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Mammalian Mathematicians
Clark Bailey
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unique equilibrium point no matter what its initial conditions are, the cor-
responding phase space landscape will be shaped like a funnel. The point
at the center of the funnel is known as an attractor, or a singularity, in this
case corresponding to the stable equilibrium point of the system. Naturally,
there are many more complicated phase space topologies, each defined by
the existence and distribution of its characteristic set of singularities and
each relating to the possibility space of a particular system.
Despite this impoverished description, it gives us a clear idea of how
DeLanda conceives the distinction between the actual and the virtual.2
What we normally refer to as the “real” system, that is, some physical sys-
tem in a particular state, with its parts disposed in a certain manner, as
well as other possible states this system could occupy at some other time,
all line up on the same side of our metaphysical divide—the actual. On
the other hand, the virtual refers to something qualitatively different. It is
not an actual or even a possible state of the system, but a structure of these
possibilities; it refers to the structure of the processes that shape a system’s
possible behaviors, to a force behind or beneath actual possibilities that
provides a consistent way of thinking about an entire set of them at once.
Deleuze, of course, repeatedly warns against confusing the virtual with the
possible, and insists on its direct structural reality. Thus, in our mathemati-
cal analogy, the virtual is a set of singularities that structure the evolution
of a system and associate its phase space with a particular topological
form. In this sense, it plays a role analogous to the one we often attribute
to the immaterial laws of physics that nevertheless somehow govern the
interaction of actual material bodies.
From our perspective, the most important reason for introducing these
mathematical concepts into a discussion of the virtual is that they provide
a very concrete way of understanding the slippery structure of the virtual
itself. The main idea is that the topological forms that characterize phase
spaces can themselves be transformed into one another as the systems
they describe undergo a series of phase transitions. While at first it may
seem extraneous to its definition and its distinction from the actual, this
internal structure of the virtual helps distinguish Deleuze’s theory from
one that simply takes the topology of a system’s phase space as its eternal
Platonic essence, while reducing the actual system to a mere instance of
these preexistent fundamental laws.
To understand this structure of the virtual, we need to know more
about the way the topological singularities that structure a phase space
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technical name for a phase space. These are surfaces that form spaces in
their own right, constructed entirely from local relations, without the need
to embed them in a global space of higher dimension as part of their defi-
nition.7 In another context, Deleuze refers to these as “absolute surfaces
or volumes” defined strictly by internal relations that cohere enough to
create a consistent topological form.8 They are self-consistent immanent
forms that arise like a vortex, tying together heterogeneous variations into
relatively stable patterns defined from within by the way these variations
form inseparable parts of an emergent whole. We will return repeatedly
to this image of the vortex; it is one of the simplest of these self-defining
forms, yet it elegantly illustrates how a global form can emerge from and
react back upon local interactions. DeLanda suggests that these absolute
surfaces and the unactualized attractors required for their definition are
the “spatial” dimension of the virtual.
The corollary of this internal definition of a multiplicity as “filling all
of its dimensions,” however, is that it can only be defined up to the limit
at which it transforms into another. Each of these transformations cor-
responds to a phase transition between the levels of a multiplicity, a line
marking the emergence of one irreducible topological form from another as
some threshold of intensity is crossed. True to form, Deleuze uses numer-
ous terms to refer to these transformations by which the various levels of a
multiplicity unfold; but whether we prefer to call these the operations of a
quasi-cause, becomings, or lines of flight, the important point is that they
are always conceived as the necessary inverse of the self-defining aspect
of a multiplicity. The absolute-ness of a multiplicity, that is, its not being
defined relative to another or to a library of preexisting forms, means that
adding or subtracting anything, modifying its internal relations, causes it
to transform into something else.9 These transitions between levels would
correspond to a characteristic virtual “temporality,” and in this essay I will
refer to them as becomings.
Finally, this means that the definition of a multiplicity is necessarily
recursive; a more complex multiplicity is defined in terms of the simpler
structures it can differentiate into, which it thus contains internally in the
same way a greater intensity contains a lesser one. Each level of a multi-
plicity is a multiplicity, with a similar structure in its own right. Moving in
the opposite direction, the capacity of a multiplicity to transform means
that its definition is open-ended. It can only be defined up to the point at
which it would again transform, and leads us inevitably toward more and
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rate of firing of each affects the rate of firing of the others, then synchro-
nized firing, aided by the reentrant networks emphasized by Gerald Edel-
man, might constitute the brain’s being in a state of common knowledge.
This common firing is a global property of the brain, dependent upon the
action of the individual parts and upon their synchrony.”20
Exploring this type of synchrony, and the way in which it can
spontaneously give rise to consistent global forms based on merely local
interactions, is an active topic of research in a number of branches of
science.21 While here we focus on the science of consciousness, any of
these areas could potentially benefit from a more careful look at the philo-
sophical problems surrounding the idea of self-organization, and hence
from the philosophy of Deleuze; after all, if “immanence is immanent only
to itself,” all organization is self-organization.
Recent neuroscientific work has naturally gone far beyond the
tentative suggestion Nozick makes about synchronized firing; how-
ever, insofar as one can speak of a scientific theory of consciousness, the
hypothesis that a conscious state corresponds to a spontaneous and
transient synchronization of distinct groups of neurons captures the
basic idea. Though a number of authors have put forward versions of this
hypothesis, one of the most fully developed theories is summarized by the
neuroscientists Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi in their recent book, A
Universe of Consciousness.22 These authors set out to explain what they call
“primary consciousness,” that is, the type of conscious experience other
mammals such as monkeys and dogs have, rather than trying to directly
tackle the linguistic self-consciousness of humans.
A Universe of Consciousness centers around the concept of the “dynamic
core,” a hypothesized neural mechanism meant to explain what Edel-
man and Tononi see as the basic phenomenological properties of all
conscious experience, “such properties include unity—the fact that each
conscious state is experienced as a whole that cannot be subdivided into
independent components—and informativeness—the fact that within
a fraction of a second, each conscious state is selected from a repertoire
of billions and billions of possible conscious states, each with different
behavioral consequences.”23 Their theory thus takes an interesting philo-
sophical form—Edelman and Tononi insist that consciousness is a process,
and that they seek not merely to uncover what neural structures are
correlated with that process but to find a neural mechanism that explains
why this mental process has the structure it does. Though seemingly
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The second aspect of the dynamic core hypothesis reveals the necessary
correlate of this immanent integration; it exists alongside other semistable
integrated states that it is distinct from but capable of transforming into.
In this context, Edelman and Tononi discuss consciousness as informative
because of its diversity, and they relate this to a measure of the complexity
of the brain: “The ability to differentiate among a large repertoire of possi-
bilities constitutes information, in the precise sense of ‘reduction of uncer-
tainty.’ Furthermore, conscious discrimination represents information that
makes a difference, in the sense that the occurrence of a given conscious
state can lead to consequences that are different, in terms of thought and
action, from those that might ensue from other conscious states.”26 The
information of consciousness is thus not primarily information about the
world, but information about the brain, about which of its potential states
the brain is in. It arises from the nature of the feedback connections that
create a consistent state; the consistency, as with common knowledge, lies
precisely in the fact that if anything were different about the activity of
one of the components, the global state arrived at would have to be dif-
ferent. The variations involved have become inseparable, so that the very
existence of one conscious state simultaneously distinguishes it from any
other possible state, thus creating, “information from the point of view
of the system itself—the number of states that make a difference to the
system itself.”27 This amounts to saying that consciousness is necessarily a
highly dynamic system with multiple attractors.
Fortunately, even though we cannot count or even classify these attrac-
tors, Edelman and Tononi go on to propose a mathematical definition of
neural complexity based on evaluating the number of different states of
each part of the system that are relevant to the behavior of the whole. “The
fact that subsets of the system can take many different states means that
individual elements are functionally segregated or specialized (if they were
not specialized, they would all do the same thing, which would correspond
to a small number of states). On the other hand, the fact that different
states of a subset of the system make a difference to the rest of the system
implies that the system is integrated (if the system were not integrated, the
states of different subsets of the system would be independent).”28
Consciousness, then, must be a complex phenomenon, in the technical
sense of having many independent parts that can still be integrated—a sys-
tem balanced between order and chaos, a “fragile and delicate mechanism”
where as many differences as possible, in the brain and ultimately in the
world, can make a difference. Here, we begin to see the value of applying
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Deleuze’s ideas about the virtual to the brain; Edelman and Tononi have
backed into a specifically virtual definition of consciousness, a definition
depending not just on the actual activity pattern of some neuron or set
of neurons, but on the simultaneous existence of objectively distinct
unactualized patterns. The virtual has precisely this reality appropriate to
what isn’t, to “extra-Being.”29 It is the reality of these virtual patterns that
distinguishes consciousness from mere feature detection or form recogni-
tion, and that gives it the ability to find structure in a novel and uncertain
world.30 A conscious brain is a virtual structure, or more precisely, an actual
material structure that extracts and preserves the virtual structure of the
processes implicit in the world around it, a feat of perception made pos-
sible by the brain’s capacity to preserve its own virtual structure. Edelman
and Tononi are at their most Deleuzian when they say
but the last time they occurred together, a jaguar appeared; a conscious
connection, though not provably causal, exists in the memory of that con-
scious individual.”32
Instead of simply processing the world in a step-by-step fashion in
order to extract a predetermined form, consciousness depends on an
entire internal mechanism whose dynamics need to reveal the way the
world might be in order to know how it is. The internal process is struc-
tured by attractors that are merely triggered by some environmental infor-
mation that consciousness is continually going beyond.33 Going beyond
the information given to form a question is, of course, precisely what we
use models for. We go beyond a question in the propositional form, “Is
there a jaguar outside my cave now?” to arrive at understanding an entire
problem, “When do these terrible beasts attack?” DeLanda has already
characterized the way in which a Deleuzian epistemology would be a
“problematic” rather than an “axiomatic” system, an approach dependent
on setting up a relevant space of possible explanations and where “under-
standing a system is not knowing how it actually behaves in this or that
specific situation, but knowing how it would behave in conditions which
may in fact not occur.”34 The idea of the “objective model” is simply an
attempt to naturalize this problematic epistemology by relating the men-
tal processes going on in a scientific subject or an animal adapting to its
environment to the physical processes going on in the scientific animal’s
brain, making room for the possibility of their isomorphism at the same
time as the brain becomes isomorphic with the world, and hence useful,
regardless of whether the animal is a mathematician or a mammal. Echo-
ing Deleuze and Guattari, we might say that it is the brain that models, not
the scientist, though the two are isomorphic.35
The brain, in short, is a virtualizer. It extracts a full virtual form only
implied in its actual environment; on the one hand, it is casually connected
to features of that environment, and on the other, it renders these diverse
facets into a consistent form through its own internal feedback relations—
functioning as a sort of cosmic switchboard achieving the most unlikely
connections. Unfortunately, this vision of the virtual is always in danger
of passing into the transcendental essence of physical law already govern-
ing the world, or of becoming the structure of an ideal mental world that
somehow magically manages to represent the actual one. These are the
two sides of the same many-faced humanist menace that always seeks to
open a metaphysical gap between conscious thought and everything else.
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Such signals carry information about the ongoing state of the organism
(sleep, waking, exploration, grooming, and the like), as well as the sudden
occurrence of events that are salient for the entire organism (including, for
example, novel stimuli, painful stimuli, and rewards).”38
These neuromodulatory systems are the common sites of action of
many pharmaceuticals associated with mental illness (recreational and
otherwise) and are also closely tied to our emotional responses (hence
the term “value”).39 Here, the feedback that selectively prunes the virtual
picks up speed, as the force of selection no longer operates relative to a
slowly changing adaptive phenotype, but to real-time adaptive actions
that result in feelings of pleasure or pain for the organism. We go from
a relatively fixed organism, with a few basic reactions executed without
respect to their context, to a more flexible creature capable of changing its
actions based on how correlations it discovers in its environment relate to
a (still) relatively fixed set of value responses.
These processes of selection set the stage for an organism with mem-
ory, though a specifically nonrepresentational type of memory where, “the
triggering of any set of circuits that results in a set of output responses suf-
ficiently similar to those that were previously adaptive provides the basis
for a repeated mental act or physical performance. In this view, a memory
is dynamically generated from the activity of certain selected subsets of
circuits.”40
This type of memory is not based on the assumption of a latent set of
codes or categories in either the environment or the mind, and it is exactly
what we need to see how a virtual model is extracted from the world in
step-by-step fashion, becoming isomorphic to it without representing
it. Memory accumulates information about the world immanently by
actively dividing it up on the basis of potential actions, creating neigh-
borhoods or basins of attraction in the immense diversity of experience.
These are dynamic reclassifications based on attractors in neural phase
space that are sufficient for certain adaptive performances, imaginative
connections that are continually tested against the world on the basis of
the repeated actions they lead to. A memory is like a miniature objective
model of the possibilities an environment affords for being around—a
state of a brain-world system consistent with there being an animal, a cycle
of repeated perception and action that has been selected naturally because
it provided for its own future repetition. Thus, individual memory forms a
more flexible adaptive system grafted onto the developmental and even
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genetic ones, meaning that each model of how to stay alive is built on top
of others, modeling how things that are already models might behave, in
a cascade of semistable mnemonic forms. Nevertheless, at all these levels,
memories are less like the storage and recall of predefined forms than the
actual creation and recreation of forms—perhaps for the jungle animal, a
jaguar simply is a shift in wind and change in sounds at twilight.
“This should be read without a pause: the animal-stalks-at-five-
o’clock.”41 Deleuze and Guattari have the same type of nonrepresentational
memory in mind when they speak of a becoming as an “antimemory” that
creates a “zone of indiscernibility” between previously disconnected parts
of the world.42 Becomings are the building blocks of an uncoded world,
a world of assemblages that do things rather than forms that are things.43
Deleuze makes especially clear that these are never imitations or repre-
sentations, but result from composing our body with a part of the world
so as to create a stable form from the interaction between the two: “Do
not imitate a dog, but make your organism enter into composition with
something else in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate
thus composed will be canine as a function of the relation of movement
and rest, or of molecular proximity, into which they enter.”44
Creating a memory that is useful for life is precisely this process of
extracting a consistent form, a “topological dog,” a “molecular dog,” that
cannot be said to be either in the organism or in the world. A becoming
is what happens between perception and action, as a sort of materialist
imagination.
For Deleuze, of course, becomings do not begin with humans, any
more than for Edelman and Tononi memory begins with conscious-
ness.45 It is only a question of composition, of finding a consistent and
semistable interaction between an organism and the environment, a feed-
back loop of action and reaction that composes a cycle that allows for
its own reperformance, a compound that “stands up on its own.”46 This
creation that arises like a vortex, being a feedback loop, tends to maintain
itself, though of course it is always in danger of falling apart because of
slippages in its internal relations or changes in its external context. Equally,
one cycle can compose with others, can augment or reduce its scope and
speed, can bifurcate, or simply drift away from its original relation. These
emergent stabilities based on feedback loops form the persistent furniture
and organisms of our world, as well as the memories of a conscious
animal.47
MAMMALIAN MATHEMATICIANS 319
extracts the virtual on the condition of being an actual and immanent part
of the world that it can never escape and can never totalize, in the same way
that any multiplicity is built from the sediment of its becomings and bor-
dered by a becoming that serves as its outside. Thus, I would like to suggest
that our understanding of virtualization as recursive serves to create a zone
of indiscernibility between multiplicity, becoming, and the plane of consis-
tency, considered as components of the concept of the virtual, which natu-
rally causes this concept to link up with the actual. The plane of immanence,
a pure and all-embracing virtuality, or a preexisting virtual space-time, is an
abstraction continually fleeing off into the distance, woven step by step by
the alternating processes of virtualization and actualization, unfolding and
enfolding, “in the fractalization of this infinitely folded up infinity.”58
I believe there is abundant textual evidence to support this most
abstract hypothesis that
there must be at least two multiplicities, two types, from the out-
set. This is not because dualism is better than unity but because the
multiplicity is precisely what happens between the two . . . actual
states of affairs and virtual events are two types of multiplicities
that are not distributed on an errant line but related to two vectors
that intersect, one according to which states of affairs actualize
events and the other according to which events absorb (or rather
adsorb) states of affairs.59
However, the most important point is to see how this question is not
something tacked on to the end of Deleuze’s philosophy as a sort of post-
modern one-upmanship, but a thought reflected in the very structure of
his slippery recursive concepts. The question of the immanence of the vir-
tual informs everything right from the beginning. “A” multiplicity contains
others within it and the potential to itself be enveloped. “A” becoming turns
into a whole chain of becomings—animal, plant, molecule, imperceptible.
“The” plane of immanence is an infinitely interleaved fractal continually
breaking up into strata. These concepts are all structured identically—the
same process is at work on a whole set of levels separated only by phase
transitions, and “the” concept refers to the whole process. This is the logic
of immanence from the very beginning, the logic of a nature becoming
expressive, becoming thought, which is neither anthropomorphic nor
mystical.
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