Does Peter Singer's argument for extending rights to non-human animals undermine the very idea of universal human

rights? Peter Singer claims that it is a moral imperative for us to grant rights to non-human animals. This paper will argue that, far from undermining progress towards universal 'human rights', if we ever hope to be able to defend the rights of all humans, with their many inherent differences, we must be willing to extend equal consideration of interests to non-human animals as well. It is my contention that if our goal is to implement legally enshrined universal human rights without raising the spectre of colonialism and religious crusades, then we must have strong logical, moral foundations for our claims, that can, as far as possible, be seen to derive from objective criteria. The granting of rights based on species membership is an arbitrary distinction and thus, as Singer claims, the argument for extending the principle of equality beyond our own species is simple, so simple that it amounts to no more than a clear understanding of the nature of the principle of equal consideration of interests1. The lineage of the 'human rights' discourse is a long one. John Locke's 'Two Treatise of Government', and the concept of 'natural law' it espoused, was ground breaking in 1689, despite taking many cues from previous theistic philosophers. Locke's concept of 'natural law' centred around the idea that in a state of nature men had equal right to ownership of the land and its resources2. This was a convincing idea in the judeo-christian western world at the time because, in societies stratified so distinctly by class and caste systems, but almost homogeneous in religious beliefs, the concept of removing all artificial advantages of rank, wealth, social status etc. was novel and attractive. Unfortunately, as Martha Nussbaum3 claims, this fiction requires the assumption that people are roughly equal, morally, physically and intellectually4 an assumption which is blatant in its inaccuracy. Locke's basis for his claims was that: the earth and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being5, a concept clearly echoing statements from the Bible such as the heavens, are the LORD'S: but the earth hath he given to the children of men6 and, perhaps more tellingly, God said to them, Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moves on the earth7.
1 Peter Singer, ed. Practical Ethics (Cambride: Cambridge University Press,2001)., p.56 2 Locke, "Two Treatise of Government." 3 Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, 4 5 6 7 ABC Radio National, in Philosopher's Zone (Australia: ABC Radio National, 22/11/2008). J. P. Locke, "Two Treatise of Government." (R. Butler, London, 1821)., p. 209 Psalm 115, The Bible, King James Version The Bible, "Genesis," http://www.gnpcb.org/esv/search/?q=Genesis+1%3A28.

We now live in an increasingly secular and atheistic global society, where scientific advances allow ever greater insight into every facet of life and in such a world the idea of man having a 'God given right' to liberty, property, or anything for that matter, begins to seem simplistic, illogical and fantastical. The basic premise of Locke's 'natural law' continued to be espoused by western philosophers for centuries and is even central to the 'social contract' in John Rawls' seminal 1971 work 'A Theory of Justice'. Rawls' first principle is each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others8 but, as Singer claims, Rawls limits the conception of worst off' to those within ones own society9. In thus limiting his theory he omits three kinds of creature: humans with disabilities, humans in countries other than our own, and non-human animals. Until relatively recently very few western philosophers questioned this basic premise. Jeremy Bentham was one such philosopher, who questioned the underlying assumption of man's dominance and I will come to him later. Before Bentham, and to a lesser degree, thinkers such as Voltaire also questioned this logical and moral assumption. In 1764 Voltaire said that, when dissecting an animal, You discover in him all the same organs of feeling as in yourself. Answer me, mechanist, has Nature arranged all the springs of feeling in this animal to the end that he might not feel?10. We can, for the moment, disregard these incredibly forward-thinking few because they undeniably formed the exception rather than the rule. The principles of 'the state of nature' and 'natural law', central to western political philosophy and the basis for much of the current 'human rights' discourse, clearly have their basis in the JudeoChristian tradition of 'god given rights'. Western philosophers are all, to some degree, influenced by the traditions of Judaism and Christianity which make human beings the stewards of nature and give them dominion over the land and all other animals11. This concept, of the earth 'belonging' to humans, is not generally found in non-western religions12.13.14 and nor does it ring true for many non-religious people and so, if we want to claim universality for any set of rights then we certainly cannot base the concept on western religious texts. So is there perhaps some way to delineate between human beings and non- human animals? Some logically cohesive definition of what it is to be human? According to Immanuel Kant 'personhood' is
8 9 10 11 12 13 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)., p.53 Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation (Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 2002)., p. 10 Voltaire, "The Philosophical Dictionary: Animals,"(1924), http://history.hanover.edu/texts/voltaire/volanima.html. ABC Radio National, in Philosopher's Zone (Australia: ABC Radio National, 29/11/2008). Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (Cambridge: Cambride University Press, 2000). Charles Eliot, "Hinduism and Buddhism." (2005), http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile? fk_files=172791. 14 Gene Sager, "Vegetarianism and the Major World Religions," http://www.serv-online.org/pamphlet2005.htm.

defined as a being who can reason and make choices15. This is a rather precarious basis for delineating between who might be granted rights and who might not. Firstly because these attributes of 'personhood' can, arguably, be attributed to a number creatures falling outside of our species and secondly because young children, many mentally ill and the intellectually disabled within our own species can and do often fail to display these attributes, not to mention the difficulty of defining concepts such as 'reason'. Similarly, our rights cannot be based upon any intellectual ability without many within our species falling far outside the realms of those deserving 'intellectual superiority rights'. For more than one hundred and fifty years, since Charles Darwin released 'On the Origins of the Species' in 1859, scientific advances have been proving just how little difference there is between homo-sapiens and non-human animals. In a recent interview Steven White, a lecturer in Animal Law at Griffith University, Queensland, explained that many nations around the world are beginning to recognise the logical inconsistencies in our granting of rights solely to homo-sapiens16. To complicate matters further, some scientists, involved in cutting edge neuro-imaging experimentation, claim that human free will is an illusion, and that our complex behavioural patterns are nothing more than a combination of instinct, genetics, and learnt behaviour17.18. It is claimed that our intentions in no way influence which actions we perform10. Other radical scientific research claims to prove that even flies, although not making conscious decisions, have a kind of primitive 'free will' circuit wired into their brains11. Altogether it appears that assigning rights on the basis of the nebulous capacity for 'free will' is fraught with loopholes, potholes and confusion. With Singer and Bentham I agree that all of these attempts at making a human/non-human distinction are irrelevant. Bentham, in 1789, eloquently summed up the issue: The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be
15 M Rohlf, "Immanuel Kant," Stanford Encuclopedia of Philosophy(2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/. 16 For example the Spanish parliament has recently passed a resolution that great apes should be granted rights equivalent to human rights; in effect recognising personhood on the part of great apes and similarly Chimpanzees are increasingly regarded as falling into the genus homo (ie. modern humans) a fact which has already been recognised in New Zealand law. (ABC Radio National, in The Law Report (Australia: ABC Radio National, 08/05/2009).) 17 S Gallagher, "Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Probelm of Free Will.," in Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition, ed. S. Pockett W. Banks, & S. Gallagher (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). 18 Phillip Ball, "Do Flies Have Free Will?," Nature(2007), http://www.nature.com/news/2007/070514/full/news070514-8.html. 10 11

recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?19. As Singer putes it our consideration for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess and so, if we agree that the principle of equality is the only sound moral basis for relations between human beings, then logic follows that we are also committed to accepting it as a sound moral basis for relations with all beings, with just as little regard of species as of skin colour or any other attribute20. Logic tells us that it is moral to reduce suffering therefore it follows that if we wish to pursue a moral life then we ought extend rights to all beings capable of 'suffering'. Singer claims that the capacity for suffering and/or happiness is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language or for higher mathematics... the capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way21. Given this, sentience is the only logically sound attribute upon which we can grant rights, any other delineation we create is arbitrary and thus dangerous, as Singer states: to mark this boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary way. Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin colour?22. Singer's somewhat utilitarian notion of equality has many opponents. A main argument levelled against him, and thinkers like him, is that we may, or even should, favour those of 'our own kind'. This popular idea though ignores both the similarities between ourselves and other, non-human animals, and the vast, complex differences between human beings; or as Singer puts it: the concept conceals a deep disagreement about who 'our own kind' are23. If we attempt to delineate those who are granted rights, from those who are not, using any attribute that can be seen as illogical or arbitrary, then how can we argue against any other illogical or arbitrary delineation? About a century ago Henry Sidgwick, then professor of moral philosophy at Cambridge University, claimed that we should all agree that each of us is bound to show kindness to his parents and spouse and children, and to other kinsmen in a less degree: and to those who have
19 20 21 22 23 Jeremy Bentham, "A Utilitarian View,"(1789), http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-c/bentham01.pdf. Singer, ed. Practical Ethics., p. 55 Ibid., p. 57 Ibid., p. 58 , One World: The Ethics of Globalisation., p. 168

rendered services to him, and any other whom he may have admitted to his intimacy and called friends: and to neighbours and to fellow countrymen more than others: and perhaps we may say to those of our own race more than to black or yellow men, and generally to human beings in proportion to their affinity to ourselves.24 and, in a similar sentiment, the infamous Heinrich Himmler once said we must be honest, decent, loyal and friendly to members of our own blood and to no one else25. So we must echo the question posed by William Godwin in 1793: What magic is there in the pronoun 'my' to overturn the decision of everlasting truth? My wife or my mother may be a fool or a prostitute, malicious, lying or dishonest. If they be, of what consequence is it that they are mine?26. Another argument against extending equal consideration of interests to non-human animals lies in the objection that it is impossible to make comparisons of the suffering between different species. In response to this the quite simple, resounding answer from scientists and philosophers around the world and throughout history is: it is impossible to know if and what another human being is feeling and yet we have no qualms about attempting to behave in a manner which takes their assumed feelings into account27.28.29. If we accept that equal consideration of interests should be extended to non-human species there are some challenging consequences. Our speciesism enables us to exploit non-human animals just as, or worse than, human slaves once were and its elimination would have similarly huge social and economic impacts. So how far do we have to look to find examples of this morally indefensible speciesism? No further than almost every shop and home across the globe and especially in the wealthy west. In the wealthy western world our use of animals as food is as simple a moral question as one could hope for. According to Singer30.31.32.33 our consumption of animal flesh as food can be seen as the best example of, and perhaps the foundation for, our speciesism. Despite the predominance of an
24 Henry Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics." (London: Macmillan, 1907)., p.246 25 The History Place, "Audio Excerps from the Speech Given by Heinrich Himmler to Ss Group Leaders in Posen, Occupied Poland,"(n.d.), http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/h-posen.htm. 26 M. Hughes Midgley, J., "Are Families out of Date?," in Feminism and Families, ed. HL Nelson (London: Routledge, 1997). 27 Singer, ed. Practical Ethics., p.61 28 MS Dawkins, "The Scientific Basis for Assesing Suffering in Animals," in In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave, ed. P. Singer (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).., p. 26 29 G. Matheny, "Utilitarianism and Animals," in In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave, ed. P Singer (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006). Ibid., p.13 30 Singer, ed. Practical Ethics. 31 , One World: The Ethics of Globalisation. 32 P Singer, "Introduction," in In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave, ed. P Singer (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006). 33 Mason J. Singer P., The Ethics of What We Eat (Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 2007).

omnivorous diet in the modern world the overwhelming weight of medical evidence indicates that animal flesh is not necessary for good health or longevity, in other words: it is a luxury not a necessity34.35.36 and many even claim that a vegetarian or vegan diet is beneficial to human health and well-being37.38.39. This moral question is at its simplest when we take into account modern factory farming techniques, in which animals are forced to live miserable, pain-filled lives in order to supply human beings with the luxury of meat at bargain prices but as Singer claims: while, the lives of free-ranging animals are undoubtedly better than those of animals reared in factory farms it is still doubtful if using them for food is compatible with equal consideration of interests40. Even if the entire planet was to turn vegan tomorrow it would not solve the problem because there are numerous other areas in which our overt speciesism causes untold, unnecessary suffering to non-human animals; hunting, zoo's, sport fighting, circuses and more, including the area in which the moral issue is at perhaps its most complicated: animal experimentation41. The issue of extending rights to non-human animals can be viewed as far more than simply a moral imperative. Progress in the 'human rights' discourse and the dissemination and enforcement of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Right has become stalled on the international stage. This is in large part because of the inherent logical inconsistencies in the concept which create great difficulty in forming a logically conclusive argument. We deem 'human rights' to be universal and yet there isn't even a universally accepted, logically sound definition of what it means to be 'human'. Some rights, such as freedom from genocide, torture and unwarranted imprisonment, and freedoms to the necessities of life, such as fresh water, food and a viable habitat, might be easier to apply universally if we had a more logically and morally sound model for what delineates between those who are granted those rights and those who are not. As Singer himself says only a
34 Singer, ed. Practical Ethics., p. 62 35 M. Hebbelinck, P. Clarys, and A. De Malsche, "Growth, Development, and Physical Fitness of Flemish Vegetarian Children, Adolescents, and Young Adults," Am J Clin Nutr 70, no. 3 Suppl (1999). 36 Spencer E.A. Davey G.K., Appleby P.N., Allen N.E., Knox K.H., & Key T.J., "EpicOxford: Lifestyle Characteristics and Nutrient Intakes in a Cohort of 33 883 Meat-Eaters and 31 546 Non Meat-Eaters in the Uk," Public Health Nutrition 6, no. 3 (2002). 37 N. S. Rizzo et al., "Vegetarian Dietary Patterns Are Associated with a Lower Risk of Metabolic Syndrome: The Adventist Health Study 2," Diabetes Care (2011). 38 D. R. Jacobs, Jr. et al., "Food, Plant Food, and Vegetarian Diets in the Us Dietary Guidelines: Conclusions of an Expert Panel," Am J Clin Nutr 89, no. 5 (2009). 39 Davey G.K., "EpicOxford: Lifestyle Characteristics and Nutrient Intakes in a Cohort of 33 883 Meat-Eaters and 31 546 Non Meat-Eaters in the Uk." 40 Singer, ed. Practical Ethics., p. 64 41 For discussion on the ethics of animal experimentation see Singer, ed. Practical Ethics; Matheny, "Utilitarianism and Animals; R.D. Ryder, "Speciesism in the Laboratory," in In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave, ed. P. Singer (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).3; Y. Touitou, M. H. Smolensky, and F. Portaluppi, "Ethics, Standards, and Procedures of Animal and Human Chronobiology Research," Chronobiol Int 23, no. 6 (2006).; Brom F.W.A. Bovenkerk B., van den Bergh B.J., "Brave New Birds: The Use of 'Animal Integrity' in Animal Ethics," in The Animal Ethics Reader, ed. Botzler R. Armstrong S. (London: Routledge, 2003).; B. E. Rollin, "The Regulation of Animal Research and the Emergence of Animal Ethics: A Conceptual History," Theor Med Bioeth 27, no. 4 (2006).

basic moral principle of this kind can allow us to defend a form of equality that embraces all human beings, with all the differences that exist between them42. The United Nations Charter, Article 55, reads that relations should be based upon universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.43. If we are to ever hope to defend the rights of abused human beings around the world then we must grant these rights based on a morally and logically sound model, one defined by the attribute of sentience and not arbitrary, illogical speciesism.

42 Singer, ed. Practical Ethics., p. 55 43 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml.

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