116 5 I THE R!SE OF ROME, 753-44 B.C. E.

to proceed in and cultivating their ground; and as for the cities that were
in the territories of Attalus, he declared that the disposal of them did not at all be-
long to the senate, but to the people, and that he himself would ask their p[easure
herein. By this he offended the more than ever he had done before.
DISCU$SION QUESTIONS
I. According to Plutarch, what specific factors prompted Tiberi us to take action in
the people's favor?
2. In his address to the crowd, how does Tiberi us characterize his opponents, and
why?
3.As portrayed by Plutarch, what fundamental Roman values did Tiberius em-
body?
6.
Toward Empire
julius Caesar, The Gallic War (s2 ij.c.e.)
The violent failure of the Gracchan reforms marked the end of political cooperation
among the Roman elite and, in the process, opened the door for a new kind of leader
in the republic - the general-politician - who used his own troops to gain wealth
and power. After securing a special command in Gaul, Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.E.)
exhibited just such a strategy through a combination of military genius and political
savvy. Between 58 and 50 B.C.E., he and his army pushed past Rome's northwest fron-
tier, conquering much of modern-day France along the way. His success sparked a gen-
eral rebellion among the peoples of central Gaul in 52 B.C.E., led by the tribal chief
Vercingetotix (d. 46 B.C.E.). Caesar described the revolt and its climax at the fortress
of Alesia in The Gallic War, excerpted below. In his account, he provides a glimpse of
the realities of warfare and, at the same time, of how he won loyalty both at home and
abroad. He used this loyalty as leverage in the civil war brewing in Rome, which ulti-
mately destroyed the republic.
... Now all his cavalry had fled, Vercingetorix withdrew his infantry force, which
he had stationed in front of the three camps, and immediately began the march to
Alesia, which is a town of the Mandubii. He issued orders for the baggage to be
fetched quickly from the camps and to follow on behind. Caesar had his army's
baggage taken to the nearest high ground and lefr two legions behind to gnard it.
He pursued Vercingetorix as long as the light lasted and killed about 3,000 of the
enemy rearguard. The following day he pitched camp near Alesia. He reconnoi-
From Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, trans. Carolyn Hammond (New York and Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1996), 181, 183-84, 188-89, 191-94, 241-42.
TowARD EMPIRE I }uuus CAESAR
117
tered the city's position and provoked panic in the enemy; then, after encouraging
the soldiers for the task they faced, he set about the of circumvallation.
1
The actual stronghold of Alesia
2
was in an extremeiy lofty position on top of
a hill, apparently impregnable except by means of a siege. On two sides the foot of
this hill was washed by rivers, and for about three miles there stretched a plain in
front of the town. Close by in every other direction more hills of equal height girded
the town. Beneath the wall, where the hill faced east, the Gallic forces filled the en-
tire space: they had constructed a ditch and a six,foot wall. The length of the siege-
works which the Romans had started reached ten miles. Camps had been pitched
at suitable locations and twenty-three forts built along the line. These forts were gar-
risoned in the daytime, to guard against unexpected sorties; at night sentries and
reinforced patrols kept watch there ....
Vercingetorix now decided to send all his cavalry away by night before the Ro-
mans completed their siege-works. As they left, he told each of them to go to his
own people and muster for battle all the men of an age to bear arms. He described
the services he had done them and called upon them to take thought for his safety,
and not to abandon him to the enemy's torments after he had done so much to se-
cure the liberty of all. ...
All these arrangements were relayed to by deserters and prisoners. He
then decided to set up the following types of fortification. He had a twenty-foot-
wide ditch dug, with vertical sides, so that the bottom of the ditch was as wide as
its edges at the top. He fixed the position of all the other fortifications 400 paces
back from the ditch, with the intention of preventing an unexpected or night-time
onslaught on them by the enemy army, and of stopping the enemy aiming missiles
at our men while they were busy on the siege-works; for the area he had enclosed
was necessarily of considerable size, and it would be difficult to encircle the entire
site with a cordon of soldiers. At this distance away, then, he extended two more
ditches, of the same depth but fifteen feet across; he filled the inner one (which was
on low-lying ground in the plain) with water diverted from the river. Behind them
he constructed an earthwork with a rampart on top, twelve feet high; to this he at-
tached a parapet and battlements, with large pointed stakes projecting at the joints
where the parapet attached to the earthwork. This would slow down an enemy as-
cent. He placed towers all round the siege-works at intervals of eighty feet ....
Meanwhile Commius
3
and the other leaders entrusted with the supreme com-
mand reached Alesia with all their forces. They occupied a hill outside, less, than a
milefrom our fortifications, and took upposition there. The next day they brought
1
The construction of a fort for mounting weapons by a besieging army. The scale of the cir-
cumvallation at Alesia was so astonishing as to become the classic proof of Caesar's mastery
of the art of generalship and command.
size of the forces on both sides is disputed: 50,000 has been suggested for Caesar's en-
tire force, both cavalry and infantry, and 80,000 for the Gallic force inside Alesia.
JBefore the uprising in Gaul, Commius had been an ally of Caesar's in Britain; in return,
Caesar had made him King of the Atrebates. [Ed.]
118 5 I THE RISE OF ROME, 753-44 B.C. E.
their cavalry out of camp and filled the whole of the plain which we described ear-
lier as being three miles across. They withdrew their infantry force a short disfance
and halted it on high ground. from the town of Alesia there was a clear view on to
the plain ....
Vercingetorix saw his men from fhe citadel of Alesia and marched out of fhe
town, taking fhe wicker hurdles, poles, shelters, siege-hooks, and fhe rest of the
equipment he had had made ready for the sortie. At one and the same moment
fhere was fighting on every side, and every expedient was put to the test. Wherever
a hint of weakness appeared, fhere fhey flocked to fhe attack. The Roman force was
strung out along its extensive fortifications and found rallying to the defense diffi-
cult in many places. The shouting which arose behind them was effective in fiight-
erring our men as fhey fought, for fhey realized fhat fhe risk to themselves depended
on fhe courage shown by ofhers: after all, it is usually _fhe case fhat what is unseen
is more effective in disturbing men's minds.
Caesar took over a suitable spot and found out what was happening in every
quarter; he sent help to fhose who were in difficulties. Both sides realized that this
was fhe very moment for putting fheir utmost effort into the fight - fhe Gauls
must despair of saving fhemselves unless they broke fhrough the Roman defenses,
and the Romans, if they held firm, were looking forward to the end of all their
labors .... The unfavorable downward slope of the site played a crucial part. Some
of the enemy threw missiles, others formed a "tortoise" and moved up close; ex-
hausted troops were continually being replaced by fresh. They all threw earth on to
fhe defenses, which gave fhe Gauls a means of ascent as well as covering over fhe de-
vices which fhe Romans had hidden in fhe ground. Our men were now running out
of weapons and of strength.
When he realized what was happening Caesar sent Labienus wifh six cohorts
to help fhe men in trouble. He told him fhat if it was impossible to hold his
he should withdraw his forces and then launch a counter-attack - but fhts was
only to be done in an emergency. Caesar then approached the rest of the men in
person, and urged them not to give up the struggle. He explamed how fhe frmts
of all their previous battles depended on that day, that hour. Instde the Roman
lines the enemy abandoned hope of success on the level ground because of the
size the defenses; so they tried to climb one of fhe steep ascents to take it, and
had all the equipment fhey had prepared conveyed fhere. A hail of missiles from
fhe defenders on fhe towers scattered them, but fhey filled in fhe ditches wifh earth
and hurdles, and started to tear down the rampart and parapet wifh grappling-
hooks.
Caesar sent first the young Brutus
4
with some cohorts, then his legate Gaius
Fabius wifh more. Finally, when fhe fighting grew more fierce, he came in perspn,
leading fresh troops for reinforcements. The battle was renewed and the enemy
4
Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus commanded Caesar's fleet against the Veneti in 56 B.C.E.
and later at Massilia in 49 B.C.E., following which he was made governor Gaul.
HP nnP nf :u;.o;:a,o;:,,dns.

,I
i
TOWARD EMPIRE I }ULIUS CAESAR
119
forced back. Then Caesar made for the place where he had sent Labienus. He with-
drew four cohorts from the nearest fort and order;done section of the cavalry to
follow him, fhe rest to move round fhe outer defenses and attack the enemy from
the rear. Once Labienus had found fhat neither earthworks nor ditches could stand
up to fhe enemy attack, he gafhered eleven cohorts, which happened to be available
after their withdrawal from fhe nearby guard posts. He then sent word to Caesar of
what he thought needed to be done.
Caesar hurried to join in the fighting. The conspicuous color of fhe cloak' he
habitually wore in battle proclaimed his arrival. Because fhe downward slopes were
in clear view from fhe heights above, the enemy spotted the cavalry squadrons and
cohorts he had ordered to follow him and joined battle. A shout went up from bofh
sides, and was answered by anofher from' fhe rampart and defense-works. Our men
fhrew fheir spears, then fought wifh swords. Suddenly fhe cavalry was glimpsed in
fhe rear: more cohorts were advancing. The enemy turned tail and the cavalry
charged fhem as fhey fled. Massive slaughter followed .... Those in fhe town viewed
the slaughter and fhe flight of fheir comrades: abandoning hope, fhey wifhdrew
fheir forces from the defenses.
As soon as the news broke, the Gauls fled from fheir camp. If our men had not
been exhausted after nmnerous relief efforts and all fhe struggles of the day fhey
would have been able to wipe out the entire enemy army. The cavalry was sent out
at around midnight and caught up with fhe enemy rearguard. Many of the enemy
were taken and killed, and the rest fled to their home states.
The following day Vercingetorix called a council and argued that he had un-
dertaken fhis war not in his own interests but for the liberty of all. Since they were
forced to yield to fortune, he went on, he was putting himself in their hands, ready
for either outcome, whether fheywanted to make reparation to the Romans by put-
ting him to death, or to hand him over alive.
They sent envoys to Caesar to discuss these options, and he ordered them to
give up fheir weapons and bring out fhe ringleaders. Then he took his seat wifhin
the fortifications in front of his camp, and the ringleaders were brought to him
there. Vercingetorix was handed over, and weapons were thrown down. Caesar had
the Aedui and Arverni kept back, in case he could use them to win back fheir states'
allegiance, and the rest of the prisoners he shared out as booty, one apiece, to his
entire army.
Once this business was settled he set out for the territory of fhe Aedui.and won
back their nation. The Arvernian enyoys who had been sent there pledged to carry
out whatever he told fhem to do ....