Soviet Foreign Policy the Church, the Christian Democrats, and Chile Author(s): Roger P.

Hamburg Source: Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Oct., 1969), pp. 605-615 Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165338 . Accessed: 18/05/2011 14:24
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Roger P. Hamburg University of Wisconsin Parkside, Wisconsin

SOVIET

FOREIGN THE CHURCH, AND

POLIGY THE CHILE

CHRISTIAN

DEMOCRATS,

established DiplomaticAmerican

matic intercourse in diplomatic negotiations, a long record of "nonintervention" e.g., rec? and diplomatic relations are almost pro forma, with little, if any, ognition implied judgment of the nature and character of the opposite number's rela? Brazil, a rather special case, reestablished government. diplomatic flirtation with the tions in 1961, at the beginning of the Quadros-Goulart Soviet Union.1 The Cuban case hardly deserves further consideration, in literally a score of publications. But having been discussed exhaustively

relations between Chile and the Soviet Union were re? in 1964, increasing to five the number of Latin carried on diplo? countries with which the U.S.S.R. at that time.* Two of these, Uruguay and Mexico, have

the Chilean situation illustrates the juncture of evolving Soviet assess? ments of the Latin American political scene and the accompanying Soviet and diplomatic and cultural programs. The advent to power of trade, aid, the Christian Democratic regime of Eduardo Frei Montalva calls atten? and probing in Soviet foreign policy. tion to significant maneuvering Soviet-Vatican Soviet ing course, Chicherin, Relations: A Short Prospectus

relations with the Holy See have followed a stormy, fluctuat? when varying from the period of the 1922 Genoa Conference, met with Papal Secretary of the Soviet Foreign Commissar, reestablished diplomatic relations of Soviet Program Appeals and and Latin America: 1953-1963," Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin,

* Since then both Colombia and Peru have with the U.S.S.R. 1 See chapter VIII, "Brazil: The Juncture Policy" in Roger P. Hamburg, "The Soviet Union unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of 1965. 605

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and intermittent State Cardinal Gasparri, for a Vaticannegotiations Church modus vivendi continued through 1927 to the height of the post World War II cold-war period. At that time the Soviet press often applied the epithet Spiritual NATO to the Vatican while papal encyclicals for? bade Roman Catholics to have any dealings with Communists.2 Beginning with 1956 and the Twentieth Party Congress and gaining with the 1958 election of Pope John XXIII, there were in? momentum creased signs of Soviet desires for a detente with the Vatican. Extensive coverage was provided and the text of Pacem in Terris printed in the So? viet press in 1963.3 In this encyclical Pope John failed to condemn com? munism. Later he received Khrushchev's Alexei Adzhubei, son-in-law, who suggested that the Soviet Union and the Vatican might reestablish diplomatic relations.4 In the spring of 1966, Pope Paul VI was also given official? basically friendly coverage in the U.S.S.R. and on April 27,1966, ly received Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who expressed the Kremlin's desire for greater collaboration with the Vatican.5 The pro? was later highlighted cess of reconciliation by the visit of Nikolai Podto the Vatican. gorny, president of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., In addition to the Vatican's desire to ease the lot of Catholics in eastern Europe and a corresponding Soviet desire to stabilize relations with the large Catholic populations in that area, other factors are involved. Soviet policy makers and analysts have unquestionably noted the strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church in many of the underdeveloped the Soviet Union conducted elaborate campaigns for and internal leverage during the Stalin period. Latin greater Catholic population and Iberian America, with its large, predominantly tradition of a strong political role for the Church, obviously comes within the Soviet purview in this regard. Various analysts have argued that the stereotyped picture of the Catholic Church as a bulwark of authoritarianism and ultraconservative is out of touch with current realities. The regimes in Latin America Church's position, one writer suggests, has evolved into an "active parti? countries influence cipation ... in the continuous of Latin American countries.6 in a number struggle against dictatorship" Social Christianity has appeared as a logiin which

2 See Paul Wohl, "Kremlin-Vatican twist: Exit dogma?" The Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 1967. 3 Ibid. 4 See Mark W. Hopkins, "The New Kremlin-Vatican Dialog," The Milwau? kee Journal, January 22, 1967. 5 Wohl, "Kremlin-Vatican twist." 6 Federico G. Gil, "Cuatro tendencias en la politica latinoamericana," Jour? nal of Inter-American Studies 1, no. 4 (October 1959): 464.

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cal consequence of the Catholic social thought contained in the papal en? Rerum Novarum and Quadregismo Anno, and has recently be? cyclicals, come an important political force. As advanced Catholic forces in Latin America have sought solutions for economic and social problems there, the Church has become divided into conservative and progressive factions, with the split sometimes, but not always, falling between the conservative hierarchy and the more liberal laity. To a certain extent, this has been a reaction to the Communist threat on the left so that "the Communistic international which threatens to canalize social offensive, necessary into an anti-Catholic has produced new tendencies that direction, changes have also appeared within the Church and that are favorable to the sup? 7 port of democratic parties." Several of the parties of social Christianity, or Christian Democratic parties have cooperated with Communist or front groups at the same time that they have sought to combat their influence on the left. They have eschewed a narrow anti-communism that ignores the real social economic feed inequities and structural deficiencies upon which the Communists and are willing to cooperate with the latter on specific reform issues while remaining wary of the nature of possible aims of Communist parties.8 Soviet analysts have described these changes in the Church position and have come to some of the same tentative conclusions as their protag? onist, suggesting a policy of suspicion and wariness but limited accommo? dation on some issues, especially anti-imperialist ones, while betraying at adver? all times a respect for a rather formidable political and ideological One such Soviet commentator castigates social Christianity for call? sary. of social classes instead of the class struggle and ing for the reconciliation for seeking to apologize for the capitalist order. he adds, Catholics and the Catholic church in Latin Nevertheless, America do not constitute a single monolithic reactionary bloc and dif? and the Catholic ferences persist between the hierarchy, the priesthood, di? masses who belong to different classes and social groups. Reflecting and some progressive, are reactionary verse interests, some Catholics even in the case of the clergy. Since Catholics face the same problems as "other strata of the workers," there are favorable prospects for joint ac? tion by Catholics and non-Catholics.9

7 Ibid., p. 468. 8 See Edward J. Williams, Latin American Christian Democratic Parties (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967). 9 I. R. Lavretsky, "Katolitsizm v. Stranakh Latinskoi Ameriki Posle Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny (Catholicism in Latin American Countries after the Second World War), in Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii. Akademia Nauk SSSR. Problemy Sovremennoi Latinskoi Ameriki (Problems of Contemporary

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More recent

articles have been in the same vein. Two of them were

part of a work published by the Latin American Institute, a subdivision in 1962 to provide a de? of Science established of the Soviet Academy tailed, continuing analysis of different aspects of the Latin American and military scene. scientific, political, cultural, economic, diplomatic, noted One article, concerned with the activities of the Church in Latin America, that in recent years the Catholic church had shown "relative flexi?

the Soviet specialist bility" in "masking its real essence." Previously, stated, the Church had opposed action against both domestic and foreign of the "reaction" (mainly U.S. capital) and had ignored the exploitation masses, but the Church now attempts to win the sympathy of the masses and the organizations connected "as if the priesthood with it are real of the workers' interests." The Soviet writer rationalizes the spokesmen Church's changed attitudes as attempts to avoid being left behind by the and antifeudal revolutions march of history when the anti-imperalialist are coming to the forefront. As part of this, the hierarchy declares "an 10 imaginary love of the people and hides its connection with reaction." Soviet author cites the creation of Catholic trade unions as an The De? attempt to strengthen the clerical position in the worker movement. strikes, he notes, spite the fact that the Catholic hierarchy condemns forces Christian trade quite often pressure from below (the masses) unions to lead strikes but, even within bounds. The real purpose to safeguard the interests of the and check the proletarian forces then, only to control them, to keep them of all this church activity, he contends, is bourgeoisie, within it.11 split the worker movement,

There is an obviously that the Church is, in grudging concession fact, making efforts in a reforming direction and achieving some success. makes a distinction, in Soviet Furthermore, Koval'sky quite common statements applied, between the "evil" although not always consistently leaders of the Church and the "good" masses who follow them. The with "North American imperialism" and Church hierarchy is connected Latin America), Moscow, Izd'vo Instituta Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1959, pp. 232-236. 1(> N.A. Koval'sky, "Politika Katolicheskoi Tserkva V. Rabochem Dvizhenii Latinskoi Ameriki" (The Policy of the Catholic Church in Latin America) in Akademia Nauk SSSR Institut Latinskoi Ameriki, Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie V Latinskoi Ameriki (The Liberation Movement in Latin America), Izd'vo "Nauka," Moscow, 1964, p. 198. ii Ibid., pp. 200-201. Koval'sky notes with some anxiety the work of the clerics. "Special attention is devoted by reactionary clerics to attempts to weaken the democratic unity of the working class, which is the most consistent fighter for the interests of the popular masses" (p. 201).

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conservative an "semifeudal elements," forces, upholding supporting and penetrating anti-Communist "democratic" organizations. policy, it seeks to "poison the awareness of the working masses by Furthermore, The masses of worker Catholics, it is Social-Christian demagoguery." are joint sufferers of exploitation with their fellow class mem? contended, and Radicals? bers and, like them?Communists, Socialists, Peronists, seek to carry out socioeconomic reforms. This will in turn create condi? the creation of unified trade tions for the "unity of the worker movement, union centers and a joint anti-imperialist, antifeudal struggle.12 Social Christianity is, of course, the province of the Christian Dem? ocratic parties.13 Although not specifically or firmly linked with the Cath? olic church itself, the Christian for many Democrats are spokesmen of aspects of current Church encyclicals dealing with the conciliation classes, social and economic reform, and the retention of private property, related to property's necessary social function. with certain restrictions or more commun? Some of them also espouse a vague communitarianism ally oriented type of society that would replace atomistic competitive and social with greater unity and stability between economic capitalism to corporatism but denies its totaliThis bears some resemblance groups. tarism aspects, especially imposition and control by the state. One can ar? gue, then, that it is a halfway house between the order of liberal capital? collectivism, ism, which it rejects, and that of Marxist or Marxist-Leninist which it equally rejects. dis? A companion piece in the same collection of Soviet monographs cusses the motivation of Christian Democratic parties, contending that the Catholic church withdrew from dogmas about the alleged one-party na? ture of Catholics and disciplined Catholic political action and sanctioned, instead, the creation of political parties to carry out programs of moder? ate social reforms. In these parties, usually acquiring the title of Chris? 14 "the radical, democratic tian Democracy, tendency forced its way." Semenov concedes that no broad, united front can succeed without and that unity of action with "Catholic patriots" is Catholic participation one of the basic problems of revolution in Latin America. He contends that the basic problem is one of overcoming differences with ideological 12 Ibid, p. 205. !3 For a general survey and critique of Christian Democratic programs see Williams, chapter VI, from which the following description is taken. !4 S.I. Semenov, "Revoliutsionnye Protsessy RorKhristianskoi Demokratii v Latinoamerikanskikh Stranakh," (The Revolutionary Process and the Role of Christian Democracy in Latin American Countries) in OsvoboditeVnoe Dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike (The Liberation Movement in Latin America), p. 208.

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the mass Catholic parties and achieving an accommodation with them on the basis of a revolutionary program.15 While stressing what he defines as the compromising, contradictory nature of Christian Democratic basic position as defend? parties?their ers of capitalism and the existing order that belies their anticapitalist and statements?Semenov nevertheless revolutionary quotes with approval a statement to the effect that the Christian Democrats are ideologically to the left of their European compatriots. He explains this as a consequence of the "new course" of the Catholic church, changes in the social struc? ture of the population, and movements of former peasant "believers" and agricultural workers to the city. All of these factors, he contends "can? not but revolutionize the political and ideological views of the honorable leaders of Christian Democracy in Latin American countries." 16 tic movement presents a resume of the history of the Christian Democra? and parties, and analyzes its red strengths, particularly in Chile. He concedes their influence among the students, the intelligentsia, and professional workers, always key targets for Communist appeals. In Semenov

denies its contention Semenov position, all private property, arguing that Marx and Engels sought only to convert bourgeois property, i.e., capital, to social property. Other private property would be unaffected. The Soviet commentator insists throughout his study that there are real differences between Christian Democratic and Communist doctrines but such differences are not insurmountable. At some future time, per? haps, Christian Democrats might recognize this. Already, some represen? tatives of Christian Democratic thought who are "sincerely attempting to stand on the position of the proletariat" agree with the Communists on the necessity for coercion to be exercised by the state against exploiting fears of Communistic classes.17 Christian Democratic are totalitarianism mere verbiage, a product of imperialist propaganda, according to Seme15 Ibid., p. 209. This is contrary to the earlier distinction made between leaders and masses, for Semenov seems to suggest a coalition with the Christian Demo? cratic parties as a whole. As previously noted, Soviet writers are not always con? sistent on this point. 16 Ibid., p. 213. A recent statement in a Soviet handbook on Latin American political parties argues in a similar fashion, making a distinction between those who would "renovate" capitalism by liquidating its vices and those who would destroy the capitalist structure and transfer the means of production into the hands of the workers. While the latter position is far from "scientific socialism," neverthe? less it creates preconditions for strengthening collaboration with the most progres? sive revolutionary forces. See Akademia Nauk SSSR. Institut Latinskoi Ameriki. Politicheskie Partii Stran Latinskoi Ameriki. Izd'vo "nauka" (Moscow, 1965), p. 19. 17 Ibid., p. 229.

the communitarian discussing that Marxism seeks to abolish

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nov. On the other hand, he concedes that, even if there were some truth it was a departure from the true socialist to this charge of totalitarianism, This is, of course, an obvious the cult of personality. idea, engendered by reference to Stalinism as a grotesque "stage" that will never recur.18 and Of course, the world views of Christian "communitarianism" sees the views of are quite different. Semenov "scientific communism" the former as a product of the illusions held by a part of the middle class, Church dogma, still middle class in psy? prisoners of long-held But and still under the sway of the idea of small ownership. chology, "sooner or later," Semenov adds, these people will "give up their delu? sions and reconcile their world view to the contemporary working class." 19 The Chile provides Chilean Case

of frequent Communist-Christian for ex? 1964 election campaign, FRAP (Frente de Ac? the candidate of the Communist-dominated ample, that he would join a co? announced Salvador Allende, tion Popular), reforms on a variety to implement alition with the Christian Democrats Democratic the best example During the cooperation. of issues.20 relies on the Chilean experience, which, he ar? move? of the Christian-Democratic gues, "helps to clarify the prospects 21 The Communist ment on the continent." party of Chile, he stresses, is making every effort to achieve unity of action with Catholics who "hold those who aren't in parties as well patriotic and democratic convictions, Semenov's analysis as members of the most diverse parties, including the Christian Demo? colla? Democratic of Communist-Christian crats." 22 He cites examples borations initiated by the former and denies the charge that the Com? munists are election rivals, claiming that this is disproved by the steady is Ibid. 19 Ibid., p. 230. He adds that the first steps in this direction may already have been taken. See also a similar argument in a Soviet journal widely circulated in Latin America and elsewhere: A. Shulgovsky, "Political Trends in Latin America," International Affairs (March 1965), p. 45. 20 Williams, Latin American Christian Democratic Parties, p. 244. Williams gives a brief survey of this relationship, full of opportunism and mutual suspicion on both sides, but still a recurrent, if intermittent phenomenon of Chilean political life. For a recent, extended discussion of the election see Ernst Halperin, National? ism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). Soviet and other Soviet-inclined writers are quite potent in citing the Chilean case as the example of the Communist-Christian Democratic collaboration that they have in mind in some of the more general statements previously cited. 21 Semenov, "Revoliutsionnye Protsessy," p. 217. 22 Ibid, p. 230.

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growth in the votes of both parties. He rebukes Christian Democrats who see the Communists as a danger, speaks straightforwardly of the Alliance for Progress, and seeks to exclude Communists from the FRAP.23 Another article, appearing in the World Marxist Review, organ of Communist of pro-Soviet parties, cites numerous examples Communist-Christian Democratic the fight collaboration, including of oil, "defense of social freedoms, restora? against denationalization tion of the constitutional rights of the Communist party, the struggle for a more democratic electoral system, solidarity with Cuba, regulation of 24 It cites some of the wages, action against inflation, etc." changes in the policy of the Catholic hierarchy, offers conciliation with the latter on the basis of Pacem in Terris, notes that the Chilean Communist Party, although atheistic, respects all faiths and insists that the party offers no threat to the "legitimate interests" of the Church.25 A Soviet survey of Chilean political, and cultural life, economic, after the election of 1964, in which Frei defeated Allende, published and future program. gives an interesting critique of the Frei candidacy It notes that Frei promised to implement a number of internal reforms and institute a number of foreign policy changes, including the expansion of Chile's external trade market and the establishment of trade and dip? lomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. attracted support from many strata in? These promises, it was conceded, workers and peasants. The United States, it alleges, supported cluding Frei as the lesser of two evils, a fear of FRAP radicalism being para? mount. But then the Soviet author makes an interesting which prognosis, recent events have at least partially borne out. Frei, it claims, will have reforms." Certain rightist forces, difficulty in instituting his "moderate 23 Of course calls for unity and collaboration carry an implied caveat. For example, Luis Corvalan, first secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, is quoted in a widely circulated journal to the effect that the Communists seek Christian Democratic participation in the Front, but he adds, "The question, therefore, con? sists in who will be the main force in the probable agreement, which class will play the leading role, what will be the scope and depth of the change." (Luis Corva? lan, "Bor'ba Za Sozdanie Narodnovo Pravitel'stva v Chili" (The Struggle for the Creation of a Popular Government in Chile), Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, 1962, no. 12, p. 19, cited in Semenov, Revoliutsionnye Protessy," p. 233. 24 Orlando Millas, "New Trends in Catholicism and the Policy of the Chilean Communists," World Marxist Review 7, no. 3 (March 1964): p. 26. 25 Ibid., pp. 26-27. Millas also presents the usual Communist critique of the progressive though inconsistent nature of Social-Christian reforms and concludes that the Church's old image is changing, "proclaiming its own rights to such values as justice and compassion, respect for human beings, for equality and progress" (p. 30). the world's

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left without a candidate during the campaign and fearing Allende, sup? abandon him and seek to check his ported Frei but will now presumably At the same time, however, there will be program of moderate reform. of the reforms that pressure from the "people" for the implementation Frei promised and which the "whole course of historical development" a continuing this would give the Communists dictated. Presumably, op? portunity for mobilizing support among the impatient and dissatisfied. Quoting Corvalan again, it is argued that "neither the history of Chile nor the history of the Chilean current elections." 26 popular movement is concluded with the

Another Soviet writer in the same anthology discusses the Frei pro? and improved relations with the gram of reform, "communitarianism," Communist world, including Frei's expressed desire for a "peaceful reso? lution" of the question of relations with Cuba.27 Approval is given to in foreign policy which "on the whole corresponds to its Frei's reestablishment of diplomatic relations with preelection promises." of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and his condemnation intervention the U.S.-Dominican and refusal to take part in the interFrei's record it is charged, However, peace force are warmly applauded. has carried out less resolutely the Christian Demo? "the Frei government cratic promises of internal reform." 28 The Soviet treatment of the Frei candidacy and election indicates American nature of Communist the conditional support for the Christian Demo? it could scarcely be otherwise. The Communists crats, and supported the "limited reforms" of Frei, having carried on an intermittent collabora? tion with the Christian basis for such Democrats support through of Frei's Christian their in the past and having prepared the analysis of the "conditional proas part of the larger pheno? Democrats

gressiveness" Fearful of losing support to the Christian menon previously discussed. and well aware of the latter's real electoral Democrats, strength, the Soviets and the Chilean Communist felt that the "in? Party evidently ternal contradictions" of the Frei regime would eventually facilitate the advent of a more propitious political climate in the country for their 26 M.F. Gornov, "Bor'ba Chiliskovo Naroda Za Korennye Demokraticheskie Preobrazovania" (The Struggle of the Chilean People for Fundamental Democratic Reforms) in Chili Politika, Ekonomika, KuVtura (Chile: Politics, Economics, Cul? ture). Izd'vo "Nauka", Moscow, 1965, pp. 61-65. 27 I.R. Grigulevich, "Kristiansko Demokraticheskaia Partiia v Chili", (The Christian Democratic Party in Chile), Chili, Politika, Ekonomika, KuVtura, pp. 176-177. 2S ibid., pp. 177-178.

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and recent developments, as noted, may have given some en? in this regard.29 couragement But no such complicated need be called into play in considerations supporters, Frei's foreign policy, including the reestablishment of dip? considering lomatic relations with which this article opened. In this area, Chile can be treated as an integrated internal divisions and unit, deemphasizing from the capitalist stressing instead Chile's desire for "independence" the United States. One Soviet analyst reviews the world, particularly of relations with the "socialist history of the gradual "normalization" relations were broken coup" after the nadir of 1947, when diplomatic with the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, ending with the formal reestablishment of Soviet-Chilean diplomatic relations on No? vember 24, 1964, shortly after Frei's election.30 Since then, Chilean students have gone to Soviet universities under an official scholarship program sponsored by the Soviet embassy.31 There were increased Soviet and Communist cultural initiatives in Chile and there has been some ac? celeration of Soviet-Chilean trade.32 In the latter area three agreements were signed in Moscow between the governments of Chile and the U.S.S.R. on January 13, 1967. One agreement is of a commercial char? acter instituting measures to govern the operation and regulation of trade between the two countries. The second measure provides for a Soviet credit of $7,000,000 over a twelve-year and a period. This agreement, somewhat similar credit agreement with Brazil were the only credit ar? rangements that the Soviets made with Latin America during the period of 1966 and early 1967, exclusive of Cuba. The third provides for cer? tain development projects.33 Conclusion In this study we have considered in regard to the changing Soviet position and policy pronouncements and role of the Catholic

initiatives

29 See Barnard Collier, "Chile's Frei Reaps a Political Whirlwind," The New York Times, January 29, 1967. Collier documents the real "contradictions" in the Frei program, proceeding too fast for the right and middle of the roaders who despise his measures and of course not fast enough for the left, especially the FRAP, who in addition blocked a proposed Frei trip to the United States because of U.S. policies in Vietnam, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. so See A.I. Sizonenko, "Chili i Sotsialisticheskie Strany" (Chile and the So? cialist Countries) in Chile: Ekonomika, Politika KuYtura, pp. 274-277. 31 See Juan de Onis, "Latin Diplomacy Touchy to Soviet. Envoys Try to be Moderate and 'Revolutionary' Too," The New York Times, May 30, 1966. 32 See Communist Propaganda Activities in Latin America, 1965. 33 See Louis B. Fleming, "Russia Intensifies Bid to Woo Latins," Chicago Sun Times, February 8, 1967, and Chilean embassy, Washington, D.C., "News From Chile, A Summary of Recent Events in Chile," no. 49, February 6,1967.

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to Latin reference with particular Church and Christian Democracy, America and Chile. The interplay between this, possible alliance part? and ners within Latin American states, and Soviet diplomatic, economic, the Frei govern? in reference to cultural initiative has been examined ment's act of reopening diplomatic and consular relations with the Soviet Union after a lapse of seventeen years. In all this, though, the broad dilemma of coordination Communist strategy within a country with more orthodox of internal Soviet di?

how to encourage through trade, aid, and other means of a country from the West, yet not so strengthen it in the process that any future promise of Communist gains is not fore? closed. This dilemma of an at least avowedly revolutionary power that behaves in many ways as an "orthodox" great power in the diplomatic arena will persist except insofar as the historical "dialectic" and course plomacy persists: the "detachment" of events, as the Soviets might some vague future date.34 say, will resolve the "contradiction" at

34 Particular attention is directed to the author's study, previously cited, which examines this difficulty in connection with the Brazilian situation of 1961-1964. As indicated, the Soviets claim that no such dilemma exists. It is, of course, a major point of contention between Chinese and Soviet wings of the Communist move? ment.