Semiotics and Indexing: A Critical Summary

Tina Jayroe

University of Denver

Shimelis G. Assefa, PhD

Information Science
October 28, 2008
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In 2001 and 2002, two scholars working in the field of information science

promoted the use of philosopher and mathematician Charles S. Peirce’s work in

semiotics as a way to improve knowledge representation in indexing systems. Both

suggest that semiotic analyses of logical and linguistic processes can help human and

automated indexing become more effective. In the first article, Jens-Erik Mai proposes

the application of Peirce’s semiotic triangle—representamen-object-interpretant; three

modes of being—firstness, secondness, and thirdness; trichotomies—icon, index,

symbol; four elements—document, subject, subject description, subject entry; and ten

categories of signs—see Appendix, to the human indexer’s task in creating a subject

entry. His article is entitled Semiotics and indexing: An analysis of the subject indexing

process.

In the same vein, Frances Morrissey incorporates Peirce’s ten semiotic triads,

along with philosopher and semiotician Umberto Eco’s connotative semiotics to

“redress” two problems of knowledge representation and information retrieval in Web-

based, scientific documentation. In the article Introduction to a semiotic of scientific

meaning, and its implications for access to scientific works on the Web, Morrisey claims

that the problems in information mapping lie in the way objects are conceptualized, as

well as in the users’ retrieval tools. She attempts to justify revealing linguistic patterns of

intertextuality via digital identifiers to uncover areas of pre-existing knowledge in the

extremely tacit nature of scientific works.

The Human Indexer

Indexes are representations of a text’s subject matter used to logically point to

information objects within a system. In the context of this article, indexes are used to
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describe subjects as well as organize information in very brief terms. They epitomize the

aboutness of a document. Mai, however, states that part of the problem of

appropriating terms to an object—whether it be descriptors, links, subject headings,

etc.—for effective retrieval, is the fact that humans are always going to be somewhat

subjective. They come to the table with their own social and cultural experiences, a

certain amount of education, and some prior experience (or inexperience) with the

system being used.

Thus, the author recommends the use of semiotics as a way to reveal

unconsciously biased behavior that may become incorporated in the selection of a term

used to represent an object. By describing each step in conjunction with Peirce’s ten

categories of signs and his four elements, Mai attempts to show how the study of signs

can make the indexing process more objective. The author’s method of illustration is to

break the process down into individual steps and elements previously constructed by

authors in the field of indexing.

One aspect of Peirce’s semiosis involves logically studying signs to produce

meaning. Mai suggests using Peirce’s notion of “unlimited semiosis,” a sign that

continuously generates other signs, to understand the ongoing and cumulative process.

He states that each step in the indexer’s process creates a new sign, which when under

examination, is independent of the interpretation. Therefore, the indexer may be

consciously or unconsciously applying labels that fall within a certain discourse, or he or

she may be applying personal and external influences into the description with each

step. The result is that the representation of what the document is about becomes

further removed from its actual content. The author supplies a perfect example: one
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indexer notates a subject’s description after having examined an information object. Yet

the next step, the task of determining a subject entry from that description, is passed

onto a completely different indexer who has never examined the item being processed,

thereby increasing the chances of unpredictability in choosing descriptive terminology.

In the article, Mai describes the steps in detail: the first step is document

analysis, where the indexer formulates a wide range of concepts associated with the

work which results in a “collage” of impressions. The second step entails deciding on a

subject description that is more formalized—a condensed interpretation of the ranges of

topics considered in step one. At this point the subject description is referred to as the

interpretant (what Peirce refers to as an idea that stands in for an object). The third step

involves translating the description from the indexer’s language to the system’s

language. Mai claims that each step (and its element) in the process is considered a

sign and the best way to interpret a sign is to identify it with one of Peirce’s ten

categories. He claims that by looking at the process in this way, one can help the user—

who is yet a step further removed from the original document—experience fewer false

drops. He admits that this breakdown of the process is for analytical purposes. In

actuality, these steps are often combined or interwoven into one task, especially if the

indexer is experienced.

While Mai’s explanations and analyses of the indexing process seem logical, I

find other aspects of his analysis disappointing. Mainly, there seems to be no

justification, conclusion, or resolution to the problem determined at the start of the

essay, which is that indexing is subjective. While the author states upfront that this

article is just an analysis of the process to which the result is unpredictability, it is still
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not clear why such a detailed and thorough analysis should be applied to human

indexing procedures. Mai simply states that it is helpful to know that the process is

subjective. But how is it is helpful?

He gives no further recommendation, unless he means to suggest that indexers

do not know they are prone to being subjective and is solely trying to create awareness.

But that being the case, I would find it hard to believe that in this field, with so much

emphasis on its constituents, that indexers are not aware of their personal biases and

disciplines. The author is correct in his semiotic comparisons, however, the concluding

statement is appropriately weak: “any study of information seeking, information retrieval,

evaluation of information systems and so on should take the fundamental and

inescapable interpretative nature of the subject indexing process into account.” Is he

saying that those who study this phenomenon do not take these things into account? If

so, I would have to disagree. [In all honesty, what I really mean to say is that anyone

who is smart enough to understand this dense article without crying and having to read

it 50 times, is probably already a very good and objective indexer. sigh…]

The Web-based Index

Like Mai, the purpose of Morrisey’s argument for using semiotics as a tool in the

construction and organization of information objects is to enhance the objectivity in

subject analysis. Morrisey’s article is specifically focused in accessing that knowledge

which is “hidden” within original works created in the scientific discipline, including

citation trails and subject keywords. Morrisey’s essay encourages the discovery of new

patterns of knowledge—ones that could be made visible if the lexical conventions that

determine a document’s aboutness were codified.

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Since science is considered an exceptionally objective field, Morrisey believes

that there is much tacit knowledge embedded in scientific works, sometimes only

understood and used by those who are extremely knowledgeable in a given discourse.

However, by using Peirce’s semiotic triad (object-sign-interpretant) and Eco’s

connotative semiotics (a secondary association in communication) as tools for

knowledge transfer, Morrisey believes that information can become more relational,

more apparent, and more interdisciplinary.

Morrisey breaks knowledge down into three domains and two procedures in

order to apply Web-based indexing and searching methods toward linking disparate

data. She says knowledge may refer to: data and phenomenology; patterns and

occurrence; and theoretical frameworks. She also considers knowledge declarative

(pre-existing units of knowledge) or procedural (knowledge that is causal)—neither of

which make information very obvious. However, realizing that these inherent information

attributes exist does allow for knowledge-visualization algorithms. The author uses the

Inspec database’s WebSOM project as an example of how to make indexing

relationships and information transfer more precise, and more apparent.

Unlike Mai, Morrissey successfully applies Peirce’s semiotic theories toward

actual applications in information technology and information theory. In this context, the

index can be just a pointer that may or may not carry descriptive information. For

instance, she demonstrates that by denoting the index a vector, it becomes possible to

link the “sign” with the “object” and therefore the individual data parts are made

relational. She then makes real-world suggestions such as using XML Topic Maps, co-

citation clusters, and self-organizing maps as tools and techniques to manipulate

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“iconic” data. These finding aids would facilitate new and graphical representations of

information relationships.

In this article, the author successfully defends the purpose of the essay and

comes to a concrete solution that is viable. Creating a unique “fingerprint” of document’s

subject content, based on its multiple facets, in conjunction with Peirce’s three modes of

being and semiotic triads, should enable better information mapping. She also applies

Eco’s theories appropriately by illustrating the usefulness of finding associations within

the subtext (for example, in the individual symbols/letters systematically arranged as

words). While I am neither an expert in semiotics nor information architecture [HA! that’s

an understatement], I am inclined to believe that many of the technical and theoretical

suggestions proposed by Morrisey in 2002 are possible, and probably in use today.

Conclusion

Despite the slight disappointment with Mai’s resolution, my overall opinion is that

both authors make astute points, convey clear examples, and come to notable

conclusions about the use of semiotics in indexing. Information contained in a work may

be made more: (a) objective; (b) explicit; (c) transferable; (d) relative; and (e) precise

when a theoretical understanding of meaning and language is applied. Although both

authors do refer to the works of other scientists and semioticians such as Eco, Blair,

Benediktsson and others, they rely most heavily on Peirce’s semiotics as the tool for

making knowledge more visible. In the field of information science where the information

object, text, and content are considered the sign, signifier, and signified, Peirce’s

concepts (such as dividing the sign into icon, index, and symbol) are very applicable to

indexing.
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When only a few characters (symbols) are used to stand in for an information

object (sign), incorrect or exclusive methods and terminologies may either increase or

decrease relevancy for a user. Therefore, I stand in agreement with both authors’ main

argument: neither human nor automated indexing can capture every meaning

associated with a text, yet there are improvements in the processes and systems that

can be made through individual awareness, and technical applications. And, by applying

semiotic theory to documents and indexing, professionals in the field of information

science can reduce the unpredictable nature of subject analysis and information

retrieval by making the process more objective.

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Appendix

Peirce’s Ten Categories of Signs

I. a qualisign is ‘a feeling, a sensation, for example, the sense of “blueness”

upon one’s being subjected to a blue object’ (Merrell, 1997, p. 193);

II. an iconic sinsign is any ‘object of experience in so far as some quality of

it makes it determine the idea of an object’ (Peirce, 1955, p. 115);

III. a rhematic indexical sinsign is any ‘object of direct experience so far as it

directs attention to an object by which its presence is caused’
(Peirce, 1955, p. 115);

IV. a dicent sinsign is ‘any object of direct experience, in so far as it is a sign,

and, as such, affords information concerning its object’
(Peirce, 1955, p. 115);

V. an iconic legisign is ‘any general law or type of sign, insofar as it manifests

some likeness with something other than itself’
(Merrell, 1997, p. 194);

VI. a rhematic indexical legisign is ‘any general type or law of sign, however
established, which requires each instance of it to be really affected by
its [semiotic] object’ (Peirce, 1955, p. 116);

VII. a dicent indexical legisign is ‘any general type or law, however established,
which requires each instance of it to be really affected by its object
in such a manner as to furnish definite information concerning that
object’ (Peirce, 1955, p. 116);

VIII. a rhematic symbol is a ‘sign connected with its object by an association

of … ideas’ (Peirce, 1955, p. 116);

IX. a dicent symbol, ‘or ordinary proposition, is a sign connected with its
object by an association of ... ideas, and acting like a Rhematic Symbol,
except that its intended interpretant represents the Dicent Symbol as
being, in respect to what it signifies, really affected by its object’
(Peirce, 1955, p. 117);

X. an argument is a sign ‘whose interpretant represents its object as being

an ulterior sign through a law, namely, the law that the passage from
all such premises to such conclusions tends to the truth’
(Peirce, 1955, pp. 117–118).

Source: Mai, 2001, p. 602

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References

Mai, J. (2001). Semiotics and indexing: An analysis of the subject indexing process.

Journal of Documentation, 57(5), 591–622. doi: 10.1108/EUM0000000007095

Morrisey, F. (2002) Introduction to a semiotic of scientific meaning, and its implications

for access to scientific works on the Web. Cataloging & Classification Quarterly,

33(3/4), 67–97. doi:10.1300/J104v33n03_05

References cited in the Appendix

Peirce, C.S. (1955). Philosophical writings of Peirce. New York: Dover Publications.

Merrell, F. (1997). Do we really need Peirce’s whole decalogue of signs? Semiotica,

114(3/4), 193–286. doi:10.1515/semi.1997.114.3-4.193, //1997