Afghanistan Weekly War Update: The U.S.

Drawdown and
UAV Strikes in Pakistan
June 7, 2011 | 1227 GMT

The July Drawdown

Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) and the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, is formulating his recommendations to
the White House for the first phase of U.S. troop reductions, slated to begin in July.
Meanwhile, during his final trip to Afghanistan as U.S. secretary of defense, Robert Gates
emphasized that the decision entails mapping out not only the initial reduction ² between
3,000-5,000 troops according to recent reports ² but the eventual drawdown of the 30,000
U.S. troops committed as part of the surge in 2009 and 2010. There currently are nearly
100,000 U.S. troops and some 40,000 additional allied troops in the country.

The White House is reportedly considering a steeper initial reduction in light of what are
characterized as new strategic considerations: the rising costs of the war and the recent, if
symbolic, killing of Osama bin Laden. Indeed, with Petraeus stepping aside to become
director of the CIA, the architect of the counterinsurgency-focused surge strategy, and its
most vocal and politically influential defender, is seeing his military influence diminish. As
Petraeus formulates his recommendations, the White House is at the very least seeking to
expand its options regarding the pace of the drawdown. Washington is looking to broaden
its standards of success at a time when even the most optimistic assessments, especially
those concerning the counterinsurgency effort against the Taliban, run to the refrain of
³fragile but reversible´ gains.

However, no major or fundamental shift seems likely at the moment. Most U.S. troops will
remain committed through at least 2012, preceding more sizable reductions as the 2014
deadline approaches. Gates has explained that initial reductions will focus to the greatest
possible extent on support personnel, meaning front-line combat power will not necessarily
be affected. But subtle moves should be watched closely, as they could signal significant
shifts in focus and commitment in the years ahead.

UAV Strikes

In the meantime, pressure to demonstrate security gains will continue to mount (although
short-term successes do not often translate into sustainable, long-term improvements). The
United States in recent years has been particularly aggressive in conducting special-
operations raids to capture or kill high-value Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, and in carrying
out unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes in Pakistan, mostly in North and South
Waziristan. The raid to kill Osama bin Laden was only the most brazen episode in a
sustained effort. The United States has acted more aggressively against senior leadership
targets in Pakistan since October 2010, looking to achieve greater impact at a critical and
decisive time, as ISAF forces are at peak strength.

There have reportedly been some 10 UAV strikes on targets in Pakistan since the killing of
bin Laden ² roughly a third of all such strikes this year ² including three on June 6 that
reportedly killed 18 militants. However, it is unclear how many of those strikes were made
possible by intelligence related to or gleaned from the bin Laden raid, or whether the
United States is simply more aggressively pushing its advantage. Similarly, it is unclear
whether there have been any changes in intelligence sharing by or political motivations
within Pakistan.

But reports have emerged that Ilyas Kashmiri, the most senior Pakistani al Qaeda leader
involved in jihadist attacks against Pakistani security forces and India (including Western
targets in the 2008 Mumbai attacks), who had connections to David Headley, was killed
June 3 in a UAV strike, along with eight other militants, in South Waziristan in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Like many senior al Qaeda leaders,
Kashmiri¶s death has been reported before. Without his body, and with only a crude note
purportedly from a Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami spokesman to confirm his death, the reports
remain questionable.

Agreements with Kabul and Islamabad

Afghan President Hamid Karzai¶s spokesman said Petraeus, during a meeting of the
National Directorate of Security, promised to end nighttime airstrikes on civilians¶ homes
and emphasized that ISAF would continue to seek to avoid civilian casualties. This comes
in the wake of a May 28 airstrike that killed 14 Afghan women and children. Civilian
casualties are an important and sensitive domestic issue for Kabul, but it is unclear how
much more ISAF rules of engagement will be ² or even can be ² tightened, given that
Western military operations, and the use of close air support, entail inherent risks to
civilians in the area.

Meanwhile, Washington and Islamabad are reportedly forming a joint intelligence team to
pursue leads related to the bin Laden raid. The CIA will contribute its analysis of materials
seized in the raid, while Pakistan will contribute intelligence gleaned from interrogations of
those who lived near bin Laden¶s compound in Abbottabad. However, much of the
actionable intelligence has likely been acted upon already, or has expired. Despite claims
by both sides touting the effort as a way to renew closer cooperation and intelligence
sharing, it is unclear how far the joint team will collaborate beyond the examination of bin
Laden-related intelligence.
order Fighting

Sustained fighting has broken out in the Upper Dir district of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
(formerly the North-West Frontier Province) along the border with Kunar province in
Afghanistan. According to reports, a small battalion-sized element of 300-400 fighters
crossed into Pakistan on June 1 wearing uniforms similar to those of Pakistani security
forces. Nearly 30 Pakistani security forces and up to three times as many militants
reportedly have been killed, though it is difficult to gauge the militants¶ casualties and
remaining strength since they have carried off the bodies. The fighting serves as a reminder
that Pakistani security forces along the border are spread thin over rugged terrain, with
militant groups of all stripes finding sanctuary on either side.

While tactical details remain sketchy, this sort of sustained assault from Afghanistan into
Pakistan is exactly the sort of jihadist traffic that Pakistan fears and helps explain
Islamabad¶s insistence on maintaining leverage over any political settlement in
Afghanistan. If the drawdown of Western forces intensifies before an adequate deal has
been reached between Washington, Kabul and the Taliban, Islamabad is afraid it will be
unable to control the spillover of continued fighting on the Afghan side of the border.

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