India Forum
Paper Series
June 2011
Summary: It may be tempting in
light of China’s growing power
and reach to imagine a world
in which China is dominant.
Although China’s policies of
noninterference might seem
appealing to many developing
countries, its demands for
obedience and its state-led
growth will threaten the liberal
capitalist order advanced by the
West. China’s growth also masks
its continuing vulnerability to
economic shocks, social insta-
bility, and ethnic separatism.
Internationally, China will see its
ambitions constrained by rising
powers along its periphery, the
United States’ continuing pres-
ence in Asia, and its support for
failing states such as Pakistan
and North Korea.
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Will China Rule the World?
A View from New Delhi
by Indrani Bagchi
China is on a blitzkrieg in Africa.
Building everything from spanking
new airport terminals in Dar-es-
Salaam to the headquarters of the
African Union in Addis Ababa and oil
refineries in Sudan, China is making
impressive and convincing state-
ments of its power and potential. Its
almost insatiable quest for resources
combined with its deep pockets has
helped spread Chinese power across a
continent that needs every dollar it can
get. For many Africans, the Chinese
style of cooperation is infinitely pref-
erable to the Western variety. Both
the United States and Europe extend
homilies that Africa has heard for
years without them making a differ-
ence. China, by contrast, is putting its
money where it matters, into building
infrastructure. With little regard for
how African regimes treat their own
people or whether they are flagrantly
abusing human rights, China is
building power.
China’s power strategy is not just
relegated to Africa, but is stunning
both in its conception and in its reach.
Across Asia and into Europe, China is
building infrastructure on a massive
scale, aiming to secure its position as
the fulcrum of the global economy for
decades to come. Beijing has plans in
place for transcontinental high-speed
rail lines spanning 17 countries. These
would follow three main routes: a
southern route connecting Kunming
in southwest China with Singapore
passing through Burma, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Thailand, and Malaysia;
a western route connecting Urumqi
in northwest China to Germany and
France, passing through Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan,
Iran, and Turkey; and a northern route
connecting Heilongjiang in northeast
China with south-eastern Europe
through Russia. By building a trans-
continental infrastructure network,
Beijing is effectively redrawing the
map of Eurasia.
For many states caught in this world,
between a receding West and a rising
China, there is little contest. China
as the world’s next superpower is no
longer a matter of debate: it is the
world’s largest exporter, has the largest
foreign exchange reserves (about a
third of the world’s total), enjoys one of
the highest savings rates in the world,
and is developing technological skills
at a rapid pace. In its foreign relations,
India Forum
Paper Series
however, it follows a different mantra from the established
Western powers: noninterference in the internal affairs of
states and respect for national sovereignty. In a world of
spreading democracy, China is demonstrating that there
is another way to develop into a global power, a way with
Chinese characteristics.
What Kind of Power Will China Be?
Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf recently suggested
that China could best rule the world by becoming more
“western.” “It would be best achieved via further develop-
ment of the rules-governed, institutionally based global
system. The obvious alternative would be a hierarchical
arrangement, with China at the apex. But such an approach
would, I fear, lead to unmanageable conflicts with the other
great powers.”1 While desirable, this may simply be wishful
thinking. Martin Jacques, in his bestselling book, When
China Rules the World argued that the Communist Party of
China is a logical continuation of Chinese imperial regimes
and that Chinese authoritarianism is not at risk for the fore-
seeable future.2 This suggests that Chinese power is unlikely
to abide by Western, liberal, capitalist rules.
Although states will be able to develop their own political
and economic systems without risking a diminution of
Chinese patronage, the Chinese model will nonetheless
present several challenges to the international system.
Although China may not interfere in the internal affairs of
sovereign states, it will demand complete obedience from
states within its circle of power. Further, the primacy of
the private sector and the market will be subordinated to
China’s state-empowered corporations, an extension of its
political strategy.
Beijing’s Vulnerabilities at Home
Although China is already challenging several longstanding
global rules set by the West, a number of factors suggest that
it is unlikely to become a global hegemon, even as its influ-
ence grows. China is—at its core—fragile, and often demon-
strably nervous that its vulnerabilities could be exploited
by countervailing powers. Beijing remains convinced that
the Communist regime’s legitimacy can only be maintained
by high economic growth which, in turn, guarantees social
Martin Wolf, “How China Should Rule the World,” Financial Times, March 22, 2011.
1
Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the
2
Birth of a New Global Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).
2
stability at home. Since the survival and longevity of the
Communist regime in China are paramount, Beijing will
do much to ensure that high economic growth rates are
maintained. It has therefore set itself the goal of continued
7 percent growth spurred by greater consumption, the
creation of 45 million more jobs, and the construction of 36
million more homes.
China is—at its core—fragile, and
often demonstrably nervous
that its vulnerabilities could be
exploited by countervailing powers.
The target rate of 7 percent growth, lower than the approxi-
mately 10 percent growth that China has been experiencing,
marks an acknowledgment that growth will slow. There
are also concerns that China is particularly vulnerable
to external shocks. Its aging population may hasten its
economic slowdown, as will rising inflation. While in neigh-
boring India, popular anger over inflation could lead to
changes in government at the state or federal level, in China
it could potentially result in massive social instability. The
fear of such instability, fuelled by a long history of violent
insurrection in Chinese society, will continue to motivate
the Chinese government to take decisions that may be in
line with Chinese perceptions, but not necessarily with
Western preferences. However, Indian observers of China
are more optimistic than their Western counterparts about
the ability of China to weather economic shocks.
A further cause of China’s perceived fragility is Beijing’s
seemingly irrational reactions to possible democratic or
popular protests at home. As authoritarian regimes in the
Middle East continue to experience perhaps the greatest
political upheaval in their recent histories, China’s nervous-
ness is palpable. Going forward, this vulnerability could
be exploited to China’s detriment, as was witnessed with
the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo and
following an anonymous Internet call for a “walking”
protest in Beijing that resulted in heavy-handed repression.
Both episodes exposed obvious Chinese vulnerabilities.
India Forum
Paper Series
Additionally, China’s approach to the Dalai Lama and policy
paralysis when it comes to the Tibet question could narrow
Chinese choices in the coming years. By flatly refusing to
deal with the issue and by demonizing the spiritual leader
in a manner that has made meaningful dialogue impossible,
China may only be setting itself up for more difficulties after
the Dalai Lama passes away and the mantle of Tibetan lead-
ership is assumed by younger, more assertive leaders.
China’s Constraints Abroad
What makes the prospects of Chinese hegemony even
more unlikely is its neighbors’ balancing. Unlike the United
States’ equally dramatic growth, which was essentially
supported by other Western powers such as Canada and
Europe, China’s rise has evoked fear and loathing in its own
neighborhood. As China becomes more aggressive in lever-
aging its newfound economic and political heft, countries
like India, Japan, Indonesia, Australia, and South Korea are
all engaged in an elaborate exercise to balance China, both
economically and militarily. And encouraged by states in
China’s periphery, the United States remains active in Asia
as the ultimate balancing power.
China’s virtually unquestioned
support for failing and dangerous
states such as Pakistan and North
Korea will almost certainly come
back to haunt it.
China’s military superiority certainly has the potential to
be a destabilizing force in Asia. But at the same time, India
is rapidly increasing its own military capabilities. Japan,
despite its recurring crises, remains a technological leader,
while South Korea is also a formidable technological and
economic power. Further, China’s period of rapid growth
comes at a time when its neighbors are also enjoying fairly
high rates of growth themselves. This will undoubtedly
inhibit China’s hegemonic ambitions. A final consideration
is China’s virtually unquestioned support for failing and
dangerous states such as Pakistan and North Korea which,
in the Indian view, will almost certainly come back to haunt
it.
Ultimately, for a China on the threshold of superpower
status, democracy remains an irritant on the horizon. The
revolutions sweeping the Middle East and North Africa
have one thing in common: the removal of entrenched
regimes. Just as some of these regimes served the purposes
of the United States, many also served the interests of
China. As the winds of change flow through these countries,
and their people demand greater representation and more
freedom, only time will tell whether China and Chinese
power will remain immune.
About the Author
Indrani Bagchi is Diplomatic Editor with the Times of India.
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