International Environmental Politics as Reinforcing the World Order A Case Analysis on Nuclear States and Radioactive Waste Disposal

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements in Political Science 180

By Therese Roxas BA Political Science III

I. Introduction The international system is constructed in such a way that every state maintains its sovereignty despite the interactions among and across states, transnational corporations, NGOs and international bodies. The state is the basic unit and the most important actor in international relations. For realists, no international institutions and agreements would compel or restrain a state to act in certain ways. They may enter to agreements and be bound to certain international laws but the state will always take into consideration that its actions will be in parallel to its national interests. States, therefore will never adhere to any treaties, conventions and other forms of international pacts for altruistic reasons because states are self-interested entities in nature (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 60-61). The emergence of environmental issues such as global warming and transboundary pollution that could only be countered by interstate cooperation pushed the states to enter into agreements. They do this in order to diminish the occurrence of natural disasters that may impede national interest. States, environmentalist groups and IOs convened to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases discharged per country through the Kyoto Protocol (Finus 2003, 82). States agreed to reduce the production of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that endanger the ozone layer (Ibid.). Thus, the thriving of international environmental politics. Mitchell defined international environmental politics as the study of human impacts on the environment the garner international attention and the efforts that states take to address them (Mitchell 2010, 1).

Along with these events occurring in the international scene are questions as to whether the anarchic system by which the world is ordered, is altered by the entry of international

environmental politics (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 259). Do environmental agreements that are international or regional in scope compel or constrain the states to act in certain ways? Or are international environmental agreements designed to keep the states right to self-determination? This paper argues that the international order remains to be anarchic and state-centric notwithstanding the advent of international environmental politics. Radioactive Waste Disposal as an Environmental Issue The improper dumping of radioactive wastes and a couple of nuclear accidents had caused the public to panic and be concern of the health risks and environmental damage that a nuclear industry could bring. Environmental advocates rallied on the streets to express their contempt on the improper radioactive waste management of nuclear industries in their places. The horror of Chernobyl accident, although not directly caused by improper nuclear waste disposal, only proved the dangers of careless management of nuclear processes. States had become unwilling to build radioactive waste repository sites within their territory, a manifestation of Not In My Backyard Syndrome (Bae 2005, 77). Thus, countries result to disposing residues of nuclear processes into the distant oceans. Marine areas that were mostly used as dumping sites were the Northeast Pacific, Northwest and east Atlantic, Arctic and West Pacific (Sjoblom and Linsley 1994, 15). Radioactive wastes could come from the occurrence of natural phenomena like volcanic eruption and from the natural environment like mineral springs and sand mounds. Industrial mining also extracts radioactive substances, referred to as Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORMs) such as substances present in thorium and uranium. Radioactive materials are also found on residues of nuclear programs both civilian and military. Exposure of humans

and wildlife to these hazardous matters could lead to somatic effects or those effects that could be readily seen e.g. skin disease. Effects could also be genetic in which diseases and abnormalities could pass on to descendants (Rao 2001, 1534-1538). Dumping of radioactive wastes to oceans and underground without proper storage could lead to toxic contamination thus endangering marine and terrestrial life. I. London Convention and Protocol 1972 marked the adoption of London Convention or also referred to as the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. It entered into force in 1975. The convention provides that those wastes and other materials under the black lists are explicitly prohibited while those on the grey list may be dumped when issued special permits. High-level radioactive wastes were blacklisted while medium-low level radioactive wastes fell on the grey list category (Fitzmaurice 2009, 49). In 1982, a proposal was made to include medium to low-level radioactive wastes to the blacklist group however did not reach two-thirds of the majority vote as stated in London Convention Article XV, 1a. The Contracting Parties then decided to postpone dealing with the issue until thorough study is made regarding the impacts of medium-low level wastes. It was not until 1993-- eleven long years after the proposal-- that all radioactive wastes are officially banned. According to Article I of London Convention, the Contracting Parties which are states who are signatories of the convention are given the authority to implement the provisions enumerated. To wit: Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote the effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and pledge

themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste and other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea. The Convention has also granted the right to refuse provisions to which they are not willing to be bound of. It was stated in Article XV 1a that An amendment shall enter into force for the Parties which have accepted it There were outside organizations and professionals in the scientific field who were invited to advice, evaluate and review the provisions and conduct investigations. The International Maritime Organization acquires administrative responsibility which ranges from giving advice, keep records and administer meetings. The IAEA is in-charge of classifying substances as to whether or not they belong to high-level radioactive waste category. They were also organized to conducting investigations and scientific studies. The implementation of the convention operates on self-regulation. It is important to note that there was no compliance measurement procedures stated on the Convention. To ensure and promote compliance to binding countries, the Compliance Group was organized in the London Protocol (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission 2009, 395). Countries must submit an annual report about their waste management practices and this will be assessed by the Compliance Group. The settlement of disputes and determining the liabilities of offenders of the convention shall be dealt with Contracting Parties whose actions must be in accordance to International Law. Before the International Court of Justice could settle disputes between states, the former must

voluntarily submit themselves to the court and recognize the third party to do arbitration (Cruz 1996, 207-208). The Convention was then replaced by a more restrictive agreement called London Protocol. While the former ordered that those on the black list category are prohibited and those on the grey list are allowed to be dumped after a special permit is issued, the Protocol commands that dumping all kinds of wastes are prohibited unless consented by Contracting Parties (Louka 2006, 150). II. Effectiveness of the Convention and Protocol International Law provides that treaties, conventions and any forms of agreement shall only be binding to parties who signed to it and the non-signatories are not compelled to follow the agreement as declared in the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (Cruz 1996, 172). A few nuclear countries abstained from signing the convention. China never signed the convention until 1985 while Russia became bound to the convention not until 1975. The United States, although a signatory of the Convention has not yet signed the Protocol. Provided that low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes are in the grey list category, countries dumping nuclear wastes at seas became a routine. Russia had continuously disposed radioactive wastes of all levels into the ocean of its territory, North Sea, Arctic Ocean and Japan Sea. In 1991, Greenpeace reported Russias schemes to the convention. Reprimand from the international community did not however concern Russia and continued to dump nuclear residues until 1992. A year after, Russia admitted that it had dumped high-, intermediate- and low-level radioactive wastes into the oceans in the past thirty four years. An investigation was conducted by the IAEA with the collaboration of Japan, Korea and Russia on the effects of

radioactive waste dumping by the said offender. In the end, Russia was never sanctioned nor paid for its liabilities since the result of the investigation had shown that the dumping had caused not much harm on the marine environment and marine life. It was advised that taking actions against Russia by countries would be unnecessary (Bae 2005). Moreover, when the infuriated Japan strongly criticized Russias actions, the latter exposed that Japan had also been putting away radioactive wastes in the Northeast Pacific (Bae 2005, 88).
III. Why Cant the Convention/Protocol Deal With Violators?

Voluntary Compliance The Convention and Protocol, like many other international environmental agreements, is voluntary in compliance. Treaties in general, only apply to the parties who agreed to it and their jurisdiction does not cover the non-signatory states. Moreover, privilege is also given to member states of the said Protocol and Convention. Countries that voted against an amendment of a certain provision or disagreed to a creation of a new rule, are not bound by that provision if ever passed. The reason behind the inclusion of opting-out clause is that countries may have justifiable political and economic reasons to do so. This privilege granted by the London Convention/Protocol undermines the effectiveness of the agreement. Also, a country can also withdraw from being bound by the Convention and Protocol through Article XXI provided that it must submit a six months notice in writing to a depositary, which shall promptly inform all Parties of such notice. No Sanctions

The Assurance Game hypothesizes that people will participate for a common cause only if all people see that the cause is beneficial to them. If some people perceive that they dont benefit from the public good, then the only way to cooperation is through applying force by an impartial state (Johnston 1989, 124-125). The assurance game could also be relevant to engagement of states into international agreements. States will comply with the latter only if they realize that such agreements coincide with their national interests. However, this is not always the case. Environmental interests more often than not clash with economic interests of the state. Given this situation, states must be coerced to comply with certain environmental policies. Most of international environmental laws and agreements apply carrots approach. Instead of imposing penalties such as trade restriction to offenders, they make violators turn away from their practices by teaching them alternatives to sea dumping of hazardous wastes. Only a small number of environmental agreements had instituted trade sanctions as the core of their enforcement policy and one of which is the Montreal Protocol (Zaelke, Orbuch and Housman 1993, 228). The London Protocol/Convention technically has provided no provision that enforces trade sanctions to violators. Although the Convention allows for member states to take necessary measures to prevent degradation of marine environment by dumping hazardous wastes and report any instances of dumping without special permits and incineration. The Convention had not provided an international institution to enforce the policies while this task is devolved to member states who will implement by creating and enforcing national legislations patterned out on the policies of the agreement. Violators are Powerful States

In the case of the London Protocol/Convention, the offenders identified were countries who have military capabilities and stable economy. According to Johnston, states who possess greater capabilities than others are reluctant to submit themselves to treaties, since this action would mean that these states must surrender some of its powers (Johnston 1989, 141). Applying this claim to our case, nuclear states such as Belgium, France, Japan, UK and US refused to agree to the resolution prohibiting low-level radioactive waste disposal because they have prospering nuclear industries to protect from (Louka 2006, 151-152). Adhering to the resolution would mean that these states must regulate the production of nuclear wastes and/or make more repository sites within their territories and thus creating additional burdens. Russia whose nuclear waste repository sites had been filled to its maximum capacity had no option at all because throwing radioactive wastes into the ocean would be the most efficient way of getting rid of them. Conclusion It is therefore concluded that the advent of environmental issues that are global in scale do not alter how the international system is ordered. It is in fact reinforcing the old World Order which is characterized as state-centric and anarchic. This is proven true by the noncoercive and non-compulsory nature of the London Dumping Convention/Protocol. It was designed in such a way that states have reservations of their right to self-determination. The ineffectiveness of the said international agreement in terms of enforcement further attest that the power to determine actions of the state still rest on the state itself and not to any international structures. The violator state may receive harsh judgments from the international community or even receive retributive sanctions. But if the state decides not to abide by policies that are international in scope, then the international community cannot do anything about it.

References

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