Of Art Aand Blasphemy A Fisher

Of Art and Blasphemy
Author(s): Anthony Fisher and Hayden Ramsay

Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 137-167
Published by: Springer
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ANTHONY FISHER and HAYDEN RAMSAY
OF ART AND BLASPHEMY
ABSTRACT. What
does philosophy have to say about the argument that blasphemous
art ought not
to be publicly displayed? We examine four concepts of blasphemy:
as offence, attack on attack on the sacred, attack on the blasphemer
blasphemy religion,
himself. We argue all four are needed to grasp this complex concept. We also argue
for blasphemy as primarily a moral, not a religious concept. We then criticise four
arguments for the public display of blasphemous art: itmay be beautiful, provocative,
devoutly intended, and is autonomous of religious concerns. Finally, we discuss the
notions of blasphemy and blasphemous art as public offences. We conclude that the
of blasphemous art is a public, and not merely a private moral offence, and
display
that there are respectable philosophical arguments for this conclusion.
KEY WORDS: art, blasphemy, freedom, freedom of religion, offence, sacrilege
1. On 'Pissing on a Crucifix'
As part of the October 1997 Melbourne City Festival, the National

Gallery of Victoria, Australia, exhibited Andres Serrano's controversial
Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix immersed in the artist's urine.1
The work already had a history of provoking opposition, including
most famously that of a New York senator, Al d'Amato, who publicly
tore up a reproduction of it in the US Senate in 1989. Before arriving
in Australia it had caused such a storm in Europe that the Netherlands
Groninger Museum had been obliged to close for the first time in its
? threats. Thus the opposition of Australian
history following bomb
Christians was predictable and the Gallery trustees and director no
doubt hoped this would generate some free publicity for the exhibition
without too much trouble.
But trouble there was. After negotiations between the churches,
gallery and government proved fruitless, the Catholic Archbishop
(unsuccessfully) sought an injunction against the picture being
displayed in a public gallery at public expense, on the grounds that it
'The exhibition extended to photos of a woman urinating in a man's mouth, the geni
tals and other parts of dead children, the decomposing victim of a fire, a woman squat
ting naked before a horse as she masturbates it, a clergyman gagged with a black studded
dog's collar, and so on. But it was Piss Christ that received the most attention.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3: 137-167, 2000.

? 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
138 ANTHONY FISHER AND HAYDEN RAMSAY
was blasphemous, indecent and obscene at law. His stance was

supported by the leaders of the other Christian churches and the Jewish
and Muslim communities, and by the vast majority of ordinary
Australians. The state Premier, however, thought that those who were
offended by the picture need not attend the exhibition and could 'go
and play tennis instead'. Unmoved by the public outcry, the Director
of the Gallery declared that freedom of artistic expression was
paramount and opened the exhibition with the artist himself in
attendance. Two days later the exhibition was closed ?precipitated by
mass public protest, and attempted vandalism of the work by amentally
disturbed man and two children. During the debate the Australian media
published the picture repeatedly in full colour, and made various
allegations, mostly sectarian in nature, against the protesters. But for
all the heat no one could pretend the commentators at the time cast much
light upon the issues involved.
From the relative safety of the academy, various disciplines might
approach this affair differently: the anthropologist may read it as an
example of taboo and taboo-breaking; the historian of ideas, as another
example in a long line of religious persecutions, artistic provocations
or juridical evasions; the jurist, as another stage in the gradual
separation of church and state and the removal of legal remedies from
church agencies; the sociologist, as an example of the struggle for
authority between rival institutions or between institutions and the
general population; the theologian, as further evidence of the
secularisation of theWest and the vilification of religion in doctrinaire
secular societies; the art critic, as another victory for philistinism; and
so on.2
For philosophers, it raises some important questions about the

relationship between art and religion in modern liberal societies. Yet
?
such words may seem archaic
'blasphemy', 'sacrilege', 'profanation'
and such notions alien today. As a result philosophers may too readily
write the objectors off as at best benighted fools with faith-induced
weak stomachs, or at worst totalitarian despots seeking to impose their
arcane tastes upon everyone else. Philosophers are not peculiarly
insensitive here: many people, of all sorts, even practising Jews and
2Lawton (1993 p. 202), for instance, asserts that blasphemy is the misunderstanding
of innovation, the privileging of one (authoritative) discourse above another: "Blasphemy
is orthodoxy's way of demonizing difference in order to perpetrate violence against it."
Likewise Levy (1993, p. 568): "Historically, the word 'blasphemy' has functioned as an
epithet to aggravate or blacken an opinion on sacred matters that is objectionable to

those in authority."
OF ART AND BLASPHEMY 139
Christians, do not take sacrilege and blasphemy seriously any longer.

It is not that they lack all moral concern: they are still enthusiastic about
respect for life, property, ecology, relationships and truth (the second
'tablet' of the ten commandments). And they may experience some
unease about the profanation of a sacred object ? whether by enemies
of the faith, Satanists, protesters or artists. But they are almost as
disinclined to 'work up a sweat' about reverence for
as non-believers
God, Scriptures, prayer, worship, Sabbath, church, creed, and the
symbols of these (the first tablet). Thus priest-historian Paul Collins
commented at the time of the Serrano controversy: "I'm not certain what
blasphemy is and in fact I don't think anyone is" (ABC Radio, 14
October 1997).
Until recently the answer would have been obvious to anyone.
Sacrilege was the violation of sacred things, and blasphemy was
speaking against God or the Sacred, or ridiculing things consecrated
to God or held sacred.3 From ancient times these were counted amongst
the worst of crimes since they were an attack on the highest of things.
Thus in ancient Greece Phidias the sculptor was prosecuted for carving
a figure of himself on the shield of the colossal statue of Athena. The
Jewish and Christian Scriptures were also straightforwardly opposed
to blasphemy.4 By late in the fourth century John Chrysostom could
famously declare that "there is nothing worse than blasphemy" and
Augustine of Hippo that no-one would deny that even those who well
meaningly engage in blasphemy still sin.5 In the Middle Ages Thomas
Aquinas, while strongly opposed to any compulsion of non-believers,
nonetheless favoured the use of civil authority against blasphemy,
religious vilification and religious persecution; victimising God, he
thought, was an even greater threat to the common good than
victimising people. In Islam words and actions of infidelity (kalimat
al-kufr), denigration (istikhf?f), contempt (ih?nah) or scorn (haq?rah)
for sacred things were similarly deplored. Amongst Christians
sacrilege of a crucifix was always regarded as particularly grave. In
1096 Alberic of Brittany, a priest, was convicted for, among other
3Unless otherwise indicated, when we speak of 'blasphemy' in what follows we also

mean to refer to sacrilege. Most sacrileges do generally imply blasphemy in the narrower
sense of ridiculing the sacred.
4Ex 20:7; Lev 5:15-19; 24:1 6; Dt 5:11; 1 Sam 2:17; Jer 32:34; Isa 66:3; Dan 3:29;
5:2; 11:31;Mt 12:31; 26:65; Mk 2:7; 14:64; Jn 2:14; 10:33.
5St John Chrysostom, Concerning the Statues 1,29; cf. 31-32; St Augustine of Hippo,
De baptismo contra Donastis tas; and Sermon 71 ('De Verbis DominV) (discussed in St.
Thomas Aqui nas, Summa theologiae, Ha Ilae, 14, 1).
140 ANTHONY FISHERAND HAYDEN RAMSAY
things, having smeared the crucifix with excrement. In 1312 the

Templars were suppressed in part for allegedly spitting on the cross.
In 1561 Charles IX of France made the desecration of a crucifix a capital
offence, and at Abbeville in 1766 La Barre was convicted of, among
other things, mutilating a crucifix, and horribly executed.
Profaning a sacred object by urinating upon it (or immersing it in urine)
would be a sacrilege in almost any culture or religion; photographing
and publicly displaying the record of such an act, let alone giving it the
particular name itwas given by Serrano, counts as blasphemy in almost
any culture; and if the creation and public display of such a work is
deliberately provocative, as it almost certainly was, this in turn
demonstrates a
disrespect for particular religion, or at least insensitivity
towards its adherents sufficient to warrant a complaint of religious
vilification and disturbance of the peace. The best indication that Piss
Christ was indeed a direct and deliberate blasphemy, calculated to be seen
as such, is the fact that had the photograph not been judged sacrilegious
etc. and not consequently stirred up the predictable public hostility, the
artist and curators would almost certainly have regarded it as a failure.
Can philosophy make any sense of this widespread outrage at
offences such as sacrilege and blasphemy, or must these remain on the
level of philosophically impenetrable taboo? Does it have anything to
say about art which includes blasphemy as a means or an end? What
are the implications for a liberal democratic society? Although such
cases as Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses have produced theological,
legal, sociological, political, and anthropological accounts of
blasphemy (Lawton, 1993; Levy, 1993,1995; Smith, 1994), a sustained
philosophical analysis is lacking. As something of a prolegomenon to
such an analysis we here first examine four philosophical approaches
to blasphemy. We then consider four aspects of art. Finally we offer
some thoughts on the conflict between freedom of religion and
freedom of artistic expression, and whether 'blasphemous art' is
properly regarded as a public offence.
2. The Concept of Blasphemy
Some philosophers believe that acts cannot be morally wrong unless

they adversely affect the interests of particular human individuals, either
harming them or causing them serious offence. For them, what iswrong
with blasphemy is that it offends others: we shall call this the
'blasphemy as offence' argument. Others, such as contemporary
OF art and blasphemy 141
Aristotelians, Thomists and Kantians, do not require a victim for there

to be a moral evil: self-regarding, trivial, slothful, wasteful, cruel, or
acts or harm no one ? from the
demeaning may offend apart agent
herself and, perhaps, the common good which includes her good. But
like the first group, this second group of theorists still count acts such
as blasphemy morally wrong because of what they do to some human
value: they attack a basic human good (religion), and are thereby not
truly meaningful human acts, they undercut some necessary
requirement of human agency and thereby harm the perpetrator,
demean human dignity, and undermine human community. We shall call
this second argument 'blasphemy as attack on religion'.
But if we assume the truth of some central claims made about 'the
sacred', certainly by adherents of religions such as Christianity but also
by many others, the category of the morally wrong must be extended
further: some acts are wrong because they harm individual human
beings, others are wrong because they harm basic human values, but
others, such as blasphemy and sacrilege, are wrong (or also wrong) for
some further reasons such as that they are attacks on God or the gods
or some 'sacred' non-human value. We call this third concern
'blasphemy as attack on the Sacred'. A last way of reading the wrong
of blasphemy focuses upon the reflexive effect on the agent of the
blasphemy: we shall call this the 'blasphemy as attack upon the
blasphemer' argument. In what follows we will argue that each
argument in turn, while instructive, fails to exhaust what iswrong with
blasphemy, but that the four are compatible and together give the best
account of the grammar of this 'wrong'.
2.1. Blasphemy as offence
On almost any moral theory it is wrong pointlessly to cause offence to

others: if someone will predictably be offended by one's actions, there
needs to be a reason good enough to justify causing that offence. The
public display of blasphemous or sacrilegious works is predictably
hurtful to believers. Indeed
the fact that such art-work is shocking to
'ordinary sensibilities' is generally regarded as one of its principal
virtues by its creators and promoters: this kind of art only works
because it hurts. Many of those who wondered 'what all the fuss was
about' in the Serrano affair seemed unable to grasp just why it was
so hurtful to Christians: this was their God, their sovereign Lord, their
divine brother, whom they saw being trivialised and insulted in the
name of art. Even if one considered them wrong to think this, only
someone lacking all moral imagination and sympathy could fail to

foresee the pain and outrage that would be associated with such
(perceived) blasphemy. As one correspondent in a Melbourne
newspaper invited readers: "think of the one person you love more than
anyone else in this world, the person you look to for guidance and
support, the person who is with you in good times and bad. Now take
an image ofthat person, immerse in urine, take a picture, hang it in the
National Gallery, and call it art" (Ritoli, 1997). Alternatively we might
consider how we would respond to the burning of a national flag or
precious book, the superimposition of a swastika over a Star of David,
or the desecration of a corpse or tomb or war memorial.
All but the most die-hard liberals would allow some limits to free
expression where the offense such expression causes is sufficiently
grave towarrant labels like 'reckless disregard' or (racial, ethnic, sexual
or religious) 'hatred' or 'vilification'. A civil society requires a certain
amount of care and respect for others' feelings; justice demands serious
grounds for causing others offence. In the case of the hanging o? Piss
Christ the Christian who was offended by the fact that such a work had
been made also had to contend with the fact that the image was on public
display in a National Gallery, in a well-advertised exhibition, as part of
an annual festival, thus both the sacrilege and its offensiveness were
radically aggravated (Sprigge, 1990). By installing Piss Christ in a
public space at public expense, the community (which included many
Christians) was forced to share in this 'celebration' of sacrilege,
whether or not particular members attended. The offence felt by some
citizens was not only hurt that such a sacrilege had occurred, but hurt
that such a blasphemy was being promoted by their community.
While this account of blasphemy as unnecessarily causing suffering
to believers has its point it does not exhaust the meaning of blasphemy.
Even ifwe accept that blasphemy (including art-by-blasphemy) should
not be committed unless the joy produced for others (e.g. by viewing
the art-work) clearly outweighs the pain it causes believers (in knowing
the art-work has been made, is on public display, is being displayed at
public expense. ..), there will be times when this is so. Yet this would
not mean the work and its display was no longer blasphemous. A more
sophisticated utilitarian account holds there ismore to human fulfilment
than simple absence of complaint: as John Stuart Mill famously
declared, it is "better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied"
(Mill, 1979, p. 9). Thus modern utilitarians distinguish 'higher' or more
worthy pleasures from 'lower' or less worthy ones, 'rational'
preferences from 'irrational' ones, 'higher order interests' or 'prudential
goods' from 'lower order' interests or mere 'wants', and so on. On this
more sophisticated utilitarian account blasphemy might be amore serious
harm than some others, but in some situations itmight be judged a good
thing or at least a necessary evil, because itmight help the believers to
confront and banish superstition, thereby serving them by extending their
range of rational participations in human goods. However, it is still
blasphemy, and utilitariaism's attempt to capture the meaning of this is
no more successful than its attempts to explain justice, cruelty, integrity
etc. (Smart and Williams, 1973; Grisez, 1978; Scheffler, 1982).
A stronger case might be made for the wrong of blasphemy by
characterising such acts as a 'profound offence': an attack on something
important enough to produce distress in serious-minded people at the
bare idea, a distress that is more than merely sensory, and that is not
felt merely on one's own behalf.6 These criteria take us further towards
the core of the offensiveness of blasphemy, and help to explain why
the response 'if it offends you, you need not attend' only trivialised
and exacerbated the offence taken by believers during the Serrano affair.
What would we say about someone who complained that a portrait of
a dying young man, covered in excrement by an artist, was being
displayed in the City Hall, or a classy 'snuff movie' was being played
in Parliament House? That she need not view the offensive matter and
should 'go and play tennis' instead? Believers did not only want to
avoid feeling squeamish: they wanted their God respected, their funds
withdrawn from what they believed to be shameful and corrupting, and
an end to their unwilling collaboration in public invitations to see what
is holy reviled. Their complaint was of an offence which goes to the
heart of their very identities and membership of the community, which
demeans those very things they hold most precious and which nourish
their souls.
In 'The Wisdom of Repugnance' Leon Kass (1997) wrote that
"revulsion is not an argument; and some of yesterday's repugnances
are today calmly accepted ? though, one must add, not always for the
better. In crucial cases, however, repugnance is the emotional expression
of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate." Popular
repugnance at sacrilege and blasphemy would seem to be an example
of this. As with incest, bestiality, cannibalism, and the desecration of
corpses, we are repelled "because we intuit and feel, immediately
and without argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold
dear".
6This category of offence is developed by Joel Feinberg (1985, pp. 58-59).

This 'blasphemy as profound offence' account is ultimately more

persuasive than the thinner 'blasphemy as hurt feelings' account, but it
shares with it the problem that even profound offence might sometimes
be endured for the greater good of the 'victim' or the greater good of
others, and that some supposedly 'profound' offences are mistakenly
perceived as such. It also requires considerably more philosophical work
to explain just which offences are 'profound' ones: otherwise it is open
to a charge of mystification by the application of large doses o? gravitas
rather than clarification of an important distinction.
In Offence to Others Joel Feinberg (1985) wonders whether
mutilating a corpse or defecating on a revered symbol 'in the privacy
of one's own home' can properly be regarded as a moral (let alone a
legal) offence. He concludes that, unless some specific individual
(other than the agent) is wronged or the activity amounts to a public
nuisance (e.g. because it is publicised, or collaborators are openly
sought), there is no wrong; a moral offence requires a victim ?
someone other than the agent herself who is harmed or caused
unpleasant sense experiences. To this we might respond: serious
wrong can be done without any individual(s) (other than the agent)
being wronged; not all evils entail the violation of someone's rights.
Wilful extinction of species, destruction of art works, popular
obscenities, lewd behaviour, swearing and telling crude jokes,
necrophilia, self-mutilation, coprophilia, demonstrations of malice,
cruelty to animals: all these may violate no-one's rights and (if done
in secret) offend no-one's sensibilities, yet still be wrong. These things
make us wince but not necessarily because we or anyone else has been
harmed in any straightforward way. Likewise the explanation of the
moral committed
wrong in the creation, titling, and hanging o? Piss
Christ lie, if at all, not only in the degree
must to which specific
individuals were offended (either in the thin or the profounder sense),
but in the shock at a violation as objectively serious as violence
against persons or property.7
2.2. Blasphemy as attack on religion
On another account,
blasphemy is not harm or offence to believers,
though these compound a
it: it is deliberate attack on (the human good
7Cf. Aquinas, Summa, Ha Ilse 10, 8. Many people, believers included, will not feel
offended by the photograph. The question is: should they feel offended? The seriousness
of blasphemy is normative for offensiveness, not vice versa.
of) religion. We here sketch such an account,8 recognising that there

are other accounts which might also serve to make the point. Whether
self-consciously or only implicitly, any rational choice is made in
pursuit of some basic human good(s) which is self-evidently choice
and ? more
worthy. Beauty religion or, strictly speaking, aesthetic and
? are two of such and there are
spiritual experience examples goods,
others (life, health, creativity, play, friendship , integrity, knowledge
.. use them in their devotions,
.).9Why people make crucifixes, and
deprecate desecrations of them, and why people make art-works, hang
and view them in exhibitions, and deprecate vandalism of them, is
ultimately explained by the two goods these actions seek to promote.10
Many contemporary philosophers would argue that such goods are
equally basic and 'incommensurable'; none properly overrides all the
others or can be reduced to the others (Finnis, 1983; Boyle et al., 1990;
George, 1992); human flourishing ordinarily requires the rich
experience of them all. By participating in such goods agents expect
to promote human flourishing in themselves and others.
To say that aesthetic and spiritual experience are basic goods is not
to say that they are reasonably to be pursued by everybody, all the time,
in all circumstances, at whatever cost to themselves and others, and by
whatever means; nor does itmean that they are the only or the most
important values. Thus while there will always be good reasons to do
things in pursuit of art or religion, there may well concurrently be
reasons not to do so ? such as or
good one's other goals
responsibilities, or the effects of such pursuits on others, or the
immorality of the proposed means to such ends. To give a parallel
example: a scientist hopes to achieve some great scientific breakthrough,
but by an experiment which requires the degradation of people (by
torture, slavery, sexual abuse . . or the of things
.) profanation (by
8We here follow the general outlines of the natural law theory developed by Germain
Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, Robert George and others over many years. Of the
various presentati ons of the theory a good representa tive is: Grisez et al. (1987, pp. 99
151). Other theorists proposing very different but rich and complex accounts of the good
which might include religion include: Alan Donagan, Alasdair Maclntyre, Onora O'Neill,
Joseph Raz, Michael Sandel, Nancy Sherman and Charles Taylor.
9For an explor?t ion of these various goods see Finnis (1980, pp. 59-99).
10This is not to deny that those who make items of devotion or of art may not have
even primary) reasons ? a profit ? but
other (additional, for doing so such as making
even these are ultimately instrumental to participation in one or more of the basic goods
(such as feeding oneself and one's family, i.e. life, health, friendship). Nor is it to deny
that there might be irrational motivations mixed in with rational intentions.
grave-robbing, desecrating war memorials, misusing the artefacts of

. . No one would the rational
indigenous peoples .). deny appeal of
seeking such scientific knowledge; no one would deny that this might
be ameans to other rationally appealing things; and both means and ends
may well have their emotional attractions. What we would question is
whether every other value can properly be compromised to achieve this
'breakthrough'. On almost any moral account other than the most facile
consequentialism, there will be some values so basic that we should never
act directly against them, some norms so absolute that we should never
compromise them, even in the name of 'the progress of science'.
Of course, to say that art and religion are basic goods to be pursued in
morally reasonable ways does not mean that they will be equally valued
by everyone or equally emphasised in their lives. Nor does itmean that
everyone will immediately appreciate their value: some people obviously
do not, or at least behave as if they do not. They dismiss all art or whole
kinds of artmerely because on first impression they 'don't like it', despite
little reflection or skill in its appreciation; others claim to have no belief
or interest in a 'transcendent' being or source of meaning in their lives,
or little care for 'higher' things until they face some crisis or conversion.
But our rational clarity and our feelings about art and religion may vary
without impinging upon their objective choice-worthiness: some thoughts
are false and some feelings inappropriate, after all.
Vocations (as artist or archbishop ..
.) and particular day-to-day
choices (e.g. whether to spend millions of dollars or even six dollars
on an art exhibition; how to make an art-work . .
.) involve giving
some preference to one good over another. But even this kind of
selectivity, concentration or commitment need not involve arbitrarily
limiting one's appreciation and respect for the other basic goods, let alone
require acting directly against them. Nor does it require exaggerating the
importance of one good at the expense of others. A life utterly devoid of
goods such as aesthetic and spiritual experience would be either deeply
irrational or sadly impoverished. And an act directed against participation
in one of the goods would amount to a denial of its basicness and the
assumption of an unjustifiable commensurability between it and whatever
other good(s) are sought through that choice. Blasphemy would seem to
be a clear case of an act against one of the basic goods, spiritual
experience.11
11
We here prescind from considering those actions in the pursuit of one religion which
are regarded by adherents of another religion as blasphemies against their God. It is also
no doubt true that churches have in the past roused members to what would now be
recognized as blasphemies against other faiths, see Webster (1990, p. 34).

Thus, ironically, the act of hanging Piss Christ and the act of
vandalising it had rather more in common than critics at the time
appreciated. Self-righteously slashing a photograph and committing
sacrilege upon a crucifix, while not the same kind of act, share the same
formal structure. Just as vandalism of art is not a positive moral stance
that happens to offend some artists but an act directly aimed against
the good of aesthetic experience, so art-by-sacrilege is not an exercise
in creativity that happens to offend the faithful but a direct attack upon
religion. Other things being equal, we should respond to barbaric,
sacrilegious, lethal, dishonest, violent, and unjust intentions with
equivalent outrage, whether committed by individuals or institutions,
galleries or churches.
This, of course, does not imply that such acts are all identical:
different goods can be attacked, undermined, impeded or trivialized
in different ways, some of which will deny self or others any
participation in that good at all, others of which will only diminish such
participation. Whereas murder destroys the participation of another
person in the good of life (and indeed all other goods), blasphemies
and lies usually only impoverish people's participation in religion and
truth; whereas some attacks on religion and truth radically undermine
people's and understanding,
faith others amount merely to missed
opportunities or passing disturbances.
What, precisely, is the 'spiritual experience' against which an 'anti
religious' act is directed? Religious symbols and reverence for them
have a part to play in the common good even of a modern 'secular'
society and so may serve even those who do not share the faith tradition
from which they emerge. Sprigge observes: "The need for preserving
certain objects of beauty and symbols of ethical and spiritual
aspiration uncontaminated from trivial, or even degrading,
associations, so that they can serve as food for the spirit, should be
admitted quite apart from belief in any particular supernatural
revelation." (Sprigge, 1990, p. 386). As John Finnis has argued, "the
value of what, since Cicero, we summarily and lamely call religion"
need not be restricted to 'God' in the classical theist or Judeo-Christian
conceptions: it refers, rather, to the goal of all actions seeking harmony
between the human person and some transcendent source of being and
meaning, freedom and reason (Finnis, 1980, pp. 89?90, 371-413).
Thus the category might be extended to include all those non-human
things which are commonly regarded as 'sacred' or worthy of
'reverence', such as of animals, nature or the
species ecosystems,
cosmos more generally, objects of beauty such as great buildings and
art-works, abstract values such as 'the sanctity of life' or the

'sacredness of marriage', as well as of course 'saints',
'angels', 'spirits',
'gods', 'God' and the symbols and 'sacraments' of these things.
Contrary to the suggestion of Feinberg (1985, p. 54), even atheists hold
some things sacred: consider, for instance, Ronald Dworkin's recent
investigations of our fundamental attitudes towards human life, great
works of art and natural species,12 or the writings of environmental
philosophers on the respect due to nature.13 A direct attack upon the
good of spiritual experience could thus be extended beyond the
traditional examples of sacrilege and blasphemy, even if desecrating a
crucifix might remain a kind of 'central case' or typos.
We have gone some way here to sketching a philosophical case for
the wrongness of sacrilege and blasphemy, even in the name of art,
based on the notion of blasphemy as an attack upon religion. We
suggested above that part of the reason why we abhor blasphemy is that
it hurts believers and causes them more profound offence, but that this
explanation does not exhaust our concern about this action. As Kass
(1997) observed, there may be a deeper wisdom in popular repugnance
towards the violation of those things held most precious. Because such
repulsion is apparently beyond reason or words does not mean it is
contrary to reason: the analytic liberal dogma that deep-seated taboos
are merely the worthless remnants of primitive belief systems14 fails
to do justice to the ineffability of the sublime and the unthinkable.
The fact
that things like incest, bestiality, vandalism and sacrilege
evoke outrage or disgust is not merely an interesting sociological
observation worthy of kid gloves: this is exactly as it should be: such
evils naturally sicken and properly bewilder us. As LaGard Smith
(1990, p. 48) observes:
"Blasphemy laws recognise what blasphemy
outrage . . . but the anger, why the
provokes: gut-level why
indignation, why the shock? It is because bedrock values have been
turned on their heads. The bounds of human decency have been
12While weagree with broad claim of Dworkin (1993) about the sacred, we concur
with his many critics regarding the many shortcomings in his argument and conclusions.
See, e.g., Stith (1997).
13Mannison et al. (1980) imply such an extension of the sacred when they talk of
respect for nature: "The believer in intrinsic values may avoid making unnecessary and
excessive noise in the forest, out of respect for the forest and its non-human inhabitants.
She will do this even when it is certain that there is no other human around to know the
difference. For one to whom the forest and its inhabitants are merely another conven
tional utility, however, there will be no such constraint." Or see Taylor (1996).
14Cf Levy (1981, p. 6) on blasphemy as mere taboo.
crossed. The demands of reason have been unmet." And as Kass (1997,
p. 20) concludes, "shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to
shudder."15
Understanding blasphemy as an attack upon religion or spiritual

experience gets us closer to the gravamen of this act than does
understanding it as an attack upon particular persons, though both
explanations are true. Yet even together these two versions of
blasphemy do not seem to exhaust its wrongness. For the most serious
blasphemies constitute attacks not only on human persons, values or
goods, but on the Sacred itself, attacks which also have serious
implications for the agent. We look at this in the next two sections.
2.3. Blasphemy as attack on the Sacred
In the previous section we suggested that the category of 'the Sacred'

need not be narrowed to 'God' as traditionally understood, and thus
that the category of acts against the good of religion or spiritual
experience might also be appropriately extended. Reading blasphemy
as a species of this broader category of acts nonetheless retains the
aspect of being an attack upon a value in which human beings
participate. On our third account of blasphemy such an act need not
involve a victim (blasphemy as offence) nor a thwarting of human
fulfilment (blasphemy as attack upon the human value of religion): its
primary focus is a direct attack upon God or the Sacred. As Aquinas
suggested, the blasphemer generally intends to do harm to God or God's
honour, absolutely speaking,16 not to the hearers. Thus while the display
of Piss Christ will be less serious if the agent of its creation is a
nonbeliever and it is only ever shown to people who have no idea what
it is about, it nonetheless remains sacrilegious and blasphemous because
it is an attack upon God or the Sacred. Of course, blasphemy generally
will involve rejecting and attacking religion as part of human
flourishing, and/or giving profound offence to believers, but what
makes such acts blasphemous is that they are addressed to God or the
Sacred itself.
15This is, of course, to assume that emotional sensibilities can themselves be morally
informative. Some contemporary rationalists would deny this. Let it suffice here to point
to the very different approaches of Nussbaum (1990), Gaita (1991) and, most recently,
Sherman (1997) as recent persuasive arguments for the importance of repugnance, shame,
grief, remorse and the like in moral cognition and judgment.
16Cf.Aqui nas, Summa, Ha Ilse, 13, 3 ad 1.
Some of those things we listed above as worthy of reverence can be

directly attacked: species or whole ecosystems can be intentionally
or recklessly wiped out, objects of beauty can be neglected or
destroyed, religious artefacts can be desecrated. Others of these
things, such as nature, or human life or marriage, cannot in general
be harmed or destroyed (even if particular instantiations of them can
be), but actions can reveal a lack of reverence or respect for them.
God on the traditional account fits into this second category: God
cannot be harmed even if his glory and his name can be dishonoured
(Mozley, 1926; Weinandy, 1985; Creel, 1986; Dodds, 1986).17 God
is not some thing, not some being immeasurably above us: God is not
a being at all but esse itself, the cause or source of being. "If God is
whatever answers our question, how come everything? then evidently
he is not to be included amongst everything. God cannot be a thing,
an existent among others. It is not possible that God and the universe
should add up to make two" (McCabe, 1987, p. 6). To make God an
inhabitant of the universe who can be benefited or harmed by human
action is idolatry.
God cannot be hurt or diminished by our irreverence. However,
God's 'glory', 'honour' or 'good name' are increased or undermined
by praise or insults: hence the religious language of 'magnifying' or
'glorifying' God.18 In this respect, we can compare reverence for God
with Kantian reverence for the moral law (Kant, 1956, pp. 74, 78, 117).
Reverence for the law is reverence for the categorical demands of
autonomy, the free workings
of the self. Reverence does not increase
autonomy (rational beings have autonomy, and nothing can alter that),
but it is an acknowledgement of it, identifying oneself with it, choosing
to recommend and be governed by its universal and categorical
demands. Contempt for the moral law is contempt for the self, resulting
in inner division and turmoil.19 As Kantian reverence opens up a
coherent moral-psychological life, the possibility for moral discourse
and reasoning, and the preconditions for a moral community, so divine
17St. Gregory of Nyssa, for instance, concluded that "the very suggestion that God
could be passible was too absurd to merit serious consideration and too blasphemous to
bear Christian repetition". Of course, if one accepts an account of God according to
which God is vulnerable, passible and mutable, them blasphemy might be seen as a
direct attack upon God himself: See, e.g. Cobb and Griffin, 1976; McWilliams, 1985.
18e.g. Pss 22:23; 34:3; 69:30; 86:9,12; Isa 24:15; Lk 1:46; Rom 15:16.
19Cf. Sullivan (1989, p. 134): "Since the moral law is the law of our own reason, the
virtuous person is one who acts out of self-respect."
reverence offers spiritual integration, the possibility of a religious

language and practice, and a relationship with God and fellow
believers.
Someone might object that this third account of the wrong of

blasphemy presupposes belief in God or something very like the
traditional God. However, many agnostics too are uneasy with
blasphemy, not merely because of the offence it causes but also because
it is, after all, just possible that there is a God, who is 'attacked' in a
blasphemous act. Unlike the atheist who believes the non-existence of
God can and has been proven, the agnostic neither believes nor
disbelieves in God: she holds either (a) that God's existence is
unproven or (b) that God's existence is in principle not amenable to
proof. Either way, a certain caution or respect for God-as-not
impossible is appropriate. Similarly, some people thought the ancient
library of Alexandria should be preserved because it contained many
of the greatest works of thought and culture the world had even
known; others thought it should be burnt because it contained only
lies; but a third position might have been that whilever 'the jury was
out' on the question, the library should be treated with respect or at
least not burnt.
Furthermore, the broad reading of 'the Sacred' proposed in 2.2. does
not require belief in a personal God of the type commonly rejected by
atheists. An avowed atheist such as Dworkin (1993) can deny the
existence of a personal God while still being very concerned to show
reverence for the umbrella category of 'the Sacred'.
2.4. Blasphemy as an attack on the blasphemer
Many modern philosophers see evil only as 'evil suffered', thus the
temptation to explain morally wrong acts wholly in terms of natural
evils suffered by victims of those acts. This may help to explain the
incomprehension of some regarding the great outrage expressed about
blasphemy: for, as we have argued, the 'blasphemy as offence'
explanation is clearly too weak to ground such broad and deep
repugnance. The classical picture of what it is to do and to suffer evil
might well assist here. On this account 'natural' evils are to be
distinguished from 'moral' evils: the victim often suffers the former,
whereas the agent is commonly the locus of the latter.20 Here the
20For a contemporary defence see Gaita (1991, ch. 5)

relevant questions involved judgement are ones like: what do

inmoral
Imake myself by unjustly causing believers hurt and more profound
offence, by directly attacking the basic human good of religion, and
by attacking the Sacred or insulting God's honour? What do I thereby
do to my relationships with these people and to the Sacred, as well as
my relationship to the goods of human flourishing? What further actions
do I incline myself to engage in in the future as a result of making this
choice? Such an analysis of the moral implications of an act in terms
of its reflexive or self-making dimensions may seem to pitch the whole
issue of blasphemy back into human goods and preferences, but this is
to misunderstand 'evil done'.
To say that a (or the) real evil inmurder is the self-diminishment of
the murderer is not to select this over the natural evils suffered by the
victim (or her nearest and dearest or the community . . Rather, it is
.).
to say that it is commitment to just such evils as an end or policy that
undoes the murderer at the levels of creature, person, citizen, relative,
friend, colleague etc. The human goods whose realisation in his own
life he obstructs and misuses on his way to taking the life of another
are not attacked in some abstract sense but as choices to harm himself
and his relationships. The grave reflexive effect of his evil is to
constitute himself a murderer, and this is something he does to some
extent even if he is thwarted in his purpose and his victim survives, let
alone if his target dies and he is unrepentant. In the case of blasphemy
the blasphemer may of course be constituting himself an 'offender of
believers' or an 'enemy of faith', with the serious effects on himself
and his relationships that these will entail. Far worse, however, is the
willingness to constitute himself a 'hater of God' or an 'enemy of the
Sacred'. This will risk effects such as spiritual isolation and turmoil,
alienation, strange inclinations at times of trouble or despair,
meaninglessness, and accidie. Given that the effects of choices remain
in and as our characters until we choose incompatibly with them (Boyle
et al., 1976), such a person may persist in his hatred, thereby closing
himself off to the possibility of divine forgiveness.21 Such deep and
pervasive effects of blasphemy upon agents are not, we think,
adequately explained by the reflexive effects of attacking believers or
religion: we require the third sense of blasphemy as an attack upon the
Sacred to make sense of them.
2'Cf. St. Augustine's exegesis of Jesus' curse upon those who blaspheme the Holy
Spirit in Sermon 71.

To those who maintain it is not obvious just what reasons we can

have for not attacking God other than that this might impede religious
participation, violate believers rights or offend them we can appeal to
Michael Smith's The Moral Problem (1994) as a recent theory of
reasons for action which retains the standard (broadly, Humean)
psychological theory of motivation in terms of desires and beliefs, yet
recognises reasons that are not reducible to human preferences,
interests, or values.22 Smith distinguishes motivating reasons from
normative reasons. Both make actions intelligible but they do so in
different ways. Motivating reasons are psychological states which
explain our acting, while to say someone has a normative reason "is to
say that there is some normative requirement that she phi-s, and is thus
to say that her phi-ing is justified from the perspective of the normative
system that generates that requirement." While the standard, Humean
psychology adequately explains motivating reasons, to explain
normative reasons we need a concept of value. When an agent is aware
that she has a normative reason to do something, she values doing that
thing, which is to say that, were she fully rational, she would want to
do that thing.23
Smith argues that normative reasons are truths, and are of as many
varieties as there are different normative systems generating req
uirements: morality, prudence, "and perhaps even normative reasons
of other kinds as well" (Smith, 1994, pp. 95?96). He does not mention
systems of religious belief here, but they seem to be prime candidates
for reason-generation. Though the philosophical and sociological
identity criteria for a religion as opposed to a cult are complex and
controversial, we might make the following points. First, a traditional
religion offers settled and inter-generational customs, beliefs and
22Smith's (1994, pp 4?11) 'moral problem' is this: moral practice implies both the
objectivity of moral judgements (we believe certain acts are right, and this presupposes
moral facts) and the practicality of moral judgements (to believe an act is right is thereby
to desire to do it). On the one hand, moral objectivity entails only that we have a true
moral belief: whether or not we have a desire to act on it is a further fact about us,
immune from rational criticism; moral practicality, on the other hand, entails a necessary
connection between a moral belief and a desire to act; the two are therefore in contradic
tion.
23With this concept Smith (1994, p. 151) is able to defend moral objectivity (in terms
of the normative requirements of morality), and moral practicality (our moral beliefs are
necessarily connected to our motivations by the concept of valuing), and show that these
are not contradictory (for anyone not fully rational the motivating desire need not ac
company their moral beliefs). Thus he claims to solve his puzzle without sacrificing the
standard account of motivation.
norms. Secondly, a traditional religion is also characterised by amoral

seriousness embodied in a living culture which challenges and sustains
itsmembers with values and symbols which lay claim to being ultimate
sources of meaning. And, thirdly, a traditional religion engages with
the wider surrounding culture in which its members live, both
questioning and contributing to that culture. On these broad criteria it
seems we can have normative reasons for religious observance or at
least for avoidance of blasphemy, sacrilege etc.; religious systems are
partially defined by just such reasons.
Smith also
argues that normative reasons are categorical im
peratives. This puts him at odds with Phillippa Foot (1972) who has
argued that though morality, like etiquette, is expressed in categorical
terms, moral requirements are not requirements of reason. She
believes in categorical requirements unconnected with desires or
interests, but she thinks those are generated by the institutions with
which we have contingent connections. Thus there is no rational
requirement to act morally, politely etc. We have argued that religious
requirements are not reducible to human desires and interests, or even
to human goods, so if they are categorical normative reasons, this
suggests they are reasons too for non-believers. If Foot is wrong in
asserting that categorical requirements are merely institutional not
? as we ?
rational have argued (in 2.2.) above and if the requirement
to avoid blasphemy is categorical, then it is irrational for anyone to
blaspheme.
3. The Concept of Art
3.1. Blasphemous art as 'beautiful in itself
In this present essay we do not purport to make any judgments about

the aesthetics or 'artistic merit' o? Piss Christ or similar works of art.
At the time of the Serrano affair the artist gave his own opinion in the
following terms:
I, you know, I just find that, and I started that work as an attempt to reduce and
simplify a lot of the ideas and images that I had been doing up until that time. I
didn't do it to be provocative, I did it because damn, the colours would look good,
you know, [clapping and cheering] Imean, sometimes I just feel like, you know,
what I do has the simplest answers, but they're not good enough. People want more
of a story and I realise I try to give them a story, but sometimes I have to say:
look, you're reading too much into this shit really, you know (ABC Radio National,
1997).
Of course as Hans-Georg Gadamer (1986) and so many others have

observed, "we should not take the self-interpretation of the artist too
seriously."
In his judgment refusing the application for an injunction, Mr. Justice
Harper of the Supreme Court of Victoria suggested that the photograph
'of itself is "not only inoffensive, but might be seen as a reverent
treatment of a sacred symbol". It is only when the circumstances of
its manufacture and the title are known that the work causes
'understandable offence' to some Christians. This notion ?that a work
of art cannot be blasphemous in itself, but only in the context of its
being considered so by others ?is commonly raised in defence of such
art-works. But the notion of 'the image itself is deeply problematical:
the subject depicted, the mode of its creation, the title it is given, the
history of its reception, and the circumstances inwhich it is displayed,
are all dimensions of the 'image itself and its (intended or at least
predictable) effect on the viewer. No one could pretend properly to
understand the beauty and significance of, for instance, an Aboriginal
artefact, from simply viewing the colours and materials; and no one
even remotely conscious of the history of the people who made it and
the meaning of their rich symbols would today speak so
reductionistically and irreverently of 'the image itself. Items of art,
like items of religion, and actions like creating art-works and 'pissing'
on something or someone, can only be understood in the context of the
culture from which they emerge and to which they speak?even if they
sometimes and to some extent challenge the boundaries ofthat culture's
expectations and transcend those borders, speaking even to outsiders.
If the crucifix had been immersed in tartrazine water and the
photograph were instead titled Icon, our response to itwould, of course,
have been very different even if it looked much the same: indeed it
might well have seemed a rather kitsch piece of religious piety and
would almost certainly not have been shown as part of a major
exhibition. Piss Christ only works because we know what a crucifix
is, what urine is, how the two were brought into conjunction, and what
the picture is called. Its fame or infamy, and thus its reception by
viewers, are also the result of its subject matter, mode of creation and
name, as well as its history of offending a long line of viewers. The
image might seem 'reverent' or 'beautiful' to someone who did not
know all of this, but that would be because they misunderstood the
work, failed to appreciate it, not because they saw something others
(prejudiced by knowledge) had missed.
3.2. Blasphemous art as 'provocative'

One of the principal values of much modern art is undoubtedly that it
?
is the p.c. words are and
shocking 'confronting', 'provocative'
'difficult'. By provoking strong emotions the artist hopes to jolt viewers
out of their comfortable complacency and stale expectations, thereby
seeking to expand their conceptions of art and to speak to them in new
and challenging ways. Paradoxically, a parallel feature of such art has
often been that any strong reaction by the viewers is declared an assault
on the freedom and prerogatives of the artistic community. Artists
demand the unfettered right to attack and disturb others', but if this
happens to them it is a reactionary attack. The artist delights in
confrontation but when the confronted turn and confront him he runs
scared, crying intolerance, fundamentalism, despotism.
Cosmo Landesman (1997) recently wrote: "The common man can
never win. If he's indifferent to the claims of art he's called a philistine;
when he responds with passion and anger he's portrayed as a member
of the mob braying for blood." As Jeffrey Stout (1988, p. 150) observes
"in contexts where the anomalous or ambiguous character of an object,
event, or act seems to threaten disruption of the natural-social order,
rather than promising to knit that order together, the object, event, or
act will be abominated" ? and abominations arouse deep passions. And
as Samuel Laeuchli (1980, p. 63) notes "art invites response, art
challenges, and challenge and response can bring about violence." If
blasphemous art is deliberately or predictably provocative, the effects
it provokes should not surprise the artists, galleries or communities
which display them.
3.3. Blasphemous art as devotion
As the Serrano affair developed, the artist repudiated his earlier lines
? ?
that his art is simply colourful and that it is deliberately shocking
and asserted instead that, far from intending to scandalise, his goal all
along had been to increase the devotion of his fellow Christians by
helping them identify better with Christ in his pain, suffering and
humiliation. Whether this revisionism was entirely candid on Serrano's
part might be doubted but, as some of the artist's defenders observed,
Jesus himself very likely lost control of his bladder in the crucifixion
and was probably 'pissed on' by the Roman soldiers. Thus the
photograph might be said merely to allude to this and to invite our
compassionate engagement with the real man.
But do the sacred and the venerated really work in this way? It is
not uncommon today for people to say that symbols and ceremonies
are only appropriate where they are 'relevant' or 'accessible', i.e. where
they express or confirm things we already well understand or have
already judged as specially important to us independently of those
symbols and ceremonies (indeed often independently of the very
religion they express). But it is a radical misunderstanding of the
anthropology of symbols and sacrament?is to imagine that by adding
'grime' to them the artist will help make them more relevant and so
devotional. Ironically, reinventing the image according to a pattern less
'sanitised' (if also less sanitary) than that received in the tradition may
do the exact opposite. A crucifix certainly expresses muck, and will
not do so if worn as costume jewellery; but neither will it do so if
smeared with muck.
This is not the place to explore at length the implications of works
such as that of Rudolf Otto (1980) on the numinous, Mircea Eliade
(1969) on the sacred and the profane, Victor Turner (1969) on the
liminal, Mary Douglas (1973) on sacred symbols, or Gadamer (1986)
on mimesis and anamnesis in art. But what can be said briefly is that
none of these classic studies of the anthropology of religious symbols
would lend credence to the notion of 'enhancement' as was proposed
by Serrano and his defenders. Objects symbolising mysteries both
reveal and conceal, inform and cloak; they do not pretend to
photographic realism (or Serranoesque photographic surrealism); they
are necessarily stylised in certain ways, made and displayed for certain
devotional purposes, and venerated in certain ways; they can only be
understood in the context of the religious culture and history of practice
from which they emerge. To think a religious object can be extracted
from such a context and 'improved' by doing to it something
unthinkable among adherents ofthat tradition is condescension of the
kind we rightly abhor in white Australians, Canadians or Americans
who seek to 'improve' on Aboriginal artefacts.
What we do with a crucifix is thus very different to how we might
go about depicting 'The Crucifixion'. The former is necessarily bound
by rigid norms of reverence; the latter allows much more latitude for
the artist to create a modern Christ, a terrified Christ, a humiliated
Christ, an exultant Christ. . . While
. a Crucifixion scene in
making
which Jesus had lost control of his bodily functions might not be
sacrilege, immersing a crucifix in urine can only be a profanation
according to the standards of the culture and religion of which it is an
artefact, and photographing and displaying such a deed can only be a
blasphemy in that culture. The Kantian dichotomy of objects and

persons appears unable to deal with this aspect of symbols.
The revisionist apologia for such works as Piss Christ as much
misunderstood devotional works would ring truer were such artists as
Serrano not notorious for their iconoclastic and subversive tempers. But
even if Serrano does indeed love and revere the crucified Christ,
reverence ismore than a 'funny internal feeling': it is demonstrated and
confirmed in oneself and others by 'performative utterances' consistent
with religious awe.24 On the face of it, the work in question is the
opposite. If this work is to be regarded as pious, can anything be
impious? If even this work is devout, what on earth is not?
Furthermore, it is patronising in the extreme to suggest that only gore
and sentimentality can call forth deep reactions from the faithful. Those
who venerate the crucifix may very well understand and love the one
who bore degradation and shame there, without
requiring the
application of excrement to their symbols by their theological betters.
Finally, even if itwere the case that blasphemy might be used by an
?
artist with some good goal in mind such as devotion or furthering
public debate about the merits or demerits of some particular religion
?
this does not amount to an argument against the intrinsic wrong of
blasphemy. Recent high school shootings have opened up a healthy
debate over gun ownership and control in the United States, yet no
one but the most crass pragmatist would think the shootings other than
abhorrent.
3.4. Art and religion as distinct disciplines

A number of participants in the Australian debate put the position that
just as the churches do not claim expertise in aesthetics, the arts
community is not in a position to decide what is blasphemous and
grossly sacrilegious: though grounded in a common human ex
perience, the religious and the artistic are distinct. Thus a separation
of church and gallery was proposed akin to the separation of church
and state so dear to the hearts of contemporary liberals.
It is surely right to say that sacredness and beauty are aspects of our
human experience that 'call' or 'speak' to us in different ways, but it
does not follow that there are entirely independent spheres. Although
distinct, art and religion are not autonomous. Many art works,
24Ramsay (1997, ch. 6) argues that certain postures, and even a certain physical ap
pearance, are required for genuine reverence, virtue, sincerity etc.
after all, are religious in content or inspiration, and much of religion

is symbol, ritual, display. A parallel might be drawn here with attempts
to compartmentalise religion and politics, or religion and morality. The
choice is not between a theocratic state in which priests determine law
and an atheist state inwhich religion is banished from public life or even
subjected to state control: there can be (and demonstrably are) many
complex interrelationships between church and state, private religion and
public politics, which do not require that either be banished or be
preeminent in everything. Likewise one need not choose between a divine
command morality in which some revealed religion or its official
interpreters arbitrarily declares what it right and wrong behaviour and a
secular morality inwhich religious considerations are entirely excluded:
there can be (and again demonstrably are) many complex ethics which
allow some place both for faith and reason, for secular moral philosophy
and religious moral theology, for universal 'natural law' and more
particular cultural (including religious) contributions.
Similarly, we need not choose between a situation where religious
experts determine what is and what is not worthy art and one in which
religion has no input into our aesthetic tastes and judgments: there will
be various complex aesthetics which allow (indeed require) both a sense
of the imminent and the transcendent, the material and the spiritual,
the sacred and the profane. A non-aesthetic religion is at least as
undesirable and as impossible as an apolitical or amoral one; and
religion historically and still today makes important contributions to
aesthetic thought and behaviour as it does to the political and moral
spheres: only dogmatic secularism could deny or exclude this.
If the separation of art and religion can be distorting, equally
misleading has been the reduction of sacrilege and blasphemy to the
sphere of the peculiarly religious (like a dispute over the Trinity, or
whether Christ is God or a prophet), rather than seeing them as the moral
categories they primarily are. Some have suggested that while the
Church might be right to brand an artwork blasphemy (and thus to ban
it from being hung in a church), a Gallery might likewise be right to label
it art (and thus to hang it in an art-gallery). According to this view no
one except the art critic is in a position to judge 'art';making and hanging
art, on this account, is not subject to any canons of criticism other than
those observed by the connoisseur. Public institutions such as national
galleries are thereby placed outside the sphere of moral responsibility:
they are accountable to no-one except the so-called 'arts community'
and to no ethics beyond aesthetics. But neither art and religion, nor
the institutions that promote them, are properly autonomous
of morality. For example, how would we react to the prospect of various

objets d'art made from skin, bone and other parts of Holocaust victims
being put on display in an art gallery? Would we be persuaded by the
claim that the curators need only concern themselves with the artistic
merits of the pieces, and that outraged Jews and others should keep their
outrage for the synagogue? Making and hanging art is a choice and has
effects upon self, particular others, and the common good, and therefore
is as much the subject of moral analysis as making and dropping bombs.
4. Public Offence
4.1. Blasphemy as a public offence

But if Piss
Christ is indeed blasphemous, is this a public offence? We
noted above the tendency of many members of contemporary liberal
societies to wonder 'what all the fuss is about' when believers express
outrage at such actions and the tendency to see such matters as issues
o? private feelings. Yet long after the separation of church and state
the common law world has retained the crime and tort of blasphemy?
primarily because of their implications for public order.25 Thus in 1676
John Taylor was pilloried at Westminster with a paper on his head
inscribed with the charge "For blasphemous words tending to the
subversion of all government" after he publicly called Christ a bastard.26
In 1797 Mr. Justice Ashurst declared that "blasphemy is not only an
offence against God but against all law and government from its
tendency to dissolve all the bonds and obligations of civil society".27
While rare, successful prosecutions for blasphemy as a public offence,
rather than a private tort, have continued well into this century inmany
liberal democratic societies.
It is important to note that the continued legal prohibition of this
offence has not involved
'censorship' in the sense of excluding
certain
opinions from being expressed in the public realm. As early as 1840
the court held that the offence of blasphemy cannot be in making
rational arguments against particular religious doctrines, but in
25Clearly, the charge of blasphemy was often misapplied to the giving of offence. For
an indication of just how many sorts of offence were prosecuted as blasphemy in the
18th and 19th centuries, see Smith (1990, ch. 3).
26R v Taylor 1Vent 298.
21R v Williams 26 St Tr 653.
appealing to "wild and improper feelings".28 In 1883 the court

concluded that no offence is committed by the simple profession of a
religious or irreligious opinion: blasphemy required "the intention to
shock, outrage, or ridicule" believers or their faith.29 In 1917 the element
of "vilification, ridicule or irreverence" was taken to be required for
establishing blasphemy.30 Earlier Mr Justice Phillimore had already
asserted that "a man is free to speak and to teach what he pleases as to
religious matters" but that were a person to make a 'scurrilous attack'
on common religious doctrines "in a public place where passers-by may
have their ears offended, and where young persons may come, he will
? the law
render himself liable to the law of blasphemous libel"31 upon
which Melbourne's Archbishop unsuccessfully sought to rely in the
Serrano affair. In another modern case the court required not only
blasphemous intent (so defined) but also the possibility of a disturbance
of the peace resulting32 ? and itwas upon the pious hope that this would
not occur in modern Melbourne that Mr. Justice Harper refused the
Archbishop his injunction. In the most important recent case Lord
Scarman held only the intent to publish what amounts to blasphemy
need be proven, whatever the further intentions of the author: "The
character of the words published matters; but not the motive of the
author or publisher."33
This is not the place to review
the similar stances taken by most
societies in historyagainst those who attack that which is counted most
sacred in their community, or that which is counted as sacred in the
religion of some. Our point is a simple one: most polities in history,
including many liberal, 'secular' societies, have regarded blasphemy
as sufficiently serious to warrant legal remedies and even sanctions.
No one could deny amodern push to remove the offence from the statute
books, a movement sadly deaf to important arguments for retention.
However, despite Law Reform Commission recommendations for its
abolition in England and Wales (1985), Ireland (1991) and New South
Wales (1994), it has to date been retained in most jurisdictions in the
common law world and beyond. The last of these reports reviewed
the statute and case law in many jurisdictions and identified
28RvHetherington (1840) 4 St Tr (NS) 563 at 591.

29Rv Ramsay and Foote (1883) 15 Cox C C 217.
3QBowman v Secular Society [1917] A C 407 at 445, per Lord Parker.
3lRv Boulter (1908) 72 J P 189.
i2Rv Gott (1922) 16C App R 86.
y>Whitehouse v Lemon [1979] A C 617.
the traditional legal justifications for the offence of blasphemy. Though

less systematic and less thoroughly argued, the report alludes to most
of the very arguments rehearsed above: protection of individual
feelings, of God, of religion, of morality, and of society (NSW Law
Reform Commission, 1994).34
4.2. Blasphemous art as a public offence

Whatever one's views of the appropriateness of laws against blasphemy
and sacrilege, democrats are naturally and rightly very reluctant to allow
anything which compromises freedom of thought and expression. The
concern has been expressed that since the law cannot distinguish
between true and false religions, it cannot tell what should be regarded
as blasphemy and what not: since everything may be contrary to some
alleged religion, anything may in principle be blasphemous on
somebody's view and a cause for offence. Sprigge (1990) tells of a
Scottish production of Wagner's Rheingold with a black bass which
roused Glaswegian worshippers ofWotan to demand the abandonment
of the production as 'religiously offensive': the whiteness of the gods
is part of their belief. Sprigge wonders why we would think this was
ridiculous. Certainly itwould be wrong to assume that the members of
this 'cult' were not genuinely searching for some transcendent source
of meaning or did not have real religious beliefs and feelings, but it
does not follow from this that they had a religion. We considered above
(2.4.) the philosophical and sociological identity criteria for a religion;
we note here a few more points. The ancient Norse gods have not for
many centuries sustained a culture, a body of moral teaching, a way of
? even are thin
life, 'food for the soul' in Glasgow Wotan-worshippers
on the ground! Recently-invented clubs of crystal lovers or Stonehenge
circle-dancers do not offer their members much more than the jest of
?
Hollywood re-creations and the banality of passing fads though they
may, of course, reflect desires for community, friendship, relaxation
etc. Indeed, whatever Wotan offers his Glaswegian devotees,
34Sadly the discussion in the New South Wales Law Reform Commission Report (1994)
was ? or re
philosophically very weak and its conclusions that retention, codification
placement of the offence is unjustified and contrary to free speech and multiculturalism
?
therefore lacked credibility. Indeed the principal argument offered by the New South
Wales commission for abolition of the offence was that there had been virtually no pros
ecutions or interest in blasphemy for the past fifty years: but only three years later the
Serrano affair erupted and Australians and others were galvanized.
the contribution of such cults to the wider community is usually and often
deliberately negligible. Unlike traditional religions which offer figures
who have become important symbols even to those who do not
acknowledge their supernatural existence (Buddha, Abraham, Christ,
Mohammed ...), such cults offer no icons of significance to outsiders.
Nevertheless, the concern that laws which limit freedom of
expression might be abused is a common one: it is raised against libel
laws, censorship laws, racial vilification laws, national security laws...
The fear, not without foundation in historical experience, is that such
laws might be used to suppress the public discussion of views
inconvenient to the majority or to powerful elites. On the other hand,
Richard Webster (1990), in his Brief History of Blasphemy, notes that
"participants in the debate have again and again talked as though the
tradition of free speech is an abstract principle, formulated primarily
for the benefit of a small elite of intellectuals and artists. . .There is
reluctance to discriminate between the freedom to impart information
and the freedom to insult, offend or abuse."35
The fear of the tyranny of laws limiting freedom of expression must
be counterbalanced by the acknowledgement that democracies
guarantee not only freedom of expression but also freedom of religion.
Political philosophers have long noted that free speech is only one of a
package of natural and positive rights which also includes freedom of
religion and that such rights often come into conflict and must be
appropriately balanced or prioritized (Scanlon, 1972; Smith, 1990, pp.
85-86; George 1993, ch. 7; Rawls, 1993, VIII). Webster (1990)
observes that historically democracies have narrowly constrained every
medium of expression (except perhaps the novel) and argues that this
is because democracy is built not on layers of freedom but on the rule
of law, that is, the selective restriction of freedom.
During the Serrano affair a leading Australian human rights lawyer,
Michael Hains, was quoted as arguing that the right to freedom of
religion is not merely the positive freedom to practice one's religious
beliefs, but includes "the right to be protected from discrimination,
vilification, violence, unfounded and unwarranted ridicule and the
like." In that jurist's view, the exhibition o? Piss Christ "ridiculed
Christian faith, discriminated against Christians, promoted religious
hatred, was blasphemous, grossly offensive and provocative"; itwas
35Cf. the extreme position of Levy (1995, p. 572), that if there is a right to persuade
others to abandon religion, it should include "ridicule, raillery and reproach."
therefore contrary to Australia's international treaty obligation to

respect religious freedom (Rollins, 1997).36 While a democracy might
allow such works to be obtainable or on view in some way, their public
display in a National Gallery more clearly raises the issue to one of
human rights and international law.
Nor can it fairly be argued this is a case of Christians, or Catholics,
claiming special treatment from the state and community in asking for
the removal of such a work. They would also be appalled if there were
so-called art works displayed of defecating on the Star of David, vomiting
on the Koran, or urinating on aboriginal totems. Respect for sacred
symbolism a
is mark of any civilized society, and would be valued alike
by ethicists across the ethical spectrum. Thus when Australian Christians
asked that their most sacred symbol not be thus insulted, they were not
asking for special treatment, for some draconian power to limit others'
freedom of expression: what they sought was equal respect from their
society for the sacred iconography not just of their own faith but of all
faiths, and for believers not only in this particular icon but of all kinds.
The demand for complete autonomy of art ?like the similar demands
sometimes made by researchers for science or by academics for
intellectual endeavour ? masks a radical
ultimately illiberalism.
Consider someone who stirs up racial hatred or prejudice against the
disabled and then pleads his right to free speech as a defence. Such
people demean the proud liberal tradition of free expression of opinions,
however controversial: for they ignore the responsibilities which come
with such freedom, misuse the audience to whom they communicate,
and fail to demonstrate the careful deliberation which grounds our very
respect for 'opinion'.37 No one who stirs up hatred of persons,
communities, truth, culture or religion is really seeking to enlarge the
range of human participations in such goods; rather, they seek to
remove one of the alternatives. Under the banner of free speech the
demagogue pursues an essentially dictatorial objective. Thus when
laws and mores forbid such attacks on race, handicap or religion, they
do not amount to 'censorship' or an attempt to suppress the expression
in good faith of controversial opinions: rather they seek to restrain
36We need not rehearse here the growing jurisprudence on 'hate crimes', 'vilification',
'discrimination', 'gross offence' and the like of which Hains' comments are a typical
example, not merely in the area of religion but with respect to race, gender etc.
37Cf. Dahl, Letter to The Times, quoted in Smith (1990, p. 78): "In a civilized world
we all have a moral obligation to apply a modicum of censorship to our own work in
order to reinforce this principle of free speech."
for the sacred (indigenous, disabled . . and the

public contempt .)
vilification and ridicule of people, especially where (in the language
of the common law) this is 'gross' and 'scurrilous' and 'likely to
provoke public disorder'.
Furthermore, those who hold that the making and hanging of art is
so important that it 'should not be interfered with' ironically trivialize
art in the process. Sprigge (1990) suspects that despite protestations
about the importance of art, literature, philosophy and perhaps science,
talk of unencumbered expression reveals an attitude to each as being
merely "a frill to human life which can be left uncontrolled because no
great good or harm can come of it" (Sprigge, 1990, pp. 384?385). He
argues that if we are to take seriously the power of such things both to
contribute to and to detract from our quality of life, we must abandon
notions like absolute autonomy, non-interference and non
complete
regulation of them.
5. Conclusion
In this article we have argued for a concept of blasphemy not exhausted

by accounts of offence, attack on religion, attack on the Sacred, or attack
on the agent, but requiring each for its elucidation. We have also argued
against defences of blasphemous art as beautiful, provocative, devout,
and distinct from legitimate religious concerns. And finally we have
offered some discussion of blasphemy and blasphemous art as public
offences.
No doubt Lawton is right that the 'discourse of blasphemy' is always

changing. Nevertheless, the several senses of blasphemy we have
outlined do form a complex concept recognized by believers of different
periods, even though different periods do, of course, disagree as to just
what acts
qualify as blasphemous.38 We have said little about
appropriate remedies: obviously, itwould be far preferable if dialogue
premised on mutual respect (rather than mass demonstrations, court
action and/or vandalism) were sufficient to achieve mutually agreeable
solutions to such conflicts. But we have demonstrated that the notion
of blasphemous art as a public, and not only as a private moral offence,
has the support not only of historical precedent but of some respectable
philosophical arguments. Artists and galleries ought to think twice
before 'pissing on a crucifix'.
'See, for example, the history documented in Levy (1993).

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ANTHONY FISHER HAYDEN RAMSAY

School of Philosophy School of Philosophy
Australian Catholic University La Trobe University
St. Patrick's Campus Bundoora, VIC 3083
Fitzroy VIC 3065 Australia
Australia

Of Art Aand Blasphemy A Fisher

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Of Art and Blasphemy

Author(s): Anthony Fisher and Hayden Ramsay

OF ART AND BLASPHEMY

KEY WORDS: art, blasphemy, freedom, freedom of religion, offence, sacrilege

As part of the October 1997 Melbourne City Festival, the National

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3: 137-167, 2000.

was blasphemous, indecent and obscene at law. His stance was

For philosophers, it raises some important questions about the

epithet to aggravate or blacken an opinion on sacred matters that is objectionable to

Christians, do not take sacrilege and blasphemy seriously any longer.

3Unless otherwise indicated, when we speak of 'blasphemy' in what follows we also

things, having smeared the crucifix with excrement. In 1312 the

2. The Concept of Blasphemy

Some philosophers believe that acts cannot be morally wrong unless

Aristotelians, Thomists and Kantians, do not require a victim for there

2.1. Blasphemy as offence

On almost any moral theory it is wrong pointlessly to cause offence to

someone lacking all moral imagination and sympathy could fail to

6This category of offence is developed by Joel Feinberg (1985, pp. 58-59).

This 'blasphemy as profound offence' account is ultimately more

2.2. Blasphemy as attack on religion

of) religion. We here sketch such an account,8 recognising that there

grave-robbing, desecrating war memorials, misusing the artefacts of

recognized as blasphemies against other faiths, see Webster (1990, p. 34).

art-works, abstract values such as 'the sanctity of life' or the

Understanding blasphemy as an attack upon religion or spiritual

2.3. Blasphemy as attack on the Sacred

In the previous section we suggested that the category of 'the Sacred'

Some of those things we listed above as worthy of reverence can be

reverence offers spiritual integration, the possibility of a religious

Someone might object that this third account of the wrong of

2.4. Blasphemy as an attack on the blasphemer

20For a contemporary defence see Gaita (1991, ch. 5)

relevant questions involved judgement are ones like: what do

Spirit in Sermon 71.

To those who maintain it is not obvious just what reasons we can

norms. Secondly, a traditional religion is also characterised by amoral

3. The Concept of Art

3.1. Blasphemous art as 'beautiful in itself

In this present essay we do not purport to make any judgments about

Of course as Hans-Georg Gadamer (1986) and so many others have

3.2. Blasphemous art as 'provocative'

3.3. Blasphemous art as devotion

blasphemy in that culture. The Kantian dichotomy of objects and

3.4. Art and religion as distinct disciplines

after all, are religious in content or inspiration, and much of religion

of morality. For example, how would we react to the prospect of various

4.1. Blasphemy as a public offence

appealing to "wild and improper feelings".28 In 1883 the court

28RvHetherington (1840) 4 St Tr (NS) 563 at 591.

the traditional legal justifications for the offence of blasphemy. Though

4.2. Blasphemous art as a public offence

therefore contrary to Australia's international treaty obligation to

for the sacred (indigenous, disabled . . and the

In this article we have argued for a concept of blasphemy not exhausted

No doubt Lawton is right that the 'discourse of blasphemy' is always

'See, for example, the history documented in Levy (1993).

ABC Radio National, Serrano Forum, Arts Today, 14 October 1997.

Augustine (of Hippo), St., Sermons. Various editions.

phia: Westminster Press, 1976.

Chrysostom, St. John, Concerning the Statues. Various editions.

Creel, R.E., Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology. Cambridge: