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Liberty Theological Seminary

THE RELATIONSHIP OF DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN FREEDOM: HOW THE FINITE HUMAN MIND CANNOT FULLY UNDERSTAND ITS CONCEPTS

A Paper Submitted to Dr. Mark Walton In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Course Systematic Theology II THEO 530-B12

By Ryan Sebastian October 15, 2010

i Thesis Statement: The purpose of this research is to dive into the conclusion that human minds are finite and cannot fully comprehend the concept of Gods Sovereignty and how it coincides with human free will.

ii CONTENTS INTRODUCTION...1 THE PREDESTINATION VIEW ............................................................................................... 1 THE FREE WILL VIEW ............................................................................................................ 2 Nature of the Will .............................................................................................................. 5 The Outstanding of Deliberation....................................................................................... 5 Absence of Exterior Thought of Determination above Choices and Decisions .................. 5 Preference and Verdict .................................................................................................... 6 Responsibility and Attempt ............................................................................................ 7 Scripture Passages That Seem to Resist Free Choice ...................................................... 8 The Will and Foreknowledge ............................................................................................ 9 DETERMINISTS AND LIBERTARIANS ............................................................................... 10 Libertarians Arguments for the Freedom of the Will ................................................... 11 The Examining of Psychological Viewpoint ................................................................... 11 The Moral and Religious Viewpoint .............................................................................. 12 Arguments for Determinism ........................................................................................... 13 Physiological Data......................................................................................................... 13 Psychological Data ........................................................................................................ 13 Sociological Data .......................................................................................................... 14

iii CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 14 BIBLIOGRAPHY 16

INTRODUCTION

The concept of human free will and Gods sovereignty is something that theologians have tried to solve for centuries. These two views seem to be conflicting but both appear in Scripture. Differentiating concepts within the two views will be examined along with the Scripture passages that support each view. The purpose is to examine the data of both points of views to conclude that there is not adequate information that the finite human mind can fully understand and that the debate between the two views must come to a standstill until man knows what nature of freedom is essential for moral responsibility.1 THE PREDESTINATION VIEW There is the viewpoint that if in order for God to be fully sovereign then He must have predestined those who would receive salvation and likewise who would receive damnation in hell. The predestination view states in quintessence that prior to the earth or people were fashioned, God selected certain persons to transpire in heaven and the rest to transpire in hell. Advocates for this view use Ephesians 1:4-5 and Romans 8:29-30 in support of predestination. Romans 9:29-30 states: For those God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the likeness of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brothers. And those He predestined, He also called those He called, he also justified; those he justified, He also gloried.2

David M. Ciocchi, Suspending The Debate About Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 51 (2008): 590. John Boykin, The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study, Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3 (2009): 262.
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2 This subject came into the sharpest focal point during the Reformation. There were many issues that faced the Reformation, but the one that was of great importance was the choosing of reciprocally exclusive sides amid the concepts of predestination and free will. The two most noted, outspoken followers for predestination were John Calvin and Martin Luther.3 Kenneth Latourette condensed Luthers view of predestination by stating, Man, so Luther held, does not have free will. Mans will is like a beast of burden. It is ridden either by God or by the Devil and does whatever the one who is in the saddle directs.4 Calvin likewise defined predestination as the eternal declaration of God, by which He has resolute in Himself, what He would have to be suited of every person of humanity. Individuals are not at all created with a parallel destiny. Some have been foreordained for eternal life and some for eternal damnation. Since every man is created for one of these outcomes, Calvin would then state that man is predestined for life or to death.5 The failure of many to accept the promise of Jesus Christ suggests the inclusive antagonism of divine sovereignty and human freedom. Freedom includes resistance to Gods will. Calvin, at a deeper intellectual level, refuses this opposition. He has noted that even human freedom to rebuff God must be in at some degree part of Gods own will.6 THE FREE WILL VIEW In contrast, the free will view states in quintessence that God created mankind with a free will to construct their own choices, which results in obedience or disobedience. God does hold
John Boykin, The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study, Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3 (2009): 263.
4 3

Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), 724. Paul Evans, The Moody Handbook of Theology (Chicago: Moody Press, 1989), 481.

William A. Wright, Divine Sovereignty: Absolute or Limited by Human Freedom, Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 16-17.

3 into account the choices of man, but he does not pressure humanity into choosing. Supporters of the free will view point to passages such as John 3:16, which states: For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. Another passage that is frequently used for support of this viewpoint is Romans 10:13, which states: Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved. In John 3:36 the author concludes in stating Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life, but whosever rejects the Son will not see life, for Gods wrath remains on him.7 An early theologian in church history named Erasmus was considered the most outspoken advocate for the free will view during the Reformation. He later became Martin Luthers antagonist in the field. Erasmus held to the view that God would be unjust and immoral if He were so to order the universe that man could not of himself fulfill the conditions which He had ordained for salvation and then were arbitrarily to choose some to be saved and by doing so condemn others to hell.8 Martin Luther confessed that at one time the evident contradiction of free will and predestination that is presented in Scripture had so driven him to the chasm of desolation that he wished that he never had been born. Luther, like many others, stood in admiration of the splendor and impenetrable justice of God. He maintained the belief that God is unattainable to human reason.9 No man can guarantee the amount of control they have. Additionally, there are some things that man cannot accomplish. Free will does not mean that humanity can append to the standing of any given bequest outside the restrictions positioned by

John Boykin, The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study, Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3 (2009): 262-263.
8

Ibid., 264.

John Boykin, The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study, Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3 (2009): 262-263.

4 nature. In addition, it does mean that man can fashion some innovative ability. Humans can only function within the restrictions and potential of their given desires and abilities of their environment. In reality, free will is freedom within the boundaries of a persons unborn capabilities and of the world in which he lives in.10 Humanity has the freedom to will under unsure limitations. Ones will action is not subjective in the logic that it can function in devoid of the regard for ones tattered nature within their precedent development. The will action represents the aptitude of humanity to construct their own world within the potential worlds provided by mans surroundings and capacities. In reality, humanity wills what is probable to their own nature, and as a result man finds himself efficient to differentiating extents. Therefore, man is further than a receptive being. Man is a responsible being. Humanitys synthetic desires and abilities supply the unrefined resources from which man can build their temperament and individuality. Man cannot be liable for the raw material. In contrast, man can be blamed for the type of configuration one can will to fashion out of them. There would be no reason in considering mans experience in moral responsibility if man could not will the good in which man aspires.11 Dr. Henry C. Thiessen once stated that God can foresee how men will act without efficiently decreeing how they shall act. God is not limited in the carrying out of His plans, except as He has limited Himself by the choices of man. God has set certain general bounds within which His universe is to operate. Within these bounds He has given man freedom to act.12

10

Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1967), 23. Ibid., 23. Samuel Fisk, Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom (New Jersey: Neptune, Loizeaux Brothers, 1973),

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54.

5 Nature of Free Will To understand the concept of free will one must first dive into its nature. The scheme of free will is a thing of human intangible pretense. In order to investigate it beneficially, one requires to commence by taking into consideration what the conception at issue involves and what intelligence can be made of it.13 The Outstanding of Deliberation There are a few requirements that free will must maintain. The first is the outstanding of deliberation. This consists of the will being the aptitude of authority of manufacturing premeditated choices concerning mans actions, and in so doing guides mans actions by way of thought. As a result, such a will is free when it follows mans own wishes rather than pertaining to being controlled or manipulated. John Locke has instructively defined free will by stating: The idea of liberty, is the idea of power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other.14 Absence of Exterior Thought of Determination Above Choices and Decisions The second requirement is the absence of exterior thought of determination above choices and decisions. In order to sustain that humans are outfitted with a free will is to declare that mankind has a confident meticulous genus of an aptitude. This capacity consists of the ability to formulate choices and decisions consisting of deliberative thought based on mankinds own

13

Nicholas Rescher, Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,

2009), 15.
14

Ibid., 16.

6 impulse, without the outcome-determinative infringement of factors and processed whose operations are entirely outside human individual power. The standard point of such an arrangement is that mans actions question human choices and decisions. Mans choices and decisions are industriously produced by man rather than being nonchalantly prepared for man by a progression lying exterior of human control. Henri Bergson stated that choice is engulfed with human sense of realitys deputation futurity. He is also noted in stating that in making a choice, man endeavors to convey to an awareness of one type of prospect relatively than to another. Within the realm of genuine freedom, the subject of the incentive becomes essential. The Greek term autexousia, which means absolute power, indicated the self-determination has an issue with freedom of slavery. This was used by the early Church Fathers to situate for the type of sovereignty characteristic of free will, which is the power of self-determination.15 Nicholas Rescher goes on to point out that: Just as in politics coercion and force are the prime impediments to freedom, so in personal agency external manipulation and undue influence are its prime impediments. With free will the only viable sort of constraint upon someones decisions and choices are those impressed by the agents thoughts and deliberations in the process of deciding; any sort of own constraint upon an agents autonomy is antithetical to free will.16

Rescher, like so many others, have strived to comprehend the complexity of the realm of free will and the necessary components behind it. Preference and Verdict Another requirement for free will is preference and verdict. One may ask how do people resolve alternatives and make ones choices and decisions? This can be answered by
15

Nicholas Rescher, Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,

2009), 22.
16

Ibid., 22.

7 individual judgment or by allocation to others. Personal judgment cannot constantly be rational since at some point snap judgment is called for because consideration computation cannot be conceded through ad infintum, which means to infinity. Therefore, deliberation is to be correlated in a relatively extensive and comprehensive manner. Responsibility and Attempt The fourth requirement is responsibility and attempt. Mans freedom as cogent beings is restricted by the apprehension of commonness of foreclosed portions. This is the innumerable thing that the unyielding realities of nature deposited afar from the reach of probability for man and experience. It is clearly given that many things are beyond humanitys capacities. Mans power of mind over matter is futile. Humanity cannot choose to stay abstemious upon drinking. In contrast, mans control over what man can try to do is grander. Humanitys control over what they desire is even better. One cannot be free of will and a forestall being inundated with anger when unreasonably offended. In reality, nothing can impede one from regretting that this is so, desiring it were otherwise, and striving to construct it as so. The results by means of reverence to authentic outcomes could be ahead of humanity, but results by means of reverence to endeavor definitely are not.17 When a person is treating matters of choice and decision, one has to sustain a peculiarity between the subjective and the objective viewpoint. There is a decisive distinction in correlation in which an agent is free to choose and what the agent is free to do. The former commonly affords to a great extent to a wider range.18

17

Nicholas Rescher, Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,

2009), 24.
18

Ibid., 29.

8 Scripture Passages That Seem to Resist Free Choice Now that we have looked at free will and it has been clearly defined, Scripture on the subject needs to be evaluated. There are several passages in Scripture that make it hard to hold to the concept of free will. One passage is Exodus 9:12, which states: But the LORD hardened Pharaoh's heart and he would not listen to Moses and Aaron, just as the LORD had said to Moses; and yet again in Exodus 9:16, which states: But I have raised you up for this very purpose, that I might show you my power and that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth. Paul also illuminates it even more, bringing forth a parallel text. The text is Exodus 33:19, which states: And I will be gracious to whom I am gracious, and will show mercy on whom I show mercy. Another difficult passage is Malachi chapter one and is also expounded in Romans chapter nine. It states, Was he not Jacobs brother? says the Lord. Yet I have loved Jacob but I have hated Esau. Paul then expounds in Romans 9:11-13 that thus they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or evil in order that Gods purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of his call, she was told, loved, but Esau have I hated. An early church father named Jerome expounds on this passage according to the interpretation of another church father named Origen. He stated that God hardens when he does not at once punish the sinner, and has mercy as soon as he invites repentance by means of afflictions. Another passage of note is Hosea 4:14, which states: I will not punish your daughters when they play the harlot. God speaks in fury according to Psalm 89:32, which states: Then I will punish their transgression with the rod and their iniquity with scourges. In the same light Jeremiah 20:7 states: O Lord, thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived; thou wert stronger than I, and thou hast prevailed. Jerome has been noted to lead astray when he does not immediately recollect from his fault, and this is also Origens belief as well. He conduces to

9 a supplementary faultless health, just as a qualified surgeon would desire an abrasion not to scar too rapidly in order that when the corrupting substance is brought out of the open injury it would permanently heal. And Origen notes that the Lord says: But for this purpose have I raised you up, not For this purpose I made you. Otherwise, Pharaoh would not have been wicked if God had made him like that: Who saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very good (Gen. 1:31). In reality, Pharaoh was created with a will that can turn to evil or to righteousness, but he wished to turn to evil and preferred not to obey God. Nonetheless, God turned the malevolence of Pharaoh to His own glory and to the salvation of the Israelites that thus it might be made plainer that men venture in futile endeavors when they defy the will of God.19 The Will and Foreknowledge Many theologians have struggled with the thought of the will and foreknowledge. To God, the will and foreknowledge is paralleled. Karl Barth is an example of a theologian that sought to better understand this topic.20 In some way, it ought to be that He wills what He foreknows as future, and that which He does not obstruct, though it is in His power to execute so. This is what Paul means when he states who can resist His will in accordance to whom He wills and hardens whom he wills (Romans 9:19). If there were a dictator who conceded into consequence whatever he willed, and no man could oppose him, the dictator could be noted to do whatever was pleasing to him. In parallel, the will of God seems to entail inevitability on mans will. In Romans 9:20 Paul does not personally unravel the question, but he rebukes the question.

E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson, Luther and Eramsmus: Free Will and Salvation (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 1969), 64-65. J. Scott Jackson, Divine Sovereignty in Light of Christs Lordship:Karl Barth on the Heidelberg Catechism, Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009):21.
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10 The passage states: But who are you, a man, to answer back to God?21 God maintains his sovereignty in every aspect of creation and time.22 DETERMINIST AND LIBERTARIANS Also, in order to have a better understanding of free will, one must examine the views of determinist and libertarians. The minority of philosophical controversies have been waged with a superior debate between the determinists and the libertarians. The dynamism between both parties of the question have been espoused do not only the metaphysical magnitude of the subject, but rather more particularly to its moral and religious implications. There are no other philosophical concerns that are of better moral and theological instant except of those consisting to God and the depravity of the soul. The question has been so meticulously debated that auxiliary contemplation of it may seem ineffective. The inquiry of the freedom of the will when it is abridged to its barest necessities is: Are mans acts of will unceremoniously fashioned by a precursor of circumstances or are at least several actions free from causal determination? The determinists maintain that the entire events, yet the most carefully planned and premeditated, can be explained, and that if man knew an adequate amount regarding a mans inherited characteristics and the situational influences which encompass the mans shaped character. Also, one could calculate just how the man would conduct themselves underneath any particular situate of conditions. The libertarian or free willist asserts that there is a minimum sort of human

E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson, Luther and Eramsmus: Free Will and Salvation (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 1969), 64-65. Winfried Corduan, Divine Sovereignty and Creation, Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 12.
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11 actions of the volitional sort in which the individual by the expression of mans will power acts autonomously of habitual conditions.23 Libertarians Arguments for the Freedom of the Will There a few arguments that need to be evaluated from the libertarians point of view. Theologians on both sides have essential arguments for or against free will. The ones that will be examined are the pensive of psychological argument and the moral and religious argument. The Examining of Psychological Viewpoint The majority of supporters of the free will doctrine hold true that the mind is unswervingly conscious of its freedom in the very act of constructing a decision. Therefore, freedom is an instantaneous reference to mans examined consciousness. The most persuasive and elementary of the arguments for freedom is the phrase, I experience myself free, thus I am free.24 The occurrence of decision following deliberation is an unquestionable truth which libertarians and determinists equally have to recognize. In actuality, the authentic issue is whether this truth warrants the production which the libertarian puts upon it. The determinist response to this argument is to urge the mind-set of freedom and that it is nothing but a sagacity of liberation proceeding upon past indecisiveness and strain. Subsequent to indecisiveness and divergence, the raved energies of the psyche are unconstrained and this progression is accompanied by an interior sagacity of supremacy. Therefore, the emotion of freedom or of intentional control over ones actions is a sheer prejudiced misapprehension which cannot be

23

Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1967), 32. Ibid., 35.

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12 measured in verification for psychological indeterminacy.25 An additional introspective actuality cited by the free willist or libertarian is the support of doctrine that the moral agent is in thought and certain that the libertarian may have trailed an itinerary of actions in contrast from that which the libertarian essentially sought after. The conviction that there are indisputable alternatives of action and that the selection among them is indeterminate, is generally stronger in outlook and in thought than at the instance of tangible choice.26 The Moral and Religious Viewpoint The moral argument assumes a diversity of shapes. The diversity of forms all concur in their effort to assume volitional freedom of the moral man from some characteristic of the moral condition. The greatest characteristic attribute of moral action is that is perceives to be bound for the comprehension of a superlative of the execution of a commitment. The libertarian would argue that its of the very temperament of an idyllic or a commitment that it shall be unreservedly embraced. The recognition or denunciation of a moral ideal and the acceptance of a commitment as fastening can merely be accounted for on the conjecture of mans free choice. The moral argument for freedom has on occasion not been affirmed from the viewpoint of the moral man, but of the moral opponent. This opponent lays verdict on the exploit of another or yet among the opponents own actions. A verdict of tribute or charge extends freedom to the man whose deed is judged.27

25

Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1967), 36. Ibid., 37. Ibid., 38.

26

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13 Arguments for Determinism While the verification for the free will doctrine is greatly humanistic and moralistic, the case for determinism is a petition to scientific data. The determinist finds that the discipline of sociology, psychology, and physiology gives verification that human deeds are no exemption to the underlying equivalence of nature. Physiological Data The greater a person knows about the physiological and impartial processes which go on in the interior of the human being, the further apparent it transpires that there is not a sever in the unremitting sequence of causation. This is even when it reacts to the greatest intricate of incentive. Physiology has revealed a sensibly transparent depiction of the machinery of human

behavior. Behaviorists have been recruited for the cause of determinism. They have applied the objective system of the physiologist to the human behavior. The behaviorists have described in the slighted aspect the apparatus of reflexes and the method of their habituation. Delayed responses are mediated by very complex neutral processes which on their subjective side are called conflict, indecision, and deliberation, but they are not exception to the behaviouristic formula.28 Psychological Data Whereas the deterministic theory conjunctures its most apparent support from physiology and behaviouristic psychology, introspective psychology constructs an endowment as well. An impartial reflective assessment of preference supports the hypothesis of psychological determinism. Now if a persons supremacy of introspective were satisfactorily constructed, that
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Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1967), 44.

14 person could presumably follow any conclusion in discovering the precise psychological influences which provides that meticulous verdict predictable. Beyond question for an absolute elucidation of definite resolutions, it is essential in calculation to the cognizant experience of the volitional performance to improve the more obscure subliminal and cataleptic influences. The subsistence of cognitively unfathomable conscious proceedings was one of the greater convincing reasons for the unique positing of a cataleptic or subliminal psyche. It stays accurate that a reasonably absolute proceeding of the psychological effect of volitional choice is probable yet lacking an alternative to a cataleptic mind. Sociological Data The social field of sciences succumb a copious confirmation for the deterministic view of human conduct. The actuality that the behavior of a great collective of individuals is expressible in conditions of an arithmetical bylaw which positively leads in that bearing, even though it is not an irrefutable fact of individual determinism. It is intricate to resolve the likelihood of the laws of a collective or accumulation of actions with the individual free will.29 CONCLUSION Theologians for centuries have tried to explain the concept of human free will against Gods sovereignty. This debate will most likely continue until the return of Christ. It is essential as a Christian to examine all aspects of doctrine including free will. After must examination into the debate the only conclusion that must be of note is that the finite human mind cannot fully comprehend the concept of Gods sovereignty and human free will. As noted, both are revealed

29

Willard F. Enteman, The Problem of Free Will (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1967), 45.

15 in Scripture. How can both concepts be true? This is a question that will consume theologians until the end of time

BIBLIOGRAPHY Boettner, Loraine. The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination. Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1932. Boykin, John. The Predestination Principle: A Bible Study. Evangelical Review of Theology 33:3 (2009): 262-269 Ciocchi, David M. Suspending The Debate About Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom. Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 51 (2008): 573-590 Corduan, Winfried. Divine Sovereignty and Creation. Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 1-15. Enteman, Willard. The Problem of Free Will. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1967. Evans, Paul. The Moody Handbook of Theology. Chicago: Moody Press, 1989. Fisk, Samuel. Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom. Neptune: Loizeaux Brothers, 1973. Jackson, J. Scott. Divine Sovereignty in Light of Christs Lordship:Karl Barth on the Heidelberg Catechism. Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 1-22. Latourette, Kenneth Scott. A History of Christianity. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953 Rescher, Nicholas. Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009. Rupp, Gordon, and Philip S. Watson. Luther and Eramsmus: Free Will and Salvation. Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 1969. Wright,William A. Divine Sovereignty: Absolute or Limited by Human Freedom. Testamentum Imperium: An International Theological Journal 2 (2009): 1-17

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