Xerxes Abadiano v.

Spouses Martir
July 31, 2008
Facts: Inocentes Banares and the heirs of his wife, Feliciana Villanueva executed an Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over Lot No. 1318. The
lot was partitioned and distributed to the following: (1) Demetrio Banares (Lot No. 1318-A), (2) Ramon and David Abadiano grandchildren of
Inocentes and Feliciana (Lot No. 1318-B) and (3) Amando Banares (Lot No. 1318-C). The partition is embodied in a notarized Deed of Partition. In 1923,
an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20641 was issued in the name of the spouses. In 1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution
of the Agreement of Partition, executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging and ratifying the document of partition. OCT No. 20641 was
administratively reconstituted in 1962 and in lieu thereof, OCT No. RO-8211 was issued over Lot No. 1318, still in the name of the spouses. The
Agreement of Partition and the Deed of Confirmation were annotated at the back of the OCT. In 1957, Demetrio sold his share to his son Leopoldo. The
latter then filed a petition praying for confirmation of the Agreement and the Deed of Confirmation and the Deed of Sale between him and his father,
and for the issuance of a new title over the property. The Court ordered the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of Leopoldo,
Amando, and Ramon and David. Petitioner insists that this is the valid and subsisting title over the property and there was no other sale to anyone.
Respondents allege however that prior to the issuance of the TCT, Ramon for himself and on behalf of David, had already sold their rights and interests
over Lot No. 1318-C to Victor Garde, as evidenced by a notarized document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922. They further allege that from
the time of sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were in continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and occupation in the concept of an
owner of the Lot. Victors heirs sold the same to Jose Garde who in turn sold it to Lolita Martir in 1979. Alleging that the Abadianos entered the
property and harvested sugarcane from it, the spouses filed an Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages in 1982. The trial
court ruled for the Martirs, holding that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property for 60 years and the
Abadianos therefore were guilty of laches. CA affirmed. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: WON the petitioner is guilty of laches.
Held: No. Under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right
to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches. Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party. The four basic elements are: 1) conduct on the part of
the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; 2)
delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute suit; 3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and 4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be
barred. Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in the name of his predecessor in interest, continued to be theirs,
especially considering that the annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. That the petitioner and his coheirs waited until the death of
Amando to try and occupy the land is understandable since any action may sow dissent within the family. In determining whether a delay in seeking to
enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties is an important circumstance for consideration, a
delay under such circumstances not being so strictly regarded as where the parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly
applied between near relatives, and the fact that parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay.
In addition, several other factors militate against the finding of laches on the part of the petitioner: a) no annotation was made of Compra Y Venta on
the OCT or the TCT; b)neither respondents nor any of their predecessors in interest participated in any of the proceedings for the issuance of the OCT
or the TCT; and c) the TCT bears out that the fact that the purported Compra Y Venta was annotated thereon only in 1982. It is most telling that
respondents, have themselves failed to have the same property transferred in their name or even only to have the sale annotated on the title of the
property.





De La Cruz vs. Dimaano
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., Dolores L. Dela Cruz, Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L. Faustino, Jorge V.
Legaspi, and Juanito V. Legaspi alleged that on July 16, 2004, respondent notarized a document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate
with Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro. Complainants further alleged that: (1) their signatures in this
document were forged; (2) they did not appear and acknowledge the document on July 16, 2004 before respondent, as notarizing officer; and (3) their
purported community tax certificates indicated in the document were not theirs.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when he made it
appear, among other things, that complainants "personally came and appeared before him" and that they affixed their signatures on the document in
his presence. In the process, complainants added, respondent effectively enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full ownership of their deceased
parents property in Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-303936 and sell the same to the Department of Public
Works and Highways.
In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation of the document in question, but admitted having indeed notarized it. He
explained that "he notarized [the] document in good faith relying on the representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the
community tax certificates appearing in the document were true and correct." Navarro would not, according to respondent, lie to him having known,
and being neighbors of, each other for 30 years. Finally, respondent disclaimed liability for any damage or injury considering that the falsified document
had been revoked and canceled.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner of the Office of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), found the following as established: (1) the questioned document bore the signatures and community tax certificates of, and purports to have
been executed by, complainants and Navarro; (2) respondent indeed notarized the questioned document on July 16, 2004; (3) complainants did not
appear and acknowledge the document before respondent on July 16, 2004; (4) respondent notarized the questioned document only on Navarros
representation that the signatures appearing and community tax certificates were true and correct; and (5) respondent did not ascertain if the
purported signatures of each of the complainants appearing in the document belonged to them.
For the stated infraction, the Commission recommended, conformably with the Courts ruling in Gonzales v. Ramos,
1
that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year; that his notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked; and that he be disqualified for reappointment as
notary public for two (2) years. On September 28, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-147, adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Commission.
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act or deed.
3
Furthermore, notaries public are required
by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented before the notaries public the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of certification.
4
Rule II, Sec. 12 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
5
now requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.-The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual, such as
but not limited to, passport, drivers license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police
clearance, postal ID, voters ID, Barangay certification, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card,
Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19,
2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the
notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
One last note. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. It must be remembered that notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts
a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
6
A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic
requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public on notorized documents will be eroded.
REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years and SUSPENDED

Camcam vs. CA

Petitioner Leonor Camcam (Leonor) and her husband Laureano Salvador (Laureano) were the registered owners of two parcels of land. Laureano died
intestate. He was survived by his wife-petitioner Leonor; his brothers Agapito and petitioners Jose and Fortunato, all surnamed Salvador; and the heirs
of his deceased brother Luis Salvador (Luis), namely, petitioners Virginia, Gloria, Florendo, Delfin, Rodrigo, Eleuterio, Narciso, Onofre, Zenaida, and
Aurelia, all surnamed Salvador. Leonor, together with her brothers-in-law Agapito, Jose, Fortunato, and Luis' heirs, filed before the RTC for annulment
of the following documents executed by Leonor in Frias' favor covering Lot Nos. 19554 and 18738:
1. November 4, 1982 Deed of Adjudication with Sale of the entire Lot No. 19554 and of Lot No. 18738, for a P11,000 consideration signed by
Leonor
2. November 4, 1982 Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of "ONE-HALF portion EACH [of the two lots] together with [Leonor's] conjugal
share of ONE-HALF EACH of the [two lots] with all the improvements thereon" for a P45,000 consideration, signed by Leonor
3. November 23, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale of the other half of Lot No. 18738, for a consideration of P3,000, signed by Leonor
In November 1982, Frias offered to purchase the two lots from Leonor. Leonor, however, was only willing to enter into a sale with right of repurchase
within five years. Frias agreed to Leonor's condition but he deceived her into signing the Deed of Adjudication-Exhibit "B"/"1," after which he paid her
P9,000 out of the P11,000 consideration, he promising that he would settle the balance of P2,000 before the end of the month.
In the latter part of November 1982, Frias, instead of delivering the balance of P2,000, again deceived Leonor into signing another document, the Deed
of Absolute Sale-Exhibit "C"/"2," he telling her that since two lots were involved, she had to sign another instrument pertaining to the other lot.
Upon verification with Rodolfo Acosta (Acosta), the notary public who notarized Exhibits "B"/"1" and "C"/"2," petitioners discovered that the deeds
Leonor signed transferred ownership of the entire area covering the two lots. They also, upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds at Lingayen,
discovered that Original Certificate of Title Nos. 11634
[5]
and 12027
[6]
in the name of Leonor and her husband covering the two lots were cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 143752
[7]
and 143753
[8]
were in their stead issued in Frias' name. Further, they discovered that Frias registered the
document-Exhibit "A"/"3," which had the same date and notarial details as those of Exhibit "B"/"1."
Petitioners alleged that assuming that the documents are valid, it is void with respect to the shares of Leonor's co-heirs-co-petitioners as they were
conveyed without their knowledge and participation.
Frias:
Leonor inherited the two lots, to the exclusion of her co-petitioners, under the old Civil Code

and it was she who convinced him to buy them.
Leonor later changed her mind and was willing to sell only the whole of the residential land, Lot No. 19554, and of the mango and coconut land, Lot
No. 18739,
[12]
as she was giving her brothers-in-law two weeks to buy the remaining portion thereof,
[13]
hence, he and Leonor forged Exhibit
"B"/"1." Leonor later informed him that her brothers-in-law could not buy the remaining portion of Lot No. 18739, hence, he and Leonor forged
Exhibit
After the execution of the two documents, Frias brought them to the Municipal Building to pay taxes. When asked by an employee of the then-Ministry
of Agrarian Reform how much he paid for the lots, Frias confessed to not having indicated the correct consideration on the documents because he
wanted to "escape" paying taxes such as capital gains taxes. On being informed of the consequences of not reflecting the true consideration of the two
lots in the documents, he had the third document, Exhibit "A"/"3," prepared which, after explaining to Leonor the reason beyond the necessity
therefor, she signed in notary public Acosta's office.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the trial court, Leonor's brother-in-law Agapito died and was substituted by his heirs, namely
petitioners Teofila, Felicidad, Mercedes, Lydia, Alfredo, Bienvenido, Efren, Lilia, Erlinda, Melinda, Marylou, and Meriam, all surnamed Salvador.

Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner Leonor Camcam regularly sold her one-half portion in the two parcels of land in favor of private
respondent Arcadio Frias, however, considering the preferential right of the other petitioners, who are admittedly the owners of the other half portion
in said parcels of land, and considering further the attendant circumstances of this case, as discussed above, the petitioners, with the exception of
petitioner Leonor Camcam, should be allowed to jointly exercise their right of redemption, the consideration of which shall proportionately be based
on that Deed (Annex "B" or Exh. "B"/"1") which was published in the newspaper.
[28]
(Underscoring supplied)
The petition is bereft of merit.

Without passing on the merits of Frias' claim that Leonor originally sold to him of Lot No. 18739 as reflected in the first November 4, 1982
document but later conveyed the remaining thereof, hence, the execution of the second document bearing the same date, an irregular notarization
merely reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which requires proof of its due execution and authenticity to be
admissible as evidence.
[29]
The irregular notarization - or, for that matter, the lack of notarization - does not thus necessarily affect the validity of the
contract reflected in the document. Tigno v. Aquino
[30]
enlightens:
x x x [F]rom a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of theDeed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction evidenced therein.
Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a
public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been
uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for
convenience. We have even affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid
and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces effects between the
parties.
[31]
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners alleged fraud on Frias' part, hence, they had the burden of establishing the same by clear and convincing evidence.
[32]
This they failed to
discharge.
By Leonor's account, she signed the three documents relying on Frias' word that they were deeds of "mortgage," and she did not read them because
she "[did] not know how to read,"
[33]
When asked, however, on cross-examination about her educational attainment, Leonor answered that she
finished the third year of a nursing course at San Juan de Dios Hospital.
[34]


Clarifying her statement that she did not know how to read, Leonor explained that she knew how to read but her eyesight was blurred.
[35]
Leonor's
granddaughter-witness Gertrudes Calpo (Gertrudes) who signed as witness in Exhibit "B"/"1" declared, however, that she read the contents of Exhibit
"B"/"1" to Leonor,
[36]
thus belying petitioners' claim that Leonor signed the same without knowing its true contents.
As for Exhibit "A"/"3" which petitioners maintain is spurious, Leonor's signature therein being allegedly forged,
[37]
Leonor herself admitted having
signed the same,
[38]
and this was corroborated by Gertrudes.
[39]

As for Leonor's co-petitioners' invocation of their right of redemption of the share of Leonor in the lots sold to Frias, points of law, theories, issues of
fact, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ordinarily are not considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.
[40]
Besides, given that petitioners already knew of the sale as early as 1983, they are guilty of laches, having raised their right of
redemption for the first time in 2000 when they filed the present petition.
[41]

At all events, even assuming that the invocation by Leonor's co-petitioners of their right of redemption was timely made, it cannot be considered a
valid exercise thereof as it was not accompanied by a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price.
[42]

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED.
St Luis University vs. De la cruz
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge
Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan.
On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently annulled for being bigamous. On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that
respondent deliberately subscribed and notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondents
notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification
1
dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio
City, to the effect that respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997.
Respondent performed acts of notarization
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following
recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He
was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.
29
In line with this philosophy, we find that a
penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not
commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-1997 after his commission as notary public had expired,
respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged
that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document
into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.
30

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a
lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do so as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also
x x x the crime of falsification of public documents."
31

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such commission is
a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when
he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates
Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,
32
a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized five documents after his commission as Notary Public
had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in
said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14)
documents
33
without the requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school
student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an
Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged
illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of
innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his
commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
Heck vs. Santos
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined
therefor? This is the novel issue presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E.
Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
[31]
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.
[32]

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality.
[33]
The Court has
characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents.
[34]
For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.
[35]

In the case of Nunga v. Viray,
[36]
the Court had the occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to
obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents
and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
[37]

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public
documents is at stake in every aspect of that function.
[38]

The respondent did not object to the complainants formal offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis
of the pleadings filed.
[39]
Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first
certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer that there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de
Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register. Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent presented no
evidence of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register.
[40]

The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him.
[41]

The respondents allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby,
is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor which include the
statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138
[42]
of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which
citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences.
[43]

Respondents Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.
[52]
By his actuations, the respondent
failed to live up to such standards;
[53]
he undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. The respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
[54]
In representing that he was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent also
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls
for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
[55]
Furthermore, a tempering of justice is
mandated in this case, considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained
of;
[56]
that there was no private offended party who came forward and claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents so notarized by the
respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits.
[57]
The
Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
Aquino vs. Pascua
Aquino falsified two documents. (1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as
"Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998". (2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-
Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998. Father
Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the
above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and
that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998. In his comment on the letter-complaint dated
September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial
Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment. The affidavit-complaints referred to
in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the
other above-named complainants. They filed with this Court a "Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondent's Comment." They maintain that
Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.
1
On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.
2
After a close
review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty.
Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda
and Remigio B. Domingo. "Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.
4
The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.
5
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct
committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,
6
wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute
Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes misconduct" and thus imposed upon him
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,
7
we
revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial Law in
not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,
8
however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension
from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized. In the present case,
considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in
order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
Santuyo vs. Hildalgo
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,
[1]
spouses Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A.
Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly
notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant
spouses averred that about six years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land. The
case was estafa through falsification of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed
of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said deed.
[2]
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed
deed of sale contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an impression of respondents notarial dry seal. Not being
persons who were learned in the technicalities surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have forged the signature of herein
respondent. They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have made any imprint of respondents seal or
signature on the subject deed of sale or elsewhere.
[3]
In his answer
[4]
to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied having
notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed property. According to respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob
Law Office where he was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several documents in that office, these,
however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior
lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law firm,
by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent added that he
normally required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary
public. He would have remembered complainants had they actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he
said he met the latters husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he purportedly notarized the
deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the strokes
were smooth and mild. He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on
December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the secretaries, with the
concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report
[5]
it submitted
to the Court, the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was different from his signatures in other documents he
submitted during the investigation of the present case.
[6]
However, it ruled that respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office
secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register.
[7]
It thus recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondents commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if
he is commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof.
[8]

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically state that they appeared before respondent to have
the deed of sale notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the document and that it was not
a forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were
sure of was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed the signature of
respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention that he only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged
notarization of the deed of sale. Respondents assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on November 17,
2001
[9]
wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the
two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted
that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of
his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary
public.For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility
that even the respondents signature which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the
case herein As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make
the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody else.
[10]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties as notary public and is
hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an
appointment as a notary public for a period of two years from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would
be dealt with more severely.

Claro vs. Silva
1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 of the Registry of Deeds for xxx Metro Manila District III over a parcel of land (Lot 42, Block 10, of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-210217, Sheet 2, being a portion of Lot 903, Malinta Estate, LRC Record No. 5941) situated in xxx Barrio of Parada,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, containing an area of 216 square meters, more or less, was registered in the names of Spouses Berlina F. Silva and Pedro M.
Silva on August 14, 1980;
2. That on March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina F. Silva, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly
executed on November 18, 1987 by Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista; and
3. That as a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988.
11

Based on the evidence presented, the RTC also found that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) as that of Berlina Silva is a
forgery, and that consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlina.
12

The RTC rendered judgment on January 10, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1988 executed by Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Berlina F. Silva, in favor of
defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista over the parcel of land, described and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 Metro
Manila District III, null and void and the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of Valenzuela Registry in the name of Spouses Claro Bautista
and Nida Bautista cancelled and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 reinstated.
2. Ordering defendants to reconvey the property covered by the said Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 together with the improvements thereon
to the plaintiff.
3. Condemning the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 in the concept of reasonable attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
Defendants' counterclaim is dismissed.
Judgment on default is hereby entered in favor of the third-party plaintiffs Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista against third-party defendants
Pedro M. Silva, condemning the third-party defendant Pedro Silva to indemnify/pay third-party plaintiffs Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista the
amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) the contract price of the sale of the property, with interest at the legal rate from the date of the
execution of the said document on March 3, 1988 until the amount is fully paid and for whatever amount that the thirdparty plaintiffs were adjudged
and paid to the plaintiff by reason of this decision and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
13

Spouses Bautista filed an appeal with the CA which, in its November 21, 2001 Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC decision;
14
and, in a Resolution
dated February 27, 2003, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
15

Hence, the herein petition filed by Spouses Bautista praying that the CA Decision and Resolution be annulled and set aside on the following grounds:
I. Respondent as represented by Hermes Dorado in his capacity as attorney-in-fact has no legal authority to file action against spouses petitioners.
II. The petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for value having relied upon a Special Power of Attorney which appears legal, valid
and genuine on its face.
III. Gratia argumenti that the special power of attorney is a forgery and the deed of sale executed by the husband is null and void, the nullity [thereof]
does not include the one half share of the husband.
16

The petition fails for lack of merit.
As to the first ground, petitioners argue that for lack of authority of Dorado to represent respondent, the latter's Complaint failed to state a cause of
action and should have been dismissed.
17

The argument holds no water.True, there was no written authority for Dorado to represent respondent in the filing of her Complaint. However, no
written authorization of Dorado was needed because the Complaint was actually filed by respondent, and not merely through Dorado as her attorney-
in-fact. As correctly observed by the CA, respondent herself signed the verification attached to the Complaint.
18
She stated therein that she is the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 and that she caused the preparation of the Complaint.
19
Respondent also personally testified on the facts alleged in
her Complaint.
20
In reality, respondent acted for and by herself, and not through any representative, when she filed the Complaint. Therefore,
respondent being the real party in interest, by virtue of the then prevailing Articles 166
21
and 173
22
of the Civil Code, the Complaint she filed sufficiently
stated a cause of action. The sufficiency of the Complaint was not affected by the inclusion of Dorado as party representative for this was an obvious
error which, under Section 11 of Rule 3,
23
is not a ground for dismissal, as it may be corrected by the court, on its own initiative and at any stage of the
action, by dropping such party from the complaint
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they were buying the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has
a defective notarial acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere photocopy
56
and we are not convinced that there ever was an original copy of said SPA as it
was only this photocopy that was testified to by petitioner Nida Bautista and offered into evidence by her counsel.
57
We emphasize this fact because it
was actually this photocopy that was relied upon by petitioners before they entered into the deed of sale with Pedro. As admitted to by petitioner Nida
Bautista, upon inspection of the photocopy of the SPA, they gave Pedro an advanced payment of Php55,000.00; this signifies that, without further
investigation on the SPA, petitioners had agreed to buy the subject property from Pedro.But then said photocopy of the SPA contains no notarial seal. A
notarial seal is a mark, image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary public has officially signed it.
58
There being no notarial
seal, the signature of the notary public on the notarial certificate was therefore incomplete. The notarial certificate being deficient, it was as if the
notarial acknowledgment was unsigned. The photocopy of the SPA has no notarial acknowledgment to speak of. It was a mere private document which
petitioners cannot foist as a banner of good faith. All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied on the photocopy of
the SPA as this turned out to be a mere private document. They should have adduced more evidence that they looked beyond it. They did not. Instead,
they took no precautions at all. They verified with Atty. Lucero whether the SPA was authentic but then the latter was not the notary public who
prepared the document. Worse, they purposely failed to inquire who was the notary public who prepared the SPA. Finally, petitioners conducted the
transaction in haste. It took them all but three days or from March 2 to 4, 1988 to enter into the deed of sale, notwithstanding the restriction on the
capacity to sell of Pedro.
59
In no way then may petitioners qualify as buyers for value in good faith. That said, we come to the third issue on whether
petitioners may retain the portion of Pedro Silva in the subject property. Certainly not. It is well-settled that the nullity of the sale of conjugal property
contracted by the husband without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife. DENIED.
Lopena vs Cabatos

Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos (respondent) was administratively charged
[1]
by Judge Gervacio A. Lopena (complainant) of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Tagbilaran-Clarin, Bohol of SERIOUS BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS and GRAVE MISCONDUCT allegedly committed as follows:
1) Respondent knowingly falsified a Deed of Donation
[2]
purportedly executed by one Crispina Panis by notarizing the same on June 24, 1981
when the donor had died on January 15, 1981, and
2) Respondent showed a grave disrespect to the courts and the administration of justice by holding, together with his followers, a parade/rally
on September 21, 1984 around the principal streets of Tagbilaran City, directed against complainant who had convicted respondents close relatives in
three criminal cases and denied the applications for probation of two of the convicts.
Acting on this Courts Resolution of February 14, 1990,
[3]
respondent submitted his COMMENT, by letter of April 19, 1990,
[4]
claiming that he had
been away from his place of birth, Panaytayon, Tubigon, Bohol since 1958, hence, when he notarized the questioned deed of donation, he really did
not recognize the person of Cristina Panis, but he was led by one Gregorio Ricafort to believe that the old woman before him at the time was the said
Crispina Panis.
Respondent informed that his notarization of the questioned document in fact resulted to his indictment in court for reckless imprudence
resulting in falsification of public document, which case was pending trial.
As for the charge of having conducted a rally/parade, respondent claimed that the same was staged by PDP Laban and BAYAN of Bohol as a protest
against complainant who showed bias in presiding over the trial of the criminal cases against members of the Cabatos family and disregarding the
evidence in convicting them.
In view of the failure of the complainant to substantiate his serious charges against the respondent, it is respectfully recommended that this charge for
disbarment be dismissed. There is no question that the complainant waived his right to present his evidence despite the opportunity given him by this
Commission and in effect deprived the respondent the right to confront him and his witnesses.
However, this Commission would like to point out that there is no issue that respondent Atty. Cabatos did not exercise that degree of diligence
required of him as a Notary Public.
That respondent was, if true, exonerated from the criminal case filed against him in connection with his notarization of the questioned document
does not exonerate him from the present administrative case.
Nor does, if respondents information in his Motion to Dismiss
[25]
is true, that the person who had been instructed by Ricafort to affix the
signature of Crispina Panis was the latters daughter exonerate him. By such information, he in fact impliedly admits that the document had already
been signed when it was brought to him for notarization.
That a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents of the truth of what are stated therein bears reiterating. On pain of sounding like a broken record, this
Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of the injunction is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party in this case Crispina Panis and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act of deed.
[26]

Respondent having thus failed to faithfully discharge his sacred duties as a notary public, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for a period of One (1) Year is in order.
As for the charge against respondent of showing grave disrespect to the courts and the administration of justice by holding a parade/rally,
along with his followers, during which he imputed bias to complainant whom he branded as worse than President Marcos, it has not been sufficiently
substantiated.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent, Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is hereby DISQUALIFIED
to be commissioned as a notary public for a period of One (1) Year, and WARNED that a similar violation by him shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the country, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let this Resolution be also made of record in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

PANTOJA-MUMAR vs. Flores
Complainant is one of the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. It appears that respondent had prepared an Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale
1
for her and 11 other co-heirs covering a three-hectare property in Pangdan, Cambanay, Danao City. The deed was executed in favor of
the spouses Filomena and Edilberto Perez, who were later able to secure a torrens title
2
over the property under their names.
In the verified Complaint
3
dated March 17, 2001, complainant alleged that respondent had prepared the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale
dated December 29, 1987, but averred that the transaction did not push through, and the deed was not notarized. She further narrated, thus:
8. [Respondent], knowing fully well that there actually was no transaction between the Pantojas and the Perezes, notarized the same
document apparently in violation of his oath as a lawyer and a breach of his duty as a notary public. Worst was the fact that [the] spouses
Perez and the respondent had the document thumbmarked by [a person other than] Maximina Pantoja as appearing above in the same
typewritten name. Attached is an enlarged Machine Copy of Maximina Pantojas true and genuine thumbmark as Annex "C" while an
enlarged machine copy of the thumbmark appearing above her typewritten name in the said document is attached as Annex "D" for
comparison;
9. Moreover, the respondent x x x made it appear in the falsified/fabricated and forged document that the same was acknowledged before
him on December 29, 1987, when in truth and in fact, he and [the] spouses Perez prepared, falsified, fabricated and forged the said document
after June 13, 1988, when they were able to fraudulently secure the first page thereof from Lucresia P. Awe, not to mention the fact that
neither of the parties to the said document appeared before him as required under the notarial law. This is supported by the written
declaration of [the] spouses Perez dated June 25, 1988 that they bought the property on June 13, 1988 for P40,000.00, a photocopy of which
is attached as Annex "E" hereof.
10. On the basis of such falsified, fabricated and forged document denominated as Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale, [the] spouses
Perez with the help of respondent attorney, were able to effect the issuance of a title over the above-described property in their names to
the damage and prejudice of complainant and the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. Attached as Annex "F" is a photocopy of the
title;
4

Respondent denies the charges against him. His version of what transpired during the signing and notarization of the document is as follows:
9. x x x [D]uring the signing of the document at the ancestral home of the Pantojas on December 29, 1987, by surviving spouse Celedonia
Lumen Pantoja and all the children (except Mrs. Mumar), the respondent called the attention of Mrs. Pantoja to the fact that Mrs. Mumar
was not a signatory to the document because she was absent. Mrs. Pantoja pleaded with the respondent to proceed with the notarization of
the document because she badly needed the money. She promised to have the document signed by Mrs. Mumar as soon as she would come
to Danao City;
10. But Mrs. Pantoja did not make good her promise. So, on February 24, 1989, Edilberto Perez (vendee) sent a registered letter to Mrs. Chita
P. Mumar at her address at Talibon, Bohol, informing her of the sale of their 3.3526 hectare property located in Pandan, Cambanay, Danao
City, covered by Tax Dec. 008-0895, a copy of the letter is hereto attached as Annex "F." The letter was received by her son Odelio Mumar on
March 2, 1989, per postal registry return card hereto attached as Annex "G";
11. Obviously, as early as March 2, 1989, complainant Mumar already knew of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale. Therefore, her
right of action, whether civil, criminal or administrative, is barred by prescription. She is also guilty of laches in failing to assert her right for an
unreasonable length of time;
12. Lastly, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale was published in the Sun Star Daily, a newspaper of general circulation in the cities and
province of Cebu in its issues of March 18, 23 and 31, 1989, as shown by an Affidavit of Publication by its Editor-in-Chief Pacheco Seares, a
copy of said affidavit is hereto attached as Annex "H."
5


It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is
converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution.
10
Indeed, a notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the
elementary formalities in the performance of their duties.
11
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would
be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
12
A notary public is duty-bound to require
the person executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely
executed the same.
13

Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that all the vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein, respondent undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with
great caution for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand,
suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired.
15
Considering that this is the respondents first administrative offense, the Court modifies the
IBPs recommendation of a two-year suspension from the practice of law to one year.
16

The Court also finds it unnecessary to discuss the other matters raised by the parties, since they involve the merits of Civil Case No. DNA-574, best left
for the trial court to decide.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Januario C. Flores is GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial
commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years. He is,
likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to
enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
SO ORDERED.
SICAT V ARIOLA, JR.
PER CURIAM; April 15, 2005
NATURE
Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
FACTS
- In an affidavit-complaint, complainat Arturo Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio
Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood
in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney(SPA) purportedly executed by one Juanito C. Benitez According to
complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on
October 25, 2000.
- He alleged that prior to notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management,
represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses(project worth=11M). For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta
issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of 3.7M, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The
check was received and cashed by the the latter by virtue of the SPA notarized by Ariola.
Respondents' Comments
- Respondent explained that as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January
4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed
a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Therefore, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it.
- Moreover, the suit should be dismissed for forum shopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Which complaints were dismissed because the assailed act referred to violation of the IRR of the Commission on Audit.
- The Court, in its resolution dated March 12, 2003, referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP recommended that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.

ISSUES
WON acts of respondent amounted to a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD
Ratio The act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
prohibits engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct..
Reasoning The undisputed facts show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. The notarial acknowledgment of respondent declared that Benitez
appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his clear and voluntary act. Clearly respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated
an untruthful statement.
- Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability.
His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on
the truthfulness of every notarial act.
Disposition WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate
attention of the Ombudsman.

Bautista vs. Bernabe
In a Complaint
1
filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004, complainant
Victorina Bautista
2
prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct in the
performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay
3
purportedly executed by Donato Salonga
and complainants mother, Basilia de la Cruz.
4
Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by
Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on January 3,
1998 because she has been dead since January 28, 1961.
5

In his Answer,
6
respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilias death. He alleged that
before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilias presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of
Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no forgery
since the signature appearing on top of Basilias name was the signature of Pronebo.
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation
7
attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance
8
of complainant which reads in part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga
sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng Integrated
Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng kanyang Abogado
na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong si Abogado
SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa
nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner
9
recommended that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal profession for one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked; and
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year.
10

In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and his notarial commission be revoked and that
he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998. Respondents alleged lack
of knowledge of Basilias death does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the personal appearance of the affiant before affixing his notarial seal
and signature on the instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
11

Respondents act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01,
12
Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
13
By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia
personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed
the document. Respondents conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that
our courts and the public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function
as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the law.
14

Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of which they have personal knowledge. They
should swear to the document personally and not through any representative. Otherwise, their representatives name should appear in the said
documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only time the representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary
public for notarization of the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear
before the notary public to acknowledge the document.
15

Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice.
16

We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,
17
respondent lawyer was found
guilty of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial commission was revoked and he was
disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 2
18
of complainants affidavit of desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized
herSinumpaang Salaysay
19
dated November 12, 2004 which was attached to the complaint filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
without requiring her to personally appear before him in violation of the Notarial Law. This allegation must likewise be investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe,
is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He
is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin
notarized theSinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004 without requiring the latters personal appearance.lavvph!1.net
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a
copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
Velasco vs. Doroin
On June 21, 1999, the Court's Second Division required the respondent lawyers to comment on the complaint within (10) days from notice.
[2]

On August 24, 1999, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, counsel for respondents, filed a Motion for Extension to File Comment praying that an extension of sixty (60)
days from August 16, 1999 be given to them to file their comment.
[3]

On October 4, 1999, the Court granted the Motion for Extension with a warning that the same shall be the last and no further extension will be given.
[4]

The respondent lawyers failed to file their comment.
On June 20, 2001, the Court ordered respondent lawyers and their counsel to show cause why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution requiring the comment. Copies of the resolution dated June 20, 2001 were returned
unserved from Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno with notations "party out/unknown at/party moved out" and "moved out." Atty. Doroin received the said
resolution on July 27, 2001.
[5]

On April 17, 2002, complainant was required to submit the correct addresses of Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno, while Atty. Charlie Doroin was fined Php
500.00 for failure to comply with the show cause resolution dated June 20, 2001 and was ordered to submit his comment.
[6]

Complainant failed to comply with the directive of the Court.
On July 23, 2003, the Court required the complainant to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for her non-compliance with the
said directive and to submit her compliance within ten (10) days from notice. In the same resolution, the fine imposed on Atty. Charlie Doroin was
increased from Php 500.00 to Php 1,000.00 for his failure to file his comment on the complaint as required by the Court, or to suffer imprisonment of
five (5) days in case he fails to pay and to submit his comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.
[7]

In a report dated August 2, 2004, the Clerk of Court informed the Court that respondent Atty. Doroin paid the fine of Php 1,000.00. However, Atty.
Doroin still failed to submit the comment on the administrative complaint required of him and has not complied with the show cause resolution dated
April 17, 2002 by submitting the correct addresses of Atty. Quintin P. Alcid and respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.
[8]

In a Manifestation submitted June 23, 2005, the complainant submitted the addresses of Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno as well as a
copy of a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Mr. Juanito C. Perez to prosecute the instant case.
[9]

On July 27, 2005, the Court issued a resolution noting the compliance of the complainant as well as the latter's manifestation and referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the record.
[10]

On October 3, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing to the parties to the case scheduled on October 26, 2005 with a strict note that "[n]on-appearance by any of the parties shall be
deemed a waiver of their right to participate in further proceedings."
[11]

On October 26, 2005, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complainant, together with his counsel Atty. Andres Villaruel, Jr. appeared. As
respondents Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno had not filed their comment, they were directed to submit it within (10) days from receipt
of notice. The hearing of the case was reset on November 30, 2005.
[12]

On November 30, 2005, again, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complaint, together with his counsel, Atty. Villaruel, appeared. The
notices sent to respondents were returned to the Commission on Bar Discipline with a notation "RTS-Moved." As respondents had not filed their
comment on the complaint, they were declared in default. In an Order dated November 30, 2005, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala submitted
her report and recommendation, viz.
[13]

The Commission on Bar Discipline reported that:
In her Affidavit-Complaint, complaint alleged that she was appointed as Administratrix in Special Proceedings Case No. Q-96-27628 pending
consideration before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 87, entitled "In the matter of the Settlement of the Estate of the Late Eduardo
Doroin, Monina E. Doroin, petitioner." The deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died on 21 January 1996, in Papua New Guinea. In this Special Proceedings case,
respondents were collaborating counsels for Oppositor, Josephine Abarquez.
On 21 March 1996, Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful means into making her sign an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Partition,
allotting complainant the sum of P1,216,078.00 giving the paramour of complainant's father, Josephine Abarquez, the share of P7,296,468.00 and also
allotting complainant's two (2) alleged illegitimate brothers and an alleged illegitimate sister, a similar sum of P1,216,075.00 each alleging that such
sharing is in accordance with law. But no share was assigned to complainant's mother, who was the legal wife of Dr. Eduardo Doroin.
To partially satisfy complainant's share of Php 1,216,078.00, Atty. Doroin required complainant to sign a paper which was an alleged Confirmation of
Authority to Sell the property of complainant's father located at Kingspoint subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 34885,
Complainant told Atty. Doroin that she will first consult a lawyer regarding the legality of the said Confirmation of Authority to Sell before she signs the
same. Eventually, she was not able to sign the said Confirmation because complainant's lawyer, Atty. Marapao, failed to confer and negotiate with Atty.
Doroin regarding the same.
When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there was no house constructed thereon, but when she
visited it again on January 1999, there was already a four-door townhouse constructed. Complainant was informed by the caretaker at the site that the
owner is one Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura. Complainant also learned later on that the property, which was one of the properties submitted to the Court
handling the Special Proceedings case in the Inventory of Property dated 3 April 1996, was sold by Atty. Doroin to Evangeline Reyes-Yonemura [sic], by
forging the signature of complainant's late father. Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon City, knowing that complainant's father was
already dead as of 21 January 1996, made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute Sale, that complainant's father appeared before him in Quezon City on
17 January 1997.
Records show that a case for Falsification of Public Document was filed against respondent Atty. Hector Centeno before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 39, docketed as Criminal Case No. 104869. Atty. Centeno was arraigned on 12 September 2001 and pleaded "not guilty." After the
arraignment, Atty. Centeno did not anymore appeared [sic] in court and jumped bail.
[14]

The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when they caused "extreme and great
damage to the complainant."
[15]
The Commissioner also noted that the failure of the respondents to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due
notice on several occasions and to appear on the scheduled hearing set showed "flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates
despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction."
[16]
The Commissioner recommended that the respondent lawyers
be disbarred.
On November 18, 2006, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline with the modification that respondent lawyers be suspended indefinitely instead of being disbarred.
The Notice of Resolution and the Report and Recommendation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, were submitted to the Court, through the
Director for Bar Discipline, in a transmittal letter dated January 22, 2007.
The issue before us is whether Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno are guilty of violating their lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which would merit their disbarment.
We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP, but modify the penalty to be imposed on respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
[17]

Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large,
[18]
and a violation of
the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
[19]
In Marcelo
v. Javier,
[20]
we reminded the members of the legal profession that:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the
attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during
good behaviour and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or
disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.
[21]

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof generally rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
[22]

In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers forged the deed of sale and forced her to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement by
explaining to her that it was "in accordance with law."
The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute a blatant violation of the lawyer's oath to uphold the law and the basic tenets of the
Code of Professional Responsibility that no lawyer shall engage in dishonest conduct. Elementary it is in succession law that compulsory heirs like the
widowed spouse shall have a share in the estate by way of legitimes
[23]
and no extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse of said right except if she
gives it up for lawful consideration, but never when the spouse is not a party to the said settlement.
[24]
And the Civil Code reminds us, that we must
"give every man his due."
[25]

The guilt of the respondent lawyers is beyond dispute. They failed to answer the complaint filed against them. Despite due notice, they failed to attend
the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainant remainuncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade,
[26]
we ruled
that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to
lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court."
[27]

The Court is mindful that disbarment is a grave penalty. Considering that the license to practice law, though it is not a property right, sustains a lawyer's
primary means of livelihood and to strip someone of such license amounts to stripping one of a career and a means to keep himself alive, we agree
with the modification submitted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that an indefinite suspension would be the more appropriate penalty on Atty.
Charlie Doroin. However, we cannot be as lenient with Atty. Hector Centeno who, aside from committing a dishonest act by depriving a person of her
rightful inheritance, also committed a criminal offense when he falsificated a public document and thereafter absconded from the criminal proceeding
against him after having posted bail.
We also take this opportunity to remind the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and their regional and city chapters to maintain an updated record of the
office and residence addresses of their members to help facilitate looking for lawyers. As officers of the court, lawyers should be readily available upon
the Court's beckoning.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Charlie Doroin is suspended indefinitely, and Atty. Hector Centeno is hereby DISBARRED.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and also be placed on the personal records of
the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Penulosu vs. Suntos (G.R. No. 133749 August 23, 2001)

Respondents Severino C. Santos (deceased) and Adela Mendez Santos are registered owners of a residential house and lot located at No. 113 Scout Rallos Street,
Quezon City under TCT No. PT-23458 (54434).
[1]
In 1988, Severino and Adela decided to sell their property and for this purpose, negotiated with petitioner Hernando (or
Henry) Pealosa. The property was then occupied by a lessee, Eleuterio Perez, who was given preference to buy it under the same terms offered by the buyer.
[2]
Perez
proposed less favorable terms
[3]
and expectedly, Severino rejected his offer.
On August 1, 1988, petitioner Henry Pealosa and respondent Severino Santos attempted to enter into an agreement whereby the latter, for a consideration
of P1,800,000.00, would sell to the former the property subject of the instant case. The deed of absolute sale
[4]
(first deed) evidencing this transaction was signed by
Henry but not by Severino, because according to the latter, Henry took time to decide on the matter.
[5]

On August 15, 1988, Henry signed a document
[6]
stating that the first deed was executed between him and Severino, for the sole purpose of helping the latter eject
Perez, the occupant of the property. Henry acknowledged in said document that although Severino had agreed to sell the property to him, he had not paid the
consideration stated in the first deed.
Thereafter, Henry and Severino executed another deed of absolute sale
[7]
(second deed) for a higher consideration of P2,000,000.00. Although the second deed
was originally dated August 1988, superimposed upon the same was the date September 12, 1988. This second deed was signed by both parties and duly
notarized. It states that Severino sells and transfers the house and lot to Henry, who had paid the full price of P2,000.000.00 therefor.
Severino explained that his initial asking price for the property was only P1,800,000.00 as shown in the first deed. But he later asked for a higher price because
Henry could not give the money as soon as expected. However, Severino claimed that he made it clear to Henry that he agreed to sell the property under the second deed
for P2,000,000.00, provided that payment be immediately effected. Severino said that he wanted to use the money to invest in another property located in Alabang and
told Henry that if payment was made at a later date, the price would be the current market value at the time of payment.
Henry then gave Severino P300,000.00 as earnest money, purportedly with the understanding that the former was to pay the balance within 60 days. Otherwise,
said amount would be forfeited in favor of Severino.
[8]
The latter also maintained that he signed the second deed only for the purpose of facilitating Henrys acquisition of a
bank loan to finance payment of the balance of the purchase price
[9]
and added that execution of the second deed was necessary to enable Henry to file a court action for
ejectment of the tenant.
[10]

After execution of the second deed, Henry filed a loan application with the Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philam Life) for the amount of
P2,500,000.00.
[11]
According to Henry, he had agreed with Severino during the signing of the second deed, that the balance of P1,700,000.00 would be paid by means of a
loan, with the property itself given as collateral.
[12]

Meanwhile, on the strength of the first deed and as new owner of the property, Henry wrote a letter
[13]
dated August 8, 1988 to the lessee, Eleuterio Perez,
demanding that the latter vacate the premises within 10 days. Failing in this effort, Henry brought a complaint for ejectment
[14]
against Perez before the Office of the
Barangay Captain.
On September 1, 1988, a Certification To File Action
[15]
was issued by the barangay lupon. This led to the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 88-0439 for unlawful
detainer, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, entitled Henry Pealosa, Plaintiff vs. Eleuterio Perez, Defendant. Claiming that he still had a
subsisting contract of lease over the property, Perez countersued and brought Civil Case No. Q-88-1062 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, entitled
Eleuterio Perez, Plaintiff vs. Severino Santos, et. al, Defendants. In this latter case, Perez assailed the validity of the sale transaction between Henry and Severino and
impleaded the former as co-defendant of Severino.
While the aforesaid court cases were pending resolution, Philam Life informed Severino through a letter,
[16]
that Henrys loan application had been approved by the
company on January 18, 1989. Philam Life stated in the letter that of the total purchase price of P2,500,000.00, the amount of P1,700,000.00 would be paid directly to
Severino by Philam Life, while P800,000.00 would be paid by Henry.
The release of the loan proceeds was made subject to the submission of certain documents in Severinos possession, one of which is the owners duplicate of the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) pertaining to the property. However, when Henry and Severino met with officials of Philam Life to finalize the loan/mortgage contract,
Severino refused to surrender the owners duplicate title and insisted on being paid immediately in cash.
[17]
As a consequence, the loan/mortgage contract with Philam
Life did not materialize.
Subsequently, on April 28, 1989, judgment
[18]
was rendered by the MTC-QC, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 0439, ordering the tenant Perez to vacate and surrender
possession of the property to Henry. In said judgment, Henry was explicitly recognized as the new owner of the property by virtue of the contract of sale dated September
12, 1988, after full payment of the purchase price of P2,000,000.00, receipt of which was duly acknowledged by Severino.
Upon finality of said judgment, Henry and his family moved into the disputed house and lot on August 1989, after making repairs and improvements.
[19]
Henry spent
a total of P700,000.00 for the renovation, as evidenced by receipts.
[20]

On July 27, 1992, Severino sent a letter
[21]
to Henry, through counsel, demanding that Henry vacate the house and lot, on the ground that Henry did not conclusively
offer nor tender a price certain for the purchase of the property. The letter also stated that Henrys alleged offer and promise to buy the property has since been rejected
by Severino.
When Henry refused to vacate the property, Severino brought this action for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 78, on September 28, 1992. Severino alleged in his complaint
[22]
that there was a cloud over the title to the property, brought about by the
existence of the second deed of sale.
Essentially, Severino averred that the second deed was void and inexistent because: a) there was no cause or consideration therefor, since he did not receive the
P2,000,000.00 stated in the deed; b) his wife, Adela, in whose name the property was titled, did not consent to the sale nor sign the deed; c) the deed was not registered
with the Register of Deeds; d) he did not acknowledge the deed personally before the notary public; e) his residence certificate, as appearing in the deed, was falsified;
and f) the deed is fictitious and simulated because it was executed only for the purpose of placing Henry in possession of the property because he tendered earnest
money. Severino also claimed that there was no meeting of minds with respect to the cause or consideration, since Henrys varied offers of P1,800,000.00,
P2,000,000.00, and P2,500,000.00, were all rejected by him.
For his part, Henry asserted that he was already the owner of the property being claimed by Severino, by virtue of a final agreement reached with the latter.
Contrary to Severinos claim, the price of the property was pegged at P2,000,000.00, as agreed upon by the parties under the second deed. Prior to the filing of the action,
his possession of the property remained undisturbed for three (3) years. Nevertheless, he admitted that since the signing of the second deed, he has not paid Severino the
balance of the purchase price. He, however, faulted the latter for the non-payment, since according to him, Severino refused to deliver the owners duplicate title to the
financing company.
2Znershlp of the property hus been trunsferred to petltloner. Artlcle 1477 of the Clvll Code stutes thut oZnershlp of the thlng sold shull be
trunsferred to the vendee upon the uctuul or constructlve dellvery thereof. It ls undlsputed thut the property Zus pluced ln the control und
possesslon of petltloner45Zhen he cume lnto muterlul possesslon thereof ufter |udgment ln the e|ectment cuse. Not only Zus the contruct of sule
perfected, but ulso uctuul dellvery of the property effectlvely consummuted the sule.
Non-puyment of the purchuse prlce ls not umong the lnstunces Zhere the luZ declures u contruct to be null und vold. Although the luZ ulloZs
resclsslon us u remedy for breuch of contruct, the sume muy not be uvulled of by respondents ln thls cuse. To begln Zlth, lt Zus Severlno Zho
prevented full puyment of the stlpuluted prlce Zhen he refused to dellver the oZners orlglnul dupllcute tltle to Phllum Llfe. Hls refusul to
cooperute Zus un|ustlfled, becuuse us Severlno hlmself udmltted, he slgned the deed preclsely to enuble petltloner to ucqulre the loun.
It should be emphuslzed thut the non-uppeurunce of the purtles before the notury publlc Zho noturlzed the deed does not necessurlly nulllfy nor
render the purtles trunsuctlon vold ub lnltlo. Artlcle 135834 of the NeZ Clvll Code on the necesslty of u publlc document ls only for convenlence,
not for vulldlty or enforceublllty.
Mallari vs. Alsol
Stalls No. 7 and 8 of the Supermarket Section of the Cabanatuan City Public Market were awarded to and occupied by Abelardo Mallari ("Abelardo"),
father of Manuel Mallari ("Manuel") and Rebecca Alsol ("respondent"). Before Abelardos death on 16 July 1986, he gave the stalls to Manuel and
respondent. Manuel and his wife Millie Mallari ("petitioners") occupied Stall No. 7 while respondent and her husband Zacarias Alsol occupied Stall No.
8.In July 1988, respondents daughter became sick and the Alsol family had to stay in Manila for two months for the medical treatment. They returned
to Cabanatuan City in September 1988 only to find out that petitioners were already occupying Stall No. 8. The partition between Stalls No. 7 and 8 had
been removed and respondents merchandise and things were already gone. Petitioners refused respondents demand to vacate Stall No.
8.Respondent sought the help of the City Market Committee ("Committee"). On 5 May 1989, the Committee passed Kapasiyahan Blg. 1, s-1989
granting Stall No. 7 to Manuel and Stall No. 8 to respondent. On 4 June 1990, respondent and the City Government of Cabanatuan ("City Government"),
represented by City Mayor Honorato C. Perez ("Mayor Perez"), executed a Contract of Lease ("Lease Contract"). The Lease Contract granted respondent
the right to occupy Stall No. 8 for a monthly rental of P316 subject to increase or decrease in accordance with the rules and ordinances of the City
Government.However, petitioners still refused to vacate Stall No. 8. Instead, they filed an action for annulment of the Lease Contract before the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 ("Branch 29"). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 789-AF. In its Order of 25 May 1990, Branch
29 dismissed the case for non-exhaustion of administrative
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The IssuesPetitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether respondent is the proper awardee of Stall No. 8.
2. Whether the Lease Contract executed between respondent and the City Government is valid.
3. Whether respondent is entitled to attorneys fees.
The Ruling of This CourtThe petition has no merit.
Ruling on Whether Respondent is the Proper Awardee of
Stall No. 8 is Premature
The Court of Appeals pointed out that when the Committee awarded Stall No. 8 to respondent, petitioners filed an appeal before the Secretary of
Finance questioning the award. In their appeal, petitioners alleged that respondent failed to comply with the conditions set by the Committee. The
appeal was still pending when the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision. Petitioners admitted in their Memorandum the pendency of the
appeal.
7
Hence, the Court may not at this time rule on whether respondent is the proper awardee of Stall No. 8. Any resolution on this question will
preempt whatever ruling the Secretary of Finance may issue on the pending appeal.
Validity of the Lease Contract
Respondent and the City Government executed the Lease Contract on 4 June 1990 prior to petitioners filing of appeal before the Secretary of Finance.
The pendency of the appeal does not affect the validity of the lease. As the Court of Appeals ruled, the Lease Contract remains valid until revoked by
the City Government or annulled by the proper court in a proper action.
Petitioners insist that the Lease Contract is not valid because the City Treasurer should have signed the Lease Contract and not Mayor Perez. Petitioners
allege that the
Court of Appeals erred in applying Republic Act No. 7160
8
("RA 7160"), otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 1
January 1992 or long after the execution of the Lease Contract on 4 June 1990. Petitioners further allege that granting Mayor Perez has the authority to
sign the Lease Contract, Mayor Perez did not appear before the notary public who notarized the Lease Contract. Hence, the Lease Contract did not
produce any right in favor of respondent.
The Court agrees with petitioners that RA 7160 is not the applicable law. Instead, the Court of Appeals should have applied Batas Pambansa Blg.
337
9
("BP 337") or the old Local Government Code. Still, even under BP 337, city mayors have the authority to sign contracts on behalf of city
governments.
Under Section 171(2), Article One, Chapter 3 of BP 337, the powers and duties of the city mayor are as follows:
Petitioners also allege that the Lease Contract is not valid because Mayor Perez did not appear before the notary public who notarized the document.
We cannot sustain this argument.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document.
12
However, the non-appearance of the parties before the notary public who
notarized the document does not necessarily nullify nor render the parties transaction void ab initio.
13
Thus:
x x x Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. Failure to follow
the proper form does not invalidate a contract. Where a contract is not in the form prescribed by law, the parties can merely compel each other to
observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This is consistent with the basic principle that contracts are obligatory in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all essential requisites are present.
14

Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor Perezs failure to appear before the notary public.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the award of attorneys fees is justified. Petitioners refused to vacate and turn over Stall No. 8 to respondent
despite respondents repeated demands and the existence of the Lease Contract between respondent and the City Government. Respondent was left
with no recourse but to litigate to protect her interest. Hence, we sustain the award of attorneys fees amounting to P10,000 to respondent.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 9 August 2001 Decision and 12 November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 52681.

ST. MARY'S FARM, INC., PETITIONER, VS. PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES, INC., RODOLFO A. AGANA, JR., AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIAS, METRO MANILA
RESPONDENTS.
[I]t appears that herein plaintiff was the registered owner of an originally twenty-five thousand five hundred ninety-eight (25,598) square meters of
land situated at Bo. Pugad Lawin, Las Pias City under Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City.

In compliance with a final court decision in Civil Case No. 87-42915 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XL of Manila, plaintiff passed and approved on 27
June 1988 a board resolution authorizing defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision four thousand (4,000) square meters of the land
covered by the aforecited Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A). Allegedly, after the consummation of this transaction, defendant Rodolfo
A. Agana did not return to plaintiff the borrowed aforementioned title and[,] instead, allegedly forged a board resolution of the plaintiff corporation
supposedly to the effect that plaintiff had authorized him to sell the remaining twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-eight (21,598) square meters
of the subject property. A series of transactions thereafter took place between defendant Rodolfo A. Agana and defendant Prima Real Properties, Inc.
(Prima) which transactions culminated to the signing on 5 September 1988 of an absolute deed of sale transferring the ownership of the subject land
from herein plaintiff to herein defendant Prima. After the consummation of the sale, defendant Prima effected the cancellation of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) in the name of plaintiff and in lieu thereof another Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 in the name of defendant Prima
was issued by defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Las Pias City.

Subsequent developments had it that on 6 October 1988, defendant Prima duly purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the aforementioned four
thousand (4,000) square meters portion of the subject property which development thereafter led to the cancellation of the aforementioned Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6175 and the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City of two separate titles both in the name of defendant Prima,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7863 covering the aforementioned four thousand square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7864 covering
the herein twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-eighty (21,598) square meter subject property.

In its complaint which was amended twice, the second amendment even needed the intervention of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and
mandamus after the same was denied admission by Hon. N.C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the then Assisting Court of Makati, [Muntinlupa], Metro
Manila, herein plaintiff alleged inter alia that the authorization certified to by Antonio V. Agcaoili, Corporate Secretary of the plaintiff and used by
defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in selling the subject property to defendant Prima was a forgery as the board of directors of the plaintiff never enacted a
resolution authorizing herein defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to sell herein subject property to defendant Prima or to anyone else for that matter. Plaintiff
further claimed that defendant Prima in collusion with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana acted maliciously and in bad faith in relying on the forged authority
without taking any step to verify the same with the plaintiff as owner of the subject property. According to plaintiff, the deed of absolute sale entered
into between defendants Prima and Rodolfo A. Agana being the result of fraudulent transaction was void thereby, among others, causing damage to
the plaintiff. For canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) knowing fully well that the authorization to sell [to] defendant Rodolfo A.
Agana was a forgery, defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva was likewise made liable for damages.

On the other hand, defendant Prima separately with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in their respective answers, sought and insisted constantly on the
dismissal of the complaint based solidly on the ground that Venice B. Agana and Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta who filed in behalf of the plaintiff the
original complaint and the amended and the second amended complaints as well, respectively, lacked legal capacity to sue because they were not
authorized therefor by the board of directors of the plaintiff. Furthermore, defendant Prima argued that it acted in good faith when it relied solely on
the face of the purported authorization of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana and entered into the deed of absolute sale and paid in full the purchase price of
PhP2,567,760.00 of the subject property. This fact, according to defendant Prima, made it a buyer in good faith and for value. To cap its argument,
defendant Prima in adopting the defense of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana asserted that even assuming that the authorization of defendant Rodolfo A.
Agana was forged when plaintiff, through its President, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr. (brother of Rodolfo) accepted/received part of the aforestated purchase
price knowing fully well the same to be the proceeds of the sale of the subject property, plaintiff has been precluded as it is now estopped from asking
for rescission of the deed of absolute sale and reconveyance of the subject property.
[3]

After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on April 7, 2000, dismissing the complaint for annulment of sale with damages filed by the
petitioner.
[4]


The trial court found that the respondent was a buyer in good faith and for value, relying on the authority of Rodolfo A. Agana to sell the property in
behalf of the petitioner company, as evidenced by a notarized board resolution. As such, the trial court ruled that the petitioner was bound by the acts
of its agent and must necessarily bear whatever damage may have been caused by this alleged breach of trust.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following errors:
I

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Respondent Agana was duly authorized by Petitioner under the Certification dated June 30, 1988
(Exhibits "D" and "3") to enter into the sale of the subject property with Respondent Prima Real.

(A) There is no proof of the Certification's authenticity and due execution;

(B) There is clear and convincing evidence that the Certification was forged.

(C) Even assuming that the Certification was authentic and duly executed, it was not sufficient in form and by its terms to authorize Respondent Agana
to sell the subject property or receive payment on behalf of Petitioner.
II

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Respondent Prima Real was the author of its own damage by not making reasonable and prudent
inquiries into the fact, nature and extent of Respondent Agana's authority, and by causing the issuance of checks in the name of Respondent Agana.
The petition must fail.

A cursory reading of the issues reveals that these are factual matters which are not within the province of the Court to look into, save only in
exceptional circumstances which are not present in the case at bar. Well settled is the rule that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only
questions of law must be raised.
[5]
As a matter of procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, especially when,
as in the case at bar, such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. This factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice,
deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal. It is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or
premises supportive of the factual holding of the lower courts.
[6]


Petitioner insists that "the sale of the realty entered into between respondent Agana, purportedly on behalf of the petitioner, and respondent Prima is
null and void for lack of authority on the part of respondent Agana to sell the property."
[7]
The board resolution allegedly granting Rodolfo Agana the
authority to sell in behalf of the company, as certified by Corporate Secretary Atty. Antonio V. Agcaoili, is alleged to be a forgery. Ma. Natividad A.
Villacorta, who served as assistant to Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., the President of St. Mary's Farm, Inc., in 1988 testified that the board of directors did not
hold any meeting on June 27, 1988; that, in fact, the signature of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili was not genuine; and that said document was merely presented
to the notary public for notarization without Atty. Agcaoili appearing before him.

Despite this insistence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the respondent court affirming those of the trial court
on this matter. Anent the forged signature of Atty. Agcaoili, the CA did not err in not giving evidentiary weight to the findings of the Document
Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the ground that the findings were not really conclusive. In the first place, the procedure for
the investigation of questionable handwriting was not properly followed. There is nothing on record that will conclusively show that the alleged
standard sample signatures of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili, which were submitted to the NBI and made the basis of comparison, were the genuine signatures
of the same Atty. Antonio Agcaoili. Moreover, the examiner testified that it was possible to have variations in the standard signatures of Atty. Agcaoili,
caused by certain factors such as passage of time, pressure and physical condition of the writer which may have decisive influences on his handwriting's
characteristics.
[8]
Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a particular signature appearing in those documents is not genuine for
lack of proper identification and a more accurate comparison of signatures. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in
the party making the allegation.
[9]
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the petitioner failed to discharge this burden.

Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the Secretary's Certification, petitioner wants us to consider the same as
inadmissible on the ground that Atty. Agcaoili did not appear before a notary public for notarization. We do not agree, because in the past, we have
already held that the non-appearance of the party before the notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the parties'
transaction void ab initio.
[10]
However, the non-appearance of the party exposes the notary public to administrative liability which warrants sanction by
the Court. This fact notwithstanding, we agree with the respondent court that it is not enough to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the
statements contained in the board resolution. To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all
reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.
[11]
In the absence of such proof, the document must be upheld. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
[12]


On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana's authority to sell the subject property.
Undeniably then, the respondent is an innocent purchaser for value in good faith. Our pronouncement inBautista v. Silva
[13]
is instructive:
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property
and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property. He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title to the property and capacity
to convey it.

To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that
he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient
only when the following conditions concur: first,the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at
the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of
the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.
[14]

All the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned case are present in the case at bar, enough for us to consider Prima as a buyer in good faith.
Prima Real Properties, Inc. is a company engaged in the buying and selling of real properties. As borne out by the records, respondent exerted efforts to
verify the true background of the subject property. Rodolfo Agana presented to respondent the (1) notarized board resolution which stated that at a
special meeting held on June 27, 1988, the board of directors authorized Mr. Rodolfo A. Agana, Treasurer, to sell the subject property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-1648;
[15]
(2) a separate Certification by the petitioner's president, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., authorizing its
Treasurer, Rodolfo Agana, to sell said property;
[16]
and, (3) TCT No. T-1648 of the subject property. Convinced that Rodolfo Agana had the authority to
sell on behalf of the company after being presented all these documents, the sale between the parties was thereby consummated. A deed of sale was
executed on September 5, 1988
[17]
and the full consideration of P2,567,760.00 for the subject property was paid.
[18]


It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to Rodolfo Agana and not to the company which, according to the petitioner, should have
alerted the respondent to inquire further into the extent of Agana's authority to transfer the subject property. This was no longer necessary considering
that respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana's authority to sell, evidenced by the notarized Certification. As explained in the Bautista
case:
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that isduly notarized, we know it to be a public document where the notarial
acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice between
knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and
replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that he executed the
document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is deprived of such choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but
because, under our notarial system, he has been given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA. And he
cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that fiction of regularity which holds together commercial transactions across borders and time.

In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has [in his] possession title to the property but whose capacity to sell is restricted,
qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter's capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry,
he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special power of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is
already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity.
[19]

Aside from the pertinent documents presented, respondent also relied on the confirmation and certification of the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City
and Mr. Timoteo S. Cruz, owner of the land likewise sold by Rodolfo Agana for the petitioner, with similar authorization by the petitioner and signed by
the corporate secretary Atty. Agcaoili. Agana acted as petitioner's authorized agent and had full authority to bind the company in that transaction with
Cruz.

Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner that respondent Agana's authority was only limited to negotiate and not to sell the subject property,
suffice it to state that the board resolution further averred that he was "authorized and empowered to sign any and all documents, instruments, papers
or writings which may be required and necessary for this purpose to bind the Corporation in this undertaking."
[20]
The certification of the President,
Marcelino Agana, Jr. also attests to this fact. With this notarized board resolution, respondent Agana, undeniably, had the authority to cede the subject
property, carrying with it all the concomitant powers necessary to implement said transaction. On the strength of the deed of absolute sale executed
pursuant to such authority, title over the land in petitioner's name was cancelled and a new certificate of title - TCT No. T-6175
[21]
- was already issued
in the name of Prima Real Properties, Inc.

Thus, it is too late in the day to have the sale voided, notwithstanding the retraction made by Rodolfo Agana in his Comment
[22]
on the Petition filed
with this Court. Therein, he admits that he acted solely and without proper authority of the corporation. Agana states that he wishes to end once and
for all the rift that had occurred in the corporation; and in order to buy peace for all the parties and for himself, he is willing to return the money paid
by Prima so that ownership of the property can be returned to the petitioner. In light of this admission that Agana had no authority, petitioner posits
that there is justifiable reason for the Court to re-visit or evaluate the facts of the case anew.

Unfortunately, the Court cannot give weight to this magnanimous gesture of Agana; neither will the Court lend credence to Agana's assertion that he
acted solely and without proper authority from the corporation, inasmuch as it was raised for the very first time in this Court and only after 8 years
from the inception of the case. In all the pleadings filed by respondent Agana in court, he was steadfast in his position that he had authority to sell the
subject property. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with
his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
[23]
In the instant case, there is no proof of these exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the retraction was
merely an afterthought on the part of respondent Agana with the intention to end the rift in the family corporation.

Considering all the foregoing, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent Prima is an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CHARLES B. BAYLON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by the complainant at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with fraud and deceit
for notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) bearing the forged signature of the complainant as the supposed principal thereof.
Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife, Rosemarie Baylon, conspired in preparing an SPA
[1]
authorizing his wife to mortgage his real
property located in Signal Village, Taguig. He said that he was out of the country when the SPA was executed on June 17, 1996, and also when it was notarized by the
respondent on June 26, 1996. To support his contention that he was overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a certification
[2]
from the Government of Singapore
showing that he was vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a certification
[3]
from the Philippine Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the
country from March 21, 1995 to January 28, 1997. To prove that his signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant presented a report
[4]
from the National Bureau of
Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned signature on the SPA was not written by him.
The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property was mortgaged to Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was subsequently foreclosed
due to the failure of his wife to settle her mortgage obligations.
In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that he initially refused to notarize it when the complainant's wife first came to his office on
June 17, 1996, due to the absence of the supposed affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the complainant's wife came back to his office on June 26,
1996, together with a person whom she introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He further contended that he believed in good faith that the person introduced to him was
the complainant because said person presented to him a Community Tax Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To corroborate his claims, the respondent attached
the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.
The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to commit fraud, deceit or falsehood.
[5]

After due proceedings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended to the IBP-Board of Governors that the respondent be strongly admonished for notarizing the
SPA; that his notarial commission be revoked; and that the respondent be barred from being granted a notarial commission for one year.
[6]

In justifying its recommended sanctions, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline stated that
In this instance, reasonable diligence should have compelled herein respondent to ascertain the true identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the
nature of the document, i.e., giving a third party authority to mortgage a real property owned by another. The only saving grace on the part of respondent is that he relied
on the fact that the person being authorized under the SPA to act as agent and who accompanied the impostor, is the wife of the principal mentioned therein.
[7]

On October 22, 2005, the IBP-Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-109 which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering Respondent's failure to properly ascertain the true identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the nature of the
document, Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and Respondent's notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified (sic) from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.
[8]

In our Resolution
[9]
dated February 1, 2006, we noted the said IBP Resolution.
We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary public in this case.
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. InSantiago v. Rafanan,
[10]
we explained,
. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon
the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are
never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public
interest.
[11]

Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of the SPA which in this case authorized the complainant's wife to mortgage the subject real
property, the respondent should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person who represented himself and was represented to be the
complainant.
[12]
He should not have relied on the Community Tax Certificate presented by the said impostor in view of the ease with which community tax certificates are
obtained these days.
[13]
As a matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a person who wishes to have
his document notarized, we did not include it in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing
before them to have their documents notarized.
[14]

Moreover, considering that respondent admitted
[15]
in the IBP hearing on February 21, 2005 that he had already previously notarized some documents
[16]
for the
complainant, he should have compared the complainant's signatures in those documents with the impostor's signature before he notarized the questioned SPA.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of respondent Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby REVOKED. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED to be reappointed as Notary Public
for a period of two years.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the respondent isDIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to this Court.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision
likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.