as someone who “…has no control over
his words and his ideas are superficial”74 and; 2) Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh, 55, who is
typically regarded as representative of the MB’s “reformist” or “dovish” wing.75 Asharq Al-
Awsat reports that age differences are gradually working themselves out as older activists
retiring from important party positions, with the expectation that they will be filled by
middle-aged (and more flexible) activists.76 (It should also be noted that the support for
female candidates and the MB’s past and present female candidates themselves are from this
middle-aged generation.)77
Second, the dual religious and political nature of the MB creates internal tensions.
The tension stems from the desire to satisfy religio-political dogmatism of some very
conservative party members and the need for political pragmatism, espoused by other
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ideologically flexible party members and conflicting ideologies and policies from rival
political organizations. Ambiguity is an attempt to publicly mask internal party divisions.
However, the party may solve this conundrum over time as calls made by prominent
younger, reformist activists – such as Essam Al-Arian – to separate the group’s religious
activities from its political activities and accede ultimate religious authority within Egypt to
Al-Azhar, are creating internal debate.78
Third, its religious and political duality is affected by the current religious national
social context. As a religious and political movement the Brotherhood must also pander to a
core constituency within a current national social context that is increasingly religious and
socially conservative.79 If it advocates positions thought to be too soft, the Brotherhood may
alienate its core voter constituency. However, it still has to deal with other political parties
and other factors that must force it to adopt a certain amount of pragmatism. Vagueness and
occasional intolerant statements are also a means of escaping conflicting internal and
external dynamics.80
Fourth, not all intolerant statements necessarily correlate with vagueness and
contradiction. In some cases the Brotherhood is quite clear about its positions. This is
because its fused religious and political capacities affect the current national religious
discourse by competing with Al-Azhar as the dominant authority on Islamic issues in Egypt.
Due to severe government restrictions Azhari scholars’ transformed ijtihad, or religious
critical thinking, from an act of worshipping God whose purpose was to benefit people, into
a method of giving Divine sanction to government policies. This has led to the erosion of
trust between the clerical establishment and the Egyptian Muslim laity, creating a vacuum of
authority. As a result conservative mainstream Islamists like the Brotherhood and radical
militant Islamists (like Gama’a Islamiyya and Al-Jihad) have the ideological space to grow and
compete with Al-Azhar for the position as the dominant authority on Islamic issues. In
order for Al-Azhar to successfully compete with these groups and maintain their credibility,
it has responded by issuing socially conservative fatwas. This forces the Islamic intellectual
trajectory toward narrow-mindedness and intolerance–which would not happen in a
democratic society where opposing viewpoints are freely expressed and debated and
religious freedom is respected. Religious minorities and Muslim reform discourses inevitably
bear a large portion of the brunt of the increased intolerance in society toward the religious
“other.”81 The ban against the Baha’i community, the controversy over Shaykh Tantawi’s
signature of a document permitting open proselytization between Muslims and Christians,
violence and discriminatory attitudes toward other religious minorities and the persecution
of Muslim reformers can at least be partly explained as symptoms of the religio-political
competition between Al-Azhar and the MB.
As this example and its consequences illustrate, advances in religious freedom are
intimately linked with larger liberalizing political reforms. Egypt’s authoritarian political
system is structured in such a way that it disallows moderate, reformist voices to freely and
credibly articulate themselves and helps to empower radicals instead. (This is true not only of
Al-Azhar, but also of the MB. See “Section V. – Assessing the Brotherhood’s Political
Trajectory.”)
SECTION IV. – U.S. GOVERNMENT VIEWS OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
This section examines the U.S. government’s position toward the Muslim
Brotherhood. The measurement was based on a compilation and analysis of all public
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statements directly concerning the MB made by State Department officials (20 total)
between June 2005 and March 20, 2007.**** For key excerpts of some of the statements
compiled, please refer to “Appendix: Excepts of State Department Officials’ Statements.”
The following are the key findings:
First, the American government will have official dialogue with “independent
candidates,” not members of the MB. This has been a consistent message publicly conveyed
by officials, based on three justifications: 1) a need to “respect Egyptian law”; 2) the MB’s
non-recognition of Israel and political support for HAMAS and 3) concern over allegations
from the Egyptian government about the MB’s violent past.82 It has consistently affirmed its
acceptance of any Islamist group entering into the political process as long as it respects the
democratic process and plays by the “rules of the game.” Officials have repeatedly declared
they will recognize any group that abides by the democratic process and respects political
pluralism.83
Nevertheless the government’s public vocal support for opposition movements and
figures in Egypt is highly inconsistent. State Department officials have not explicitly
denounced of mass detentions and physical violence against peaceful MB supporters, but
they have been extremely vocal for support of secular activists like Ayman Nour.84 This may
be due to a belief in certain government circles that the Muslim Brotherhood is not really
committed to promoting democracy and the rule of law, as was implied in one public
statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.85
In light of that finding, it also important to note that the American government has
mentioned nothing about freedom of religion and belief in relation to the MB. Simply put,
issue of their religious freedom, much less other violations of their freedoms (such as
freedom of assembly, speech, and freedom from arbitrary detention) have not been publicly
raised thus far. On those rare occasions when the issue of religious freedom is Egypt is
mentioned, the State Department statements concerned themselves with particular religious
minority groups,86 as opposed to the rights of all of Egypt’s religious communities.87
SECTION V. – ASSESSING THE BROTHERHOOD’S POLITICAL TRAJECTORY
Although the Brotherhood’s positions on democracy and religious freedom have

evolved towards a more pragmatic and liberal-leaning trend, their evolution is not automatic
and could be reversed. In fact this paper’s assessment of the MB’s political trajectory sees a
reversal as a very likely possibility, based on three important events.
The first is not a single event per se, but rather a series of them. Since protesting in
support of two electoral judges who were tried for exposing vote rigging in the 2005
parliamentary elections, the Egyptian State has engaging a massive crackdown on the
Brotherhood. Six prominent members – Essam El-Arian, Rashad Bayoumi and Mohammad
Mursi, Ibrahim El-Zaarafani, Hassan El-Hawayan and Helmi El-Gazzar (all of “reformist”
wing) – are among the 645 people detained between May and July 2006. Although most of
those people – including the six leaders – have been released, as of March 27, 2007, 234
people remain detained–including Second Deputy Chairman Khairat Al-Shater (also a
reformist) and thirty-one others who face military tribunals.88
****
Statements include daily press briefings, and recorded remarks from State Department officials at
various events.
11
12
The second important event is the Al-Azhar martial arts demonstration itself. In
early December 2006 a group of 50 student members of the MB acted on their own accord
to perform a martial arts demonstration and called themselves part of a ‘militia.’ Although
the non-violent demonstration –which was “protest[ing] the Egyptian dictatorship’s
expulsion of Brotherhood students from their dorms and its intervention in student council
elections”–89 was denounced by Brotherhood leaders,90 state-controlled anti-Islamist media
immediately took advantage of the incident and raised peoples’ fears and questions of the
Islamist group.91 Putting aside exaggerated images of the MB’s past use of violence, the
incident is important because it may be evidence of another split within the group–between
middle-aged reformists and some radical younger members. It is also important because it
may be evidence that the MB’s leadership find some of these more radical younger members
are becoming harder to control.92 This would no surprise, given that the MB has had broad
membership boundaries, containing small numbers of very-loosely affiliated radical activists
who reject their non-violent message, are either ejected or voluntarily leave the group and
end up joining the ranks of militant organizations.93
Finally, the recent changes to the national constitution could exacerbate these other
two factors. The constitutional amendments are clearly structured to effectively choke off
the MB from a peaceful political outlet because it forbids any political activity within a
religious framework (marja’iyya).94 Doing so prevents reformists from openly articulating their
evolutionary political vision further and only empowers conservative hardliners within the
organization.
The combination of crackdowns against the organization (particularly its emerging
reformist leadership), increased legal restrictions that deny a peaceful political outlet for
reformist vision and the existence of some angry and younger members is a very dangerous
mix. This process could either radicalize the rest of the organization over time or make
others splinter off into new and violent groups like Gama’a Islamiyya and Al-Jihad did in the
1970s. Either way, such a trend does not bode well for the consolidation of reformists’
power within the MB and for the future of religious or other political freedoms in Egypt.
SECTION VI. – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In spite of the pessimistic assessment of the Brotherhood’s political trajectory, there

is hope that things could turn around. However, the United States must undertake drastic
policy changes for that to occur. Given the current administration’s political posturing and
prioritization in other parts of the Middle East this is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, I put
forth the following preliminary recommendations in the hope that another administration
will give them some consideration.
• First, analysts from the United States’ Commission on Religious Freedom
should conduct a fact-finding mission to learn more about the Brotherhood’s
views. The purpose of the mission would be to inform policymakers as much as
possible about the organization’s political directions and what its views are on issues
of political and religious freedom. I specific emphasize that its professional analysts
and not its Commissioners should be engaged in this fact-finding mission because
unlike the Commissioners, they are not political appointees with overt ideological
leanings. The professional analysts, given their academic credentials, are better poised
to provide a more objective and nuanced analysis of the facts. Should such a mission
12
13
be undertaken, it is highly advised that as many MB leaders from different age

groups should be probed on their positions of various issues. Again, as reiterated in this
study, significant ideological cleavages are present along age lines and therefore it would be best to
conduct more research based on this premise. Although the findings from the present paper
are far from conclusive, it, along with others’ works, can be used as a preliminary
basis for a larger report.
• Second, the United States government must formulate a smarter and more
consistent democracy promotion strategy. It means finding a middle ground
between the shortsighted recklessness of military interventionism and support for
the authoritarian status quo. America’s shyness to condemn these authoritarian
changes to the Egyptian Constitution send a message to democracy activists in Egypt
and the rest of the world that it does not really care about democracy promotion.
The same goes for its unequal condemnation of opposition activists’ detention and
issues of religious freedom. Consistency requires condemnation of both peaceful
secular and Islamist opposition activists, as opposed to only the former. It requires
not only condemning attacks against Christian churches and identity discrimination
against Baha’is, but also the state’s financial and political stranglehold over mosques
and Islamic centers of learning. It should also come out and definitively denounce
the authoritarian nature of the recent constitutional amendments.
• Third, reduce and change the structure of the next foreign aid appropriations
bill to Egypt. Tough and consistent rhetoric is extremely important, but it is not
enough. In order to literally put its money where its mouth is, the United States
should show its seriousness about democracy promotion by adding provisions in the
next foreign aid bill that stipulate Egypt will receive American aid when it meets
certain clear political benchmarks that support democracy, the rule of law and
human rights. The reduction and eventual elimination of state security services’ interference in the
administrative affairs of all religious communities is one suggested preliminary benchmark.
Furthermore, regardless of the level military aid to Egypt, a certain part of any such
aid should be dedicated to Expanded International Military Education and Training
(E-IMET) and International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP) training for Egyptian army and police officers–training that teaches
soldiers and police officers how to effectively do their jobs while respecting the rule
of law and human rights. Currently no such programs to Egypt exist.95
13
14
Appendix: Selected Excerpts of State Department Officials’ Statements
Remarks During Press Roundtable in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt

Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt

May 21, 2006
DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: Well, I think ultimately this will again be a

question of where I thought about sort of the direction of political Islam. You’ve got
different movements, here, the government obviously has great anxiety about whether they
are committed to the democratic process. […] it will also be important for the Muslim
Brotherhood to clarify are they committed to a democratic process. Are they committed
totally to nonviolent solutions? Are they committed to the process of democracy?
<http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/2006/66540.htm>
Daily Press Briefing

Sean McCormack, Spokesman
Washington, DC
May 11, 2006
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, if you're referring to the Muslim Brotherhood, Barry, it is

under the Egyptian Constitution that is a group that is not allowed to be. The Egyptian
Constitution says that any -- there should not be any political parties that are based on
religion. That's the Egyptian Constitution. Now in terms of how the Egyptian people
organize themselves politically, that is for them to decide and for them to look at their laws
and their constitution to decide whether or not they have it right.
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2006/66163.htm>
Opening Remarks and Q&A Session at Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Chicago Hilton
Chicago, Illinois
April 19, 2006
SEC. RICE: […] And we have not -- we don't have contact with the Muslim brotherhood at
this point. It's complicated because, of course, this is a growing force in Egypt, but our view
is that the organizations that are really committed to democracy ought to be the ones that
are supported by contact with the United States…
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64797.htm>
14
15
The U.S. and the United Arab Emirates

C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
Press Roundtable With WAM, Al Ittihad, Al Bayan, Gulf News, Khaleej Times, Al Sharq Al
Awsat, Al Hayat
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
March 29, 2006
AMBASSADOR WELCH: On the Muslim Brotherhood, the Al-Ikhwân Al-Muslimûn, in

Egypt in the parliamentary election there were a variety of independents elected to the majlis.
If those independents wish contact with the United States, we have no objection. We do not
have any relationship or contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is not an established
political party under the laws in Egypt, and that is presently our policy.
<http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/60802.htm>
Interview on Egyptian Television With Mervat Mohsen

Cairo, Egypt
February 22, 2006
SECRETARY RICE: Now, once people are elected to power, they have a responsibility
then to those who elected them to rule democratically, not to rule by fiat or not to rule
undemocratically. They also have a responsibility to give up and to renounce violence and
terrorism, because you can't on the one hand be in the political process and on the other
hand continue to pursue violence.
Interview With Osman Mirghani of Al Sharq al Awsat

London, United Kingdom
January 30, 2006
QUESTION: Right. Are you going to start some kind of dialogue or talks with some
Islamic movements, like the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, say?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think that this is an evolutionary period. Certainly we aren't
going to talk with terrorist organizations. We're not going to talk with organizations that
espouse violence. We're not going to talk with organizations that refuse to recognize whole
states within the international system, like Israel.
We do not have contacts with Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt because of Egyptian laws, but
we are, I think, in many places opening up dialogue with Islamist groups who are democratic
in their orientation. For instance, in both Iraq and Afghanistan we have a full range of
contacts with groups that are some quite -- not violent extremists, but some who I think you
15
16
would view as being very conservative Islamist groups. They have a place in the political
system as long as they recognize the right of others to have a place in the political system.
And so this is a time of evolution in the Middle East. It is a time when I think Middle
Eastern states are going to have to come to terms with how Islam relates to open political
systems. And that's much healthier than not having that debate.
Briefing En Route Cairo, Egypt

Karen Hughes, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
En Route Cairo, Egypt
September 25, 2005
QUESTION: I’d like to be very specific, are you going to meet with anybody from the
Muslim Brotherhood?
UNDER SECRETARY HUGHES: I do not believe we’re…I don’t believe so.
QUESTION: And, the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest opposition group in Egypt -- so
they represent a large constituency --
UNDER SECRETARY HUGHES: Well, we are, as the Secretary has said in the past,
Jonathan, I know you’ve had extended conversations with her about this, we’re respectful of
Egypt’s laws, and a, we’re respectful of Egypt’s laws…
<http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/54023.htm>
Daily Press Briefing

Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC
December 8, 2005
QUESTION: Egypt. The results of the elections are in now and the Muslim Brotherhood
has won about a fifth of the seats in parliament. Previously, you hadn't been willing to
comment on the Muslim Brotherhood, saying that the elections aren't over yet. Now they
are, so can we have a comment? And specifically, the last time when the Secretary was in
Egypt, she did not -- conspicuously did not meet with the Muslim Brotherhood or anybody
there.
MR. ERELI: Right.
QUESTION: Now that they are becoming a very important political force in Egypt, are
there plans for U.S. officials to do some sort of reach-out?
16
17
MR. ERELI: I don't want to speak to the final numeric results because I'll leave it to the
Egyptians to speak to that. What I think is clear is that an unprecedented number of
representatives not affiliated with the government party have been elected to Egypt's
parliament, and this really is historic. Why? Because it represents a broadening of the
representation, of representation of opposition and independent candidates in the Egyptian
parliament and we think that that's going to have a substantial impact on political life in
Egypt. And that's positive. That's a sign that pluralism and democracy has taken a step
forward in Egypt. […]
QUESTION: Can I just follow up on that? Since you managed -- my question was about
the Muslim Brotherhood and you managed not to mention the words "Muslim
Brotherhood" in your response. I was wondering if I can rephrase the question and refocus
it and get a specific -- because this is an Islamic organization. They do have ties to violence
in the past. The U.S. has shunned them. They are now a force in Egypt and I think it is just a
matter of reality what is the United States going to do?
MR. ERELI: The fact is and the best person to answer this would be an Egyptian
government official, but the fact is that as the Muslim Brotherhood is outlawed as a political
party, pursuant to Egyptian law that outlaws any party based on religious affiliation, and
those candidates that you refer to as Muslim Brothers are elected as independent candidates,
not affiliated with a party.
QUESTION: Okay. So does that mean the U.S. will deal with them?
MR. ERELI: They're independent candidates. There's no injunction against --
QUESTION: Does that mean the U.S. will deal with them?
MR. ERELI: There's no injunction that I'm aware of that prevents -- that would prevent
that.
QUESTION: Just to again refocus just one more time. Are there any plans or any
possibility of the United States reaching out to the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization,
as a result of this?
MR. ERELI: The United States will respect Egyptian law.
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/57831.htm>
Also see:
November 28, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/57411.htm>
17
18
September 14, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/53153.htm>
July 14, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/49751.htm>
June 23, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48596.htm>
June 20: 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48352.htm>
18
19
Endnotes
1
Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-
1942. (Reading, UK: Garnet, 1998), P. 109-11.
2
Lia, The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt, P. 236-44; Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim
Brothers. (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), P. 15-6.
3
Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. (San Francisco:
HarperSanFrancisco, 2005), P. 75-6.
4
Lia, The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt, P. 172-81, 270-1; Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim
Brothers, P. 33, 62, 67-71, 82-91, 116-25; Robert S. Leiken, “To Talk or Not To Talk? – That is The
Question.” The National Interest, (April 25, 2007), http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14150.
5
Amira Howeidy, “Politics in God’s Name.” Al-Ahram Weekly, (November 16, 1995),
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/archives/parties/muslimb/polgod.htm; Juan Cole, “Foreign Occupation Has
Produced Radical Muslim Terrorism.” Informed Comment: Thoughts on the Middle East, History and
Religion, (March 7, 2005), http://www.juancole.com/2005/03/foreign-occupation-has-produced.html;
Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, “The Other Face of the Islamist Movement.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace,
(January 2003), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp33.pdf, P. 8-9; Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft,
P. 75-81; Mustafa El-Feki, “Past and present of political Islam.” Al-Ahram Weekly, (January 10, 2006),
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/777/op2.htm.
6
The death of Al-Banna marked the beginning of the end for the old leadership of liberal Salafis. Sayyid
Qutb is arguably the perfect embodiment of this ideological shift, who started his life off as a moderate
Muslim, and ended his life executed as a radical. He has, and will continue to be remembered as a martyr
by many because he executed for his ideas – which were radicalized during his temporary escape to Saudi
Arabia and while being tortured in prison – not his actions. For more on a brief synopsis of Qutb’s life and
the Wahhabi contributions to the mutation of Salafism, see: Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft, P. 81-5.
7
Howeidy, “Politics in God’s Name.”; Esposito, Unholy War, P. 87-9, 93-4; Robert S. Leiken and Steven
Brooke, “Strategic Thinking about the Muslim Brotherhood.” The National Interest, (March 23, 2007),
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13894.
8
On the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, see: Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Islam Can
Vote, If We Let It.” New York Times, (May 23, 2005),
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/23/opinion/edibrahim.php; John Walsh, “Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam.” Harvard International Review, Vol. 24, (4), (Winter 2003),
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1048; Amr Hamzawy, “The West and moderate Islamism.”
Bitterlemons-International, (June 2, 2005), http://www.bitterlemons-
international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=86#351; Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the
Egyptian Muslim Brothers.” The International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 37, (June 2005), P.
373-395.
9
For examples of its support in the most recent escalations, see: “Muslim Scholars: Backing Resistance Is a
Religious Duty.” Ikhwanweb.com, (July 22, 2006),
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=479
3; “Fights on fringes of big Cairo protest.” Reuters, (July 21, 2006),
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L21773787.htm; “Middle East: Muslim Brotherhood and TV
Cleric Back Hezbollah.” Adnkronos International, (July 27, 2006),
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Politics&loid=8.0.325385458&par; “Egypt:
Muslim Brotherhood Calls for Jihad.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (August 3, 2006),
http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=5865; “Egyptian Islamist leader ready to send fighters
to Lebanon.” Agence France Presse, (August 4, 2006),
http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=World_News&subsection=Gulf%2C+Middl
e+East+%26+Africa&month=August2006&file=World_News2006080434528.xml; Dania Saadi and
Maher Chmaytelli, “U.S. Aims to Bolster Arab States Condemning Hezbollah.” Bloomberg News, (July 24,
2006), http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=adWntUowKH6o; “Hamas, Muslim
Brotherhood hails Hezbollah capture of Israeli soldiers.” Agence France Presse, (July 12, 2006),
http://www.religionnewsblog.com/15247; Michael Slackman, “Voices of Peace Muffled by Rising Mideast
Strife.” New York Times, (July 15, 2006), http://www.miftah.org/PrinterF.cfm?DocId=10807; “HAMAS
19
20
(Islamic Resistance Movement).” Globalsecurity.org, (July 16, 2006),

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas.htm.
10
Howeidy, “Politics in God’s Name.”; “Social programmes bolster appeal of Muslim Brotherhood.” IRIN
News, (February 22, 2006), http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=51850; Mariam Fam, “Muslim
Brotherhood Influences Egypt Vote.” Associated Press, (September 1, 2005),
http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:mfaF-
27QaNcJ:news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl%3Fpage%3D/ap/i/631/09-02-
2005/f223003266d3f172.html; Mary Crane, “Does the Muslim Brotherhood Have Ties to Terrorism?”
Council on Foreign Relations, (April 5, 2005),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9248/does_the_muslim_brotherhood_have_ties_to_terrorism.html.
11
Howiedy, “Politics in God’s Name.”; Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, “The Muslim Brothers and Political
Reform in Egypt.” Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 2, (2), (February 2004),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1458#egypt.
12
“Elections in Egypt.”; Daniel Williams, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood May Be Model for Islam’s
Political Adaptation.” Washington Post, (February 3, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/02/AR2006020202368_pf.html.
13
“The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.” Available at:
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2297.pdf, P. 1.
14
Ibid., P. 2-23.
15
Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations.” Congressional Research Service, (July 26,
2006), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/73956.pdf, P. 29.
16
Dwight N. Bashir, “Policy Focus: Egypt.” The United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom, http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/policyfocus/EgyptPolicyBrief.pdf, P. 6.
17
Mary Fitzgerald, “The Brotherhood in limbo.” The Irish Times, (June 16, 2006),
http://www.ireland.com/focus/gageby/brotherhood.htm; Gamal Nassar, “Dr. Habib explains the Muslim
Brotherhood’s Political Program.” Al-Mujtama’a Magazine (March 8, 2006),
2; Noha El-Hennawy, “Around the bloc.” Egypt Today, (January 2006),
http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6252.; Cecile Hennion, “Banned for 50 years, the
Islamist group is now Egypt’s second-biggest political force.” Guardian Weekly, (March 3, 2006).
Accessed June 19, 2006 through Nexis.; Amira Howeidy, “‘We take nobody’s permission.’” Al-Ahram
Weekly, (December 15, 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/773/eg5.htm; Abdel Monem Abul Fotouh,
“Crackdown by a clique.” The Guardian, (March 16, 2007),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2035428,00.html.
18
Howeidy, “‘We take nobody’s permission.’”; Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina S. Ottoway,
“What Islamists Need to Be Clear About: The Case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, (February 2007),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ottaway_brown_hamzawy_islamists_final.pdf, P.1.
19
Munir Adib, “Habib says we reject the amendment of Article Two of the Constitution and the Copts are
brothers of the homeland.” Ikhwanonline.com, (July 2, 2006). Accessed July 11, 2006 through the Open
Source Center. Also see: Nassar, “Dr. Habib explains the Muslim Brotherhood’s Political Program.”
20
El-Hennawy, “Around the bloc.” For further analysis on Islamists and the notion of “implementing the
Sharià,” see: Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina S. Ottoway, “Islamist Movements and the
Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones.” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and Herbert-Quandt-Stiftung, (March 2006),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP67.Brown.FINAL.pdf, P. 8-10
21
Azizuddin El-Kaissouni and Dina Abdel-Mageed, “Waiting in the Wings: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.”
Islamonline.net, (October 30, 2005),
http://www.islamonline.net/English/Views/2005/10/article03a.SHTML.
22
“Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood says tourists can drink.” Reuters, (June 12, 2006),
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2006/June/middleeast_June25
6.xml&section=middleeast.
23
For a recent debate among contemporary Islamic jurists, see: “Apostasy and the Freedom of Religion.”
Islamonline.net, (April 13, 2006),
http://www.islamonline.net/English/contemporary/2006/04/article01.shtml; For other opinions against
20
21
punishment for apostasy, see: Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid, “Extremism Isn’t Islamic Law.” Washington
Post, (May 23, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/22/AR2006052201152.html; Jay Tolson, “Why Afghanistan should not have
dismissed the apostasy case.” US News and World Report, (March 30, 2006),
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060330/30rahman.htm; Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed,
Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam.(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004).
24
(Emphasis added.) Joseph Mayton, “Government Continues Appeal of Baha’i Recognition.” Daily Star
Egypt, (May 9, 2006), http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1434; “State to appeal ruling
that favours Egypt’s Baha’is.” Reuters, (May 3, 2006),
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2006/May/middleeast_May69.xml
&section=middleeast&col; “Baha’is struggle to win full rights as Egyptians.” Middle East Times, (May 11,
2006), http://www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=21497&sec=59&cont=3.
25
Dan Murphy, “Egypt keeps Muslim Brotherhood boxed in.” Christian Science Monitor, (June 7, 2005),
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0607/p01s04-wome.html.
26
Mary Fitzgerald, “Muslims divided on cleric’s teachings.” The Irish Times, (May 5, 2006),
http://www.ireland.com/focus/gageby/teaching.htm; “Al-Qardawi Turns Down Offer to Assume
Leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Al-Jazeera, (January 12, 2004),
http://www.cesnur.org/2004/qaradawi.htm.
27
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, “Apostasy: Major and Minor.” Islamonline.net, (April 13, 2006),
http://www.islamonline.net/English/contemporary/2006/04/article01c.shtml.
28
Abdu Zenah, “Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide: ‘We do not pose a threat to anybody.” Asharq Al-
Awsat, (January 17, 2007), http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=7693; Robert S. Leiken and
Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.” Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2007),
http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/LeikenBrookeMB.pdf. P. 110, 112-3.
29
"Shaykh Tantawi stabs Islam and Muslims." Al-Sha’b, (April 7, 2006). Accessed June 20, 2006 through
the Open Source Center.
30
Ibid.
31
El-Kaissouni and Abdel-Mageed, “Waiting in the Wings.”
32
Brown et al., “Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process” P. 8-10. On the fourth point it is
important to note that Egypt’s tourism industry provides over one-third of the national revenue at $7.6bn
out $21bn in total revenues. See: “Egypt Sees 2007 Tourism Revenue Surging 18 PCT.” Reuters, (April 12,
2007), http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6576; “Egypt.” CIA World Factbook, (Last
updated April 17, 2007), https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/eg.html#Econ.
33
For an overview of discrimination faced by Coptic Orthodox Christians, see: Issandr El Amrani, “The
Emergence of a ‘Coptic Question’ in Egypt.” Middle East Report, (April 28, 2006),
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero042806.html.
34
Samir Morcos, “Citizens of one state.” Al-Ahram Weekly, (April 27, 2006),
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/792/op63.htm; Ali Abd-al-Al, “Egypt: Coptic Leader says demanding
rights of Copts does not mean sectarian sedition.” Ikhwanonline.com, (March 8, 2006). Accessed June 19,
2006 through the Open Source Center.; Sameh Fawzi, “Brothers and others.” Al-Ahram Weekly, (December
8, 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/772/op8.htm; Abdul Baqi Khalifa, “Egypt Christian Community
Fears the Muslim Brotherhod’s Recent Political Success.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (November 28, 2005),
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=2860; Coptic Researcher Explains Copt’s
Concerns to MB Political Rise.” Ikhwanweb.com, (May 3, 2006). Accessed July 7, 2006 through the Open
Source Center.
35
Khalifa, “Egypt Christian Community Fears,”; “Muslim Brotherhood Seeks to Allay Copts’ Concerns.”
Nahdat Misr, (December 2, 2005). Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center.; Essam El-
Arian, “Comments on the Sidelines of the Alexandria Events.” London Al-Hayah, (April 25, 2006).
Accessed June 19, 2006 through the Open Source Center.
36
Abd-al-Rahim Ali, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood deputy guide: We are preparing a comprehensive
political programme, paper recognizing full equality between Copts, Muslims.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (July 5,
2005). Accessed on June 21, 2006 through Nexis, taken from BBC Worldwide Monitoring.
37
Ahmad Ramadan, “Abu-al-Futuh says the MB rejects foreign intervention in the affairs of states.”
Ikhwanonline.com, (March 28, 2006). Accessed June 19, 2006 through the Open Source Center.; “Muslim
Brotherhood Seeks to Allay Copts’ Concerns.”; Muhammad Habib, “What if the MB acceded to power?”
21
22
Ikhwanonline.com, (February 7, 2006). Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center.; Nassar,
“Dr. Habib explains the Muslim Brotherhood’s Political Program.”; Doha Al Zohairy, “Muslim
Brotherhood: We are a power in Egypt.” Al-Jazeera, (June 22, 2005),
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/52642A0D-2FC0-4616-8308-19972B99E70F.htm.
38
Amr Hamzawy and Nathan J. Brown, “Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More Democratic
Future?” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, (December 2005),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO24.brown.hamzawy.FINAL1.pdf, P. 7. Lately it appears the
younger activists have upper hand in the debate as older activists like First Deputy Guide Habib have been
publicly stating that, “…they [Copts] have full right in assuming public offices including that of the head of
the state.” [sic.] See: Muhammad Habib, “The Brotherhood are Unlikely to Form Government, However,
this is how We Envisage It.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (November 28, 2005),
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=2858.
39
For a background on restrictions building and repairing Coptic Churches, see: “Church Building
Regulations Eased.” Compass, (December 13, 2005),
http://www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=19813&sec=36&cont=3.
40
‘Abd-al-Mu’izz Muhammad, “Habib says the Muslim Brotherhood Group in Egypt will issue a
document on the relations between the Muslims and Copts.” Ikhwanonline.com, (January 26, 2006).
Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center.
41
For instance, see: Accessed June 19, 2006 through the Open Source Center. Muhammad Izzat, “Akef
demands confrontation of the US hegemony and boycott of the imperialist countries.” Ikhwanonline.com,
(March 4, 2006).; Hamdi Salim, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Guide Mahdi Akef: We Have the Largest
Organization in the World.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (December 11, 2005). Accessed June 20, 2006 through the
Open Source Center.
42
For instance, see: Mas’ad Al-Hufi, “The drive of the one-million signatures against the US medicinal
companies.” Afaq Arabiyah, (March 17, 2005). Accessed August 4, 2006 through the Open Source Center.
43
Salih Shalabi, “Khalifah warns against jewish control of Egyptian medicinal companies.”
Ikhwanonline.com, (April 4, 2006). Accessed August 4, 2006 through the Open Source Center;
‘Abd-al-Mu’izz Muhammad, “A question tabled warning against the sale of medicinal companies to the
Jews.” Ikhwanonline.com, (January 2, 2006). Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center.
Only very recently had the Brotherhood decided to distinguish between Jews and Israelis, warning against
the sale of pharmaceutical companies to “Zionists.” See: Salih Shahabi, “the MB tables a question on the
Zionist scheme to buy the medicinal companies.” Ikhwanonline.com, (June 25, 2006). Accessed August 4,
2006 through the Open Source Center.
44
For instance, see: Hazim Sagiyah, “Denying the Holocaust: The Disease Grips Our Authorities.” London
Al-Hayah, (December 24, 2005). Accessed July 10, 2006 through the Open Source Center.; Ahmed Fathy,
“Egypt’s Brotherhood Says No Holocaust Denial.” IslamOnline.net, (December 23, 2005),
http://islamonline.net/English/News/2005-12/23/article07.shtml.
45
Leiken and Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.” P. 116-7; Robert S. Leiken and Steven
Brooke, “Response to Patrick Poole’s ‘Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood.’” FrontPage Magazine,
(April 11, 2007),
http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:LDm_F5s0icoJ:www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp%
3FID%3D27800+Frontpage+response+to+Patrick+Poole&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=firefox-a.
46
Helena Cobban, “Interview with Dr. Abdel Monem Abul-Futouh.” Just World News, (February 23,
2007), http://justworldnews.org/archives/002404.html.
47
Ibid. With respect to the “secular, democratic state” comment, Helena Cobban gives the following
commentary on it: “I certainly had not been expecting the support he expressed for a single, secular
democratic state within all the area of Mandate Palestine. That had, of course, been the position the PLO
espoused between 1968 and 1974 (before it moved over into supporting the idea of two states living side-
by-side there.) And back then as I recall it, the MB opposed the idea, mainly because of its opposition to
secular rule anywhere within the historic lands of Islam.”
48
Joel Beinin, The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a Modern
Diaspora. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). Online edition.
http://content.cdlib.org/view?docId=ft2290045n&chunk.id=ch3.
22
23
49
“The Role of Muslim Women in an Islamic Society.” Ikhwanweb.com, (January 30, 2006),
7.
50
Ibid.
51
Mary Fitzgerald, “‘I raised six children and had an academic career’: the lone voice of the sisters.” The
Irish Times, (June 16, 2006), http://www.ireland.com/focus/gageby/voice.htm; Noha El-Hennawy, “Abdel
Monem Abou El-Fotuh.” Egypt Today, (March 2006),
http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6462.
52
Mona Eltahawy, “The Muslim Brotherhood and Women.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (December 5, 2005),
53
Fitzgerald, “‘I raised six children and had an academic career,’”. Also see: Daniel Williams, “Egypt’s
Muslim Brotherhood May Be Model for Islam’s Political Adaptation.” Washington Post, (February 3,
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/02/AR2006020202368.html.
54
Joseph Krauss, “Egypt’s election indifference: Women find few doors open to elective office.” San
Francisco Chronice, (April 23, 2006), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/04/23/ING47ICR7G1.DTL&type=printable.
55
Chinoy, “A veil of uncertainty.”; El-Eltahawy, “The Muslim Brotherhood and Women.”
56
Abduh Zinah abd Issam Fadl, “‘A Woman Could Assume the Leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood’
says the Group’s Female Parliamentary Candidate.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (December 25, 2005),
57
Pakinam Amer, “Muslim Brotherhood Initiative Controversial.” The Daily Star Egypt, (June 5, 2006),
http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1780.
58
Shahnaz Taplin Chinoy, “A veil of uncertainty.” Salon.com, (June 13, 2006),
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/06/13/arab_women/print.html.Amira Howiedy, “Taking their
chance.” Al-Ahram Weekly, (November 2, 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/767/eg5.htm; Chinoy,
“A veil of uncertainty.”; Ahmed Aboul-Wafa and Issandr El Amrani, “Sister doing it for herself.” Cairo
Magazine, (October 27, 2005),
http://www.cairomagazine.com/?module=displaystory&story_id=1527&format=html; Issam Fadl, “A
Woman Could Assume,”; Cobban, “Interview with Dr. Abdel Monem Abul-Futouh.”
59
For instance, see: Eltahawy, “The Muslim Brotherhood and Women,”; Aboul-Wafa and El Amrani,
“Sister doing it for herself.”; Fitzgerald, “‘I raised six children and had an academic career’”.
60
Bahira Sherif and Hussein Ghanem, “Egypt.” The Continuum Complete International Encyclopedia of
Sexuality, (2004), P. 352-3. Citing Susan Sachs, “Egypt Makes it Easier for Women to Divorce Husbands.”
New York Times, (January 28, 2000), P. A8.
61
“Rights activists welcome ruling recognizing Bahai rights.” IRIN News, (April 4, 2006),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=52652&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=EGYP
T.
62
“Interior ministry resists recognition of Baha’i faith.” IRIN News, (May 8, 2006),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=53201&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=EGYP
T.
63
Mayton, “Government Continues Appeal of Baha’i Recognition.”; Also see: Mariam Fam, “Egypt
Suppresses Bahai Faith.” Associated Press, (June 22, 2006),
http://www.religionnewsblog.com/15096/egypt-suppresses-bahai-faith.
64
Alexandra Sandels and Abdel-Rahman Hussein, Daily Star Egypt, (December 18, 2006),
65
Bashir, “Egypt: Policy Focus.” P. 3.
66
Mona Eltahawy, “The Politics of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (August 7, 2005),
67
“Brotherhood Rejects Saudi Fatwas on Hezbollah Support.” Reuters, (July 28, 2006),
68
On support for reforming Amendments 76 and 77 to limit Executive powers, see: Amira Howeidy,
“Muslim Brotherhood flexes muscles.” Al-Jazeera, (December 5, 2005),
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C72F8EF6-FBBB-451D-AC76-C40319A66F8C.htm; El-Hennawy,
“Around the bloc.”
23
24
69
Ursula Lindsey, “Egypt extends emergency rule.” Christian Science Monitor, (May 2, 2006),
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0502/p10s01-wome.html?s=widep; “Egypt extends emergency law for
two years.” Reuters, (May 1, 2006), http://www.gulf-
times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=84253&version=1&template_id=37&parent_id=17;
“Egypt ‘detains Muslim Brothers.’” BBC News, (May 4, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4973856.stm.
70
For an example of its vagueness, see: “The Vision of MB concerning reform and development.”
Ikhwanweb, (July 6, 2006),
0.
71
Brown, et al., “Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process,” P. 4.
72
For more on splits within the Brotherhood, see: Abdel Rahim Ali, “Interview with the Leader of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (July 29, 2005),
5; Manal Lufti, “The Brotherhood and America Part Four.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (March 15, 2006),
73
Brown, et al., “Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process,” P. 7-8. “Islamism in North Africa:
Egypt’s Opportunity.” International Crisis Group, (April 20, 2004),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/egypt_north_africa/200404_isla
mism_in_north_africa_ii.pdf, P. 16; Israel Elad Altman, “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood after the 2005
elections.” Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 4, (July 16, 2006),
http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/pubID.48/pub_detail.asp.
74
Original source: Karam Jabr, “The Guide’s Tounge: The Best Anti-Brothers Weapon.” Rose al-Yusuf,
(May 27, 2006). Accessed June 20, 2006 through the Open Source Center. Also see: “A New Leader for
the Muslim Brotherhood.” Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 2, (2), (February 2004),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1458#new; Shadi Hamid,
“Muslim Brotherhood to Form New Political Party.” Democracy Arsenal, (January 19, 2007),
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2007/01/the_muslim_brot.html; Leiken and Brooke, “Response to
Patrick Poole’s ‘Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood.’”
75
For instance, see: Omayma Abdel-Latif, “Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh: A different kind of syndicalism.”
Al-Ahram Weekly, (May 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/743/profile.htm; El-El-Hennawy, “Abdel
Monem Abou El-Fotouh.” Egypt Today, (March 2006),
http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6462.
76
Accessed June 21, 2006 through Nexis. Original source: BBC Monitoring, translating, “Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood Leader Not to Seek Second Term.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (February 24, 2006).
77
El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis,” P. 373, 383; Chinoy, “A veil of uncertainty.”
78
Sharon Otterman, “Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections.” Council on Foreign
Relations, (December 1, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/publication/9319/; “Muslim Brotherhood Official Urges
Setting Up Political, Religious Wings.” Safwa TV, (November 20, 2005) Accessed June 21, 2006 through
the Open Source Center. ; Hamdy Al Husseini, “Egypt’s MB Weighs Conservative Political Party.”
Islamonline.net, (December 27, 2005), http://islamonline.net/English/News/2005-12/27/article04.shtml;
Essam El-Erian, “Towards the Renaissance.” Al-Ahram Weekly, (December 1, 2005),
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/771/op71.htm. Also see: El-Hennawy, “Abdel Monem Abou El-Fotouh.”;
Yasmine Saleh, “Muslim Brotherhood in Final Preparations to Establish a Political Party.” Daily Star
Egypt, (January 14, 2007), http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=4972.
79
Lisa Anderson, “Egypt’s cultural shift reflects Islam’s pull.” Chicago Tribune, (March 21, 2004),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-
0403210513mar21,1,6736381,print.story?ctrack=2&cset=true; Aida Akl, “Muslim Youth: Between Two
Worlds.” Voice of America, (April 6, 2007), http://www.voanews.com/english/NewsAnalysis/2007-04-12-
voa69.cfm. “Muslim Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam.” Program on International Public Attitudes,
(April 26, 2007),
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/346.php?nid=&id=&pnt=346&lb=hmpg1.
80
Brown, et al., “Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process,” P. 8.
81
F. Shazene Hussein, “The ‘Ulama of Egypt: A Moderate and Progressive Religious Authority?” Paper
Presented at the Annual Conference of The Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, (May 6, 2006),
24
25
http://www.csidonline.org/images/stories/pdfiles/shaznene_hussain[1].pdf, P. 10-6; Malika Zeghal,

“Religion and Politics in Egypt: the Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam and the State.” International
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, (3), (August 1999), P. 380, 81, 82-3; Steven Barraclough, “Al-
Azhar Between the Government and the Islamists.” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, (2), (Spring 1998),
P. 236-49; Rachel Scott, “An ‘official’ Islamic response to the Egyptian al-jihad movement.” Journal of
Political Ideologies, Vol. 8, (1), (2003) P. 40-1; Gihan Shahine, “A Government Mouthpiece?” Al-Ahram
Weekly, (September 1-7, 2005), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/758/fo1.htm; Abdulwahab Salah Babeair,
“The Role of The Ulama in Modern Islamic Society: An Historical Perspective.” Seasons Journal,
(Spring/Summer 2003), P. 51; Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, P. 168-9; Dan Murphy, “Can Islam’s
leaders teach its radicals?” Christian Science Monitor, (July 14, 2005),
http://csmonitor.com/2005/0714/p01s01-wome.html; Charles Levinson, “Call to Change: Reformers take
on traditionalists over future of the faith.” Cairo Magazine, (April 27, 2005),
http://www.cairomagazine.com/?module=displaystory&story_id=850&format=html.
This dynamic is largely the same in many other parts of the Middle East and Muslim World. See:
Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization. (New York: Columbia University Press,
2004), P. 73; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), P. 60-2; Aziz Enhaili and Oumelkheir Adda, “State and
Islamism in the Maghreb.” MERIA Journal, 7, no. 4, (March 2003), P. 66-7, 68-70, 75 fns. 4, 8; Douglas
Jehl, “Moderate Muslims Fear Their Message is Being Ignored.” New York Times, (October 21, 2001);
Richard W. Bulliet, “The Crisis Within Islam.” Policy, (18), no. 4, (Summer 2003), P. 34-40; David
Smock, “Ijtihad: Reinterpreting Principles for the Twenty-First Century.” United States Institute of Peace,
(August 2004), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr125.pdf, P. 4-5; Alejandro J. Beutel, “Recalling
the Historic Adversial Relation Between Islamic Scholars and the State.” Minaret of Freedom Weblog,
(February 26, 2007), http://blog.minaret.org/?p=225.
On June 21, 2006, the House of Representatives’ subcommittee on Central Asia and Middle
Eastern Affairs held a hearing on the strategic relationship between the United States and Egypt. During the
question and answer session, one of the panelists, Michele Dunne, noted that acts of violence and
discrimination against minorities are mostly socially based. She went on to mention government complicity
by not aggressively prosecuting these acts. While her observation shows a clear need for a non-
discriminatory enforcement of the law, it also highlights the need to drain the swamp of religious tension
and intolerance in Egyptian society. In my opinion, this swamp of tension and intolerance has been largely
created by the competition between Al-Azhar and conservative Islamists to “out Islam” each other by
taking more conservative positions.
This dynamic can be contrasted with the situations in Syria and Indonesia where the mainstream
Islamic clerical establishments, to differing degrees, enjoy more political and financial autonomy than Al-
Azhar. As a result, the reputation of the mainstream clergies in Indonesia and Syria are far better than their
counterparts in most other Muslim-majority countries, making them important forces for political and
social change. See: Anthony Shadid, “Syria’s Unpredictable Force: The State-Sanctioned Clergy.”
Washington Post, (May 27, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/05/26/AR2005052601549_pf.html; Douglas E. Ramage, “Islam in Asia.” U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, (July 14, 2004),
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa94835.000/hfa94835_0.HTM#38.
It is also useful to compare Al-Azhar to the Coptic Church, which, according to the Encyclopedia
Coptica, “…has never been controlled or allowed itself to control the governments in Egypt.” According to
this memorandum’s analysis the Patriarchate’s independence allows it to maintain its credibility among its
followers rather than look like a government stooge, especially during times of violent crisis like the Wafa
Constantine incident. See: “Encylopedia Coptica.” The Christian Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt,
(2001), http://www.coptic.net/EncyclopediaCoptica/; “Egyptian Pope Goes into Seclusion.” BBC News,
(December 20, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4110861.stm; “Good Copts, Sad Copts.”
Economist, (December 29, 2004),
http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3524939.
82
Also see: Manal Lutfi, “The Brotherhood and American Part Two.” Asharq Al-Awsat, (March 13, 2007),
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=8297. For a non-Islamist criticism of these
government allegations, see: Al-Sayyid, “The Other Face of the Islamist Movement.” P. 8-12.
25
26
83
For instance, see: Robert B. Zoellick, “Remarks During Press Roundtable in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.”
United States Department of State, (May 21, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/2006/66540.htm; Condoleezza Rice, “Open Remarks and
Q&A Session at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.” United States Department of State, (April 19,
2006), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64797.htm; Condoleezza Rice, “Interview with Osman
Mirghani of Asharq Al Awsat.” United States Department of State, (January 30, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/60034.htm.
84
In fact Al-Arabiyya journalist Randa Abu Alawmy makes this exact point in an interview with Secretary
Rice. See: “Interview on Al Arabiya With Randa Abu Alawmy.” United States Department of State, (June
20, 2005), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48350.htm.
85
“Opening Remarks and Q&A Session at Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.” United States
Department of State, (April 19, 2006), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64797.htm.
86
“Daily Press Briefing.” United States Department of State, (December 18, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2006/77924.htm.
87
For an excellent overview of the religious freedom challenges facing Egypt, see: Bashir, “Policy Focus:
Egypt.” P. 1-6.
88
The last systematic count of detained Muslim Brothers was conducted by Human Rights Watch, putting
the number at 226. “Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood Detainees Face Military Tribunals.” Human Rights
Watch, (February 15, 2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/02/15/egypt15329.htm. The next day another
56 were detained. See: Yasmine Saleh, “Egypt Holds 56 Brotherhood Islamists After Clampdown.” Daily
Star Egypt, (February 16, 2007), http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=5657. However 5
days later, on February 20, media reported 48 students were released, bring the total down to 234. See:
Yasmine Saleh, “Release of 48 Al-Azhar Students.” Daily Star Egypt, (February 20, 2007),
89
Leiken and Brooke, “Response to Patrick Poole’s ‘Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood.’”
90
“Muslim Brotherhood distances itself from a militia parade in Egypt.” Associated Press, (December 12,
2006), http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/12/12/africa/ME_GEN_Egypt_Muslim_Brotherhood.php;
Sarah El-Sirgany, “Muslim Brotherhood Students Dress as Militias in Al Azhar Sit-In.” Daily Star Egypt,
(December 12, 2006), http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=4427.
91
For instance, see: Issandr El-Amrani, “The Brotherhood’s kung-fu militia.” The Arabist, (December 14,
2006), http://arabist.net/archives/2006/12/14/the-brotherhoods-kung-fu-militia/.
92
Ibid.
93
Marisa Morrison, “The Multifaceted Brotherhood.” The National Interest, (March 8, 2007),
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13822.
94
Nathan Brown, Michele Dunne, Amr Hamzawy, “Egypt’s Constitutional Amendments.” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, (March 23, 2007),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf, P. 3.
95
For more information on E-IMET, see: “E-IMET: Expanded International Military Education and
Training.” Center for International Policy, (September 2, 2003), http://www.ciponline.org/facts/eimet.htm.
For more information on ICITAP, see: “International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP).” United States Department of Justice, (March 27, 2007),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/icitap/index.html.
26

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Preliminary Assessment of Its Positions On Religious Freedom, Women and Religious Minorities

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“The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Preliminary Assessment of its Positions on

Religious Freedom, Women and Religious Minorities”

By: Alejandro J. Beutel♦

This paper is an attempt to provide a preliminary assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood’s

Section I. – Background Information

Brief History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood (known as Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimûn, in Arabic) was founded

involvement in civil society, winning control of several student unions, professional

Overview of US Policy on Religious Freedom and Egypt

Official American policy on international religious freedom centers on The

SECTION II. – ASSESSING THE BROTHERHOOD’S COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM OF

1) Role of Shari`a in society. What is their definition of Shari`a? Do they

2) Views toward Coptic Orthodox and other Christians.33 Are they to be

3) Views toward Jews. Does the MB view Jews as productive citizens of

The notion of a woman serving as head of state is a highly contested issue.

MB parliamentarians do not recognize the Baha’i faith as a “heavenly religion.” On

6) Views toward Shi’as, non-conforming Muslims and other faiths. How

SECTION III. – ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

“The existence of such gray zones [vagueness and contradictions] could

SECTION IV. – U.S. GOVERNMENT VIEWS OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

SECTION V. – ASSESSING THE BROTHERHOOD’S POLITICAL TRAJECTORY

Although the Brotherhood’s positions on democracy and religious freedom have

SECTION VI. – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In spite of the pessimistic assessment of the Brotherhood’s political trajectory, there

be undertaken, it is highly advised that as many MB leaders from different age

Appendix: Selected Excerpts of State Department Officials’ Statements

Remarks During Press Roundtable in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt

Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: Well, I think ultimately this will again be a

Daily Press Briefing

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, if you're referring to the Muslim Brotherhood, Barry, it is

Opening Remarks and Q&A Session at Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

The U.S. and the United Arab Emirates

AMBASSADOR WELCH: On the Muslim Brotherhood, the Al-Ikhwân Al-Muslimûn, in

Interview on Egyptian Television With Mervat Mohsen

Interview With Osman Mirghani of Al Sharq al Awsat

Briefing En Route Cairo, Egypt

UNDER SECRETARY HUGHES: I do not believe we’re…I don’t believe so.

Daily Press Briefing

MR. ERELI: Right.

MR. ERELI: They're independent candidates. There's no injunction against --

MR. ERELI: The United States will respect Egyptian law.

November 28, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/57411.htm>

November 22, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/57281.htm>

November 21, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/57196.htm>

November 16, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/57004.htm>

September 14, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/53153.htm>

July 14, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/49751.htm>

June 23, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48596.htm>

June 21, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48430.htm>

June 20, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48390.htm>

June 20: 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48352.htm>

June 20, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48350.htm>

June 20, 2005: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48369.htm>

(Islamic Resistance Movement).” Globalsecurity.org, (July 16, 2006),

http://www.csidonline.org/images/stories/pdfiles/shaznene_hussain[1].pdf, P. 10-6; Malika Zeghal,

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