Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Defendant, City of Dallas, (hereinafter, the “City”) files this, its First Amended Answer
and Affirmative Defenses to the First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
(hereinafter, the “Complaint”), ECF Doc. No. 18, filed by Plaintiffs in this cause and
Defendant’s Counterclaims.
I. Answer
1. The City admits that Plaintiffs are attempting, in this case, to challenge a City of
Dallas ordinance. The City denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the
Complaint.
3. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegation, contained in paragraph 3 of the Complaint, that Plaintiffs are
small business owners, and, accordingly, denies that allegation. The City denies the remaining
5. The City admits the allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 5 of
the Complaint. The City denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the
Complaint.
6. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the Complaint and, accordingly,
8. The City denies the allegations contained in the first and third sentences of
paragraph 8 of the Complaint. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form
a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the second sentence of paragraph
9. The City admits that Plaintiffs are attempting, in this civil action, to challenge
City of Dallas Ordinance No. 27253, specifically that portion codified as Dallas City Code §§
51A-7.305. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint are denied.
10. The City admits that Plaintiffs are attempting, in this lawsuit, to allege a claim for
violation of their First Amendment rights and that, in the lawsuit, Plaintiffs are attempting to
obtain injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as nominal damages as their remedy for that
alleged violation of their rights. The City denies the remaining allegations contained in
paragraph 10 of the Complaint and specifically denies that Plaintiffs have stated a valid cause of
11. To the extent that Plaintiffs have: (a) stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted; (b) standing to bring these claims; and (c) timely filed this cause of action, the City
admits the allegation contained in paragraph 11 of the Complaint that this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The City denies all remaining allegations contained in
12. To the extent that Plaintiffs have: (a) stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted; (b) standing to bring these claims; and (c) timely filed this cause of action, the City
admits the allegation contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint that venue is appropriate
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The City denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph
12 of the Complaint.
13. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the Complaint and, accordingly,
14. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Complaint and, accordingly,
15. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the Complaint and, accordingly,
16. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraph 16 of the Complaint and, accordingly,
17. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraph 17 of the Complaint and, accordingly,
18. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the Complaint and, accordingly,
19. The City admits the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the Complaint.
20. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of the Complaint and, accordingly,
21. The City denies the allegations contained in the last sentence of paragraph 21 of
the Complaint. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 21 of the Complaint and,
22. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the first, second, third, and fourth sentences of
paragraph 22 of the Complaint and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the
23. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the first, second, and third sentences of paragraph
23 of the Complaint and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the remaining
24. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the first and second sentences of paragraph 24 of
the Complaint and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the remaining
25. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the first and second sentences of paragraph 25 of
the Complaint and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the remaining
26. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the first, second, third, and fourth sentences of
paragraph 26 of the Complaint and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the
27. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the first and second sentences of paragraph 27 of
the Complaint and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the remaining
28. The City admits that City of Dallas Ordinance 27253 (hereinafter, the
“Ordinance”) was passed on June 25, 2008 and that it amended Sections 51A-7.205 and 51A-
7.305 of the Dallas City Code. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 28 of the
29. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 29 of the Complaint.
30. The City admits that upon conviction, a person violating a provision of the
Ordinance may be fined an amount not to exceed $2,000. The remaining allegations contained
31. The City admits that shortly after passage of the Ordinance, the Dallas Morning
News reported that Dallas Mayor Pro Tem Dwaine Caraway stated that “These signs just trash
up the community.” The City denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 31 of the
Complaint.
32. The City admits the allegations contained in paragraph 32 of the Complaint.
33. The City admits that it has issued at least 115 warnings or citations for violations
of various provisions of the City’s sign ordinances, including but not limited to violations
relating to signs attached to windows or buildings. The City denies the remaining allegations
34. The City admits the allegations contained in the first two sentences of paragraph
34 of the Complaint. The City denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 34 of the
Complaint.
35. The City admits that Lakeside Cleaners’ Knox Avenue location was visited by
City inspectors. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 35 of
the Complaint nor of allegations contained in the second and fifth sentences of paragraph 35 of
the Complaint and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the remaining
36. The City admits that TK Scrubs’ Plano Road location was visited by City
inspectors. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the remaining allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 36 of the
Complaint nor of the allegations contained in the second and fifth sentences of paragraph 36 of
the Complaint and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the remaining
37. The City admits that AAA Vacuum was visited by a city inspector at its Walnut
Hill Lane location and that on December 14, 2009 AAA Vacuum was issued a citation for
violation of the Sign Ordinance. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 27 of the
38. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraph 38 of the Complaint and, accordingly,
39. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 39 of the Complaint.
Complaint, the City reanswers and incorporates by reference its answers set forth in paragraphs 1
through 39 above. To the extent that any further response is required, the City denies the
41. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 41 of the Complaint.
42. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 42 of the Complaint.
43. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 43 of the Complaint
and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the remaining allegations contained
44. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 44 of the Complaint.
45. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the second and third sentences of paragraph 45 and,
accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the remaining allegations contained in
Complaint, the City reanswers and incorporates by reference its answers set forth in paragraphs 1
through 45 above. To the extent that any further response is required, the City denies the
47. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 47 of the Complaint.
48. The City does not have information sufficient to allow it to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 48 of the Complaint
and, accordingly, denies those allegations. The City denies the remaining allegations contained
49. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 49 of the Complaint.
50. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 50 of the Complaint.
51. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 51 of the Complaint.
52. The City denies the allegations contained in paragraph 52 of the Complaint.
53. The City denies the allegations contained in the final and unnumbered paragraph
of the Complaint, which is captioned “REQUEST FOR RELIEF,” and begins, “WHEREFORE,
Plaintiffs respectfully request relief . . .”, including all allegations contained in its numbered
subparagraphs 1 through 5 and specifically denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief therein
54. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
55. The City affirmatively invokes the defense of governmental immunity from suit
and liability and would show that it is a municipal corporation organized and existing as a
political subdivision and a unit of government of the State of Texas and a home-rule city under
the Home-Rule Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Texas and the provisions
applicable to Home-Rule Municipalities as set forth in the Local Government Code of the State
of Texas.
56. Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert the claims that are asserted in this lawsuit.
Furthermore, the sellers of signage do not have standing to assert the First Amendment rights of
57. To the extent that Plaintiffs’ cause of action falls outside the applicable statute of
limitations, the City affirmatively pleads that this action is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.
58. To the extent Plaintiffs have failed to timely exhaust all administrative remedies,
the City affirmatively pleads that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the prerequisites and conditions
59. The City affirmatively pleads that Ordinance No. 27253 is content neutral, is
narrowly tailored to and does directly and materially advance a compelling, significant, and/or
substantial government interest, and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication of
information.
60. The City affirmatively pleads that its ordinances and actions are entitled to a
presumption of validity and that Plaintiffs have the extraordinary burden to show that no
61. The City affirmatively pleads that all of its actions were consistent with city
ordinances and state and federal law, were supported by applicable law and evidence, were in all
things valid, legal and constitutional, and were not arbitrary, capricious, irrational, unreasonable
or an abuse of discretion.
62. The City affirmatively pleads that no deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights occurred
63. The City affirmatively pleads that on the occasion in question, no unlawful or
constitutionally defective official policy or practice of the City was the actual or proximate cause
64. The City affirmatively pleads that Plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages.
65. The City affirmatively asserts the defense of unclean hands, in that upon
information and belief and subject to further discovery, Plaintiffs have violated the Ordinance at
issue and/or committed wrongful acts with regard to the subject matter of this civil action.
66. The City affirmatively asserts that inasmuch as Plaintiffs content that the
Ordinance is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied, the Court should abate this
litigation until Plaintiffs have satisfied the notice and opportunity to intervene provisions of
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.006(b) in favor of the Texas Attorney
General.
67. The City reserves the right to assert additional affirmative defenses to the extent
III. Counterclaims
municipal corporation, incorporated and operating under the laws of the State of Texas.
business in Dallas County, Texas. Ms. Gilliland has control over the premises on which she is
operating her business. No service of process is needed on Ms. Gilliland since she is a plaintiff
in this case.
in Dallas County, Texas. Mr. Patel has control over the premises on which he is operating his
business. No service of process is needed on Mr. Patel since he is a plaintiff in this case.
Dallas County, Texas. Ms. McDonald has control over the premises on which she is operating
her business. No service of process is needed on Ms. McDonald since she is a plaintiff in this
case.
Dallas County, Texas. Ms. Thomi has control over the premises on which she is operating her
business. No service of process is needed on Ms. Thomi since she is a plaintiff in this case.
and the record owner of the commercial real property situated at 10207 North Central
Expressway, Dallas, Texas, which includes 10225 North Central Expressway in Dallas, Texas,
and may be served with process through its registered agent H. Craig Kinney, 8525 Ferndale
the record owner of the real property situated at 3001 Knox Street, Suite 104, Dallas, Texas, and
may be served with process through its registered agent Corporation Service Company dba CSC
- Lawyers Inc. 701 Brazos Street, Suite 1050 Austin, Texas 78701.
75. Counterdefendant McKinney Avenue Properties No. 2 Ltd., is the record owner of
the real property situated at 2705 McKinney Avenue, including 2715 McKinney Avenue Suite C
Dallas, Texas 75204. McKinney Avenue Properties No. 2 Ltd. is a Texas limited partnership
and may be served with process through its registered agent Kasnetz Properties, LLC at the
following address: 2702 McKinney Avenue, Suite 200 Dallas, Texas 75204.
property situated at 9845 Walnut Hill Lane Dallas, Texas 75238. Mr. Loven maybe served with
process via certified mail at the following postal address: Post Office Box 809 Forney, Texas
75126.
77. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas in that the City’s cause of action
arose in this district. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction to preside over Defendant’s
counterclaims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367 and Rules 13, 18-20, F.R.C.P. This Court also has
jurisdiction pursuant to Chapters 54 and 211 of the Texas Local Government Code. The
counterclaims asserted herein arise out of the same transaction and occurrence that is the subject
of the plaintiffs’ claims, do not require for their adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction and have questions of law or fact common to all
78. In July 2008, the Dallas City Council adopted Ordinance No 27253, codified as
Chapter 51A Article VII (amended) of the Dallas City Code and commonly referred to as the
Sign Ordinance. While the function of Article VII is regulatory, its purpose is unquestionably to
serve and promote public health, safety and welfare. “[T]his article provides standards for the
erection and maintenance of private signs. All private signs not exempted as provided below
shall be erected and maintained in accordance with these standards. The general objectives of
these standards are to promote health, safety, welfare, convenience and enjoyment of the public.”
79. The Sign Ordinance promotes public safety by mandating that signs do not
obstruct fire fighting or police surveillance §51A-7.101(a)(2) and do not create traffic hazards by
impeding any driver’s view of pedestrians, obstacles, other vehicles and safety signs §51A-7.101
(a)(3). The public policy rationale behind sign regulation seeks to ensure that signs may serve
their intended communication, information or advertising purpose and to promote the general
welfare by ensuring that persons exposed to signs are not so overwhelmed by the number of
messages presented that they cannot find the information they seek. §51A-7.101(b). Further
sign regulation serves to enhance the appearance and economic value of the landscape §51A-
7.101(c).
80. Violations of Dallas City Code Chapter 51A, Section 7.305 exist at each of the
properties (referred to below as “the Properties”) listed below for which each of the
municipality to bring a civil action for the enforcement of an ordinance that is adopted under
Subchapter A of Chapter 211 of the Code. The Sign Ordinance is an ordinance that is adopted
under Subchapter A of Chapter 211 of the Code. Therefore, Section 211.012(c) of the Code
applies to the Sign Ordinance. Similarly, Chapter 54 of the Code authorizes a municipality to
bring a civil action, including civil penalties, for the enforcement of an ordinance involving
zoning that provides for the use of land. The Sign Ordinance is an ordinance involving zoning
82. The property commonly referred to as 10225 North Central Expressway in Dallas,
Texas, has the following legal description: Block 7293, Pt Lot 26 ACS 0.871 Central & Meadow
Pk (hereafter “Fast Signs Property”). The record property owner of this property is
Counterdefendant K&B Texas Commercial Ltd. The Fast Signs Property is operated and
controlled by Counterdefendant April Gilliland. The property, in its current usage and condition,
has signs exceeding the eight word limit in violation of 51A-7.305(c), has attached window signs
whose combined effective area exceeds 15% of the area of a window or glass door and has
attached window signs in the upper two-thirds of a window or glass door in violation of §51A-
7.305(d) of the Dallas City Code. Both the record property owner and the owner’s representative
with control over the premises are subject to injunctive relief and the imposition of civil
penalties.
83. The property commonly referred to as 3001 Knox Street, Suite 104 in Dallas,
Texas, has the following legal description: Cockrells Fairland, Block J/1534 Lot 1A ACS 2.0012
the record property owner of the Lakeside Cleaners Property. The Lakeside Cleaners Property is
operated and controlled by Charlie Patel who does business thereon as Lakeside Cleaners. The
property, in its current usage and condition, has signs exceeding the eight word limit in violation
of 51A-7.305(c), and has attached window signs in the upper two-thirds of a window or glass
door in violation of §51A-7.305(d) of the Dallas City Code. Both the record property owner and
the owner’s representative with control over the premises are subject to injunctive relief and the
84. The property commonly referred to as 2715 McKinney Avenue, Suite C, Dallas,
Texas 75204, has the following legal description: City Block 2/955, Partial Lots 2 and 3, is
owned by Counterdefendant McKinney Avenue Properties No. 2 Ltd. (hereafter “Tiki Trips
Property”). Counterdefendant Dena McDonald operates and controls the premises of the Tiki
Trips Property. The property, in its current usage and condition, has signs exceeding the eight
word limit in violation of 51A-7.305(c) of the Dallas City Code, and has attached window signs
in the upper two-thirds of a window or glass door in violation of §51A-7.305(d) of the Dallas
City Code. Both the record property owner and the owner’s representative with control over the
premises are subject to injunctive relief and the imposition of civil penalties.
85. The property commonly referred to as 9845 Walnut Hill Lane, Dallas, Texas, has
the following legal description: Lake North Center Blk 8081 Lt 3 in Dallas, Texas, is owned by
Thomi operates and controls the premises of the AAA Property. The property, in its current
usage and condition, has signs exceeding the eight word limit in violation of 51A-7.305(c) of the
Dallas City Code, and has attached window signs in the upper two-thirds of a window or glass
door in violation of §51A-7.305(d) of the Dallas City Code. Both the record property owner and
the owner’s representative with control over the premises are subject to injunctive relief and the
86. The Lakeside Cleaners Property, the Fast Signs Property, the AAA Property, and
the Tiki Trips Property shall collectively be referred to herein as “the Properties”.
87. Sections 54.017 and 211.012 of the Texas Local Government Code apply to the
Sign Ordinance, the former authorizes the recovery of civil penalties and the latter authorizes
88. Pursuant to Texas Local Government Code §211.012(c), the City requests
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and an order directing the Counterdefendants to
remedy the conditions of the Properties to bring them into compliance with the Dallas City Code.
89. The City also seeks civil penalties not to exceed $1,000 per day for each violation
of the Sign Ordinance pursuant to Texas Local Government Code §54.017. The Sign Ordinance
is an ordinance “for zoning that provides for the use of land.” Texas Local Government Code,
§54.012(3) Counterdefendants are jointly and severally liable to the City of Dallas for any
90. The City of Dallas may bring a civil action seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief to
enjoin ongoing violations of its Code and to enforce its ordinances concerning buildings used in
violation of the Sign Ordinance. Texas Local Government Code, §211.012(c) Each of the
parties named as Counterdefendants herein, either own or are persons in control of real property
within the City that is being maintained in a condition and manner that is in violation of Dallas
City Ordinance No. 27253, and more specifically that portion codified as Dallas City Code
§51A-7.305. Violations of Chapter 51A may be prosecuted civilly and enforced through civil
court action as provided by state law. Dallas City Code, Chapter 51A-1.103(b).
91. Each third-party defendant is a record owner of their respective property and each
92. The general objectives of the Sign Ordinance are “[t]o promote the safety of
persons and property by providing that signs (1) do not create a hazard due to collapse, fire,
collision, decay or abandonment; (2) do not obstruct fire fighting or police surveillance; and (3)
do not create traffic hazards by confusing or distracting motorists, or by impairing the driver's
ability to see pedestrians, obstacles, or other vehicles, or to ready traffic signs. Dallas City Code,
§ 51A-7.101(a).
IV. Prayer
Having answered and asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaims, the City prays that
Plaintiffs take nothing by this suit, that all relief requested by the Plaintiffs be denied, that the
City obtain preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin the illegal operation of the
businesses on the Properties in violation of the Dallas City Code, a civil penalty from each
Counterdefandant in the amount of $1,000.00 per day for each day that any of the Properties are
in violation of the Dallas City Code, that the City recover its costs of court and that it have such
other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which it may show itself justly entitled.
Respectfully Submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 24, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the clerk of the court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using
the electronic case filing system of the court. The electronic case filing system sent a “Notice of
Electronic Filing” to all counsel of record who have consented in writing to accept this Notice as
Matthew R. Miller
Wesley Hottot
Institute for Justice Texas Chapter
816 Congress Avenue, Suite 960
Austin, TX 78701
William H. Mellor
Institute for Justice
901 N. Glebe Road, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22203
/s/Christopher J. Caso___________________
Christopher J. Caso