What counter-terrorism strategies characterize a

constructive and cost effective response to al Qaeda

inspired terrorism?

This article discusses counter-terrorism strategies which would constitute a
constructive and cost effective response to al Qaeda inspired terrorism. It
begins with a review of al Qaedas development as a terrorist group and its
organizational structure. A critique of the overall effectiveness of the current
US strategies is followed by a discussion of al Qaedas religious and cultural
grievances as well as more constructive and cost-effective counter-terror
strategies. It concludes with a summary of some counter-terrorism strategies
that represent a constructive and cost effective way to utilize a combination
of hard and soft power counter-terrorism tactics.




Author: Charles Laffiteau, Dublin City University























1
Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the counter-terrorism measures which
are most likely to be both more cost efficient and more effective in addressing the
terror threat al Qaeda poses to the United States (US) as well as other civil societies
around the globe. Therefore, a basic understanding of the elements which helped
create and justify the existence of al Qaeda is essential in devising strategies to
counter its use of terror tactics. As such, Part I reviews al Qaedas development as a
terrorist organization, its religious and cultural grievances, the reasons why bin
Laden and al Qaeda have embraced terrorism to advance their political and
ideological agendas and how al Qaeda is structured. Part II critiques the effectiveness
of the war on terror against al Qaeda terrorism in both the US and other regions of
the world. Part III will explore less expensive long term counter-terror strategies and
explain why they should be used to counter the al Qaeda terror threat. Then, in the
Conclusions section I will summarize the combination of counter-terrorism tactics and
strategic geo-political initiatives which are most likely to be more cost efficient and
more effective in countering al Qaeda terrorism both in the US and other countries.
Part I
More than 25 years ago, noted terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw made the
following observation about what causes terrorism; Terrorism per se is not usually a
reflection of mass discontent or deep cleavages in society. More often it represents the
disaffection of a fragment of the elite, who may take it upon themselves to act on the
behalf of the majority unaware of its plight, unwilling to take action to remedy
grievances, or unable to express discontent.
1
This observation appears to still be true
today when one examines the backgrounds of al Qaedas terrorist leaders, most

1
Martha Crenshaw. The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics Vol.13 No. 4 (1981):.396
2
notably, Osama bin Laden. Much more recently, and still very much in line with
Crenshaws observations, another terrorism expert, Louise Richardson, postulates that
3 essential ingredients must be present for terrorism to emerge: 1) A disaffected
individual, 2) An enabling group and 3) A legitimizing ideology.
2

When one applies both Crenshaws pre-al Qaeda political terrorism
observations and Richardsons post 9/11 catalogue of elements which give rise to
terrorism to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, an amazingly accurate picture emerges:
Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders as well as many of their followers are
indeed disaffected individuals from a fragment of their respective Muslim Arabic
(Saudi, Egyptian, and Jordanian et al), Asian (India, Pakistan and Indonesia et al)
African, (Somalia, Sudan and Nigeria et al) as well as Western (UK, US and Germany
et al) societies elites.
Their upbringing as members of their native countrys social elites provided
them with both the education and economic means they needed to form an enabling
group, in this case, al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden as well as most of al Qaedas leaders
also came of age within Muslim societies which have very limited political freedom.
Furthermore, the inability to express ones political views is often cited as one of the
key structural factors which explain why some groups of ethnic, political and
religious dissidents resort to the use of terrorism to advance their respective causes.
In turn, the al Qaeda enabling group allowed these disaffected elites to
recruit other estranged members of Middle Eastern societies to act on behalf of the so-
called silent majority of Muslims, who are either unable or unwilling to act against
their own countries autocratic and or secular governing regimes. As their leader,
Osama bin Laden has provided these al Qaeda members with a religious justification

2
Richardson, Louise. What Terrorists Want : Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat. New
York: Random House, (2006) :59
3
for their use of terrorist violence, which is largely based on bin Ladens Wahhabist
religious training in Saudi Arabia.
Wahhabism is the dominant form of Sunni Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia
and the Wahhabi sect supports the use of Shariah (strict Islamic religious laws) in all
aspects of Islamic society. Some of its religious leaders have also condoned or
supported the use violence against non-Muslims. Thus Osama bin Ladens Wahhabist
upbringing provided him with much of the religious foundation upon which to base al
Qaedas legitimizing ideology of Islamic jihad.
While the literal translation of the term jihad means Holy Struggle, In
broader usage and interpretation, the term jihad has accrued both violent and non-
violent meanings. It can refer to striving to live a moral and virtuous life, to spreading
and defending Islam, and to fighting injustice and oppression, among other usages.
3

However, Osama bin Laden has successfully hijacked the use of the term jihad, such
that it is now generally interpreted by many Muslims and non-Muslims alike to mean
a violent Holy War in defense of or on behalf of Islam.
Most of al Qaedas core members were originally drawn from the ranks of the
Mujahideen veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. They were Arab
religious militants who had left their native countries in the Middle East (i.e. Egypt,
Jordan, Syria, and Yemen) and North Africa (i.e. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) to fight
alongside native Afghanis against the Russian occupiers of Afghanistan. But after the
Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, most of these Afghan war veterans found
that they were no longer welcome to return to their home nations. The secular
governments there would not allow many of them to return because of their Islamic

3
John Esposito Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, New York: Oxford University Press
(2002):.26
4
militancy and fears that these experienced fighters would join with other militant
religious groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to cause trouble in their homelands.
When Osama bin Laden returned to his native Saudi Arabia after the end of
the Afghan war he was put under virtual house arrest and forbidden to travel to other
countries because of fears that he would start another civil war in (Soviet friendly)
Yemen. So bin Laden turned to lecturing and warning other Saudis about Saddam
Hussein and Saddams plans to invade Saudi Arabia. When Iraq subsequently invaded
Kuwait, bin Laden even offered to help the Saudi regime fight Saddams Iraqi forces
by mobilizing his fellow Afghan Mujahideen veterans. Osama bin Laden did not
begin to turn against the Saudi government until they allowed the US to set up bases
in Saudi Arabia as part of a UN sanctioned effort to expel Iraqs army from Kuwait.
4

While the continued presence of American soldiers on holy Saudi soil
following the end of the 1991 Gulf war deeply angered bin Laden, it wasnt until 1994
when he was exiled that bin Laden turned against the Saudi government and the US. It
was in this year that bin Laden formed the terrorist organization known as al Qaeda to
wage war against both the US and western influence in the Islamic world. The first
World Trade Center bombing in 1993 has often been attributed to al Qaeda, when in
fact it was the work of other Islamic extremists who later joined al Qaeda. The 1996
bombing of the Khobar Towers has also been linked to al Qaeda, when in fact this
was the work of Saudi Hezbollah militants backed by Iran. It wasnt until 1998 that al
Qaeda actually sponsored its first terrorist attack against US Embassies in East Africa.
Terrorist leaders seldom refer to themselves as terrorists. They prefer to be
seen as defenders or liberators who are at war on behalf of an aggrieved populace.
Terrorist organizations almost without exception now regularly select names for

4
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/bio.html

5
themselves that consciously eschew the word terrorism in any of its forms.
5
The
name originally given to the training camps in Afghanistan for anti-Soviet
Mujahideen fighters was al Qaeda, which when translated means the base. Since
Mujahideen warriors were seen by many Muslims as both defenders of the Islamic
faith and as liberators of a foreign occupied Islamic country, it thus follows that bin
Laden would chose such a name for his new terrorist group.
Because terrorist organizations are not states they do not feel bound by
internationally accepted rules of war which prohibit states from using chemical
weapons or killing prisoners-of-war and hostages. Terrorist tactics, from the point of
view of the terrorist, must differ from those seen in conventional warfare.
6
Since
non-state terrorist groups lack the sophisticated weaponry and manpower needed to
successfully confront states head on, they often view terrorism as a tactic they must
use to spread their message, recruit new members and effectively fight their war.
Terror leaders do a cost-benefit analysis which usually weighs the costs of killing
innocents against the benefits of media publicity. They use a similar calculus when
weighing the use of suicide attacks. The use of suicide bombers minimizes their own
casualties and simplifies operational planning (no need to design escape routes), while
maximizing the number of people killed by a single attacker. So for terrorist leaders,
the use of terrorism and or suicide attacks as tactics of war is a very rational choice.
Al Qaeda and its pseudo-religious brand name affiliates have increasingly
come to rely on suicide bombings in their war against Muslim as well as Western
governments. As such they have also become very adept at recruiting and radicalizing
disaffected young Muslims not only from Muslim countries but also Muslims born in
non-Muslim Western nations. The al Qaeda operatives assigned to preparing these

5
Bruce Hoffman. Inside Terrorism. London: Indigo.(1998):.29

6
John Horgan. The Psychology of Terrorism New York: Routledge. (2005):10
6
young Muslim recruits for their suicide missions have also perfected psychological
techniques that will increase the chances these suicide bombers will successfully carry
out their suicide attacks such as isolating their recruits from their family and friends.
But most terrorist leaders will only utilize terrorism on a limited basis because
History shows that terrorism has been more effective as an auxiliary weapon in
revolutionary and national liberation struggles.
7
This is due to the fact that terror
attacks which kill innocent civilians, particularly women and children, can often erode
rather than increase support for their cause within a given society. Once they have
calculated that the use of terrorism is no longer advancing their cause, they cease their
attacks on civilian targets, begin to moderate their demands and become willing to
negotiate. Just as the decision to use terror tactics is a calculated risk, so too is the
decision to pursue negotiations as way of preserving terrorists limited resources.
Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network of operatives are actually quite
different from all other known terrorist groups, in that the use of terrorism and suicide
attacks is the primary weapon they are using in their ideological war with the United
States and secular, western influenced governments in Muslim countries. There are
other differences as well. Unlike other terrorist organizations which use terror tactics
in specific countries or regions (i.e. Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Israel/Palestine, and Spain
et al), al Qaeda is fighting its war on a global scale. Al Qaeda also doesnt have any
political wing which governments can talk to or negotiate with. There is no need for
spokespersons to discuss the organizations demands or grievances with government
or media representatives because they use the Internet to do so. While Osama bin
Laden is the undisputed inspirational leader and main financier of al Qaeda, there is

7
Paul Wilkinson. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. Oxford: Frank Cass.
(2001):21

7
also no true structural hierarchy below him to provide command and control over all
of al Qaedas geographically disparate members and nationalist groups.
Unlike other terrorist networks, al Qaeda is by and large a network of
networks consisting of loose collections of smaller subgroups which operate
independent of a command structure or semi-autonomously. Many nationalist
revolutionary groups have also adopted al Qaeda as a kind of brand name which
helps them to recruit new members within their respective territorial spheres of
influence. They dont actually share Osama bin Laden pseudo-religious political
views so its unlikely they would carry out the kinds of indiscriminate suicide attacks
that al Qaeda members claim responsibility for. One way to envision al Qaedas
overall global structure is to think of it as one consisting of four concentric circles
8

with bin Laden in the innermost circle. Other members of this inner circle are those
who have been allowed the privilege of pledging their loyalty to the group and its
leader. The population of this inner circle is (at most) probably in the hundreds.
9

This inner circle is surrounded by a ring of loosely connected al Qaeda
members who carry out terrorist and suicide attacks or belong to the aforementioned
nationalist revolutionary groups which use the al Qaeda brand name. The number of
people in this circle is estimated to be between 50,000- 200,000 and they are abetted
by a third ring of sympathisers consisting of anywhere from 20-35% of the worlds
Muslim religious population. The outermost ring consists of the rest of the 1.5 billion
members of the Islamic faith who are either unaware of the threat, unwilling to act or
unable to express their discontent. Movement between these circles since 1994 has
been almost exclusively from the outer rings inward.

8
Richard Clarke. Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action. Washington: Century Foundation
Press. 2004:16

9
Ibid
8
Part II
The US Bush administrations approach to countering the terror threat posed
by al Qaeda, typifies a government strategy based on treating the symptoms as
opposed to treating the symptoms while simultaneously addressing the underlying
causes of terrorism. Dealing with symptoms involves military, intelligence, financial,
legal and police activities to root out terrorists.
10
While the Obama administration
has made some significant modifications to the previous administrations counter-
terrorism strategies, it has by and large continued to devote the majority of its
resources to a continuation of the Bush administrations symptomatic approach.
For President Bush this symptomatic treatment strategy entailed using the
US governments considerable military resources anywhere in the world the US
deems necessary to battle the threat of terrorism. Although President Obama has a
much more limited and realistic perspective as regards how and when the US should
use its military resources, his options for applying them are limited to new al Qaeda
hot spots such as Yemen rather than the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the
use of symptomatic tactics and military resources are appropriate in the battle against
al Qaeda and the Taliban insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, this strategy still does
nothing to address the underlying grievances which fuel the wider conflict between al
Qaeda and the Western world. According to recent US intelligence estimates, this
strategic limitation has resulted in an increase rather than decrease in the number of
active al Qaeda members and their sympathisers throughout the Islamic world.
Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, a noted political
scientist and scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has accused
the Bush administration of falsely depicting or hyping a war on terror to promote a

10
Karin Von Hippel. The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths. The Political Quarterly
Vol.73 No. s1.(2002): p.25

9
culture of fear. He suggested that the US should adopt more muted reactions to
the threat of al Qaeda terrorism similar to other countries which have suffered terror
attacks such as Great Britain and Spain. Brzezinski went on to say that A global
alliance of moderates, including Muslim ones, engaged in a deliberate campaign both
to extirpate the specific terrorist networks and to terminate the political conflicts that
spawn terrorism would have been more productive than a demagogically proclaimed
and largely solitary U.S. war on terror against Islamo-fascism.
11

Although the Obama administration has expunged terms like the war on
terror and Islamo-fascism from the vocabulary it uses when discussing al Qaeda
inspired terrorism, outside of Pakistan and Yemen it has made little progress thus far
in terms of extirpating terrorist networks in other countries or resolving the political
conflicts that provide recruiting fodder for terrorist groups. On the other hand it would
be unreasonable to expect that the Obama administration could undo the effects of
eight years of neglect by the previous administration during its first year in office.
Historians, psychologists and political leaders, be they authoritarian or
democratically elected, have long been aware that a fearful public is much easier to
manipulate and thus inclined to support and or vote for political leaders who appear to
be tough on terrorism and offer hard-nosed solutions that also quench the publics
thirst for revenge. A war on terror is also a fairly simple concept which is both
easier for political leaders to explain and for frightened citizens to understand.
Brzezinski also notes that To justify the war on terror, the administration has lately
crafted a false historical narrative, that could even become a self-fulfilling prophecy,
claiming that its war is similar to earlier U.S. struggles against Nazism and then
Stalinism (while ignoring the fact that both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were

11
Zbigniew Brzezinski Terrorized by War on Terror: How a Three-Word Mantra Has Undermined
America The Washington Post ( March 25,2007): B-1

10
first-rate military powers, a status al-Qaeda neither has nor can achieve).
12
So the
Obama administrations decision to eschew such hard nosed rhetoric has been a good
step in the right direction as regards creating a more authentic and realistic narrative.
The Bush administrations initial reaction to Brzezinskis suggestions came
from Michael Chertoff who was appointed to be the Secretary of Homeland Security
in 2005. Mr. Chertoff actually authored the administrations response to Brzezinskis
accusations and began by saying that in the wake of the al Qaeda 9/11 attacks, no
one could have imagined a day when Americas leaders would be criticized for being
tough in protecting Americans from further acts of war. Chertoff then went on to
justify the use of the war on terror phrase by saying our foes have declared their
intent to make war, have demonstrated a capability to prosecute war and have laid on
us the horrific consequences commensurate with war.
13

It should be noted that contrary to Mr. Chertoffs assertions, Brzezinski never
actually criticized Americas leaders for being tough in protecting Americans in the
article he wrote. Thus it would appear from Mr.Chertoffs response that the Bush
administration interpreted critiques of US counter-terrorism strategies as suggestions
that the US should go soft on terror. Mr.Chertoffs response was also solely focused
on defending the Bush administrations declaration of war on a non-state terror group.
Mr. Chertoff never addressed any of the specific shortcomings of US ant-terror tactics
cited by Brzezinski. The failure to address those specifics thus appeared to be a tacit
acknowledgement by Chertoff of the validity of Brzezinskis unambiguous criticisms.
The reasons why Bush characterized the US as being in a war on terror should
be considered within the context of US domestic policy making. In 2001, Martha

12
Brzezinski : B-1

13
Chertoff, Michael Make No Mistake: This Is War The Washington Post (April 22, 2007): B-7

11
Crenshaw noted that Due to pressures from Congress, the president will not be able
to set the agenda for counterterrorism policy with as much freedom as he can in other
policy areas. Where the president dominates is in the rare use of military force.
14
In
other words, only in his capacity as the Commander in Chief of US military forces
does the president have the ability to act freely to defend the US without the consent
of Congress. While Congress must agree to authorize military appropriations to fund a
war, it plays only a consultative role when it comes to actual decisions on how the
war is prosecuted. Thus by making counter-terrorism part of a war, President Bush
was able to free himself from the Congressional constraints of US domestic policy
making. By doing so he also won the support of fearful and or revenge seeking US
voters for both re-election and the measures he saw fit to use in his war on terror..
But an effective domestic policy making and political re-election strategy is
not the same thing as an effective strategy to counter terrorism. As political scientist
Barry Rosen notes, The United States faces a long war against a small, elusive and
dangerous foe that must be pursued with discipline and determination and requires a
strategy to guide its efforts including the allocation of resources. That strategy must
set priorities because resources are scarce and the war will prove expensive.
15

Many of the initial steps taken by the US in the wake of the 9/11 al Qaeda
terrorist attacks were appropriate, albeit expensive, counter-terrorism measures.
Increasing security at US airports, hardening potential targets and closer scrutiny of
foreign nationals entering the US were all eminently defensible anti-terror tactics.
Soliciting the assistance of other nations and co-ordinating intelligence gathering
efforts with them to identify terror suspects outside of the US was another prudent

14
Russell Howard & Reid Sawyer. Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security
Environment, Readings and Interpretations. Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin. 2005:456

15
Howard & Sawyer: 439
12
measure as were attempts by the US to persuade other nations to exert political and
economic pressure on countries providing safe havens for members of al Qaeda.
Multilateral efforts to identify and freeze al Qaedas and other terrorist groups
financial resources was yet another step in the right direction. The US also sought and
received a large measure of international support for the 2002 invasion of Afghanistan
and its efforts to topple a Taliban regime which was providing a safe haven for Osama
bin Laden and al Qaeda. However that invasion also marked the last time that the US
acted in a multilateral fashion as regards the prosecution of its war on terror. While
the Bush administration claimed that its invasion of Iraq was always part of its larger
global war on terror, other evidence that has emerged over the years following the
invasion of Iraq would suggest that these assertions are not entirely true.
The Bush administrations three pretexts for invading Iraq as part of its war on
terror were; that Saddam was hiding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), that there
was a connection between al Qaeda terrorists and the Iraq government and that
toppling Saddams regime would make the world safer from terrorism. But the US
could only produce what most governments felt were questionable intelligence reports
to support its claims of the presence of WMDs and al Qaeda in Iraq. As a result most
of the nations which supported the US invasion of Afghanistan declined to do so in
Iraq. Undaunted, the US decided to proceed unilaterally with the invasion of Iraq.
In fact, no WMDs were ever found in Iraq and subsequent investigations
revealed that US intelligence reports on WMDs in Iraq were based on discredited
rumours and innuendo. Then in February of 2007, the Pentagon Inspector Generals
report revealed that at high ranking Defence Department official, Douglas Feith, who
had been appointed by President Bush was predisposed to finding a significant
relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda and did so based on reporting of dubious
13
quality or reliability
16
. The report then went on to state that the actions of the Bush
administration official in claiming that there was a connection between Iraqi officials
and al Qaeda were inappropriate but not illegal.
Evidence of other reasons for the Iraq invasion can be gleaned from published
books and articles written by Bushs former CIA Director, George Tenet and Bushs
former counter-terrorism czar, Richard Clarke. In his book, Tenet states that Vice
President Cheney and others wanted to attack Iraq from the moment Bush first took
office, long before the 9/11 attacks. He says that Cheney and other administration
officials also ignored his pre 9/11 warnings about al Qaeda and asked for briefings
about Iraq instead. Tenet claims aides to Cheney and Rumsfeld repeatedly stretched
intelligence reports and tried to insert crap into the Bush administrations public
justifications about why the US had to invade Iraq. Tenet also accuses the Bush
administration of being focused solely on Iraq as a threat to the US both before the
9/11 al Qaeda attacks and after 9/11 in 2002. He notes that There was never a serious
debate that I know of within the administration about the imminence of the Iraqi
threat nor was there ever a significant discussion about alternatives to invading
Iraq as way to contain the possible threat Saddam Hussein might pose to the US.
17

Tenets comments are supported by President Bushs former head of
counterterrorism, Richard Clarke who wrote that; prior to 9/11, Tenet was vociferous
about al Qaeda and bin Laden. They (Bush, Cheney et al) wouldnt listen to him. And
he was their Director of CIA for Christs sake. Clarke also pointed to the real reason
behind the invasion of Iraq saying that; This was not about replacing Saddam

16
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Report No. 07-INTEL-04 (Project No. D2006-
DINT01-0077000) February 9,2007:2

17
George J.Tenet At the Center of the Storm. New York: Harper Collins, 2007
14
Hussein. This was about some insane plot to rebuild Iraq in our (Americas) image.
(Thats when) I knew we had lost the war on terror. Because if youre occupying an
Arab country, you cant possibly gain Arab support (against the terrorists).
18
These
statements by the Bushs top intelligence and counter-terrorism officials clearly do
not support the administrations claim that invading Iraq was part of its war on terror.
Part III
So what kind of counter-terror strategy should the US use to blunt the terror
threat posed by bin Laden and al Qaeda? To begin with one must first examine the
underlying causes of al Qaedas war against the US. Terrorism scholar Richard Betts
notes in his 2002 analysis that Americas global primacy is one of the causes of this
war and it animates both al Qaedas purpose and its choice of tactics. The US is the
enemy because its military power dominates the world, supports corrupt governments
in their countries and backs Israel against Muslim Palestinians; American culture
insults their religion and pollutes their societies; and American economic power
makes all these intrusions and desecrations possible.
19
Because attacking American
culture directly is problematic at best, this explains al Qaedas choice of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon as targets, since they were symbolic of Americas
global economic and military power. Thus US attempts to use its military power to
thwart the al Qaeda terror threat is probably the reaction bin Laden was hoping for.
Conversely, the initial US military response involving the use of a small
number of Special Forces soldiers in Afghanistan recognized that You cant attack a
network (like al Qaeda) with a field army. 11 Special Forces A-teams (fewer than 200
troops overall) toppled the Taliban and put al Qaeda on the run. But since late in

18
Richard A. Clarke Epiphanies: Richard A. Clarke Foreign Policy Issue 160 (May-June 2007): 19
19
Howard & Sawyer: 377

15
2001, US generals have reasserted their preference for big, balky units, first in
Afghanistan and later in Iraq, and so today we have two quagmires.
20
The decision to
turn what was a Special Forces counter-terrorism guerrilla operation (with little or no
media publicity) into a media heavy conventional war, did help Bush win political re-
election, but at a huge cost in terms of foreign political prestige and military power.
Since President Bush announced the end of combat operations on May 1
st

2003, the war has also cost the lives of many Iraqis as well as over 4,000 US soldiers
and another 30,000 wounded at an expense to US taxpayers of over 900 billion dollars
thus far. In the meantime, the war on terror has gravely damaged the United States
internationally. For Muslims, the similarity between the rough treatment of Iraqi
civilians by the U.S. military and of the Palestinians by the Israelis has prompted a
widespread sense of hostility toward the United States in general.
21
The latest US
intelligence estimate, the first since the invasion of Iraq, represents a consensus view
of 16 different spy services inside government. The estimate asserts that Islamic
radicalism, rather than being in retreat, has metastasized and spread around the globe.
Extricating its military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan is but one of several
steps the US should take as part of a long term strategy to counter al Qaeda terrorism.
But regardless of whether or not one agrees or disagrees with the reasons why the
Bush administration undertook the invasions of these two countries, withdrawing
American forces from these nations must still be done in a responsible manner.
President Obama has acknowledged that this means America must first ensure that the
governments of those countries have the ability to address their citizens security
needs with their own security forces before America can begin this withdrawal.

20
John Arquilla The War on Terror: How to Win Foreign Policy Issue 160 (May-June, 2007): 45

21
Brzezinski : B-1

16
Immanuel Wallersteins analysis of the Bush administrations overall strategy
to combat al Qaeda terrorists notes that; The basic problem with the Bush strategy is
the very audacious assumption that the US can control all the crucial variables in a
chaotic world.
22
Recognizing there are practical limits to US economic, military and
political power, President Obama appears to have abandoned any plans to continue
the previous administrations unilateral actions in favour of a multilateral approach to
countering al Qaeda worldwide. But doing so will also require quiet diplomacy and
patience when it comes to gauging the progress of its new geo-political initiatives.
Chief among these would be a new diplomatic push to resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict along with other initiatives to reduce religious tensions and anti-Americanism
in the Middle East and the rest of world. Getting both sides to agree to a resolution of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be difficult. Noted scholar and top US Middle East
adviser, Aaron Miller says that In an existential conflict driven by memory, identity,
religion and national trauma, the Israeli and Palestinian capacities to absorb and inflict
pain are limitless. Nonetheless, it is mainly due to Muslim sympathies for the plight
of Palestinians in this conflict, that the Islamic world has become a breeding ground
for terrorists fuelled by popular anti-American sentiments. Miller goes on to say that,
In a post-9/11 era, the cause of Palestine drives recruits to al-Qaeda and helps
generate lethal levels of anti-Americanism.
23
Millers comments thus help to explain
why the USs own intelligence estimates of the number of al Qaeda members world
wide has grown from an estimated 20,000 in 2001 at the time of the 9/11 attacks to

22
Ken Booth and Tim Dunne Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. New York:
Palgrave Macmillian. 2002: 99

23
Aaron David Miller. The Abandonment: How the Bush Administration Left Israelis and
Palestinians to Their Fate The Washington Post (April 29, 2007): B-1

17
over 50,000 in 2006.
24
Thus it is essential for the US to find a way to pressure Israel
to stop building settlements as a first step to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if it
wants to dry up the primary source of anti-American terrorism, which is the Islamic
world's frustration with US support of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians.
Measures designed to harden potential terrorist targets must also be examined
as regards their cost efficiency and practical effectiveness, so that measures which are
implemented are done so more cost effectively. Thousands of skyscrapers and
virtually all government buildings in the US have installed expensive 24/7 security
measures such as closed circuit security TV cameras, metal detectors and armed
security guards. Yet most shopping malls, sports and entertainment venues, which
attract many thousands of civilian patrons, lack similar security measures. Practically
speaking, it only makes sense that terrorists who wish to maximize the number of
civilian casualties in their terror attacks are much more likely to choose targets which
are easily accessible and attract the largest number of people at any given time.
The US government must also recognize the harm that is caused by turning up
the rhetoric with an emphasis on our being involved in a war and its attempts to
demonize terrorists. A fearful public is less disposed to understanding that people
with Arabic names or dressed in a traditional manner are not necessarily sympathetic
to Islamic terrorists. The terrorists who struck on 9/11 made it a point to disguise their
religious backgrounds and to appear to be just like other average American citizens.
Another notable difference between al Qaeda and other terrorists groups (both past
and present) is the fact that despite its threats to kill Western non-believers, in the
years following the 2001 9/11 attacks the vast majority of al Qaedas suicide bombing
victims have been their predominately non-Western Muslim brethren. (See Figure 1)

24
DeYoung, Karen Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Hurting U.S. Terror Fight The Washington Post
(September.24, 2006): A-1

18
Figure 1

Heavily promoting and publicising the total numbers of Western and Non-
Western citizens killed by al Qaeda terrorists would be beneficial in several ways. It
would serve to reassure citizens of the US and other Western countries that the
chances of them ever becoming victims of al Qaeda inspired terrorists bombing is
relatively low compare to what it was five years ago. It would also serve as a
reminder to al Qaeda sympathisers that despite their proclamations of success, al
Qaeda has become progressively more impotent rather than stronger since the 9/11
attacks and as a reminder to Muslims that the vast majority of al Qaedas victims are
the very same innocent Muslims al Qaeda claims to be waging a jihad on behalf of.
Another cost effective initiative would involve funding understanding and
tolerance of other religious beliefs particularly among the Abrahamic faiths
(Christianity, Islam & Judaism) which share many of the same basic beliefs because;
If meaningful alliances are to be made among societies which have clashed or
harbour historic resentments, religion like it or not - must play a central role.
25


25
R. Scott Appleby Religious Extremism :A Radical Solution Foreign Policy Issue 160 (May-June,
2007): 40

19
Many Christians, Jews and Muslims are seemingly unaware of the many similarities
between these religious faiths including; their common heritage as the descendants of
Abraham, their similar values and monotheistic beliefs, their Middle Eastern roots and
geographically common shrines and holy places.
Lastly, the US should spend its government money more effectively and better
utilize TV and radio broadcasts, development assistance, and cultural exchanges to
promote friendship and understanding among the people of the western Judeo-
Christian and Islamic worlds. This will also ease the tensions and resentments toward
the US that exist in many Muslim countries. Currently, The US spends 500 times
more on its military than it does on broadcasting and (cultural) exchanges.
26
The US
entertainment industry could be an extremely effective resource for educating the
citizens of both western and Islamic countries about their common heritages as well
as in promoting the many cultural, ethical and moral values that they share.
Figure 2


26
Nye, Joseph S. Anti-Americanism: A Smarter Superpower. Foreign Policy Issue 160 (May-
June 2007): 46-47

20
For example, one of the top ten movies in the world in 2008 was a Bollywood
movie called Jodhaa Akbar (See Figure 2) that promoted the concept of religious
tolerance by framing it within a historical context. Jodhaa Akbar is based on the life
of the 16
th
century Mughai Emperor of India, Akbar the Great, who married a Hindu
Rajput Princess even though he was a Sunni Muslim. Akbars Muslim tutors, two of
whom were Iranian Shias, did not believe or engage in religious intolerance, a secular
perspective which Akbar later embraced during his 60 reign as emperor. Akbar was
not only known for his tolerance of many different types of religious faiths as well as
great respect for the Hindu religion but was also known for not being averse to
performing Hindu rituals despite his Islamic beliefs.
27

Conclusions
Effectively dealing with the global threat posed by al Qaeda inspired terrorism
will require a level of sophistication in terms of both money and manpower utilization
that goes well beyond anything the United States has ever dealt with before. In a
recent interview Bruce Hoffman said Our strategy and focus has been almost
exclusively on killing and capturing terrorists. We cannot fight this war as we have
until now. We will be exhausted financially and in terms of manpower.
28
Hoffman
and other terrorism experts share a common belief that in order to effectively stop al
Qaeda and curb the ongoing radicalization that is occurring in many Muslim nations,
the US and its western allies must provide more counter-terrorism assistance to local
governments instead of intervening directly in an attempt to neutralize suspected al
Qaeda cells.

27
Jodhaa Akbar (February 15, 2008)
28
Bruce Hoffman.The resurgence of al-Qaeda Economist (January 28 2010): 67

21
While the following list of suggested tactics is by no means all encompassing,
any cost effective long term strategy for America to deal with al Qaeda inspired
terrorism should include the following elements and or geo-political initiatives:
- A muted military response involving the judicious use of specially trained
counter-terrorism Special Forces in foreign countries where al Qaeda is operating.
- A cost effective approach to the implementation of internal US and border
security measures which objectively weighs the costs vs. the benefits of all measures.
- Restructuring the Department of Homeland Security and removing
responsibilities not directly related to counter-terrorism like natural disaster relief.
- Coordination of counter-intelligence & intelligence gathering activities with
countries facing similar threats, particularly nations with large Muslim populations.
- Effective utilization of the Internet to track al Qaeda terrorist recruitment, to
emphasize al Qaedas killing of women and children and to spread dis-information.
- Using the news media to publicize the fact that terrorist attacks are rare and
that while the government is addressing the issue, no security measures are fool-proof.
- Ending characterizations of counter-terrorism measures as being part of a
War on Terror thus reducing the publics fear of eminent threats of terrorist attacks
- Demonstrating to other citizens around the world the respect the US has for
the rule of law and international norms regarding the treatment of captured terrorists.
- Encouraging dialogs among religious leaders that emphasize similarities in
the religions representing descendants of Abraham; Islam, Judaism and Christianity.
- Using government dollars to fund and promote Arabic and native language
movies, radio & TV broadcasts within and cultural exchanges with Islamic countries.
- Undertaking a geo-political initiative to resolve the conflict between Israelis
and Palestinians in order to address the Islamic worlds #1 grievance against the US.
22
A senior US counterterrorism official summarized the problem with the
current US strategy in its war on terror when he pointed out that, A really big hole
(in the US strategy) is that we focus on the terrorists and very little on how they are
created. If you looked at all the resources of the U.S. government, we spent 85, 90
percent on current terrorists, not on how people are radicalized.
29

Although the US and its Western allies have thus far avoided a repeat of the
devastating 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda suicide bombers and the massive loss of civilian
lives associated with them, there hasnt been a drop off in the numbers of disaffected
Muslims who wish to launch similar attacks. Given the vast sums of money that have
been spent to prevent future al Qaeda attacks, devoting some of those resources to
reducing the number of disaffected Muslims that are attracted to al Qaeda would
appear to be a more financially prudent alternative counter-terrorism strategy.

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