A Unified Theory of Attention & Petition to Rename Attention Deficit Disorder In the DSM-V Jonathan D. Boyer, M.A.

James Madison University March, 2007

Abstract Attention is typically referred to in terms of what it is being paid to; as if anytime attention is given there is a price to pay. Similar to a budget, where each transaction of paying attention causes a re-structuring of ones mental finances, attention requires a psychological balance of cost. The next question is where, or at what location points, can we say attention is being given or paid? Attention remains in such constant flux that perhaps the only chance to identify its ever-changing location is by analyzing its properties when lapses, or mental errors, occur. By analyzing mental errors, this paper explores whether the function of attention is the same across different cognitive processes. If it can be demonstrated that the function of attention does in fact retain its structure across different cognitive tasks, there is evidence to support a unified theory of attention. Implications of this theory in relation to what has been called Attention Deficit Disorder are explored particularly why this term is both unnecessarily negative and inaccurate.

Background Often in psychological theory we begin with a word or idea that has been known by experience to exist, and we investigate that idea in order to more clearly define it conceptually. Take memory, for example: no one doubts whether or not memory exists, yet it remains difficult to define without referring to one of its synonyms (things I recall; all that I remember; all my past recollections). Aside from the vagueness of its term, it is difficult to define memory because it is always in use we use memory for everything we do: It is a pre-requisite subfunction of every human function, so to define memory one would need to compile a list of everything that requires its use (which is everything!). In psychological theory, it follows that memory is hypothesized to be not just one thing or one idea but many ideas it is composed of many types. Thus, the discovery of types whether they be types of memory or other types of mental phenomena is the central focus of psychological theory. So what are the different types of memory? A quick brainstorm might produce: shortterm, long-term, episodic, procedural, declarative, implicit, and explicit. Now, with such an explicit list of memory types, it becomes easier for one to imagine the mental activity that each different type involves and how each activity differs from one another in quality of cognitive experience. Even with this differentiation of memory types evident, there is still an uncertainty as to whether some common memory-thread might exist neurologically, somehow linking all memory types together, so that, in essence, memory is still just memory and not a scattered dispersion of types. Although this question of where does the concept of memory begin and end, existentially, opens itself up to philosophical debate, psychological theory adheres to a more concrete system of ideas, as cognitive neuroscience often serves as the scientifically objective, theoretical jury.

Essentially this means that our understanding of the differentiation of brain processes is used to dissociate one process (e.g. type of memory) or set of processes from another i.e. are they separate processes in the brain, or is the activity actually one, singularly integrated process? In other words, if it is demonstrated that memory functions as two different processes in separate brain regions, these processes should then represent with two different concepts in psychological theory. Neurocognitive processes, therefore, should have a direct, 1-to-1 correspondence to the psychological concepts they inspire. Taken to the extreme, one might imagine the hypothetical unification of cognitive neuroscience and psychological theory as the point where every, single brain process corresponds to every, single concept in psychological theory. Double Dissociation The classic case-study of HM, a 27 year-old man with severe epileptic seizures, is a hallmark of cognitive neuroscience, dating back to 1953, when for the first time neurological evidence was found to support the differentiation between long-term and short-term memory as well as declarative versus procedural memory. Neurological evidence, as the term is used, generally refers to the results of brain injuries and the particularities of their effects on behavior and cognition; although there are a number of ways, besides injury, the brain might become dysfunctional. For the proper amount of experimental control, an isolated brain region needs to be either damaged or removed so that the abnormalities observed in behavior can be attributed to that location of brain damage. In HMs case, a surgeon removed his amygdala (commonly associated with emotional regulation) and most of his hippocampus, which are both part of the brains limbic system (Dawson, 1998). The compelling result was that HM, while unable to construct new long-term memories, was still able to utilize short-term memory functions: Although HM was able to hold

conversations, the topics under discussion were severely restricted to the immediate present, as anything already faded to the recent past, beyond short-term memory, was no longer accessible to HM. The following is an example of a conversation recorded with H.M. following the surgery: SC: When youre not at MIT what do you do during a typical day? HM: Uhh see thats . . . I dont remember things. SC: Do you remember what you did yesterday? HM: No I dont. SC: How about this morning? HM: I dont even remember that. SC: Could you even tell me what you had for lunch today? HM: I dont know to tell you the truth. (Dawson, 1998)

Although HM at least had the short-term memory capacity to understand the questions being asked long enough to answer them, if those questions delved significantly into the past, his recollection became a lost cause. HMs neurological case study revealed that after removing specific regions of the brain, it is possible for long-term memory to become dysfunctional while short-term memory remains in tact. In other words, the brain region that long-term memory relies upon is not the same as that of short-term memory; therefore a neurological dissociation can be established between the two processes. In reference to the title of this section, this finding is only halfway to establishing a double dissociation, which is the traditional standard in cognitive science for making a conceptual distinction between cognitive processes. In HMs case, a single dissociation has indeed been found, but to round out the memory-based hypothesis we must establish a double

dissociation by demonstrating that the reverse is true. As soon as it can be demonstrated that a regionally specific brain lesion that causes short-term memory dysfunction can leave long-term memory in tact (the reverse), we can establish a double dissociation between the two processes and make a strong case for a distinction between the two concepts in psychological theory. Evidence of sub-division within the brain is theoretically compelling, but on some level it remains clear that the brain is not simply a set of isolated systems. In some way, all sub-systems work together toward an integrative and adaptive form of all output that functions in the interest of the organism similar to how a CPU (central processing unit) functions as the integrative through-point of all sub-systems of a computer. Of course theorizing about a pervasive, integrative thread that flows through an organism, and all its sub-systems, is again toward the realm of philosophy or perhaps an entropy-related law of physics; nevertheless, if there is evidence that something remains constant across brain processes that have been neurologically dissociated, like attention for example, we have reason to speak of a common thread that bridges the two, at least on some conceptual level. Natural Errors Reflecting on the cause of error has been the source of theoretical revelation in a number of academic disciplines and life in general. In History, we learn not to repeat the mistakes of our past. In computer science, we learn by correcting errors that occur in programming code. In English class, we improve our writing by correcting and understanding our errors. In life, we learn from our errors by retracing events and figuring out where we went wrong . . . It seems no matter what type of activity I am engaged in walking, running writing, keyboarding, listening, or just thinking I can somehow manage to make similar errors of thought and movement. Not because of any brain damage or general dysfunction (I think), but

because I sometimes fail to hold it all together mentally my focus, or attention, becomes lost or somehow in the wrong spot. It is as if the part of my mind whose processes have become automatic has plans of its own, and those automatic plans win out despite my own, more conscious cognitive plans and intentions. This proves especially true when there is a circumstantial lack of focus for whatever reason. Perhaps error is not the proper term here, as these instances are more a discrepancy between plans that have become automatic to my organism at an unconscious level and plans that are currently, cognitively, consciously and intentionally derived. In fact, it would be difficult to call anything an error without referring to a discrepancy between multiple intentions because all organisms ultimately have a logical sequence that in retrospect can explain outputs/decisions, whether these decisions were consciously intended or not. All things considered, this paper proposes that natural errors are at least one example of a phenomenon that remains constant across dissociated neurological processes. This is not to discredit the double-dissociation(s) of processes, per se, but rather to point out the possibility of an underlying common thread, leaving room for theoretical and experimental advances in explaining the inter-connective and isotropic properties of the brain. Ultimately, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that the function and structure of attention remains constant across neurologically dissociated processes (e.g. speech and gross motor output). Like most psychological theory with adequate external validity, this unified theory of attention (UTA) is conceptually grounded in mental experiences that are commonly recognized to occur in many people, which in this case is the occurrence of mental errors. UTAs hypotheses begin with the proposition that these errors exhibit a direct structural relationship to changes in location of attention, as pinpointed on a cognitive plan (or blueprint).

Secondly, UTA hopes to facilitate communication about the concept of attention, particularly with respect to understanding what has been labeled Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention-deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (AD/HD). It is contested that ADD is not a deficit but rather a misallocation of attentional resources. It follows that a less negative and more theoretically congruent name is proposed.

Structure & Types of Errors This Unified Theory of Attention outlines three types of errors that, while occurring via different cognitive processes, are ultimately proposed to be structurally equivalent due to the same fault in attention: Oral Language, Gross-Motor, and Graphomotor output are, in this case, examples of neurologically dissociated processes that are yet still susceptible to identical mental errors in terms of how their executions are disorderly structured. Whether the process being executed is oral language (speech), gross motor output, or the fine touch of writing, one always has a plan, or mental model, of the general sequence to be followed when executing the action. When it comes to actions as routine as speech, the planning phase is so automatized that the cognitive representation of that plan may only exist for a nearly unconscious split second prior to it being executed, leaving a seamlessly unnoticeable flow between cognitive planning and subsequent executive decisions. Moving forward, a central premise of this paper is that most, if not all, of human life is the re-enactment of a mental plan. Furthermore, our life plans exhibit the same structure, regardless of the type of cognitive function, which seats planning at the highest, most evolved level of cognition, superimposing its structure on all executive functions. Therefore, mental errors occurring across dissociated brain processes will exhibit the same structure in terms of

how that error misconstrues the plan misconstrues that are often for the sake of conservation of mental energy. Psychic energy conservation will be referred to in this paper as the CME Principle, which for psychologists interested in intelligence theory might see the connection to gtheory here. In other word, one might hypothesize that the conservation of mental energy implies that each individual is working with his or her own energy capacity, or intelligence. Of course this leaves room for any theory of multiple intelligences because the same energy capacities have the potential to be allocated toward different cognitive avenues based on personality differences or genetic strengths and weaknesses. Lastly, there is a tentative, secondary hypothesis that language in some way guides the structure of all cognitive plans, just as the grammar of ones native language organizes speech and writing. Taking ideas from Chomsky (1967), the universal grammar that is the foundation of all language acquisition can be seen as an organizing principle that gives structure to virtually all human action. Plan of Action A plan of action, in this sense, is not necessarily as explicit as someone sitting down to draft the contingency plans of a hostage negotiation. Day-to-day plans, on the other hand, require much less thought, or cognitive resources, especially if that plan has been executed countless times and is stiffly cemented in routine. Once plans have become such a routine, there is no longer a need to mull over them cognitively or analyze them step-by-step. After all, doing so would be a waste of time a waste of mental energy. It therefore makes sense that when action plans are executed on a consistent basis, there is a natural drive to have that plan become implicit so that one can conserve mental energy and ones attention can be allocated to tasks or ideas that demand more explicit cognitive resources. As a general rule, cognitions or actions that require

mental energy (or cognitive resources) are explicit or intentional, and those that require less mental energy are more implicit or routine. Often I roll out of bed, put on clothes, and brush my teeth without remembering the effort it took to complete that sequence; but I can remember the time my zipper got stuck because it threw a wrench in my routine and forced me to summon mental energy. At that point my actions suddenly needed to be explicit and effortful, which made it possible to later recall what my plan had been to get my zipper unstuck. In any case, just because a plan is implicit, subconscious, or not remembered does not mean there was no plan; it may just have been done so many times that it did not require much attention. Like memory, we often talk about attention as if we understand what it refers to, but in the reality of psychological theory attention is a concept not so easy to grasp. It is perhaps the hardest to grasp because there is no observable proof of where ones attention is at any given time here, there, or elsewhere. Although it is a common phrase to describe someones mind as elsewhere, this expression only means that we are not exactly sure where or how far away that is. We just know that it is somewhere else. There is even a symptomatic description of AD/HD, according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), as the mind appearing to be elsewhere, which begs the question: where exactly might elsewhere be? If its definition is as general as anywhere else but here, one can imagine the great difficulty of trying to locate attention because it is never constant its location is always changing. In light of this quandary the best we can do, from the standpoint of UTA, is derive location points on a given cognitive plan and locate attention in relation to those points. To locate attention in relation to points on a cognitive plan, we must first break down and understand the structure of that plan. Because many cognitive plans are largely implicit and

nearly unconscious, the best way to understand their structure is through post-error analysis. In this sense, we can learn from mental errors by indulging in the cognitive pauses they incite, allowing insight into the implicit processes of planning and attention. The word pause is emphasized here because the objective of automatic and implicit planning processes are to prevent pauses, i.e., there should no longer be a need to pause and allocate attentional resources to cognitive planning because it has become routine. It should also be noted that mental errors only give us the opportunity to pause and reflect on our implicit behaviors; meaning, of course, that reflection does not happen automatically. In fact, the errors we make on a daily basis are often discarded or laughed at, while the foundation of this paper is exactly the opposite. Automatic Transmissions With implicit versus explicit types of cognition in mind, mental errors can be described as occurring when there is a discrepancy between the two when the will of a planning principle that is well seated in routine contradicts the demands of a situation that is novel enough to need explicit cognitive re-structuring. One might reflect on the difficulty of driving an automatic transmission after many years of driving a standard transmission. Breaking at a stoplight, ones left foot might go for the clutch . . . . . . . but it isnt there! The manual clutch routine has become so powerful that, despite the novel situation, cognitive re-structuring of the relevant planning principle (driving in this case) does not occur. There is a discrepancy between a past history of implicitness and the need to be explicit in the present. Although the clutch example has its merits, this type of mental error is primarily the result of a discrepancy between a history of routine and new cognitive planning requirements, which is not always necessary to cause a mental error. In fact, routines that cannot be traced to ones history can still intrude on cognitive intentions. It becomes an issue of attention when

there is no history of routine that might conflict with the required plan of action, yet still there occurs a curious mental error. These errors-without-history are hypothesized to be the result of a dislocation of attention, which can happen for a number of reasons that fall into three main categories 1) the cognitive task requires more attention than one is energized or willing to give, or 2) the mis-location is abiding by the principle of conservation of mental energy. A general rule is that in some way it is usually both. Errors in Gross-Motor Output One evening, I was sitting in the passenger seat of a friends car as we pulled up to an ATM. It didnt take too much thinking, but I was aware that I had two things to do before exiting the car. I was needed to both unfasten my seatbelt, which was on my left, and take my wallet out, which was in my back right pocket. Of course it would be difficult to reach for my wallet with my seatbelt fastened, so the unfastening part of my plan was logically set to come first in sequence. Interestingly, as my arm reached for the seatbelt, I found it was my left arm not my right reaching across my body to unfasten my wallet? My mind had somehow combined a plan that consisted of two main actions (seatbelt and wallet) into a single action by incorporating a property of each. In this case, each of the two main actions within my original plan consisted of two parts: plane-of-reach and endpoint-of-reach (e.g. arm-across-body and seatbelt). As for the mental error, although the plane of reach was retained for unfastening my seatbelt (arm across body), the endpoint was not. For the sake of conserving mental energy, my attention was dislocated one step ahead of the plan to my wallet, removed in some type of plan combination effort. It seems as if the conservation of mental energy principle was implicitly aware that both actions involved arm movements and thus took advantage of this similarity by restructuring my cognitive plan that was not being paid enough attention. In this sense, there can

be said to be an implicit, logical compulsion that looks for ways to achieve the goals of both action plans through more efficient combination efforts, all for the sake of conserving mental energy. Notice the presence of plans-within-plans: inside the two-part plan of unfastening seatbelt and retrieving wallet, there is also an individual plan for each action, each consisting of coordinating arm movements. The two-part macroplan is more oriented toward sequence, that is, cognitively ordering the steps and execution of each microplan what comes first, next, and so on. As the number of plans-within-plans increase in terms of their level of microcosm, the sequence or brain process needed to execute that plan becomes further implicit and less conscious. As the plan increases in terms of its level of macrocosm, the plan becomes further explicit, more conscious, and of a higher order of cognition. The upper limit of macroplan order seems only bound by short-term memory, long-term memory, and the cognitive pre-disposition (personality) to macroplan. Figure 1:

*1 = Unfasten; 2 = Get Wallet ** a & b are only hypothesized to be plane of reach and endpoint of reach, as these

microplans are difficult to break down and are verging on implicit. Certainly the coordinating processes within a & b are implicit and thus not part of an intentional cognitive plan. Action 1a (plane-of-reach = across body) is combined with action 2b (endpoint = wallet) to form the new CME action of (a1, b2). As compelled by the CME Principle, dislocations of attention seem to be focused on the end-state or final action (2b) that completes all macroplans and microplans therein: they are inherently forward looking. Ironically, what the CME principle fails to realize is that these new efficient actions actually end up costing more energy, as we often have to start over following error. From this long-winded example, there are a number of conclusions that might be reached regarding the potential structure of mental error and its relation to planning and attention. First, the mental error and accompanying dislocation of attention causing the error is always in reference to the original cognitive plan that failed to be executed properly. The best we can do to locate attention is to refer to its point on the cognitive plan. Second, the specific error that was outlined involves a combination of elements from two separate actions; and because the two actions occur in sequence, the combination must include an element from opposite parts of both sequences. In other words, the combination could not involve both endpoints 1b and 2b (seatbelt and wallet) because the sequence is not logically possible, and the action would not be capable of performance. Third, one element of this combination corresponds to the point where attention became dislocated, which generates another general rule that the element at the point where attention is mislocated often becomes incorporated in the combination. Errors in Speech One of the first mental errors I logged in prelude to this paper occurred during a graduate statistics class in which my professor was explaining the advantages and disadvantages of using

multiple-choice tests as a form of assessment. At some point during the lecture my professor accidentally said multiple chest and then corrected the mistake by snickering and saying excuse me multiple choice test. In the time that was taken to say excuse me and make the correction, the mental error had raised the professors awareness to the need for increased attention to the action sequence at hand; otherwise the same mistake would be made again. Like the seatbelt/wallet example, the cognitive plan in this case can be broken into two parts 1 saying the words 1)choice and 2)test. Of course if we refer to the entire sentence being spoken as the macroplan (although the upper limit of the macroplan would still be unclear), these two words are simply isolated microplans that came to be combined. Both microplans are further decomposable into phoneme structure (e.g. ch - oice and t - est), as there is evidence that this is the functional level at which speech is planned and executed. For example, I once misspoke the word responsibility by saying, responsilibity. By transposing the L and B sounds, my error occurred at the level of the phoneme, giving evidence that in terms of cognitive planning, speech and therefore attention to speech is sequenced by phoneme. In light of this attention structure, the choice-test error can be diagramed as follows: Figure 2:

The word multiple is disregarded because it is not part of the mental error.

The most outstanding feature of the diagram is that it contains the same structure as that of the gross-motor planning example. Particularly the combination style, of substituting 2b for 1b, is evidence that the structure and dislocation of attention in relation to cognitive planning remains constant across cognitive processes that are neurologically dissociated, i.e. speech and gross motor movement. Furthermore, there is a natural drive acting as a common thread amongst these errors, which is the winning out of the compulsory CME Principle over the more explicit intentions of a cognitive plan. Besides the CME Principle, there are other factors that may contribute to errors of this nature, particularly the fluidity or ease of pronunciation when speaking. Perhaps best illustrated by so-called tongue twisters, we are more prone to speech errors when there is a lack of fluidity about what is being spoken. A skunk sat on a stump. The stump thought the skunk stunk, and the skunk thought the stump stunk. In the case of the skunk, the stump, and who stunk, there is a constant recoiling of the tongue so that the position of the tongue after speaking each word or syllable is not well set up for ease of speaking the following word or syllable.

Again, it all reverts back to the CME Principle, as a marked lack of fluidity requires more intentional restructuring 2 of tongue movements, which in turn necessitate increased mental energy. Although not to the degree of the skunk example, the choice-test error still suffers from this same lack of fluidity: The position the tongue is left in after saying OICE does not lend itself to the subsequent T-sound and ST-sound in the word test. Examine yourself and notice your tongue and lip movements when moving from OICE to TEST: not only does the tongue have to fully recoil to touch the roof of the mouth for the T-sound, but the upper lip is awkwardly tensed for the duration. At this point it is important to note that the CME Principle is not so concerned with the muscular requirements of tongue and lip movements but the attention required to successfully execute those movements. Different muscular sequences may in fact consume similar amounts of physical energy yet differ in sequential fluidity; therefore the crucial difference remains the amount of mental energy required for a successfully executed sequence. Errors in Writing The physical act of writing involves a combination of skills and neurological processes. All at once, there occurs an integration of what one is planning to write, ones knowledge of spelling, and the fine motor skills required to coordinate pen/pencil movements. Given the foundation already established by this paper in regard to speech and gross-motor errors, I will bypass the use of a diagram and give a quick example of how writing errors can be of similar structure in both purpose and combination style. While taking notes in class a few days ago, I was in the midst of writing the word discussion when I found myself subject to error. It happened during the curving motion of writing the letter c, when instead of finishing the letter properly and continuing to the letter u
Intentional restructuring is simply the awareness or attention to the direction of what is next in sequence, so in general where there is intention there is attention.
2

in the word discussion, I finished the c as if I were finishing the u. The CME Principle is so cleverly aware of similarities between components of ones current plan (e.g. the curving motions in both letters c and u), that it assumed my curving around the bottom of the c was a sufficient and efficient segway into finishing the u. So then, both individual letterplans were combined to form a single, mutated letter that looked more like a d without the extended chimney top. It is as if the underlying principle was purporting, lets get this done quickly and conserve energy by any means possible. Once again we can describe this fault of attention as forward-looking and being dislocated one step ahead of the current plan onto the letter u. Ironically, the CME Principle was imploring me to conserve energy, but I still ended up having to erase my error and expend more energy. Semantics and Associations in Mental Errors Much of the discussion surrounding the preceding diagrams and analyses have been focused on the sequence of cognitive plans. Although this might imply a linear or serial model of cognition, this is certainly not the case or the absolute contention of this paper. It is clear that sequence plays a role and is an important component in how cognitive plans are organized; however, ones decision or arrival at the proper sequence of action is not always linear or narrow-minded i.e. there can be more than one cognitive storyline. I liken this to either a game of connect-the-dots or completing a pencil maze, in which the picture or sequential solution is not immediately clear. First, one must cognitively appraise the situation and possibly mix-andmatch solutions. The ultimate goal is still the discovery of sequence, but the cognitive workbench, so to speak, used to make such a discovery is multi-dimensional and has an array of tools at its disposal. The various mental faculties having influence over the construction of

cognitive plans can seemingly arise from any associative direction; in other words, the process is inherently spatial. To give a more concrete example, I once observed a colleague of mine use of the phrase let on to believe. After noticing the phrase was a bit odd sounding, it became clear to me that there were originally two phrases in mind that were being considered for mental execution both equivalent in logic and meaning and both of which could have fulfilled the semantic intention of what was trying to be expressed. The two original phrases being considered were let on and led to believe, both implying some degree of deceit or incidental misunderstanding, depending on the context. It seemed my colleague, when constructing his speech plan, was faced with two semantic equivalents to choose between, and instead of mulling over (losing mental energy) such an ambivalent choice, the CME Principle took precedence and conjured up a healthy / clever combination. It would appear this is evidence that there exists a semantic gestalt in the human model of cognition that comes into play when planning/choosing words and phrases for speech. The semantic gestalt, as a kind of two-part schema, comprised of the two phrases equivalent in semantic content, is attempted to be retrieved for inclusion in the speech plan, only at this point there are still two different directions one could go in let on or led to believe. Going beyond semantics to any type of cognitive planning, we begin with some type of schematic 3 gestalt of what is thought to be relevant to or near a solution to a situation that requires a plan whether it be the proper sentence, the proper arm movements, or the proper letters to write and we analyze the components of that gestalt in order to pick-and-choose, mixand-match what best fits the situation both sequentially and meaningfully.

The gestalt is the schema in the sense that we retrieve it as a whole; however, there may be different types based on different content and different situations.

A strikingly similar example of note is my witnessing the use of the quasi-word pervading when trying to describe a pervasive and invading feeling. The feeling in need of description was simultaneously felt to be both pervasive and invading, yet the feeling still had a single essence or quality that was compelled to be expressed as a single word, as motivated by either the CME Principle, the individual, or both. Saying one word, of course, takes less energy than saying two. The purpose of the preceding examples was to illustrate the spatial nature of attention in relation to cognitive planning and the gradual construction of action sequence. The consequence of this spatial quality of how a mental plan is represented is that the construction of ones plan can be influenced by a variety of linguistic elements from all associative corners of the mind. When retrieving words, phrases, or ideas from memory and attempting to incorporate them into a cognitive plan, one becomes vulnerable to the erroneous intrusion of random associations and semantic congruencies related to these ideas. In other words, one might have the intention to retrieve a word/idea/element from a schema and accidentally incorporate an element associated with the one intended into the cognitive plan. For example, I once was in the midst of retrieving the name of a UConn (University of Connecticut) basketball player named Rudy Gay when I erroneously said Udy Gay. During the retrieval process, my attention was located around the schema, or gestalt, that shares the common characteristic of being associated with UConn (See Figure 3). Because my attention remained stuck and located (at least partially) on the UConn quality of the schema, I became vulnerable to the error that occurred. This dislocation was also convenient for the CME Principle because of its tendency to notice intra-cognitive similarities and the obvious/easy substitution of the U in UConn for the u in Rudy (See Figure 4). The shared quality of the schema acting as its elemental thread was the elements relation to UConn,

so my error appears to be evidencing a compulsion to express the entire gestalt (UConn) on which ones attention is located or at least the common thread that defines it. Because it takes mental energy to break the gestalt down into the elements of planning that should also abide by the laws of language, it is more likely that ones attention will remain dislocated outside the elements onto the shared quality. As a concluding general rule in regards to the spatial nature of planning and attention, the presence of a gestalt, of whatever type, always precedes its decomposition and subsequent organization into planning the sequence of a cognitive task. Figure 3 The UConn Schema/Gestalt:

Figure 4 The Udy Gay Error:

Attention Location Dysfunction When using the term deficit, whether referring to the federal budget, a food supply, or below average psychological faculties, it is implied that there is a quantitative lack of something, or the amount needed to fulfill some purpose is below standard level. Take two separate war generals, for example, one of which is suffering from a lack of soldiers following a tough battle. The other general, on the other hand, does not lack numbers, but his soldiers are disorganized, spread out, and in the wrong locations. Needless to say, it would be incorrect to call the second generals problem a soldier deficit, even though the two generals might suffer the same

consequences. Now with this distinction in mind, imagine someone with an attention deficit, forgetting any pre-conceptions about ADD. What might be characteristic of that persons behavior? I personally would imagine someone who is absent-minded, lethargic, and generally tired because a true deficit of attention would seem to resemble being tired or asleep. If you ask any parent or teacher of a child that has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, you are highly unlikely to have them describe this child as tired or lethargic, although this may sometimes be the case when ADHD is potentially comorbid or confused with Dysthymia or another Depressive Disorder. ADHD children may in fact be described as having a lack of attention, but this is most likely a figure of speech used to express that the childs attention is not located where the parent or teacher would like it to be. There is not an actual lack or deficit of attention; the childs attention is just in the wrong place at the wrong time. Including conference presentations, psychological literature, and direct conversations with teachers and parents, I have heard from numerous sources that the ADHD label over its history has been confusing. It used to be ADD, but now it is ADHD? Whats the difference? If the child is not hyperactive, does that mean he does not have ADHD? And there are subtypes of ADHD? Why is hyperactivity a sub-type if it is in the title of ADHD? And the list goes on. It is clear that at least one way teachers attempt to gain an understanding of a child is by understanding the name of the disorder with which the child is diagnosed; therefore the importance of how that name is theoretically derived and structured should not be underemphasized. If the name of the disorder is inherently flawed, or even worse unnecessarily negative our understanding of the childs difficulty will in turn be inherently flawed, as well as our communication about such between professionals and other invested

parties. In this way, the name of a mental disorder is essential for effective communication between parents, teachers, administrators, and psychologists. After thinking about the name Attention Location Dysfunction (ALD) for some time, it began to appear too general for my liking. Perhaps being overly ambitious and psychologically minded, I attempted to derive a name that would encompass something more complex and paint a clearer picture of how the dysfunction is structured. I location element I thought was essential, but I felt there was something more that needed to be illustrated about how ones attention is specifically managed an allocated to different stimuli. With this in mind, I began entertaining the names: Attention Location Dysfunction, Attention Management Dysfunction, and Attention Allocation Dysfunction. Again, the problem is not that one lacks the attentional resources; rather, those resources are mismanaged or misallocated relation to societal and educational demands. In fact, some cases of Attention Deficit Disorder might be more properly named Attention Overload Disorder, as an overload would seem capable of disrupting the allocation process. Subtypes & the DSM-IV Every subtype of ADHD in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) is laden with symptomatic descriptions that ultimately amount to dislocations of attention, yet somehow the disorder insists on being called a deficit. The inattentive type lacks close attention to detail, makes careless mistakes, and appears as if his or her mind is elsewhere. What these descriptions fail to qualify is the type of tasks during which this is true (at home versus at school is far too vague). When there is a lack of close attention to detail, is there close attention to something else, or is the child in some kind of comatose state? This question is essentially answered by another quality of the inattentive type, that is, his or her mind

is often elsewhere. In other words, the child is paying attention to something, just not what is demanded of them by whoever would like to direct their attention. Even the hyperactive-impulsive type displays these dislocations through their typical physical manifestations, as this type of child is described as often blurting out answers and having difficulty waiting their turn. Once might also call this impatience, as the child can be described as rushing to be one step ahead of the current task: their attention is dislocated forward, that is, forward looking in the same sense of as the CME Principles demonstrated tendency. Still, it is important not to disregard to role of impulsivity in the context of this subtype because impulse control is a distinct neurological process at play that may be one of the causes of dislocation. For this reason, the hyperactive-impulsive subtype is a helpful descriptor and is recommended to be unchanged in the DSM-V. On the other hand, the inattentive type is in need of clarification because it is narrowly defined in terms of what is educationally and developmentally adaptive. In this way, the childs problem can be better described as disorganization rather than a lack of attention. At this time, this paper awaits further input from petition responses to conclude what best represents the attention dysfunction called AD/HD; however, at this time, the working title of Attention Management Dysfunction will be used, along with the three emerging types: 1) Attention Management Dysfunction Disorganized Type 2) Attention Management Dysfunction Hyperactive/Impulsive Type 3) Attention Management Dysfunction Combined Type

References Chomsky, N. (1967). Transformational grammar and linguistic universals. Bobbs-Merrill Dawson, M. (1998). Understanding Cognitive Science. Blackswell Publishers: Oxford.