Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines & Judge Hilario Mapayo

1
Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Political Law Tags: case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, equal protection, himagan vs people,Jurisprudence, Political Law, scra, Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies

Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to

constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. Read full text here. Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

Imelda Marcos vs Court of Appeals, Manila RTC Judge Guillermo Loja Sr., et al
1
Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Political Law Tags: case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, equal protection, Jurisprudence, marcos vs ca, Political Law, scra

Equal Protection Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circ 960 which banned residents, firms, associations and corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad w/o permission from the CB. The circular was issued in 1983. Any violation thereof constitutes a criminal offense. In 1991, 8 informations were filed against Marcos accusing her of maintaining a foreign account in Switzerland from 1968-1991. On 21 Dec 1991, 14 more informations were filed against Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera for the same offense. In

January 1992, 11 more informations were filed. The RTC consolidated the cases and Marcos was arraigned in Feb 1992. During the pendency of these cases, CB Circ 1318 and CB Circ 1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) were issued which basically allowed residents, firms, associations and corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the circulars have a saving clause excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of CB Circ 960. Marcos filed a Motion to Quash based on the new circular. The RTC denied the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal. Marcos averred that her right to equal protection has been violated, among others, as the new circular was purposedly designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her. ISSUE: Whether or not Imeldas right to equal protection had been violated by CB Circ 1353. HELD: The SC ruled against Imelda. The SC said Her lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioners claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage therefor, and not at their present posture. Read full text here. Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

People of the Philippines & HSBC vs Judge Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng
1
Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, Jurisprudence, Political Law, Remedial Law Tags: case brief, case digest, case digest. case brief, Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, equal protection, Jurisprudence, people vs vera, Political Law, probation law,Remedial Law, scra

Equal Protection Probation Law Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular

Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that ony in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer may the probation system be applied. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional.

Read full text here.

Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

Roma Drug & Romeo Rodriguez vs RTC of Guagua, Pampanga et al

4

Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Political Law Tags: access to medicine, case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, equal protection,Jurisprudence, Political Law, roma drug vs rtc, scra

Equal Protection Access to Medicine Roma Drug, owned by Rodriguez, was raided by the NBI upon request of Smithkline a pharmaceutical company (now Glaxo Smithkline). RD is apparently one of 6 pharmacies who are directly importing 5 medicines produced by Smithknline from abroad. RD is not purchasing those medicines via local Smithkline the authorized distributor of Smithkline in the Philippines. Smithkline Phil avers that because the medicines were not purchased from a Philippine registered counterpart of Smithkline then the products imported by RD are considered as counterfeit or unregistered imported drug product - as defined by RA 8203 Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs. Notwithstanding RDs motion for reconsideration, the provincial prosecutor recommended that Rodriguez be tried. Rodriguez assails the constitutionality of SLCD averring, among other things, that it has violated his right to equal protection as it banned him access from such medicines. ISSUE: Whether or not SLCD violates equal protection. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of RD. The SC denounced SLCD for it violated equal protection. It does not allow private 3rd parties to import such medicines abroad even in cases of life and death nor does it allow the importation by 3rd parties in cases wherein the stocks of such medicine would run out. It discriminates at the expense of Filipinos who cannot travel abroad to purchase such medicines yet need them badly. Nevertheless, the flawed intention of Congress had been abrogated by the passage of RA 9502 Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008 and its IRR. This law does not expressly repeal SLCD but it emphasized that any medicine introduced into the Philippines by its patent holder be accessible to anyone. It provides that the right to import drugs and medicines shall be available to any government agency OR ANY PRIVATE 3rd PARTY. The SC noted that this law provided and recognized the constitutionally-guaranteed right of the public to health. Read full text here. Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

1

Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Political Law Tags: association of small landowners vs secretary of agrarian reform, case digest. case brief, Constitutional Law, equal protection, Jurisprudence, Political Law, scra

Equal Protection These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also

become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. Read full text here. Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

What are the Requisites of a Valid Classification?

Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Legal Questions Tags: Constitutional Law, Legal Questions, requisites of classification, valid classification

The requisites to be complied with are; (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. ** Taken from People of the Philippines vs Cayat. Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

People of the Philippines vs Cayat

2
Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Political Law Tags: Bar from Drinking Gin, case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, equal protection,Jurisprudence, people vs cayat, Political Law, Requisites of a Valid Classification, scra

Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians. ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are; (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the

enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. Read full text here.

Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

Patricio Dumlao et al vs COMELEC

1
Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Political Law Tags: case brief, case digest, Constitutional Law, dumlao vs comelec, eligibility to office,equal protection, Jurisprudence, Political Law, scra

Equal Protection Eligibility to Office after Being 65 Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon

in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. Read full text here.

Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

What is the Scope of the Equal Protection Clause?

Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Legal Questions Tags: Constitutional Law, equal protection, Legal Questions, scope of equal protection,who are covered under the equal protection clause

WHO ARE PROTECTED Equal protection is available to all persons, natural as well as juridical. Artificial persons, however, are entitled to the protection only insofar as their property is concerned.

By constitutional reservation, certain rights are enjoyable only by citizens, such as the rights to vote, hold public office, exploit natural resources, and operate public utilities, although aliens are comprehended in the guaranty. Even ordinary statutes can validly distinguish between citizens and aliens or, for that matter, even between or among citizens only. **Taken from Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea et al Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

What is Equal Protection?

Posted by Howard | Posted on 06-11-2010 Category : Constitutional Law, Legal Questions Tags: Constitutional Law, equal protection, equal protection defined, Legal Questions

EQUAL PROTECTION Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. Substantive equality is NOT enough, it is also required that the law be enforced and applied equally. Even if the law be fair and impartial on its face, it will still violate equal protection if it is administered with an evil eye and uneven hand, so as to unjustly benefit some and prejudice others. The right to equal protection, basic as it is, sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of the government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications. **Taken from Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea et al Howard Chan is the Founder of Case Digests for Law Students, a website which provides reliable case digests for law students and researchers who may not have the time to read lengthy Supreme Court decisions.

Previous