Field Investigation Report

2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI

EARTHQUAKE + STRUCTURAL ENGINEERS

0 | CONTENTS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Arahama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Sendai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Tagajyo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Kesennuma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Minami Sanriku . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Rikuzen-Takata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Ofunato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Kamaishi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

THE TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI CAUSED WIDE-SPREAD DAMAGE.

1 | PREFACE
In my reconnaissance of the Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami, I visited the Sendai Airport, which had been incapacitated by a 2-meter-high tsunami-induced flood. I also visited a beach close by and found 6-meter-high seawalls that had been destroyed by a 10-meterhigh tsunami . The seawalls were a massive, impressive concrete fortress that proved to be insufficient. This failure also contributed to the Fukushima nuclear plant crisis. The biggest issue that I saw was overconfidence with our current level of engineering knowledge . We engineers should be humble enough to say, What if the design wave height is not adequate? We should place the emergency generator on higher ground . If someone had challenged the norm during the design of the nuclear plant, the meltdown could have been avoided . This issue is is not exclusive to Tokyo Electric Power Company or Japan alone . This event could easily have happened in the United States . When we design buildings or sea walls, we use mandated codes and the standard of practice . These guidelines have accepted risks that the public and legal system are unaware of . Most people think that meeting the code or standards means complete safety . But the truth is that the code ensures minimal life protection at best . It does not guarantee sustainability of a building or community after a large earthquake . I found many warning signs posted on streets that indicated the limits of tsunami water, and they were accurate . Japanese engineers knew about the possibility of a 10-meter wave and how far it could reach . The 6-meter-high sea walls failed . Fortunately, the sophisticated warning system saved hundreds of thousands of lives . Still, we lost more than 11,000 people, many towns, and 400,000 people are homeless . The 6-meter-high sea wall was built per design . The implication for the rest of the world, including the United States, is significant. We engineers know what the worst-case scenarios may be . But we rarely communicate the risk to the public and stakeholders in such a way that they understand it, and we fail to inform then that cost-effective, innovative engineering solutions exist to make structures safe and sustainable for cities . Buildings in tsunami areas should be multi-story concrete or steel structures; these are the only structural types that will survive large tsunamis . These structures can also be architecturally attractive and sustainable . Civilization is fragile . In 90 seconds, we lost a big piece of eastern Japan . There is no power, no gas, no food, and no water . Lives, and some communities, were lost forever . Nature has a way of proving us wrong in our assumptions and standards . The additional cost for smarter ways to protect civilization is insignificant compared with what is at stake. We know how to do better .

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On my return home, as I walked out of the arrival hall at San Francisco International Airport, my wife and kids ran up to meet me. My five-year-old boy hugged me tight and did not want to let me go. My mind briefly flashed to an image of a little boy who was crying in a cold, snowy Japanese town that had been destroyed .
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the people of the Tohoku disaster area . Despite losing everything, they are determined to have their lives back . I did not see a single occasion of civil unrest or looting, or the presence of armed forces or armed police . I respect their courage and endurance . I know that they will overcome . I also acknowledge the dedicated staff of Miyamoto International and Global Risk Miyamoto . Their round-the- clock technical and logistical support for our team was critical for collecting technical data . I thank the media crew of ITN from England . Their collaboration was very important during this very difficult initial phase. Finally, to my family in Davis, California, and Tokyo, I always appreciate your support . I know that I always make you worry during a disaster response, and I especially want to say to my little kids Mimi, Julia, and Alexander, I love you . H . Kit Miyamoto, S .E ., Ph .D . 2 April, 2011 Davis, California

2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

2 | THE TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI

The magnitude (MW) 9 .0 event occurred at 2:46 p .m . local time on 11 March 2011, in the western Pacific Ocean off the coast of Japan. Its epicenter was approximately 130 kilometers from Sendai, Honshu, Japan . This earthquake occurred in the subduction zone between the Pacific Plate and Northern Honshu Plate. The rupture length is expected to exceed several hundred kilometers and the event had an approximate depth of 25 kilometers . As shown in Table 1, United States Geological Survey (USGS), 2011, a large population of more than 2 .1 million people was exposed to high earthquake intensity during the event . The main earthquake was preceded by a number of large foreshocks. The first major foreshock was a MW 7 .2 event on 9 March . The main event was followed by hundreds of aftershocks of magnitude 5 or greater . Figure 1 (USGS 2011) presents the intensity and aftershock maps for this event .
TABLE 1. POPULATION EXPOSURE
CITY POPULATION (THOUSANDS) MODIFIED MERCALLI INTENSITY (MMI)

Furukawa Sendai Iwaki Koriyama Hitachi Ishinomaki

76 1,038 357 341 186 117

IX VIII VIII VIII VIII VIII

Japan has an extensive array of strong-motion sensors . One minute before the earthquake was felt in Tokyo, the Earthquake Early Warning system, which includes more than 1,000 seismometers in Japan, sent out warnings of impending strong shaking . This warning likely prevented further loss of life . The unprocessed strong-motion data, for example, see Figure 2, California Geological Survey (CGS) 2011 indicates large accelerations . In the Miyagi Prefecture, approximately 75 kilometers from the epicenter, peak ground acceleration (PGA) values as high as 2 .7g were recorded in the horizontal direction . By contrast, in Tokyo, which was approximately 370 kilometers from the epicenter, the maximum PGA was 0 .16g . The strong motion lasted approximately 90 seconds . Japan is one of the worlds most earthquake-prone countries, with tremors occurring daily . Major earthquakes and tsunamis also affected this region in 1896 and 1933 .

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FIGURE 1. EARTHQUAKE DATA (USGS 2011)

Intensity map

Aftershocks

FIGURE 2. RECORDED GROUND ACCELERATION (RAW DATA) FROM STATION MYG013 IN SENDAI (CGS 2011)

2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

The earthquake was followed by a large tsunami . Waves averaging 10 metersand some as high as 29 .6 metersstruck, traveling as far as 6 miles inland . Smaller waves reached other countries, including the United States, and caused damage in excess of several millions of dollars (US) in costal California . The tsunami inundated a total area of approximately 470 square kilometers . An hour after the earthquake, the Sendai Airport was inundated with waves that wept away cars and planes and flooded buildings. A 4-meter-high tsunami hit Iwate Prefecture . Wakabayashi Ward in Sendai was hit particularly hard . The water column height on 11 March, 2011, at the Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) Station there shows the effect of the tsunami . The Japan Meteorological Agency issued a major tsunami warning . The initial estimates indicated that the tsunami would take 10 to 30 minutes to reach the areas first affected, and then areas farther north and south, based on the geography of the coastline . This warning allowed hundreds of thousands of people to escape to higher ground inland . The damage from the tsunami was far greater than that from the earthquake . One factor contributing to the damage and high death toll was the sheer size of the water surge topping the tsunami walls, which were designed to withstand smaller tsunami heights . The height and inland reach of the tsunami surprised many people who thought that they were located either on high enough ground or in locations far enough away inland . Considering the data available at the time of this report, the extent of casualties and damage from his event is astonishing (see Table 2 from various news organizations) .
TABLE 2. CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2011 EVENT (FROM VARIOUS NEWS ORGANIZATIONS)
DESCRIPTION COMMENT

Deaths Missing Injured Building collapsed or severely damaged Transportation (roads, bridges)

11,000+ 16,000+ 3,000+ 120,000+ All major ports were damaged; the rail system and Road 45, the major road along the coastline, were inaccessible; Tohoku Way, the main freeway, was open only to authorized rescue vehicles; Sendai Airport was damaged by a 2-meter-high tsunami The entire coastal area lost all services; Sendai lost extensive power and fuel Fukushima nuclear reactors; oil tanks in Kesennuma $300 billion

Lifelines (electricity, water, gas, etc .) Critical facility affected Direct damage

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Just one day after the earthquake, an engineering team from Miyamoto International and Global Risk Miyamoto was on the ground in the affected area, investigating and analyzing the damage for response, recovery, and reconstruction data, and documenting failures and successes to reduce the risk of catastrophic losses in future earthquakes. The teams findings on the earthquake effects on people, structures, and local industry are presented here for various important locations, identified in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3. MAP OF VISITED SITES

2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

3 | ARAHAMA
This area experienced tsunami waves approximately 7 meters high causing extensive and widespread damage . Even 5 kilometers from the shore, many houses and structures were destroyed (see Figure 4) . Typical Japanese residential housing uses wood framing and concrete foundation . This type of construction does not perform well in a tsunami surge type of loading . Many cars were washed away over great distances by the tsunami . As part of the search and rescue effort, the Japanese recovery teams checked cars, looking for survivors or bodies and then tagged the vehicles (see Figure 5) .
FIGURE 4. COLLAPSED HOUSES 5 KILOMETERS FROM SHORE

Many industrial buildings survived the tsunami . For example, the industrial building in Figure 6 did not suffer severe damage . This performance stems in part from the fact that these types of buildings are constructed with steel and concrete, and they have better foundation anchorage from the super structure . In addition, the buildings have seismic detailing, which provides toughness, system integrity, and strength for seismic and tsunami surge and impact loading . Steel and concrete buildings performed well . For example, the four-story concrete school building in Figure 7, less than 1 kilometer from the ocean, experienced 7-meterhigh waves and was essentially undamaged . The gymnasium structure was damaged by water surging in from one side at the bottom floor and bursting through the other side but there was no evidence of structural damage . In Arahama the only buildings left standing had either steel or concrete construction .
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FIGURE 5. INSPECTED CAR

FIGURE 6. SURVIVING INDUSTRIAL BUILDING

FIGURE 7. UNDAMAGED CONCRETE SCHOOL BUILDING

2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

In general, steel and concrete buildings have much better anchorage to the foundation than does the comparable wood construction that uses sill plates and anchors, which is similar to California construction (see Figure 8) . Note in Figure 8 that the superstructure has been washed away . Many inlet bridges also suffered damage . The bridges parallel to the shore sustained most of the damage, being subjected to perpendicular wave forces (see Figure 9) . In contrast, bridges perpendicular to the beach performed better (see Figure 10) .
FIGURE 8. TYPICAL WOOD-FRAME FOUNDATION

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FIGURE 9. BRIDGE PARALLEL TO THE SHORE

The tsunami seawall in this area was approximately 2 meters tall . The protection for the city was provided by the seawall and a row of pine trees planted near the beach (see Figure 11) .
FIGURE 10. SEA WALL

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2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

FIGURE 11. PINE TREES PLANTED FOR TSUNAMI WAVE PROTECTION

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4 | SENDAI
Sendai is the capital city of Miyagi Prefecture, Japan, and the largest city in the Tohoku region . It has a population of more than 1 million and is a modern city with extensive new high-rise construction . Although preliminary reports have indicated large PGAs in this area, there was no evidence of wide spread major earthquake damage; however, some older nonductile concrete buildings were damaged . There was also no evidence of major liquefaction . All commercial buildings were closed (see Figure 12), however, and residents had to line up to shop (see Figure 13) . There was a wide-spread shortage of basic food and gas in the surrounding unaffected area, caused by the following factors: (a) all eastern ports were damaged; (b) the rail system was damaged; (c) Tohoku Waythe only freeway between Tokyo and Tohokuwas open for emergency vehicles only; and (d) residents in unaffected areas such as Tokyo over-purchased essentials such as food and gas .
FIGURE 12. CLOSED RETAIL STORES

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2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

FIGURE 13. LINE FOR PURCHASING ESSENTIAL ITEMS

The Sendai Airport was closed . This facility is located approximately 5 to 10 kilometers from the ocean and experienced 2-meter-high tsunami-induced flood. The main structure itself did not sustain much damage (see Figure 14) . Many industrial facilities close to the port were undamaged (see Figure 15), but financial losses for this sector will be large because of business interruptions .
FIGURE 14. SENDAI AIRPORT MAIN BUILDING FIGURE 15. INDUSTRIAL FACILITY NEAR PORT

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The seawall in this area was about 6 meters tall (see Figure 16) . The wall had extensive damage likely resulting from the erosion and land-slide caused by suction as the water went over the top . The ocean side of the wall was not damaged (see Figure 17) . Note that damage to the seawall becomes more pronounced at the place where the dolosconcrete blocks used to protect the harbor wallsstopped .
FIGURE 16. AIRPORT SEAWALL

FIGURE 17. ERODED SEAWALL

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2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

FIGURE 18. FLOODED MAJOR ROADWAY

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5 | TAGAJYO
There was major flooding of the main roadway in Tagajyo (see Figure 18) and a shortage of foodstuffs and goods, similar to the shortage in Sendai . Transmission towers were damaged (see Figure 19) because the tsunami picked up cars and slammed them onto the tower legs .
FIGURE 19. DAMAGED TRANSMISSION TOWER

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2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

6 | KESENNUMA
Almost the entire stock of wood buildings was destroyed in the tsunami-affected area, but modern concrete structures designed per Japanese seismic code performed well (see Figure 20) . Light poles and sign structures experienced bending failure at their bases (see Figure 21), likely due to debris impact . Oil tank containers at the bay failed (see Figure 22), and oil poured out and ignited a large fire, which contributed to the destruction. When the 7-meter-high seawall at the Fukushima nuclear power plant was breached, emergency power was lost . This power outage eventually led to the meltdown of the nuclear reactors . In addition, a large number of deep-ocean ships were washed ashore several kilometers into town (see Figure 23) .

FIGURE 20. CONCRETE AND WOOD BUILDING, SIDE BY SIDE

FIGURE 21. FAILED SIGN STRUCTURE

FIGURE 22. FAILED OIL TANKS

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FIGURE 23. LARGE TUNA FISHING BOAT THAT WAS SWEPT INTO TOWN
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2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

7 | MINAMI SANRIKU
Many residential (see Figure 24) and industrial buildings (see Figure 25) were destroyed in Minami Sanriku . As in Kesennuma, almost the entire stock of wood buildings was destroyed in the tsunami-affected area but modern concrete structures designed per Japanese seismic code performed well (see Figure 20 for an example in Kesennuma) .
FIGURE 24. RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS FIGURE 25. INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS

The bridge perpendicular to the inlet bay was washed away, and only the bridge railing and some portions of the pier were left behind (see Figure 26) . This particular bridge did not seem to have adequate anchorage . Bridges such as the one in this photo near the inlet of the narrow bay were subjected to large impact and perpendicular tsunami wave forces . Steel buildings fared well, as shown in Figure 27 . In this building, the moment frame itself is intact, and the non structural walls were damaged from the force of the tsunami .
FIGURE 26. DESTROYED BRIDGE FIGURE 27. STEEL MOMENT-FRAME BUILDING

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The three-story concrete building shown in Figure 28 did not sustain any damage, even though it is located right at the bay . This modern structure was designed and constructed according the to current seismic code in Japan. This design provided sufficient strength and ductility for the building to withstand the tsunami forces . This particular building was operational and back in business only one week after the tsunami .
FIGURE 28. UNDAMAGED AND OPERATIONAL BUILDING

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2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

8 | RIKUZEN-TAKATA
The school building in Rikuzen-Takata suffered erosion damage at the foundation (see Figure 29) . Most of the town was washed away (see Figure 30) . Many residential and industrial buildings were destroyed in the town of 50,000 people . Figures 24 and 25 show examples of such damage in the region .
FIGURE 29. SCHOOL BUILDING FOUNDATION EROSION

FIGURE 30. DESTROYED WOOD BUILDINGS

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The steel truss bridge superstructure over Highway 45 was washed inland about 0 .5 kilometers from its original site (see Figure 31) . Note that the concrete pier walls were severely cracked in shear, as shown in Figure 32 . The river became a focal point of the tsunami wave . It increased the tsunami velocity and height substantially . Modern concrete structures performed well as shown in Figure 33, but older concrete buildings did not. The older building shown in Figure 34 did not have confinement steel and used smooth bars, and it collapsed .

FIGURE 31. PIERS AND WASHED AWAY STEEL TRUSS SUPERSTRUCTURE

FIGURE 32. CRACKED PIERS

FIGURE 33. UNDAMAGED NEWER CONCRETE BUILDING

FIGURE 34. DAMAGED OLDER CONCRETE BUILDING

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2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI | FIELD REPORT

9 | OFUNATO
Damage in the residential district of Ofunato was limited . Only the wharf district (see Figure 35), sustained major damage . However, the industrial steel buildings in this area collapsed, as seen in Figure 36 . The column-to-foundation anchorage was inadequate and it failed, causing these collapses .
FIGURE 35. DAMAGED WHARF DISTRICT

FIGURE 36. COLLAPSED STEEL BUILDINGS

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Figure 37 presents a street sign that was placed by the Japanese government predicting the extent of a tsunami . Remarkably, the tsunami reached to within 1 meter of this sign, indicating both the planning and the accuracy of the modeling used by the engineers .
FIGURE 37. SIGN PREDICTING THE EXTENT OF A TSUNAMI

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10 | KAMAISHI
The damage in this town was limited to the wharf area . This town was powered by a generator from a steel mill, pointing out the effectiveness of self-sustainable disaster management and an intact electrical power grid .

11 | DISCUSSION
The 2011 Tohoku Taiheiyo Oki Earthquake caused wide-spread significant damage and resulted in more than 11,000 deaths . After an initial reconnaissance, the Miyamoto team has made the following observations: Japan has an extensive and elaborate tsunami warning system. The warning was communicated by radio, public address (PA) system, cell phone, etc ., and saved hundreds of thousands of lives . Preparedness and disaster management for self-sustainability are critical for post-disaster response . It is important for government agencies and professional organizations to educate citizens on such events . This event differed from the more localized Kobe Earthquake of 1995 and affected an area of more than 400 kilometers . A coordinated damage response is required for such a widespread and non-localized event . Limiting the Tohoku Way freeway only to government-authorized emergency vehicles led to a lack of basic necessities in surrounding unaffected areas . The tall seawalls seem to have slowed down the tsunami velocity in certain areas. However, after water had breached them, they were not effective . Emergency and lifeline facilities such as the nuclear power plant and gas tanks, need to be relocated to higher ground or else seawalls designed for extreme events need to be constructed to protect them . Seismic detailing such as confinement, system integrity, toughness, and adequate anchorage work well for tsunami loading . It is possible to cost-effectively construct tsunami-resistant structures . Multistory steel and concrete-frame buildings with a mechanism for water travel are good candidates .

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THE 2011 TOHOKU TAIHEIYO OKI EARTHQUAKE CAUSED WIDE-SPREAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE

Miyamoto International, Inc . 1450 Halyard Drive, Suite One West Sacramento CA 95691 Tel: 916 .373 .1995 www .miyamotointernational .com