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SCHOLARS BIOTERROR CP

Bioterror CP – Scholars
Bioterror CP – Scholars................................................................................................................1
1NC Shell........................................................................................................................................2
Solvency..........................................................................................................................................3
Bioterror Popular...........................................................................................................................4
FEMA Unpopular..........................................................................................................................5
No Funding Trade-Off...................................................................................................................6
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SCHOLARS BIOTERROR CP

1NC Shell
Text: The 50 States, Washington DC, and all relevant U.S. territories should lift
prescription control restrictions, patient transfer regulations, physician licensing
requirements, distribution regulations, physician retirement conditions, and implement an
internet communication system in the event of a bioterror attack.

State regulations hinder the effectiveness of combating bioterror attacks.


Richard E. Hoffman, University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, Denver, Colorado, USA, February, 2003,
(“Preparing for a Bioterrorist Attack: Legal and Administrative Strategies”,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no2/02-0538.htm)
Some existing state regulations, which in normal times are intended to ensure quality medical care, could
hinder community efforts during a bioterrorist attack. For example, consideration should be given to
modifying, for a limited period through executive orders, the regulations that control the prescription and
dispensing of medicine, licensing of physicians and nurses, and transfer of patients between hospitals.
Providing antibiotics or vaccinations in mass clinics and obtaining the services of retired or out-of-
state physicians and nurses may be necessary.

Communication and access to hospitals will be vital when responding to a bioterror attack.
Tim Parris, President of Baylor University Medical Center, 2001 July, (“Local perspectives on bioterrorism”,
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1305823)
According to John Gavras, executive director of the Dallas–Fort Worth Hospital Council, a critical
component in ensuring a well-coordinated response to a bioterrorist attack is an effective
communication system. An integral part of the work of the Dallas–Fort Worth Hospital Council is the
development of a communication system, possibly Internet-based, to allow for realtime information
exchange between hospitals and all other emergency responders. Unlike conventional disasters, such as a
plane crash or bus accident, victims of a bioterrorist attack must be evaluated prior to allowing a massive
influx of contaminated patients into the hospitals. The experiences of Japan and other places tell us that with
a biological or chemical weapon attack, people do not call 911. They drive their cars to emergency
rooms. Realistically, the first few facilities receiving these contaminated patients must lock their doors to
prevent spread of contamination. But once an attack has been identified, communication throughout the
public health system can contain its spread and allow the remaining facilities to prepare. Additionally,
the need for certain medications or antidotes can be quickly identified and disseminated.
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SCHOLARS BIOTERROR CP

Solvency

Expansion of disease care and communication are key to combating bioterror.


OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Association, 11/26/2006, (United States Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health Association, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/bioterrorism/solutions.html.)
Due to the time lapse between exposure and the onset of symptoms following a bioterrorist attack, such
attacks are difficult to determine and control. With the rapid transit network in the US, people could be
exposed in one area and then return home before developing symptoms, potentially exposing hundreds of
other people. The following references provide ways to prepare for responding to a bioterrorist attack,
including state and federal disease surveillance and epidemiology, stockpiling vaccine for emergency
use, mass vaccination of first responders, and training for medical personnel.

Communication is the key to responding to a bioterror attack.


Richard E. Hoffman, University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, Denver, Colorado, USA, February, 2003,
(“Preparing for a Bioterrorist Attack: Legal and Administrative Strategies”,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no2/02-0538.htm)
The magnitude of a bioterrorist attack (i.e., how many persons are exposed to the agent and how many
become ill) and the characteristics of the bioagent (e.g., contagious or not) employed by the terrorists are not
predictable, but these factors will affect virtually all of the response activities. Nonetheless, “generic”
public health duties during a major bioterrorist attack are predictable: providing accurate
information to health-care providers and the public about the status of the epidemic and protective
measures; conducting disease surveillance and contact tracing; administering vaccines or prophylactic
antibiotics; implementing restrictive measures; analyzing human and environmental laboratory
specimens; and maintaining the quality of air, water, and food
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SCHOLARS BIOTERROR CP

Bioterror Popular

The house and senate back bioterror legislation.


Bryan Bender, Globe Staff, May 19, 2004, (“Bioterror defense plan is local boost”, The Boston Globe)
Project Bioshield is expected to be a boon for some Massachusetts firms specializing in vaccine research
and production and provide a much-needed boost for the nation's biotechnology industry to invest in next-
generation treatments to combat deadly pathogens, according to company officials and industry specialists.
The project, first proposed by President Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union address, is set to pass its
last hurdle when the full Senate votes as early as today. The House of Representatives approved the
project last year, and Democrats and Republicans in the Senate are poised to back the plan.

The Senate and House loves homeland security.


Jeremy Pelofsky, Staff Writer, Fri Jul 10, 2009, (“U.S. Senate approves $42.9 billion homeland security bill”,
Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE5690F420090710.)
The Senate voted 84-6 for the annual spending bill funding the Department of Homeland Security for the
year starting October 1, and now lawmakers must work out differences with a $42.6 billion version of the
bill that passed the U.S. House of Representatives last month.
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SCHOLARS BIOTERROR CP

FEMA Unpopular

Senate is against FEMA.


Senatus, Daily Senate Coverage, July 8, 2009 (“Senate Defeats McCain / Feingold Homeland Security Earmark
Amendment”, http://senatus.wordpress.com/2009/07/08/senate-defeats-mccain-feingold-homeland-security-
earmark-amendment/.)
An amendment offered by Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Russ Feingold (D-WI) to the Homeland
Security Appropriations Act (H.R. 2892) has been defeated by a vote of 38 to 60. It ensures “that
FEMA funding to prepare for, and lessen the effects of, disasters go to projects that need it most,
rather than to pet projects of members of Congress,” according to a press release. Specifically, the
amendment prohibits “the earmarking of two FEMA grant programs and instead require funds be allocated
by a competitive grant process.” They are the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) program and the
Predisaster Mitigation Program (PDM).
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SCHOLARS BIOTERROR CP

No Funding Trade-Off
Funding will come from the DHS budget. No trade-off with anything else.
DHS, June, 2009, (Budget-in-Brief FY2010, Department of Homeland Security)
Guarding Against Terrorism – Protecting the American people from terrorist threats is the founding
purpose of the Department and DHS’ highest priority. This Budget expands DHS efforts to battle
terrorism, including detecting explosives in public spaces and transportation networks, helping protect
critical infrastructure and cyber networks from attack, detecting agents of biological warfare, and building
information-sharing partnerships with state and local law enforcement that can enable law
enforcement to mitigate threats.

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