AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON

CONTENTS

DECLARA IE............................................................1 INTRODUCTION........................................................2 1. A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE COLD WAR..............

1.1 DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT CHURCHILLdS FULTON SPEECH (THE IRON

CURTAIN)............................................... 1.2 THE LONG TELEGRAM....................................... 1.3 THEORIES RELATED TO THE COLD WAR:

SCOALA POZITIVISTA, SCOALA, REVIZIONISTA, TEORIA MIXTA.......... 2. NIXONdS RISE TO POWER (ELECTIONS ETC); AND HIS POLICY IN VITENAM 2.1 PRESIDENCY.......................... 2.2 NIXON AND THE MIDDLE EAST........................... RICHARD NIXONdS

3. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA.................................. 4. NIXONdS TRIANGULAR POLICY (KISSINGER AND NIXONdS VISIT TO CHINA)...................................................... 5. RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND USSR.................. 6. THE POLICY OF D )........ 7. THE END OF THE WAR.............................................. CONCLUSIONS......................................................... LIST OF IMAGE, MAPS AND TABLES................................. BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................... TENTE TOWARDS USSR (SALT I

INTRODUCTION

2. NIXONdS RISE TO POWER (ELECTIONS ETC); AND HIS POLICY IN VITENAM

Nixon won the 1968 presid ential election and was sworn in office on the 20 th of January 1969. Vietnam was on the top of his list of things

to tackle. e He announced in 1969 that U.S. troops would leave Vietnam in a phased withd rawal. This policy promised to wind d own the war and end the antiwar protests. Nixon, however, had no intention of following what he bitterly called isolationism. The United States must retain its global obligations, but it has to uphold them with d ifferent policies than it had d uring the post-1945 years when it enjoyed overwhelming powerf
1

e Nixon was willing to negotiate an honorable withd rawal that he d efined as almost anything except the surrend ering to the No rth

Vietnamese of the millions of men who had been encouraged by his

LaFeber, Walter, op. cit. p. 261

pre ecessors to rely on America. He treate cre ibility an honor, because they efine

America

s capacity to

a peaceful international or er.f all his pre ecessors: he ha

But he ha

ma e the same mistake as s

un erestimate

Ho Chi Minh

etermination

to win the war. The Vietnamese lea er was confi ent his troops woul the confrontation; after all Saigon was not rule

effectively an

Americans were more reluctant with each passing

ay to continue the

fighting. Ho was not willing to give up anything at the negotiations table from what he thought his army woul

gain.

Despite

the

increasing

concessions from the American si e, Hanoi woul The North Vietnamese regime ha two major

not change its attitu e.

eman s before realizing the put out a

American prisoners: firstly the U.S.A. shoul with rawal of its forces an

ate for the

secon ly for the replacement of the that what Hanoi wante

government in South Vietnam. Kissinger claime was basically a e ishonorable capitulationf was not acceptable however. Nixon ha conflict an analyze manage

from the American si e.

This

what were the best options for en ing the to come up with three strategies: a un ilateral

ha

with rawal of forces, a prolonge military an

confrontation with Hanoi alternating a gra ual increase in Saigon s

political

pressures

or

responsibilities which woul

allow America to slowly with raw from the

country. After much consi eration the thir best solution.

option was chosen as the

A unilateral with rawal of forces was not supporte have pose

by

the population. Such an act woul

also serious logistical

problems. The 500 000 American sol iers fighting there coul

not be
4

with rew in less than 15 months accor ing to the Defense Department. Even if the removal of troops began the

win ling numbers of men

2 3 4

Kissinger, Henry, Diploma ia, p 588, own translation Kissinger, Henry op. cit. , p. 591 Numbers are taken from Kissinger, op. cit. p. 592

seriously the notions of efine

win the

benefit from this as they might try to impose even harsher peace

four a ministrations, ma e by a presi ent whose foreign policy has so far

epen ing on American support, regar less of them agreeing or not with

America was willing to neg otiate but also to show there were limits to its

e It was the strategy that I personally preferre , because I thought it

the a ministration to han le more unifying tasks.f

There were three

5 6

Kissinger, Henry, op. cit., p. 592, own translation ibi ., own translation

that the communists be allowe

incentives an

unilateral actions as possible without accepting, however, to take Southern Vietnam. It was also

these talks the American peace

elegation was to try to offer as many

Secon ly, negotiations ha

to be c on ucte

vote a resolution that woul

have permitte

with

components to this strategy: firstly, Nixon ha

to convince Congress to him to continue the war. North Vietnam; uring

woul

en

the internal

isputes that

iving us an

because it w oul

patience. Kissinger was also supportive of this secon

option. He states

woul

not respect his part of the

to negotiate with Hanoi an

with raw their forces but, in case the latter eal, military actions woul intensify.

comprise

a mixture of political an

military pressures. They were willing

allow

The

secon

option that

ha

been

evise

the

etails of the policy America con ucte

isappointment in the ranks of America

s allies, especially among those

towar s Vietnam.f

by Nixon

ai es

been

consi ere

conservative,

woul

have

regar ing a major American commitment, exten e

le

over the course of twenty years. [...] A 180

egrees reorientation over the course of

to

e The trust that America inspire

emoralization in the ranks of America

s allies. ha been built with ifficulty

profoun

con itions.

Above

all

Nixon

was

aware

that

this

woul

lea

South Vietnamese army might turn on them. North Vietnam woul

remaining woul

come un er increasing pressure from the enemy an

the also

to

The map presents the Ho Chi Minh trail running through Laos. The map also pre sents the

http://www.talkingprou .us/ImagesMilitary/Blin bat/HMTMap.jpg

estroye

in or er to put an en

forces. Nixon or ere

the Trail as well as the communist bases in Cambo ia to be to the war. Picture taken from

infrastructure, this became a vital route for resupplying the Viet Minh an

Viet Co ng

South Vietnam After systematic bombings by the Americans

estroye

North Vietnam

communist bases from Cambo ia from were frequent attacks were launche

but the tactics

not lea

to victory.

General Westmorelan

an

his staff ha

trie

clear that the military strategy a opte

by the Americans was wrong. to wage a conventional war

against s

Vietnamese to install training camps there, it was they who first of all

state with the purpose of cleaning the commu nist sanctuaries there. The U.S.A. must not act like a e pitiful, helpless giant.f e American troops

were therefore inva ing Cambo ia to clean out the communist camps. In

U.S. history.f
7 8

LaFeber, Walter , op. cit. p. 262 i em, p. 263

one in a series of

isasters that marke

1970 -1971 as a na ir in recent

protests ignite

all throughout the country. e The Cambo ian trage y was

le

to increase

opposition with regar s to the

war an

who, first of all, ha

ha

invite

the Vietnamese to install training camps there, it was they inva e a neutral country. This expan ing of the war omestic

was welcome

by the country

s lea ership; if one thinks about it nobo y

the name of

win ling

own the war, Nixon expan e

communist. America was thus offere

a coup initiate

by one of the army officers: Lon Nol, a fervent anti the chance to enter this neutral

it.f

The attack

1970 the government of Prince Noro om Sihanouk was overthrown

an

further entrenche

in Cambo ia an

en

the war. The plan faile

an

only le

the communists to get further estabilize the country. In ea rly uring

in the hope that Hanoi woul

finally succumb to pressures an

ha

inva e

a neutral countr y Also the

ecision to bomb Laos was taken accept to

the country

s lea ership; if one thinks about it nobo y ha

invite

estroye

the communist sanctuaries there. The attack was welcome

by the

woul

have to be expan e : American troops inva e

an

South Vietnamese positions This le

to a fateful

ecision. The war Cambo ia an

country an

from there groups of Viet Minh sol iers attacke

Vietnamese training camps ha

coul

still be supplie

using the Ho Chi Minh path through Laos. Also North been built in Cambo ia, a suppose ly neutral American

estroying the North s infrastructure, the Viet Cong an

the Viet Minh

The massive bombings initiate

by Johnson ha

also faile :

espite

resemble giving peanuts to the public -the more we sol iers we take out

pursue its actual p ath. Every American sol ier brought home will be

inal stages since the rate at which we lose our sol iers has nothing to o with how many American troops we have in Southern Vietnam. To kill

150 American sol iers per week, the enemy will only have to attack a

one. Johnson ha This came in sharp contrast to what his pre ecessor ha e Americanize the war by sen ing increasingly numbers o U.S. troops to ight along Saigon s army. Nixon now wante to with raw these troops an leave only the South Vietnamese Army o the war- he woul o course sen them war equipment, guns an ammo but no more sol iers. 10 Kissinger, Henry, op. cit. p 594, own translation

be given a chance to prove that it can

e en

itsel an

inally, stimulants

actors: American morale at home woul

be on a rising path, Saigon woul

vietnamise the

war. The presi ent

s rationale was base

ice but to no avail. Nixon woul

not be bu ge

in his

small portion o

our troops

10

The memoran um was presente

Vietnamization might not lea

to a

ecrease in American casualties until its

har

to

keep

up,

not

to

mention

the

than his pre ecessor. The morale o

the sol iers remaining will be very morale o their mothers.

represent an increasing percent in the number o

relatively more important to the war e

ort in the South because he will Unite States troops

more sol iers we with raw, the more encourage

eman

or a unilateral with rawal o

orces- probably in a year. The Hanoi will become to

in the Oval ecision to on three

an

bring home the more the public will ask to

o so. This might en

by a

problems as we

ollow it; the with rawal o

the American troops woul

this thir

option implie :

e the process o

Vietnamization woul

ormer

s executive assistant. The memoran um spoke about the

Presi ent

consi ere

a success one. On 10 September 1969 Kissinger sent to the a memoran um elaborate mostly by Anthony Lake, the

war.9 Despite the

iculties it implie , this thir

option was to be

angers le to

be the one a opte . Nixon

eci e

to pursue a e Vietnamization

The thir

solution propose

by the a ministration was in the en

to

the

the only solution. This course of action also left open the possibility of a

ragging on in Paris, Nixon put his policy of Vietnamization in practice. The

country. The first 25 000 sol iers were brought home in July 1969. On the

1972 only 69 000. 11 It was obvious to everyone that the conflict was on a path that woul , in the en , solve it. Vietnamization was an overall success. Despite the worst fears of

Cong.

Kissinger, Nixon private counselor. At the beginning of the talks in 1970,

11

Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, Kaspi An r , Istoria rela n zilele noastre, p. 245 12 Kissinger, Henry, op. cit., p 595, own translation

iilor interna

ionale 1948- p



itional help of

500 000 Americans?f

12

The answer was foun

 

only on the South Vietnamese army, when it coul n

Le Duc Tho mocke

the Americans: e How can you expect to win relying t win with the by the

Xuan Thuy an

Le Duc Tho an

the American

elegation was le

by Henry

negotiate seriously. The negotiations were le

on the Vietnamese si e by

trail through Laos, an

the mining of its ports that finally le

couple

with the

isruption of the North s supply line, the Ho Chi Minh Han oi to

It was this unexpecte

resilience of the South Vietnamese army

Unite

States, were able to wage war against the Viet Minh an

the Americans, the South Vietnam troops, traine

an

1st of May 1971 there were 325 000 troops left an

peak ha

been reache

in April 1969 with 543 000 sol iers present in the

number of U.S. troops ha

been heavily re uce . As negotiations were

on the 1 st of May

equippe

unilateral with rawal with the a vantage of this being

one after the

that the strategy was very

ifficult to implement but, in the en , it was

point it woul

negotiate an

accept American terms. Kissinger a vocates

an

threats of renewe

fighting woul

be use

to se uce Hanoi to the

by the the Viet

American forces in Vietnam from almost 550 000 to 20 000 in three

total in 1968 to about 600 or 1 per cent in 1972, the last year of the war. e
14

negotiations until two preliminary requests were complete : announcing an

ibi . own translation Kissinger, Henry, op. cit. , p. 599 15 This came in opposition to the American position: precisely because of lack of support at home they wante to separate the two issues. See Kissinger, op. cit. p. 596 16 Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, Kaspi An r , op. cit. p. 247, own translation
14

13

military

personnel,

inclu ing

technical

military

personnel

an

military

a total with rawal from South Viet-Nam of troops, military a visers, an

e Within sixty

ays of the signing of this Agreement, there will be

American POWs woul

be release . It was an honorable peace he sai f

16

announce

e that within 60

ays all troops woul

the Agreement on En ing the War an

quickly evolve

an

Kissinger was able to sign on the 23 r of January 1973 Restoring Peace in Vietnam. Nixon

be with rawn an

October when Le Duc Tho agree

laste

from August 1972 to January 1973. The breakthrough came on 8 to an armistice. From there on things

of it. Only the thir

of negotiations laste

from May to July 1971. Again no result came out of peace talks brought a visible progress. It

roun

insiste

not to separate political an

military matters.

15

The secon

roun

the

omestic atmosphere in the Unite

States was against the war an

Vietnam government le

by Thieu. The North Vietnamese un erstoo

official

ate for the with rawal of troops an

the removal of the South that so

The Vietnamese initially woul

 

 

years; losses ha

win le

from about 16 000 men or 28 per cent of the

not agree to any other roun s of

plan of fighting the war using Vietnamese troops. e Nixon ha

1970 an

1973. During this time the Nixon a ministration went on with its re uce

The negotiations were

an

a weakene

Hanoi ma e a favorable answer available.f

13

ifficult; several roun s took place between

U.S. when e four years later, a combination between a fortifie

Saigon

2.1

RICHARD NIXON

gubernatorial race but lost again. A liberal columnist wrote t hat this

America also mark the beginning of a new orientation in American foreign

inclu ing negotiations on the issue of arms control, the signing of the

Chapter 2, article 5 of the Agreement on En ing the War an Restoring Peace in Vietnam; http://www.mtholyoke.e u/aca /intrel/vietnam/treaty.htm on 11 January 2009 18 LaFeber, Walter, op. cit., p. 255

17



China. Nixon

s foreign policy was also concerne

SALT I an

ABM treaties

an

for moving towar

war going on in Vietnam, for pursuing

policy.

He was the one who manage

to extricate the country from the tente with the Soviet Union

a rapprochement with le East,

about the Mi

resign of office Nixon

s terms as Presi ent of the Unite

Though mostly remembere



national

isasters which

efeat ha

sent Nixon e to that small place in history which belongs to i not happen.f
18

for being the only Presi ent ever to States of

presi ency in 1960 but was

efeate . In 1962 he ran in the California

him vice-presi ent of the U.S.A. between

1952-1961. He ha

run for

Eisenhower picke

Nixon to be his running mate in the elections an

the House of Representatives in 1946 an

in the Senate in 1950. In 1952 ma e

when he entere

Richar

Nixon was not a new figure on the American political stage the 1968 presi ential campaign. He ha been electe in

with rawn within the same perio

of time.f

17

S PRESIDENCY

countries to all paramilitary organizations an

the police force will also be

countries mentione

in Article 3 (a). A visers from the above -mentione

an

war material of the Unite

personnel associate

with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, States an those of the other foreign

success of a people. That key... is in your han s. Every action I have

to help us snap out of self - oubt, the self- isparagement that saps our

19

http://en.wikipe ia.org/wiki/Richar _Nixon#Presi ency_.28 on January 6 2009 An rew, Christopher, For the Presi ent s eyes only. Secret Intelligence an Presi ency from Washington to Bush, p. 351
20

clear that the Soviet Union was Nixon

trying to win the Col

War an

eliminate the Soviet Union. In fact it was s biggest partner towar s peace.

partnership, strength, an

the willingness to negotiate.

 

peace

an

he

ha

evelope

three

pillars

to

support

Nixon woul

knew that a strong America was essential for this. He wante

to maintain policies: stop

his

resignation.f

20

The Presi ent wante

to achieve a global equilibrium an

emonstrate

a flair for foreign policy still evi ent twenty years after his he

 

an

hel

iscussions

with

many

worl

lea ers.

congressman an

vice-presi ent, he ha

presi ents: he ha

a very goo

grasp of international relations. e As travele to over eighty countries As presi ent, Nixon

When Nixon entere

office he ha

estiny, your pri e in your country an

Number One

epen s on your competitive spirit, your sense of personal yourself.f

19

energy an

ero es our confi ence in ourselves... Whether the nation stays

an a vantage over all previo us

taken tonight is

esigne

to nurture an

stimulate that competitive spirit

of international speculators.... Government...

oes not hol

the key to the

e The American

ollar must never again be a hostage in the han s

system an

thus reinvigorating the economy. Nixon sai

in his speech:

convertibility stan ar , practically putting an en

to the Bretton Woo s

 

is

remembere

for

being

the

one

who

cancele

the

Apollo 13 mission took place

uring his first term as presi ent. Nixon also ol lar-gol

space. All U.S. Apollo Project moon lan ings as well as the attempte

a man on the moon when in 1969 he sent Neil Armstrong an

Buzz Al rin in

 

especially Iran. He was the one who fulfille

Kenne y

ream of sen ing

 

3. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA

e Taking into consi eration a long perspective we simply can t

neighbors. On this small planet there is not room for a billion of its, potentially, most capable inhabitants to live in a threateni ng isolationism.f

to fee

its fantasies, to cultivate its hatre

affor

forever to leave a nation like China outsi e the family of nations, an to threaten its

strengthening of

emocracies.

an

thought that negotiations an

peaceful competition woul

lea

He was also the one to throw the policy of con tainment to the

ustbin to

eWe must not forget China. We must always look for opportunities

for changes. We must try to create themf

21

The two texts I have chosen point out extremely well Nixon s

faithful to the Taiwan government, refusing to recognize the Communist

shake han s with Chou En Lai at the 1954 Geneva Conference. 22

China in or er to be able to make the Soviets more malleable. Nixon great

foreign policy.

Kissinger, Henry, op. cit. , p. 628. own translation. The first text is from a 1967 article publishe by woul -be presi ent Nixon in Foreign Affairs. The secon paragraph was taken from an interview in September 1968. It is clear the course of action that Nixon wants to set with regar s to China: it is man atory that relations be improve . 22 i em. p. 626 23 http://mo ern-us-history.suite101.com/article.cfm/the_nixon_ octrine_an _ etente on 24 January 2009

21

##

"

to give their allies nuclear weaponry or ai

them in fabricating it. The rift

"

"

interest. Another moment of crises came was when the Soviets

"

"

"

got a mo est loan on which he ha

been tol

China woul

have to pay ecline

"

"

"

"

aske

for major financial help in or er to stabilize the country. Instea

he

"

"

"

Stalin s time. When he ha

first met with Mao Ze ong the later ha

"

"

Tension between the USSR an

China ha

been growing since

"

"

"

"

office it was basically him an

Kissinger that

ictate

the countr y

"

"

"

been highly encourage

by Kissinger, his ai e. During Nixon s time in s

"

asserting itself against Russia [a ]f

23

His approach to the Chinese ha

"

"

Communism [a ] He un erstoo

"

merit was that he e seeme

to grasp that nationalism was stronger than that tra itional Chinese xenophobia was

"

"

"

Nixon wante

to change this. He wante

to improve relations with

"

"

relations. A symbol of these straine

relations was Dulles

refusal to

"

"

"

to the point Washington an

Beijing ha

completely cut off

iplomatic

"

"

"

"

"

Forwar

the relations between the two countries ha

become straine

"

" "

regime in the mainlan . Between 1949 an

uring Mao

s Great Leap up

"

"

course of action with regar s to China. His pre ecessors ha

remaine

"

" " "

to talk with her, as well as with the USSR. We

on

t just have to wait

"

"

"

at troop d ployme e nts along Chinads and Russiads common bord r. eThe e

the Chine se bord r. In 1961, just be ore the Sino -Sovie split we e f t nt public, the bord r was manne by twe e d lve Sovie shad t ow d ivisions, some at two-third stre s ngth, some at one -third stre ngth with a d ivisional HQ which could be re orce in about te d inf d n ays. By 1969 the re we re twe nty-f ive f stre ull ngth d ivisions, and f orty -f ive d ivisions by 1973. Tactical aircraf numbe gre f t rs w rom 200 to 1200 warplane in the same s

tra e d to the Chine bord r, a ha pra nsf rre se e nd d ctice a cks on site d tta s built to e cho the la yout a Lop Nor.f 24 t

24

Wa r, Ma lke rtin, op. cit. p. 217

&

U.S. inte nce llige

t a rs d e re ports f ound th t Sovie nucle r bombe ha be n

&

&

pe riod along with 120 me ium -range SS-11 ballistic missile , d s.[

major military build o up

the Sovie t

orce d s uring the 190s had be n along e

Communist bloc was no longe a monolith was r

they claime

was eSovie impe t rialism

Nixonds conviction that the urthe e r nhan ce by looking d

Chinese ha

then openly attacke

$ $

again highlighte

uring the 1968 crushing of the Prague Spring. The Brezhnev s ecision con emning what

between the Soviets an

the Chinese Communist Party ha

been once

] L te r

an attack against the site. Image taken from http://www.nro.gov/corona/corona6.jpg

secon ly, to assure the stability of the Asian continent. If Brezhnev

proble of aggre m ssion from the Unite State or China is re d s lative ly

eclarations of the Chinese lea ership. Mao claime

that eAt pre nt, the se

to approach the U.S.A an

China. He was encourage

(( (

were high in ee . With this in min

Soviet plan coul

be stoppe

in its tracks the prospects for stability Nixon eci e to make a major attempt in this aspect by the

Czechoslovakia, the consequences woul

have been

i sastrous. But if the

( (

(( (

eci e

to apply to China

the

same

treatment

he

ha

impose

in

of all more space to maneuver in the

(( ((

an

eci e

to approach the Chinese in or er to reach two goals:

America became concerne

however at the actions of the Soviets first

ealings with the USSR an

'

'

the layout at Lop Nor. USSR went so far as to ask what woul

'

'

between USSR an

China, Soviet nuclear bombers exercise

attack on sites built to echo U.S.A. s reaction be to

'

'

The picture presents the Lop Nor nuclear

test site. As tensions

evelope

minor.[...] You wish to with raw part of your troops back on your

cooperation was even more obvious when he mentioned the problem of Taiwan: eWe can d without the [Taiwan] f now and we wait f o m or or the to come ove 100 ye m r ars.f 26 The Ame rican ad ministration was thus

e ncourage to make some small unilate d ral conce ssions such as allowing Ame ricans to trave to China, bring back good in worth of up to 100 l s d ollars, se ral limite grain shipme ve d nts we authorize e re d tc.
27

The gre ste f at p orward come howe r whe Nixon authorize a ve n d public state nt on Se mbe 5, 1969, that the Unite State we me pte r d s re ed e e ply worrie f about a Sino-Sovie war. Thus the USSR had be n d t e warne publicly warne against anothe e d d r scalation of conf licts with its ne ighbor. The ne ste in the rapproche nt to China was mad in 1971 xt p me e whe Nixonds right hand Kissinge mad a se t trip to China. The n , r e cre Chine le e wante to make sure Ame se ad rs d rica would not coope rate with the Sovie Union in case of an attack f t rom the f orme Nixon wante to r. d be sure if Be ijing was willing to he Ame lp rica limit the Sovie ge t opolitical
28 ofe f nsive Progre was also obtaine on July 15 whe Nixon said he had ss d n

be n invite to China be e d cause ehis d sire to visit the Popular Re e public was we ll knownf 29 and that he had acce d this pte with joy. The

pre e sid ntds trip took place be e 21 -28 Fe twe n bruary 1972.

25 26 27 28 29

Kissinge He r, nry, op. cit., p. 634 own translation id m. p. 633 own translation e id m. p. 629 own translation e id m, p 633, own translation e Durose , Je lle an-Baptiste Kaspi And , op. cit. p. 248, own translation , r

territory;

ours

no

stray out.f 25

Maods d esire

f or increased

http://en.wikipe ia.org/wiki/File:Nixon_Mao_1972-02-29.png

promote

stability

in

Asia

jumpe

at

the

opportunity.

Picture

taken

from

fears about the USSSR. Nixon, who wante

to improve the relations with Beijing an

Mao an

Nixon shaking han s. Their relation was create

base

upon Chinese

Nixon shakes han s with Chinese Premier Chou En Lai on his arrival in China. The

http://people.cohums.ohio-

state.e u/ben er4/eall131/EAHRea ings/mo ule02/imageforcontent/nixonzhouenlai.jpg

the inte st of both countrie both want to re re s; duce the dange of r inte rnationally military conflict, none of the two signatorie must try to s obtain he mony in the Asian-Pacific re ge gion and e ach of the oppose m s the e fforts of any othe country or group of countrie to e r s stablish such a he mony and ne r of the two parts is pre ge ithe pare to ne d gotiate in the name of a third party or to sign agre me e nts and unde rstandings dire te c d against othe state with the othe 30 r s r.f

30

Kissinge He r, nry, op. cit. p. 634

path of normalizing the re lations be e China an twe n

presente

a list of topic that they ha

agree

upon: e pro gre on the ss the Unite State is in d s

path for American-Sino relations for a new

eca e. The Communiqu

Here he signe

the Shanghai Communiqu

meeting Dulles refuse

to shake han s with him. Picture taken from

that woul

1 1

American presi ent ha

not forgotten how insulte

Chou En Lai ha

been when at a

set

own the

During the negotiations the problem of admitting Communist China in the United Nations was also discussed. The Americans did not want to abandon Taiwan or to see it removed; they therefore proposed that both Taiwan and China be represented. Despite the American proposal did not

pass- 59 votes against 54 for the admittance and 15 abstentions -a solution was found by Albania: communist China would replace nationalist China, gaining the latterds permanent place and veto right in the

Security Council. The resolution passed with 76 votes against 35 and 17 abstentions on the 26 October 1971. 31 China had now entered the family of the United Nations The rapprochement between China and the U.S.A. brought increase fear in the Soviet camp. Faced with two major fronts in case of war, Kremlin had to read just its foreign policy and be more prud ent in its actions. It was this move toward China, along with an economic s

d ownfall, that mad USSR launch overtures in search in d tente. e

4.

NIXONdS

TRIANGULAR

POLICY

KISSINGER

AND

NIXONdS VISIT TO CHINA)

Nixon was the first American presid ent who, d uring the Cold War, visited both China and the USSR. Nixon had broken a 20 year old policy of not recognizing the Beijing government the d he accepted the invitation ay to China. His move was a bold one, breaking with the trad ition set up by the three presid ents before him. It had been d one in the hope of stabilizing Asia and for convincing the USSR to pursue d tente.

31

The numbers taken from

31

Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, Kaspi And r

, op. cit. p 248.

Nixon had followed what was to be known as a triangular foreign policy. Along with Kissinger, his right hand man and the only one whom the President could trust, he followed his objectives regardless of opposition. He was also the one to try to apply the concept of elinkage in his f f ign policy. The be e ore st xample was the way in which he conducte d diplomacy with China and USSR. At the be ginning of his te as Pre rm side of the Unite State of nt d s Ame rica, Nixon had promise he would e the Vie d nd tnam War. In orde to r achie this howe r, he ne de to convince Moscow to pre its ally ve ve e d ss Hanoi to acce signing a pe pt ace tre aty. The pre side achie d le rage nt ve ve ove the USSR whe he move towards re r n d cognizing the Chine mainland se gove rnme nt. His analyst had warne him that this rapproche nt with d me Chine would le to an incre se ad ase in te nsions with the Sovie Nixon and ts. Kissinge thought the e r xact opposite would happe the we prove n; y re n right whe hardly a month passe f n, d rom Kissinge rds trip to China, the Sovie le e Le t ad r onid Ilyich Bre zhne was asking f a me ting with the v or e Ame rican pre e sid nt. Nixon had corre ctly appre ciate that a me ting with d e

the Chine would f se orce Moscowds hand as long as the USSR and the ; Chine we in conf se re lict the Unite State could act as an inte d s rnatio nal arbite be e the two Asian colossi. The Ame r twe n rican pre e sid nt had succe ully linke up the me ting with the Chine to a me ting with the ssf d e se e Sovie The re ts. laxation in te nsions that f ollowe gave Nixon a f e hand in d re the Vie tnam War. Whe Hanoi f d t o re ct the armistice signe , Nixon n aile spe d was f d with no opposition, inte ace rnally of e rnally, whe he initiate xte n d the massive Christmas bombings against North Vie tnam. Ne r the Chine ithe se nor the Sovie re ts acte to the bombings. In f d act it was the Sovie wh o ts f orce Hanoi d to sign the tre aty signaling the e nd of Ame ricads

involve nt in the Vie me tnam War. It was anothe e r xample of how the linkage conce was applie . pt d

Nixon had thus achieved what he had promised and even more: he had managed to end the Vietnam Wa r and bring back home the American troops fighting there. He had obtained what he liked to call was an ehonorable pe f. He was the f ace irst Ame rican pre side to visit China nt af r the installme ofthe communist re te nt gime in that country. He was the f irst Ame rican pre side to visit Moscow and sign an agre me on limiting nt e nt the nucle ar arse nal of the two countrie Again Bre s. zhne vds visit to Moscow in 1973 marke anothe score point f his f ign policy. d r d or ore The Pre e had accomplishe more f ign policy goa ls than any sid nt d ore othe one be ore him. r f Ye Nixon is now mostly re mbe d f be t me re or ing the only Ame rican pre e e r to re sid nt ve sign out of ofice De f . spite the gre succe s he at sse obtaine on the e rnal policy age a, the way Nixon cond d xte nd ucte his d inte rnal policy was to bring his d ownf The Wate all. rgate scand was to al prove the e f his care r. nd or e eWith ce rtainty of an impe achme nt in the House of

Re se pre ntative and of a conviction in the Se s nate Nixon re , signe te d n d ays late be r, coming the only US Pre e to have re sid nt signe f d rom ofice f . His succe ssor, Ge rald Ford would issue a controve , rsial pard f any on or f d ral crime Nixon may have committe while in ofice 32 ee s d f .f

32

http://e n.wikipe ia.org/wiki/Wate d rgate _scand al#Article s_of _impe achme nt.2C_re signation. 2C_and _convictions on January 18 2009

6. THE POLICY OF D

TENTE TOWARDS USSR (SALT I )

Another goal of the Nixon administration was to relax tensions with Moscow. This had been the thinking behind the eChina cardf policy. Ame rica had to improve re lations with the Sovie in orde to attain ts r othe goals: Moscowds support in e ing the Vie r nd tnam War, stability in Asia. Dome stic goals we re also f ollowe : Nixon wante to cut back d d military e nd xpe iture and re uce the d f nse bud t in ord r to re re s d ee ge e d ss the e conomy and he ne d d Sovie coope ee t ration in ord r to achie this. e ve It was not only Ame rica who had e conomic proble howe r. The ms ve Sovie e t conomy was in an e n worse state of afairs. Af r a huge ve f te e conomic growth back in 50s, the rhythm h ad slowe d d own in the 60s and 70s. It se me that Khrushche e d vds pre ictions - that USSR will catch up d e conomically with the U.S.A. in the 70s - we re not coming true33 If . anything the Sovie t e conomy was f ring alte and f alling be . hind

Conce ntrating on ke ping up the arms race the Kre e , mlin had be n unable e to prod uce e nough consume good to ke p the population happy. From this r e point of vie a re w laxation of te nsions was we lcome by the Sovie d ts. Anothe argume that pointe in the d ction ofincre d re r nt d ire ase lations wi th
33

Durose , Je lle an-Baptiste Kaspi And , r

, op. cit. p. 237

the two superpowers was also the fact that the USSR had achieved similar nuclear capabilities to those of the U.S.A. e[...] the Sovie military t had by 1971 caught up with the Unite State in the numbe of launche d s rs rs for nucle we ar apons, although not in warhe ads. By 1973, the Sovie Union t had a 10 pe ce supe r nt riority in launche numbe rs rs, and, by 1976, 25 pe r ce nt supe riority
34

- se adjoine table for more information. Once e d

achie d, nucle parity gave a ne impulse to Sovie fore ve ar w t ign policy. Bre zhne now be v gan to e xpand Kre mlinds influe nce around the globe in place such as Africa- Angola, Egypt e s tc-, in the Mid le East and d e ntually in Afghanistan. Ame ve rica could not acce this. pt

USA Ye ar 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Launche rs 1653 1812 2021 1888 2139 2268 2191 2109 2100 2087 2167 2133 2106 2106 2092 Warhe s ad 3267 1612 4180 4251 4607 4892 4839 4736 4960 6064 7601 8885 9324 9828 10436 Launche rs 235 302 425 463 570 947 1206 1431 1835 2075 2207 2339 2423 2515 2545

USSR Warhe s ad 481 589 771 829 954 1349 1605 1815 2216 2441 2573 2711 2795 3217 3477

34

Walke Martin, op. cit. p. 214 r,

1977 1978 1979 1980

2092 2086 2086 2022

10580 10832 10800 10608

2562 2557 2548 2535

4242 5516 6571 7480

Numbers of US and Soviet nuclear launchers and warheads 1962 -8035 When studying the table one notices immediately that the USA had been intimated by a much smaller number of USSR nuclear missiles in 1962 than was the case in the beginning of the 70s.

It

was

generally

believed

by

the

Washington

experts

that

Americads approach to China would lead to a rift with the USSR. This proved to be completely miscalculated Relations . between the two

countries had soared after the 1968 crushing of the Prague Spring. Even the planed meeting between Johnson and Brezhnev had been cancelled . Things however turned 180 d egrees around after Nixonds trip to China. Now the Soviets, alarmed by this maneuver, wanted to pursue d tente. They were aware of Nixonds d esire to meet the Kremlin lead yet they er had cond itioned this meeting to a list of d emand that first had to be s negotiated However, following Kissingerds visit to China, not more than a month passed before the Soviets were asking this time for a meeting. The move toward China had paid its d end s ivid s. The summit meeting was arranged to take place in the spring of 1972 at Moscow. Nixon was the firs t American presid ent to visit Kremlin

35

Table is taken from Walker, Martin, op. cit. p. 214

when he arrived on May 22, 1972. During his meetings with Brezhnev the two leaders concentrated on finding a way to limit the arms race and thus permit funds to be used for other purposes. The negotiations were filled with success. The negotiations led to the signing of SALT I and the ABM treaty. 36 SALT I was the first major

agreement between the two superpowers to wind down the arms race that was sapping their economies. The treaty was limited to a five years period; during this time the two countries had agreed to work on a more permanent agreement. SALT I specified the maximum number of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads each side could deploy. eThe Unite d State was limite to 1,710 missile launche s d rs, whi ch at the time consiste d of 1,054 land -base and 656 se -base missile The Sovie we d a d s. ts re limite to 2,328 missile launche d rs; at the time the agre me we into e nt nt e ct, the include 1,607 land -base and 740 se -base missile .37 ffe se d d a d s De spite imposing such n umbe the tre rs aty was not ve cle on the ry ar modality of counting the missile and could be bypasse by the two s d c o u n t r i es w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f M I R V .
38

SALT is an acronym for Strate Arms Limitations Tre gic aty. ABM is an acronym for Anti Ballistic Missile s 37 http://www.pre side ntprofile s.com/Ke dy-Bush/Richard-M-Nixon-D-te -with-the nne nte sovie t-union.html on January 18 2009 38 MIRV is an acronym for Multiple Inde nde Targe d Re ntry Ve pe nt te e hicle Basically MIRV s. me ant a missile that could carry multiple nucle warhe ar ads and launch t m inde nde he pe ntly on diffe nt targe The de lopme of MIRV me re ts. ve nt ant that the SALT I agre me could e nt be bypasse by the two signatorie d s.

36

t e missiles, t e treaty was a success. Picture taken from http://encarta.msn.com/media 61536754_761563374_ 1_1/nixon_and_bre hnev_in_moscow.html

warheads- another good reason why Bre hnev wanted an agreement that limited the number of missiles. One American submarine possessing MIRV was capable of inflicting 160 Hiroshima blasts. The United States had over thirty such subs. The Soviets moved rapidly to deploy their first

MIRV in the mid-1970s. SALT I therefore only placed a few limits on, but

signed on May 26 1972. Americans because it

The ABM treaty was highly desired by the in this domain that they lagged behind.

was

39

La e ber, Walter, op. cit. p. 270

G G

Development o

ABMs had proved very costly and the e ectiveness o

did not stop, the arms race.

39

Still the treaty was a success and was

Ma

26, 1972. Despite not being very clear on t e issue of MIRV and t e way to count

) in Moscow, marking t e signing of t e Strategic Arms Limitation Treat

48

8 3

7 76

43

S v et leade

Le n d Bre

nev t a ted Un ted State

Pre dent Ric ard Nixon on

CB@9 @A@9 4 3 7

the system was questioned especially after MIRV missiles were introduced. The Soviets were far ahead in the development of their ABM system while the Americans were seriously lagging behind. The treaty im posed

the presence of ABM systems only in two places: one would be around the capital; the other would be around the location of the nuclear missiles silos. The White House thus sought to neutralize Kremlinds lead in this field eFor many ye . ars the ABM Tre aty was, in the We consid re one st, e d of the land marks in arms limitations. It was pe ive as re rce d quiring two e mie to agre not to d ploy a pote ne s e e ntially use we ful apon, d libe e rate ly to maintain the balance of powe and as such, was also take as r n confirmation of the Sovie ad re t he nce to the MAD d octrinef40 The talks . be e the two le e also touche on the e twe n ad rs d conomic issue Sovie . t e conomy was lagging be hind more and more and ne d d inputs of We rn ee ste te chnology and capital to be able to support the arms race 41 An . agre me on the se e nt lling of whe to the USSR was f at inally agre d upon e that fne arly d ouble Sovie d t-Ame rican trad f42 e The signing of SALT I was a ste pping stone in the proce build ss ing d te nte and political trust be twe n the two supe e rpowe The me ting in rs. e Moscow was f ollowe by Bre d zhne vds visit to Washington f rom 18 to 25 June 1973. The re sults of the me ting we publi she in the Joint U.S.e re d U.S.S.R. Communiqu Communiqu was a , San Cle nte on June 24, 1973. Includ d in the me e d ocume nt re e f rring to the d sire of the two e

supe rpowe to pre nt a nucle war not only be rs ve ar twe n the but also e m be e third partie Othe issue that we d twe n s. r s re iscusse includ d re uction d e d

40

http://e n.wikipe ia.org/wiki/Anti-Ballistic_Missile d _Tre aty on January 18 2009. MAD was an acronym f Mutual Assure De or d struction. It state that the two supe d rpowe rs had e nough nucle me tonnage to assure the re ar ga ir ciprocal d struction. e
41

Soviet economy was crippled by the arms race: the USA spent 5 per cent of their GDP on the military at a time when the Soviets were spending 40 per cent; numbers are taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Ballistic_Missile_Treaty on January 18 2009
42

LaFe r, Walte op. cit. p. 268 be r,

of tensions in Indochina, the Middle East, the expansion of economic relations, peaceful use of atomic energy etc.

CONCLUSSIONS

In this paper I have talked about the American foreign policy and the way it was conducted for more than one and a half decade, from 1962 when Kennedy was president until 1979 -1980. This period coincided more or less to the period of d tente.

In this period from 1962 to 1980 the way in which American foreign policy was conducted saw major 180 degrees turns. In the beginning of the 1960 the USSR was considered the mortal enemy of the United States. The few contacts that existed between the two

superpowers were strained. The conception of esafe tyf de ine the way f d in which both USA and USSR saw the world. For USSR saf ty was e e qual

to a military-controlled Eastern Europe and to the prevention of a unified Germany which could later on join NATO forces. Ideology shaped

Moscowds view of the outsid world Lenin had pred e . icated on the ad vancement of the communist world and an unavoid able conflict between the socialist camp and the ewar monge ring capitalist world .f Socialism was the path to the f uture The Kre . mlin le d rs we convince of this. a e re d On the othe sid was the f e capitalist world le by the Unite State r e re d d s ofAme rica. Like the sovie counte ir t rparts the USA had the ce rtitud that e the mod l was be r since it was base on e ntial human rights and ir e tte d sse f e oms. The USA vie d the se re d we ir curity as re late to the containme of d nt communism. The containme policy was a political truism that was give nt n birth in the cable te gram se by Ge le nt orge Ke nnan, a d iplomat at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, in Fe bruary 1946 to the Pre e sid nt. Othe conce r pts appe d in time eappe me are : ase ntf was one of the and erollbackf was m the othe At the he r. ight of te nsions be e the U.S.A. and USSR many twe n Ame rican politician campaigne f d or the rollback of communism. The

abnormalitie cre d by the communist re s ate gime had to d s isappe ar no matte the cost the claime . Such was the policy Ame r y d rica pursue in the d Kore War. an Anothe truism of the Ame r rican f ign policy was the so calle ore d ed omino the oryf, be e st xplaine in the word of Pre e Eise d s sid nt nhowe : r eFinally, you have broad r consid rations that might f e e ollow what you would call the "f alling d omino" principle You have a row of d . ominoe se s t up, you knock ove the f r irst one and what will happe to the last one is , n the ce rtainty that it will go ove ve quickly. So you could have a r ry be ginning of a d isinte gration that would have the most prof ound

inf nce 43 lue s.f policy make rs

This type of political truisms d ominate Ame d rican f ign ore e n ve we ll d uring Johnsonds pre e sid ncy. Af r te all

43

http://e n.wikipe ia.org/wiki/Domino_the d ory on 20 January 2009

containment of communist expansion and the domino theory were the pillars with which he justified the continuation and escalation of the Vietnam War. The next period was one of an overall relaxation of tensions and of moving away from the Cold War I mentality that stated the u nequivocal enmity between the United States of America and the USSR. Foreign policy was influenced by two factors: one was the MAD doctrine; the other was the decline in the national economies of the two superpowers. D tente was conceived firstly as a mean s to an end. The goal was to

reduce the arms race and thus divert funds from the military to other sectors of the economy; both countries could benefit if d successful. Johnson sought d tente was

tente with the USSR but his main foreign

policy goal was pre venting South Vietnam from going communist. Caught in the confines of the domino strategy Johnson dropped d tente and

increased American commitment to the war. The greatest change in American foreign policy was heralded in the 1968 elections when all candidates championed the ending of the war and the pursuit of d tente.

On this platform Nixon was elected. His foreign policy was built on the idea that

Europe is

"irrelevant,

throwing

U.S.

weight

around

in

the

Caribbean and Latin America is a given .f44 He was impressed only by the Chinese and their pragmatically way ofconducting afairs. Nixon innovated f American f oreign policy by f ollowing a triangular policy -USA-USSRChina- and by the use ofelinkage His promise to e the Vie f. nd tnam War was tie to promoting d d te nte with the USSR which in turn de nde on pe d

approaching and be rie f nding the Chine communist re se gime in Be ijing. His me thod le to him scoring se ral succe s on the e rnal le l: SALT I, d ve sse xte ve the ABM tre aty, d te nte with the USSR and ope d the door to an ne

approach to China. Unde his le rship Ame r ade rica playe a role as an d
44

http://www.cbsne ws.com/storie s/2002/05/07/politics/main508210.shtml on 20 January 2009

arbiter in Asia, forcing both the USSR and China to promote a more balanced and restrained policy in their relations . Nixon had thus achieved what he had promised and even more: he had managed to end the Vietnam War and bring back home the American troops fighting there. He had obtained what he liked to call was an ehonorable pe f. He was the f ace irst Ame rican pre side to visit China nt af r the installme ofthe communist re te nt gime in that country. He was the f irst Ame rican pre side to visit Moscow and sign an agre me on limiting nt e nt the nucle ar arse nal of the two countrie Again Bre s. zhne vds visit to Moscow in 1973 marke anothe score point f his f ign policy. d r d or ore The Pre e had accomplishe more f ign policy goals than any sid nt d ore othe one be ore him. r f Ye Nixon is now mostly re mbe d f be t me re or ing the only Ame rican pre e e r to re sid nt ve sign out of ofice De f . spite the gre su cce s he at sse obtaine on the e rnal policy age a, the way Nixon cond d xte nd ucte his d inte rnal policy was to bring his d ownf The Wate all. rgate scand was to al prove the e f his care r. nd or e

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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3. Kissinger, Henry, The White House Years, Little Brown&Co, 1979 4. Leffler, Melvyn P.; Painter, David S., Origins of the Cold War. An international history, London and New Yorkk, Routledge, 1994 5. McCauley Martin, Russia, America& The Cold War. Seminar Studies, London and New York, Longman, 1998 6. Westad, Odd Arne, U.S.-Soviet Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Middle East and Africa in the 1970, The Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo, 1995 7. Westad, Odd Arne, Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches,

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