Egypt under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political Change in a Post-Populist State Author(s): Raymond A.

Hinnebusch Source: Social Problems, Vol. 28, No. 4, Development Processes and Problems (Apr., 1981), pp. 442-464 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social Problems Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/800057 . Accessed: 19/04/2011 09:30
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SOCIALPROBLEMS,Vol.28, No. 4, April 1981

UNDER SADAT: EGYPT AND POWER CHANGE STRUCTURE, POLITICAL ELITES, IN A POST-POPULIST STATE* A. RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH
The College of Saint Catherine in In this paper I examine the transformations the Egyptian state-specifically in the political establishment-as Egypt moves into a new stage of development and I characterizedby economic liberalization a westwardpoliticalrealignment. exof amine persistence and change in the structure and distribution power in the establishment,inelite ideology,recruitment practices and social composition,and in the patterns and cleavages of intra-elitepolitics.Throughthis examinationI try to assess the relativestrengthand effect of forces pullingthe politicalsystem toward on on politicalliberalization the one hand,and towardconservativeauthoritarianism the other. Iconclude thatthe currentregimeremainsan authoritarian butthat it one, has taken on an increasinglyconservativeface and is characterizedby a greater, if uninstitutionalized, pluralismlimitedto elite levels. It is implicitin the analysis that the open door policy cannot be fully explained without reference to these sociopoliticaltransformations. The Egyptian political system under Sadat is undergoing a fundamental transformation from Nasir's authoritarian nationalist-populist state to one distinctly different, a "post-populist" sociopolitical formation. This study will examine the nature of this transformation. The nature of the Nasir regime and its potentialities for change have inevitably shaped the development of the political system emerging under Sadat today. Nasir's regime resulted from a "breakthrough"of the emerging middle class into a political arena heretofore dominated by the traditional upper classes - at a time when the lower classes were barely politically aware and in a country still struggling to throw off western imperialist control. The "new elite" saw its main tasks as the creation of a modern, less dependent national state, socioeconomic modernization, and a redistribution of power and wealth from the upper to the middle and lower classes. Behind this "populist-nationalist" program, it mobilized a broad middle-lower-class support coalition. Real political power, however, was concentrated in the hands of a charismatic leader and military cadre who shaped and presided over a huge authoritarian bureaucratic state, extended its control through all sectors of society, and attempted to impose a revolution from above. This state proved, however, to have inherent structural weaknessess which made it vulnerable to pressures for transformation emanating from its changing environment - both from powerful external forces, and from internal forces generated by the very socioeconomic changes it tried to carry out. Both Infitah (the open door policy) and the westward political realignment accompanying it, are symptomatic of radical changes taking place in the Egyptian state as under Sadat Egypt enters a new "post-populist" phase. But what precisely can we expect to happen to the structure of the state and to politics in this new phase? Political development theories suggest two models useful in understanding the complex processes by which rather different tendencies may be simultaneously pulling the current transformation of the Egyptian political system in opposing directions. A model (proposed by liberal writers), which could be called "Pluralization and Absorption," suggests one possible operative tendency. It holds that economic development and social mobilization initiated by modernizing regimes lead to a growing expansion and proliferation of sociopolitical forces. The middle class expands in size and complexity while the lower class is also
* Ed. note: In the original typescript the analyses presented here were well documented with extensive citations. The author graciously agreed to cut these to the minimum to save space. (D.C.)

EgyptUnderSadat

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increasingly mobilized. These multiple concentrations of new social power, increasingly resistant to state control, produce differentiated elites and counterelites who demand a greater share of power. Ultimately, the uninstitutionalized authoritarian state can no longer contain these demands; to avoid the costs of repression, it responds by loosening controls and with liberal institutional arrangements for power sharing. Open to the free rise of elites through competition for mass support, the absorptive and representative capacity of the political system expands and ultimately all the various sociopolitical forces are incorporated into it as participants.1 Such an outcome is by no means inevitable, however, and another model (proposed by Marxists) suggests that liberalization may face powerful counterpressures. This model, one of "Conservatization and Exclusion," holds that in the post-populist phase, despite pressures for a diffusion of power, the authoritarian political structure can indeed persist-but its concentrated political power is then used to resist social and political change rather than to propel it. This happens because after a time elites lose their ideological commitments to revolution from above, and the impetus to collective change gives way to conservatization and privitization in elite circles. Such a change in orientation corresponds to a gradual social transformation of the elite from a previously deprived "new middle class" in conflict with the traditional establishment into a new bourgeoisie of wealth and power defending the status quo from rising mass demands and advancing its interests through reintegration into the world capitalist system. While the new bourgeoisie would prefer a liberal to an authoriatarian state, it fears that a more open political system would permit the political mobilization of egalitarian and anti-imperialist mass demands which could threaten its interests. Hence, the authoritarian state in the post-populist phase is maintained to contain such demands-a change in orientation which representsa virtual system transformation.2 Both models seem to have some explanatory power in the Egyptian case. On the one hand, modernization policies have indeed sparked rising levels of social and political mobilization and a proliferation of social forces - especially a rapidly expanding middle class - which could push the system toward liberalization. On the other hand, forces which could lead to the maintenance of the authoritarian state, albeit in defense of a new conservative order, are also apparent. Growing inequality and a rate of social mobilization in excess of economic development are increasing class contradictions. Conflicts over how to deal with the intense international pressures on Egypt since 1967 have widened political cleavages. A desire by elites to contain these conflicts through exclusion of counterelites from the political arena could well work against pressures for liberalization. The changes in the socioeconomic infrastructure and global setting of the Egyptian state under Infitah are examined elsewhere in this issue. Here the focus will be on persistence and change in the political "superstructure" of contemporary Egypt - specifically, in the political elite, its ideology, and the power structure on which it rests - as Sadat's state adapts itself to the conflicting pressures emanating from its post-populist environment. THE PYRAMIDOF POWER:THE STRUCTURE OF THE SADAT ESTABLISHMENT Ten years after Nasir's death, the huge authoritarian bureaucractic state which he built remains intact. It is used increasingly for purposes different from those for which he shaped it and, also increasingly, forces inside and outside of it are altering it. But so far, while adapting to and containing these forces, it has resisted structural transformation and continues to set the framework of elite politics.
1. For an application of this model to the Turkish case see Frey (1965). Several important writers, including Berger (1962) and Halpern (1963), have suggested that Arab military republics like Nasir's Egypt might fol-

low a similarcoursetowardliberalism.

2. For an application of the authoritarian conservative model stressing class contradictions to Egypt, see Hussein (1975).

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TheApex. Presidential Monarchy

President Anwar al-Sadat has preserved and defended against all threats the authoritarian presidency inherited from Nasir. The 1971 succession conflict between Sadat and Ali Sabri was as much about the powers of the presidency as about policy. In Sabri's bid, Sadat perceived an attempt to restrict his "right"to make presidential decisions as Nasir had done. In defeating Sabri, he defeated an alternative conception of the political system which could have made the president accountable to a wider collective leadership of equals ensconced in other power centers of the bureaucratic state, notably the party. Since Sabri's defeat, no member of the elite has been able to seriously challenge the prerogatives of the presidency. The powers of the presidency remain enormous: its formal constitutional powers greatly overshadow the legislature and the judiciary, and it presides over a huge largely compliant bureaucracy which envelopes Egyptian society. The president is above such formal constraints as law or the administrative regulations which bind his subordinates; he remains the sole source of major policy or ideological innovation (although such innovations may be responses to pressures from below); and he still defines and can change at will the "rules of the political game"- the conditions of political participation. The presidency today is no less a concentration of enormous personalized power than under Nasir. Yet the man makes the office as well as vice versa, and Sadat's goals, style, and leadership have left a distinctive imprint. A major change from Nasir's time is Sadat's traditional conception of the president's role. Essentially, Egyptian society is seen as the authoritarian patriarchal family, writ large, with the president as the "father," entitled to respect and obedience.3 Such a conception of leadership is, of course, profoundly illiberal, and - incompatible with legitimate demands for a redistribution of wealth and power - part of the symbolism of authoritarian-conservative rule worldwide. However, coexisting with, if subordinate to, this role conception is a cautious commitment to a certain liberalization of the political system, as expressed in Sadat's desire to create a "state of laws and institutions," rather than men, and in his experiments with a multiparty system. But it is clear that Sadat is prepared to accept and encourage liberalization and pluralization only in a carefully controlled way: only to the extent that it does not encroach on the prerogatives of the presidency, and that it does not spread downward to the mass level. In other words, it is acceptable only at the middle levels of the power structure and the top levels of the class system. While such limited liberalization has important consequences for the political system, it stops far short of the expectations of those who hoped Sadat might be prepared to withdraw "above" the political arena and allow elites to compete for mass support and over the determination of policy. That Sadat never had any such intention is clear from his unwillingness in the course of the multiparty experiment to concede any of his unilateral right to determine basic policy or to permit criticism of his policy. It is also clear from his expectation that opposition should be "constructive"-that is, offer, in restricted elite councils, practical alternatives within the broad lines of presidential policy. Sadat's personal style has also had an impact on the real distribution of power in the system. Nasir made the presidency a highly activist, interventionist force. He was hard-driving, dynamic, domineering and suspicious of other members of the elite; he was personally a source of enormous energy at the top of the system, pushing the elite into motion and holding it accountable to his plans. Sadat is more easygoing and tolerant; his presidency has meant a relaxation and contraction of control over the elite. But far from being merely a matter of personal style, these

3. See Dimbleby(1977)for an insightfulportraitof Sadat'spersonalstyle.

EgyptUnderSadat

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contrasts also reflect decisive differences in the goals of the two leaders. Nasir wanted to transform Egypt, even if this required running roughshod over vested elite interests; much of his activism and interventionism was a response to the natural tendency of these elites to resist and deflect his goals. Sadat accepts the status quo and with it the right of elite interests to defend and advance themselves incrementally, as long as this does not encroach on presidential prerogatives. Sadat was aware of the resentment in elite circles at Nasir's interventionist, domineering style. Part of his support from the elite has depended on maintaining a lower presidential profile in state and society. Thus, at the very apex of the political system, populist charismatic leadership seems now to be routinized in the form of "Presidential Monarchy" (see Apter, 1965:214-215). Concentrated personalized power persists, but is wielded in increasingly traditionalist fashion. The cautious liberalization and contraction of control from the apex should be seen basically as an attempt to satisfy (and win legitimacy from) elites, while containing pressures for a more significant opening up of the political system. Presidency and Elite: Decision Making and Control It would be hard to argue that basic decision making in Egypt is less concentrated today than it was under Nasir. Nasir was at least partially constrained by a minimum of accountability to an inner core of Free Officers - men who made the revolution with him, and who, far from being his creatures, were relatively permanent members of a team not easily disregarded and who on occasion could defy him. In the case of Sadat, the elite are much more "his"men-often obscure persons co-opted to power - whom he makes and breaks as he pleases. There is no inner core of equals or revolutionary comrades to whom he is in any way accountable. No centers of power independent of the president have emerged. It is well known that Sadat makes many major decisions with little consultation with or concern for the opinions of the members of the elite, whom he tends to regard as his staff rather than as colleagues. Especially in foreign policy Sadat has led rather than followed elite opinion. No member of the elite has been able to stand against him and keep his position. A number of factors account for Sadat's ability to maintain himself far above the rest of the elite. The authority of presidential office and the deference of the state machinery to such legal legitimacy are substantial in Egypt. This superior legal legitimacy was no small factor in accounting for Sadat's victory over the Sabri faction in 1971, and since then it has given him unique stature. Sadat also enjoys personal legitimacy resources flowing from his status as the senior Free Officer in 1971, his association with the October 1973 War, the partial recovery of lost Egyptian territory, and steps toward peace. Sadat has also rewarded the elite, winning loyalty by policies which respond to its interests and ideals- from Infitah and political relaxation to his relative tolerance of corrupt practices.4 The Egyptian establishment must know it can expect no better treatment from any other leader. Yet Sadat has taken care, through periodic shakeups in the elite to prevent any individual member from acquiring a personal base from which to challenge the presidency and its powers; moreover, he has proven himself a master of the politics of "divide and rule," of the exploitation of intra-elite rivalries. In the early years when the main threat was from the left, Sadat mobilized the Nasirite center, including many Free Officers and the professional military, to purge both Marxists and the radical Ali Sabri faction. But with the left deposed, Sadat then gradually edged mainstream Nasirite personalities out of power. The Free Officers were the first to disappear. After the 1973 war Sadat undermined the center further by encourag-

4. For an argument that corruption had become "institutionalized" in the 'seventies see Ayubi (1979).

446

HINNEBUSCH

ing the emergence of quiescent elites on the right and brought in a new team to preside over Infitah. But since then new waves of replacements have periodically swept out incumbent governments. Three times as many ministers per year have served under Sadat as served Nasir.5 In the process of moving to the right and shaking up his subordinates, Sadat has left behind a trail of old supporters often in tacit or open opposition to his policies, but who, deprived of their institutional bases, have proved little threat to the president so far. There are two qualifications to this picture of "one-man rule," however. First, although Sadat has insisted on his unilateral right to make major policy decisions, it does not follow that he is isolated from the influence of the elite. In his effort to maintain and expand his legitimacy, Sadat has been open - particularily in matters outside foreign policy which he regards as his special domain- to an exchange of influence, especially with his inner entourage. Second, although Sadat reserves the right to intervene in the smallest matter, in practice he has allowed elites considerable jurisdiction over lesser decisions and more automony in their own domains than they enjoyed under Nasir. Nevertheless, between the president and the next rung in the power elite there is certainly a bigger gap than there was under Nasir. The structure of elite "ranks"under Sadat is briefly suggested by what follows. The top elite. The most striking transformation in the top elite-the inner core of power-is the disappearance of the Free Officers organization and the substitution for it of personal advisors, confidants and chief ministers who together resemble a royal court. Sadat's original succession governments contained large numbers of Free Officers; and after the 1971split when a slight majority of Free Officers supported him, many were kept on as ministers or advisors. But, in a fairly rapid process of attrition, most were retired or pushed into peripheral positions; only a few remain as informal members of Sadat's team. The new inner core is headed by four men who enjoy extremely close personal relations with Sadat (three being linked to his family by marriage ties); this mixture of political with primordial ties gives the group the aura of a "royal family." Osman Ahmad Osman, director of the huge Arab Contracting Company and perhaps the number two man in Egypt today, is the country's largest capitalist and seems to represent the nonagricultural wing of the bourgeoisie at the center of power. One of his sons is married to one of Sadat's daughters. He presides over a vast clientage network. He has held several public offices including those of Minister of Reconstruction and head of "food sufficiency projects." His power rests, however, not on formal office but on his business empire and his personal and familial relations with the president. Next to Osman, and also married into the Sadat family, are Sayid Marei and Mahmoud Abu Wafia, both from old landed families. Marei, in particular, has had a long and distinguished carreer in the elite concerned with agrarian policy, and has his own formidable clientage network. These men represent the agrarian bourgeoisie in the inner circles of power. Marei has served as a minister, as First Secretary of the state party, and as Speaker of Parliament. He appears to influence Sadat's policies and is regarded as a force behind Infitah. Both he and Abu Wafia were active forces supporting the political liberalization experiment and the organization of the new ruling party. The fourth member of the inner core is Vice President Husni Mubarek. Mubarek, in addition to authority of office, seems to enjoy the close trust of Sadat; as a successful Air Force commander he has prestige and a following in the military. (Former Vice President Shafei was held in light regard by Sadat and enjoyed little political power.) All these men have had distinguished 5. In Nasir's18 years, 131personsheldministerial of 9 portfolios(an average 7.2 peryear);in Sadat's years

from 1970-79, 186 have so served (20.6 per year). The average tenure of a minister under Nasir was 44 months compared to 21 under Sadat.

EgyptUnderSadat

447

careers. It is also significant that some, notably Osman, have private power bases outside the State, a marked departure from Nasir's time. But most of their political power accrues from closeness to Sadat, from their ability to influence his decisions and, because this is known, to thus influence a wide range of lesser decisions by other elite elements. Their permanence also separates them from the rest of the elite: ministers, even prime ministers, and generals come and go, but these man stay at the center of power. The outer ring of the top elite is made up of the Prime Minister and other important ministers, top military commanders (The Minister of War and the Chief of Staff), top party leaders, and close presidential advisors. Prime ministers are powerful because as the president's chief policy implementers they have opportunities to influence and shape policy, and they make a host of lesser but crucial "who gets what" decisions. They can also fill many cabinet and lower-level positions with clients. But for tenure they depend on the president, rather then their own political bases: Sadat has had five prime ministers since 1970 and none has remained in office longer than three years. Only one, Aziz Sidqi, showed any signs of independence from the president. Top military commanders rank in the top elite since military support is crucial for the regime and because they represent a potential veto group. Four of Sadat's top commanders have, to some degree, challenged his policies; but because they were unable to carry the military establishment with them they were all dismissed with apparent ease. Rounding out the top elite are holders of certain critical ministerial portfolios that are presidential, not prime ministerial, appointments and who participate in broader policymaking: the Ministers of Economy, Finance, Interior and Foreign Affairs; a few ministers who have enjoyed exceptional longevity because of special technical competence or close personal relations with Sadat; and the president's top political advisors and party managers. The middle elite. Most cabinet ministers and governors of the provinces make up the middle elite. They exercise considerable discretion in their own domains, albeit within the lines of presidential and government policy, and where technical expertise is called for they may have input into broader policies. But, dependent on presidential favor, rather than political bases for their positions, few last more than one or two years in their positions. Significantly, not one minister in Sadat's first post-Sabri government was still around in 1979. The ministerial elite is largely nonpolitical, made up of technicians lacking both ideological commitment and constituencies. Because the recruitment pool is so large and tenure so brief, networks of solidarity among ministers or governors do not seem to develop and the cabinet hardly functions as a collegial body. There is thus little possibility that those in the middle elite could or would challenge presidential policy. A few have resigned in disagreement but their typical attitude to the president is deferential. Over the fate of those below them, however, they are men of power. The subelite. The subelite is here considered to be those subcabinet members who link the elite to the population and comprise the elite recruitmentpool. This group includes top civil servants in the various departments of the state, commanders of military units, public-sector managers, editors of newspapers, religious leaders, leaders of professional syndicates and chambers of commerce, and local notables who head branches of the state party. The basic meeting ground for all these elites is parliament, the institutional arena where the interests of the "second stratum," the solid core support base of the regime, are expressed and taken into account by top and middle elites. Parliamentary elites do not make big decisions or even hold top decision makers accountable. Big issues such as foreign policy - in which Sadat has refused to be constrained by parliamentary opinion-are beyond their competence, and even major economic and technical decisions are often made by ministers enjoying extensive right to "legislate" by decree, with little or no consultation. The government is not really dependent on parliamentary support, nor is the president

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TABLEI1

Original Occupations of Egyptian Ministers*

InheritedNasir Elite 1970-71 Period Original Occupations Military Academia Engineering Law Bureaucrat Business/Professional Police Diplomacy Other TOTALS * Source: al-Ahram. No. 16 9 5 4 4 1 0 3 0 42 % 38.1 21.4 12.0 9.5 9.5 2.4 0.0 7.1 0.0 100.0 Sadat Elite Post-1971 Sadat Elite Post-Infitah Recruits (1974) Recruits No. 23 33 34 22 4 7 4 7 1 135 % 17.0 24.4 25.2 16.3 3.0 5.2 3.0 5.2 0.7 100.0 No. 6 23 21 11 4 6 3 3 0 77 % 7.8 29.9 27.3 14.2 5.2 7.8 3.9 3.9 0.0 100.0

TABLE 26

Career Recruitment Paths of Egyptian Ministers*

InheritedNasir Elite 1970-71 Period
Recruitment Paths No. %

Sadat Elite Post-1971 Recruits

No. %

Sadat Elite Post-Infitah (1974) Recruits

No. %

1 Military 2 Milit-Bureaucrata 3 Milit-Politicalb 4 Academic Only 5 Academic-Engineer 6 Academic-Bureaucrat 7 Academic-Politician 8 BureaucratOnly 9 Bureaucrat-Engineer 10 Bureaucrat-Politician 11 Law 12 Law-Academic 13 Law-Bureaucrat 14 Law-Judiciary 15 Law-Politician

1 6 9 3 3 3 2 1 4 1 0 0 1 2 1

2.4 14.3 21.4 7.1 7.1 7.1 4.8 2.4 9.5 2.4 0.0 0.0 2.4 4.8 2.4

7 14 5 9 6 15 6 4 27 1 1 6 4 3 4

5.3 10.5 3.8 6.8 4.5 11.3 4.5 3.0 20.3 0.7 0.7 4.5 3.0 2.3 3.0

2 7 0 7 2 11 4 3 17 1 0 1 2 2 2

2.7 9.3 0.0 9.3 2.7 14.7 5.3 4.0 22.7 1.3 0.0 1.3 2.7 2.7 2.7

16 BusinessOnly
17 Business-Bureaucrat 18 Business-Politician 19 Professionalc 20 Professional-Politician 21 Professional Academic 22 Diplomat 23 Syndicalist
TOTALS

0
0 0 0 1 0 3 1
42

0.0
0.0 0.0 2 0.0 2.4 2.4 0.0 7.2 2.4
100.0%

2
2 1 3 2 3 7 1
133

1.5
1.5 0.7 2.3 1.5 2.3 5.3 0.7
100.0%

2
9.8 2 1 3 1 2 3 0
75

2.7
2.7 1.3 4.0 1.3 2.7 4.0 0.0
100.0%

14.7

* Source: al-Ahram. a Denotes officers who served in the bureaucracy or public sector or in the foreign policy bureaucracy. Police officers are included. b Denotes officers who served as political advisors or trouble-shooters in the presidential bureaucracyor as party officials or parliamentaryleaders. c Denotes professionals other than lawyers, e.g., doctors, journalists, and pharmacists. 6. Tables I and 2 classify Egyptian ministers according to original occupation and according to "career recruitment path," meant to denote certain basic combinations of occupation and institutional career service which have been followed by those entering ministerial roles.

Under Sadat Egypt

449

constrained to ensure such support by picking government leaders from parliamentary influentials. Thus, parliament exercises influence at the sufferance of the president and the more powerful ministers. Nevertheless, Sadat seeks through parliament to keep his main constituency satisfied. Parliamentary seats are desirable because they enhance local power and influence and may even count in recruitment to higher elite levels. Parliament gives the "second stratum"access to decision makers, permitting grievances to be redressed and the interests of the state bourgeoisie to be reconciled with those of its private cousins. In this process, government policies are occasionally altered. When the government is considering a policy shift it may sound out opinion at its base through parliamentary debate. Parliament has sometimes criticized abuses by the government and exposed corrupt practices. On one occasion Sadat was forced to reverse a personal decision, though subsequently that troublesome 1977parliament was dissolved (see Fouad, 1979, and Gami, 1979). However, parliamentary elites have seldom demonstrated much sense of collective institutional solidarity vis-ia-visthe executive; parliament is viewed by members more as a channel to cultivate strategic personal connections higher up than as a base from which to challenge government decisions in the name of alternative conceptions of public policy. AND SOCIALCOMPOSITION ELITE RECRUITMENT There is substantial continuity in the Egyptian political elite from the Nasir to Sadat periods: a majority of those who preside over Sadat's post-populist redirection rose throught recruitment channels established under Nasir. Nevertheless, an accumulation of gradual changes since 1952 is producing an emergent transformation in the social composition of the elite. Under Nasir there were three quite separate channels of recruitment, each tending to terminate at a separate level in the power structure. The Free Officers movement channeled into top and middle elite roles military officers of rural lower-middle-class background. Academia and the bureaucracy channeled into the middle elite (but usually no further) persons of the urban uppermiddle class (Dekmejian, 1974). The subelite was recruited from middle class officials and rural notables serving in local branches of the state party and parliament. Access to elite roles from each channel required co-optation from above. Most of the old elite of aristocratic or haute bourgeois background was excluded from the new elite. This four-way segmentation, and the political subordination of higher status elites by lower status ones, could not persist indefinitely, and intra-elite social differentiation was already being bridged before Nasir died. The new lower-middle-class power elite, gradually acquiring wealth (through high salaries, corruption and even business) and social status, transformed itself into a "state bourgeoisie," a process largely completed though never quite legitimized under Nasir (who retained a petty bourgeois lifestyle and never identified with Egypt's bourgeoisie). Under Sadat, elite transformation is being carried considerably further. First, the recruitment

The tablescomparethreeperiods.The firstcolumnsbreakdown the compositionof ministries according to occupationand recruitment periodafterNasirhad died but duringwhichSadat path for the transitional
still had to share power with the rest of the Nasirite elite. As such it represents the Nasirite elite at its most mature level of development, and is an excellent benchmark with which to compare later changes in the com-

of the ministers recruited after May 1971, the date when Sadat purged much of the Nasirite elite, consolidated his power and began to recruit his own men. Note that not all ministers serving after this date are included in the data, but only those first recruited after May 1971. By confining the data to those recruitedafter this date, the data are made more sensitive to emergent changes in recruitment patterns. The third columns represent the compostion of the elite recruited beginning in 1974 when Sadat initiated the major redirection in Egypt's course which goes under the name of Infitah. Again not all ministers serving after 1974 are included which have accompanied this redirection in the regime's orientation. The data, taken from al-Ahram files, are fairly complete, but data on occupation are lacking for nine ministers and on career paths for eleven.

the his positionof the elite once Sadathad consolidated power.The secondcolumnsrepresent composition

after 1974-in orderto highlightthe changesin elite composition in the data, but only those first recruited

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HINNEBUSCH
TABLE 37

EducationalSpecializationsof EgyptianMinisters*
InheritedNasir Elite 1970-71 Period Educational Specializations Military Military-Technocratica Military-Otherb Engineering Agronomy Medicine Law Economics/Business Humanities Social Science Pure Science Religion None TOTALS No 9 3 4 4 3 3 8 3 1 2 1 0 0 41 % 22.0 7.3 9.8 9.8 7.3 7.3 19.5 7.3 2.4 4.9 2.4 0.0 0.0 100.0 Sadat Elite Post-1971 Recruits No. 13 10 4 29 10 6 27 20 3 1 4 5 1 133 % 9.8 7.5 3.0 21.8 7.5 4.5 20.3 15.0 2.3 0.7 3.0 3.8 0.7 100.0 Sadat Elite Post-Infitah (1974) Recruits No. 4 4 1 17 7 3 14 16 2 1 3 3 0 75 % 5.3 5.3 1.3 22.7 9.3 4.0 18.7 21.3 2.7 1.3 4.0 4.0 0.0 100.0

* Source: al-Ahram. a Denotes persons combining militarywith technical or scientific education. b Denotes persons combining militarywith another nontechnical degree, e.g., law.

system has altered in important ways. One basic change is the clear and continuing decline of the military career as a route into the elite. While the presidency and vice-presidency are still preserves of ex-officers, the prime ministership, once a monopoly of the military, now goes to civilians; ministerial portfolios are open to a dwindling number of officers. (Under Nasir, officers made up about one-third of the elite; by the late Sadat years, little more than one new recruit in ten has been an officer.) The disappearance of the Free Officer-military career route means that the one recruitment channel by which younger persons of modest social status could reach top elite positions has eroded, and not been replaced. It also means an opening of top elite roles to civilians. Academia continues to serve as a main recruitment channel, supplying about onethird of elite recruits. Egypt's top economic managers in particular tend to be picked from the universities. The bureaucracy per se is still a major and expanding recruitment channel, but the classical career bureaucrat has increasingly been replaced in ministerial roles by a new breed of engineer-bureaucrats who work their way up through state organization and the public sector. Their emergence at the top is an outcome of the "technocratic revolution" begun under Nasir. Although their presence is somewhat incongruent with the growing threat to the public sector from Infitah, it indicates that the influence of the "state bourgeoisie" is unlikely to disappear overnight. Diplomacy remains an important subsidiary route to the elite, and as the age of revolutionary militancy gives way to that of accomodation, professional diplomats are replacing soldiers in Egypt's top foreign-policy management roles. More significant yet, it now appears that the one career route outside the state-academic complex - in private business and the professions - is increasingly reopening. Under Nasir, this route dwindled in significance (except for the recruitment of judges to ministerial positions), but by the late 'seventies one-quarter of new ministers were reaching office from such careers. Moreover,

7. The data on the educational specializations of ministers are broken down into three time periods defined in exactly the same way as those for occupation and for career paths.

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Sadat has deliberately co-opted into top political roles representatives of both new business (now flourishing under Infitah) and old wealth (respectable once more).8 It is also significant that "private sector" persons have often served in parliament and the government party before reaching the top; thus these institutions, dominated by the military-bureaucraticelite and largely dead-ending in subelite roles under Nasir, may now be emerging as recruitment channels to higher levels. These changes, taken together, seem to spell the end of the three-track system which under Nasir segmented the elite into separate compartments. A similar pattern can be seen in recruitment to governorships; while under Nasir these positions were in good part a military preserve, civilians now dominate, and professionals and academics as well as career bureaucrats now qualify for such appointments. Finally, there has been a significant increase in ministers with educational specializations in economics, law and engineering. Presumably, these are the skills needed in an era of Infitah and peace with its stress on the free market and internal development. The decline in those with military and social science education may reflect the end to the period of forced social engineering from above. Of equal significance for change in elite composition are the outreach strategies incumbent elites are using to build connections outside the state establishment. Increasingly the "state bourgoisie," acquiring wealth and status through state service, is investing it in the private sector and forming alliances with forces outside the state. First, Infitah has opened up opportunities, hardly existent under Nasir, to acquire wealth - notably through commissions and other licit or illicit payments from foreign investors; it has also opened up opportunities to invest this wealth in collaboration with foreign or private Egyptian capital. In brief, the Egyptian political elite is going into business, transforming itself into a private-property owning bourgeoisie. Second, an amalgamation of the old and new bourgeoisies is taking place as business, marriage, and even political alliances are formed between these once rather antagonistic social forces. This process, begun to some extent under Nasir, has advanced under Sadat, whose own marriage, lifestyle, and political alliances provide a legitimizing model at the top. The decline in military domination of elite roles, the diversification of recruitment channels, the growing development by state elites of resource bases outside immediate state control, and the greater incorporation of previously excluded or peripheral elites into the power structure do point to a tendency toward the pluralization of power among differentiated bourgeois elites inside Sadat's state. In the long run this tendency may indeed provide conditions for political liberalization, but as yet it remains rudimentary. Elites outside the state still cannot use their resources in open competition for elite roles, and they depend ultimately on co-optation from above. Moreover, no business or professional base can at present be more than partially independent of state control in Egypt. Far more significant are countertendencies toward a closed, diffuse elite: the closure of recruitment channels from the lower-middle class; the growing web of ties between previously disparate sections of the elite; the bridging of the gap between power and wealth, state and society; the effacement of the separate track recruitment system; and the increasing overlap of state and extrastate careers. Despite the persistence of intra-elite contradictions, all these tendencies seem to spell the emergence of an increasingly cohesive bourgeois ruling elite. Completing the process is the replacement of a president-leader who tried to stay above and juggle the different classes by one who bases himself chiefly on (and identifies mostly with) the bourgeoisie.

8. Recentadditionsto Sadat'sinnercircleincludeMansurHasan,an importmillionaire, FikriMakram and old Obayd, a prominent professionalfrom a prestigious family.

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ELITEIDEOLOGY The ideology of the Egyptian power elite in the post-populist phase has undergone a rapid and thorough transformation which has effaced the "Nasirism" of the previous period. The elite never was intensely committed to Nasirism as a belief system; rather, "Nasirism" was in part a pragmatic response to specific experiences and circumstances which are now superceded in elite consciousness by more recent experiences. In particular much of the current outlook of the elite seems shaped by a perception of the very high costs incurred by Egypt in its effort to challenge the world-imperialist order in the Middle East and a belief in the need to avoid such costs in the future-indeed, to reap benefits by accomodation to that order. But at a deeper level, the eclipse of radical populist nationalism reflects the social transformation of the elite from petty bourgeois outsiders in conflict with a traditional ruling class into a privileged establishment with interests to preserve and a growing desire to be accepted as part of what may be called the "international bourgeoisie." The emergence of this new elite orientation can be seen by tracing several dimensions of the direction of current ideological change.

Dimensionsof Change
Conservatization. Increasingly the symbolism of revolution and radical change typical of Nasirism is disappearing from the elite vocabulary and being replaced by traditionalism and conservatism. President Sadat, in particular, advocates a model of social life emphasizing deference to traditional authority, harmony between rich and poor, and adherence to the traditional values of family and religion. Socialism, and particularly Marxism, are regarded with abhorrence as alien ideas employed by "haters" who play on the envy of the poor to stir up class strife (see Critchfield, 1978: Intro.). Cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is used here to mean the tendency of westernized elites in developing countries to identify themselves as members of a global-actually western-community, adopting such values and perceptions partly at the expense of identification with their own cultures. A tendency by elites to identify more with the West than their own culture increasingly displaces the nativist radical nationalism of the Nasir era. The Egyptian ruling class was distinctively cosmopolitan in prerevolutionary days, but under Nasir an Arab-Islamic identity was favored. Now, with the embourgeoisment of the elite and its amalgamation with the westernized old upper classes, cosmopolitan tendencies are strongly reemerging. This shift can be seen in the abandonment of anti-imperalism and nonalignment in favor of a close American alliance, in the devaluing of self-sufficiency, and in the opening up to a vast influx of western cultural and consumer commodities. It can be seen in the current attempts to define Egyptian national identity by deemphasizing its Arab-Islamic content in favor of "Pharaonic" or "Mediterranean"alternatives which set Egypt apart from her Middle East environment and link her westward. Elitism. As Nasir's populism fades, elitism as ideology is increasingly accentuated. Nasirite efforts to redistribute resources by administrative means have fallen into disrepute, and there is a corresponding rehabilitation of the market as a mechanism supposed to distribute rewards according to efficiency. Populist measures, such as subsidies on mass consumption goods, the maximization of employment and limits on salaries and profits, are increasingly seen as distortions of the market efficiency needed for development. It is also held that capital, advanced technology and highly skilled personnel, now seen as the chief keys to development, must be obtained and kept through rewards at internationally accepted levels. The inequalities resulting from the allocation of rewards to the minority who control such scarce resources are taken as part of the cost of economic development. In the political field, elitism can be seen in the devaluation of the role of the masses. Under Nasir some efforts were made to draw the masses into participa-

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tion; the elite now explicitly seeks mass demobilization and depoliticization (e.g., of the campus and mosque). Privatization. The pursuit of private interests has emerged as a dominant elite orientation at the expense of the state and public goals stressed under Nasir. Nasir's emphasis on duties rather than rights, and on the hierarchical enforcement of discipline and control by the leviathan state, has under Sadat generated a sharp contrary reaction among the elite. The emphasis now is on contraction of state economic controls over society and the liberation of private initiative. The pursuit of individual self-interest, castigated under Nasir, is now legitimized; "socialism"has been replaced by "freedom" as the ideological watchword. But "freedom" has been translated into a growing acceptance of the soft state and its increasing subordination to and colonization by powerful privileged interests. Liberalization. A strong current of political liberalism now competes with the inherited authoritarian model for the loyalities of Egypt's political elite. Official ideology holds that Egypt has passed from an era of "Revolutionary Legitimacy" to one of "Constitutional Legitimacy." The increased personal security and enhanced rule of law under Sadat are indeed so valued among the elite that a return to harsher controls would be difficult for the ruler. Moreover, pressures to dismantle the single party and expand political freedoms have emanated from parliamentary subelites as well as from personalities in the very top elite. Nevertheless, only a minority of the elite believe a fully open competitive liberal regime is suitable for Egypt, fearing the erosion of authority such a system might entail. At a deeper level, Egypt's bourgeoisie is profoundly ambivalent about liberalism: it wants enough to allow it to share power with the ruler, but fears that excessive relaxation of controls could open opportunities for radical counterelites to mobilize a mass threat from below. Thus, the starts and stops in Eygpt's effort to arrive at some form of limited or elite-level pluralism correspond to the dominant attitude among the elite and its bourgeois constituency. Elite ideology is clearly undergoing a major change, away from the nationalist-etatist-populist Nasirite mix toward a more cosmopolitan-privatist-conservative blend. On the other hand, movement away from authoritarianism is far less marked; indeed, though challenged by a liberal current, the persistence of authoritarianism is quite compatible with the new conservative elitism. Thus, the dominant emergent orientation today is authoritarian conservatism, a tone set by the President himself. Three secondary tendencies can also be identified. A politically liberal but socially conservative tendency, perhaps best represented by Sayid Marei, the President's close confident, is the next strongest orientation among the elite. Far weaker is liberal populism, best represented by the leader of the official opposition party, Ibrahim Shukry. Authoritarian populism - that is, mainstream Nasirism - does persist among the elite, but is clearly a recessive orientation. These differences in elite orientations should be seen as subtle shadings, rather than sharp cleavages, because general deference to the ruler and a sense of shared class interests have increasingly resulted in a remarkable level of elite cohesion. Nevertheless, intra-elite politics and conflict are neither absent nor detached from the big issues and choices which face Egypt as she moves into the post-populist era, as the following section will seek to show. ELITEPOLITICS:INTRA-ELITE CONFLICTAND COHESION The Military Elite and Defense Policy The military elite remains the most critical force in the Egyptian political system. Without its support, Sadat's rule would be very vulnerable to challenge; moreover, it remains the only force with the potential to impose a change of policy or leadership at the top. Yet, without losing control of the military establishment, Sadat has been increasingly able to exclude the officer elite

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from political decision making and to alter profoundly the role assumed by the Egyptian army under Nasir as defender of the revolution and of the Arab nation against imperialism and Zionism. Certain basic long-term transformations help explain military acquiescence in Sadat's policies. The military has undergone an increasing embourgeoisment and ideological conservatization which parallels that of the civilian elite. If in the early 'fifties the officer elite acted as the populist "tribune of the people," by the end of the Nasir era it was becoming increasingly conservative. Moreover, its 1967 defeat by Israel, which many officers blamed on Nasir's anti-imperialist, Arab-Nationalist policies, or on lack of Soviet support, inclined the military away from support for radical causes outside Egypt. Also, since the 1967 defeat, the military has increasingly accepted a more strictly professional role and an ethic of noninvolvement in politics, and the relative success in the 1973 war following the greater professionalization of the officer corps has legitimized this role change in military eyes. Professionalization has implied unquestioning acceptance of the commands of legitimate authority -that is, of the president. As Sadat has pushed the military out of the political arena, he has been careful to foster the organization of countervailing civilian political forces to fill the vacuum against the possibility of a reemergence of military politicians. These policies have not, however, gone unchallenged by elements of the military elite. In the first decisive intra-elite struggle, Sadat faced left-wing Free Officers led by Ali Sabri, but won out largely because of the support of the more conservative professional officer corps. In the years of stalemate with Israel (1971-73) he had to contend with "rightists"(led by War Minister Sadek) incensed with the Soviet advisors and "militants" (such as Chief of Staff Shazli) dissatisfied with Egypt's inaction in the face of the Israelis. The expulsion of the Soviet advisors, and the October War, eased this dissatisfaction and greatly bolstered Sadat's legitimacy in military eyes; but in the postwar period both militants and more moderate officers challenged Sadat's decisions to give up the war option and rely on American diplomacy in dealing with Israel and then to sign a separate peace with her. Securing his position with other more compliant officers, Sadat successfully dismissed all such dissenters. By the late 'seventies, he had transformed the army from a vanguard of change into a conservative guardian of order; internally, it put down the popular disturbances of 1977; externally, it was on polite terms with Israel, engaged on the side of the right in Zaire, and in open conflict with radical Libya. Though this transformation has generated unease in the officer corps, for most officers there is little viable alternative to Sadat. A change in leadership could jeopardize the privileges and prestige Sadat has been careful to accord them and open up the possibility of another unwinnable war with Israel. Moreover, because the military has so far failed to act as a cohesive interest group in the system, allowing Sadat to count on the support of loyalist elements against dissenters, the risks of opposition are very high. Technocratic-AdministrativeElites: The Politics of Economic Management Under Nasir, technocratic and administrative elites constituted a privileged stratum, largely recruited from the urbanupper-middle and middle classes. In political attitude they were etatist and largely illiberal; pragmatic and adaptable as well, they had become, by the 'sixties, "socialists by presidential decree." They were not, however, entirely happy with Nasirism as it had evolved in the 'sixties and almost unanimously welcomed the victory of Sadat over the Nasirite "left." Although, unlike the military, the technocrats offered no immediate threat to Sadat's position, he has sought their support as a contribution to the legitimacy of the regime; and because his policies have been very favorable to them, he has, on the whole, received it. Most technocrats have applauded the reversal of the policies of the Nasirite left. In the 'sixties, Ali Sabri's ASU faction had made the high salaries and privileges of the technocrats an ob-

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ject of attack, accusing them of forming a "new class" above the masses. Moreover, westerntrained, few of them felt comfortable with the Soviet connection represented by Sabri. Nasir's socialist policies had, by Egyptian standards, liberally rewarded the technocrats; but by the western standards against which they measured themselves, their living standards were modest. Under Sadat they have fared better: he has freed them of ASU harassment; lowered their taxes; raised their salaries (Ahmad Ali, 1977); and through trade liberalization given them access to the consumer goods and western lifestyle they believe their due. The more tolerant view taken by Sadat of self-enrichment, the relaxation of controls from the top, and the influx of foreign businessmen under Infitah have greatly widened licit and illicit opportunities for tax-free commissions and other kinds of income supplements. Managers and technocrats, having acquired experience and connections in public service, now find chances to go into business for themselves or to join high-paying foreign firms. Politically, under Nasir, the military domination of power was resented by civilian elites, but as Sadat has pushed the military out of top elite roles, opportunities for civilians have expanded. It would be wrong to say Egypt is ruled by technocracy, for the big decisions are the exclusive prerogative of the president; the technocrats lack institutional bases secure from his unrestrained powers of appointment and dismissal, and they have failed to act as a cohesive interest group seeking power-sharing arrangements. Yet they now enjoy more personal security, more professional autonomy, and more freedom to take middle-level decisions free of political controls whether from above (the presidency), laterally (the ASU), or below (trade unions). Distrustful of the consequences of an open political system, they can be easily satisfied by the current experiments in limited pluralism. For all these reasons the technocratic elite has largely supported Sadat's policies, including Infitah. Nevertheless there has been in technocratic circles some ambivalence, even some opposition, to Sadat's course. Moreover, on issues where Sadat has not imposed an official view, there have been conflicts among elites advocating different policies. In the early 'seventies, four divergent trends could be identified among the technocratic elite (Aziz, 1972). One, an etatist view associated with Aziz Sidqi, remained suspicious of foreign and private capital unless tightly controlled. There was also a lesser trend (in alliance with the private sector) espousing free enterprise capitalism, and (at the other extreme) a small genuine socialist tendency. The largest trend consisted of centrists who advocated a mixed economy in which new private and foreign capitalist sectors would be created to compete with the public sector; the public sector would contract, but still play a major role in the economy, largely confined to heavy industry. In the early Sadat years the etatists had the upper hand and Aziz Sidqi - long time rival of Ali Sabri and a conspicuous supporter of Sadat in the succession crisis- served as Minister of Industry and then (in 1972-3) as Prime Minister. But he met fierce resistance from parliament, especially from the agrarian bourgeoisie led by his rival and presidential confident, Sayid Marei; he was too much of a Nasirite and too strong and independent a public figure for Sadat's taste. In the wake of the October war, buttressed by his newly won legitimacy, Sadat launched the open door policy (Infitah), bringing in Abdul Aziz Hegazy, long-time Treasury Minister and liberal economist, to replace Sidqi. This marked the eclipse of the etatist orientation in the elite, and the beginning of a major reorientation in Egypt's economic policy. In the October Paper, Sadat stressed the need to open Egypt to foreign investment and to revitalize the private sector; he affirmed that the public sector would remain, but it was soon clear that it was no longer regarded as the cutting edge of development. Sadat encouraged attacks on the public sector's efficiency and productivity in parliament and appointed the leader of those attacks, Ahmad Abu Ismail, a liberal economist from a wealthy bourgeois family, Minister of Finance. In 1975, Ismail Sabry Abdullah, who had waged a losing battle to submit foreign investment to a coherent state plan,

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the of as was dismissed Minister Statefor Planning,marking fall of the tinyleft-wingcomponent had elite. By 1975Nasir's"ArabSocialism" died a quiet death. of the technocratic Infitah was well underway,but Egypt'stop economicmanagersdisBy the mid-'seventies, to shouldbe permitted whollydismantle agreedabouthow far a returnto freemarketoperations Nasir'spopulistpoliciessuch as food subsidiesand employment security.One view was that the norms of operationof international capitalism,introducedthroughthe foreigncapitalsector, shouldeventually system.Then, for example, spreadto and engulfthe restof the socioeconomic and to sectorfirmswouldoperateaccording normsof capitalist profitability cost accountpublic and and the statewouldceaseto administer subsidize prices.Otherssawthis courseas socialing, of ly dangerous,likelyto lead to class gaps and possiblyto the destabilization the system.This and freertrade.As the tendedto see Infitahas merelyan openingto outsideinvestment group and Fundandwesterninvestors International Egyptto lift subsidies float the pressured Monetary dif- measures whichwouldgreatlyincreasethe cost of livingfor the masses intra-elite pound ferencesover economicpolicy came to a head. It appearsthat both Abu Ismailand Economy and MinisterZaki Shafeiresistedthese demands.In November1976they weredismissed Abdul MoneimQaysunibecameDeputy PrimeMinisterfor EconomicAffairs, presidingover a new Hamidas Fiof HamidSayehas Minister EconomyandMuhammed moreliberalteam, including nance Minister.Qaysuniarguedthat subsidiesfueled inflationand actuallybenefited,through abuse, the well-off as much as the poor. The resultof the decisionto lift the subsidieswas the backed down and restoredthe subsidiesand before long 1977 "food riots."The government the the riots having strengthened hand of those who opposed his reforms. Qaysuniresigned, the as remained top economicmanager; regimehas since However,his prot6g6,HamidSayeh, removalof the subsidies.Otherpopulist floatedthe pound and appearscommittedto a gradual are to of and guaranteed appointment graduates the bureaucracy, policies, such as overstaffing Inthe end of the 'seventies is also underattack,but theirreversal also politically dangerous.By the defitah was firmly established,but economicdecision makingremainedcaughtbetween Thereweresome signsthat, to and economicrationality politicalexpediency. mandsof capitalist avoid the high politicalcosts of dismantling populism,it had been decidedto ease the drive towardeconomicrationalization and, as the country'sforeigndebt mounted,let the Americans pick up the tab. and towardInfitaharepublicsectormanagers the Ministhanthe economists Moreambivalent do they havebeen givensomewhat try of Industry.In Infitahsome managers see opportunities: more authoritythan under Nasir, and more freedomfrom centralcontrol, labor unions, and in workerrepresentatives the factory. Some have welcomedthe accessto advancedtechnology in and methodswhichthey believeparticipation joint ventureswith foreignfirmswill bring(see businessor addout havebranched into private Hendoussa,1979).UnderInfitahsomemanagers a elite but ed to theirincomesthroughcommissions; a good partof the managerial also perceives reduced the and threatin the neweconomiccourse.Somehavefelt theirprestige opportunities by devaluation and possiblecontractionof the publicsector. Some fear the greaterresponsibilities and risks of operationunder competitivemarketconditions.But their main grievanceis that that they must face wideningforeigncompetitionby inwhile they are told by the government levelsor outputof by creasingtheirefficiency(whichwill be measured profit, not employment policy low-priced populargoods), theyhavebeendeniedthe freedomin pricingand employment inmarket.Moreover,whilemost Egyptian on neededto operateas entrepreneurs a competitive dustryprobablycould not competewiththe influxof cheapforeigngoods underany conditions, currenttax and customslaws-which exemptnew foreign and privatefirms-put the heavily taxed publicsectorat a big disadvantage (Hendoussa,1979). bases havelackedthe politicalpoweror the will to protecttheirdeteriorating So far, managers

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in the atmosphere Infitah. Liableto removalwithoutredress,and evidentlylackingmuchcoof does somehesion, they are not in a strongbargaining position. Whilethe Ministryof Industry timesdefendthe publicsector(and some ministers havelost theirjobs by doing so), the Ministry is expectedto disciplinethe managers. The Ministry's interestin centralized controlclasheswith the managerial demandsfor a loweredtaxburdenclasheswith urgefor autonomy.The managers' the treasury's need for revenue.The managers' desireto raisepriceswith costs and to dismissexcess labor frightenspoliticiansfearful of popularreaction.Theircall for tariff protectionand demandsof more restrictions foreignimportsis drownedout by the insatiableconsumption on the bourgeoisie a whole.The regime's as interestin promoting has foreigninvestment so far overin interests freetrade riddenany urgeto protectnationalindustry.In rulingcircles,compradors' the seemto override needsof the publicsector.Unableto fightInfitah,manypublicsectormanagers seek to join it by linkingparts of their firms in joint ventureswith foreigninvestors;if can class, this processmayevenEgypt'snationalcapitalist publicsectormanagers be considered tuallyefface its nationalcharacter.It will also mean the end of the publicsectoras a sourceof benefits. "populist"
Interest Group Elites: Interest Articulation by the Private Bourgeoisie

in the Interestgroupelitesare those leaderswho "represent" councilsof government powerful favored those of the currently interestsin Egyptiansociety,in particular privateand semiprivate class, the bourgeoisie. Sincehis victoryoverAli Sabri,Sadathas workedto winthe supportof the privatebourgeoisie in orderto broadenhis base beyondstateelites;and in doing so he has shapedthe policy of the controlsof the Nasiritestate statein manywaysto meettheirneeds. He has relaxedthe stringent over society, allowingthe bourgeoisiegreatersecurityand autonomyin its businessand private to with a multiparty life. Sadat'sexperiments systemwereresponses the desireof the liberalbourAn liberalparty,the New Wafd, wasevenallowedto for more"democracy." independent geoisie in cost Sadatsome hard-wonlegitimacy bourgeoiscircles,but emerge.Its subsequent repression of towarda liberalsystem: ambivalence the bourgeoisie the damagewas limitedby the persistent it desiresone, yet fearsthat it could lead to chaos or the riseof a massthreat.Moreover,under underNasir, has been openedup Sadat, accessto the very centerof power, almostnonexistent for this class. Its interestgroupassociations,used underNasirmore for controlthan interestara demands.Moreimportant, conticulation,arenow moreautonomousand effectivein pressing the from the privatebourgeoisie, dominates stellationof powerfulpersonalities, largelyrecruited innercircle. Judgingby policy outputs,this accesshas not been ineffective.Infitah, President's the interests the American connectionandthe peacetreaty,all servebourgeois first,bringing revitalization of the privatesector, free access to westernculturaland consumergoods, and the has chanceto get rich as compradors. Thus, in general,the privatebourgeoisie manyreasonsto supportSadatand, by and large, has done so. The businesswing of the bourgeoisiefinds a more sympathetic hearingin elite circlesthan it has enjoyedsince the revolution.To be sure, Egypthas as yet few of the big businessmagnates who wield great influencein older capitaliststates. But in a relativelyshort time Infitah has createda stratum newmillionaires, in OsmanAhmadOsman,headof Egypt's of and biggestbuswho servesas "Minisinessconcern,and MansurHasan, one of the new millionaire compradors ter at the Presidency," businessworldfinds effectivelinkageto decisionmakers.Belowthis the is connectionswith stateelites, the businessbourgeoisie level, throughits businessand marriage channelsof accessto the findingpathsinto the statecenter.Therearealso moreinstitutionalized and merchants employers,speakswith politicalelite. The Chamberof Commerce,representing increasing authority.The NationalCouncilon Productionvoicesthe interestsof Egypt'smiddle-

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sizedindustrialists. thereis a dim spot in the pictureit is here, for althoughlocal industrialists If have evidentlywon tax and customsprivileges equalto those of foreigninvestors,theirpleasfor of seemto carrylittleweightbesidethe interests thoseenriching helpagainstforeigncompetition on themselves free trade. The agrarian is bourgeoisie no less well servedby accesschannels.SayidMarei,leadingmember of the president's innercircleand a veteranpolitican-bureaucrat, one of theirnumber.In is his role as head of the Agronomists' theirinterests.Significantly, Union, he represents Marei,an architectof Nasir'sland reform, now arguesthat the reformlimitedproductionby rewarding to poor peasantswith a high propensity consume;by implication,if the statewantsagricultural Affairs growthit must now favor the investment-prone agrarian bourgeoisie.The Agricultural of Committee Parliament, whichall legislation the sectoris submitted government, to on also by In 1972, it deflecteda bill offered by the etatist effectivelyfor the agrarian speaks bourgeoisie. to cash crop on whichthe agrarian is Sidqigovernment tax fruittrees- the lucrative bourgeoisie itself. Thisproposalwasrejected only afterfouryearsandpresidential and incurrently enriching terventiondid the committeeaccepta verydilutedversionof the originalbill (see Nazli, 1979). The committeehas also won land rent increases,a watering down of the agrarian relationslaw whichreducesthe securityof tenants,and a provisionthat landowners may acquireland in excess of the agrarian reformceilingin newlyreclaimed areas.Up to now, its campaign abolish to of cotton and othervitalcropswiththe statehas failed, for hereit runsup compulsory marketing againstthe vital interestsof the state bourgeoisie. in The "free professions" represented the elite by their syndicateleaderships are and those memberspicked to fill cabinet posts-such as the doctor normallyrecruitedas Ministerof of who Health, or the lawyerwho headsthe Ministry Justice as well as by theirmanymembers were enjoy personalor politicalconnectionsat the center.UnderNasir, professional syndicates not withoutinfluencein defenseof professional interests.But the regime,particularly the 'sixin ties, made seriousefforts to controlthem throughthe ASU and sometimesimposedleadership from above- thoughsuch proregime leadersweresometimes welcomedas offeringbetteraccess to decisionmakers the have,of course,welcomed dismantling (Springborg, 1978).The syndicates of ASU controlsand the consequentincreasein autonomywhichthey now enjoy underSadat. havevariedin theirattitudetowardthe regimebut generally and Syndicates supported triedto and expandthe regime's measures; theyhavetriedto defend politicaland economicliberalization and widentheir professionalautonomyagainstpersistent efforts to influencetheir government continueto seek prominent policiesand internalelections.Some syndicates regimepersonalities as theirspokesmen (e.g., MustafaKhaliland OsmanAhmadOsmanhaveboth servedas headsof the Engineers' and the Syndicate Mareias headof the Agronomists Others,especially Syndicate). LawyersSyndicate,have taken liberalpolitical positions notably independentof the regime. studentand workerdemonstrations 1972,gaveWafin Lawyers,for example,openlysupported dist leaderSeragad-Dina forumfor his blistering attackon the revolution his effortto resurand rect the Wafd as a politicalforce, labeledthe Wafd's subsequent unconstitutional, repression burnedan Israeliflag at its headquarters protestagainst"normalization" relations in of withthat havebeen activein country,and fiercelyattackedthe Law of Aib. Theircousinsin the judiciary the defenseof personaland propertyrightsin the name of "ruleof law,"sometimesto the anwhichcould be very noyanceof the regime.Strikinga blow for the sanctityof privateproperty of costly for the treasury, judgeshave ruledsome of the nationalizations the 'sixtiesunconstitutionaland theirvictimsentitledto compensation. Judgeshavealso opposedefforts of the police to repress politicaldissent.Sadat,unlikeNasir,has so far steeredshy of a majorpurgeof suchrecalcitrant and judges. Lawyers judgesarean important politicalforceworkingto defendand exthe pand the limitedliberalization regimehas permitted.

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Educationalelites have also supportedthe regime'sliberalization initiativesand occasionally triedto articulate liberalvaluesto the authorities (Dessouki,1978).However,theirlack of securministersfrom top educationaladministrators and ity of tenure, and the practiceof recruiting seniorprofessors,seem to have contributed makingEgyptianacademiamorecompliantwith to the wishesof government than is true elsewhere(e.g., in the effort to rid campusesof troublesome Islamicfundamentalist students). Journalistshave been less fortunatein defendingprofessionalfreedomsbecause the mass mediais regarded, less underSadatthanNasir,as an instrument shapingpublicopinionin no for the government's interest.The fall of Heikalat al-Ahram on (who opposedtotal dependence the lost U.S. for recovering land) not only silenceda prominentNasiritepersonality,but also sigvoice at variancewith presidential naled that no major independent policy would be tolerated. removedby the Today, as underNasir, editorsof majorpapersare appointedand periodically In 1977, Sadat did permitthe newly formedoppositionpartiesto publishtheirown president. on but criticism majorissues newspapers, thosewhichhavegone too often beyond"constructive" have been repressed.Throughtheir syndicate,journalistshave consistentlyurgedgreaterpress tolerance,but they havewon freedom,and in theirwritingshave testedthe limitsof government no substantially freedomto write.UnderNasir,at leastthe politicalleft carvedout a place greater for itself beside the mainstream official press;underSadat, it has lost this place as the official moves continuouslyto the right. Yet the press has experienced cycles of contractionand press of control, reflectingthe contraryimpulsesof the regimeto repressdissentand yet loosening avoid antagonizing liberalpublic opinion; in the periodsof greateropenness,journalistshave been able to writemorefreelythanusual,even if this has often subsequently themtheirjobs cost Amin interviewin Dalia, 1979). (Mustafa Religiouselitesare today no less pliantthanunderNasir.The Islamicreligiousleadership, appointedby the government,has respondedfavorablyto Sadat'sdesirefor religiouslegitimation of controversial policiessuch as the reformof the personalstatuslaw and the trip to Jerusalem. Indicative the tendency allowgreater of to to of autonomy elitesis the fact thatthe Minister Waqfs is now regularlyrecruitedfrom the religiousestablishment of itself. The leadership the Coptic has church,long enjoyingmore autonomythan its Islamiccounterparts, been less amenableto of althoughas representative a minoritycommunityit cannot afford to politicalmanipulation, antagonizethe regime. In summary,underSadat, economicand professionalelites have been more successfulthan in and previously carvingout autonomousspacefor themselves in winningaccessto the centerof power. Yet, while some are learninghow to colonize the leviathanstate, all must live in its shadow.Moreover,the privatebourgeoisie yet to win the rightto organizeitselfas a classfor has politicalaction.
Party Elites: Elite-Base Linkage

bond betweenthe top regimeelite and the subelites Egypt'srulingpartyis the organizational whichrepresent core supportand its linkagewith widersocial forces. The currentrulingNaits tional DemocraticParty, a directdescendantof the ASU inheritedfrom Nasir, still preserves of Most of the partyleadership inheritedfrom is many of the characteristics that organization. the ASU and drawnfrom the same overlapping social groups- officialdom,urbanprofessional and businesselements,and the ruralnotability.Members the partycadretypicallycome from of middlelandowningfamilies,wereeducatedas professionals,madecareerspartlyin the bureaucracy,and wereelectedto parliament. Theyhavegood reasonto supportSadatunderwhomthey haverecovered local powerand parliamentary the seatsAli Sabrideprived themof in the 'sixties. recruitment a from below and coLeadership processesare currently mixtureof advancement

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the as optationfromabove. Originally partyemerged a centristfactionof notablesin parliament underthe leadership MohmoudAbu Wafia, and becauseelectionsto parliament the time of at the partywas forming(1976)wereleft relatively those notafree, the partytendedto incorporate and bles who already however,the partywas taken enjoyedlocalprestige support.Subsequently, over "fromabove"with the impositionof severalministers Sadathimselfas the partyleaderand purgedmany local notable-deputies ship. Moreover,in the 1979election, this party leadership to and ran newcomersin many constituencies produce a more compliantparliament.Other leaders,suchas MansurHasanand FikriMakram Obaydhavesincebeen imposedat the top by presidential patronage,althoughthese leadersdo have local bases of theirown. Thus, as under bases is less importantin recruitment than is coNasir, the cultivationof local or intraparty service now counts for more in the cooptation from above. Yet party and parliamentary who optationprocessitself. Thus, bureaucrats move up seemto need partyas well as purelybureaucratic credentials.More important,the end to militarydominationof top party roles has to openedroomat the top for elites(often withprivatesectorcareers) riseessentially throughparratherthangovernment service.Partyservice se seemsto givelittlerightto sharein central ty per policy making;while formalrulesexist for providingfor internalpartyconsultationoverpolicy and for electionsof leaders,these are so far virtuallyinoperative.But it does provideaccessto local power, the leversof local government patronage,and strategicconnectionsto the center. The party's baseincludesa broadset of socialforces,heldtogetherless by ideologyand organizationthanby personalconnections,pragmatic concernsfor career patronage,anda willingand ness to follow PresidentSadat. Formalideologyis of minimalsignificance: leadersdo not feel boundby the partyprogram,and regular havevariedattitudesthoughthey arelargely members deferentto government fromthe ASU, willserve Muchof the base, simplyborrowed leadership. Sadatjust as it did Nasir. Organizationally, partyso far lacksrealcadres,and the organizathe tional gap betweencenterand base, characteristic the ASU, seemsreplicated the NDP. Alof in reform,the regimeseemscontentto let thoughSadathas spokenof the need for organizational patron-clienttypes of ties servefor organizational linkageto the masses. At the villagelevel, the NDP lacks formalpresence,relyingexclusively personalties to enon of suresupport.This strategyseemsto reflecta lack of interestin the organizational penetration masssocietyand indeedrepresents degreeof demobilization a with the 'sixties.Nevercompared theless, this clientagenetworkreachesdown to petty notablesand rich peasantswho provide much of the naturalleadershipof the village;combinedwith traditionalpeasantdeferenceto authorityand the president's village-notable patriarchal styleof publicappeal,this probablyenof suresthe regimeat least the acquiescence a good partof the village.Thus, the weightof peasant votes, soldiers,and inertiahelp contain the largelyurban-based opposition. In the traditional urbanquarters,similarlocal brokerslink government population.Manygovernment and employeesprotector advancetheircareers throughpartymembership, government partyleaders over many of the professionalsyndicates,and a substantial of the educatedbourpreside part studentorganization geoisiesupportsthe government party.The party's competes withthe help of university administrations withIslamicfundamentalists controlof the studentunion;and for labor leaders, co-opted into the party leadership,control the organizedlabor progovernment hierarchy though at the bases they face competitionfrom the left. In general,the government partylinks the politicalelite to a widebase;but apartfrom its innercore of subelites,this base, than the smallerbut more lackingideologicalor organizational solidarity,is probably"softer" highlymobilizedbases of the oppositionparties.On the whole, it would be difficultto make a case that the NDP is a moreeffectiveinstrument organizing for massparticipation than was the ASU. Furthermore, has not yet becomean effectivemeansby whichpoliticianscan mobilize it favor or disfavor.But it may be evolving powerbases from below to competewith government

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theirsupport into a meansby whichelites outsideof the state apparatus se can demonstrate per neededto be co-optedinto elite circles. for the regimeand earn the politicalcredentials and Crisisof Absorption? Counter-Elites: Pluralization both from insideand From the time of Nasir'sdeath, the Sadatregimefaced risingpressures outsideits base to widenpoliticalfreedoms.His personallegitimacy greatlyenhancedby the Oca tober War, Sadatdecidedto expandand entrenchhis widersupportby attempting limitedlibwitha multiparty He eralization fromabove, combining experiment. expected politicalrelaxation fromthis experiment wouldprovide"constructive" alternatives that the politicalpartiesemerging on noncritical matterswithoutchallenging unilateral his to government rightto set major policies In policyor tryingto mobilizemasssupportagainstthe government. this wayhe wouldpleasethe into he was incorporating the base of his regime,withouthavingto give up a great bourgeoisie of deal of power. The actualconsequences this experiment, however,werein manyways uninin tended.As Sadatincreasingly moved"right" his policymaking,leftist andcentristelementsof from Nasirpartedcompanywith the regime.As politicalcontrolswere the coalitionhe inherited such elementsmovedinto increasingly relaxed, open oppositionto the regime,whileolderpolitthe ical forces, repressedor containedunder Nasir, reemerged; multiparty experiment gave at least some of these forces a chanceto startorganizing short themselves.Thus, in a remarkably relaxation politicalcontrolsundera leaderwho followedverycontroversial of while time, policies led of lackingunchallenged legitimacy to seriouspluralization the politicalarena.Counterelites distinctivefrom those of the rulingpartyand comemergedwith ideologiesand constituencies own base shed manyof the dispetingwith it for widersupport.At the sametime, the regime's parateelementsof the broadcoalitioninheritedfrom Nasirand took on an enhancedsocialand politicalcoherence. Two of the new oppositionforcesemergedfrom the Nasiritecoalition.One- whichmightbe calledthe "Nationalist Center"- consistedof etatistand militaryfragments the Nasiriteestabof It lishmentwhichcontestedSadat'sde-Nasirization. lacksmuchcohesionor massbase, but may find an organizational home in the new LaborParty. Another- the NationalistLeft- incorporatedthe left wingof Nasirism,madeup of intellectuals tradeunionists.It stood againstInand fitah, the separatepeace, and the Americanalignment.Threeotheremergentoppositionforces the predated 1952revolution.A liberalopposition,the New Wafd, upperand middleclassin social composition,supportedInfitah but demandeda corresponding Ispoliticalliberalization. lamicfundamentalists, heirsof the MuslimBrotherhood enjoyingperhaps strongest and the mass roots among the opposition, disputedthe regime'swesternizing policies and its Americanand Israelities. A small Marxistleft also reappeared, albeitillegally. Thesecounterelites workedto widenthe latitudeof permitted to politicalactionand, contrary Sadat'sdesires,triedto mobilizemasssupportin a challenge his basicpolicies.The 1977"food to left riots"(in whichboth Islamicforcesand the nationalist playeda role), Islamicfundamentalist in and a left-Wafdcombination parliament violenceagainstthe government, whichin its rising criticismof the regimedid not sparethe president himself,showedthat the oppositioncould not to threatened permitthe mobilireadilybe controlled.Widenedlatitudefor politicalcompetition of zation by counterelites sufficientsupportto pose a challengeto the president's monopolyon policy making.Accordingly,in April 1978Sadatcrackeddown, the Wafd dissolveditself, and the nationalist was virtually left bannedfrom publicpoliticalactivity.Subsequently, whiletrying to imposea newrightwingorthodoxy,the regimehas stoppedshortof whollyreversing politthe ical relaxationand has contenteditself with efforts to contain the opposition'saccess to the it. masses ratherthan totally repressing Historicalanimositiesbetweenthe variousopposition forces have also given the regimesome opportunityto play them off againsteach other. This

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strategy,combinedwith the traditionaldeferenceto authority,economic dependenceon the of state, and lack of politicalresources the masses,has so farworkedto containthe massmobilizationalpotentialof the opposition.Nevertheless, the 1980sthereweresignsthat the various by front. At the sametime, the growing oppositionforceswerecoalescinginto a unitedantiregime cost of Infitah,whichthe masseshavebeen forcedto bearwhilea tinyclassenriches itself, growat and ing resentment the lack of democracy,and revulsionagainstforeignculturalpenetration into tinderfor whichcounterelites, unabsorbed legitimate havingpersisted dependency represent channelsof participation, might still providethe spark.
WITH A CONSERVATIVE FACE CONCLUSIONS: AUTHORITARIANISM

The authoritarian statein post-populist has intact,but its orientation Egyptremains essentially monarch hoardshis poweragainstall comers,proparadically changed.At the top, a presidential and, morethanever, treatsthe state authority gatesan ideologyof massdeferenceto patriarchal as if it werehis personalpatrimony.It is here, at the very top, that the impulseto conservative is its authoritarianism the strongest.The bulk of the elite, abandoning formernationalist,popuelitismand privatism, list, etatistideologyin favor of growingcosmopolitanism, generallysupin Thoseeliteswho defendedthe populistcoursehave inports or acquiesces this reorientation. of conflictto otherswillingto presideoverthe subordination nalost creasingly out in intra-elite tional capitalto international capital,the erosionof populistsocialpolicies, the transformation and of the armyinto a conservative internaland regionalgendarmerie, the slideinto dependency on the United States. This changein the orientationof the statecorresponds, most basically,to the socialtransforstructure dominated a military core drawn mationof the elite froma multilayered, segmented by into from politicallyand sociallydeprived"outsiders" an increasingly homogeneous,bourgeois The of establishment. intermixing stateand privateas well as old and "new" bourgeoiselements, of or the effacementof the military-civil cleavageby the civilianization withdrawal the military into professionalroles, the expulsionof leftist or populistideologicaldissidentsinheritedfrom of the Nasiritecoalition,and the lateralincorporation economicelitesinto the politicalestablishfrombelowis closed- areall contributing the emergence a morecoto of mentwhilerecruitment does not precludeintra-elite conhesive, more conservative, bourgeoiselite. This development flict; indeedit has resulted,in part, froma decadeof suchconflict.Moreover,conflictsand conin tradictionsstill persistin the elite: notably, the divergence the interestsof state and private the clash of authoritarian liberaltendencies,and disputesover the wisdomof various and elites, or shouldgive way to marketrationality, the condipolicies- suchas how far populistmeasures tions of peacewith Israel.But theseconflictsare now moreand morecontainedby the developmentof a greatersenseof sharedclassinterestdistinctand apartfromthe masses,and by the expulsionof dissidentsfrom the elite. fromNasirhas, underSadat,so far been ableto adaptto The systemof elite politicsinherited for and containpressures transformation, althoughin the processit has beenalteredand mayyet of and character politics, authoritarian more. In the persisting bureaucratic personalistic change of decisionmakinghas elementsof continuityare clearlydominant.The presidential monopoly do not changed;conflict and bargaining take place among the elite but are only legitimateat if of is and levelsbelowthe presidency, the exercise influenceon the president only permissible his thaneveron the presito The ultimateauthority refuseis acknowledged. elite is moredependent dent: recruitment dependson co-optationfrom above far more than cultivationof bases from below; the exerciseof powerdependson bureaucratic authorityof office and personalconnecstateelites, tions to the top, ratherthan the supportof constituencies; most elites, especially and bases dismissal,do not enjoy the independent lackingsecuretenureand subjectto presidential whichcould providesupportfor the pluralization sharingof power.Elites, especiallystate and

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to elites, do not act as coherentcorporate groups.Moreover,becauseeliteconnections the masses elite but do not rest on issues or politicalorganization, are mattersof tenuouspatron-clientage, is largelyisolatedfromthe widerpublicarena.Thus,in the politicalgame,elitesact largepolitics channelsor personalconnections,without or ly as individuals smallgroupsthroughbureaucratic to bringto bearas a resourcemobilizedpopularsupportfrombelow. UnderSadat,estabtrying lishmentelites, far from seekingto mobilizemass support,actuallyseek mass demobilization; and the charismaticbond that mitigated the elitist bureaucraticcharacter of the Nasir and regime and linkedtop and bottom- has disappeared not beenreplaced.As long as thosein the elite do not act togetherin large cohesivegroups, and as long as mass supportcannot be mobilizedas a politicalresource,no memberof the elite can hope to competewith the president; up to now, none has been able to challengehim and survive. can elitepluralism clearlybe someevolutiontowarda formof limitedbut greater Nevertheless, the use of politicalpower, seen. BecauseSadatlacksNasir'sambitionto transform Egyptthrough he has relaxedhis personalcontrol over the elite, allowingthem greaterautonomyand more interests.The state has relaxedits control opportunityto defend and advancetheir particular into whileas yet powertranslates elites to accumulate over society, permitting privateresources; accessto the centerof power. wealthmore readilythan vice versa, wealthis findingincreasing Not only has the privatebourgeoisie forgedpersonallinksto the top, but privateinterestgroups cohesionand autonomy,and the rulingpartyis bebeenallowedto developmorecorporate have institutionalized channelof accessto the top, outsidethe state coming(for privateelites)a more machine se. On the one hand, the privatebourgeoisie usingits newinfluenceto colonizethe is per stateelites. As long as state;on the other, it is developingcountervailing power, able to restrain monarchrethis privatepowerremainsconsiderably dependenton the stateand the presidential but mainsimmunefromits sway, this processremainsrudimentary; as Infitahgenerates growing statecontrol,it shoulddevelopfurtherand mayevencentersof socialpoweroutsideimmediate Finally,addingto the picture,the increasing tuallyprovidethe socialbase for genuinepluralism. dominationof the bourgeoisieover the state, the expulsionof dissidentelites from the regime, of of and the relaxation politicalcontrolshaveprovidedconditionsfor the emergence opposition outsidethe establishment. elites and thus an incipienttendencytowardpluralization of Sadat, seekinglegitimacyamong the liberalbourgeoisieand the institutionalization these in in with tendencies a controllable form, has experimented a "multiparty system" whichelites,in returnfor greaterpoliticalfreedoms,would refrainfrom challenging authorityof the presithe massmobilization. However,becauseoppositionelites dencyand eschewattemptsat competitive and werenot contentwith nominalparticipation did try to mobilizemass supportin a challenge to regimepolicy, Sadatcurbedthe experiment. Had it been allowedto mature,it could havereof sultedin a virtualliberaltransformation the politicalsystem.In callinga halt to this cautious Sadatwas able to count on the fearsof elitesand the bourgeoisie that step towardliberalization, to an open politicalsystemwouldbe unableto containchallenges the post-populist coursewhich of favorsthem so much. Thusthe threatfrom below and the authoritarian proclivities the presidiffusionof powerin the system.In consedent havecombinedto containdemandsfor a greater quence, there has been little movementtowarda more institutionalized politicalsystemunder at Sadat:the president,abovethe law, can changethe rulesof politicalparticipation will;opposition elites, containedbut not absorbedinto legitimate channelsof participation, mustchoosebelimitedelite tweensubmission rebellion.The resultant and system- a kind of uninstitutionalized decision pluralism,which opens up greaterinformalaccess for the bourgeoisieto sympathetic to makersbut deniesrightsof participation leaderswho wouldmobilizeand speakfor those outside the establishment clearlyfavors the haves over the have-nots.This authoritarian system an witha conservative face, far frombeingprimarily artifactof Egyptian politicalculture,should be seen as anothercase of perhapsthe most widespread politicalformationin the contemporary

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developing world: a state which has passed the early populist stage, produced an expanding and privileged bourgeoisie, and now braces itself against the rise of the masses. REFERENCES Ali, Shafif Ahmad Ruz 1979 "Imaginary ministers." al-Yusuf,Cairo, July 4:18. Apter, David 1965 The Politics of Modernization. of Chicago:University ChicagoPress. Ayubi, Nazih in causesand costs."Cairo:NationalCenterfor 1979 "Administrative corruption Egypt:Phenomenon, Criminal and Social Research. Aziz, Khayri 1972 "Thenationalbourgeoisie." al-Talia,Cairo, June: 121-35. Berger,Morroe 1962 The Arab WorldToday. New York:Doubleday. Critchfield,Richard of 1978 Shahhat:An Egyptian.Syracuse,N.Y.: University SyracusePress. Dalia, N. with MustafaAmin,' reportedin 'The evolutionof the Egyptianpressfrom Nasirto 1979 " 'Interview Sadat.'" Paper presentedat seminaron "Egyptunder Sadat" offered by R. Hinnebuschat in AmericanUniversity Cairo, Fall. Dekmejian,H. R. of 1974 EgyptUnderNasir. Albany, N.Y.: State University New York Press. Dessouki,Ali (ed.) in 1978 "Democracy Egypt."CairoPapersin Social Science1 (2): entirevolume. Dimbleby,Jonathan 1977 "Sadat's solitaryhand."The New Statesman12(August):204-6. Fouad, Neamat 1979 "Thepyramids plateauproject."Cairo Papersin Social Science2 (4):137-57. Frey, Frederick Mass.: MITPress. 1965 The TurkishPoliticalElite. Cambridge, Gami',Ahmad 1979 "Thepyramids plateauproject."CairoPapersin Social Science2 (4):162-74. Halpern,Manfred UniN.J.: Princeton 1963 ThePoliticsof SocialChangein the MiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Princeton, versityPress. Hendoussa,Heba Ahmad CairoPapersin Social Science2 (3):101-123. 1979 "Timefor reform:Egypt'spublicsectorindustry." Hussein,Mahmoud 1975 L'Egypte,1967-73. Paris:Maspero.
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and 1979 "Socieoeconomic politicalstudy of taxationon fruit gardensin Egypt."Paperpreparedfor in Seminaron Elitesin the MiddleEast, AmericanUniversity Cairo, Spring. Robert Springborg, Journalof MiddleEasternStudies9 in 1978 "Professional syndicates Egyptianpolitics."International
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