Pakistan and the Challenges of U.S.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan

June 24, 2011 | 0557 GMT Summary
The United States plans to drawdown its forces in Afghanistan, but it will be unable to successfully do so without Pakistans help in negotiating a settlement with the Afghan Taliban. However, any such negotiation on the part of Pakistan will be difficult to achieve for a host of reasons. Islamabad does not have the level of influence over the militant group as it previously did; it will have to contend with its own domestic insurgency after Western troops leave; and relations with the United States are strained and marked with mistrust. Moreover, outside players, such as Iran, have a vested interest in the outcome of the withdrawal. These problems will need to be overcome for the United States to fully realize its planned withdrawal.

Analysis
U.S. President Barack Obama has announced a plan to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. The various details of that plan will no doubt initiate debate both inside and outside Washington. One fact, however, remains: Pakistans facilitating a U.S. withdrawal through a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Taliban is and was always necessary. Relying on Pakistan, however, will be problematic for of a number of reasons. U.S.-Pakistan relations are tense and marred by distrust. Pakistan lacks the level of influence over the Afghan Taliban it once had, and Pakistan will have its own al Qaeda-backed Taliban insurgency with which to contend U.S.-Pakistani tensions over how to deal with the regions jihadist problem have led to growing mistrust and acrimony between the two sides, especially since the beginning of 2011. Tensions reached unprecedented levels after U.S. forces conducted a unilateral operation to kill al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. The announcement from U.S. President Barack Obama regarding an accelerated troop drawdown from Afghanistan thus comes at a time when U.S.-Pakistani relations are at an all time low. Complimenting this situation is the Pakistani apprehensions about how a NATO withdrawal from its western neighbor will impact Islamabads national security interests. Pakistan would like to see an exit of western forces from Afghanistan but fears that a pullout, which conflicts with Islamabads needs, can aggravate cross-border insurgencies. In other words, a withdrawal requires that the United States and Pakistan not only sort out the pre-existing problems between them, but also have a meeting of minds on how to move forward neither of which are likely to be achieved anytime soon.

Pakistans cooperation with the United States against jihadists has not led to Islamabad satisfying Washingtons expectations but has cost Islamabad in terms of its influence over the Afghan Taliban. The balancing act between facilitating the U.S. military and intelligence operations on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border and trying to refrain from taking significant action against the Afghan Taliban has placed the Pakistanis in a difficult situation between their great power ally and regional proxies. The result has been that Washington suspects Islamabad of double-dealing, and the Afghan Taliban feel betrayed by Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban has fragmented and become extremely complex over the past decade, while jihadist actors have become much more independent of the Pakistanis. They insist that Taliban linkages to Pakistan should not be mistaken for a great deal of influence on Islamabads part. We are told that the army-intelligence leadership is currently engaged in internal discussions to re-assess the extent of influence the Pakistani state has over the Afghan Islamist insurgents and whether it can truly control them during and after the drawdown. Also being considered is whether it is in Islamabads interest to rely on such untrustworthy forces, especially as their ideological leanings have been influenced by transnational jihadism. Some within the Pakistani government have an interest in highlighting these factors because they wish to see the Pakistani security establishment remain on the defensive, unable to reestablish its influence over its Afghan militant assets. Internally, Islamabad disagrees over what a post-drawdown Afghanistan will look like. Some envisage it as a threat for Pakistani security, while others perceive it as a way for Islamabad to solve its own domestic security problem and regain influence in Afghanistan. This is not just a disagreement between civilians and the military; there is disagreement within the military itself over the issue. A key factor in this regard is the Pakistani Taliban rebels, who in the past four years have created a situation where Islamabads efforts to juggle sustaining influence over the Afghan Taliban and its commitment to the United States have succumbed to the need to address its growing domestic security threat. A great deal of the Pakistani security forces efforts have been devoted to dealing with attacks from al Qaedas local allies not to mention the fact that militants have significantly penetrated Islamabads security system. Therefore, fighting the Taliban on its side of the border has made regaining influence over the Afghan Taliban all the more difficult. The U.S. move to negotiate with the Taliban will be welcomed by the Pakistanis as an opportunity to be exploited. When the Pakistanis aligned with the United States after 9/11, they thought they could wait out the United States response before returning, more or less, to the status quo. Instead, that waiting period lasted too long the Taliban spilled over into Pakistan, due in no small part to al Qaeda. Reliance on Pakistan alone will not lead to the conditions that the United States requires to be able to operationalize a withdrawal from Afghanistan, even if we assume the United States and Pakistan resolve their bilateral problems; Islamabad is able to regain a considerable amount of influence over the Afghan Taliban; and the Pakistanis brought under control their own domestic insurgency. This is because Pakistan the only player with a stake in Afghanistan.

There are many other players who have a vested interest in the drawdown Iran, Central Asian states, Russia, China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The most important of these is Iran, which has the ability to undermine any settlement with the Afghan jihadists because it maintains more influence over anti-Taliban forces, as well as elements within the Pashtun jihadist movement, than the others. The overall state of U.S.-Iranian relations could complicate U.S. drawdown efforts. Meanwhile, relations between Washington and its ally in Afghanistan, the regime of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, have plummeted since the Obama administration took office. There is growing anti-American sentiment among the opponents of the Taliban. The U.S. move to withdraw forces has had a demoralizing effect on the Karzai regime, which is increasingly looking to regional partners to secure its interests and has been increasingly reaching out to Pakistan and Iran. Elsewhere, the Afghan Taliban will be very inflexible in light of the U.S. drawing down. When the surge was announced, they were somewhat disappointed at least at the outset. Now, however, they feel they can once become achieve prominence (though Mullah Mohammad Omar and his top associates have a number of internal issues to sort through). The Taliban are willing to part ways with al Qaeda, for a price. The Pashtun jihadists would want to move from being a global terrorist entity to securing international recognition for themselves. In exchange, they will sever their relationship with al Qaeda and offer guarantees that they will not allow foreign jihadists to use Afghanistan as a base for attacks against the United States and its allies and partners. From the American point of view, doing business with Mullah Omar will be politically dangerous. STRATFOR sources say al Qaeda is aware of this and is determined to sabotage any efforts toward a negotiated settlement. While having minimal presence in Afghanistan, al Qaeda is in command of the Pakistani insurgency. Pakistani Taliban rebels and their local allies are responsible for attacks, but they are being ordered by al Qaeda. We are told that in addition to the Arab leadership, al Qaeda in Pakistan is composed of many Pakistanis who provide the transnational jihadists with a great degree of operational capability. Therefore, al Qaeda, which is closely watching the various international moves vis-a-vis an Afghan settlement, will be exploiting the various fault lines to sabotage any efforts toward a settlement. For al Qaeda, preventing a settlement is about neutralizing an existential threat and taking advantage of an opportunity in the form of the Western withdrawal and a weakened Pakistani state. The U.S. drawdown has been announced, but challenges remain. U.S.-Pakistani tensions, U.S.Afghan tensions, concerns over the Afghan Taliban and external players are but a few of the problems that will need to be overcome for the withdrawal to fully succeed and allow the United States to bring closure to the longest war in its history.

Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.