Agnia Baranauskaite Grigas 'Explaining Lithuania's Policy On EU Accession, 1991-2002'

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Explaining Lithuanias Policy on EU Accession, 1991-2002
Agnia Baranauskaite St. Antonys College University of Oxford April 2006 Supervisor: Dr. Alex Pravda
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. The work in this thesis is all my own except where otherwise indicated. 30,033 words 1
To my mother
A number of people have contributed to this thesis. First of all, I am very grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Alex Pravda, for his many useful comments during the writing of this thesis. Also, I would like to thank Dr. Walter Mattli, Dr. Kalypso Nicolaidis and Dr. Jan Zielonka for their suggestions and assistance during various stages of this project. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge Prof. Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Prof. Vytautas Landsbergis and Prof. Egidijus Vareikis for sharing their insights on the Lithuanian accession process.
Explaining Lithuanias Policy on EU Accession, 1991-2002

Contents Introduction..1 Literature Review...4 Analytical Framework......11 Argument and Project ..17 Methods....22 Structure of Study.....25 Chapter 2: Economic Factors of Lithuanias EU Policy ...27 The Changing Salience and Nature of Economic Concerns27 Rational Utility Considerations30 Domestic Politics..42 Ideational Considerations.....45 Conclusions..49 Chapter 3: Political and Security Factors in Lithuanias EU Policy.52 The Changing Salience and Nature of Security Concerns...53 Hard Security Needs and Concerns...57 Soft Security Benefits...62 Political Voice..64 Domestic Politics..66 Conclusions..75 Chapter 4: The Relationship between Material and Ideational Motivations in Lithuanias EU Policy: 1997 to 2000...77 Changes in Domestic and External Conditions from 1997 to 2000.78 Economic Factors.79 Security Factors....84 Domestic Factors......89 Ideational Factors.93 Conclusions..97 Conclusion..99 Bibliography.109 Books and Articles.109 Interviews...111
Introduction
In little more than a decade after a difficult secession from the Soviet Union, Lithuania gained membership into the European Union (EU) in May of 2004. The EU membership was seen domestically and abroad as validation of Lithuanias success in establishing a democratic state, transitioning to a market economy and permanently leaving the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, it was seen as a means to ensure positive economic, political, and social developments in the future. Yet it was lamented by some as a giving up of hard-fought sovereignty from the USSR to yet another Union.
At first glance one might reasonably conclude that Lithuanias bid for membership was bound to succeed since Lithuania appears to be a textbook example of rational motivation for integration. Furthermore, Lithuanias accession story can be told in an over-determined way given the complementary economic, security, and ideational motivations for membership. However, Lithuanias policies towards EU membership were much more complex. Lithuania's EU accession process was animated at all times by tension between material and ideational factors, between the perceived gains of integration and sovereignty concerns. In the face of seemingly ample arguments in
favour of EU membership, it has often been overlooked that for Lithuania there were also potent arguments and sentiment against membership in the spheres of economics, sovereignty, cultural identity; and there was the paradox of joining a new union after recent secession from another. Nor should one overlook the fact that the population at large did not embrace the prospect of EU membership immediately. Lithuanian public opinion over the years was rather fickle regarding the EU despite the
seemingly apparent economic and security benefits, the compatibility of European and Lithuanian identities, and the consensus within the political elite on EU membership.1 There were shifts in the way EU membership was perceived by the government even though the official national policy of seeking EU membership never veered. For instance, the 1992 parliamentary election and the 1993 presidential election brought to power elites cautious of integration to Western structures and interested in a national path for development. The 2000 elections were dominated by parties that opposed Lithuanias early entry to the EU. Yet once in power, elected officials maintained the EU trajectory of foreign policy in 2000 as in 1993 and 1992. Thus, the Lithuanian accession process was not a straightforward affair of continuous support for EU membership due to complementary material and ideational motivations. In fact, in addition to material costs and benefits of membership there were perceived sovereignty losses to the EU and sovereignty gains due to escaping the Russian sphere of influence, both of which were often articulated in ideational terms by the Lithuanian elites.
This thesis explores the various tensions involved in the Lithuanian accession process in seeking to address the general question: What was the interplay between the material and ideational factors that shaped Lithuanias EU policy? More specifically, to what extent was the Lithuanian accession process driven by material motivations? If material motivations were not the decisive determinant, to what extent did ideational aspects play a part in Lithuanias EU policy? We are also interested in
For Baltic public opinion shifts see Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes Central and East European views on EU Enlargement: Political Debates and Public Opinion in Karen Henderson, ed., Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester 1999, p. 186
assessing how domestic conditions came into play and in particular how they related to the role of material and ideational factors.
Lithuania, a state of less than four million people, may not seem like a very significant case study of EU enlargement and perhaps for this reason it has not received much attention from students of EU eastern enlargement. However, as a former Soviet-occupied Republic and one of the most eastern states geographically among the new accession countries, Lithuania has its own peculiarities that are noteworthy and that should be placed in the general context of the recent EU enlargement. The Lithuanian case can shed light on Baltic states accession in general due to a number of similar characteristics. Moreover, a study of a single case rather than a regional analysis of the Baltics allows for an in-depth examination of the key episodes, motives, and discourse that a broader study could not capture. The Lithuanian case, can not only shed light on the Baltics but also on the recent accession process of many Central and Eastern European post-communist states, which all shared a common experience of transitioning to market economies and democratic governments while seeking EU membership in the 1990s. With three additional former communist and Eastern European states of Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria on the timetable for EU accession, it is important to examine former cases of integration that seem to defy some integrationist logic and assumptions. The accession of postSoviet Lithuania may be of comparable use when examining the potential candidature of Ukraine and Belarus. The case also sheds light on the drivers of EU integration and enlargement overall and offers the perspective of a small state on regional integration in general.
Literature Review The conventional analysis of the Lithuanian and the Baltic accession process states that the impetus to EU accession was rationally and materially driven. The principal rational motivations of Lithuania, and the Baltic states in general, to join the EU can be combined in three main categories: economic, security, and reform-driven considerations. The economic calculus was such that EU accession was attractive due to the opportunities of the common market as it was for Britain or Denmark and because of growth and development prospects as for Ireland. Security concerns were an important factor due to Russias proximity. Meanwhile, there was a recognised need for reform for which the EU was seen to be an anchor as was the case for Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
A competing constructivist perspective holds that Lithuania sought EU membership due to its European identity and historical legacy. In the sparse literature on the Baltic accession, a comprehensive analysis on Lithuanias, or even the Baltic, accession from all four angles of economics, politics, domestic reforms, and identity is lacking. Most authors stress either one or the other factor or are limited by the exclusive focus on either the rationalist or constructivist perspective. Furthermore, most studies present a linear account of the accession policies and perspectives and do not explain how motivations changed and evolved over time or manifested themselves in particular episodes.
Literature on Economic Motivations
Interestingly, despite the seeming evidence for economic gain from the Union and the final package that Lithuania received from the accession negotiations in 2002, most literature on the Baltic accessions holds that in the decade leading up to the negotiations EU membership was not driven exclusively or even primarily by economic considerations. Heather Grabbe states that hope for money from Brussels is not in fact a key motivation for membership2 She and Kirsty Hughes argue that in the Baltics benefits through access to markets, trade, investment and transfers are secondary motives.3 Zaneta Ozolina considers Baltic states economic motivations for membership, but focuses on the EUs transformative power on the Baltic economies rather than on transfers, capital market integration, or an increase in FDI. 4 Ramunas Vilpisauskas, a prominent Lithuanian political economist and current advisor to President, is the most convinced of the importance of economic factors as an impetus for raising EU membership to the top of the Baltic states foreign policy goals stating that the EU was viewed as a source of economic opportunities and resources.5 Yet Vilpisauskas like Ozolina underlines the economic costs of EU integration. The two most widely cited concerns of Lithuania related to EU membership are agricultural reforms and the EU request that the Ignalina nuclear power plant be closed. In light of these and other costs associated with EU norms and regulations, Vilpisauskas has noted that it may be economically more advantageous to be an Associate of the EU rather than a full member. According to Vilpiauskas, EU becomes advantageous when you consider not only the economic aspects of
2
Heather Grabbe Challenges of EU Enlargement in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds., Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 69 3 Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson, p. 189 4 Zaneta Ozolina The EU and the Baltic States in Lieven and Trenin, p. 205-9 5 Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Regional Integration in Europe: Analysing Intra-Baltic Economic Cooperation in the Context of European Integration in Vello Pettai, and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 2003, p. 172
accession, but also politic and security considerations.6 In summary, the economic literature surprisingly places little importance on economic motivations on integration for Lithuania and the Baltic states. The elements that arise from the literature such as economic opportunities and costs, the EUs transformative power on the economy and Lithuanias perceptions of the EU as centre of wealth warrant more attention and will be explored in this thesis.
In contrast to the Baltics, most rationalist literature on Central and Eastern European (CEE) enlargement stress the motivations of benefits such as access to the EU market, transfers from the EU budget, increased investment and growth, and increased entrepreneurship and skills.7 Milada Vachudova in her book Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism builds on political economy theories and international institution theories and applies them to CEE (with the exception of the Baltics). Throughout her analysis, Vachudova primarily focuses on the economic stimulus for integration, particularly the economic costs of exclusion due to the EUs harsh treatment of non-members as well as the costs of exclusion that are created when neighbouring states are joining.8 To what extent Lithuania was influenced by the potential costs of exclusion has yet to be examined in depth. This
Ramunas Vilpisauskas Derybos del Narystes ES : Procesas, Veikejai, ir Rezultatai in Klaudijus Maniokas, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Darius Zeruolis, eds., Lietuvos Kelias I Europos Sajunga Europos Susivienijimas ir Lietuvos Derybos del Narystes Europos Sajungoje, Eugrimas, Vilnius, 2004, p. 66. A number of studies on the Central and Eastern European states accession have questioned the presumed economic benefits of membership. Vachudova notes small transfer payments and costs of building institutions and social policy directives to implement the acquis in Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p.231-3. For a critique of the agricultural policy towards the new entrants see Grabbe in Lieven and Trenin, p. 69, 76. David Ellison and Mustally Hussain have proposed that the Easter European states may have experienced higher levels of economic growth if they stayed out of the EU, in particular given the meagre financial assistance that they are receiving upon accession. Source: Vachudova, p. 231. 7 Vachudova, p. 65 8 Ibid., p. 65
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thesis will inquire into the material as well as the ideational perceptions of negative externalities of non-membership.
Literature on Security Concerns Despite the potential tangible economic gains of EU membership for Lithuania and the Baltics, most authors have stressed the importance of security concerns for the Baltic states as one of, if not the primary motivation for seeking membership in the Union.9 For the Baltic states, these security concerns consist of the desire to maintain full independence and territorial integrity from the potential threat of Russia. For Lithuania, there are also the concerns of bordering the highly militarized Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Graeme Herd in his article, The Baltic States and EU Enlargement, argued that for the Baltics, the EU had become securitized meaning that the security environment that characterized the Baltic region in the early 1990s had both a defining impact upon the ways in which EU membership was to be sought and upon the expectation of benefits EU membership would provide.10 According to Herd, security concerns were so vital to the Baltic states that in fact EU was considered only a medium-term security generator until NATO membership was secured as NATO was the only viable security panacea for the Baltic states.11 Yet, the committed and simultaneous pursuit of both EU and NATO membership by the Lithuanian elites cannot be fully explained by the view that the EU only represented a second choice solution to Lithuanias security concerns.
Authors such as Herd, Grabbe and Hughes, Miniotaite, Ozolina, Tiilikainen, Austrevicius, and Vilpisauskas have emphasized the primacy of security motivations in Lithuanias EU policy. 10 Graeme Herd, The Baltic States and EU Enlargement, in Henderson, p. 261 11 Ibid., p. 259, 260.
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Baltic security considerations in the context of the EU are not traditional conceptions of security advantages, a fact that is recognized but not sufficiently analysed by Herd and other authors. While the EU could not provide Lithuania with security guarantees like NATOs Article V, the Union is considered a provider of soft security since membership can indirectly deter aggression.12 As Grabbe and Hughes point out, for the Baltics the security benefit of EU membership is seen more in terms of the EU being a community of states rather than because of any hopes for the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 13 However, Lithuanias perceptions of its security needs and particularly the belief that the EU could address some of these needs can be better understood by examining Lithuanias national identity and historical legacy. Grazina Miniotaite in her article The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity addresses this issue by interpreting the security and foreign policy of the Baltic states as the embodiment of their developing political identity. 14 However her focus is on the broader structures of Euro-Atlantic community, particularly NATO. She does not address the relationship between the perceived security benefits of NATO versus EU membership, which is an important point to differentiate in order to ascertain the claim that Lithuanias accession was primarily driven by security concerns.
Literature on Ideational Considerations Though less common than the rationalist security-driven explanation, an ideational based argument has also been used to explain Lithuanias and the Baltics EU policy. The constructivist literature on the Baltics, very similar to that on CEE accession,
12 13
Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 209 Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson, p. 190 14 Grazina Miniotaite The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity in Charles Krupnick, ed., Almost NATO, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, London, 2003, p. 263-288
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emphasizes ideational and historical considerations understood as a desire to return to Europe as the driving force in EU enlargement. For example, Pettai argues that the intuitive sense of belonging to this geopolitical region [of Europe] was never in doubt, and it was largely this belief which propelled the Baltics in their quest for EU membership.15 However, the ideational motivations to join EU viewed as a desire to be part of Europe captures only part of the story and the literature often misses the complexities of the Baltic national identity - a weakness that this analysis will seek to rectify.
Some scholars viewing the seeming ideational compatibility between Baltic states national vision and EU integration have concluded that the integration dilemma the inherent tension between integration gains and sovereignty losses appears to be completely lacking in the Baltic region.16 However, this perspective misses many of the ideational complexities of the Baltics such as the significance of the anti-Soviet and sovereignty-focused discourse. Furthermore it underestimates the facts on the ground such as the Lithuanian Euro-sceptic movement - the National Democratic Movement. This movement opposed EU admission because it is perceived to undermine independence and argued that EU membership was not necessarily beneficial in terms of the economy, national culture, identity and sovereignty. Pavlovaite has suggested that there may be an integration dilemma in Lithuania where sovereignty discourse has been particularly potent since 1990.17 However she does not address why despite the scepticism among some political parties, a rather fluctuating public opinion regarding the EU, and the sovereignty dilemma, the Lithuanian
15 16
Pettai and Zielonka, p. 3 Herd in Henderson, p. 270 17 Inga Pavlovaite, Paradise Regained: The Conceptualization of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate in Marko Lehti and David J. Smith, Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experience, Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland, 2003, p. 207
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government was firmly committed to seeking EU membership throughout the postSoviet years.
In the literature on Lithuanias and the Baltic accession, the importance of EU as a facilitator of reforms has not been emphasized but only mentioned in passing. However, in the general literature on Eastern Enlargement, it has been recognized that for the CEE states which emerged from planned economies and non-democratic systems, EU accession offered the benefit of building and strengthening a candidates social, judicial, political and economic institutions (like the independent Central Bank act) as well as a chance to implement key structural reforms during the chapter by chapter acceptance of the acquis. 18 Yet what has rarely been noted is that the reformanchoring role of the EU can be analyzed from an ideational perspective since the EU has served as a model for reforms due to its magnetic appeal - the promise of progress, prosperity and efficiency. As Pavlovaite has argued, Europe has acquired a near-mystic, taken-for-granted status in the Lithuanian discourse on economic, political and social transformation.19
In summary, the literature on the Baltic accession is rather sparse and lacks a comprehensive study of the economic, security, and ideational motives for membership. The aim of this study is to provide such a comprehensive analysis and one that takes into account the evolution of motives over time. The reviewed studies still leave a number of questions to be answered and room for contribution, thus, the study will analyze Lithuanias ideational perspective on soft security to reconcile Lithuanias simultaneous pursuit of EU and NATO membership. Furthermore, the
18 19
Vachudova, p. 181-219 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 212
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additional components of national identity - from anti-Russian sentiments to outsider complex - will be addressed. Insights from more general literature from CEE enlargement and regional integration such as appeal of EU reforms and the costs of non-membership will be applied to enrich the understanding the Lithuanian and Baltic case. Furthermore, broader theoretical approaches of constructivism and liberalism will contribute to the field that is largely rationalist in its orientation and will help to assess the ideational and domestic influences on EU policy.
Analytical Framework When considering Lithuanias accession policy, this study will use additional international relations approaches to regional integration, then the ones common to the current literature on the Baltic accession. The analytical framework of this thesis will not rely on a single theoretic approach but rather combine rationalist, constructivist, and liberal schools of thought which will enable a comprehensive study of material, ideational, and domestic factors of EU policy.
Rationalist Approaches The analytical framework of this thesis will rely greatly on the rationalist analyses from Walter Mattlis book The Logic of Regional Integration and Milada Vachudovas book Europe Undivided.20 Mattli presents a rationalist approach that views European integration, and regional integration in general, as driven by market forces and enforced by institutional factors. Though Mattli notes the EU is a unique confluence of security, political, and economic motives, his theory focuses almost exclusively on the economic motives for integration and enlargement.
20
Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999 and Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.
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The economic motives for integration are a good starting point to analyze Lithuanias and the Baltic states accession. Mattli points out that integration is generally sought by outsider states with lower growth rates than insider states in cases where there is little difference in economic development between the outsiders and insiders. In the recent EU enlargement, there was a gap in wealth between the old and new members, but most CEE states such as Lithuania had higher growth rates than the existing members of the EU. However, Mattlis perspective could still be useful in analysing the case of Lithuania since he argues that for poor states such as Spain, Portugal, and now the CEE countries, the motivation lies in reducing the glaring per capita income gap between themselves and the Union21 potentially through gains from EUs Regional Development & Structural Re-adjustment Funds.
Mattli argues that the supply of integration depends on the willingness of the leaders to integrate which in turn depends on the payoffs and costs of integration to political leaders. The Lithuanian government elite and their interests or costs to integrate in terms of re-election will be examined using Mattlis insights. Did Lithuanias political leaders step up their efforts for membership in anticipation of the next presidential election of 1998 or parliamentary elections of 2000? Were the political elites mindful of the costs of integration the rising Euro-scepticism of the Lithuanian public during the late 1990s? Mattlis insight that economically successful leaders are a lot less likely to pursue deep integration than economically unsuccessful leaders will also be tested in the case of Lithuania. The economic downturn of 1998 and 1999 after the Russian crises followed by the accelerated efforts for EU integration seem to support this hypothesis.
21
Mattli, p. 95
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Mattli and Vachudova both note that the costs of non-integration influences elites seeking EU membership. According to Mattli, a country seeks to integrate its economy only when there is a significant positive cost of maintaining its present governance structure in terms of foregone growth.22 The analysts opinion varies on whether Lithuania would forego growth if it was not admitted to the EU, with some analysts predicting higher economic performance through Associate status of EU rather than full membership, but recent government studies argue that membership will increase GDP growth.23 The thesis will consider if foregone growth and potential negative externalities of integration on outsiders such as trade diversion, investment diversion, and aid diversion influenced Lithuania elites thinking particularly as the prospect of being left out of enlargement emerged after the Commissions decision of 1997.
Vachudova, in considering rational material motivations of EU membership, addresses the political benefits of integration in addition to the economic ones. She argues that the EU exerted passive leverage over candidate countries due to the potential benefits associated with EU membership which included: 1) political benefits such as the protection of EU rules and a voice in EU decision-making, 2) economic benefits such as access to EU markets, transfers from the EU budget, increased investment and growth, increased entrepreneurship and skills, and 3) conditionality which acts as a catalyst for domestic reforms.24 The political and reform benefits have been underemphasized in the literature on the Baltics and will be
22 23
Ibid., p. 81 Vilpisauskas in Maniokas, Vilpisauskas, and Zeruolis, p. 66. See also Edmundas Piesarskas, Lietuvos Integracijos I ES Finansiniu, Ekonominiu, ir Socialiniu Pasekmiu Susiteminimas ir Analize, Europos Komitetas prie Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybes, Ekonomines Konsultacijos ir Tyrimai, Vilnius, 2002. 24 Vachudova, p. 65
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considered in this thesis. Vachudova also analyzes how membership (or courtship) of an international organization transforms state strategies and preferences.25 Vachudova employs this concept of active leverage of the EU to explain how the EU had an impact on domestic outcomes of Visegrad states and argues that organizations such as NATO did not have the same leverage. 26 EUs active leverage will be used to consider Lithuanias policies towards EU and NATO membership in the key episode postCommissions decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of negotiation in 1997.
Constructivist Approaches The rationalist approach is often incomplete to fully explain EU integration or enlargement and thus, the constructivist school of international relations can shed new insight into the same studies. Alexander Wendt in Social Theory of International Relations proposes that the structures of human association, or international organizations, are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.27 While the rationalist approach views the enlargement on the part of the entrants as a product of a cost-benefit calculation, constructivist approaches focus on the appeal of Western European norms and values, the commonality of European identities, and the legacy of history.28 As Jan Zielonka highlights We belong to Europe was the repeated cry of Eastern Europeans since the late 80s. In their view, Europe possesses a special kind of identity which is based on certain cultural and legal traditions, on common principles of democracy and the
25 26
Ibid., p. 7 Ibid., p. 134-137 27 Alex Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 1 28 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, Theorizing EU Enlargement, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, no. 4, 2002.
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common religious roots of Christianity and Judaism, an identity that the Eastern Europeans feel that they share.29
In this thesis, constructivist approaches will be used to complement the rationalist perspective and thus, consider the importance of ideational factors in Lithuanias interest formation regarding EU membership and their effect on EU policy. As Tiilikainen argues, state policies have been a reflection of states national identities in the Baltic states: As a basis for foreign policy, national identities express themselves as worldviews, that is as subjective interpretations concerning the international environment and ones own position in it. These worldviews furthermore express a set of values functioning as the value basis for a given policy. 30 An analysis of the Lithuanian worldview will be useful to understand more clearly Lithuanias political, security, and even economic interests in seeking EU membership. Lithuanias and EUs cultural match which according to constructivist institutionalists is the compatibility between outsiders and insiders regarding collective identity and fundamental beliefs will be examined in this thesis to consider Lithuanias pursuit and resistance to the integration process.
Liberal Approach The liberal approach could bring additional insight into the analysis of Lithuanias policy towards EU by opening the black box of the state and analysing Lithuanias domestic politics. The politics of EU enlargement is an area that has been underemphasized in the studies of Baltic accession and the liberal approach enables an analysis of the role played by government elites, interests groups, and public
29
Jan Zielonka, The Assertion of Democracy in Ronald J. Hill and Jan Zielonka, eds., Restructuring Eastern Europe :Towards a New European Order, Aldershot, Hants, 1990, p. 46 30 Teija Tiilikainen, The Political Implications of the EU Enlargement to the Baltic States, Robert Schumann Centre, European University Institute, Florence 2001, p. 15
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opinion. In Lithuania, in particular, there has been a notable divide between the steadfast government commitment to the EU and the sceptical public. In this thesis, the liberal/domestic approach is instrumental in explaining to what extent Lithuanian elites sought EU membership so they could introduce domestic reforms, for political gains, or due to their desire to compete. Also it allows us to consider to what extent fluctuating public opinion played a role in EU policy formulation and if it changed the strategic direction or just the tactics of EU policy.31
Of these perspectives on EU enlargement, the rationalist lens will be one of the two main approaches of this thesis, especially for examination of the economic factors to Lithuanias EU policy and to some extent the political factors. Complementary explanatory power will be sought from the constructivist approach by considering to what extent and when Lithuanian policy and choices were a reflection of national identity. Political, security, and economic motivations for EU membership will be considered in the light of Lithuanias worldview. Lastly, a liberal domestic approach will examine the role of actors below the state level to understand the complexities of domestic politics and its influence on EU accession. However, this approach will be complementary to rather than constitutive of the analysis since throughout the 19912002 period, despite the changes in political parties, leadership, and public opinion, national policy on EU remained consistent.
Argument and Project
31
The liberal approach could also be used to examine to what extent domestic interests groups influenced EU policy, but this line of inquiry will not be attempted in the thesis due to lack of supporting evidence that interests groups played a significant role in the Lithuanian accession process. See Vilpisauskas in Pettai and Zielonka, p. 160-73
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Relying on rationalist and constructivist approaches, this thesis will advance the main argument that ideational factors made material considerations more salient during key episodes of decision making process and the interaction of the two thus determined Lithuanias EU policy. On a stand-alone basis, neither the material nor the ideational factors played a decisive role in motivating Lithuania to seek EU membership but when a correlation between material considerations and ideational factors occurred, integration was accelerated. On the other hand, when only material factors were at play, integration momentum slowed.32
Furthermore, the thesis holds that Lithuanias accession strategy was motivated by different factors in the pre-application and post-application phase.33 Material political and security motivations were of great importance to Lithuania in the years leading up to the decision to seek EU membership in 1995. Furthermore, political and security motivations were decisive for EU membership because they were made more salient by complementary ideational factors. Calculations of the economic benefits of EU membership were not central in making the initial decision to seek EU membership in 1995 but came to play an increasingly important role in the late 1990s and particularly in the early 2000 to 2002. After 1995 ideational factors maintained the salience of political and security factors, which, if based solely on rationalist considerations, may have lost relevance.
32
This inquiry greatly utilizes the dichotomy between material and ideational factors, which admittedly are generally difficult to separate into two distinct categories and in the case of Lithuanias accession policy. For the purpose of this thesis, material considerations will be understood to include rational economic costs and benefits of EU membership such as transfer payments, FDI, reform implementation. Political gains such as representation in the European Council and to some extent security benefits are analyzed as material factors. Ideational aspects include the sovereignty concerns, perception of the EU as an ideal model for emulation, soft security gains from being part of Europe, escaping Europes periphery and a dangerous sphere of Russias influence. 33 The application process itself did not significantly alter national motivations. But because Lithuanias national motivations evolved from 1991 to 2002, the application date is a useful marker which enables to evaluate on which set of motivations Lithuanias application was based. Other studies do not make this distinction and generalize about motivations as whole from 1991 to 2002 providing an imprecise picture.
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The argument is that ideational factors influenced Lithuanias perceptions of national interests and thus, the accession process. Lithuanian ideational motivations for EU membership are more complex than a sense of common European heritage even though this is how the literature often interprets the ideational pull of Europe. The thesis will employ an understanding of the Lithuanian national identity that is not simply European, but one that is also decisively anti-Russian/Eastern, historically an outsider and one that prizes national sovereignty.34 Ideational motivations are based as much on the pull force of the EU as on the push force away from the post-Soviet space. This push force is also a protest vote demonstrating a desire to escape the Soviet Unions legacy rather than simply joining Europe. In line with Pavlovaites argument, for Lithuania the return to Europe then takes on a meaning not of becoming a member of the European community but rather a legitimate, reliable and safe way of distancing Lithuania from Russia and of overcoming Lithuanias most recent communist past35. I argue that this desire to establish distance from Russia coupled with the sense of being a historical outsider greatly influenced the ultimate success of the pro-European case in Lithuania since integration particularly after 1997 was driven by a fear that Lithuania would be left out in the process of European development and thus relegated again to the Russian sphere of influence, in a type of geopolitical ghetto between the EU and the East. This thesis, while utilizing a rationalist perspective on Vilnius economic and security motivations for EU membership, also relies on ideational factors to elucidate how Lithuanian elites
34
This description of the national identity is formulated from insights from several sources: Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 263-288; Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 199-213; Egidijus Vareikis, Dinozaurejanti Europa, Stroga, Vilnius, 2002, p. 291-303; Inga Vinogradnaite, Kelias Europon: Europiestiskojo Identiteto Konstravimas, in Darius Staliunas, ed., Europos Ideja Lietuvoje: Istorija ir Dabartis, LII Leidykla, Vilnius, 2002, p. 180-189. 35 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 200
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perceived the economic and security variables. For instance, Lithuania certainly had some potent economic and security arguments to join the EU but because the West [is] associated with prosperity, security, and democracy, whereas the East is linked with poverty, unpredictability, and insecurity36 the EU integration policy was often perceived as the only viable solution for Lithuania. The idealized perception of the West and a desire to escape the Soviet past was illustrated by President Adamkus statement that the EU is the guarantee of progress and future prosperityThe only way to escape the backwardness of the province is to board the fast Europe train.37 Similarly security motivations to join the EU were meaningful only to the extent that Lithuanian political elites perceived insecurity in their geopolitical position and to the extent that EU was thought to be able to provide any security solutions. In summary, if the Lithuanian elites would have had a different national identity and different perceptions, the EU accession process could have proceeded considerably differently. Most probably, Lithuania would have still sought EU membership since there were economic and structural improvements to be gained from membership but it would have done so without the same fervour and dedication. Also it is arguable that Lithuania would have sought membership in the case where there was no economic benefit to be gained from membership and done so motivated by security, ideational, and reform factors.
This thesis also emphasizes the importance of external events and factors in cementing Lithuanias resolve to seek EU membership. For instance the rising nationalist rhetoric in Russian politics in the mid-1990s, as exemplified by Zhirinovsky performance in the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections, greatly stirred
36
37
Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 278 Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001, p. 44
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Lithuania and the other Baltic states to seek security through integration into Western Structures. The most important external events occurred in the brief time period between 1997 and 1999: 1) in 1997 the EU Commission made a decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of negotiations process for membership; 2) the Russian financial crisis of 1998 caused a recession for the Lithuanian economy; 3) NATO did not include any of the Baltic states in its first round of enlargement in 1999. These three seemingly discouraging events only intensified Lithuanias elite consensus on the necessity of EU membership because they were fed on the fears of being left out of the European structures and left behind in Russias unstable backyard. The external factor of regional competition among the Baltic states pushed all three states towards integration rather than exploring the option of creating a regional alternative to integration.
Lastly, this thesis will approach Lithuanias economic, security, and ideational motivations in a non-linear fashion arguing that certain motivations were important during some time periods and not in others, and that the strength of certain motivations evolved over time. Lithuanias policy towards the EU cannot be understood as a static and unchanging set of preferences between the years of 1991 and 2002 as most of the aforementioned literature had attempted. Until 1995, when Lithuania submitted an official application to the EU, economic considerations for membership were overshadowed by Lithuanias security concerns due to the presence of the Russian army, its geopolitical location, and its new and fragile independence.
From Lithuanias 1995 application until 1997, the country pursued a mixed strategy of both officially seeking EU membership while simultaneously pursuing trade
24
opportunities with Russia and the CIS and lagging in the implementation of necessary reforms for EU accession. The security aspects of EU membership remained salient but pragmatic economic considerations compelled the Lithuanian elites to maintain trade with Russia. The coupled external events of EU and NATO exclusion and the Russian crisis in the late 1990s rekindled some of the greatest ideationally-based fears of Lithuanian elites - the economic and political consequences of being left out of Europe in a Baltic ghetto.
From 2000 to 2002 EU policy became increasingly driven by economic motivations for membership. Though the EU was still regarded in symbolic terms of wealth, progress and modernity, increasingly a rationalist utility maximizing perspective of the costs and benefits of EU membership appeared. However, the rationalist perspective was used more for the negotiation strategy and ensuring that Lithuania gets the best deal in its accession package than for making the decision of whether or not to seek membership which was already decided in 1995.
The argument is thus that ideational factors mattered as much if not more than material considerations in determining Lithuanian elites' drive for EU by influencing Lithuanian elite perceptions of the economic, security, and political costs and benefits of membership, which came to prominence at different points of the accession process. In order to demonstrate this I will use discourse analysis and key episode study methods described in the next section.
Methods
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This thesis combines the historical explanatory and theory-testing categories of Van Everas typology of political science dissertations.38 Consistent with the explanatory approach, I seek to explain the causes [and] consequences of [a] historical case. The historical case I seek to explain is Lithuanias accession to the EU. My thesis will also incorporate elements of the theory-testing approach, applying and testing the noted elements of rationalist, constructivist and liberal approaches on the case of Lithuania EU accession. However, the primary purpose of the thesis is not to prove or disprove any particular theory but rather to explain the historical case of Lithuanias accession by using some relevant theoretical tools.
In this thesis, discourse analysis is an important tool for explaining the Lithuanian case because discourse demonstrates how the EU was perceived and what benefits and costs were anticipated by the Lithuanian governing elites. Discourse is understood as a common understanding of self and the world that legitimates and motivates collection action.39 Discourse analysis will rely primarily on official statements and speeches on EU and Lithuanian foreign policy by high-level government officials. Published compilations of speeches such as President Adamkus Trys Metiniai Praneimai and Penkeri Darbo Metai, Landsbergis Lietuvos Kelias NATO will be cited most extensively.40 Noteworthy strands of discourse will be highlighted from the Lithuanian Constitution as well as the National Law on Defence. Government
38
Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1997, p. 90-2 39 Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Feelings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 6. See also Jennifer Milliken, The Study of Discourse in International Relations: a Critique of Research and Methods, European Journal of Internaltional Relations, Vol. 5, No. 2 1999. 40 Trys Metiniai Praneimai is a collection of the President national addresses from 1999 to 2001. Penkeri Darbo Metai is a collection of the Presidents speeches and interviews from 1998 to 2003. Lietuvos Kelias NATO is a collection of Landsbergis speeches, interviews, foreign policy formulations, and articles from 1990 to 2004 and though focused on NATO membership gives numerous insights on EU membership and the general Western orientation of foreign policy.
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sponsored studies on the effects of integration41 will be considered. Academic articles from high-level bureaucrats and influential political scientists who serve as advisors to the government will be useful not only for the information that they provide but also because they reveal the perspectives of the inner circle. Interviews with key officials will fill gaps in the literature and breathe life into the analysis. The discourse analysis will not focus on public statements or journalistic comments, as the emphasis of this thesis is on government elites consensus. Despite the focus on policy actors, the divergence between public opinion and pro-EU elite consensus will be considered when relevant.42
My proposed discourse analysis poses some challenges but also enables me to make some useful contributions. Admittedly, assessing the impact of discourse on policy formation is difficult, thus the thesis will not claim to explain policy actions but rather the thinking behind these actions. The analysis will assume a correlation but not causality between thinking/discourse and policy. For instance, I am not arguing that the discourse on the Baltic ghetto or periphery encouraged Lithuanian government elites to accelerate the integration process but rather reflected the perceptions of the elites who steeped in this thinking pursued EU membership.
The thesis will contribute in both theoretical and practical terms to the study of EU enlargement and the Lithuanian accession case. Theoretically, the in-depth study of the Lithuanian case can enhance the understanding of the complexities of elite motivations for EU enlargement and decision-making processes for candidate countries. Practically, by working with primary materials and conducting interviews,
41 42
Lietuvos Integracijos ES Finansini, Ekonomini Ir Socialini Pasekmi Susisteminimas ir Analiz Statistics from the Euro-barometer will be used for public opinion analysis.
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the thesis will gather and process a large amount of data that is still absent from secondary sources in either Lithuanian or English.
The selected time frame for study is from August 1991 when the EU recognized Lithuanias independence to December 2002 when Lithuania successfully concluded accession negotiations at the Copenhagen European Council.43 Though the thesis is not structured in a historical or chronological fashion, the two general phases of preand post-decision to submit an EU membership application in 1995 will be considered. The pre-1995 years demonstrate what initial motivations shaped Lithuanian EU policy and the decision to submit the EU application. After 1995, though Lithuania was in the process of deliberation, preparation, and negotiation for EU membership, the country had already to a great extent the set its trajectory in foreign policy and was only implementing it.
A key episode between 1997 and 2000 demonstrated that Lithuanias EU policy was not predetermined even after the application submission and highlights the importance of external events in shaping it. This particular episode will be analysed in a subsequent chapter as a key case which contained an interplay of various elements such as economic pressures, public scepticism, historical fears, the European Commissions (EC) decisions and the Russian financial crisis. This episode is also worthy of examination because it emphasizes the distinct conditions in Lithuania from 1997 to 2000 in comparison to the other Baltic states. Lithuania was the only state among its neighbours that experienced the double disappointment of EU and NATO
43
The analysis does not extend to up to when Lithuania officially became a member of the EU in May 2004, because after the negotiations were completed in December 2002 Lithuanias membership was certain and the nature of Lithuanias policy motivations could not be analyzed in the same manner as in the pre-2002 period.
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exclusion when Estonia was invited to start negotiations with the EU and Latvia had less reason to expect an invitation from NATO. In addition, Lithuania was the most affected by the Russian financial crisis. Thus, the years from 1997 to 2000 in Lithuania were marked by trials and tribulations for its EU and Western-oriented policy more so than for the other Baltic states and most Central and Eastern European states. The years from 1997 to 2000 will demonstrate to what extent Lithuanias pivotal decision-making episodes were driven by material or ideation factors such as negative economic externalities or the fear of being left out of European developments. The case study will prove the main argument of the thesis that ideational factors made material considerations decisive in Lithuanias EU policy.
Structure of Study Following this introduction, the thesis consists of three core chapters. The second chapter, entitled Economic Factors of Lithuanias EU Policy, examines the changing salience of economic factors in Lithuanias EU policy from 1991 to 2002. The analysis will proceed thematically rather than chronologically, focusing on the role of rational utility, domestic politics and ideational factors in economic considerations.
The third chapter, entitled Political and Security Factors in Lithuanias EU Policy, examines the evolution of political and security concerns in Lithuanias EU policy from 1991 to 2002. The analysis proceeds thematically focusing on hard and soft security concerns and political voice. The impact of domestic politics and ideational factors in the sphere of political and security concerns is also examined.
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The fourth chapter, The Relationship between Material and Ideational Motivations in Lithuanias EU Policy: 1997 to 2000, will consider a crucial period in Lithuanias accession process to demonstrate how economic, political, and security considerations were made more salient by ideational factors. The analysis will reveal the important role of external conditions for Lithuanias foreign policy while concluding that domestic political conditions have played a more modest role.
Lastly, the conclusion will summarize the findings and consider what insights from the Lithuanian EU accession policy can be applied to Lithuanias general foreign policy as well as the Baltic and CEE accession.
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Chapter 2: Economic Factors of Lithuanias EU Policy
The following chapter will elucidate the main hypothesis that ideational factors complemented material considerations and so made them more salient during key episodes of Lithuanian policy on EU membership. The following analysis will emphasize the tension in Lithuanias EU accession process between economic and ideational factors, between the perceived losses and gains of integration. This chapter will demonstrate that calculations of economic benefits of EU membership were not significant in making the initial decision to seek EU membership in 1995 and came to play an increasingly important but still not decisive role from the late 1990s onwards and especially from 2000 to 2002.
First the evolution of Lithuanias EU policy will be examined to demonstrate the ways in which economic cost-benefit analysis figured in elite thinking. Second, a thematic explanation using rational utility considerations, domestic politics and ideational factors, will be used to identify how ideational factors influenced material considerations and ultimately ensured the success of Lithuanias EU policy.
The Changing Salience and Nature of Economic Concerns Lithuanias relationship with the EU started at the same time as Lithuania was establishing its independence and renewing its statehood. The first point of contact was political not economic when in August of 1991, the EU recognized the independence of Lithuania. The economic relationship began only a year later in May 1992 when Lithuania and the European Community signed the Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Co-operation which came into force in 1993 and
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provided Most Favoured Nation trade status. The first economically significant accords were the Agreements on Trade and Trade Related Matters, signed by all of the Baltic states in July of 1994 and activated in the beginning of 1995. In June of 1995, Lithuania, along with the other Baltic states signed the Association (Europe) Agreement, which explicitly recognized its wish to become an EU member.
In the years leading up to Lithuanias submission of the EU application, economic factors and particularly rationalist cost-benefit calculations did not figure significantly in Lithuanias policy towards the EU for two main reasons. First, in the early 1990s, Lithuania had pressing priorities other than economic development. The primary policy goals at the time were political: the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces, securing full independence despite being in the Russian sphere of influence, and establishing relationships with various international organizations.44 Secondly, in the early 1990s, EU membership was still an abstract and to some extent unattainable goal, thus, calculations of transfer payments, increased FDI and trade volumes would have been premature. Throughout most of the 1990s, when economic considerations were mentioned in political or social discourse they were expressed in vague and general terms. The EU was often understood as synonymous with Europe and the West, representing a successful economic model, wealth and efficiency which Lithuania hoped to emulate and be part of.45 But, before the application for membership was submitted in 1995, the government had not fully considered the economic consequences of EU membership: studies on the implications of EU membership on the Lithuanian economy had not entered the elite or public discourse
44
These factors will be addressed in depth in the following chapter on political and security considerations for EU membership. 45 Zaneta Ozolina The EU and the Baltic States in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds., Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 208
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and the government continued to pursue an economic relationship with Russia and the CIS. Thus the Lithuanian EU application was submitted before economic arguments gained salience or traction among the political class.
The years between 1997 and 2000 marked a significant shift in Lithuanias perceptions of EU which were reshaped by two important external economic events. The first event was the decision of the EU Commission in 1997 to exclude Lithuania from the first round of negotiations for membership. The second event was the Russian financial crisis of 1998, which resulted in difficult economic conditions for the year of 1999. These two events brought about a shift in perceptions of EU policy and benefits by the public and the government. Estonias inclusion in the negotiations, arguably due to Estonias better economic performance, highlighted the weakness of some aspects of Lithuanias economic policy and highlighted the need for greater economic reforms. Between these turning-point years of 1997 and 2000, the policies of trying to exploit the economic opportunities offered by Russia and the CIS were fully abandoned in favour of a clear orientation toward the EU. The need for reforms and EU membership was emphasized by the effects of the Russian crisis on the Lithuanian and the Baltic economy. Elite discourse centred on the need to escape a dependency on unstable Russian markets and a fear of being left out of EU enlargement, which would position Lithuania in a vulnerable grey zone between the East and the West. However, the public reacted to economic uncertainty of the late 1990s, evincing a Euro-scepticism that was mostly ignored by political forces in economic policy formulation but at times addressed or exploited in the domestic political sphere.
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From the time that Lithuania started its negotiations with the EU in 2000 and until the completion of negotiations in 2002, a rationalist utility approach towards EU membership began appearing more frequently in government discourse and policy. In general, the rationalist analysis that appeared in the late 1990s and gained force from 2000 to 2002, demonstrates the thinking behind Lithuanias negotiation strategy rather than thinking behind EU membership policy. Government studies such as the Analysis of Financial, Economic, and Social Implications of Lithuanias Integration to the EU were carried out so the policy class could better understand the economic dimensions of EU integration and its effects on the Lithuanian economy and society as EU negotiations commenced in February of 2000. Still, ideational factors remained influential in elite calculations. Some of the rationalist concerns such as the downsizing effects of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on Lithuanian agriculture, which employes 20 percent of the labour force, were were coloured by Lithuanian national identity as an agrarian nation. The EU-stipulated closure of the old Soviet Ignalina nuclear plant, which was an important source of energy for the state, was ideationally appealing due to historical antagonism towards Soviet enviromental damage.
Rational Utility Considerations Lithuanias negotiated EU package was deemed very good by the government. In the words of Purlys, the Negotiations Delegations First Secretary and head of the Integration Politics department, Lithuania secured one of the best financial packets for infrastructure, agriculture and social investments.46 In direct transfers alone, Lithuania
46
Vidmantas Purlys Derybu del Lietuvos Narystees ES Apzvalga (2000 m vasario 15d 2002 gruodzio 13d ) in Klaudijus Maniokas, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, and Darius Zeruolis, eds., Lietuvos Kelias I Europos Sajunga Europos Susivienijimas ir Lietuvos Derybos del Narystes Europos Sajungoje, Eugrimas, Vilnius, 2004, p. 127
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negotiated a sizable assistance package from the EU - around EUR 200 million in preaccession assistance during 2003, including assistance for nuclear decommissioning of its Ignalina plant. After accession, Lithuania was poised to be one of the countries with the highest rate per capita of EU funds (EUR 769 for 2004-2006, out of which EUR 208 were devoted to agriculture). In terms of EU allocations, Lithuania was to be a net beneficiary: its per capita contribution to the EU budget totalling EUR 147, while receipts were EUR 535. 47 In hindsight it seems that Lithuania was certain to gain economically from EU membership. At first glance one might therefore conclude that the Lithuanian membership was over-determined. However, the Lithuanian elites and public were not privileged with this hindsight and the realities in the preaccession decade often differed from the final package. Furthermore, perceptions of costs and benefits of EU membership were not based solely on numbers.
This section will: 1) outline the changing rationalist and ideational assumptions surrounding trade with Russia, 2) provide a costs and benefits summary of the final package as it was presented by key Lithuanian studies, and 3) offer an in-depth analysis of Lithuanias key issues of accession agriculture and the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, which demonstrate that the perceptions of strategic benefits and costs were significantly coloured by ideational factors.
The Costs of Benefits of Lithuanias Russian Trade Lithuanias geographic location and historical legacy have positioned the state to benefit from trade and contacts with both Western Europe and Russia. Though Lithuania has continuously maintained ties with both camps, different rational calculations and ideational considerations have influenced Lithuanias trade
47
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/lithuania/
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orientation at different times. Comparing and contrasting Lithuanias trade with Russia and its trade with the EU is instructive when considering rational and ideational influences in Lithuanias economic policies.
Although the official commitment to EU membership was firm after 1995, in the mid1990s the governments of the Baltic states still had not given serious consideration to the economic implications of EU membership. This is evident from government policies which tried to pursue an economic strategy which sought a balance between a re-orientation towards the stable market in the West and the continued exploitation of the opportunities offered by Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) a market which was well known and which had a potential for development. Initially, Russia and the CIS represented 95 percent of all Baltic foreign trade. In the years immediately after the Soviet collapse, some aspects of this trade greatly increased.48 Economic ties with CIS can be understood as a pragmatic approach of the new Lithuanian government [LDDP] of maintaining and fostering old commercial ties with the CIS. Latvia took a similar approach while Estonia was the only Baltic state that made considerable strides to reorient its trade to the West.49 The benefits of trade with the former Soviet Union were enticing all the way until the Russian financial crises of 1998.50 The fact that Lithuania actively pursued trade with Russia in the early 1990s weakens the argument that Lithuanias EU membership was overdetermined from an economic standpoint and demonstrates that Lithuanian elites were not fully convinced of the economic benefits of EU membership. This supports my
48 49
Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 208 Misiunas J. Romuald, National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic States, in S. Fredrick Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, New York and London, 1994, p. 106 50 Kazys Bobelis, Member of Parliament, confirmed that trade with the East was natural and offered a guaranteed market for Lithuanian products before the Russian crisis. Interview by author 11 April 2006.
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view that cost-benefit calculations did not determine Lithuanias early EU policy as membership was still pursued even without rational economic conviction.
The Russian financial crisis51 rippled through the Baltic economies due to significant economic ties between the two regions. 1999 was a culmination of economic decline with a contraction of GDP by 4.1 percent and a rise of government debt to LTL13 billion. The dangers of a close economic relationship with Russia and the CIS became clear and Lithuanian elites accelerated the accession process with the EU. After 1998, trade with the CIS declined rapidly and shifted toward EU markets. By 1999,
Lithuania exported considerably more to the EU than to the CIS (EUR 1,616 million versus EUR 1,164 million) while Lithuanias imports from EU increased to EUR 2,095 million and from Russia decreased to EUR 534 million in 1999.
52
As these
rationalist motivations reinvigorated Lithuanias relationship with the EU, the economic chaos to the east increasingly became an ideational motivating factor for the government elites to reform the Lithuanian economy so it could become a part of the stable and secure economic environment of the EU.53 The Lithuanian historical experience with an unstable Russia further reinforced this ideational motive to escape economic dependency on the chaotic East.
Economic Opportunities and Costs of Lithuanias EU Package Though Lithuania was due to be a net beneficiary from the EU budget and received sizable transfers, there were broader economic costs and benefits of integration that should be considered to understand Lithuanias EU package. Factors of EU
51
The effects of the Russian financial crisis on Lithuanias economic and EU policy will be analysed in greater depth in Chapter Four. 52 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 208 53 Ibid., p. 208
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integration that had a significant impact on the Lithuanian economy were: the removal of barriers to trade in goods and services; the removal of barriers to the circulation of capital; the removal of barriers to movement of labour; regulatory measures in line with the EU acquis in the area of the internal market; and common rules in selected sectors including agriculture, the EMU, and external trade policy.54 It was estimated that due to integration Lithuanias exports alone will be about 1.9 times higher in 2002-2009 than they would have otherwise been under the hypothetical scenario of non-integration. However, it was noted in several studies that it is difficult to isolate the potential effects of EU integration from those that would have occurred anyway due to globalisation or the transformative process for a transitional economy.55 Thus some of perceived costs and benefits of EU integration may have occurred anyway even if Lithuanian had not sought EU membership.
A government sponsored study anticipated that integration to the EU will have a positive impact on the GDP of Lithuania. Lithuanias GDP in the period of 2002-2009 would be higher by about LTL 65.9 billion (LTL 11.4 billion in 2009 alone) than it would have been under the non-integration scenario.56 Furthermore, Lithuanias
economy will experience net growth even when accounting for the costs of integration from 2002-2009 of about 1.14 percentage points faster than under the hypothetical scenario of non-integration. The government study expected that due to the effects of the accession process from 2002 to 2009 investments in the Lithuanian economy will
54
Ramunas Vilpisauskas and Guoda Steponaviciute The Baltic States: The Economic Dimension in Helena Tang, ed., Winners and Losers of EU Integration: Policy Issues for Central and Eastern Europe, The World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000, p. 55 55 Ibid., p. 53. See also Edmundas Piesarskas, Lietuvos Integracijos I ES Finansiniu, Ekonominiu, ir Socialiniu Pasekmiu Susiteminimas ir Analize, Europos Komitetas prie Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybes, Ekonomines Konsultacijos ir Tyrimai, 2002(a) 56 Edmundas Piesarskas, Summary: Systemisation and Analysis of Fianncial, Economic and Social Implications of Lithuanias Integration to the EU, The European Committee under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2002(b), p. 1-11
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amount to LTL 23 billion, which will include LTL 9 billion from the EU funds, LTL 4.5 billion of public investments, and the remainder from the private sector. Grants from EU and donor countries will amount to LTL 15 billion for 2002-2009.
According to this government study the costs associated with integration will amount to LTL 16 billion from 2002-2009. A significant part of these costs LTL 4.3 billion are payments made by Lithuania to the EU budget. For the years of 2004-2006 it has been estimated that Lithuanian payments to the EU budget will account for 1.2 percent of GDP annually. However, as previously noted, Lithuanias receipts from the EU budget will be higher than its payments to the EU budget, and this positive difference will gradually increase in the first few years of membership. Excluding the costs of decommissioning of the Ignalina plant, the net positive difference between budgetary transfers amounted to EUR 258 million (about LTL 890 million) in 2004, EUR 392 million (about LTL 1353 million) in 2005, and EUR 525 million (about LTL 1813 million) in 2006.
In addition, many individual sectors in the Lithuanian economy required sizable capital investments in order to meet EU standards. It was estimated that for agriculture and industries, the total need for investments in approximation to the EU requirements in the period of 2002-2009 almost seven times exceeds the total amount of payments to be received from the EU over the same period. However, it must be taken into account that a large portion of the investments would have been made even if Lithuania had not decided to join the EU. The investments would, in any case, have been necessitated by the globalisation processes, by the goal to achieve international competitiveness, and by the geographical position.57
57
Piesarskas, 2002(b), p. 6
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In summary, Lithuania was poised to gain from the effects of EU integration, though it was difficult to ascertain to what extent the noted gains were from EU accession and would not have been achieved through the process of transitioning to a market economy and opening to globalization. However the fact that these studies were completed and entered the academic and political debate only in 2000 or 2002, demonstrates that rationalist cost-benefit calculations became salient only in the period of negotiations but not at the time of application for EU membership. Furthermore, the numbers often do not tell the story of how each of these benefits and costs were perceived by the Lithuanian political elites in the years leading up to accession and if they impacted Lithuanias EU policy. A closer look at two key economic issues of accession will fill in the details for the rationalist framework.
Agriculture and Ignalina: Lithuanias Sensitive Issue Areas The two main economic concerns that arose specifically for Lithuania regarding EU membership were agriculture and the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant (NPP). By examining these most sensitive issues, it is possible to get a clearer picture of the extent to which material and ideational considerations played a role in Lithuanias economic aims regarding EU membership. The two cases also reveal how ideational and material factors interacted.
According to recent official studies the agricultural sector will experience benefits from integration and the CAP. It was estimated that between 2002 and 2009, there will be LTL 6 billion investments into the agricultural sector, of which LTL 0.4 billion will be invested by the Lithuanian government. From 2002 to 2009, the total transfers and
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support from EU funds for agriculture will be LTL 7 billion. In addition, there will be LTL 4.5 billion benefits from the increased agricultural product prices and the increased production capabilities.58 However, the rational EU benefits for the agricultural sector were rarely mentioned in the Lithuanian political and public discourse. Instead, concerns were voiced about the social costs of restructuring the sector and ideational considerations arose due to the agrarian character of Lithuania.
The agricultural sector has traditionally represented a larger share of the Baltic economies, Lithuania in particular, than is usual in industrial countries. For example, in 1990, agriculture made up 28 percent of GDP in Lithuania. While agricultural GDP input decreased to 9 percent by 1999, 20 percent of the Lithuanian population was still employed in the agricultural sector.59 In fact the agricultural labour force increased since it absorbed workers made redundant in other sectors. For example in 1990, the agricultural sector accounted for 17.8 percent of labour while in 1997 it rose to 20.8 percent.60 Due to the disproportional segment of the population living and working in the Lithuanian countryside, there were thorny issues to be considered when restructuring the agricultural sector that were not apparent from the positive statistics of CAP investments and transfer payments. President Adamkus discussed some of these considerations in 2000: In my opinion, the most difficult challenges lie for our agriculture. Today 30 percent of the Lithuanian population lives in the countryside. As you know, in industrial states like Germany about 2 percent of the population work in the agricultural sector and they feed a population of over 50 million. In Lithuania there are 30 percent farmers, while the nations population is 3.7 million. Lithuania was traditionally a farming country, but we will have to reduce the workers in this sector to 10 percent.61
58 59
Piesarskas, 2002(a), p. 16 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 219 60 Hilary Ingham and Mike Ingham, EU Expansion to the East, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002, p. 33 61 Adamkus, Valdas, Penkeri Darbo Metai, Baltos Lankos, Vilnius, 2002, p. 309
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Reducing the number of workers in the agricultural sector created social costs and was difficult to accomplish politically. Farmers, making up a large portion of the population and one that was politically organized with the Farmers Party (Valstieiu Partija) opposed EU membership despite the predicted overall benefits for the sector from integration. Throughout the late 1990s, Lithuanian farmers the largest lobby groups in the country have managed to receive import protection from the government, even when such protection contradicted international obligations of Lithuania in its accession process.62
While for the economists the transformation and reduction of the agricultural sector may seem like an efficient development, it is important to note that in Lithuania agriculture retains a certain special and sentimental place in the minds of the public that stems from the Lithuanian agrarian national identity that was formulated in the nineteenth century.63 Thus, social and ideational issues have coloured the perception and policies on Lithuanian agriculture in the face of EU integration. Public discourse has been filled with calls for protection of farmers against the EU agenda: if farmers are not protected than agriculture will die in Lithuania which will threaten the foundations of the state since the Lithuanians do not have anything else but land.64 In summary, though according to rational utility analysis EU integration is beneficial for the Lithuanian agricultural sector, ideational factors have prevented CAP from being seen in a positive light in elite and public discourse. From the social and identity perspective, CAP threatens to destroy the social fabric of the Lithuanian countryside and jeopardize the Lithuanian national identity.
62 63
Vilpisauskas and Steponaviciute in Tang, p. 59 Writers and activists such as Donelaitis, Baranauskas, and others idealized Lithuania as a nation of small farmers living close to their land and avoiding foreign influences. 64 Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001, p. 51
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The EUs request to close the Ignalina NPP due to safety reasons was the other main concern for Lithuania. The Ignalina Protocol for the Accession Treaty stipulated that Lithuania is committed, at EU request, to close Unit 1 of Ignalina before 2005 and Unit 2 by 2009. For Lithuania this was no easy choice since in 1995, the year it submitted its application to the EU, Lithuania was ranked the worlds most nuclear dependent country with 85 percent dependency.65 In contrast to the case of agriculture, in terms of rational utility the closure appeared costly for the Lithuanian state. However, the public and the government were generally more receptive to this cost of EU membership than the perceived costs of agricultural reform.
The costs of decommissioning the Ignalina plant were estimated at around LTL 1.8 billion for the period of 2002-2009, excluding investments in construction of new power plants, modernisation of the existing power plants, and implementation of environmental measures. In total, due to EU integration the energy sector from 2002 to 2009 would require an investment of LTL 3.7 billion and would experience losses of LTL 2.2 billion. Most of these investments and costs stem from the closure of Ignalina and implementation of environmental projects in the energy sector. The government would experience costs of 655 million, which would be used to finance the closure of Ignalina and investments into structural funds. 66
Despite the high anticipated costs, the EU was quite parsimonious with regard to compensation and assistance causing a considerable amount of resentment in Lithuania during the years of negotiations. In the end, Lithuania negotiated a
65
Mel Huang, Electricity in the Air: The Real Power Politics in the Baltics, Defence Academy of the UK, London, UK 2002, p. 2 66 Piesarskas, 2002(a), p. 4
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decommissioning package of EUR 285 million for 2004-2006 from the EU, who initially only offered EUR 210 millions, and continuous support for Lithuania's decommissioning efforts after 2007.67 In total, Lithuania anticipated receiving funds of over LTL 2 billion during 2002-2009 from various sources such as EU, donor countries, and structural funds. 68
However, the above numbers should not be taken at face value and, to a degree, risk being misleading. In the case of the Ignalina power plant, for instance, EU subventions covered the cost of closure of the plant and perhaps some social spending for the unemployed members of the sector while, in the end leaving Lithuania with a need to find an alternative source of energy and deprived the country of a potential source of revenue in power export. For instance, in 1998 the Ignalina plant generated 77 percent of Lithuanias electricity. Also in the 1990s, Lithuanias electricity output doubled between 1994 and 1996 as residential energy consumption increased. In addition to meeting its growing internal demand of energy, the state had been generating income from exporting energy to its neighbours such as Latvia, Kaliningrad, and Belarus.69 Lastly, Ignalina had strategic importance for Lithuania: it provided electricity even when Russian oil flows were reduced or interrupted. According to Clemens, many Lithuanians who had wanted after the 1986 Chernobyl meltdown to close down Ignalina had changed their minds in the 1990s, when Russia showed it could stop oil deliveries to Lithuania.70
67 68
Purlys in Maniokas, Vilpisauskas, and Zeruolis, p. 124 Piesarskas, 2002(a), p. 16 69 Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002, p. 140 70 Ibid., p. 141
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Thus, it is unsurprising that initially some Lithuanian elites were cautious in complying with EU requests and shutting down the power plant. In 1998, the government of Prime Minister Vagnorius had second thoughts. The head of the Nuclear Energy Division in Lithuanias Economic Ministry, citing an international study, argued that there were no safety reasons to close the Ignalina plant.71 Rather than searching for alternative sources of energy, the Vagnorius government wanted to export electrical energy across Poland to Western Europe and looked for ways to extend Ignalinas life to 2015. Opponents said that shutting down Ignalina would spell economic suicide for Lithuania and said that total costs from the shutdown would run into billion of dollars far more than any aid tendered by the EU.72
Yet by 1999, Lithuanias parliament, led by Western-oriented politicians such as Landbergis and President Adamkus, agreed to close one of Ignalinas two reactors by 2005. In 2002 President Adamkus explained the logic behind Lithuanias willingness to close the plant by saying our nuclear reactors are not permanent. We will be able to avoid shutting them down in the future. Perhaps it will be rational to replace them with newer more modern ones. [The] European Commission is offering us support. Thus, it is necessary now for Lithuania to negotiate the most beneficial terms.73
Yet it was not just a rational choice to dismantle the reactors. It can be argued that ideational factors played a role in Lithuanias decision. Significantly, the independence movement in the Baltics was greatly associated with the environmentalist movement against the rampant pollution of the Soviet years. In
71
Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the Integration Dilemma, Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 32 72 Clemens, p. 140-1 73 Adamkus 2002, p. 246
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Lithuania, in the late 1980s, there was a strong public movement against the building of the third nuclear reactor in Ignalina by the Soviets, and many of current government elites had participated in that movement. It is possible that the general unpopularity of these Soviet-imposed nuclear reactors made the decision to close Ignalina easier.
In summary, the sums and differences of rational costs and benefits of EU membership do not appear to have been decisive in Lithuanias two key issue areas. Despite calculated benefits from CAP, the transformation of the agricultural sector was perceived to be one of the main drawbacks of EU membership for Lithuania. On the other hand, the seemingly costly closure of Ignalina did not preclude membership.
Domestic Politics By the mid- to late 1990s, economic factors of EU membership entered the Lithuanian domestic politics. As has been noted in the previous section, the perceived negative effects of CAP resulted in the Farmers Party opposing EU membership. However, from the economic sphere, it was the EU reforms that became one of the most salient issues of domestic politics. Lithuanian political elites used EU reforms instrumentally: at some stages using the EU to justify the needed reforms to the public while at other stages emphasizing the stand-alone necessity of reforms when Euro-scepticism rose among the Lithuanian public. The elites realized that economic, political, and societal reforms must be completed for Lithuania to transform itself after fifty years of planned economy and non-democratic government even without the prospect of EU membership. However, there was a hope among the policy class that EU membership and the accession process would accelerate reform implementation through the
46
expertise and pressure of the EU. There was also a tactical use of EU policy to implement reforms in order to make them politically less costly for the governing elites. Government officials often presented their reform agendas by stating that this is a direct request from Brussels. With high public support for EU membership in the early years of the transition (1990-1993) 74, the government elites sought to gain from such tactics.
In spite of this instrumental reliance on the EU to speed reforms, the Lithuanian elites often dragged their feet on implementation. By the mid-90s , the Baltic states had started implementing pre-accession strategies of the Association Agreements and the White Paper75 which in effect meant implementing costly reforms. The costs of the acquis were already beginning to be felt in the first years of seeking EU membership, while the potential benefits still lay far ahead and were still intangible.76 By 1997, when the Commission made its recommendations, Lithuania and Latvia had completed fewer reforms than Estonia and because of this some argue, they were not invited to the first round of negotiations.
The decision of the EU Commission was both a wake up call to the government elites and a new opportunity to use the EU as an anchor to push through the needed but costly economic reforms. The discourse on the necessity of economic reforms became very prominent by the end of 1998. In his Annual Address for the start of 1999, President Adamkus implied that Lithuanias rejection from the first round of negotiations was due to the slow reforms and emphasized the need to speed up
74
Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes Central and East European Views on EU Enlargement: Political Debates and Public Opinion in Karen Henderson, ed., Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester, 1999, p. 186 75 Vilpisauskas and Steponaviciute in Tang, p. 57 76 With the exception of the PHARE program which provided funding for the Baltic states and had been operating in Lithuania since 1992
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domestic reforms in the annual address.77 Adamkus emphasized not only the economic aspects of domestic reform such as improving the tax collection system, private investment, and the structure of the agricultural sector but also called for a modernization of the state and its governing, issuance of new laws, improving the judicial system, fighting corruption, and reforming education.78 Adamkus explained the poor economic performance of 1999 as nothing less but the price of nonimplemented reforms. The price of politics biased towards the inertia of the past and the fear of change.79 Adamkus emphasis on non-implemented reforms as the greatest ill for the Lithuanian economy and only a brief mention of the Russian financial crisis during this Annual Address highlights the instrumental usage of the EU reforms in domestic politics. By 2000, at a high point of Euro-scepticism, there was also a noticeable change in elite tactics regarding EU reforms. In another Annual Address, Adamkus addressed the public backlash against EU-driven reforms and the tendency of politicians to blame the costs of reforms on the integration process. Adamkus stated: Today I want to emphasize once more what I have said many times: all reforms, which we planned to fulfil before joining the EU, are being implemented for our own benefit, not because the EU demands it. The argument that Brussels wants this should be eliminated from the political vocabulary by taking any political decision, first we must answer what we ourselves need.80 While Lithuanian elites adjusted their discourse on reforms to changes in public opinion on the EU (from high public support in the early 1990s to Euro-scepticism of the late 1990s), one should not conclude that the Lithuanian elites based their reform agenda on public opinion. Despite, the high public support for the EU in the early
77 78
Adamkus 2001, p. 34 Ibid., p. 7-34 79 Ibid., p. 40 80 Adamkus 2001, p. 73
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years of transition (1990-93)
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elites were slow to implement reforms. The lowest
point in terms of public opinion on EU membership for Lithuania was in the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000, when those against exceeded those for EU membership (35 percent versus 29 percent and the remainder voting neutral). Yet this was also the time when the Lithuanian government reiterated its EU membership goal and accelerated reform efforts. The following chapters on security factors and the key episode study will demonstrate that public opinion did not generally play a major role in Lithuanias EU policy decisions. In fact, throughout the decade of seeking EU membership public opinion and elite EU views often clashed. For example, as this chapter revealed, an opportunistic policy of close economic relationship with Russia was pursued at times of greatest Euro-enthusiasm among the public.
Ideational Considerations The ideational factors that underscored economic considerations regarding EU membership were centred on two complementary constructs: projections of the EU as a model to be emulated and the fear of being left out of Europe. From the days predating Lithuanias independence movement to 2002, the EU was perceived as a model of wealth, economic growth, efficiency and social progress. The discourse of the government elites continuously emphasized the economic benefits of EU in symbolic ways - viewing the EU as an ideal to be achieved. This hope of emulation stemmed from the understanding of the EU as an anchor for reforms and Lithuanias sole instrument for progress. For example, Adamkus stated in 2000: Today, we could, without the support of others, try to remedy the decades of falling behind the Western worlds progress. But let us not forget that the West does not stand still. In many cases it is transforming much faster than us.
81
Grabbe and Hughes, p. 186
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Thus, the only real chance for Lithuania to escape provincial backwardness is to get on the fast Europe train.82 Autreviius, the Lithuanian EU negotiation teams second man, called the EU one of the main drivers of our internal reforms and said that no one has come up with anything better than EU membership. For Lithuania EU means political stability, state security, economic growth, and social welfare. More than half of Lithuanian people associate a better life with EU.83 In 2000, the Foreign minister of Lithuania, Saudargas clearly linked the foreign policy goal of EU membership to domestic aspirations and policies by stating that EU membership is an essential means for Lithuanian economic and societal modernization.84 The view that EU membership presented the best available path for Lithuanias development heavily influenced foreign and domestic policies. Alternatives to EU membership were never seriously considered, as ideational considerations made the case for EU membership appear demonstrably more persuasive than any other options.
Though ideational factors continued to play an important role in the elite thinking, by 2002, a more practical approach started appearing in the discourse of the government that sought to understand in rational, material terms the potential economic benefits of EU membership. Autreviius, wrote in 2002 that Integration euphoria has been replaced with a practical concern how to best prepare for membership, what membership means and how it is beneficial to us.85 Yet while the government elites started considering EU membership in practical terms in addition to ideational ones, the public and the media continued in their overwhelmingly symbolic interpretation of
82 83
Italics added. Adamkus 2001, p.44 Petras Autreviius, Tautinis Identitetas ir Vieningos Europos Raida, in Darius Staliunas, Europos Ideja Lietuvoje: Istorija ir Dabartis, LII Leidykla, 2002, p. 172 84 Purlys in Maniokas,Vilpisauskas and Zeruolis, p. 98. 85 Autreviius in Staliunas, p. 172
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the Union. The persistence of the euphoric rhetoric presenting the EU as the answer to all of Lithuanias economic problems is highlighted by the dialogue between newspaper Obzor and President Adamkus in 2002: Obzor: The media from morning to evening announces that our future is the integration to NATO and EU. All of this is presented as panacea from all illnesses. Can it be that as soon as we have joined these organizations all problems will be solved? Can it be that uncle foreigner will solve our difficulties? Adamkus I want to say it clearly neither NATO nor EU is the kite that will bring us fortunes. Everything depends on us. Organizations about which we are taking are only a means to create wellbeing and security. For example, the Irish have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by the EU and today are one of the economic leaders of EU.86 Even though elites started to analyze EU policies from a rational perspective, not solely from an ideational one, the importance of ideational factors cannot be underestimated in Lithuanias EU policy. The rationalist analysis gained force only in 2002, when Lithuania had already concluded EU accession negotiations and Lithuanias EU policy was unlikely to be reversed.
The second important ideational aspect that influenced elites understanding of the economic benefits of EU membership was the perceived political, economic, and cultural insecurity of Lithuania as a newly independent state on the cross roads of greater geopolitical divisions and the consequent fear of being left out of the EU. The ideational arguments were often intertwined with the fear of negative economic repercussions of non-membership but were often disproportionate in comparison to the material dangers. Vinogradnaite, in a study of policy class discourse, notes that in Lithuania Europe was understood as a closed entity and that a state remaining outside the borders of the EU cannot be called a European state. Thus discourse on the possibility of staying out of EU utilized phrases such as Lithuania will become the
86
Adamkus 2002, p. 247
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province of Europe, on the outskirts of Europe.87 At the same time, even before Lithuania was offered membership, the perception of belonging to an exclusive European club was to some extent already present at the pre-accession stage when Lithuania was an associate member. In the words of Landsbergis, Association membership in the EU, was celebrated almost as membership itself, since it implied proximity to Europe we were no longer in the backyard [of Europe] surrounded by vicious dogs.88
While this fear of being left out of Europe was pervasive from 1991 to 2002 it became most marked in the few years from 1997 to 2000. During this episode the gap between ideational fears and real material losses increased. The possibility of being left out of the EU while another Baltic State Estonia was invited to start negotiations marked a psychological blow to the government elites of Lithuania. Political discourse became centred on visions of Lithuania as a non-EU member being stuck in a Baltic ghetto or a grey zone between enlarging EU and revanchist Russia.89 Lithuanias Prime Minister Vagnorius warned a meeting of the European Parliaments Christian Democrats that barring his country and Latvia from the first wave of enlargement could stoke security tensions in the Baltic region and create new dividing lines in Europe.90 Though Lithuania was only being left out from the first round of the negotiation process, and its application was being reviewed in just a years time, the EUs decision was interpreted as monumental and irreversibly detrimental to national interests. This key episode and the accompanying ideational aspects will be discussed at length in the last chapter.
87 88
Inga Vinogradnaite, Kelias Europon: Europiestiskojo Identiteto Konstravimas, in Staliunas, p. 187 Vytautas Landsbergis, interviewed by author, 11 April 2006. 89 Herd Graeme, The Baltic States and EU Enlargement, in Henderson, p. 262, 267 90 Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union, Sheffield Academic Press, 1999, p. 123
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In summary, ideational aspects were closely intertwined with the perceived benefits and costs of EU membership. Since ideational constructs of the EU as a model and the dangers of non-membership complemented the rationalist motivations for reforms and the fears of negative economic externalities of non-membership, the ideational factors we have noted were particularly salient in Lithuanias EU policy. To be sure, it is difficult to isolate ideational strands that only influenced economic considerations since fears such as being left out of Europe came to influence security, political, and cultural considerations as will be seen in the subsequent chapters.
Conclusions It has been shown that rational utility considerations were not salient for most of Lithuanias decision process of seeking EU membership. Transfer payments and FDI opportunities were hardly motivating factors in the early 1990s as Lithuania was trying to establish its independence and was seeking a relationship with the EU for political recognition and from a desire to move out the Russian sphere of influence. When economic motivations for EU membership did enter elite calculations, they were always highly connected to perceptions. As Vilpisauskas notes in his analysis of Lithuanias economic motivations for seeking EU membership: the EU has been perceived as a centre of economic prosperityIts importance as a source of economic opportunities and resourceshas provided a strong impetus for raising EU membership to the top of the Baltic states foreign policy goals.91 By the mid-1990s, the prospects of transforming the Lithuanian economy along the model proposed by
91
Italics added. Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Regional integration in Europe: Analysing intra-Baltic economic cooperation in the context of European integration, in Vello Pettai, and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 2003, p. 172
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the EU was highly appealing, but may not have been enough to keep Lithuania on the fast track on EU accession. Yet the fear of being left out, a sense of competition with its Baltic neighbours as well as the consequences of the Russian financial crisis cemented Lithuanian elites resolve for membership.
Even though a mathematical calculation of costs and benefits of EU membership probably did result in a yes vote on EU membership, these calculations were not completed in Lithuania until 2000 or even 2002. By this point the policies of seeking EU membership were already a decade old, and thus were motivated by other factors than a rationalist utility analysis. The rationalist utility arguments for the EU were more a tool for a negotiation strategy rather than a deciding factor for seeking EU membership. Furthermore, during the time that rationalist analysis were being completed Lithuania was already negotiating for EU membership and thus EU-geared policies were unlikely to be reversed by the government even in the face of potential costs of membership such as the closure of the Ignalina plant. In addition to the elite consensus on the necessity of EU membership it seems that there was a phenomenon of path dependency for Lithuanian in its EU policy. Even in 2000 when Euroscepticism was high and some politicians questioned the benefits of EU membership, the existing EU policy prevailed. The perceived lack of alternatives for Lithuanian development, highlighted by the Russian financial crisis, was the primary reason for Lithuanias dependency on the EU path.
Economic considerations lacked salience for most of Lithuanias EU membership strategy and process. However, it is not because there were not valid economic benefits to be gained from membership. The Lithuanian accession package and the
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economists projections demonstrate that Lithuania was poised to experience further growth and development from membership, despite some costs of integration. The primary reason that economic considerations by themselves lacked decisive weight is that Lithuanian identity seems to be a dominant factor in its EU policy. This identity stems from Lithuanias geopolitical and economic vulnerability as a new state in transition and is responsible for the two main ideational drivers: an idealized view of the EU as a model for Lithuanias development, and the fear of being left out of Europe.
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Chapter 3: Political and Security Factors in Lithuanias EU Policy
Most analyses of the Baltic accession stress political and particularly security motivations for membership.92 Security however is a complex dimension that stretches from hard to soft security encompassing factors such as military defence considerations, entering or exiting certain spheres of influence, economic and social security, political voice and political access. While security can be analyzed as an objective condition from a rationalist standpoint, in this case greater insight is gained from considering its subjective dimension since Lithuanian cultural perceptions and identity figured greatly in all of the noted security dimensions.
The following chapter will explain Lithuanias EU policy by focusing on the tension and concord between ideational and material factors in Lithuanian elite considerations of EU policy. In examining political and security motivations it is particularly difficult to separate ideational from material concerns as the two are often intertwined and, in the case of Lithuania, reinforce each other. The subsequent analysis will not attempt to separate the political and security motivations into rational and ideational categories as was done in the chapter on economic motivations but in this case proves to be rather artificial. Rather the analysis will emphasize throughout the chapter when ideational factors were at the forefront of security and political considerations. This chapter will demonstrate that political and security motivations were of great importance in Lithuanias aspiration to join Europe, particularly in the years leading up to the decision to seek EU membership in 1995. It will also argue that political and
92
The work of Herd, Grabbe and Hughes, Miniotaite, Ozolina, Tiilikainen, Austrevicius, and Vilpisauskas cited throughout this thesis emphasizes the primacy of security motivations in Lithuanias EU policy.
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security motivations were decisive in creating an EU membership strategy when they were reinforced by complementary ideational factors.
First the chapter will document the way security concerns evolved from 1991 to 2002: becoming less salient after 1995 but at the same time expanding from primarily military concerns to a preoccupation with the broad benefits of soft security and political access. Then, an analysis of hard security, soft security, political voice, and domestic political factors using rationalist and ideational perspectives will follow.
The Changing Salience and Nature of Security Concerns Almost immediately following independence in 1991, Lithuania was concerned about its political and economic security as well as cultural autonomy. While the reasons for, and intensity of, these concerns fluctuated with time, security remained at the forefront of Vilnius EU policy considerations especially in the years leading up to the submission of the application for EU membership in 1995.
Lithuanias political relationship with the EU began in 1991 when the EU recognized Lithuanias independence from the USSR. While this represented a significant political gain for the country, it did little to alleviate the countys immediate security concerns. Recognising that the country continued to face material risks, particularly from Russia who still had troops stationed on Lithuanian soil, Lithuanias leaders embarked on a course to gain full EU membership as one means of enhancing its security. At the onset, however, the countrys top foreign and domestic policy
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objective was to convince Russia to remove its troops which it eventually did in 1993.93
Once Russia withdrew its troops, Lithuania sought and gained entry to the Council of Europe. Membership in the Council was effectively Lithuanias first political step towards EU membership since even though the Council is distinct from the EU no country has ever joined the Union without being a member of the Council. While membership had numerous benefits, the Lithuanian government presented Council membership as an act of security-seeking. According to Landsbergis, the head of Lithuanian state at the time, Lithuanian membership in the Council of Europe meant western political direction, incorporation in and recognition by European structures, thus, political security.94 EU membership, like membership of the Council, was understood primarily and almost exclusively through the prism of political security concerns by Lithuanias policy elites until the application for membership was submitted. Yet these security concerns were driven often not by an imminent Russian threat on the ground but rather by Lithuanian historical experience and by Lithuanias perception of Russia and itself.
After Russian troops left Lithuania in 1993 and Yeltsins brief love affair with the West ended, Russian bellicose rhetoric returned, giving no end of unease to the Lithuanians. In 1996, for example, the Russian Duma decided to recall the agreement regarding the dissolution of the USSR and announced as valid the 1991 referendum
93
See Vytautas Landsbergis , Kryzkele, Lietuvos Aidas, Vilnius 1995 and Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuania: Independent Again, University of Wales Press, Wales, 2000. The other Baltic states had similar foreign policy priorities. See Romuald, J. Misiunas, National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic States, in Fredrick Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, New York and London, 1994, p. 106 94 Landsbergis, 1995, p. 78
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results safeguarding the USSR.95 In another instance, the Russian Defence Research Institute supported by the Ministry of Defence produced a report in 1996 warning that Russia might need to fight in the Baltics in the near future. Anton Surikov, a researcher at the institute, explained that Russia would reoccupy the pribaltika region if the Baltic states joined NATO or tried to expel Russian speakers and that they did not expect the world to respond. On a similar note, Zhirinovsky declared in 1996 I am doing everything to liquidate the Baltic states.96 While this rhetoric represented the opinions of a marginal section of Russian ultranationalist elites rather than official Russian policy, it still caused alarm for the Lithuanians who were all too familiar with the danger of ignoring Russian antagonism. Bellicose Russian rhetoric was not, however, all hot air. In fact, Russia made several moves beginning in the late 1990s that were viewed as decidedly pugnacious by Lithuanian leaders. For instance, in the summer of 1999, Russian military manoeuvres took place on land and sea near to Latvia and Estonia. Landsbergis called the 1999 manoeuvres a gesture of psychological cold war against the Baltic states.97 In 2000, US satellite photos showed that Russia had moved short-range nuclear weapons from St. Petersburg to a storage facility in Kaliningrad.98
While the Russian tactics and rhetoric could have been ignored as posturing by many Western states, the history of Russian aggression in the Baltics led the Lithuanians to conclude that they still faced potential danger from the East. President Adamkus words as late as year 2000 highlighted the security concerns of Lithuania stemming
95
Klaudijus Maniokas and Gediminas Vitkus, Lietuvos Integracija I ES : Bukles, Perspektyviu ir Pasekmiu Studija, Eugrimas, Vilnius 1997, p. 53 96 Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002, p. 188 97 Ibid., p. 190 98 Ibid., p. 196
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from its historical experience and the perception that EU and NATO could provide a solution to these concerns: Can we take risks today regarding NATO and EU issues? I believe, that neither the Lithuanias tragic twentieth century experience, nor present realities allows us to naively speak about national security without alliances. Lets not forget Balys Sruogas [national poet] warning: history destined us to build our home on Vesuvius. The historical responsibility of all Lithuanian citizens is to guarantee a secure future for the nation.99 Furthermore, Russian rhetoric and actions were often magnified by the local media and some political parties to emphasize to the Lithuanian public and at times to the international community the Lithuanian need for international security guarantees against Russia. Thus, due to a genuine fear of Russian threat and due to tactical reasons aimed at the international community, Lithuanian elites still viewed EU membership greatly in security terms and sought security guarantees through membership in NATO throughout the accession decade.
Yet by the late 1990s, Lithuanian and Baltic leaders were becoming less concerned about a military Russian threat in the near future as a clear gap existed between Russias capabilities, resolve, and rhetoric. As such, security in a narrow military sense was less often used to describe the benefits of EU membership. Instead, soft security conceptions consisting of political, economic, environmental and social aspects seemed to sway Vilnius towards EU membership in the years after the submission of the EU membership application. In the late 1990s, another consideration gained salience - the prospect of having a political voice in European affairs and participation in the world community through EU membership. Political voice was seen as both an ideational and rational benefit that was increasingly cited as the negotiation process drew closer. Along with growing awareness of the political
99
Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001, p. 43
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benefits of EU membership by 2000, there was a growing concern about the political costs of joining the EU such as limitations on state sovereignty. By 2000, when Lithuania entered into membership negotiations with the Union, the hard security motivations of the early 1990s had greatly given way to broader considerations of the political benefits and costs of membership.
Hard Security Needs and Concerns While Lithuanians elites had deep concerns over national security, their fears may well have exceeded actual security needs. Furthermore, the hard security concerns of Lithuania often diverged from the EUs capacity to address them. While Lithuanias concerns have been driven by ideational factors, Lithuanias needs are a result of its material factors. In this sense, the preoccupation with security concerns in Lithuanias motives for membership suggests that ideational factors were more important than material factors in Lithuanias accession policy.
The primary hard security objective of Lithuania following 1991 was the desire to maintain its independence and territorial integrity from the potential threat of Russia as noted above. As Misiunas argued in 1994, fear of Russia and of Russians continued to constitute the dominant leitmotif in the foreign and internal policies of all three Baltic nations.100 Since the Balts generally tend to consider most Russians incorrigible imperialists who would if circumstances once again proved favourable, as in 1939-40, move to reincorporate their countries into a greater Russia, 101 Lithuanian foreign policy priorities focused on securing themselves against such circumstances, particularly in the early to mid-1990s.
100
101
Misiunas in Starr, p. 95 Ibid., p. 107
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Initially, there were several possible security policy options available for Lithuania and the Baltic states. Neutrality was the first option, a popular idea in the political discourse in 1989-91 and one that remained an active option until 1994; it was seriously raised as late as 1996. However, it was considered a potentially dangerous strategy especially when the Russian Duma elections of 1995 reflected the ideology of return to the empire. Neutrality was also seen as an increasingly outdated policy in a post-Cold War Europe when other neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden joined the EU 1995.102 Another policy option was to create an alliance of the Baltic states but though this idea attracted popular support in Lithuania it did not take root with the political elites.103 As Landsbergis stated, it was impossible to be neither there [West] nor elsewhere [East].104 Thus the last viable option and the one Lithuania chose to pursue was membership in multilateral alliances such as NATO and the EU.
Though Lithuanian elites evoked hard security concerns throughout the 1990s it is questionable to what extent these concerns were justified. On one hand there were some valid fears in the mid-1990s when nationalist and imperialist rhetoric and actions gained popularity in Russia. Thus in 1997, leading Lithuanian political scholars, Maniokas and Vitkus, argued that despite the current stable relations with Russia Today it is difficult to contradict that Russia and the uncertainty of its future developments constitutes one of the greatest possible threats to the security of the Baltic region and all of Europe.105 Yet, foreign analysts deemed an imminent threat from Russia to be unlikely. Kamp has emphasized that given the decrepitude of the
102
Grazina Miniotaite, The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity in Charles Krupnick, ed., Almost NATO, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p. 275 103 Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 277 104 Vytautas Landsbergis interviewed by author, April 11, 2006. 105 Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 63
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Russian armed forces, an invasion of the Baltic states was and is probably not even possible militarily, quite apart from the disaster for Russias international position which would result.106
Lithuanian security concerns were not generally based on rational calculations of imminent or probable Russian aggression and thus, often diverged from Lithuanias material security needs. Rather, these concerns stemmed from broader historical perceptions of self and other, national identities and a general feeling of geopolitical weakness. The role of Lithuanian national identity is best conceptualized as both European and at the same time anti-Russian identifying with Europe and seeking EU integration while at the same actively trying to escape the Russian sphere of influence. Formal and informal evocations of the Lithuanian European identity are frequent in Lithuanian security conceptions and policies. For example, the law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania (1996) includes a guiding principle: the Lithuanian State, established many centuries ago and resting on the Christian cultural foundation unifying Europe, is an integral part of the community of European nations.107 An understanding of the other as the East or Russia is formalized at the level of Lithuanian constitutional law with the act On the Non-Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania with Post-Soviet Eastern Alliances (1992), which explicitly prohibits the Lithuanian state from entering into any alliance with countries in the post-Soviet space.108 The dualistic Lithuanian identity particularly in the sphere of security, demonstrates that the Lithuanian accession case was more complex than the
106
Karl-Heinz Kamp The Dynamics of NATO Enlargement in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds., Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 197 107 Inga Pavlovaite, Paradise Regained: The Conceptualization of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate in Marko Lehti, and David J. Smith, eds., Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experience, Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland, 2003, p. 202 108 Ibid., p. 201
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back to Europe motive, and that the fear of Russia was as much of a driving force as the lure of the EU. In fact, the choice to pursue EU membership can be seen as a type of protest vote against Lithuanias historical relegation to the Russian sphere of influence.
Lithuanian hard security concerns whether based on real needs or perceptions could only be met by NATO as the EU does not offer any guarantees against aggression on state integrity and sovereignty. However in the early 1990s the EU was often presented in policy and discourse as an additional security guarantee to NATO. According to Pavlovaite, Although the EU is conceptualized as providing security guarantees against potential aggression from Russia, NATO membership is seen as the ultimate and more relevant goal in hard security terms.109 Thus, both EU and NATO membership were formally a part of Lithuanias security strategy as expounded in the Basics of National Security of Lithuania law of 1996. The law cites membership in NATO, WEU, and the EU as the primary means of ensuring Lithuanian security and the countrys habitation in the zone of peace.110 Broadly then, in the early 1990s, EU membership was conceptualized and presented in the political discourse as a potential security guarantee against military aggression from Russia.
Although EU and NATO membership were often understood as complementary tools to achieve hard security, Lithuania developed an increasingly broader understanding of the benefits of the two organizations as the 1990s progressed. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, NATO and the EU were less frequently evoked as guarantors against Russia. In his 2001 Annual Address, President Adamkus stated that Euro-Atlantic
109
110
Ibid., p. 202 Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 269
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integration is not a balance against Russia. Euro-Atlantic integration means being in a common values space. It is not directed against anyone. President Adamkus highlighted the economic and social aspects of EU security, which was a noticeable shift from the discourse on the Russian threat in the early and mid 1990s. He stated that I am convinced that its not foreign military threats that gives rise to the greatest danger to Lithuanias security, but our potential economic and social
backwardness.111 Landsbergis also broadened the perceived benefits of NATO stating that it enhances the protection of the market, trust, encourages investment in the safe space and speeds up the preparations for EU membership.112 The cited remarks reveal a change in the articulations of EU and NATO and seem to reflect Lithuanias changing security notions.113 However, though the discourse on the Russian threat had changed, perceptions may not have changed fully. Furthermore, the change in discourse may have been tactical and aimed at the international community rather than a result of altered perceptions. Vareikis writes, For Central Europe, Russia and its allies remain, as it they were, a natural threat but continues to say that to speak about Russias threat is old fashioned and simply uncouth. No matter how it really is, today candidate states say they are seeking NATO membership to increase European security and stability, not because of any Russian threat. All of this may not matter, but NATO accession is so difficult particularly because of Russia. 114
In summary, Lithuanias EU membership was motivated to some extent by material security concerns such as the presence of Russian troops until 1993, and bellicose rhetoric and provocative military tactics from Russia. However, these concerns were
111
Adamkus 2001, p. 69 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 202 113 The new security outlook was articulated in Lithuanias new concept of national defence of 2000 which based more on a cooperative conception of international relations, less sovereignty focused and less securitized. Ibid., p. 202 114 Egidijus Vareikis, Dinozaurejanti Europa, Stroga, Vilnius, 2002, p. 228-245
112
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made more salient and thus, lasting and decisive due to the ideational considerations stemming from Lithuanias historical legacy and national identity.
Soft Security Benefits Increasingly in the mid-1990s Lithuanian government elites began to broaden the discussion of the potential security benefits of EU membership beyond the geopolitical and military. Vilnius recognised that the EU acted as a link between Lithuania and other European states creating a level of soft security as a complement to the hard security requirements of the country. In the words of Maniokas and Vitkus in 1997, the EU like other alliances is not ambivalent about the security of member states though it does not provide guarantees and does not take responsibility to protect its members from aggression as does NATO.115
EU membership was also seen to provide soft political security to Lithuania since it was a means for Lithuania to move out the Russian sphere of influence. In the early 1990s, Chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, Landsbergis called for true independence not Russian satellite status for Lithuania.116 The primary instrument for Lithuania and the Baltic states to achieve this was to underscore their European orientation and to build up their Western ties.117 EU membership, as well as membership to NATO and various other international organizations, helped build up Western ties and reduce ties to the East. According to Misiunas, In view of the their desire to distance themselves from the CIS as much as possible, the focus of the foreign policy activity of the Baltic states has concentrated on seeking as wide and as rapid an integration as possible into the formal structure of the international
115 116
Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 49 Landsbergis 1995, p. 77, 80. 117 Misiunas p. 102
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community.118 A member of the Lithuanian parliament, Vareikis, confirmed that political elites sought membership in all possible organizations during the early 1990s in order to maximize Lithuanian soft security and that EU was only one of the means to do so.119 Thus, seeking EU membership was driven greatly by ideational factors such as the perceived need to enter the international community, decrease Lithuanias geopolitical isolation and leave the Russian sphere of influence.
While in the early 1990s both the EU and NATO were invoked simultaneously with regard to Lithuanian hard security concerns, by the late 1990s both organizations were also seen as complementary tools to social and economic security. For example in 1998, President Adamkus stated EU and NATO are these mechanisms, which ensure the life and continuation of our principlesMembership in EU and NATO are the guarantees of our independence and democracy not any less than they are the signs of our independence and democracy.120 He expanded this point by saying, Membership in the EU and NATO for Lithuania and other Central European states means security, economic growth guarantees, as well as participation in a common values space.121
In summary, Lithuanias soft security motivations for EU membership evolved from 1991 to 2002, increasingly broadening to encompass political, social and economic security. Furthermore, these soft security motivations stemmed from ideational as well as material factors. Since the EU could not provide hard security guarantees, as Lithuania moved closer to membership and increasingly analyzed the EU in more
118 119
Ibid., 103 Vareikis interviewed by author, August 10, 2005. 120 Valdas Adamkus, Penkeri Darbo Metai, Baltos Lankos, Vilnius, 2002, p. 272 121 Ibid., p. 273
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detailed and rational terms, previous hard security discourse in relation to the EU was slowly abandoned.
Political Voice Another benefit of EU membership was political voice or what has been termed a seat at the table of decision making for member states through the forum of the Union. In Lithuania, this aspect of EU membership was not highlighted in the early 1990s when hard security motives were at the forefront of the EU policy agenda. However by the late 1990s and early 2000s political voice and access to EU decision making was increasingly mentioned in the discourse. To some extent political voice was a rational benefit and its emphasis coincided with a rationalist discussion of the economic costs and benefits of EU membership. In 2002, the Senior Lithuanian Negotiator with EU, Autreviius, expressed the political empowerment which would accompany EU membership by stating In reality today we are European but we are not a part of Europe. We are not yet represented in all main European institutions, which would guarantee that our word would be important in decisive moments. 122 Vareikis, in making his pro-EU argument also emphasized political voice benefits by noting that Lithuania will have a high number of votes in the EU based on the Nice agreement and thus, will be able to use its voice power in a globalizing world.123 The importance of decision making privileges associated with the EU is also apparent from Lithuanias negotiation strategy for membership. Autreviius and other Lithuanian government elites had clearly expressed the Lithuanian position against any form of second-class membership. He stated in 2002, We are prepared to accept
122
Petras Autreviius, Tautinis Identitetas ir Vieningos Europos Raida in Darius Staliunas, ed., Europos Ideja Lietuvoje: Istorija ir Dabartis, LII Leidykla, Vilnius, 2002, p. 177 123 Vareikis, p. 302
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all membership responsibilities, but at the same time we demand all membership rights.124
However, Lithuanias motivations regarding political voice were not simply a matter of number of votes, representatives, and capacity to provide input into the Unions decision making process, but were greatly driven by ideational factors. Lithuanias and Baltics states understanding of political benefits of EU membership was closely related to their historical perspectives on their nations role in Europe. Lithuania and the Baltics have been greatly excluded from the political developments in Europe over the past several hundred years. This has resulted in a sense of peripheral and outsider status. The inability to participate in decision making process and being on receiving end of the pre-formulated decisions of the great powers such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Secret Protocol of 1939 resulted in losses of sovereignty and a real sense of historical victimhood.
The political voice associated with EU membership offered the ideational means to mitigate the past injustices by finally leaving the periphery and gaining more power over the national fate. According to Vareikis, if Lithuania will actually become a developed Western democracy, it will be in the West so powerfully, so close to the West, as it had never been before.125 Thus it will finally become an insider. Being an insider of this most exclusive European club was seen as increasing Lithuanias influence and prestige in the world according to Maniokas.126 As a member, Lithuania will have greater capacity to address its primary concerns regarding EU relations with
124 125
Autreviius in Staliunas, p. 177 Vareikis, p. 302 126 Klaudijus Maniokas, Lietuva ir Europos Sajungos Bendroji Uzsienio ir Saugumo Politika, in Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 329
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Russia and neighbouring states such as Belarus and Ukraine which were part of the historical Lithuanian Grand Duchy.127
In conclusion, Lithuanian recognition of the EU political voice benefits came rather late in the accession process. Though rationalist benefits such as number of votes were noted, political voice was greatly an ideational motivation due to Lithuanian historical experiences and perceptions.
Domestic Politics Domestic politics also played a role in influencing the political and security dimension of Lithuanias policy on EU membership. Party politics and the debate on state sovereignty constraints due to EU membership subtly influenced Lithuanias EU policy though the main course of policy remained unchanged. Thus, domestic factors had a secondary effect on policy by impacting not why EU membership was sought but how it was sought.
The Sovereignty Debate The previous sections outlined the security and political benefits of EU membership as perceived by the elites in their policy considerations, but there were also political costs of integration which became voiced primarily in the domestic public debate. Public Euro-scepticism that centred greatly on the sovereignty debate became increasingly noticeable in the 1990s. A similar contradiction between wanting the benefits and security of EU membership but at the same time being cautious about surrendering newly achieved sovereignty has been characterized as the integration
127
Vareikis, p. 299
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dilemma128 and was a factor in other Central and Eastern European accession process. As Inotai has noted, On the one hand, they know that their economic modernization anchor is the EU. On the other hand, they would like to keep their full political sovereignty. This is mainly the case in those countries which have a very difficult historical past, where national sovereignty has been questioned several times or even abolished.129 In the Baltics, and particularly in Lithuania, the sovereignty debate and Euro-scepticism was particularly pronounced due to the legacy of Soviet and Russian imperial occupation. Thus, the Russian legacy had a dual effect on Lithuania. In security considerations, fears of Russia motivated Lithuania to seek EU membership. In the sovereignty debate, the legacy of the Soviet experience and the struggle for independence caused Lithuania to be cautious in giving up its sovereignty to Brussels. Thus, in contrast to the other applicants, in the Baltics there was a marked deterioration of the image of the EU from 1991 until 1996 with positive views falling 27 percentage points in Lithuania, and 14 percent and 19 percent in Estonia and Latvia respectively.130 In 1999, the Lithuanian public was even against membership, when those against exceeded those for EU membership (39 percent versus 28 percent with the remainder declaring neutrality on the matter).
131
In fact, in Lithuania, unlike
in the other two Baltic states, a Euro-sceptic National Democratic Movement emerged arguing that EU admission undermines independence. Rimantas Sapronas, leader of this movement and a member of parliament, argued that EU membership was not necessarily beneficial in terms of the economy, national culture, identity and
128
Morten Kelstrup, Small States and European Political Integration in Teija Tiilikainen and Ib Damgaard Petersen, eds., The Nordic Countries and EC, Copenhagen Political Studies Press, Copenhagen, 1991, p. 136-162. 129 Andras Inotai The Eastern Enlargements of the European Union in Marise Cremona, ed., The Enlargement of the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 88 130 Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, Central and East European Views on EU Enlargement: Political Debates and Public Opinion in Karen Henderson, ed., Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester 1999, p. 187 131 Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the Integration Dilemma, Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 31
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sovereignty and instead proposed creating an alternative union that would encompass states from the Baltic to the Black Sea.132
The Euro-sceptic movement found various and seemingly incompatible partisans: ethnic nationalists and sympathisers of the old Soviet regime. The result was a type of unholy alliance of far left and far right of the political spectrum in their protest against EU membership. On a more moderate side were the self-proclaimed Euro-realists who were critical of the perceived unfavourable terms of membership and argued that Lithuania should strengthen its economy and governance and join EU later as an equal partner.133 However, one should not consider the Lithuanian public as generally anti-integrationist but rather as exhibiting a considerable dose of reserve and scepticism regarding membership.134
The government elites responded to the Euro-sceptics and the sovereignty discourse by emphasizing the benefits of political voice as well as the EUs role in safeguarding Lithuanian sovereignty. President Adamkus emphasized that Lithuanian sovereignty can be safeguarded rather than threatened by EU saying Lithuanian sovereignty in the twenty first century is possible only by actively participating in the creation on a common future. Integrating to Euro-Atlantic structures, we dont limit but expand our freedom of choice. He addressed the Euro-realist position of postponing membership
132
Graeme Herd, The Baltic States and EU Enlargement, in Henderson, p. 265 Zaneta Ozolina, The EU and the Baltic States in Lieven and Trenin, p. 226 134 Interestingly, while between 1991-1996 the Lithuanian public was least responsive to the EU in comparison with the other Baltic states and the rest of CEE candidates, by the 2003 referendum, Lithuanians were much more in favour of joining the EU than Estonia and Latvia. In the May 2003 referendum, despite previous public scepticisms, 91 percent of Lithuanians voted for joining the EU, 9 percent against, with the turnout being 63 percent. In Latvia and Estonia 67 percent of the voters were in favour. Thus from 1996 to 2003, Lithuanian public went from being one of the greatest sceptics of EU membership among the CEE candidates to being one of the greatest supporters. Landsbergis explained the referendum results saying that the people did not want to be deported to Siberia once again in their lifetime. Interviewed by author on April 11, 2006.
133
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by noting that If we are late [to integrate] we will have to accept more and more standards, which we did not create.135 In response to the presumed reduction of Lithuanian economic and social autonomy within the EU structure, advisor to the President, Vilpisauskas argued that because Lithuania is a small and open state, EUs decisions will powerfully affect Lithuanian economy and its distinct spheres even if Lithuania is not a member of the EU. 136 From these comments it appears that the Lithuanian elites viewed sovereignty questions differently than the public. The Lithuanian elites did not think that Lithuania would be able to maintain full sovereignty on its own due to either Russian interference, EUs influence or globalization. Thus, EU membership was argued to be the best guarantee of sovereignty despite the sovereignty losses the public feared.
Party Politics and Elite Consensus Despite the episodic public scepticism and the attempt by some marginal parties such as the National Democratic Movement to exploit populist sentiments, government elites remained committed and consistent in their pro-EU policies. As Grabbe and Hughes note, there was a surprisingly high level of consensus among political parties in the Baltic states on preparation for EU accession given popular scepticism revealed in opinion polls of 1993-1996.137 However, Lithuanian political parties used EU accession strategy instrumentally in domestic politics to increase their popularity. At times some politicians such as the New Union of Social Liberals (Social Liberals) would take advantage of the public scepticism using populist anti-EU rhetoric. At other times politicians such as the Homeland Union would critique their opponents
135
Adamkus 2001, p. 33 Vilpisauskas, Ramunas, Lietuvos Narystes ES Kastai ir Nauda in Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 202 137 Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson, p. 189
136
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such as the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP138) for not pursuing EU membership with enough gusto and efficiency. Often, unwilling to bear the political costs of implementing harsh but necessary reforms for Lithuanias transition from planned to market economy, politicians would present reforms as a EU requirement.
Table 3.1: Party Politics in Lithuania

1992-1996 LDDP, formed from former Communist Party of Lithuania, won the elections and shared power with the Social Democratic Party to create a left-of-centre government. 1996-2000 Homeland Union, a right party supporting market reforms and integration, carried the victory and formed a conservative coalition government with the Christian Democratic Party. The Homeland Union actively sought Lithuanias membership in NATO and EU. 2000-2004 New Union of Social Liberals created a centrist coalition with the Liberal Union.
Throughout the decade from 1991 to 2002, EU membership remained Lithuanias foreign policy objective despite the changes in parties in power (see Table 3.1 above). A particularly interesting case was in 1992 when the LDDP won the Parliamentary election. Though in their election programme they had expressed a desire for state neutrality, once in power the party continued the EU integration path.139 Furthermore, in 1993 the presidency was taken over by an ex-communist turned Social Democrat, Algirdas Brazauskas, who according to his election platform was not a great activist of integration to European or Transatlantic structures. Thus, it is quite surprising that during the time period from 1992 to 1996 when political forces ambivalent to EU membership were in power, the goal of EU membership was not only pursued but that the application for EU membership was submitted in 1995.
138
Lietuvos Demokratu Darbo Partija Lina Peceliuniene, Sunkus kelias I NATO, in Vytautas Landsbergis, Lietuvos Kelias I NATO, Versus Aureus, Vilnius, 2004, p. 645
139
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There are six reasons why this policy was maintained, which will be outlined in order of importance below. While it is difficult to decisively isolate the most important reasons, the cumulative effect of all five was a consistent EU policy.140 First, the opposition was persistent in its efforts of keeping the EU and NATO on the top of the agenda. Landsbergis who was the leader of the opposition political forces from 1992 to 1996 stated that Lithuania after the 1992 Parliamentary elections maintained to some extent foreign policy continuation EU and NATO became a foreign policy priority only after the oppositions pressure.141 However, the oppositions influence, as Landsbergis admits, was not powerful enough to have perfect control over foreign policy and thus, During LDDP governance years much time was wasted due to several post-communist questioning and double meanings, but the main decision was maintained.142 It can be argued that even though Lithuania submitted its application for EU membership in 1995 under the LDDP government, not much actual progress towards completing necessary reforms and meeting the acquis was made. The second reason is that LDDP could not suggest any better alternatives than integration into Western structures as a path for Lithuanias development and because the Constitution of the state explicitly forbids any form of integration with any states of the CIS. Third, the LDDP, being former communists were always haunted by claims that they will lead Lithuania back to Moscow. Opposing Western integration would have enabled their opponents to add further fuel to the flames. Fourth, public opinion, though increasingly critical after 1993, was still marked by high support for the EU strategy. Lastly, the domestic politics and foreign policies of the other Baltic states may have
Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliamentary delegation to WEU from 1996 to 2000, agreed with these six reasons and their ordering, particularly emphasizing the role of the opposition in an interview with author on March 27, 2006. Egidijus Vareikis agreed with this reasoning and emphasized the cumulative effect of all six factors. Interviewed by author on March 15, 2006. Vytautas Landsbergis also noted that except LDDP all other factions in the Parliament were in favour of EU and NATO membership in an interview with author on April 11, 2006. 141 Landsbergis 2004, p. 187 142 Ibid., p. 187
140
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also had an influence on Lithuania. During this time period in Estonia and Latvia reformers and pro-EU parties were in power and sought EU membership consistently. Pursuing a diverging path for Lithuania would have been difficult to justify.
The consistency of EU policy despite the change in domestic politics was attributable to the confluence of the six factors outlined above. However, without most of the six factors, the EU policy may have been varied. For instance, if anti-EU parties had been in power and the pro-EU opposition led by Landsbergis marginalized in Parliament as in the 2000 election, the public highly sceptical as in 1999 and 2000 and the other Baltic states less resolute on membership, then the EU application might not have been filed or its filling might have been delayed. As if to secure against such future threats to the stability of Lithuanias foreign policy, the pro-EU political forces included a clause to guarantee against backward gravitation in the law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania in 1996. The clause safeguarded Lithuanian foreign policy priorities of EU and NATO.143 Not only would the anti-EU forces have to push through the change of the law through Parliament but propose an alternative path for Lithuanian development.
In 1996 the Homeland Union led by Landsbergis won the election and secured the majority in the Parliament by a coalition with the Christian Democratic Party. In 1998, a Western oriented, non-partisan Adamkus took over the Presidency. From 1996 and 1998 onwards when parties and leaders favourable to Western institutions presided, a major push towards membership occurred despite the noted increase in public Euro-scepticism. After great efforts of the elites, in December of 1999 Lithuania was invited to start negotiations at the Helsinki European Council. Yet in
143
Landsbergis 2004, p. 319
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1999 and 2000, due to the poor economic conditions related to the 1998 Russian financial crises and the increasing burden of EU stipulated reforms, the public and political discourse was increasingly Euro-sceptic. In the 2000 municipal elections several small populist parties tried to exploit the publics sentiments in a discreet way. For example, the National Democrats stated we bowed to Moscow, now we bow to Brussels invoking an image of a new type of imperial control.144
The 2000 new parliamentary elections again brought a sceptical leadership to power a coalition of Liberals and Social Liberals. Yet, similarly to the LDDP, once in power Social Liberals maintained the EU geared trajectory of foreign policy. The Social Liberals continuation of the EU accession process is puzzling given that Euroscepticism was at its highest levels. The reasons for the persistent commitment to EU integration will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Four but some domestic political reasons will be outlined below. First, it must be recognized that Lithuania was already on the way to membership. In February of 2000, Lithuania started the negotiation process and the reversal of this would have been a very radical move, one apparently that parties like the Social Liberals were not prepared to push for. Furthermore, President Adamkus was an avid supporter of Lithuanias integration to European and trans-Atlantic structures and increasingly sought to address the public scepticism and misconceptions about membership. Lastly, it seems that the antiintegrationist election platform was simply a populist move to gain more votes in the election and that the Social Liberals had no serious intention of staying true to it.145
144 145
Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 211 Vareikis supports this opinion in an interview with the author on March 15, 2006 as does Kuzmickas in an interview with the author on March 27, 2006.
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Lithuanian domestic politics did not play a role in altering EU policy though it influenced it subtly. For instance, political parties and elites took notice of the publics scepticism and concerns by changing their rhetoric but not their course of action. Some, such as the LDDP, Social Liberals, or National Democrats, critiqued EU membership or suggested neutrality but in the end maintained the EU integration strategy, even if it was half-hearted. Others, such as President Adamkus, sought to address some of the major criticisms, change discourse on EU, and thus, ease the scepticism. In the end, the Lithuanian elites re-marketing campaign of the EU worked the Lithuanian public voted overwhelmingly in favour of membership in the referendum of 2003. The Lithuanian case suggests that elite convictions and goals superseded public opinions and outweighed public and some elites sovereignty concerns. Furthermore, the findings seem to support the path dependency theory that once a trajectory for EU membership is drawn it is hard to reverse the process even if as in the case of Lithuania political parties change and public opinion fluctuates. However, one should be cautious in drawing such a conclusion since the cases of Rumania and Bulgaria demonstrate that hurdles in the reform and negotiation process can greatly prolong the endpoint of membership.146
Conclusions Our analysis of the political and security factors has shown that ideational considerations were prominent in Lithuanias EU policy because they were often as important as the material factors and because they added salience to material motivations. From this chapter it is clear that Lithuanias motivations for membership and thus, EU policy were highly securitized. However while other analysts have
146
Romania and Bulgaria had applied for EU membership in 1995 along with Lithuania, but were unable to fully commit to reforms and the EU path and are slotted for membership in 2007.
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concluded that Lithuania and the other Baltic states sought EU membership for security reasons stemming from a fear of Russia, this chapter has shown that security motivations evolved over time. Soft security considerations, political voice benefits, and sovereignty concerns all entered the Lithuanian EU policy decision making but not all in a complementary manner. While soft security and political voice were conceived as benefits of integration and thus worked in favour of Lithuanias pro-EU policy consensus, sovereignty concerns created mixed effects. Sovereignty was evoked by both pro-EU politicians and Euro-sceptics, as EU membership was seen as a guarantor of Lithuanias security in the face of the Russian threat and globalization and as a restraint on Lithuanias full national sovereignty due to Brussels rules and regulations. The sovereignty concerns created perhaps not a full-fledged integration dilemma for Lithuanias EU policy but certainly integration tensions. Yet despite these tensions EU policy remained consistent primarily since broad security considerations remained on the forefront of Lithuanias agenda. Soft security concerns and political voice motives maintained their salience in the decade from 1991 to 2002 due to the complementary ideational and rational security factors. Lithuanias national identity as a European outsider and historical sense of victimhood made security considerations still potent even when the threat from Russia was not likely. An understanding of Lithuanias national identity as simultaneously European and antiRussian demonstrates that Lithuanias drive to EU membership was driven by a desire to escape Russia in addition to the back to Europe motive.
The analysis of this chapter revealed the persistence of elite consensus on the necessity of EU membership, which resulted in the ultimate success of EU policy. Furthermore, the case of Lithuania has demonstrated that once in motion the EU
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integration process gains self-momentum for the applicant states. Lithuanian foreign policy of seeking Western integration has been consistent not only due to elite consensus on integration but also due to elite path dependency. The EU trajectory of foreign policy had become difficult to alter even when Euro-scepticism was high because there was a perceived lack of alternative options. Furthermore, build-in security measures against changes in foreign policy and thus, guarantees of staying on the EU path were present in the Constitution and the Law on National Security of 1996. While, rhetorical entrapment of enlarging the EU has already been noted by scholars,147 this same element may exist on the side of the applicant states. The Lithuanian elite consensus on the necessity of EU membership may be understood in part by a reverse rhetorical entrapment. As had been demonstrated it became very difficult for elites to suggest staying out of the EU when this had been proclaimed as Lithuanias primary goal since the early 1990s. Chapter 4: The Relationship between Material and Ideational Motivations in Lithuanias EU Policy: 1997 to 2000
The years from 1997 to 2000 were crucial for Lithuanias EU policy. Lithuania went from lagging behind in its accession strategy to renewing its efforts for a determined campaign for membership and starting EU negotiations at the end of 1999. The circumstances in Lithuania between the years of 1997 to 2000, though seemingly similar to the other Baltic states, were quite unique and help account for the apparent turnaround on the EU question. Lithuania was the only Baltic state that experienced the double disappointment of being disqualified from starting negotiations for EU membership in 1997, and being excluded from the first round of NATO enlargement
147
Frank Schimmelfennig, The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, International Organization vol.55, no.1.
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of 1999. Estonia started negotiations for EU membership in 1997, while Latvia though equally disappointed with EU negotiations exclusion had not expected an invitation from NATO. Lithuania, feeling best prepared for NATO membership and feeling as qualified as Estonia to start EU negotiations had its expectations shattered. Furthermore, Lithuania was more exposed than the other Baltic states to the Russian financial crisis and experienced the greatest decline in public support for EU membership in the late 1990s. Thus, Lithuania in the period from 1997 to 2000 was marked by external shocks that reverberated in foreign policy and domestic politics. In this key episode, economic, security, and ideational factors came to reinforce elite consensus on EU policy. This key episode demonstrates that ideational factors as well as external events complemented and made material considerations more salient, ultimately contributing to the success of Lithuanias EU policy.
First, a summary of the domestic and external events during this key period will be provided. Then economic, security and ideational considerations in Lithuanias EU policy will be analysed thematically.
Changes in Domestic and External Conditions from 1997 to 2000 During these three years many events transpired that impacted Lithuanias policy on the EU. These events can be divided into domestic events and external events for greater clarity. Though domestic developments set a background for policy making worth examining, the external developments were the key determinants in Lithuanias EU policy. Domestically, in the Presidential elections of January 1998, Adamkus, supported by the Centre coalition, replaced incumbent Brazauskas of the leftist coalition. The domestic political constant throughout most of the period was the
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parties in power in parliament. Landsbergis was the Speaker of the Parliament and his Homeland Union party had a majority of seats since the elections of 1996. However, the municipal and parliamentary elections of 2000 shook up the incumbents. The municipal election in March saw the victory of left-leaning parties New Union of Social Liberals (Social Liberals) and the Peasants Party, both of which resisted Lithuanias early entry into the EU and NATO. The Parliamentary election in October was marked by similar tendencies and resulted in the victory of centre-right alliance of the Liberal Union and the Social Liberals. The Homeland Union was marginalized. Nevertheless, in a surprise turn-around, the dominating alliance agreed on the need to seek EU and NATO membership once they came into power.
There were three key external events that impacted Lithuanias EU policy making: the Commissions decision in 1997 to delay accession negotiations for Lithuania, the Russian financial crisis of 1998 and exclusion from NATOs enlargement round of 1999. The cumulative effect of all three events occurring in the short space of time added significantly to their importance in impacting Lithuanias EU policy. By May of 1997, it had become clear to Vilnius that none of the Baltic states will be invited to the Washington round of NATO enlargement of March of 1999. Lithuania had placed high hopes of being the one Baltic state to be invited along with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The government elites, led by Landsbergis, had lobbied hard for membership and had received a somewhat encouraging response from the US though less so from the European leaders. Then a few months after the bad news from NATO, the second blow came in July of 1997: the EU Commission excluded Lithuania from the list of accession candidates that were deemed ready to start the negotiations at the Luxembourg round of 1998. The Commissions decision to invite Estonia to
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negotiations made this disqualification particularly acute due to the endemic regional competition among the Baltic states. Estonias inclusion had a multiplier effect on Lithuanias disappointment due to exclusion. The two consecutive failures with NATO and EU could have had caused government elites to question Lithuanias foreign policy of Western orientation, yet Lithuanian EU policy remained consistent. The third external shock came in August 1998 with the Russian financial crisis. The negative effects of the Russian financial crisis on the Lithuanian economy drove home the argument that the Lithuania should seek integration with the West rather than with the East.
Economic Factors As demonstrated in the second chapter, economic cost and benefit calculations on EU membership were not of primary importance to Lithuania before 2000. However, in the 1997-2000 period, several economic arguments came to the forefront. The first was related to the Commissions decision to exclude Vilnius from the first round of enlargement; the second was related to the reconsideration of national economic strategy after the Russian financial crisis. After Estonia was invited to negotiate and Lithuania and Latvia were deemed unready, arguments appeared in both states that being left out would be detrimental to their economies. Lithuanian leaders worried that investments would be directed away from Lithuania towards Estonia and to its western neighbour, Poland, which was also starting negotiations. These concerns over the economic ramifications of being left out of the negotiation process are reminiscent of the Visegrad countries concerns over being kept out of the EU. However, as Vachudova argues, the Visegrad countries were most concerned about access to EU
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markets and EU protectionism towards non-members.148 Lithuanian rhetoric regarding the redirection of investments demonstrates that economic motivations for seeking membership stemmed not only from potential benefits of membership but the potential costs of exclusion, an insight that has often not been recognized in the literature.
The second economic argument during this time period was a reconsideration of economic and foreign policy strategy due to the Russian financial crisis of August 1998. As noted in Chapter Two, from the mid-1990s until the crisis, not all Lithuanian elites had fully recognized the benefits of EU membership and were still pursuing an opportunistic and dualistic economic strategy of maintaining a high level of commerce with Russia and increasing ties with Western economies. However the Russian crisis exposed the dangers of economic interdependence with the East. While 1997 had been a year of high economic growth for Lithuania, 1998 resulted in a slowdown of GDP growth. 1999 was a very difficult year economically with a contraction of GDP by 4.1 percent and a rise of government debt to LTL 13 billion.149 The Russian economic downturn affected Lithuania more than Latvia or Estonia since Lithuania traded far more with Russia than did its neighbours. A fourth of all Lithuanian meat and dairy production went to Russia in the late 1990s, but these exports were suspended on 1 September 1998 because Russian consumers could not pay.150 The dismal state of affairs in 1999 was highlighted in President Adamkus Annual Address: the highest in a decade level of unemployment, half a billion debt by Sodra,151 13 billion LTL state debt, more than one thousand bankrupt companies,
148
Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 71-2 149 Zaneta Ozolina, The EU and the Baltic States in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds., Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 208 150 Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002, p. 166 151 Lithuanian National Social Insurance Fund
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the unfinished land reforms, millions of LTL debt to farmers, the unreformed energy sector, unpaid debt from Belarus for electric energy, a half-empty fund for the closure of nuclear station, etc.152 Still the consequences of the Russian economic crisis could have been even more severe if Lithuania had not reoriented some of its trade to the West in the years leading up to 1998 and if investors had not assumed the Baltics to be outside the Russian economic sphere and therefore not pulled out their investment to the degree they did in Russia and the CIS.153 Thus, the Russian crisis clearly demonstrated the costs of trade with the East and the benefits of being perceived by investors as part of the West.
The Russian crisis was an unexpected external event that made a major impact on Lithuanian elite and public perspectives on Lithuanias economic and foreign policy. While the elites became more convinced on the necessity EU membership and integration to the West, the public was increasingly sceptical of the existing government policies and particularly of EU membership. However, Lithuanian elites did not heed public opinion and accelerated the EU accession process.
Lithuanian elites reinvigorated drive for EU membership in response to the economic downturn of 1999 could be explained in terms of rationalist enlargement theories. According to Mattli, economically unsuccessful national leaders are much more likely to pursue integrationist strategies and integration is generally sought by outsider states with lower growth rates than insider states. 154 In the mid-90s, while Lithuania was benefiting from trade with Russia and increasingly with the West and thus
152 153
Adamkus, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba, Vilnius, 2001, p. 65 Jan Zielonka, Europe as an Empire, Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapter Two; Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 208 154 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 95
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experiencing high growth rates, EU membership from an economic perspective was not on the top of the elites agenda. However, when growth rates dropped to negative digits, Lithuanian elites started actively pursuing EU membership. However, the correlation between economic decline and re-invigoration of EU policy does not necessarily imply causation. The decision to accelerate integrationist efforts was made in 1997 immediately after the Commissions decision, before the Crisis and economic downturn. The Russian crisis served to reinforce EU policy but was not the original cause of renewed efforts for membership.
Lithuanian political elites interpreted the Russian financial crisis and its lessons for Lithuania not only in economic but also in strategic and ideational terms. The crisis was used to confirm that Lithuania chose the right strategy of distancing itself from Russia and choosing the EU as its model and economic partner. Ideologically, the crisis reinforced the perspective of Russia as unstable and dangerous. Landsbergis, speaking about the Russian crisis, stated, our national political goal and the goal of all parties is to finally exit the post-Soviet undefined and threatening space.155 The economic chaos to the east was presented as much of a threat to Lithuania as the Russian armies had been in the early 1990s. President Adamkus described the previous dualistic and inconsistent policy of economic relations with the West and the East as a destructive path which demonstrated the powerlessness of our state in the face of the Russian crisis.156 Though the EU policy may have cost the ruling government elites such as Landsbergis and his Homeland Union party re-election in 2000, the EU policy was pursued or at a minimum presented in ideological terms as well as rational terms. Furthermore, the ideational view of Russia as an unstable and
155 156
Vytautas Landsbergis, Lietuvos Kelias I NATO, Versus Aureus, Vilnius, 2004, p. 348 Adamkus 2001, p. 100
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dangerous ally made the economic effects of the Russian crisis even more salient in the Lithuanian elite calculations on EU policy.
To summarize, the downturn in the Lithuanian economy following the Russian crisis coupled with the Commissions decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of negotiations, strengthened the resolve of the Lithuanian elites to seek EU membership. Though both external events posed material costs for Lithuania, elite discourse was mostly framed in ideational rather than material terms.
Security Factors Though Lithuania was considerably more secure in 1997 than in the early 1990s, security objectives continued to figure to some extent in justifying EU membership. During these key years Lithuanias security concerns, though not based on material threats, were reinforced by the economic insecurity of the period and the ideational fears of being left out of EU and NATO expansion.
Speaking on the improvement of Lithuanias security conditions in 1997 in relation to four years ago, Landsbergis stated optimistically that the International situation is calmer and more stabilized. Lithuania secured its position in European and world perceptions as a rebuilt state, which has a right to exist. Just this already provides more security, as does Lithuanian participation in international structures. From these the most important to us is our association membership in the EU.157 Thus by 1997, Lithuania was perceived to be more secure due to the web of participation in
157
Landsbergis, p. 246
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international organizations. The Association Agreement with the EU was considered to be a source of security and stability for Lithuania in the present and full EU and NATO membership were to provide security in the future.
This positive articulation of Lithuanias security coincided with Lithuanias campaign to be included in the first wave of NATO enlargement. In early to mid-1997, before it was apparent that Lithuania would not be included in the first round of NATO enlargement, Lithuanias rhetoric on security was decidedly changed. As noted in the previous chapter, Lithuanian political elites, particularly Landsbergis, in their discourse on the East started diminishing the formerly emphasized Russian threat and questioning Western perceptions that the Baltics are un-defendable. Addressing the perceived threat from Russia to the Baltics, Landsbergis stated in 1997, We do not think that far ahead and that negatively, as in the West, about a concrete aggressor to the Baltic states. All neighbours are a gift from God [!] We only want stability and reliability from different investors, different cooperation, and do not want that someone would threaten us or dictate to us.158 While the efforts to downplay the Russian threat seem tactical in Lithuanias quest for NATO membership and geared towards the West, they still demonstrate the importance of the Russia factor in the discourse. However, the cited remarks also reveal a focus on the emerging concept of broader stability (rather than security) constituted by investments and relations with the West.
Vilnius instrumental use of the Russian factor to emphasise or de-emphasise the Russian threat depending on the situation or audience is particularly noticeable in another episode. In May of 1997, when Lithuania realized that it would not be
158
Speaking to Estonian parliament in January 1997. Landsbergis, p. 213
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included in the first round of NATO enlargement it again vocalized its concerns about Russia. Discussing the consequences of being left out of NATO, Landsbergis stated, I do not think that currently there is a threat of direct Russian aggression. Nevertheless, we could be pressured by Russia by various ultimatums. We could be forced to make concessions and to limit our sovereignty, as did Cold War Finland, which had to make concessions to Russia in economic, military, and political spheres.159 Here Landsbergis was asking for security guarantees for Lithuania from the broader potential pressures from Russia. These guarantees came in January 1998 when the Four State Charter was signed between the Baltics and the US, providing Baltic states with greater international stability and security prospects. The Charter sweetened the bitter first enlargement of NATO in March of 1999 when only the Visegrad countries were accepted.
Lithuanias security considerations for EU membership can be better understood by examining the relationship between the goals of EU and NATO membership, which became particularly apparent during this time period. Scholars such as Herd have argued that Lithuanias primary foreign policy goal had been NATO membership rather than EU until a shift in policy occurred in 1997 after the EU Commission made a recommendation to exclude Lithuania from the negotiation process. Herd stated that This recommendation caused a dramatic foreign policy reorientation within Lithuania. Lithuania reiterated that it would attempt to join the first stage of European eastern enlargement; this was to become the new primary priority of Lithuanian domestic and foreign policy. Consequently, the central tenet of Lithuanian foreign policy NATO membership was now to be officially down-graded as a priority.160
159 160
May 1997 Interview with Danish newspaper in Ibid., p. 277 Graeme P. Herd The Baltic States and EU Enlargement in Karen Henderson,, ed., Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester 1999, p. 267
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However, a closer examination of the discourse of Lithuanian elites, the political decisions at the time, and interviews with key participants161 does not support Herds argument that a dramatic foreign policy reorientation favouring EU to NATO occurred in 1997. In the years prior to and after the Commissions decision, elite discourse demonstrates the equal importance of EU and NATO membership as Lithuanian foreign policy goals. Before and after 1997 Landsbergis stated on a number of occasions that EU and NATO membership should not be viewed as alternative priorities they are equal national political goals, ones that do not interfere with one another, ones that are complementary to each other. 162 This policy of giving equal priority to EU and NATO membership was confirmed in a Foreign Policy coordination meeting with the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence minister, Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman in early 1997 before the EU Commissions decision.
The perception that NATO membership had been of primary importance could have arisen due to the fact that for a few years up to mid-1997 Lithuanian elites, seeing a window of opportunity, invested significant efforts to be in the first round of NATO enlargement of 1999.163 After the realisation that NATO membership will not be possible in the near future and that Lithuania was not included in the first round of EU negotiations, the pressing goal for Lithuanian elites was to make sure that Lithuania would be invited to the next round of EU negotiations at the Helsinki Summit
161
Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, Speaker of Parliament from 1996 to 2000, on April 11, 2006. Interview with Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliamentary delegation to WEU from 1996 to 2000, on March 27, 2006. Interview with Egidijus Vareikis, member of Parliament Committees on European Affairs and Foreign Affairs, on March 15, 2006. 162 Stated in a speech in January 1997. Landsbergis, p. 214, see also p. 423 163 Vytautas Landsbergis revealed that his optimal strategy aimed to link Lithuania with the Visegrad states and thus, enter NATO and perhaps the EU at an earlier date along with Czeck Republic, Hungary and Poland. Interviewed by author April 11, 2006.
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scheduled for 1999. Thus, what Herd interpreted to be a dramatic reorientation in Lithuanias EU and NATO policies was in fact a shift in emphasis that responded to external constraints and opportunities. NATOs decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of enlargement was viewed by Lithuanian elites as a political move to appease Russia. There was not much Lithuania could do in the meantime as the next enlargement was years away (in fact the next enlargement occurred only in 2004) and NATO did not have a sole document listing the criteria for membership that Lithuania could try to implement. The EU, unlike NATO, operated with sticks and carrots, rewarding compliance to its numerous requirements by invitations to candidates to begin membership negotiations on an annual basis. Even though Lithuania was not chosen to start negotiations it was given the incentive to step up its reforms because the EU was going to reconsider the Lithuanian application within a year. Another incentive was the known possibility that if Lithuania made progress it could join the EU at the same time as Estonia and the other Central European states despite a late start in negotiations. Lithuanias reinvigorated efforts for EU membership after the Commissions negative decision supports Vachudovas EUs active leverage theory164 and is comparable to Slovakias response to being left out of the first round of enlargement. The contrasting short term Lithuanian response to NATO exclusion could be elucidated by Vachudovas argument that NATO, without a meritocracy or enforcement system, did not have the same active leverage on applicant countries as EU.165 Thus, Lithuanias differing tactical approaches to NATO and EU membership could be explained not by assuming a shift in national priorities but by Lithuanias response to NATO and the EUs differing incentives structures. However, as explained in the above paragraph, the EU and NATO always remained equally
164 165
Vachudova, p. 105-139 Ibid., p. 134-137
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important strategic foreign policy goals though the short term foreign policy tactics varied in 1997 to 2000.
Analyzing EU and NATO membership together also demonstrates that both organisations were considered to be complementary tools to achieve similar goals of not only security but economic well-being. Increasingly throughout the late 1990s, economics and security, and thus the EU and NATO, were viewed as indivisible goals by Vilnius. For instance in December of 1998 Landsbergis argues that both EU and NATO membership are necessary since in order to increase economic and living standards we need cooperation and trade; for trade we need investments, for investments we need security.166 In February of 1999, Landsbergis emphasized the indivisibility of security and economics stating that national security is necessary for various reasons even purely economic reasons.167 This perspective helps explain Lithuanias simultaneous policy commitment to join both NATO and EU and gives further evidence against Herds argument.
In summary, Lithuanias pursuit of EU and NATO membership simultaneously can be understood by the elites view that both organizations were complementary in their capacity to increase Lithuanian security and economic well-being. Furthermore, Lithuanias policy on EU and NATO demonstrates that ideational perspectives of EU as a source of not only economic prosperity but security and NATO as a tool not only for national security but economic wellbeing, coloured Lithuanian elite considerations of the material benefits of these two organizations.
166 167
Ibid., p. 365 Landsbergis, p. 378
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Domestic Factors The analysis of domestic factors that influenced Lithuanias policy towards the EU in the period from 1997 to 2000 brings three questions to mind. First, to what extent did domestic political parties influence Lithuanias EU policy from 1997 to 2000? Second, was political leaders willingness to integrate based on calculations on reelection in the presidential elections of 1998, and municipal and parliamentary elections of 2000? Lastly, was EU membership used instrumentally by domestic elites? In general, Lithuanias major political parties accepted the elite policy consensus which viewed EU membership as the only way forward for Lithuanias future development.
There appears to be a link between Lithuanias domestic political parties and EU policy during the years of 1997 to 2000. With the Parliament dominated by a pro-EU Homeland Union from 1996 to 2000, and with a pro-Western integration President Adamkus from 1998 onwards, Lithuanias push for EU membership might appear predictable. However, as the previous chapter argued, domestic politics was not the decisive factor in Lithuanias policy on EU. For instance, in 1995, a decision to submit the EU application was made under Euro-sceptic LDDP leadership. And in 2000, the Parliamentary parties that had won on anti-integration platforms, once in power maintained their predecessors pro-EU and pro-NATO foreign policy. Thus the success of Lithuanias EU policy from 1997 to 2000 cannot be explicable solely by the Homeland Unions and Adamkus support for EU membership.
Mattli has argued that political leaders willingness to integrate is motivated by the political payoffs of re-election. The case of Lithuania, particularly from 1997 to 2000,
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demonstrates that political incumbents and newcomers took a different approach to the EU policy political payoffs. In light of rising public Euro-scepticism from the late 1990s to 2000, the incumbent government elites, by accelerating integration, were not acting in the hope of appealing to the public. On the contrary, the 2000 elections brought new parties to power who with populist slogans had opposed EU and NATO membership in their platforms. Thus re-election ambitions did not influence the incumbents willingness to integrate but electoral considerations played a tactical role for the new political entrants who exploited the rising Euro-scepticism. However, once voted into office, the political newcomers would revert to elite policy consensus of seeking EU membership. For instance, in the 1998 presidential elections some new candidates ran on a Euro-sceptic platform.168 However this strategy did not pay off in 1998 with a pro-West Adamkus winning the presidency. But the municipal and parliamentary elections of 2000 favoured the Euro-sceptics since the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000 was the lowest point in terms of public opinion on EU membership, when Euro-sceptics exceeded EU supporters (with a vote of 39 percent against versus 28 percent in favour of integration).169 On the other hand, the incumbent government elites such as the Homeland Union party were seeking EU integration despite the political losses in re-elections which they suffered in 2000. Landsbergis explained his own and his partys position by stating that Europhobia or isolationist tendencies are unreal and without prospects170 even though his party was marginalized by the 2000 elections.171
168 169
Incumbent President Brazauskas chose not to run in the 1998 presidential elections. Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the Integration Dilemma, Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 31 170 Landsbergis, p. 311 171 However, the EU was not the only or most important issue to the voters. The elections brought in new political forces to power because most voters were disappointed by the poor economic conditions and governance of the preceding years.
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The Lithuanian elites used the prospect EU membership instrumentally for domestic political gains and this tendency is most evident from the episode following the Commissions decision of 1997 to exclude Lithuania from negotiations. Lithuanias exclusion, while another Baltic State was included, triggered a frenzy of defensive posturing and finger pointing throughout the Lithuanian political class.172 In December of 1997, several months after the Commission decision and a year after his party gained power in the Parliament, Landsbergis stated that in the last year through hard work more was accomplished [towards EU membership] than during the several years prior.173 The newly elect President Adamkus also critiqued the poor state of affairs and economy in Lithuania and blamed it on the uncompleted reforms by his predecessors, which not only hurt the Lithuanian state but also precluded it from starting negotiations.174
The instrumental usage by the Lithuanian elites of EU membership failures to critique their opponents and find support for their policies was influenced by an important regional factor. Miniotaite has argued that since the withdrawal of Russian troops from the region, the Baltic states, despite their common initiatives, have engaged in mutual competition in their pursuits of integration with the West and in strengthening of respective states sovereignty.175 Regional competition among the Baltic states, similar to the competition among the Visegrad countries, came to a high point after the Commission decision in 1997. For Lithuanias political elites, the Commissions move to include Estonia but not Lithuania highlighted their failure to manage the
172
Vitalis Nakrosis, Assessing Governmental Capabilities to Manage European Affairs: The Case of Lithuania in Vello Pettai, and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 2003, p. 103 173 Landsbergis, p. 313 174 See details in Chapter 2. 175 Miniotaite 1999, p. 24
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accession process as well as their counterparts in Estonia. For example, Landsbergis blamed LDDPs years in power from 1992 to 1996 for squandering Lithuanias political capital since in his view from 1990 to 1992 Lithuania was a leader in the Baltics.176 The potential beneficial aspects of Estonias success was also mentioned Estonia was breaking the ice for Lithuanian and Latvian membership.177 Still there was a general atmosphere of failure in Lithuania in the light of Estonias success which stimulated the Lithuanian government elites to catch up with Estonia and enter the Union at the same time.178
In summary, Lithuanias EU policy was not altered radically despite the changing domestic political climate or public opinion. But EU policy did figure in the elections and was used instrumentally by the elites in power and by the challengers. However, even Euro-sceptic opponents once in power accepted the pro-EU elite consensus, most likely due to the perceived lack of alternative options. Regional elite competition had a multiplier effect on the Commissions decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of negotiations and further cemented elite resolve to seek membership.
Ideational Factors While each of the previously discussed factors of economy, security and domestic politics contained ideational elements and were made more potent by Lithuanian elite perceptions, the following section will specifically elaborate on the ideational forces at work in Lithuanias EU policy from 1997 to 2000.
176
Landsbergis Statement ran in major Lithuanian newspaper Lietuvos aidas after the Commissions decision. Landsbergis, p. 289 177 Ibid., p. 311 178 Interview with Egidijus Vareikis on March 15, 2006.
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After the Commission announced its decision in 1997, elite discourse on Lithuanias vulnerable position as a non-EU member gained force. Significantly, despite the potential negative economic externalities that could result from the exclusion from the EU, most of the rhetoric was posed in ideational terms. An ideational fear of being left out of the EU became a greater motivator for membership than the perceived ideational or material benefits of EU membership had ever been. Political discourse became centred on visions of Lithuania being stuck in a Baltic ghetto or a grey zone between an enlarging EU and revanchist Russia.179 The sense of periphery and being in the grey zone of Europe was only intensified by the double exclusion of Lithuania from NATO enlargement as well. As its neighbours, Poland and Estonia, were already in the negotiation process with the EU, Poland a future NATO member, Lithuania was left in the regional company of Latvia, Kaliningrad, and Belarus. This sense of frustration and isolation was all the more emphasized by the fact that Estonia had managed to escape this Baltic ghetto and start negotiations with the EU.
During these years it is interesting to examine how Lithuania was perceived and presented by its political elites. In the rhetoric, one discerns the aforementioned focus on the unfortunate geopolitical situation that the Baltic states share. With the former Warsaw Pact states integrating securely into Western organisations and CIS forming another bloc, the Baltic states, prevented from early entry into the EU or NATO, were left out as some sort of special case as the Baltic leaders critically noted. But by the late 1990s, there was also a sense that the Baltic states were in the process of escaping this inferior position through integration into Western institutions. For example, Landsbergis speaking in 1998 stated, Our state has left in the past its isolated position
179
Herd in Henderson p. 262, 267
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in the Baltic periphery, where we were locked up along with Latvia and Estonia as a small specific European regionThis artificially created isolation problem, created due to the old Yalta line, is in a way resolved.180 Recognizing Lithuanias historically difficult international position, the elites struggled to present Lithuania as a normal state rather than some special case or even more colourfully as a Baltic mushroom in a basket.181 A struggle for labels and rhetoric appeared repeatedly during this time which called for conceptualizing Lithuania as part of Central Europe182 not Eastern Europe where we would be in the same basket as Ukraine, Caucasus, and something else.183
From 1997 to 2000, ideational considerations also coloured Lithuanias perception of the integration process. The idea gained strength that it was Lithuanias right to exercise its political voice as an independent state and thus choose integration into Western organizations. In the discourse, the pursuit of national goals - a fight for a right to choose to integrate to NATO and EU was compared to the fight for independence.184 In a similar vein, Landsbergis stated that Independence works are unfinished until Lithuania is able to use Western organizations, such as NATO and EU.185 This perception of integration as a sign of Lithuanias independent status can be explained as a stance against the continuous Russian resistance to Baltic integration into Western organizations, particularly NATO. Thus, Lithuanian political motivations for membership in EU and NATO can be understood as Lithuanias expression of its political voice despite Russias resistance. Russias hostility and
180 181
Landsbergis, p. 336 Speech to Lithuanian Ambassador Conference in 1997. Ibid., p. 217 182 Vytautas Lansbergis hoped that Lithuania would join the Visegrad group. Interviewed by author on April 11, 2006. 183 Landsbergis, p. 217 184 Ibid., p. 302 185 Ibid., p. 248
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resistance, because it was interpreted as a threat to Lithuanias security and wellbeing, only further cemented Lithuanias resolve.
Right after the Commissions decision, elite discourse was centred on the perceived lack of alternatives for Lithuanias future development other than integration into Western structures. In response to a view that Lithuania could balance between the East and the West and maintain its political and economic sovereignty Landsbergis stated that this option was unrealistic: We do not have an alternative other than to join and integrate to democratic Western states trans-Atlantic structures.186 The argument that Lithuania lacked alternatives to integration was coloured by emotional perspectives of being in a Baltic ghetto and being again a European outsider. Furthermore, the elites repeatedly used dramatic comparisons of Lithuania to Albania. According to Lithuanian parliamentarian and political scientist, Vareikis, a nonintegrated Lithuania would become a chaotic Albania, whose identity today is most problematically definable and which is one of the least wanted nations in Europe. 187 Similarly, Landsbergis, discussing the option of staying out of the Union, stated: Of course it is possible to become some isolated, hidden state, which would strangely think that it could survive by avoiding competition and progress, like some new Albania.188
In summary, ideational factors came to figure prominently in the discourse of Lithuanian political elites in the period from 1997 to 2000. They stemmed primarily from three factors: Lithuanias perceived geopolitical insecurity, from economic dependence on an unstable Russia, and from the fear of being left out of Europe. All
186 187
Ibid., p. 412 Egidijus Vareikis, Dinozaurejanti Europa, Strofa, Vilnius, 2002, p. 294 188 Landsbergis, p. 311
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three of these factors flowed from Lithuanias recent and distant historical experiences. Ideational fears related to non-membership outweighed in importance the potential economic costs of non-membership as well as sovereignty concerns in the calculations of Lithuanian elites. Conclusions The years from 1997 to 2000 were filled with numerous events and elements that seemed to influence Lithuanias policy on the EU. These included poor economic conditions, disappointments and successes in seeking security alliances, regional competition, domestic political shifts and fluctuations in public opinion. The most important and constant factor throughout this rather turbulent period was Lithuanian elite consensus on the necessity of EU membership. The stability of this elite consensus can be explained by the co-variance between Lithuanian economic and security interest and broader factors of identity, culture and historical legacy. In fact, ideational factors not only mattered more than material factors in their own right during this period, but they made material considerations more salient. The result of the concord of these ideational and ideationally-enhanced material factors contributed to the ultimate success of Lithuanias EU policy. While Lithuanias EU policy lacked momentum during much of the 1990s, after 1997, Lithuanian elites emerged with new resolve for entering the Union in the first round of enlargement.
Another crucial aspect to the elite consensus in this period, besides the co-variance in economic, political, and ideational interests, was the impact on policy by external factors. The cumulative effect of exclusion in the first wave of EU accession negotiations, the Russian economic crisis and exclusion from the first round of NATO enlargement, all occurring during the brief period from 1997 to 1999, hardened the
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elite resolve for EU membership. The fear of being left out of Europe and of being marginalized in a Baltic periphery on the border on an unstable Russia were more invoked by the Lithuanian elites during these years than the material benefits of EU membership. Furthermore, these ideational fears overrode the sovereignty tensions of EU membership that increasingly entered the public debate during this time period.
Lastly, the elections of 2000 demonstrated that Lithuanian political elites were unable or unwilling to alter the Lithuanian foreign policy course. There was a noticeable element of path dependency and rhetorical entrapment in Lithuanias EU policy as the closer Lithuania got to membership the more difficult it was to change the course of action. Though sovereignty tensions were high and public Euro-scepticism at its peak, political parties such as Social Liberals continued the foreign policy agenda of their predecessors. The reasons were numerous: a perceived lack of alternatives, negotiations with the EU had already commenced earlier in the year, and it was difficult to renege on a decade worth of statements and actions to the effect that EU membership is Lithuanias primary foreign policy goal.
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Conclusion
Lithuanias rapid accession to the EU in its first decade of independence might at first sight give the mistaken impression of a clear and materially over-determined story of integration. Our detailed analysis has demonstrated that Lithuania's EU accession process was animated at all times by tension and concord between material and ideational factors. The latter mattered as much if not more than material considerations in determining Lithuanian policy elites' drive for EU membership for two reasons. First, ideational factors were often crucial because of their impact on elite perceptions of the EU. Second, and more importantly, ideational factors made material considerations more salient in elite decision making on EU policy. The correlation between ideational factors and ideationally-enhanced material factors accounted for the success of Lithuanias EU policy in key episodes such as in the years between 1997 and 2000.
This study has demonstrated that in addition to the potent correlation between material and ideational factors, Lithuanian EU policy succeeded because of the confluence of a number of elements. The most important of these, such as Lithuanian elite consensus on foreign policy, inverse rhetorical entrapment, path dependency, foreign policy independence from domestic politics, Lithuanian national identity and regional competition, are outlined below.
Lithuanian elite consensus on the necessity of integration to Western structures through membership in the EU and NATO was one of the dominating features of the story of Lithuanias accession. Despite some tactical shifts in the way EU membership
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was sought and articulated, and despite the fact that Euro-scepticism entered the election platforms of some major political parties, Lithuanian foreign policy never officially deviated from its goal of entering the EU in the first wave of enlargement. This elite consensus on foreign policy can be attributed to rational motivations such as security and political benefits of membership, the potential of economic growth and development within the Union, the fear of negative economic externalities of nonmembership and the necessity of EU expertise and advice to implement the necessary reforms for a state in transition to market economy and democracy. However, it is the ideational motivations of soft security benefits, the desire to emulate the idealized European model, the fear of being left out of European developments and of being relegated to a permanent periphery and ghetto that often proven decisive.
Ideational motivations often had an exponential impact on Lithuanias material considerations during key policy decision periods.
Lithuanian elite consensus can be best understood by acknowledging its converses elite path dependency and rhetorical entrapment in EU policy formulation. Lithuanian elites not only chose to pursue EU membership because of its perceived benefits but during some key episodes were pushed to do so: they increasingly became dependent on the path of EU membership for Lithuanias national vision and increasingly entrapped by their statements that EU membership is Lithuanias key foreign policy goal. For instance Lithuanias EU application was submitted in 1995 under the EU-cautious LDDP leadership and when economic relations with Russia were still bearing fruit. This was done because of the perceived lack of security alternatives to Western integration and of already having expressed the desire and made progress to enter the Union in 1994 when the negotiations of the Europe
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Agreement were started. Indeed, the rejection of Lithuania from the first round of negotiations for membership in 1997, far from dampening Lithuanian enthusiasm for membership, had the effect of reinforcing it. This was due partly to the active leverage of the EU, which kept Lithuania on its path to membership with annual reviews and evaluations. In 2000, when the Euro-sceptic Social Liberals won the Parliamentary elections, they were bound by the actions and rhetoric of their predecessors the clauses in the Constitution and national security conceptions as well as the negotiations with the EU which had commenced earlier that year. Thus, Lithuanian elites not only seemed to agree on the necessity of EU membership but often found themselves in self-propelling motion towards membership.
Lithuanian foreign policy consensus lasted for more than a decade and was impacted by the forces of path dependency and rhetorical entrapment due to foreign policy independence from domestic politics. While Lithuanian domestic politics experienced shifts in presidents and political parties over this decade ranging from left to right to centrist forces, foreign policy remained consistent. Furthermore, despite the shifts in Lithuanian public opinion from Euro-enthusiasm in the early 1990s to peaking Euroscepticism by 1999 to 2000, domestic political parties did not strategically alter foreign policy by seeking electoral payoffs. Though some political forces such as the Social Liberals and politicians such as Adamkus changed their tactics and rhetoric regarding the EU, the former hoping to appeal to the public with a EU-sceptic platform and the later seeking to frame the EU in a new light to the public in order to dispel their concerns, the trajectory of foreign policy remained consistent. The independence of foreign policy from domestic politics ultimately contributed to the success of Lithuanias EU policy.
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Another explanatory factor for the consistency and success of Lithuanias EU policy was the nature of the Lithuanian national identity which can be identified simultaneously as European, anti-Russian, and as a historical European outsider. While Central and Eastern European accession has often been conceived from a constructivist perspective as a return to Europe, the case of Lithuanian national identity demonstrated that the realities were often significantly more complex. A desire to be a part of the European community of states as well as a member of the West was a motivating factor for Lithuania. However, it seems that equally or possibly even more important, was the desire to escape the Russian sphere of influence and the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, a fear of being left out of Europe once again as many times before in Lithuanian history in a ghetto between Kaliningrad and Belarus was a key motivation for Lithuania particularly in the years from 1997 to 2000. This sense of being left out was reinforced by that fact that neighbouring states of Poland and Estonia seemed poised to join the Union. Taken together these three strands of Lithuanian national identity were all active drivers to EU membership, though individually they may not have been salient enough.
Regional competition among the Baltic states was another aspect that was instrumental to the ultimate success of Lithuanias EU policy. As our analysis of 1997- 2000 highlighted, Lithuania was determined to enter the Union at the same time as Estonia due to material and ideational concerns. Materially, there were concerns that FDI invest would flow out of Lithuania to Estonia, while ideationally, the prospect of being left out fed fears of remaining alone with Latvia in a Baltic ghetto.
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In addition to identifying the key factors in the success of Lithuanian EU policy, this study has drawn attention to some significant impediments to EU membership. These included fluctuating public support for EU membership, the high costs of EU stipulated reforms and diverging national interests as the case of the agricultural policy and the closure of Ignalina nuclear power plant demonstrated. But the most important impediment was the tension created by the sovereignty debate and the integration dilemma. Lithuania, as a newly independent state, was very concerned about infringements on its hard-fought sovereignty from Brussels which was often critically called the new Moscow. The public and some politicians considered an alternative national path for Lithuania without EU membership. However, in the end, the sovereignty debate was not decisive in precluding Lithuanias EU membership because the EU was perceived to be a guarantor of Lithuanias sovereignty against greater threats than Brussels Russia and, to some extent, globalization.
Another important finding of this study is the non-linear account of Lithuanias motives for EU membership. Though it may appear that Lithuania was primarily motivated to join the EU by security concerns we have demonstrated that this was far from being the case. Lithuanian security concerns reinforced by ideational factors played an important role in the initial determination to seek EU membership in the years up to the submission of the application when rational economic motivations were marginal. However, in the mid- 1990s, Lithuania increasingly looked towards the broader benefits of soft security, political voice and access of membership. By 2000, when Lithuania started its accession negotiations, rational calculations about the economic package and the number of votes in the European Parliament played an
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important role as Vilnius tried to secure the best deal for membership. This finding may be a useful insight into the pre-application and post-application motives of accession states in general. It seems that in the initial stages of accession states are guided by broader motives that may include ideational aspects or general understandings of economic and political opportunities. However, the closer states get to negotiations and membership the more concerned they get about the specific implications of membership on their economy and sovereignty.
There are a number of insights from this study of Lithuanian EU policy that can be applied to Lithuanias foreign policy in general. Lithuanian foreign policy, as can be expected for a small and newly independent state, is influenced by its external environment and external events. This was demonstrated in Lithuanias EU policy when the EU Commissions decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of negotiations, the Russian financial crisis and NATOs decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of enlargement proved decisive in cementing Lithuanias resolve to pursue EU membership. However, the influence of external parties should not be overestimated in Lithuanias foreign policy since NATO membership was achieved despite the vocal opposition of Moscow and scepticism in many European capitals. Another inference that can be drawn from this study is that there seems to be a lack of relationship between domestic politics, public opinion and foreign policy. Foreign policy is formulated by elites, affected little by changes in the political parties in power or by shifts in public opinion.
Though the thesis focuses on Lithuanias EU accession many inferences can be drawn about Lithuanias policy towards Euro-Atlantic structures in general. In the
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Lithuanian political discourse EU and NATO were often addressed together and viewed as inseparable and complementary goals. Furthermore, the public often did not greatly differentiate between them and thus, public opinion shifts on the EU were similar to public opinion shifts on NATO. For instance, during the 1999 dip in public approval for EU membership, those who were against NATO outnumbered those who were for NATO in a public opinion survey (32 percent and 31 percent) accordingly.189 Though NATO membership was driven more by material security benefits such as Article V, both organizations were initially perceived as doorways to Western European community of states and to escaping Lithuanias peripheral geopolitical position. However, in the later years as Lithuania was completing a detailed cost-benefit analysis of EU membership it was also weighing the costs and benefits of NATO membership particularly the expenditure of 2 percent of its GDP on defence. The defence spending came under fire from critics in the 2000 Parliamentary elections who felt that this money could be better spent on social programs. Thus, NATO and EU membership throughout the 1990s and early 2000s were perceived in many similar ways by the Lithuanian elites.
Insights into the Baltic, Central and Eastern European accession can also be derived from the Lithuanian case. Viewing the Baltic accession as a whole has been common in the integration literature due to their many similarities. The Baltic states shared a similar history during the inter-war and Soviet era, took a common path to independence and spent the 1990s trying to integrate into Western structures such as the EU and NATO. Many of the findings in the case of Lithuania such as evolving motives, the importance of ideational factors, the divide between the public and the
189
Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the Integration Dilemma, Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 31
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elites on integration, the consistency of foreign policy are present in fellow Baltic states. As this study has highlighted, a number of ideational and material considerations that might have been be common to the Baltic states were heightened in sensitivity in the case of Lithuania due to the unique conditions that emerged from 1997 and 2000. The high level of fear of being left out and subjugated to a ghetto of Europe may have been unique to Lithuania as Latvia did not have the double disappointment from NATO and the EU and Estonia achieved one of its goals in 1997. It would be interesting to examine if in the case of Estonia, its success to start EU negotiations in 1997 may have alleviated some of its material and ideational concerns to prevent the scenario of non-membership.
The assumption that Central and Eastern European accession was driven by a back to Europe argument has to be re-examined in the light of the findings from the Lithuanian case. It is likely that Poland was similarly driven to pursue EU membership from broad notions of security in light of proximity to Russia and the Kaliningrad enclave. A desire to escape the Russian sphere of influence may have been less of a factor for states such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia which are geographically and geopolitically further removed than the Baltics or Poland from Russia. However, it is likely that these states like Lithuania had ideationally tainted fears of being left out of Europe and becoming the new Albanias. Yugoslavias impact on Slovenia is worth exploring since it is comparable in some respects to the USSRs legacy on the Baltic states, both in terms of fuelling a desire to integrate into Western structures and prompting hesitation due to sovereignty infringements upon newly won independence. Slovakia may be fruitfully compared to Lithuania in its accession policy particularly in the years of 1997 to 2000. Both states
109
experienced the double disappointment of being excluded from the first round of negotiations for EU membership in 1997 and from the first round of NATO enlargement of 1999. Furthermore, just like Lithuania, which was motivated by Estonias achievement, Slovakias failure was magnified by the success of its neighbour, Czech Republic, which started EU negotiations earlier and entered NATO in the first round of enlargement. Just like Lithuania, Slovakia, intensified its efforts to seek EU membership and entered the Union in 2004 along with the first-wave of applicants. Thus, the insights from the Lithuanian case study reveal a number of aspects worthy of further exploration in the Central and Eastern European accession states; it demonstrates that the Lithuanian and Baltic states accession was not the special case some have assumed it to have been.
The findings of this study may provide insight into the ongoing accession process of Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania as well as the potential accession of Belarus and Ukraine. After excluding Bulgaria and Romania from the first round of negotiations for membership in 1997, the Commission opened accession negotiations with these two states in December of 1999 along with Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Malta. However Bulgaria and Romania lagged behind in accepting chapters of the acquis. It would be interesting to examine if the tensions between ideational aspects and material considerations have caused a slowdown in the EU policies of these two states. Furthermore, did domestic politics190, public opinion, and/or regional competition played a role in their foreign policy? Since Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in 2004, it is possible to infer that their membership will be less driven by
190
Vachudova has argued Bulgaria and Romanias slow progress towards EU membership was a result of illiberal government elites in non-competitive political systems. Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 25-29; p. 198-217.
110
security considerations than the Baltic states which simultaneously pursued EU and NATO membership throughout the 1990s. Croatia may demonstrate a number of similarities with the Lithuanian accession process since it is a newly independent state having emerged from union with Yugoslavia. Furthermore, just like the Baltic competition stimulated Lithuania and Latvia to catch up to Estonias progress in EU accession, so may Slovenias success motivate Croatia. Furthermore, Croatia may prove to be as or even more motivated than the Baltic states by security benefits of EU membership due to its recent experience of war. Lithuanias EU accession experience may also shed some light on the potential candidatures of Belarus and Ukraine. The Soviet legacy certainly played a role in Lithuanias EU policy and will probably do so for these post-Soviet states.
Another fruitful comparison between the Lithuanian or the Baltic accession as a whole may be made with the accession process of the Nordic states. There are certainly some key differences between Nordic and Baltic countries since the Nordic states are not new states, do not have significant security concerns other than Finland and are not transition states or post-communist economies. However, the Nordic states, similarly to the Baltics, experienced a divide between public and elite on integration. While government elites pitched membership as a precondition for political influence and continued economic growth, public scepticism was centred on cultural nationalism and desire to preserve the welfare state.191 Moreover, comparative analysis of these two regional sets of states may shed interesting light on the wider questions of the dynamics animating EU enlargement and regional integration processes.
191
Lene Hansen and Ole Wver, European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p. 5
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Bibliography This bibliography has been compiled on selective basis and refers only to the works cited in the thesis. All the works mentioned in the thesis are listed below. The bibliography includes a books and articles section, which consists of secondary and primary materials, as well as an interviews section. Books and Articles Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001 Adamkus, Valdas, Penkeri Darbo Metai, Baltos Lankos, Vilnius, 2002 Avery, Graham and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield, 1999 Clemens, Walter C., The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002 Cremona, Marise, ed., The Enlargement of the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003 Hansen, Lene and Ole Wver, European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, Routledge, London and New York, 2002 Henderson, Karen, ed., Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester, 1999 Hill, Ronald J., and Jan Zielonka, eds., Restructuring Eastern Europe: Towards a New European Order, Aldershot, Hants, 1990 Huang, Mel, Electricity in the Air: The Real Power Politics in the Baltics, Defence Academy of the UK, London, 2002 Ingham, Hilary and Mike Ingham, EU Expansion to the East, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002 Krupnick, Charles, ed., Almost NATO, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, London, 2003 Landsbergis, Vytautas, Kryzkele, Lietuvos Aidas, Vilnius, 1995 Landsbergis, Vytautas, Lithuania: Independent Again, University of Wales Press, Wales, 2000 Landsbergis, Vytautas, Lietuvos Kelias I NATO, Versus Aureus, Vilnius, 2004
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Lieven, Anatol and Dmitri Trenin, eds., Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C, 2003 Lehti, Marko and David J. Smith, eds., Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experience, Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland, 2003 Maniokas Klaudijus, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Darius Zeruolis, eds., Lietuvos Kelias I Europos Sajunga Europos Susivienijimas ir Lietuvos Derybos del Narystes Europos Sajungoje, Eugrimas, Vilnius, 2004 Maniokas, Klaudijus and Gediminas Vitkus, Lietuvos Integracija I ES: Bukles, Perspektyviu ir Pasekmiu Studija, Eugrimas,Vilnius, 1997 Mattli, Walter, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999 McAdam, Doug and John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Feelings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996 Milliken, Jennifer, The study of discourse in international relations: a critique of research and methods, European Journal of International Relations, 5, no 2, 1999 Miniotaite, Grazina, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the Integration Dilemma, Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999 Pettai, Vello and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 2003 Piesarskas, Edmundas, Lietuvos Integracijos I ES Finansiniu, Ekonominiu, ir Socialiniu Pasekmiu Susiteminimas ir Analize, Europos Komitetas prie Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybes, Ekonomines Konsultacijos ir Tyrimai, Vilnius, 2002 Piesarskas, Edmundas, Summary: Systemisation and Analysis of Fianncial, Economic and Social Implications of Lithuanias Integration to the EU, The European Committee under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius, 2002 Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier, Theorizing EU Enlargement, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, no. 4, 2002 Schimmelfennig, Frank, The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, International Organization, vol.55, no.1. Staliunas, Darius, ed., Europos Ideja Lietuvoje: Istorija ir Dabartis, LII Leidykla, Vilnius, 2002 113
Starr, S. Fredrick, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1994 Tang, Helena, ed., Winners and Losers of EU Integration: Policy Issues for Central and Eastern Europe, The World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000 Tiilikainen, Teija, The Political Implications of the EU Enlargement to the Baltic States, Robert Schumann Centre, European University Institute, Florence, 2001 Tiilikainen, Teija and Ib Damgaard Petersen, eds., The Nordic Countries and EC, Copenhagen Political Studies Press, Copenhagen, 1991 Vachudova, Milada Anna, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005 Van Evera, Stephen, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1997 Vareikis, Egidijus, Dinozaurejanti Europa, Stroga, Vilnius, 2002 Vilpisauskas, Ramunas, and Vitalis Nakrosis, Politikos Igyvendinimas Lietuvoje ir Europos Sajungos Itaka, Eugrimas,Vilnius, 2003 Wendt, Alex, Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999 Zielonka, Jan, Europe as an Empire, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006
Interviews by Author Bobelis, Kazys. Member of Lithuanian Parliament and Parliaments Committees on European Affairs and Foreign Affairs. April 12, 2006. Kuzmickas, Bronislovas. Former Member of Lithuanian Parliament, Head of Lithuanias delegation to WEU. March 27, 2006. Landsbergis, Vytautas. Speaker of Lithuanian Parliament 1996 to 2000, Leader of Homeland Union party, European Parliament Member. April 12, 2006. Vareikis, Egidijus. Member of Lithuanian Parliament, Vice-Chairman of Parliaments European Affairs Committee. August 10, 2005 and March 15, 2006.
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Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Explaining Lithuanias Policy on EU Accession, 1991-2002

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Explaining Lithuanias Policy on EU Accession, 1991-2002

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Literature on Economic Motivations

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Vachudova, p. 181-219 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 212

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Argument and Project

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Chapter 2: Economic Factors of Lithuanias EU Policy

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Adamkus 2001, p. 34 Ibid., p. 7-34 79 Ibid., p. 40 80 Adamkus 2001, p. 73

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

years of transition (1990-93)

elites were slow to implement reforms. The lowest

Grabbe and Hughes, p. 186

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

Adamkus 2002, p. 247

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.