Tinga Digests

DIGESTS POLITICAL LAW
JAINAL v. COMELEC 07 Mar 2007
OF
SELECTED TINGA PONENCIAS

proclamation of respondent Salip Aloy Jainal was likewise annulled. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELECs Resolution. The COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration but modified the resolution of its 2nd Division by declaring the election return pertaining to Precinct 9A of Barangay Adjid as valid. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, including Hussi Ahajan (Ahajan) as private respondent in his capacity as Vice-Mayor who, under the provisions of the Local Government Code, will fill up the vacancy created by the annulment of petitioners proclamation. Issues: (1) WON Talib should have followed the procedure outlined in Sec. 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166 for contesting election returns; (2) WON the order of the Regional Trial Court of Jolo, Sulu in Election Protest Case No. 5-4-04 upholding petitioners proclamation as Mayor of Indanan, Sulu precludes the COMELEC from issuing the assailed resolutions; (3) WON the COMELEC observed the procedure outlined in Sec. 235 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) for annulling election returns; and (4) WON it was proper for the COMELEC to "pierce-the-veil" of election returns. *In his Comment, Ahajan questions, as an additional issue, the validity of the 5 October 2006 Order of the COMELEC which directed him, as Vice-Mayor, or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor. Said Order was issued during the pendency of the present petition and after Ahajan had already taken his oath and assumed office as Acting Mayor. Held/ Ratio: (1) NO. Apparently relying on his bare allegation, petitioner does not state in what respect and on what basis Talib failed to comply with Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166. It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the alleged non-compliance. In the absence of such proof, there is no aspect in the proceedings before the MBC which legally precludes Talib from filing his petition before the COMELEC in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. In fact, petitioner did not even raise this issue of non-compliance with Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 in his Answer and Memorandum filed before the COMELEC.
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Facts: Petitioner Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and private respondent Julhatab J. Talib (Talib) were duly certified candidates for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu in the 10 May 2004 elections. During the canvassing, Talib objected to the inclusion of certain returns before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC). On 20 May 2004, petitioner was proclaimed by the MBC as the winning candidate with an alleged margin of 1,018 votes. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the precincts before the counting and the preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the election returns for these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and his official watchers, a fact which indicates that said election returns were manufactured. Talib also noted that the number of votes cast exceeded the number of voters in Precinct Nos. 33A and 34A. Petitioner, in his memorandum, prayed for the dismissal of the Talib petition, contending that the latters allegations were the proper subject of an election protest in the proper trial court. The members of the MBC were summoned and directed to file their verified answer to Talibs petition. They failed to file their Answer and, despite notice, they also failed to attend the scheduled hearing. They also failed to submit the memorandum required by the COMELEC. Talib, however, presented an affidavit4 signed by Daryl Kinazo and Roy M. Cuevas, Chairman and ViceChairman, respectively, of the MBC of Indanan, Sulu to the effect that Indanan, Sulu was not their original station; that the stations of COMELEC personnel were re-shuffled and they were reassigned to Indanan, Sulu because the election officer originally assigned there for canvassing was nowhere to be found; that when they assumed their duties as members of the MBC, they noticed that some election returns canvassed by them were materially incomplete while others bore erasures. The COMELEC (2nd Division) issued a Resolution, granting the petition in part, annulling the election returns from nine precincts. The
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contested election returns; (2) it was done without prior COMELEC authorization which is required in view of the unresolved objections of Talib to the inclusion of certain returns in the canvass; and (3) it was predicated on a canvass that included unsigned election returns involving such number of votes as will affect the outcome of the election. In this regard, it has long been recognized that among the reliefs that the COMELEC may grant is to nullify a proclamation or suspend the effects of one. Parenthetically, the absence of the required signatures and thumbmarks rendered the election returns concerned materially defective. The crucial circumstance also served as a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy. (2) NO. Note that the Election Protest Case is an election protest case filed by Isnaji, the third candidate for the position of Mayor against petitioner and Talib. Being an election protest or a post-proclamation case, it is markedly different from the case filed by Talib before the COMELEC which is a pre-proclamation case. The order of the trial court in the election protest case does not conflict with nor diminish the legal effect of the COMELEC en banc Resolution. The order is not inconsistent with the directive of the COMELEC to the Election Officer of Indanan to convene the BEI in the concerned precincts for a recount, after notice to the parties and after ensuring that the integrity of the ballot boxes are not compromised. The order of the trial court directed a dismissal of the election protest on a technicality, that is, for failure of Isnaji as protestant to prosecute the protest. No election returns were examined and no ballots revised. The questioned election returns could not have been examined before the trial court because they were already with the COMELEC at that time in connection with Talibs pre-proclamation case. The trial court perfunctorily considered the report of the Revision Committee and on that basis concluded that it was no longer necessary to continue with the case because of petitioners "enormous lead" over Isnaji, not Talib. Although denominated as a respondent in the Election Protest Case, Talib could not be expected to participate therein because of his pending preproclamation case with the COMELEC. Had he participated in the election protest, his preproclamation case would have been deemed abandoned because the general rule is that the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
In view of the absence of the names and signatures of the members of the BEI on the returns, the MBC was further duty bound to comply with Section 212 and Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said provisions respectively allow and require the MBC to summon the members of the BEI to complete the election returns and/or correct the same should it appear that some requisites in form or data are omitted in the election returns. Assuming, however, that Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 was not complied with, Talib cannot be faulted or made to suffer for such non-compliance as it was the MBC who did not comply with its duties under Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166. When Talib made his objections to the inclusion of the contested election returns, there was no other recourse for the MBC except to rule on the objections, suspend the canvass of the contested election returns, and suspend the proclamation of petitioner, in that sequence. Instead of doing so, the MBC, after ruling on the objections, included the contested returns in the canvass and immediately proclaimed petitioner. These actions of the MBC rendered it impossible for Talib to comply with Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 any further. It should be noted that the fortyeight-hour period for filing a verified notice of appeal with the MBC is reckoned from suspension of the canvass. The appeal to the COMELEC is also reckoned five days from suspension of the canvass. Understandably, Talib had no other recourse but to go directly to the COMELEC. It is worthy of note that what was filed with and resolved by the poll body is a pre-proclamation case. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns. The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is, logically, no longer viable after a proclamation has been made. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when the proclamation is null and void. The proclamation of petitioner in this case is void for three (3) reasons: (1) it was based on a canvass that should have been suspended with respect to the
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of R.A. No. 7160 and Art. 83, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code governing vacancies and succession apply. According to Art. 83, A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. The vacancy created by the nullification of petitioners proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a "permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his office." Ahajans assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of the recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC. Thus, there is an immediate need for the COMELEC to speedily ascertain the true will of the electorate in the eight precincts whose election returns were nullified. **On Forum Shopping: We note with disapproval the action taken by petitioner when he filed with the COMELEC en banc the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation, praying for an order suspending the implementation and execution of the 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 COMELEC resolutions. Clearly, the move is violative of the prohibition against forum-shopping. There is forum-shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forumshopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice. If the act of the party or its counsel clearly constitutes willful and deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall constitute direct contempt, and a cause for administrative sanctions, as well as a ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice. In the case at bar, the relief sought in the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation is basically the same as the prayer for a temporary restraining order in the present petition which was still pending resolution by this Court at the
warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a preproclamation controversy, or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed. The dismissal of the Election Protest Case could not have cast an adverse or prejudicial effect on Talibs pending pre-proclamation case. (3) YES. The COMELEC fully complied with this Courts exhortation in Dagloc v. COMELEC that Sec. 235 of the Omnibus Election Code be followed to ascertain the will of the electorate. The COMELEC did not instantaneously nullify the questioned election returns as claimed by petitioner. Utilizing the first procedure contained in the first sentence of Sec. 235, the COMELEC used other copies of said suspect election returns, namely the election returns submitted by Talib. When this was not enough, it even resorted to an examination of the COMELEC copies. And when it was evident that the election returns for the nine precincts were manufactured or fabricated because the printed names and signatures of the members of the BEI were absent, it was only then that the COMELEC annulled the said election returns and petitioners proclamation. The COMELEC thereafter ordered the Election Officer of Indanan to convene the BEI in the concerned precincts for a recount, if possible, or to report to the COMELEC the impossibility of a recount so that a special election can be immediately scheduled. Clearly, the issuances of the COMELEC can hardly be described as precipitate and premature. (4) NO. It is a well-entrenched rule in jurisprudence that in a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns. In Chu v. COMELEC, aside from reiterating the rule against piercing the veil of returns, this Court intimated that a preproclamation case is the proper remedy if the defects and irregularities are apparent from a physical inspection of the election returns. In the case at bar, the COMELEC did not have to look at other evidence to conclude that the election returns were manufactured because the defects were apparent on the face of the election returns themselves. In fact, a detailed description of each questioned election return was provided in the Resolution of the COMELEC (2nd Division). * With the nullification of petitioners proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan, Sulu is vacant. The Local Government Code is clear on the matter of succession. Sec. 44
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asked for therein despite a clear showing and despite its foreknowledge, of the forum-shopping. PERMAN v. COMELEC, ET AL. 08 Feb 2007 Facts: Pet Perman and Priv-Resp Iddong are candidates for Punong Barangay in the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Iddong was proclaimed winner by 67 votes. Perman filed as election protest with MCTC. After revision of ballots, trial court invalidated 83 of the ballots for Iddong for being marked and deducted the same from his total votes. Consequently, MCTC rendered decision saying that Perman won the election by 13 votes. Priv-Resp Iddong appealed with COMELEC and on 23 Feb 2005, COMELE validated the then invalidated ballots and ruled in favor of Iddong. Motion for Recon by Pet Perman to COMELEC was denied, hence this petition. Issue: Whether the COMELEC En banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its appreciation of the contested ballots, sixty-five (65) ballots for private respondent and two (2) ballots for petitioner. Held/Ratio: No. Pet contends that the 65 ballots validated by COMELEC should be invalidated for they were written by 2 persons. And as per the 2 ballots for Pet, Perman contended that the poll body should have credited the two (2) ballots to him consistent with its rulings on similarly situated ballots of private respondent and with the rules of appreciation of ballots which favor validity in case of doubt in order to uphold the will of the voters. BOTH CONTENTIONS ARE BEREFT OF MERIT. The rule embodied in Rule 23 under Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), provides: 23. Any ballot which clearly appears to have been filled by two distinct persons before it was deposited in the ballot box during the voting is totally null and void. The rule in Trajano v. Inciso is that if at the time it was cast it was filled only by one person, but thereafter it was tampered and entries were made thereon by other persons, the ballot is
time the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation was filed before the COMELEC. However, for as long as the present petition, including the prayer for injunctive relief, pends before this Court, the assailed COMELEC resolutions remain presumptively valid. With the filing of the present petition, only this Court has jurisdiction to nullify the COMELEC resolutions or suspend their enforcement. Another violation of the ban against forumshopping lies in petitioners failure to inform this Court of its filing of the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with the COMELEC, prescribed by Sec. 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. And, conformably with such prescription, petitioner assumed the undertaking by executing the certification against forum-shopping in the present petition. Worse than petitioners forum-shopping, however, is the poll bodys favorable action on petitioners Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation despite knowledge of the pending petition with this Court. Such action on the part of COMELEC should not be countenanced and deserves disapprobation. Under Sec. 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by this Court. Clearly, the effects of the 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 resolutions can no longer be suspended not only because the resolutions are already final and executory but also because the power to suspend enforcement lies only with this Court. Thus, in granting the motion and ordering the Vice-Mayor or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor of Indanan, Sulu, it committed what amounts to a usurpation of this Courts prerogative that is to issue the TRO which is precisely one of the reliefs sought in the present petition. It behooved the COMELEC en banc to deny or at least refuse to take action on the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation. Quite plainly, the 5 October 2006 order of the COMELEC En banc is null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction and in usurpation of this Courts prerogative and jurisdiction. Consequently, the COMELEC should be taken to task for entertaining the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and granting an injunctive relief
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for placing the said numbers immediately after the name of the candidate, which mark is too big for a period, except to mark the ballot. Finally, this is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Under this rule, findings of fact of the COMELEC supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non-reviewable. We see no reason to depart from the principle. LUCMAN v. MALAWI et al. 19 Dec 2006 Facts: Petition for mandamus filed by respondents before the trial court is rooted in their claim that they were deprived of their Internal Revenue Allotment for the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1997. Respondents further alleged that these same funds were released by petitioner as Manager of Land Bank, the depositary bank, to third persons. There were originally 6 petitioners when the Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was filed by now respondents before the court of origin. They were Alimatar Malawi, Abdulkhayr Pangcoga, Salimatar Sarip, Lomala Cadar, Aliriba S. Macarambon and Abdul Usman who were the incumbent barangay chairmen of Bubong Ngingir (Kabasaran), Ilian, Linindingan, Mapantao-Ingod, Paigoay and Rangiran, respectively, all from the Municipality of Pagayawan, Lanao del Sur. All of them were the incumbent barangay chairmen of their respective barangays prior to the 12 May 1997 barangay elections. Elections on 12 May 1997 in the aforesaid barangays resulted in a failure of elections. The special elections held in these barangays likewise resulted in a failure of elections. Respondents remained in office in a holdover capacity pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6679 and Comelec Resolution No. 2888 dated February 5, 1997. Beginning with the second quarter of 1997, LBP was selected as the government depository bank for the IRAs of the abovementioned barangays. Being a new government depositary bank for the IRA funds, the authorized public officials had to open new accounts in behalf of their government units with the proper LBP branch from which they could withdraw the IRAs.
valid. If, on the other hand, it already bore the fillings of two or more persons when cast, said ballots are deemed marked and thus void. The presumption juris tantum is that a ballot found to be with the handwriting of two or more persons suffered this defect before it was cast. It is only a presumption juris tantum, rebuttable by evidence. The presumption that a ballot found to be in the handwriting of two or more persons suffered this defect before it was cast was overcome in Trajano. Similarly, in the case at bar, the COMELEC En banc, found that the presumption had indeed been overcome. Following Columbres v. COMELEC, the presumption was overcome by evidence that the ballots were tampered with after they had been deposited in the ballot box. The COMELEC found that: In all the said ballots, only one and the same person made the insertions based on handwriting; It was made a point that the insertion was clear and noticeable based on the difference in pen color; The insertions are redundant, primarily to serve as to clarify what was already written by the real voter. Hence, in view of the findings above, the sixtyfive (65) ballots for private respondent were tampered with after they were deposited in the ballot box. We agree with the conclusion reached by the COMELEC En banc. As to the 2 ballots for pet, In order for a ballot to be considered marked, in the sense necessary to invalidate it, it must appear that the voter designedly placed some superfluous sign or mark on the ballot which might serve to identify it thereafter. No ballot should be discarded as a marked ballot unless its character as such is unmistakable. The distinguishing mark which the law forbids to be placed on the ballots is that which the elector may have placed with the intention of facilitating the means of identifying said ballot, for the purpose of defeating the secrecy of suffrage which the law establishes. Thus, marked ballots are ballots containing distinguishing marks, the purpose of which is to identify them. In the case at bar, Exhibits 24 and 24-A contained the encircled numbers "16" and "15," respectively, in the voters own handwriting after the name of petitioner. There can be no reason
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Respondent Macarambon testified that he was the incumbent chairperson of Barangay Paigoay prior to the 12 May 1997 elections and that due to the failure of elections, he continued to occupy his position in a holdover capacity until he was succeeded by his wife upon the latter's election to the same post. He testified on petitioner's refusal to release the money to him despite his submission of the Accountant's Advice. For failure to appear at the scheduled hearing on 20 April 1999, petitioner was held as in default and respondents were allowed to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring him as in default was granted. After failing again to appear on the given time for him to adduce evidence, another Order was issued wherein petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence. The Order was lifted on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Instead of presenting evidence, petitioner filed on 10 November 1999 a Motion to Dispense or Waive Presentation of Evidence wherein he represented that the prayers in the complaint had already been complied with. RTC granted petitioner's motion. RTC rendered a Decision commanding petitioner to pay respondents, except respondent Alimatar Malawi who failed to testify, the IRAs of their respective barangays even without the Accountant's Advice. RTC: (1) Gave no credence to petitioner's assertion of payment to the rightful barangay officers, there having been no testimonial or documentary evidence proferred in substantiation thereof; (2) Considered petitioner's refusal to present evidence as a "silence" that equates to an admission of respondents' allegations; (3) Relied on the testimonies and certifications adduced by respondents in holding that they were occupying their positions in a holdover capacityand that by virtue thereof, they had "the perfect right to continue performing the duties and functions of their positions including the withdrawal of funds of their respective barangays."
After the failed 12 May 1997 elections, respondents attempted to open their respective barangays' IRA bank accounts but were refused by petitioner because respondents needed to show their individual certifications showing their right to continue serving as Barangay Chairmen and the requisite Municipal Accountant's Advice giving respondents the authority to withdraw IRA deposits. Respondents were eventually allowed to open accounts for their barangays except for Lomala Cadar and Abdul Usman of barangays MapantaoIngud and Rangiran, respectively, because the accounts for these barangays were previously opened by two persons who presented themselves as the duly proclaimed Barangay Chairmen for these same barangays. All respondents were not allowed to withdraw the IRA funds from the opened accounts, owing to the absence of the requisite Accountant's Advice. 4 August 1997: 5 other persons presented themselves before petitioner as the newly proclaimed Punong Barangays of the five barangays concerned, each of them presenting a certification of his election as Punong Barangay issued by the provincial director of the DILGARMM and another Certification issued by the Local Government Operations Officer attesting, among others, to the revocation of the certification previously issued to respondents. Without verifying the authenticity of the certifications presented by these third persons, petitioner proceeded to release the IRA funds for the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1997 to them. Respondents filed on 11 August 1997 a special civil action for Mandamus with Application for Preliminary Mandatory Injunctionto compel petitioner to allow them to open and maintain deposit accounts covering the IRAs of their respective barangays and to withdraw therefrom. The case was raffled to the RTC of Lanao del Sur, Branch 11. At the trial respondents Sarip, Cadar, Pangcoga and Usman testified that they were duly elected chairpersons of their respective barangays and continued as such in a holdover capacity until their re-election on 30 August 1997. They testified further that despite presenting the corresponding documents, petitioner refused to allow the withdrawal of the funds.
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treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans (Art. 1980, Civil Code; Gullas v. Phil. National Bank, 62 Phil. 519). Current and savings deposits are loans to a bank because it can use the same. The petitioner here in making time deposits that earn interest with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila was in reality a creditor of the respondent Bank and not a depositor. The respondent Bank was in turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure of the respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay its obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from a depository's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit. The relationship being contractual in nature, mandamus is therefore not an available remedy since mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. Issue #2: Legal personality to bring suit. Ratio/Held: No legal personality to institute petition. The IRA funds for which the bank accounts were created belong to the barangays headed by respondents. The barangays are the only lawful recipients of these funds. Any transaction or claim involving these funds can be done only through the proper authorization from the barangays as juridical entities. The determination, therefore, of whether or not the IRA funds were unlawfully withheld or improperly released to third persons can only be determined if the barangays participated as parties to this action. These questions cannot be resolved with finality without the involvement of the barangays. After all, these controversies involve funds rightfully belonging to the barangays. Hence, the barangays are indispensable parties in this case. An indispensable party is defined as parties-ininterest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason
CA affirmed the RTC's decision. Hence this petition. Petitioners arguments: (1) Respondents have no cause of action against him since they failed to present valid certifications showing their respective right to continue serving as Punong Barangay as well as the requisite Municipal Accountant's Advice; (2) The LBP Marawi Branch had already released the contested IRAs to the Barangay Treasurers who were acting in conjunction with the duly recognized Punong Barangays, thereby making the petition for mandamus moot and academic; (3) Respondents have no legal personality to institute the petition for mandamus in their own names since the IRAs rightfully belong to the respective barangays and not to them and that their respective barangays already received the claimed IRAs in this instant case. Issue# 1: Presence of cause of action. Held/Ratio: No COA. Although the pleading filed before the lower court was denominated as a Petition for Mandamus With Prayer For Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the allegations thereof indicate that it is an action for specific performance, particularly to compel petitioner to allow withdrawal of funds from the accounts of the barangays headed by respondents with the LBP, Marawi Branch. From the records of the case, it appears that the shares of the barangays in the IRA had already been remitted by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to the LBP Marawi Branch where they were kept in the accounts opened in the names of the barangays. By virtue of the deposits, there exists between the barangays as depositors and LBP a creditordebtor relationship. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions are governed by the provisions concerning simple loan. In other words, the barangays are the lenders while the bank is the borrower. This Court elucidated on the matter in Guingona, Jr., et al. v. The City Fiscal of Manila, et al., citing Serrano v. Central Bank of the Philippines, thus: Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be
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availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the department or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to the validity, propriety, and legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring administrative expenses xxx approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed.
to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation. In Arcelona v. CA, the Court dwelt on the consequences of failure to include indispensable parties in a case, categorically stating that the presence of indispensable parties is a condition for the exercise of juridical power and when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. This case was not initiated by the barangays themselves. Neither did the barangay chairmen file the suit in representation of their respective barangays. Nothing from the records shows otherwise. On this score alone, the case in the lower court should have been dismissed. Even if the barangays themselves had filed the case, still it would not prosper. The case involves government funds and as such, any release therefrom can only be done in accordance with the prevailing rules and procedures. The Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM) provides that the local treasurers shall maintain the depositary accounts in the name of their respective local government units with banks. Under the Local Government Code, the treasurer is given the power, among others, to: (1) keep custody of barangay funds and properties; and (2) disburse funds in accordance with the financial procedures provided by the Local Government Code.The same manual defines disbursements as constituting all cash paid out during a given period either in currency or by check. Sec. 344 of the Local Government Code further provides for the following requirements in cases of disbursements, to wit:
Sec. 344. No local budget appropriation purpose, the appropriation, money shall be disbursed unless the officer certifies to the existence of that has been legally made for the local accountant has obligated said and the local treasurer certifies to the
Thus, as a safeguard against unwarranted disbursements, certifications are required from: (a) the local budget officer as to the existence and validity of the appropriation; (b) the local accountant as to the legal obligation incurred by the appropriation; (c) the local treasurer as to the availability of funds; and (d) the local department head as to the validity, propriety and legality of the claim against the appropriation. Further, the GAAM provides for the basic requirements applicable to all classes of disbursements that shall be complied with, to wit: a) Certificate of Availability of Fund. Existence of lawful appropriation, the unexpended balance of which, free from other obligations, is sufficient to cover the expenditure, certified as available by an accounting officer or any other official required to accomplish the certificate. Use of moneys appropriated solely for the specific purpose for which appropriated, and for no other, except when authorized by law or by a corresponding appropriating body. b) Approval of claim or expenditure by head of office or his duly authorized representative. c) Documents to establish validity of claim. Submission of documents and other evidences to establish the validity and correctness of the claim for payment. d) Conformity of the expenditure to existing laws and regulations. e) Proper accounting treatment. This prescribed legal framework governing the release and disbursement of IRA funds to the respective barangays disabuses from the notion that a barangay chairman, relying solely on his authority as a local executive, has the right to demand physical possession of the IRA funds allocated by the national government to the barangay. The right to demand for the funds belongs to the local government itself through the authorization of their Sanggunian.
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Reliance on Sec 13, of PD 705 is highly misplaced. P.D. No. 705 was promulgated only on 19 May 1975, or four (4) years after the free patent and title were awarded to Orcullo. Thus, it finds no application in the instant case. Also, respondents main basis for asserting that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve is a purported L.C. Map No. 2961. However, at the hearing on 6 June 1997, the trial court denied admission of the map for the purpose of showing that the subject lot falls within a timberland reserve after respondent had failed to submit either a certified true copy or an official publication thereof. The Court observes that the document adverted to is a mere photocopy of the purported original, and not the blue print as insisted by respondent. A mere photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence of the existence of the L.C. Map. The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true when the Government is one of the parties. The Government, when it comes to court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its rights and privileges at every stage of the proceedings are substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage. BARILLO, ET AL. V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 31 Aug 2006 Facts: In September 1994, Barillo, as President of Cebu State College of Science and Technology (Cebu State), introduced a school-based entrepreneurship project known as the Printing Entrepreneurial Shop (PES), installing himself as the Chairman and Hinoguin, Rojas, Plaza and Allego as the Project Coordinator, Project-inCharge, Treasurer and Auditor, respectively. Barillo then drafted an Operation Manual for its implementation. It was to serve as a guideline for the safekeeping of funds and the sharing of the programs realized income, with a bulk going to them as personnel, the students, as well as maintenance (water, electricity, etc.) Seed money in the amount of P40,000.00 was obtained from the Cebu State Entrepreneurship Training Center (ETC) Funds purportedly as a loan to the PES. The PES was thus formally established. It accepted printing jobs from Cebu State as well as other private entities. The seed money was used to acquire the necessary equipment and facilities for the printing shop although at the time, printing technology was not
There is no conclusive proof from the records showing that the IRA funds for the 2nd and 3rd quarters of the barangays concerned remitted by the DBM had already been withdrawn from the LBP Marawi Branch. Considering the implications of this action of possibly depriving several local government units of their IRAs, the Court took the initiative to request the COMELEC to issue certifications on who were the duly elected chairmen of the barangays concerned. The COMELEC issued to this Court a list of the elected barangay chairmen which confirmed the re-election of respondents as barangay chairmen of their respective barangays. If withdrawals were indeed made, whether by the respondents or by impostors, the matter deserves to be investigated since public funds are involved. Accordingly, we refer the matter to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) for investigation and appropriate action. SAAD-AGRO INDUSTRIES INC. V. RP 27 Sep 2006 The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve or that it has been classified as such before the issuance of the free patent and the original title. According to the trial court, the issuance of the free patent and title was regular and in order, and must be accorded full faith. However, on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial courts judgment. It held that timber or forest lands, to which the subject lot belongs, are not subject to private ownership, unless these are first classified as agricultural lands. In sum, petitioner asserts that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is inside the timberland block, thereby casting doubt on the accuracy of the survey conducted by the Bureau of Forestry and the opinions of DENR officers. Since respondent is the original plaintiff in the reversion case, the burden is on it to prove that the subject lot is part of the timberland block. It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for reversion, to show the details attending the issuance of title over the alleged inalienable land and explain why such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed property. Unfortunately, respondent failed to do so.
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from dismissal from service to six (6) months suspension without pay. The Court of Appeals found no merit in petitioner Barillos contention that the seed money used for the establishment of the PES and its subsequent income are private funds. According to the appellate court, the seed money was sourced from the ETC Funds of Cebu State which funds are allocations made in favor of Cebu State by the Bureau of Technical and Vocational Education (BTVE) of the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) for the creation of the Cebu State ETC. These funds were not meant to be loaned out as capital for supposed entrepreneurial projects. Moreover, despite the fact that Cebu States resources, manpower and facilities were used in the operations of the PES, no portion of its income was ever remitted to Cebu States coffers. There was also a clear conflict of interest because Barillo, who brokered for the PES to obtain printing contracts from Cebu State, was also the one who approved said contracts. As regards Barillos reliance on his acquittal by the Sandiganbayan, the appellate court held that such dismissal does not affect Barillos administrative liability because administrative proceedings are independent from criminal proceedings. Petitioners insist that due to the dismissal by the Sandiganbayan, the administrative case for Dishonesty should similarly be dismissed because the acts which the Sandiganbayan declared as not unlawful are the same acts for which they were held administratively liable. Petitioners also assail the directing them to immediately cease and desist from holding office as a palpable violation of the Constitution. According to them, while the Ombudsman has authority to file and investigate administrative cases against government officials and employees, the power to implement the decision of dismissal lies in the Office of the President or the Department Head. On the Ombudsmans part, he averred that the PES was an illegal money-making venture because petitioners allocated to themselves specific percentages of the income generated from the project as shown by the sharing scheme in the Operation Manual. They treated the income generated by the project like their own by depositing the same in their private account. However, the expenditures for the PES such as supplies, equipment and materials used for
yet offered as a course in Cebu State. The course was eventually offered as a two (2)-year Certificate of Printing Technology program in school year 1996-1997, almost two (2) years after the establishment of the PES. In the course of the post-audit COA, uncovered certain irregularities and anomalous transactions in relation to the operations of the PES, alleging that the school facilities, resources and manpower were being utilized for the advancement of the private interests of petitioners. Moreover, considering that the printing office is deemed an auxiliary service of Cebu State, Auditor Dela Pea alleged that Barillo also violated Sec. 2 of DBM Circular Letter No. 928 dated November 18, 1998, which requires that all receipts from auxiliary services shall accrue to a revolving fund and be remitted to the National Treasury. Barillo claimed that the latter was not covered by a COA audit because it did not use public funds in its operations. He also denied that the PES used funds from the appropriation of Cebu State for maintenance and other operating expenses. He averred that to allow Auditor Dela Pea to examine the PESs records would violate Cebu States right to academic freedom and due process of law. Based on the foregoing, Auditor Dela Pea executed an Affidavit accusing Barillo, Hinoguin, Rojas, Plaza and Allego, in their respective capacities of violating Sec. 3(e), (f) and (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Sec. 4(a) and (c) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Code of Conduct). Auditor Dela Pea alleged that the expenditures for the PES projects were illegally taken from the General Fund of Cebu State and that the income generated therefrom were illegally funneled to the personal accounts of petitioners. The graft case was filed with the Sandiganbayan, while the charge of Dishonesty under Sec. 4(a) and (c) of the Code of Conduct was docketed with the Ombudsman-Visayas as an Administrative case. The graft case was dismissed. However, in the administrative proceedings, the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a Resolution finding petitioners guilty of Dishonesty and imposing upon them the penalty of dismissal from the service with. It later modified the Order of the Ombudsman-Visayas by reducing the penalty imposed upon Hinoguin, Rojas, Plaza and Allego
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employee is not merely advisory but is actually mandatory within the bounds of the law, such that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring public officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action. The power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. The provisions of the Constitution and RA 6770 should be taken to mean that the recommendation of the Ombudsman regarding the action to be taken against an erring public officer or employee should be coursed through the proper officer, often the head of the agency to which such officer or employee belongs. The ruling in Ledesma was recently reiterated in Estarija v. Ranada, et al. where we held that far from restricting the powers of the Ombudsman, the Constitution gave Congress the discretion to spell out these powers. This Congress did through RA 6770 vesting in the Ombudsman the power to directly sanction erring government officials and employees, except only members of Congress and the Judiciary. Given these unassailable precedents, the position taken by Barillo (et. al.) is clearly wrong. The second and third issues are interrelated and shall be discussed jointly. Administrative cases are, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings. The dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or the acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case does not necessarily foreclose the administrative proceeding nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is because unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings is substantial evidence, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The criminal case against petitioners Hinoguin, Rojas, Plaza and Allego was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Information against them did not allege that they conspired with Barillo and because their salary grades are below that required for jurisdiction to vest in the Sandiganbayan.
printing office maintenance and electricity were borne by the school. Citing Ocampo v. Ombudsman, the Ombudsman contends that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioners has no effect on the present administrative case because the evidence against petitioners, though found insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, satisfies the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings. Finally, as regards the OSGs position, the Ombudsman argues that the ruling of this Court in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, to the effect that the Ombudsman is without authority to directly dismiss an erring employee from government service, is the subject of a pending motion for reconsideration in which the Ombudsman argued that it is invested with administrative disciplinary powers to the fullest extent. The Ombudsman insists that it has the authority to compel and enforce, even through the use of the coercive power of contempt, the implementation of the penalties it assesses against erring public officials and employees. Issues: 1. What is the scope of the powers granted to the Ombudsman by the Constitution; 2. WON the Sandiganbayans Decision acquitting Barillo and dismissing the case against the other petitioners, has an effect on the present administrative proceeding; and 3. WON there is substantial evidence against petitioners. Held: On the first issue. The authority of the Ombudsman to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee, and to direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed is already settled. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we held that the statement in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra, to the effect that the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman is only recommendatory is a mere obiter dictum which cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Court. We declared that the authority of the Ombudsman under Sec. 15 of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770), otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, to recommend the removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an erring public officer or
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income generated by the PES from its operations, were deposited in the Banco de Oro account of Barillo, Rojas and Plaza. Moreover, we agree with the appellate courts finding that there is a clear irregularity in the dealings between the PES and Cebu State in that Barillo, who acted as Chairman of the PES, was also the one who approved the latters printing contracts with Cebu State. Considering that he and the other petitioners have a pecuniary interest in the PES as they shared in its income, this conflict of interest should have been militantly guarded against. In view of these circumstances, we find that there is substantial evidence to find petitioners guilty of Dishonesty under the Code of Conduct. Their act of obtaining direct pecuniary benefits from the PES; use of Cebu States resources, manpower and facilities; disregard of their public accountability; and refusal to submit the books and accounts of the PES to audit are highly irregular and questionable. GUDANI v. SENGA 15 Aug 2006 Facts: In September 2005, Senator Biazon invited several AFP senior officers, including petitioners Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and respondent Gen. Senga, to appear before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security at a public hearing regarding allegations of massive cheating during the 2004 elections, at which time Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of Joint Task Force Ranao tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Gen. Senga replied through a letter to Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend but he nonetheless directed other officers from the AFP who were invited to attend the hearing. 26 September 2005 - the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum signed in behalf of Gen. Senga, directing Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan to attend the hearing. Conformably, they filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent. 27 September 2005 - Gen. Senga wrote to Sen. Biazon, requesting the postponement of the hearing since some of the invited officers also could not attend as they were attending to other urgent operational matters. By this time, both
On the other hand, Barillo was acquitted because the Sandiganbayan found the evidence adduced by the prosecution inadequate to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. According to the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution failed to establish that the P40,000.00 borrowed by the PES from the ETC Funds partakes of the nature of public funds so as to be subject to COA audit. Moreover, when the money was lent to the PES, it assumed the characteristic of a private fund. The fact that it was subsequently deposited to the Banco de Oro account of Barillo, Rojas and Plaza was deemed insufficient to convict Barillo. Further, the Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the operational expenses of the PES were borne by Cebu State. Thus, the government did not suffer any damage as a result of the actions attributed to Barillo. The Sandiganbayan also ruled that the prosecution failed to prove that Barillo acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Sandiganbayan Decision was not the basis of the filing of the administrative case against petitioners. In fact, the administrative case lodged with the Ombudsman-Visayas proceeded independently of the criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Further, nowhere in its Decision did the Sandiganbayan unreservedly declare that the acts for which petitioners were being held liable are not unlawful and irregular. Whether this evidence satisfies the standard of proof required in administrative cases is a different matter which we shall now resolve. Dishonesty connotes a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. In this case, the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals made significant factual findings, which are binding on this Court, and which militate against petitioners argument that there is no longer any basis to hold them administratively liable. Notably, the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals found that the ETC Funds were not meant to be lent as capital for entrepreneurial projects. They were purposely given by the BTVE to Cebu State in order to facilitate the establishment of the latters ETC. Barillo, as President of Cebu State, is charged with knowledge of this fact. Despite this knowledge, however, the proceeds of the loan, as well as the
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Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service, having reached the age of 56. 24 October 2005 - petitioners were separately served with Orders directing them to appear in person at the Pre-Trial Investigation of the Charges for violation of Articles 651 and 972 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 and to submit their counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses at the Office of the Judge Advocate General. The Orders were accompanied by respective charge sheets against petitioners, accusing them of violating Articles of War 65 and 97. It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, particularly seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners from testifying before Congress without her prior approval be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges stated in the charge sheets against petitioners be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga, among others, and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against petitioners, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate on 28 September 2005. Issue: WON the violation of the order of Gen. Senga, which emanated from Pres. MacapagalArroyo, could lead to any investigation for courtmartial of petitioners Held/Ratio: YES. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that [t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-inchief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had already departed Baguio for Manila to attend the hearing. In the evening, a message was transmitted to the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as follows:
PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY
The following day, Gen. Senga informed Sen. Biazon that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifests that shortly before the start of the hearing, a copy of Gen. Sengas letter to Sen. Biazon sent earlier that day was handed at the Senate by Commodore Tolentino to Gen. Gudani, who replied that he already had a copy. Further, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino on the latters cell phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In response, Gen. Senga instructed Commodore Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani still refused to take Gen. Sengas call. A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then. On the very day of the hearing, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464, which enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. This Court subsequently ruled on the constitutionality of the said executive order in Senate v. Ermita. 30 September 2005 - petitioners were directed by Gen. Senga, to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) for investigation. During their appearance, both petitioners invoked their right to remain silent. The following day,
For assaulting or willfully disobeying superior officer. See Article 65, Com. Act No. 408 (1938).
2
A general article which punishes all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline and all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service x x x See Com. Act No. 408 (1938), Art. 97. Winlaw BarOps 2008 Page 13 of 219
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ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts. In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. The Court did not rule that the power to conduct legislative inquiry ipso facto superseded the claim of executive privilege, acknowledging instead that the viability of executive privilege stood on a case to case basis. Should neither branch yield to the other branchs assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries. Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action should be directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces, the persons who wield authority and control over the actions of the officers concerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any defenses against the same whether grounded on executive privilege, national security or similar concerns would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All the constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of government may be raised, assessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply with the decision of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor.
Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain of command. Willful disobedience of a superior officer is punishable by court-martial under Article 65 of the Articles of War. An individual soldier is not free to ignore the lawful orders or duties assigned by his immediate superiors. For there would be an end of all discipline if the seaman and marines on board a ship of war [or soldiers deployed in the field], on a distant service, were permitted to act upon their own opinion of their rights [or their opinion of the Presidents intent], and to throw off the authority of the commander whenever they supposed it to be unlawfully exercised. Still, it would be highly myopic on our part to resolve the issue solely on generalities surrounding military discipline. After all, petitioners seek to impress on us that their acts are justified as they were responding to an invitation from the Philippine Senate, a component of the legislative branch of government. At the same time, the order for them not to testify ultimately came from the President, the head of the executive branch of government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the
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filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a)3 of the Local Government Code (LGC) applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. He alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified therefore. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under the LGC does not apply to him. Issue: WON Moreno is qualified to run, which is dependent on WON his sentence was served Held/Ratio: Morenos sentence was not served, hence he is qualified to run for Punong Barangay. The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence found in Sec. 40(a) of the LGC. In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession. Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts. Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the superlative principle that is the Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The Constitution simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed, and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same result could have been achieved without offending constitutional principles. MORENO v. COMELEC, MEJES 10 Aug 2006 Facts: Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months by the RTC. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under the Probation Law, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections. The Investigating Officer of the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running. The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years of serving sentence; Winlaw BarOps 2008 Page 15 of 219
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Dec 24, 1998- Executive Secretary of ARMM, by authority of the ARMM Regional declared Arimao AWOL due to her failure to report to her office for at least a year after the expiration of her study leave and directed that she be dropped from the payroll. Arimao appealed to the Office of the ARMM Regional Governor. Appeal denied, finding that from 30 Oct 1996 up to the opening of SY 1997-1998, 1st sem, Arimao failed to report to office despite the fact that she was not able to enroll immediately upon the approval of her study leave. Aug 4, 2000- ARMM Regional Gov. Misuari issued a Memorandum to the TESDA-ARMM, ordering Arimaos reinstatement, in accordance with CSC Reso No. 96-3101 and CSC-ARMM directive dated 26 July 2000. Taher filed a Petition for Prohibition, RTCCotabato City, claiming that she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as she stands to suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury if she is removed from the office which she has held for more than five years. TC ruled that the Aug 4, 2000 Memorandum could no longer be implemented because the CSC resolutions ordering Arimaos reinstatement, relied upon by ARMM Regional Gov Misuari, were superseded by the CSC resolutions finding Arimao on AWOL and dropping her from the payroll. MR denied. Oct 31, 2000, Arimao moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of CSC Reso 96-3101 (ordering her reinstatement to her former office). CSC issued Reso 01-0132 ordering the concerned officials of the DECS-ARMM to implement CSC Reso 96-3101. 22 May 2002, the CSC issued Reso 020743. TESDA-ARMM is not under legal obligation to reinstate petitioner because she was already dropped from the rolls effective 24 December 1998. Issue #1: WON Arimao can be reinstated by mere directive of the ARMM Regional Governor Held/Ratio: NO. The AWOL order dated 24 December 1998 was in full force and effect when ARMM Regional Gov Misuari issued the assailed 04 August 2000 Memorandum. The order of reinstatement was made in implementation of CSC Reso No. 96-3101 and CSC-ARMM Directive Order dated 26 July 2000, both of which ordained her reinstatement. However, these directives were rendered functus officio by the CSC per its Reso No. 020743, which
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. ARIMAO V. TAHER 07 Aug 2006 Facts: Mar 22, 1995- Arimao was appointed as Director II, Bureau of Non-formal Education (DECS-ARMM). Jul 17, 1995- Taher was appointed Education Supervisor II. The position of Education Supervisor II being occupied by respondent was devolved from DECS-ARMM to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) - ARMM. Meanwhile, Arimao applied for and was granted by the DECS-ARMM a 1-year academic scholarship with pay effective 30 Oct 1996 in her capacity as Education Supervisor II. Arimaos appointment as Director was disapproved by Civil Service Commission- Field Office (CSC- FO) for failure to meet the experience required for the position, as affirmed by CSC on May 2, 1996. Arimao was to be reverted to her former position of Education Supervisor II. Arimao filed MR- denied. Dec 2, 1998- Arimao informed the CSC Regional Office that she was already allowed by the Director of TESDA-ARMM to report for duty, only that she and Taher are reporting for the same position. CSC Regional Director enjoined Taher from reporting to the TESDA-ARMM. Taher continued to report as Education Supervisor II. Dec 7, 1998- Taher filed a complaint before the Regional Director, ARMM, re Arimaos continued absence.
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prohibition violated jurisdiction the doctrine of primary
ruled that the TESDA-ARMM is not under legal obligation to reinstate Arimao because she was already dropped from the rolls effective 24 December 1998. With the finality of the AWOL order and her having been dropped from the rolls, Arimao legally lost her right to the position of Education Supervisor II. In any case, she has already received from the DECS-ARMM her salaries as Education Supervisor II for the period October 1996 to 1997, or the period corresponding to the time the position was still with the said department. Issue #2: WON a writ of prohibition lies to enjoin the directive of the ARMM Governor to reinstate Arimao to the position of Education Supervisor II despite having been declared on AWOL and dropped from the roll Held/Ratio: YES. The principal purpose for the writ of prohibition is to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation or assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal. It is granted when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or to put a stop to multiplicity of actions. Thus, for a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Under RA 6734, executive power in the ARMM is vested in the Regional Governor, who has control of all the regional executive commissions, boards, bureaus and offices, and exercises general supervision over the local government units within the Autonomous Region. The assailed Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor Misuari was presumably issued in the exercise of his power of control and supervision. However, by ordering the reinstatement of petitioner to her former position based upon an outdated CSC Resolution, despite the AWOL order and her being dropped from the rolls, ARMM Regional Governor Misuari acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Issue # 3: WON the filing of the petition for
Held: NO. GR: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Exception: When the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency. In the instant case, the legal question of whether a memorandum of the ARMM Governor, ordering the reinstatement of an employee declared AWOL and dropped from the rolls, was issued in excess of jurisdiction is a legal question which should be resolved by the courts. For the same reason that the issues to be resolved in this case are purely legal in nature, respondent need not abide by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Issue # 4: Who is entitled to the position of Education Supervisor II. Held/Ratio: Neither Arimao nor Taher is entitled to the position. The finality of the disapproval of Arimaos promotion, as well as that of the Order declaring her on AWOL and dropping her from the rolls in 1999, is no longer disputed. Thus, as found by the CSC in its Resolution No. 020743, TESDA has no legal obligation to reinstate Arimao to the position of Education Supervisor II. This does not mean that Taher is entitled to the position of Education Supervisor II. The efficacy of Tahers appointment was dependent on the validity of Arimaos promotional appointment which in turn was subject to the outcome of the protest against it. Due to the disapproval of Arimaos promotional appointment as Director II, Tahers appointment to Education Supervisor II was likewise invalidated. As of the date of finality of the denial of the petition questioning the disapproval of petitioners appointment as Director IIboth Arimao and Taher were reverted to their former positions. During Tahers occupancy of the position of Education Supervisor II after Arimaos promotional appointment had been disapproved, Taher should be deemed a de facto officer only. A de facto officer is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes and yet is not a good officer in point of law. He is one who is in
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On May 14, 2003, Pres GMA signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center Administration Committee, who formulated the IRR of RA 9207. Petitioners contend that provisions of the IRR are constitutionally infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with the object and purpose of the law sought to be implemented. Issue # 1: WON the homeowners association has legal standing to file the petition Held/Ratio: YES. It has legal standing, WON it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the NGC. The individual members of the association are residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either benefited or injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. Issue # 2: WON regular courts have jurisdiction over the case Held/Ratio: YES. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The principle of exhaustion of remedies applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasilegislative power. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the SC, CA and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. SC has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct
possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation. In Monroy v. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period of his wrongful tenure. In this case, Taher should account to Arimao for the salaries she received from the time the disapproval of promotion became final, up to the time when Arimao was declared on AWOL and dropped from the rolls. However, Taher may be allowed to keep the emoluments she received during said period, there being no de jure officer at the time. Taher cannot continue her unauthorized occupancy, notwithstanding the fact that the position of Education Supervisor II has been vacant since 1999. Absent any showing that she has been reappointed to the position after Arimao was declared AWOL and dropped from the rolls, Taher cannot lay a valid claim thereto. HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSN V. DEFENSOR, ET AL. 03 Aug 2006 Facts: On March 5, 1972, Pres. Marcos issued Proc No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On Aug 11, 1987, Pres. Aquino issued Proc No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proc No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. On Sept 7, 1993, Pres Ramos issued Proc No. 248, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program.
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optimal land use can be read in Proc No. 248 issued by then President Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the rapid increase in the population density in the NGC, it did not allocate additional property within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead authorized the vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots would not adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona fide residents in the NGC. In Sec 4, RA 9207, the institutional beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by them; hence, the portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries are fixed and cannot be allocated for other non-institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended for institutional beneficiaries would have to be equitably distributed among the bona fide residents of the NGC. In order to accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the area to be awarded to each beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary consequence. II. While Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m., RA 9207 does not provide for the price. It is said that Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by RA 9207. Held/Ratio: IRR provision is constitutional. Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. In Sec 5, RA 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statutes objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the
invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. There is no compelling reason shown to warrant the Courts taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Issue # 3: WON the IRR of RA 9207, or the National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003. is constitutional. I. RE: the limitation on the areas to be awarded to qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR- WON in harmony with RA 9207, which mandates that the lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used or occupied by bona fide residents without limitation to area. Held/Ratio: IRR provision is constitutional. The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two groups, namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC site and certain government institutions including the local government. Sec 3, RA 9207 mandates the allocation of additional property within the NGC for disposition to its bona fide residents and the manner by which this area may be distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Sec 4, RA 9207 governs the lot disposition to government institutions. While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area actually used or occupied at the time of the laws effectivity, this proviso applies only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local government, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions which do not have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC. There is no proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise entitled to the lot area actually occupied by him. The governments policy to set aside public property aims to benefit not only the urban poor but also the local government and various government institutions devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious purposes. Thus, although Proc No. 137 authorized the sale of lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area of the NGC was declared open for disposition subject to the condition that those portions being used or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the housing program for NGC residents. The same policy of rational and
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expansion programs for its runway. Expropriation proceedings were thus initiated over most of the properties. In 1996, Joaquin Rodriguez, one of the owners of the surrounding lots occupied by the expanded runway and assumed as not expropriated, proposed to sell his property to MIAA through its General Manager, Francisco Atayde. However, the offer did not ripen into a deal. Roqriguez subsequently bought a bigger lot, 7,687.5 square meters of which is being occupied by the expanded runway. This bigger lot is now the subject of present proceedings. After acquisition, Roqriguez demanded from MIAA full payment of the property and back rentals for 27 years amounting to p468.8M. As MIAA did not heed this demand, Roqriguez filed a case for accion reinvindicatoria with damages. The trial court held that MIAA had indeed illegally taken possession of the property and ordered MIAA to pay Rodriguez the purchase price of the property at p15,000 per square meter, back rentals from 1972 to 1998, as well as exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On appeal by MIAA, the Court of Appeals modified the ruling of the trial court holding that Rodriguez is only entitled to back rentals from the time he became the registered owner of the property, the award of rentals not being based on a contract of lease, but as a form of damages. Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals partially granted Rodriguezs by including legal interest in the award of rentals and denied MIAAs. Issue: WON Rodriguez is entitled to compensation and damages for the occupation of his property as a runway by MIAA. Held/Ratio: YES MIAA argues that it had already expropriated the subject lot back in the 1970s. This argument is without merit. It has been brought up for the first time on appeal and is negated by the fact that MIAA and Atayde negotiated with Rodriguez when the latter offered his property for sale as evidenced by correspondence between the parties. If indeed MIAA already owned the property, there would be no more need to negotiate. Just Compensation The subject lot was occupied by the runway of the MIAA starting in 1972. It has been repeatedly
qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law. These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over these matters. The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots is unreasonable. The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committees authority to formulate guidelines and policies to implement RA 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. III. RE: procedural flaw in the adoption of the assailed IRR. Held/Ratio: In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed complied with. That there is observance of more than the minimum requirements of due process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same. MIAA V. RODRIGUEZ 28 Feb 2006 Facts: In the seventies, petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), the government-owned and controlled corporation managing and operating the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Complex, implemented
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held that just compensation is determined on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the taking thereof, when the Government took possession of the land in question. The reason for this that the owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. [Republic v. Lara] Thus, the value of the lot in 1972 should serve as the basis for the award of compensation to the owner. Actual Damages Undeniably, the MIAAs illegal occupation of the lot for more than 20 years has resulted in pecuniary loss to Rodriguez and his predecessorsin-interest. This loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual damages which should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking up, from said point up to full payment by the MIAA. This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking. This award of interest renders unwarranted the grant of back rentals. As ruled in Republic v. Lara, et al., the indemnity for rentals is inconsistent with a property owners right to be paid legal interest on the value of the property, for if the condemnor is to pay the compensation due to the owners from the time of the actual taking of the property, the payment of such compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property; and hence, there is no basis for claiming rentals from the time of actual taking. Regardless of whether or not Rodriguez acted in bad faith (as argued by MIAA), all that he will be entitled to is the value of the property at the time of taking with legal interest thereon until fully paid. Exemplary Damages and Attorneys Fees For more than 20 years, the MIAA occupied the subject lot without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without the MIAA exerting efforts to ascertain ownership of the lot and negotiating with any of the owners of the property. These are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award of exemplary damages is in order, but the amounts granted by the courts below should be equitably reduced. ANTONIO V. GERONIMO 29 Nov 2005
Main: Expropriation has no binding legal effect unless a formal expropriation proceeding has been instituted. Facts:
Private respondent Alexander Catolos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, alleging he was the registered owner of 4 parcels of land situated at Antipolo. Petitioners Antonio et al. were occupying the said properties. Catolos claimed he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his land without requiring them to pay rent, on the condition that the latter would immediately vacate the same in the event that Catolos would need the premises. However, when Catolos did notify petitioners of his need to use the premises, petitioners refused to vacate the land even after demand. Respondent RTC judge ruled in favor of Catolos and ordered petitioners to vacate the subject properties. Writ of demolition issued. Partial demolition had already taken place when the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, Rizal passed 3 resolutuions authorizing Mayor Daniel Garcia to acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subject properties for public purposes/socialized housing. The demolition proceeded despite said resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan. The squatter petitioners filed a motion to stay execution with the MTC on the ground that supervening events have rendered execution unjust and inequitable. Motion denied - Respondent judge reasoned out 1) that no action for expropriation had yet been filed in court and 2) that petitioners had not complied with Commonwealth Act No. 538 in paying the current rents. Petitioners ascribe grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction to respondent judge in denying the motion to stay execution in view of two considerations, namely: the supervening events which make execution unjust and inequitable, and b) noncompliance with Commonwealth Act No. 538. Petitioners argue that Commonwealth Act No. 538 clearly provides that for the purposes of the Act, the action shall be considered instituted from the time the competent authority advises in writing the owner of the intention of the government to acquire his land.
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consider are the Local Government Code (LGC) and Republic Act No. 7279 (UDHA). Section 19, LGC - establishes how a local government unit may expropriate private property:
In its Comment, private respondent Catolos posits that Commonwealth Act No. 538 applies only to cases wherein expropriation proceedings are filed. The Sangguniang Bayans resolutions expressing the intent to expropriate the properties evinced merely an intention to expropriate and not the actual expropriation proceeding. According to private respondent, assuming that there exists an expropriation proceeding, petitioners still cannot avail of the automatic suspension of the ejectment case because they failed to pay their current rentals and deposit them with the court. (But petitioners were not required by contract to pay rents, thereby rendering the requirement by private respondent inapplicable.)
Issue: Whether a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can suspend the writ of execution and demolition in an ejectment case. Held: No! Demolition was valid. Petitioners must vacate. Ratio: In actions for ejectment, the general rule is if judgment is rendered against the defendant, it is immediately executory. Such judgment, however, may be stayed by the defendant only by: (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must concur. Exceptions are: 1) Existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from making the monthly deposit 2) Occurrence of supervening events which have brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitable 3) Where there is compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN - inherent in the State, employs private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. Local government units may exercise the power of eminent domain, subject to the limitation embodied under the law. Two relevant laws to
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
The Sangguniang Bayan, being a local legislative body, may exercise the power to expropriate private properties, subject to the following requisites, all of which must concur: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the instant case, no ordinance was passed. In the cases of Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation and Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, the Court stated that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
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An examination of the resolutions readily shows that the purpose for which they were passed is to save petitioners from the impending demolition. Commonwealth Act No. 538 applies only to cases where there exist actual expropriation proceedings. OTHER RELEVANT LAWS: SECTION 5, RA 1162 - an action for ejectment is deemed suspended only when an expropriation proceeding is actually commenced. To cure the objection that by the indefinite period of suspension provided for in section 5 of Republic Act No. 1162 the owner would be deprived indefinitely of his property without due process of law, RA 1599 was enacted amending that section by expressly providing that the suspension of ejectment proceedings shall be limited to the period of two years from the date of the approval of the amendatory act. SECTION 4, RA 3453 SEC. 4. Upon approval of this amendatory Act, no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against the present occupants of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment proceedings already commenced shall be continued, and such lot or any portion thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any person other than the present occupant without the consent of the latter given in a public instrument. Javier v. Araneta - therein petitioner was not allowed to invoke the benefits of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538. Only tenants who have been in faithful payment of rentals may invoke the benefits under Commonwealth Act No. 538. A squatter is not a tenant within a legal meaning of this word. SPS. CONSTANTINO, ET AL. V. HON. JOSE CUSIA, ET AL. 13 October 2005 Facts: This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assails contracts entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 (Financing Program or Program). This Financing Program was to manage the countrys external debt problem through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy involving cooperation and negotiation with foreign creditors. The Aquino government entered into three restructuring agreements with
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. The UDHA is also relevant as it governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10, in particular, provide the relevant limitations, thus:
Sec. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order: (a) Those owned by the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; (d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (f) Privately-owned lands. Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other models of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
Records do not show compliance with the abovementioned rules. No attempt was made to acquire the first five (5) lands mentioned in Section 9. Neither were the other modes of acquisition exhausted, as mandated by Section
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representatives of foreign creditor governments during the period of 1986 to 1991. During the same period, three similarly-oriented restructuring agreements were executed with commercial bank creditors. The Financing Program extinguished portions of the countrys pre-existing loans through either debt buyback or bond-conversion. The buyback approach essentially pre-terminated portions of public debts while the bond-conversion scheme extinguished public debts through obtaining a new loan by virtue of a sovereign bond issuance, the proceeds of which in turn were used for terminating the original loan. The Philippine Debt Negotiating Team negotiated an agreement with the countrys Bank Advisory Committee, representing all foreign commercial bank creditors, on the Financing Program. The Program was scheduled to be executed on 24 July 1992, nonetheless, petitioners alleged that even prior to the execution of the Program respondents had already implemented its buyback component when on 15 May 1992, the Philippines bought back P1.26 billion of external debts pursuant to the Program. According to petitioners the Financing Program is a package offered to the countrys foreign creditors consisting of two debt-relief options. The first option was a cash buyback of portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount. The second option allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine debt instruments into any of three kinds of bonds/securities: (1) new money bonds with a five-year grace period and 17 years final maturity, the purchase of which would allow the creditors to convert their eligible debt papers into bearer bonds with the same terms; (2) interest-reduction bonds with a maturity of 25 years; and (3) principal-collateralized interestreduction bonds with a maturity of 25 years. On the other hand, according to respondents the Financing Program would cover about U.S. $5.3 billion of foreign commercial debts and it was expected to deal comprehensively with the commercial bank debt problem of the country and pave the way for the countrys access to capital markets. They add that the Program carried three basic options from which foreign bank lenders could choose, namely: to lend money, to exchange existing restructured Philippine debts with an interest reduction bond; or to exchange the same Philippine debts with a principal collateralized interest reduction bond.
Issues: 1. WON the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing Program are beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution. 2. WON even assuming that the contracts under the Financing Program are constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into these contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents. 3. WON the Financing Program violates several constitutional policies and that contracts executed or to be executed pursuant thereto were or will be done by respondents with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Held/Ratio: 1. No. Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution provides, viz:
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and subject to such limitations as may be provided under law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
Loans are transactions wherein the owner of a property allows another party to use the property and where customarily, the latter promises to return the property after a specified period with payment for its use, called interest. On the other hand, bonds are interest-bearing or discounted government or corporate securities that obligate the issuer to pay the bondholder a specified sum of money, usually at specific intervals, and to repay the principal amount of the loan at maturity. The word bond means contract, agreement, or guarantee. The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary
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market and economic structures, the contracts entered into by respondents may possibly have a net outflow and therefore negative result. To ask the Court to strike down debt-relief contracts, which, according to independent third party evaluations using historically-suggested rates would result in substantial debt-relief, based merely on the possibility of petitioners worst-case scenario projection, hardly seems reasonable. CITY OF MANILA v. LAGUIO, JR. 12 April 2005 Facts: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate, licensed as a motel, although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDCs Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for amusement or entertainment and they were not services or facilities for entertainment, nor did they use women as tools for entertainment, and neither did they disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants or adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this regard, we note that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 245 as amended by Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 142, s. 1973, entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of bonds. Under this law, sovereign bonds may be issued not only to supplement government expenditures but also to provide for the purchase, redemption, or refunding of any obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the Philippine Government. 2. No. Delegation of Power The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. It falls upon the Secretary of Finance, as the alter ego of the President regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of the Government, to formulate a scheme for the implementation of the policy publicly expressed by the President herself. Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance. 3. No. Grave Abuse of Discretion and Violation of Constitutional Policies The respondents efforts were geared towards debt-relief with marked positive results and towards achieving the constitutional policies which petitioners so hastily declare as having been violated by respondents. We recognize that as with other schemes dependent on volatile
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or unconstitutionality. Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone; that the Ordinance cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation; the Ordinance did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila. On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order (TRO) against the enforcement of the Ordinance. And on 16 July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating the case SC under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. In the Petition and in its Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower court. In its Memorandum dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law; that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.
MTDC advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499 which specifically declared portions of the ErmitaMalate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDCs constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiffs property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. In their Answer dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code. Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and amusement. Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409, or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila). Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the burden to prove its illegality
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stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The principal purpose of the guarantee is to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owners point of view, equivalent to a taking unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable. A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the takings clause. A restriction on use of property may also constitute a taking if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner. The Ordinance gives the owners the directive to wind up business operations which amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed
Issue: W/N the petitioners validly exercised the police power delegated to them in enacting and enforcing said Ordinance. Held/Ratio: No. The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat (N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . . This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or property. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rightsa violation of the due process clause. While petitioners earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of wholesome, innocent establishments. There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. The rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes. Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motels premisebe it
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moral welfare of the community. The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. This would be a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to aninterference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, it needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. It cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions; 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Courts view, the classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area as
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. The Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. The second and third options transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property. The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. It qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the problem, it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole. Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and
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provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory powers. It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, but it cannot be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code Section 131. Thus the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies. Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity but such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. BALAJONDA v. COMELEC, ET AL. 28 Feb 2005 Facts: 07/16/02 Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman having won in the elections held the previous day. Her margin of victory over private respondent Francisco was 420 votes. Francisco duly filed
a noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located elsewhere. The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women. Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws. The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether such establishments. The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. Said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. It is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Thus, submitting to petitioners interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latters
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a petition for election protest, within 10 days from the date of proclamation in the MeTC of Quezon City. In answer, Balajonda alleged that Franciscos petition stated no cause of action and that the allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities were "baseless, conjectural, flimsy, frivolous, preposterous and mere figments of the latters wild imagination." She also stressed that although the grounds relied upon by Francisco were violations of election laws, not a single person had been prosecuted for violation of the same. MeTC: Dismissed the protest with its finding that Balajonda still led Francisco by 418 votes. Francisco appealed the decision to the COMELEC. COMELEC (02/02/04): Reversed the MeTC (granted appeal), finding that Francisco won over Balajonda by 111 votes. It annulled the proclamation of Balajonda, and declared Francisco as the duly elected Barangay Chairman. It ordered Balajonda to vacate in favor of Francisco and to cease and desist from performing the functions of the office. Balajonda filed a Motion for Reconsideration while Francisco filed a Motion for Execution (02/05/04), praying for a writ of execution in accordance with Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 of the ROC, which allows discretionary execution of judgment upon good reasons to be stated in the order. Balajonda opposed the motion, arguing in the main that under Sec. 2(a), Rule 39, only the judgment or final order of a trial court may be the subject of discretionary execution pending appeal. COMELEC (11/26/04): Granted the motion and directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution, ordering Balajonda to cease and desist from discharging her functions as Barangay Chairman and relinquish said office to Francisco. Francisco ordered to post a bond of P50,000 which shall answer for whatever damage Balajonda will sustain by reason of such execution if the final resolution of the protest would decide that he is not entitled thereto. Order immediately executory. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to order the immediate execution of its judgment or final order involving a disputed barangay chairmanship?
Held/Ratio: Yes Batul v. Bayron (2003): Affirmed a similar order of the COMELEC First Division directing the immediate execution of its own judgment. Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the ROC is expressly authorized by Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the ROC shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. However, Batul is different from this case in that in Batul the decision subject of the order of immediate execution was rendered by the poll body in the exercise of its original jurisdiction while the decision in this case was promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Still, there is no reason to dispose of this petition in a manner different from Batul. The public policy underlying the suppletory application of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 is to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as determined by either the courts or the COMELEC. Towards that end, we have consistently employed liberal construction of procedural rules in election cases to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In the instant case, the good reasons enunciated in Ramas v. Comelec (286 SCRA 189), to wit: (1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining period, and (3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending, is obtaining. Public interest is best served if Francisco who actually received the highest number of votes should be immediately be installed. It is likewise true that the remaining period or the unexpired term is too short that to further prolong the tenure of the protestee is a virtual denial of the right of the protestant, the duly elected barangay captain, to assume office. Considering that there are good reasons for the issuance of an Order of Execution, to wit: dictates of public policy and the shortness of the remaining period, the motion is granted.
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Local Government Code declares that all general and special laws or decrees inconsistent with the Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, but such clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the acts that are intended to be repealed. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are disfavored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it is not intended to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter Act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier. Is the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule under the Cockfighting Law clearly and convincingly irreconcilable with Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code? The clear import of Section 447(a)(3)(v) is that it is the sangguniang bayan which is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks, notwithstanding any law to the contrary. The necessity of the qualifying phrase "any law to the contrary notwithstanding" can be discerned by examining the history of laws pertaining to the authorization of cockpit operation in this country. P.D. No. 1802 reestablished the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and imposed further structure in the regulation of cockfighting. Under Section 4 thereof, city and municipal mayors with the concurrence of their respective sangguniang panglunsod or sangguniang bayan, were given the authority to license and regulate cockfighting, under the supervision of the City Mayor or the Provincial Governor. However, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802 was subsequently amended, removing the supervision exercised by the mayor or governor and substituting in their stead the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. The amended provision ordained:
Once more, Batul instructs that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELECs resolution with the COMELEC en banc does not suspend the execution thereof. TAN V. PEREA 18 Feb 2005 Facts: Petitioner Leonardo Tan (Tan) applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the issuance of a permit/license to establish and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, in Daanbantayan. At the time of his application, there was already another cockpit in operation in Daanbantayan, operated by respondent Socorro Y. Perea (Perea), who was the duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator in the municipality since the 1970s. Pereas franchise, per records, was valid until 2002. The Municipal Gamefowl Commission favorably recommended to the mayor of Daanbantayan, petitioner Lamberto Te (Te), that a permit be issued to Tan. On 20 January 1996, Te issued a mayors permit allowing Tan "to establish/operate/conduct" the business of a cockpit in Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan, Cebu for the period from 20 January 1996 to 31 December 1996. This act of the mayor served as cause for Perea to file a Complaint for damages with a prayer for injunction against Tan Issue: How many cockpits may be allowed to operate in a city or municipality? (There are two competing values of high order that come to fore in this case the traditional power of the national government to enact police power measures, on one hand, and the vague principle of local autonomy now enshrined in the Constitution on the other.) Held/Ratio: Petitioner Tes position denied. For the petitioners, Section 447(a)(3)(v) (LGC) sufficiently repeals Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law, vesting as it does on LGUs the power and authority to issue franchises and regulate the operation and establishment of cockpits in their respective municipalities, any law to the contrary notwithstanding. However, while the Local Government Code expressly repealed several laws, the Cockfighting Law was not among them. Section 534(f) of the
Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective "Sanggunians" shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and supervision.
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irrespective of territorial jurisdictions. Cockfighting is one such condition. It is a traditionally regulated activity, due to the attendant gambling involved or maybe even the fact that it essentially consists of two birds killing each other for public amusement. If we construe Section 447(a)(3)(v) as vesting an unlimited discretion to the sanggunian to control all aspects of cockpits and cockfighting in their respective jurisdiction, this could lead to the prospect of daily cockfights in municipalities, a certain distraction in the daily routine of life in a municipality. This certainly goes against the grain of the legislation earlier discussed. If the arguments of the petitioners were adopted, the national government would be effectively barred from imposing any future regulatory enactments pertaining to cockpits and cockfighting unless it were to repeal Section 447(a)(3)(v). SULTAN OSOP CAMID V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET.AL. 17 Jan 2005 Facts: Invoking Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, President Diosdado Macapagal issued Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao, one of them being EO 107 which created Andong in Lanao del Sur. Pelaez vs. Auditor Gen (1965): Then VP Pelaez successfully assailed the said Executive Orders, saying that the orders constituted undue delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. The EOs were declared void ab initio by the SC- the Auditor General was permanently enjoined from disbursing funds to the said municipalities and from passing audit on funds to implement the annulled executive orders, including EO 107. Petitioner Sultan Camid (as a private citizen, taxpayer and resident of Andong) comes to the court to assail a Certification issued by the DILGs Bureau of Local Government Supervision, which enumerates 18 municipalities certified as existing based on the DILGs records. Those 18 municipalities were among the 33 that were previously declared annulled by reason of the Pelaez ruling and so Camid alleges that theres unequal treatment to the municipalities that are similarly situated, resulting in grave abuse of discretion on the DILGs part. Camids Prayer: * That the DILG Certification dated Nov 21 2003 be annulled
The Court, on a few occasions prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991, had opportunity to expound on Section 4 as amended. A discussion of these cases will provide a better understanding of the qualifier "any law to the contrary notwithstanding" provided in Section 447(a)(3)(v). In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court, through Justice Cruz, asserted that the conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in the Constitution. The twin pronouncements that it is the municipal authorities who are empowered to issue cockpit licenses and that the powers of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission were limited to review and supervision were affirmed in subsequent cases. Then, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted. There is no more forceful authority on this landmark legislation than Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., its principal author. In his annotations to the Local Government Code, he makes the following remarks relating to Section 447(a)(3)(v):
12. Licensing power. In connection with the power to grant licenses lodged with it, the Sangguniang Bayan may now regulate not only businesses but also occupations, professions or callings that do not require government examinations within its jurisdiction. It may also authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, regulate cockfighting, and the commercial breeding of gamecocks. Existing rights however, may not be prejudiced. The power to license cockpits and permits for cockfighting has been removed completely from the Gamefowl Commission.
Thus, that part of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos, Inc. et al., which held that "the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal councils guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission" is no longer controlling. Under [Section 447(a)(3)(v)], the power of the Sanggunian concerned is no longer subject to the supervision of the Gamefowl Commission. We do not doubt, however, the ability of the national government to implement police power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the subject of regulation is a condition of universal character
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once done, he should have brought the issue with the CA, which has the power to make factual determinations on a case. Only the Congress/legislature has the power to create political subdivisions. There are only two ways by which municipalities created via executive orders may be recognized: Thru Curative legislation Sec 442(d) of LGC 1991 This applies to the cases of Sinacaban, San Andres and Alicia which were created through EOs but were recognized as existing de jure. The requisites for the application of Sec 442(d) are: That the municipality has elective officials That the municipality should have been recognized by the national government Curative laws are in essence retrospective, aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been valid under existing laws, as if existing laws are complied with. Sec 442 (d) does not serve to legitimize the creation of municipalities by the executive department, it merely affirms the existence of municipalities which have been operating de facto. Andong doesnt meet the abovementioned requisites because: i. The EO creating it in 1964 was expressly declared void by the court in 1965 ii. Andong never elected its municipal officers iii. The national government did not recognize its existence, depriving it of public funds, refusing to conduct municipal elections for it Thru Reimplementing Statutes the 18 municipalities that were recognized by the DILG, against which Camid invokes equal protection in behalf of Andong, were reconstituted through legislation. Andong does not benefit from any such statute. Those municipalities derive their legal personality from the legislation enacted to revive them, NOT from he presidential issuances or executive orders that originally created them. DISOMANGCOP, ET AL V. DATUMANONG, ET AL.
* That the Court direct the DILG to classify Andong as a regular existing municipality * That the public respondents extend full recognition and support of Andong * That the Department of Finance and Department of Budget and Management immediately release revenue allotments for andong * That the public respondents esp. the DILG to respect the Interim Officialsof Andong Camid relies on several things to prove that Andong has been in existence: It has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, DECS Office, at least 7 barangay units Interim Officials who have neither been elected nor appointed but have been attending to the needs of the constituents Certification by DENRs Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) re: total land area of Andong Certification by Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi re: total population of Andong Section 442(d) of the Local Govt Code which says that Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivitiy of this Code shall continue to operate and exist as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities Issues: 1. WON special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus resorted to by the Petitioner are proper remedies 2. WON a municipality such as Andong whose creation was previously voided by the Court can attain recognition without any curative or reimplementing statute/ WON it is similarly situated as the 18 municipalities recognized by the DILG Held: 1. No. 2. No. Ratio: There was a failure to observe exhaustion of administrative remedies and doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The case deals with factual antecedents, which cannot be confirmed because the appreciation of such is beyond the function of the Supreme Court as it is not a trier of facts. Camid should have exhausted administrative remedies first and
DIGESTS
25 Nov 2004
OF

R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts. Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. They sought mainly the following relief:
(2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH...
Facts: 1987 Constitution the Philippines ordained the establishment of regional autonomy. Sections 1 and 15, Article X mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. Subsequent laws enacted (in chronological order): R.A. 6734 (An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the ARMM) calling for the holding of a plebiscite in various provinces and cities in Mindanao. Only 4 provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the ARMM. E.O. 426 (Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes) issued by Pres. Aquino in accordance with R.A. 6734. ARMM was formally organized on November 1990, President Aquino having already signed 7 EO's devolving to ARMM the powers of 7 cabinet departments. D.O. 119 issued by DPWH Secretary Vigilar, which created the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office, having jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 (An Act Establishing an Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor) enacted 2 years later. Sec. 3 of which states:
SEC. 3. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act... such sums as may be necessary for the maintenance and continued operation of the engineering district office shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. They also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly studied, and that the explanatory note to H.B. 995 from which the law originated is questionable. They assert that no public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. Respondents maintain the validity of D.O. 119, arguing that it was issued in accordance with E.O. 124. In defense of the constitutionality of R.A. 8999, they submit that the powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power of Congress. They also contend that the petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the law and the department order. They note that petitioners have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. Issue 1: Is the case justiciable? Held: Yes.
1. Taada v. Angara: where an action of the

legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 2. In deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition questioning acts of the political departments of government, the Court will not review the wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike them down only on
R.A. 9054 (An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734) Like its forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government.
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requirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become operative. R.A. 9054 advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter laws objective. Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts, It contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy. The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures must be allowed to flourish. Regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious peace and order problems and secessionist movements. However, the creation of autonomous regions can be installed only within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Regional autonomy is the degree of selfdetermination exercised by the local government unit vis--vis the central government. Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central government. The objective is to permit determined groups, with a common tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. It implies the cultivation of more positive means for national integration. Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates to exercise authority in certain areas. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments. 2 forms: Deconcentration / administrative decentralization involves the transfer
either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion. 3. For an abuse to be grave, the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 4. The creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWHARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case. Issue 2: Whether R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional and were issued with grave abuse of discretion. Held: Yes.
R.A. 8999 R.A. 8999 never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a subsequent enactment. The ARMM Organic Acts, being a part of the regional autonomy scheme, are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. R.A. 6074 devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time) to the Regional Government. By creating an office with previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect. Absent compliance with this
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The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124signed and approved by President Aquino in her residual legislative powersis of no moment. A special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogant generali. Grave abuse of discretion Respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A. 8999 despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices. Devolution connotes political decentralization; there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities; aims to grant greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical capabilities. E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG). Also, Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to the ARG. The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and transfer of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the ARG are meant to be true, meaningful and unfettered. With R.A. 8999, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control again. The hands, once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up. The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional autonomy illusory with respect to infrastructure projects. DPWH Department Order No. 119 D.O. 119 creating the Marawi SubDistrict Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426 which sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the ARG. The office created under D.O. 119 is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive order. The DPWHs order cannot rise higher than its source of powerthe Executive.
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the manner of her alleged illegal dismissal. She cannot be allowed to file a separate or independent civil action for damages where the alleged injury has a reasonable connection to her termination from employment. Consequently, the action for damages filed before the MeTC must be dismissed. DULDULAO v. CA 01 March 2007 Facts: Petitioner Constancia P. Duldulao was hired by respondent Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) as secretary/clerk-typist and assigned to the College of Law in 1987. In August 1996, a certain law student filed a complaint against petitioner for alleged irregularities in the performance of her work. Petitioner was told to submit her answer to the complaint and given several extensions to do so, but failed to submit her answer. Dean Aquino of the College of Law informed BCF President Tenefrancia of petitioners failure to file her answer and recommended the assignment of petitioner outside the College of Law, not only because of such failure to answer but also her having admitted fraternizing with students of the College. On the same day, BCF VP for Administration Dela Cruz, issued a Department Order stipulating: 1. She shall report at the office of the Principals of the High School and Elementary Departments; 2. She shall render regular duty in those offices until further notice. Petitioner filed a case with the BCF Grievance Committee, citing her "unceremonious, capricious, whimsical and arbitrary reassignment from her position as Secretary of the College of Law to the Elementary/High School Departments," but the case was transferred to the Administrative Investigating Committee as petitioner was not a member of the union. The Committee found the Department Order appropriate since it was intended to prevent the controversy between petitioner and the complaining student from adversely affecting a harmonious relationship within the College of Law. It recommended that petitioner start reporting to her new assignment, approved and adopted by BCF President Tenefrancia. In the interim, upon the request of several students from the College of Law, respondent constituted a Fact-Finding Committee to investigate the allegations. The Fact Finding Committee Report was submitted to the Dean. It
KAWACHI, ET AL. v. DEL QUERO, ET AL. 27 March 2007 Facts: Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations. The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code. Private respondent Del Quero charged A/J Raymundo Pawnshop, Inc., Virgilio Kawachi and petitioner Julius Kawachi with illegal dismissal, non-execution of a contract of employment, violation of the minimum wage law, and nonpayment of overtime pay. The complaint was filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The complaint alleged that Virgilio Kawachi hired private respondent as a clerk of the pawnshop and that on certain occasions, she worked beyond the regular working hours but was not paid the corresponding overtime pay. It was also alleged that petitioner Julius Kawachi terminated private respondents employment without affording her due process. Private respondent Del Quero filed an action for damages against petitioners before the MeTC of QC. Who has jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for damages? Held: The NLRC has jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for illegal dismissal and damages arising therefrom. Under the "reasonable causal connection rule, if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor courts. In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction. In this case, the allegations in private respondents complaint for damages show that her injury was the offshoot of petitioners immediate harsh reaction as her administrative superiors to the supposedly sloppy manner by which she had discharged her duties. Petitioners reaction culminated in private respondents dismissal from work in the very same incident. Clearly, the alleged injury is directly related to the employeremployee relations of the parties. Where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation, the regular courts have jurisdiction. The allegations in private respondents complaint unmistakably relate to
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the Principals of the High School and Elementary Departments was premised on certain considerations, namely: (i) the polarization of the students as a result of the controversy between petitioner and the complaining student; (ii) petitioners failure to file her answer to the complaint against her; and (iii) petitioners having expressly admitted her fraternization with some students. Respondent justifies its reassignment of petitioner as a legitimate exercise of its management prerogative. Issue: WON petitioners transfer as secretary/clerk-typist from the College of Law to the High School and Elementary Departments amounts to constructive dismissal. Held/Ratio: NO. Findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the NLRC, are accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The findings of the NLRC were affirmed by the Court of Appeals and can only be set aside upon showing of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, none of which has been shown here. There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it would foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. It exists where there is cessation of work because "continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay," which is not seen in this case. It must be stressed that petitioner has no vested right to the position of secretary/clerk-typist of the College of Law that may operate to deprive respondent of its prerogative to change or transfer her assignment to another department where she will be most useful in its judgment.Petitioner was employed by respondent which is the BCF system itself, not the College of Law only, which is but a component part of the system. Thus, to respondent belongs the prerogative to reassign petitioner to any of its departments as it sees fit, provided that such reassignment is made in good faith. In the case of Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corp. v. NLRC, the Court ruled: It is the employers prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its
contained, among others, a pronouncement that while petitioner was not guilty of the specific charges against her, "the implementation by the college secretary of the policies of the college, while oftentimes carrying the imprimatur of the Dean and of the Faculty, had alienated some students due to the lack of circumspection which, when coupled with ingrained perceptions, result in failure of communication." The Department Order notwithstanding, petitioner did not report for work and instead took a vacation leave and several other leave of absences from October 1996 to January 1997. Then, on February 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for constructive dismissal with prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees before the NLRC. She claimed that she was arbitrarily directed to report for work in a location far from her original place of assignment on account of which she would be incurring additional expenses in transportation. She also claimed that aside from being tainted with procedural lapses in violation of her right to due process, the transfer amounted to her demotion in rank. The NLRC held that petitioner was neither demoted nor dismissed, as her salary, benefits and other privileges remained the same despite her reassignment. Neither was there any violation of due process since petitioner was granted an initial period and several extensions within which to file her answer to the complaint against her. Moreover, even as petitioner continued to display a hostile attitude in work by refusing to report at her new assignment under the guise of leave of absences, respondent did not impose any disciplinary action. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the NLRC. It ruled that petitioner was not constructively dismissed, finding that petitioner was unable to point to any evidence that her reassignment was prompted by the malevolence or ill-will of respondent. Respondent did not intend petitioners transfer to be a disciplinary sanction against her but merely a temporary measure to prevent controversy within the College of Law. In the instant petition, petitioner reiterates her posture that her transfer was a case of constructive dismissal, tainted with bad faith and intended as punishment for an erring employee, whereupon she claims entitlement to backwages, benefits and moral damages. On the other hand, respondent asserts that petitioners temporary transfer from the Office of the Dean of the College of Law to the Office of
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pending complaint or investigation against a possible erring employee, respondent could not afford to have a discordant studentry, and a college tainted with controversy. Surely, the harmony and integrity of its faculty, staff and students are as important as, if not more important than, any of the properties of respondent. Mere incidental inconvenience is not enough to warrant a claim of constructive dismissal. SIME DARBY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. V. NLRC 06 Dec 2006 Facts:
business operations in order to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. An employees right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal. In her complaint, petitioner alleged that by reason of the transfer, she would incur additional transportation expenses, be constrained to engage the services of a house help, and suffer a demotion in rank and status. As explained by respondent, the difference in traveling distance is not so large as to cause great inconvenience to petitioner as in fact, by merely changing the route to take, the distance from petitioners house to the College of Law and that from her house to her new assignment will almost be the same. Neither is the transfer equivalent to a demotion in rank and status. Petitioner was a secretary/clerktypist of the College of Law. As such secretary/clerk-typist, she would only have to perform the same duties in the Office of the Principals of the High School and Elementary Departments. Moreover, the order of transfer prior to the submission of her answer cannot be deemed a violation of her right to due process. Reassignments by management pending investigation of irregularities allegedly committed by an employee fall within the ambit of management prerogative. The transfer, while incidental to the pending charges against petitioner, was not meant to be a penalty, but rather a preventive measure to avoid further damage to the College of Law. It was not designed to be the culmination of the then ongoing administrative case against petitioner. The purpose of reassignments is no different from that of preventive suspension which management could validly impose as a measure of protection of the companys property pending investigation of any malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. In the same way that an ordinary business cannot afford to put at risk its resources while there is a
October 1995- Petitioner Union submitted proposal to the company for the remaining 2 years of 10-year CBA. The company gave its counterproposal but the parties failed to agree. Company declared a deadlock in the negotiations and also filed a notice of CBA deadlock and request for preventive mediation with the DOLE. The union objected to the deadlock and filed its opposition to the assumption of jurisdiction and certification to arbitration. 21 June 1995- company filed a Notice of Lockout on the ground of deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiations and sent a Notice of Lock Out Vote dated 24 July 1995 to the NCMB. 23 June 1995- union conducted its strike vote referendum and filed its Strike Vote Result Report to NCMB on 24 July 1995. 06 August 1995- the company declared and implemented a lockout against all the hourly employees of its tire factory on the ground of sabotage and work slowdown. September 1995- union filed a complaint for illegal lockout before the DOLE-NLRC 19 October 1995- stockholders of the company approved the sale of the companys tire manufacturing assets and business operation. The company issued a memorandum dated 20 October 1995 informing all its employees of the plan to sell the tire manufacturing assets and operations. 27 October 1995- the company filed with the DOLE a Closure and Sale of Tire Manufacturing Operation. 15 November 1995- company individually served notices of termination to all the
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complaints against the company for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. Findings of the Labor Arbiter: 1. lockout valid and legal, and justified by the incidents of continued work slowdown, mass absences, and consistent low production output, high rate of waste and scrap tires and machine breakdown. 2. declared valid the mass termination of all the employees and authorized termination of employment due to closure of the establishment, the company having complied with the requirements laid down by Article 283 of the Labor Code, payment of the prescribed separation pay. 3. also decided that the companys decision to sell all of its assets was a valid and legitimate exercise of its management prerogative. 4. Re ULP claim: the labor arbiter found no evidence to substantiate the same, and that the records merely showed that the closure of and eventual cessation from business was justified by the circumstances in order to protect the companys investments and assets. 5. also ruled that the quitclaims and receipts signed by petitioners were voluntarily signed, indicating that the settlement reached by petitioners and the company was just and reasonable. 6. declared that the motions for ocular inspection and return of separation pay field by the company are rendered moot and academic in view of said Decision. 7. dismissed the consolidated complaints for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal and unfair labor. 8. complaint against respondent SD Retread System was also dismissed for failure of the complainants to sufficiently establish and substantiate their claim that the latter and respondent Sime Darby are one and the same company, and for lack of employeremployee relationship. Petitioners appealed the labor arbiters decision to the NLRC but appeal was dismissed. NLRC Ruling: 1. affirmed the labor arbiters decision and ruled that the labor arbiter still had jurisdiction over the consolidated complaints when he issued his decision.
employees, including the individual petitioners. Employees were barred from entering company premises, and were only allowed to enter to get their personal belongings and their earned benefits on 21-22 November 1995. On said dates, the employees likewise received their separation pay equivalent to 150% of the base rate for every year of credited service; they also signed and executed individual quitclaims and releases. 24 November 1995- company filed with the DOLE a Notice of Termination of Employees dated 17 November 1995, covering all its employees in the tire manufacturing and support operations effective 15 December 1995. November 1995- petitioners filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the DOLE. January 1996- petitioners filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice. The cases for illegal dismissal, illegal lockout and unfair labor practice were then consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Portillo. 24 April 1996- company sold its tire manufacturing plant and facilities to Goodyear. 20 August 1996- company and its officers filed a motion to conduct ocular inspection of the tire factory premises to establish that it was sold to Goodyear; motion was opposed by the union. 14 July 1998- company filed a motion for the return of the separation pay received by the complainants, pending the resolution of the case. 25 August 1998- Labor Arbiter Portillo orderedthat the respondents instant motion be treated in the resolution of the above cases on the merits. The parties were given the opportunity to submit their respective memorandum within 10 days from and thereafter the instant cases deemed submitted for resolution without further notice. 26 October 1998- Union filed an Appeal Memorandum with a petition for injunction and/or a temporary restraining order before the NLRC without filing the memorandum as ordered by the labor arbiter. 29 October 1998- labor arbiter rendered his decision in the consolidated cases, dismissing for lack of merit petitioners
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the CA decision; issue of failure to abide by the 30-day notice rule can no longer be raised for the first time on appeal. 3. company points out that the ruling in Serrano does not apply to this case since Serrano involved the retrenchment of only one employee, Ruben Serrano, from an establishment which remained and continued in business, while in the present scenario, the companys business operation ceased for good, and the employees were furnished individual termination notices 30days before the actual date of separation. 4. The 25 August 1995 Order, an interlocutory order is unappealable,thus the labor arbiter retained its jurisdiction over the cases even after the Order was appealed to the NLRC 5. decisions of the labor arbiter and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are supported by substantial evidence 6. insists on the legality of the lockout and termination of employment, and denies having committed an unfair labor practice. SD Retread Systems, Inc. argues that it has a separate and distinct entity from Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., and denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with petitioners. Issues: WON labor arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued its decision; WON labor arbiter lost jurisdictional competence to issue his decision after petitioners appealed his 25 August 1995 Order Held/Ratio: No; no, labor arbiter still jurisdiction when he rendered his decision. had
Petitionersprayer for damages and attorneys fees also struck down. 2. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting them to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. CA ruling: 1. denied the petition and affirmed decision of the NLRC 2. declared arbiter was not divested of its jurisdiction over the consolidated cases when petitioners filed their appeal memorandum since the appealed order is interlocutory in nature. 3. affirmed the dismissal of the complaints against SD Retread System for failure of the petitioners to substantiate the claim of the existence of employer-employee relationship. 4. Petitioners sought motion for reconsideration for appeal but was denied. Petitioners arguments : 1. they were denied due process when they were dismissed right on the day they were handed down their termination letters, without the benefit of the thirty (30)-day notice as required by law, and invoke the ruling in Serrano v. NLRC 2. they deny having executed quitclaims in favor of the company. 3. arbiter had lost jurisdictional competence to issue his 29 October 1998 Decision since they have already perfected their appeal on 26 October 1998, making said Decision void ab initio. 4. claim that the labor arbiter erred when it failed to consider as admitted the matters contained in their Request for Admission after respondents failed to file a sworn answer 5. they allege that the decisions of the CA and the NLRC lacked evidentiary support Companys arguments: 1. company asserts that it complied with the 30-day notice requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code when it notified the employees on 15 November 1995 that their termination was to take effect on 15 December 1995. 2. alleged violation of the 30 day notice requirement was never raised in the proceedings below, except in petitioners supplemental motion for reconsideration of
The 25 August 1998 Order of the labor arbiter partakes the nature of an interlocutory order, or one which refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the courts. The 25 August 1998 Order merely terminated formal trial of the consolidated cases, declared that the motion for inspection will be dealt with in the resolution of the case, and ordered the submission of the parties respective memoranda after which the case shall be submitted for
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the CBA negotiations, lack of notice of dismissal, the validity of the release and quitclaim, etc. Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories. hearings and resolutions of labor disputes are not governed by the strict and technical rules of evidence and procedure observed in the regular courts of law. Technical rules of procedure are not applicable in labor cases, but may apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character, for instance, when there is a need to attain substantial justice and an expeditious, practical and convenient solution to a labor problem. The ruling in Serrano has already been superseded by the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relation Commission.The Agabon enunciates the new doctrine that if the dismissal is for just cause but statutory due process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for noncompliance with the procedural requirements of due process. The issue of illegal dismissal had already been resolved by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, which both found that the company had an authorized cause and had complied with the requirements of due process when it dismissed petitioners. LIGANZA v. RBL SHIPYARD CORPORATION et al. 17 October 2006 Facts: After working as a carpenter for respondent since August 1991, petitioner's employment was terminated on 30 October 1999. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Respondent however insists that petitioner was a mere project employee who was terminated upon completion of the project for which he was hired. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner is a regular, not a project employee. As petitioner's dismissal was not done in accordance with the due process requirement of twin notices, said dismissal is illegal. The Labor Arbiter thus ordered the reinstatement of petitioner, and the payment of backwages, as well as moral and exemplary damages. On appeal to the NLRC, respondent corporation presented the other project
resolution. It did not put an end to the issues of illegal lockout, ULP, and illegal dismissal. Being interlocutory in nature, the 25 August 1998 Order could not have been validly appealed such that it would divest the labor arbiter of his jurisdiction over the consolidated cases.
Even if petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari, which would have been the proper remedy, the same would still fail. the labor arbiter did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when he issued the 25 August 1998 Order. holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. Section 4, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC grants a labor arbiter wide latitude to determine, after the submission by the parties of their position papers/memoranda, whether there is need for a formal trial or hearing. a formal type or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of controversy. in one case, Court held that a party has no vested right to a formal hearing simply and merely because the labor arbiter granted its motion and set labor arbiter enjoys wide discretion in determining whether there is a need for a formal hearing in a given case, and he or she may use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case without regard to technicalities. With or without a formal hearing, the labor arbiter may still adequately decide the case since he can resolve the issues on the basis of the pleadings and other documentary evidence previously submitted. When the parties submitted their position papers and other pertinent pleadings to the labor arbiter, it is understood/given/deemed that they have included therein all the pieces of evidence needed to establish their respective cases. Petitioners request for admission does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. A review of said Request for Admission shows that it contained matters which are precisely the issues in the consolidated cases, and/or irrelevant matters; for example, the reasons behind the lockout, the companys motive in
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employment Commission Decision.
OF

these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and jurisprudence." Length of time is not the controlling test for project employment. Nevertheless, it is vital in determining if the employee was hired for a specific undertaking or tasked to perform functions vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. Here, respondent had been a project employee several times over. His employment ceased to be coterminous with specific projects when he was repeatedly re-hired due to the demands of petitioner's business. Where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down as contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order. Finally, the Court reiterates that: At this time, we wish to allay any fears that this decision unduly burdens an employer by imposing a duty to re-hire a project employee even after completion of the project for which he was hired. The import of this decision is not to impose a positive and sweeping obligation upon the employer to re-hire project employees. What this decision merely accomplishes is a judicial recognition of the employment status of a project or work pool employee in accordance with what is fait accompli, i.e., the continuous re-hiring by the employer of project or work pool employees who perform tasks necessary or desirable to the employer's usual business or trade. x x x DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. V. SALDIVAR, ET AL. 11 October 2006 The main issue for resolution herein is whether there was sufficient cause for the dismissal of a rank-and-file employee effectuated through the enforcement of a closed-shop provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the employer and the union. Timbal, a member of ALU, the exclusive bargaining agent of plantation workers of petitioner Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) in Bukidnon, along with 4 others, was charged by ALU for disloyalty to the union, particularly for encouraging defections to a rival union, the National Federation of Labor (NFL). Del Monte
contracts with petitioner. The set aside the Labor Arbiter's
Petitioner went up to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review on certiorari, The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Issue: WON petitioner is a project employee Held/Ratio. NO. A project employee is one whose "employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season." While the appropriate evidence to show that a person is a project employee is the employment contract specifying the project and the duration of such project, the existence of such contract is not always conclusive of the nature of one's employment. The Court takes exception to the Court of Appeals' finding that "after every completion of the project, petitioner was free to seek other employments outside the private respondent's company." This conclusion is not supported by the record. As respondent has affirmed, it executes three (3)-month or six (6)- month contracts with its so-called project employees. Even assuming that petitioner is a project employee, respondent failed to prove that his termination was for a just and valid cause. While it is true that the employment contract states that the contract ends upon a specific date, or upon completion of the project, respondent failed to prove that the last project was indeed completed so as to justify petitioner's termination from employment. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause. However, all that we have is respondent's self-serving assertion that the project has been completed. This Court has held that an employment ceases to be co-terminous with specific projects when the employee is continuously rehired due to the demands of employer's business and re-engaged for many more projects without interruption. In Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC (Second Division), the Court ruled that "once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, rehired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2)
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terminated Timbal and her co-employees, noting that the termination was "upon demand of [ALU] pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of Article III of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement. Even if the dismissal of an employee is conditioned not on the grounds for termination under the Labor Code, but pursuant to the provisions of a CBA, it still is necessary to observe substantive due process in order to validate the dismissal. As applied to the Labor Code, adherence to substantive due process is a requisite for a valid determination that just or authorized causes existed to justify the dismissal. As applied to the dismissals grounded on violations of the CBA, observance of substantial due process is indispensable in establishing the presence of the cause or causes for dismissal as provided for in the CBA. Moreover, the presence of a second witness, Piquero, to corroborate the disloyalty charge against Timbal cannot be given credence for the name and testimony were invoked for the first time only in Del Monte's motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. Other than the handwritten reference made in the raw stenographic notes attached to ALU's position paper before the NLRC-RAB, Piquero's name or testimony was not mentioned either by ALU or Del Monte before any of the pleadings filed before the NLRC-RAB, the NLRC, and even with those submitted to the Court of Appeals prior to that court's decision. In order for the Court to be able to appreciate Piquero's testimony as basis for finding Timbal guilty of disloyalty, it is necessary that the fact of such testimony must have been duly established before the NLRC-RAB, the NLRC, or at the very least, even before the Court of Appeals. Inasmuch as we have ascertained in the text of this discourse that the OFC whimsically dismissed petitioners without proper hearing and has thus opened OFC to a charge of unfair labor practice, it ineluctably follows that petitioners can receive their back wages computed from the moment their compensation was withheld after their dismissal in 1989 up to the date of actual reinstatement. The conclusion that the Labor Arbiter in the instant case could not properly pass judgment on the cross-claim for reimbursement of Del Monte against ALU is further strengthened by the fact that Del Monte and ALU expressly recognized the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators in the CBA.
VELASCO vs. NLRC 26 June 2006 Facts:
Velasco - owner-manager of Modern Furniture Manufacturing - 1970: He hired the private respondents, Tayags - 1999: Velasco laid off Tayags due to business losses but promised that if they would be rehired of the business would prosper - Tayags filed a complaint against Velasco for illegal dismissal with money claims before the NLRC - Velasco alleges that it was the Tayags who abandoned work. - LA: dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal - NLRC: reversed LA. However, only granted reinstatement without backwages there being no showing that there was illegal dismissal. - CA: affirmed NLRC. However, it stated that there was illegal dismissal (employer had the burden of proving that the termination was for a just or authorized cause) Issue: WON NLRC found that there was illegal dismissal Held/Ratio: YES. VELASCO: CA erred in finding that the Tayags were illegally dismissed since the NLRC concluded otherwise. - relies upon this phrase to conclude that the NLRC said that there was illegal dismissal is: "there being no showing also that there was illegal dismissal." SC: NO! Such statement is clearly off-tangent with the rest of the Resolution, as well as the dispositive portion thereof. Reading the entire Resolution of the NLRC would show that it is beyond doubt that the NLRC concluded that Velasco had failed to establish that the Tayags had abandoned their employment. Further, the NLRC concluded that the Tayags had stopped reporting to the premises of Modern Furniture because Velasco and Modern Furniture had stopped assigning them work. Considering such ruling of the NLRC which illustrated that the
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Facts: Respondent APFLAA, which was issued a Certificate of Union Registration by DOLE, was elected as the collective bargaining representative of the flight attendants of APC. APC filed a Petition for De-Certification and Cancellation of Union Registration against APFLAA with DOLE. APC alleged that APFLAA could not be registered as a labor organization, as its composition consisted of a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file flight attendants. Particularly, APC alleged that flight attendants holding the position of Lead Cabin Attendant, which according to it is supervisory in character, were among those who comprised APFLAA. DOLE dismissed the petition and held that Article 245 of the Labor Code, which states that supervisory employees are not eligible for membership in labor organizations of rank-and-file employees, does not provide a ground for cancellation of union registration, which is instead governed by Article 239 of the Labor Code. Issue: WON APFLAAs union registration may be cancelled considering that the union is allegedly composed of a mixture of supervisory and rankand-file employees? Held: No. The rule under Article 245 barring supervisory employees from joining the union of rank-and-file employees is not a ground for cancellation of union registration. Ratio: In SPI Technologies Inc. v. DOLE the Court held that Article 245 of the Labor Code merely prescribed the requirements for eligibility in joining a union and did not prescribe the grounds for cancellation of union registration and in the case of Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees UnionPGTWO, it was ruled that the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code. Clearly then, for the purpose of de-certifying a union, it is not enough to establish that the rankand-file union includes ineligible employees in its membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, or in connection with the election of officers, minutes
Tayags were not guilty of abandonment, there is no legal basis whatsoever for the conclusion that "there was no showing x x x that there was illegal dismissal." When it is clear that the cited passage cannot stand with the rest of the decision, including the dispositive portion, the Court cannot obviously confer binding effect on the conclusion that there was no illegal dismissal, as it runs contrary against the grain of the rest of the Resolution. *Tayags should be awarded full backwages The normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and, secondly, the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. These twin remedies -reinstatement and payment of backwages-make the dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to continued employment. *Separation Pay vs. Backwages The two forms of relief are distinct and separate, one from the other. Though the grant of reinstatement commonly carries with it an award of backwages, the inappropriateness or nonavailability of one does not carry with it the inappropriateness or non-availability of the other. Separation pay was awarded in favor of petitioner Lydia Santos because the NLRC found that her reinstatement was no longer feasible or appropriate which is designed to provide the employee with "the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment." The grant of separation pay did not redress the injury that is intended to be relieved by the second remedy of backwages, that is, the loss of earnings that would have accrued to the dismissed employee during the period between dismissal and reinstatement IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF THE UNION REGISTRATION OF AIR PHILIPPINES FLIGHT ATTENDANTS ASSOCIATION, AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS and AIR PHILIPPINES FLIGHT ATTENDANTS ASSOCIATION 22 June 2006
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instances, it is indispensable that the employer establish the existence of just or authorized causes for dismissal as spelled out in the Labor Code. Retirement, on the other hand, is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees and/or consents to sever his employment with the former. Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended, governs retirement of employees, stating: Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract. The CBA in the case at bar established 60 as the compulsory retirement age. However, it is not alleged that either Javier or Llagas had reached the compulsory retirement age of 60 years, but instead that they had rendered at least 20 years of service in the School, the last three (3) years continuous. Clearly, the CBA provision allows the employee to be retired by the School even before reaching the age of 60, provided that he/she had rendered 20 years of service. Would such a stipulation be valid? Jurisprudence affirms the position of the School. In Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC the court held that the Labor Code permitted employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age at below 60 years of age. Moreover, the Court also held that there was no illegal dismissal since it was the CBA itself that incorporated the agreement reached between the employer and the bargaining agent with respect to the terms and conditions of employment; hence, when the private respondent ratified the CBA with his union, he concurrently agreed to conform to and abide by its provisions. Thus, the Court asserted, [p]roviding in a CBA for compulsory retirement of employees after twenty-five (25) years of service is legal and enforceable so long as the parties agree to be governed by such CBA. By their acceptance of the CBA, the Union and its members are obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations they had agreed to cede to management. The questioned retirement provisions cannot be deemed as an imposition foisted on the Union, which very well had the right to have refused to agree to allowing management to retire employees with at least 20
of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR. CAINTA CATHOLIC SCHOOL, ET AL. v. CAINTA CATHOLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES UNION 04 May 2006 Facts: A CBA was entered into between between Cainta Catholic School (School) and the Cainta Catholic School Employees Union (Union). The Union held an election of officers, with Llagas being elected as President and Javier as VicePresident. The School retired Llagas and Javier, who had rendered more than twenty (20) years of continuous service, pursuant to Section 2, Article X of the CBA, to wit: An employee may be retired, either upon application by the employee himself or by the decision of the Director of the School, upon reaching the age of sixty (60) or after having rendered at least twenty (20) years of service to the School the last three (3) years of which must be continuous. The Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice before the NLRC. The NLRC ruled that the retirement of Llagas and Javier is legal as the School was merely exercising an option given to it under the CBA. On appeal the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and construed the retirement of Llagas and Javier as an act amounting to unfair labor practice when viewed against the backdrop of the relevant circumstances obtaining in the case. The appellate court concluded that the retirement of the two (2) union officers was clearly to bust the union. Issue: WON the forced retirement of Llagas and Javier was a valid exercise of management prerogative? Held/Ratio: Yes. Pursuant to the existing CBA, the School has the option to retire an employee upon reaching the age limit of sixty (60) or after having rendered at least twenty (20) years of service to the School, the last three (3) years of which must be continuous. Retirement is a different specie of termination of employment from dismissal for just or authorized causes under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. While in all three cases, the employee to be terminated may be unwilling to part from service, there are eminently higher standards to be met by the employer validly exercising the prerogative to dismiss for just or authorized causes. In those two
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effect retroactively October 9, 1996. from April 11, 1996 to
years of service. It should not be taken to mean that retirement provisions agreed upon in the CBA are absolutely beyond the ambit of judicial review and nullification. A CBA, as a labor contract, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest. If the retirement provisions in the CBA run contrary to law, public morals, or public policy, such provisions may very well be voided. We affirm the continued validity of Pantranco and its kindred cases, and thus reiterate that under Article 287 of the Labor Code, a CBA may validly accord management the prerogative to optionally retire an employee under the terms and conditions mutually agreed upon by management and the bargaining union, even if such agreement allows for retirement at an age lower than the optional retirement age or the compulsory retirement age. MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION v. DECORION 12 April 2006 Facts: Decorion was a regular employee of Maricalum Mining under the Concentrator Maintenance Department and was later promoted to Foreman I. On April 11, 1996, the Concentrator Maintenance Supervisor called a meeting which Decorion failed to attend as he was then supervising the workers under him. Because of his alleged insubordination for failure to attend the meeting, he was placed under preventive suspension on the same day. He was also not allowed to report for work the following day. A month later, Decorion was served a Notice of Infraction and Proposed Dismissal to enable him to present his side. A grievance meeting was held where Decorion manifested that he failed to attend the meeting on April 11 because he was then still assigning work to his men. He maintained that he has not committed any offense and that his service record would show his efficiency. In the meantime, Maricalum Minings Chief and Head of Legal and Industrial Relations issued a memorandum recommending that Decorions indefinite suspension be made definite with a warning that a repetition of the same conduct would be punished with dismissal. The companys Resident Manager issued a memorandum placing Decorion under definite disciplinary suspension of six months which would include the period of his preventive suspension which was made to take
On September 4, 1996, Decorion was served a memorandum informing him of his temporary layoff due to Maricalum Minings temporary suspension of operations and shut down of its mining operations for six (6) months, with the assurance that in the event of resumption of operations, he would be reinstated to his former position without loss of seniority rights. Decorion wrote a letter to Maricalum Mining on October 8, 1996, requesting that he be reinstated to his former position. The request was denied with the explanation that priority for retention and inclusion in the skeleton force was given to employees who are efficient and whose services are necessary during the shutdown. The labor arbiter rendered a decision finding that Decorion was illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the decision and dismissed Decorions complaint. On petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the decision of the labor arbiter was reinstated. Issue 1: WON the preventive suspension was justified Held/Ratio: NO. The preventive suspension was clearly unjustified. The Rules are explicit that preventive suspension is justified where the employees continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of the employees coworkers. There is no evidence to indicate that his failure to attend the meeting prejudiced his employer or that his presence in the companys premises posed a serious threat to his employer and coworkers. Issue 2: WON Decorion was illegally dismissed Held/Ratio: YES. Decorions preventive suspension had already ripened into constructive dismissal at that time. Decorions suspension persisted beyond the 30-day period allowed by the Implementing Rules. The Court ruled that preventive suspension which lasts beyond the maximum period allowed by the Implementing Rules amounts to constructive dismissal. CADIZ, ET AL V. CA
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labor arbiter, was couched in general terms and without explaining how the rules were violated. NLRC reversed the labor arbiters decision and concluded that petitioners were dismissed for just cause. Court of Appeals Ninth Division similarly determined on the basis of substantial evidence that petitioners were validly terminated Issue: WON the NLRC and the CA erred Held/Ratio: No. Far from petitioners thrust, the miscoding of deposit slips cannot be downplayed as mere procedural inadequacies. After all, it is such miscoding that precipitated the fraudulent withdrawals in the first place. The act operated as the first indispensable step towards the commission of fraud on the bank. Whatever liability or responsibility was expected of the bank stands as an issue separate from the liability of the recreant bank employees. There is no demand that the notices of dismissal themselves be couched in the form and language of judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. What is required is that the employer conduct a formal investigation process, with notices duly served on the employees informing them of the fact of investigation, and subsequently, if warranted, a separate notice of dismissal. In the instant case, records show that respondent bank complied with the two-notice rule prescribed in Article 277(b) of the Labor Code. Employees who abuse their position for fiduciary gain cannot be shielded from the consequences of their wrongdoing even on account of the banks operational laxities that may have provided the gateway for their shenanigans. Their misconduct provides the bank with cause for the termination of their employment. SAN MIGUEL CORP. v. MANDAUE PACKING PRODUCTS 16 Aug 2005 Facts: Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging ProductsSan Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-And-File UnionFFW filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss because respondent is not listed in the roster of legitimate labor organizations based on the certification issued by the DOLE Regional Director Atty. Gabor. On 3 August 1998, the Chief of Labor Relations Division of DOLE issued a Certificate of
Facts: Petitioners were employed in the main office branch (MOB) of Philippine Commercial International Bank (respondent bank). Alqueza filed a complaint with PCIB for the alleged nonreceipt of a Six Hundred Dollar ($600.00) demand draft drawn against it. Upon verification, it was uncovered that the demand draft was deposited on 10 June 1988 with FCDU Savings Account (S/A) No. 1083-4, an account under the name of Sonia Alfiscar (Alfiscar). Further investigation revealed that the demand draft, together with four (4) other checks, was made to appear as only one deposit covered by HSBC Check No. 979120 for One Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-two Dollars (US$1,232.00). Over a series of meetings, petitioners allegedly verbally admitted their participation in a scheme to divert funds intended for other accounts using the Savings Account of Alfiscar. Subsequently, Cadiz allegedly paid Alqueza P12,690.00, the peso equivalent of US$600, but insisted that the corresponding receipt be issued in Alfiscars name instead. Internal auditors of the bank determined that as early as July 1987, petitioner Cadiz had reserved the savings account in the name of Sonia Alfiscar. The account was opened on 27 November 1987 and closed on 23 June 1988. Twenty-five (25) deposit slips involving the account were posted by Bongkingki while sixteen (16) deposit slips were posted by Gloria. A verification of the deposit slips yielded findings of miscoded checks, forged signatures, nonvalidation of deposit slips by the tellers, wrongful deposit of second-endorsed checks into foreign currency deposit accounts, the deposit slips which do not bear the required approval of bank officers, and withdrawals made either on the day of deposit or the following banking day. Respondent bank in memoranda all dated 22 June 1989 dismissed petitioners from employment for violation of Article III Section 1 B-2 and Article III Section 1-C of the Code of Discipline. Petitioners lodged a complaint before the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal on 18 September 1989. Labor Arbiter Ernesto S. Dinopol adjudged that petitioners were illegally dismissed and ordered their reinstatement and payment of backwages. This conclusion was based on the notices of dismissal, which, to the mind of the
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Respondent then submitted the charter certificate along with the other documentary requirements to the Regional Office, but not for the specific purpose of creating the local/chapter, but for filing the petition for certification election. So it could be said that at the moment respondent was filing the petition for certification, it did not yet possess any legal personality, since the requisites for acquisition of legal personality under Department Order No. 9 had not yet been complied with. Although the Court acknowledges that strict letter of the procedural rule was not complied with, labor laws are generally construed liberally in favor of labor. To ascertain when respondent acquired legal personality, we need to determine the date the Regional Office received the complete documentary requirements. On 15 June 1998, or the date respondent filed its petition for certification election, attached were respondents constitution, the names and addresses of its officers, and the charter certificate issued by the national union FFW but respondent never submitted a separate by-laws. But an examination of respondents constitution reveals it sufficiently comprehensive in establishing the necessary rules for its operation so there is no need for a separate set of by-laws to be submitted by respondent. There is no good reason to deny legal personality or defer its conferral to the local/chapter if it is evident at the onset that the federation or national union itself has already through its own means established the local/chapter. Charter Certificate expressly acknowledges FFWs intent to establish respondent as of 9 June 1998.We consider the respondent to have submitted the required documents itself to the Regional Office, and proper that respondents legal personality be deemed existent as of 15 June 1998. Issue 2: On the Alleged PresenceOf Supervisory Employees as Officers of the Respondent Held/Ratio: Under the law, a managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. A supervisory employee is one who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommends managerial actions if the exercise of such recommendatory authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. Finally, all
Creation of Local/Chapter certifying that from 30 July 1998, respondent has acquired legal personality as a labor organization/workers association. Respondent filed a Position Paper asserting it had complied with all requirements for the conduct of a certification election, and that the ground for the Motion to Dismiss was a mere technicality. Petitioner filed a Comment, reiterating that respondent was not a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of the petition and two of respondents officers, VicePresident Emannuel L. Rosell and Secretary Bathan, were supervisory employees. Petitioner filed a petition to cancel the union registration of respondent. But this petition was denied, and such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. MedArbiter Manit dismissed respondents petition for certification election on the ground that on the date of filing of the petition on 15 June 1998, respondent did not have the legal personality to file the said petition for certification election. Respondent appealed to the DOLE and DOLE Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz reversed the Order. Issue 1: On the Acquisition of Legal Personality by Respondent Held/Ratio: The procedure for the registration of a local or chapter of a labor organization provided in Book V of IRR has been amended by Department Order No. 9 ( 21 June 1997), and by Department Order No. 40 (17 February 2003). Since the instant petition for certification was filed in 1998, Department Order No. 9, should govern this case. In regular order, it is the federation or national union, already in possession of legal personality, which initiates the creation of the local/chapter. It issues a charter certificate indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter. It then submits this charter certificate, along with the names of the local/chapters officers, constitution and by-laws to the Regional Office or Bureau. It is the submission of these documents, certified under oath by the Secretary or Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested by the President, which vests legal personality in the local/chapter, which is then free to file on its own a petition for certification election. In this case, the federation in question, the FFW, did not submit any of these documentary requirements to the Regional Office or Bureau. It did however issue a charter certificate to the putative local/chapter (herein respondent).
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labor union, the collective bargaining agent in the company. In May 1998, he obtained a loan from one of the dealers whom he dealt with, Gloria A. de Manuel (De Manuel), amounting to Nine Thousand Pesos (P9,000.00). After paying One Thousand One Hundred Twenty-five Pesos (P1,125.00), respondent reneged on the balance of his loan. De Manuel wrote a letter dated 6 July 1998 to petitioner, and seeking assistance for collection on the remainder of the loan. She claimed that when respondent became remissed on his personal obligation, he stopped collecting periodically the outstanding dues of De Manuel. On 9 July 1998, petitioner sent a letter addressed to respondent, requiring an explanation for the transaction with De Manuel, as well as for his failure to pay back the loan according to the conditions agreed upon. In his reply letter dated 13 July 1998, respondent admitted having incurred the loan, but offered no definitive explanation for his failure to repay the same. Petitioner, through a Memorandum dated 24 August 1998, imposed the penalty of suspension on respondent for 4 days, from 27 August to 1 September 1998, for violating Company Policy No. 2.17 and ordered his transfer to the Administration Department. On 2 September 1998, respondent wrote a letter to petitioner, stating that he wanted to sign a transfer memo before assuming his new position. On September 7, 1998, he was handed the Payroll Change Advice (PCA), indicating his new assignment to the Traffic and Order Department of Metromedia. Nonetheless, respondent stopped reporting for work. On 16 September 1998, he sent a letter to petitioner communicating his refusal to accept the transfer. Respondent duly filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other money claims with the labor arbiter, a copy of which petitioner received on 28 September 1998. The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion: He concluded that respondent did not commit insubordination or disobedience so as to warrant his transfer, and that petitioner was not aggrieved by respondents failure to settle his obligation with De Manuel. The dispositive portion read:
employees not falling within the definition of managerial or supervisory employee are considered rank-and-file employees. In the case of Emmanuel Rossell, evidence shows that he undertakes the filling out of evaluation reports on the performance of mechanics, which in turn are used as basis for reclassification. It would appear that his functions are more routinary than recommendatory and hardly leave room for independent judgment. But in the case of Noel Bathan, appellants evidence does not show his job title although it shows that his recommendations on disciplinary actions appear to have carried some weight on higher management. Assuming that Bathan is a supervisory employee, this does not prove the existence of fraud, false statement or misrepresentation. An essential element of fraud, false statement and misrepresentation in order for these to be actionable is intent to mislead by the party making the representation. There is no proof to show that Bathan, or appellee union intended to mislead anyone. The charge of fraud, false statement or misrepresentation cannot be sustained. We take administrative notice of the realities in union organizing, during which the organizers must take their chances, oftentimes unaware of the fine distinctions between managerial, supervisory and rank and file employees. The grounds for cancellation of union registration are not meant to be applied automatically, but indeed with utmost discretion. Where a remedy short of cancellation is available, that remedy should be preferred. In this case, no party will be prejudiced if Bathan were to be excluded from membership in the union. METROMEDIA TIMES CORP. v. PASTORIN 29 July 2005 Facts: Johnny Pastorin was employed by Metromedia Times Corporation on 10 December 1990 as a Field Representative/Collector. His task entailed the periodic collection of receivables from dealers of petitioner's newspapers. Prior to the subject incident, respondent claimed to have received a termination letter dated 7 May 1998 from management terminating his services for tardiness effective 16 June 1998. Respondent, member of Metro Media Times Employees Union, was not dismissed due to the intervention of the
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Secretary of Labor, Ducat v. Court of Appeals, Bayoca v. Nogales, Jimenez v. Patricia, Centeno v. Centeno, and ABS-CBN Supervisors Employee Union Members v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, all adhering to the doctrine that a partys active participation in the actual proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop him from assailing such lack of jurisdiction. Respondent heavily relies on this doctrinal jurisprudence. On the other hand, the cases of Dy v. NLRC, La Naval Drug v. CA, De Rossi vs. CA and Union Motors Corporation v. NLRC buttress the position of petitioner that jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of jurisdiction may be questioned at any time even on appeal. A more circumspect analysis would reveal that the cases cited by respondent do not fall squarely within the issue and factual circumstances of the instant case. The notion that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel on the party invoking the same most prominently emerged in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy However, Tijam represented an exceptional case wherein the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen (15) years, and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the Court of Appeals. In this case, jurisdiction of the labor arbiter was questioned as early as during appeal before the NLRC, whereas in Marquez, the question of jurisdiction was raised for the first time only before this Court. The viability of Marquez as controlling doctrine in this case is diminished owing to the radically different circumstances in these two cases. Evidently, none of [the respondents] cited precedents squarely operates as stare decisis on this case, involving as they did different circumstances. The rulings in Lozon v. NLRC addresses the issue at hand. This Court came up with a clear rule as to when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not: ....
WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant to his former position, with full backwages from the time his salary was withheld until he is actually reinstated. As of this date, the complainants backwages has reached the sum of P97,324.17. The respondents are further directed to pay the complainant his 13th month pay for 1998 in the sum of P3,611.89. The claims for allowance and unpaid commission are dismissed for lack of sufficient basis to make an award.
Petitioner lodged an appeal with the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over respondents complaint. Significally, this issue was not raised by petitioner in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. NLRC: In its Decision dated 16 March 2001, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on the ground that thee latter had no jurisdiction over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator. The motion for reconsideration having been denied on 18 May 2001, respondent elevated the case before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. CA: The CA ruled that the active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction. The CA denied the reconsideration. Hence, this Petition. petitioners motion for
Issue: WON Metromedia is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the subject matter of the case for the first time only in their appeal before the NLRC. Held/Ratio: NO. Jurisdiction of a tribunal, agency, or office, is conferred by law, and its lack of jurisdiction may be questioned at any time even on appeal. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. There are divergent jurisprudential doctrines touching on this issue. On the one hand are the cases of Martinez v. Merced, Marquez v.
"The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing
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Camarines Norte as attendants to the display of California Marketing Corporation (CMC), one of petitioners clients. On 13 August 1996, JPL notified private respondents that CMC would stop its direct merchandising activity in the Bicol Region, Isabela, and Cagayan Valley effective 15 August 1996. They were advised to wait for further notice as they would be transferred to other clients. Procedure: On 17 October 1996, private respondents Abesa and Gonzales filed before the National Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch (NLRC) Sub V complaints for illegal dismissal, praying for separation pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and payment for moral damages. Aninipot filed a similar case thereafter. o Executive Labor Arbiter Gelacio L. Rivera, Jr. dismissed the complaints for lack of merit. o The Labor Arbiter found that Gonzales and Abesa applied with and were employed by the store where they were originally assigned by JPL even before the lapse of the six (6)-month period given by law to JPL to provide private respondents a new assignment. Thus, they may be considered to have unilaterally severed their relation with JPL, and cannot charge JPL with illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter held that it was incumbent upon private respondents to wait until they were reassigned by JPL, and if after six months they were not reassigned, they can file an action for separation pay but not for illegal dismissal. The claims for 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay was also denied since private respondents were paid way above the applicable minimum wage during their employment. Private respondents appealed to the NLRC o NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiters finding that when private respondents filed their complaints, the six-month period had not yet expired, and that CMCs decision to stop its operations in the areas was beyond the control of JPL, thus, they were not illegally dismissed. However, it found that despite JPLs effort to look for clients to which private respondents may be reassigned it was unable to do so, and hence they are entitled to separation pay
such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the guidelines in Lozon, the labor arbiter assumed jurisdiction when he should not. In fact, the NLRC correctly reversed the labor arbiters decision and ratiocinated:
.... Based on the foregoing considerations, it appears that the issue of validity of complainants reassignment stemmed from the exercise of a management prerogative which is a matter apt for resolution by a Grievance Committee, the parties having opted to consider such as a grievable issue. Further, a review of the records would show that the matter of reassignment is one not directly related to the charge of complainants having committed an act which is inimical to respondents interest, since the latter had already been addressed to by complainants service of a suspension order. The transfer, in effect, is one which properly falls under Section 1, Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and, as such, questions as to the enforcement thereof is one which falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose petitioners claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the labor arbiter. He adduced no other legal ground in support of his contention that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, his claim falls flat in light of our pronouncement, and more so considering the NLRCs correct observation that jurisdiction over grievance issues, such as the propriety of the reassignment of a union member falls under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. JPL MARKETING PROMOTIONS v. CA 08 July 2005 Facts: JPL Marketing and Promotions is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of recruitment and placement of workers. Private respondents Noel Gonzales, Ramon Abesa III and Faustino Aninipot were employed by JPL as merchandisers on separate dates and assigned at different establishments in Naga City and Daet,
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Furthermore, Art. 286 of the Labor Code allows the bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, wherein an employee/employees are placed on the so-called floating status. When that floating status of an employee lasts for more than six months, he may be considered to have been illegally dismissed from the service. Thus, he is entitled to the corresponding benefits for his separation, and this would apply to suspension either of the entire business or of a specific component thereof. As clearly borne out by the records of this case, private respondents sought employment from other establishments even before the expiration of the six (6)-month period provided by law. As they admitted in their comment, all three of them applied for and were employed by another establishment after they received the notice from JPL. JPL did not terminate their employment; they themselves severed their relations with JPL. Thus, they are not entitled to separation pay. However, JPL cannot escape the payment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay to private respondents. Said benefits are mandated by law and should be given to employees as a matter of right. Service incentive leave, as provided in Art. 95 of the Labor Code, is a yearly leave benefit of five (5) days with pay, enjoyed by an employee who has rendered at least one year of service. Unless specifically excepted, all establishments are required to grant service incentive leave to their employees. The term at least one year of service shall mean service within twelve (12) months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the employee started working. The Court has held in several instances that service incentive leave is clearly demandable after one year of service. Admittedly, private respondents were not given their 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay while they were under the employ of JPL. Instead, JPL provided salaries which were over and above the minimum wage. The Court rules that the difference between the minimum wage and the actual salary received by private respondents cannot be deemed as their 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay as such difference is not equivalent to or of the same import as the said benefits contemplated
JPL filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. It claimed that private respondents are not by law entitled to separation pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay o The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the NLRC resolution. While conceding that there was no illegal dismissal, it justified the award of separation pay on the grounds of equity and social justice Issue: WON the private respondents are entitled to separation pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. Held/Ratio: Under Arts. 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, separation pay is authorized only in cases of dismissals due to any of these reasons: (a) installation of labor saving devices; (b) redundancy; (c) retrenchment; (d) cessation of the employer's business; and (e) when the employee is suffering from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health and to the health of his co-employees. However, separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice in those cases where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character, but only when he was illegally dismissed. In addition, Sec. 4(b), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides for the payment of separation pay to an employee entitled to reinstatement but the establishment where he is to be reinstated has closed or has ceased operations or his present position no longer exists at the time of reinstatement for reasons not attributable to the employer. The common denominator of the instances where payment of separation pay is warranted is that the employee was dismissed by the employer. In the instant case, there was no dismissal to speak of. Private respondents were simply not dismissed at all, whether legally or illegally. What they received from JPL was not a notice of termination of employment, but a memo informing them of the termination of CMCs contract with JPL. More importantly, they were advised that they were to be reassigned. At that time, there was no severance of employment to speak of.
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The Court has invariably affirmed that it will not hesitate to tilt the scales of justice to the labor class for no less than the Constitution dictates that the State . . . shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare The MWSS is a government owned and controlled corporation with its own charter, Republic Act No. 6234, as such, it is covered by the civil service and falls under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, categorically made the distinction between contract of services/job orders and contractual and plantilla appointment, declaring that services rendered under contracts of services and job orders are non-government services which do not have to be submitted to the CSC for approval This was followed by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 4, Series of 1994, which allowed the crediting of services for purposes of retirement only for such services supported by duly approved appointments For purposes of determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the Court has consistently adhered to the four-fold test, namely: (1) whether the alleged employer has the power of selection and engagement of an employee; (2) whether he has control of the employee with respect to the means and methods by which work is to be accomplished; (3) whether he has the power to dismiss; and (4) whether the employee was paid wages of the four, the control test is the most important element A review of the circumstances reveals that petitioners are employees of MWSS; despite the attempt of MWSS to categorize petitioners as mere service providers, not employees, by entering into contracts for services, its actuations show that they are its employees MWSS wielded its power of selection when it contracted with the individual petitioners, undertaking separate contracts or agreements; the same goes true for the power to dismiss MWSS committed itself to pay severance and terminal leave pay to its regular employees - the guidelines thereof states that regular employees who have rendered at least a year of service and not eligible for retirement are entitled to
by law. Thus, as properly held by the Court of Appeals and by the NLRC, private respondents are entitled to the 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. LOPEZ ET AL. V. MWSS 30 June 2005 Facts: By virtue of an Agreement, petitioners were engaged by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) as collectors-contractors, wherein the former agreed to collect from the concessionaires of MWSS, charges, fees, assessments of rents for water, sewer and/or plumbing services which the MWSS bills from time to time MWSS entered into a Concession Agreement with Manila Water Service, Inc. and Benpress-Lyonnaise; the collection of bills was transferred to said concessionaires, effectively terminating the contracts of service between petitioners and MWSS Regular employees of the MWSS, except those who had retired or opted to remain with the latter, were absorbed by the concessionaires; they were paid their retirement benefits The petitioners were refused said benefits, MWSS relying on a resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that contractcollectors of the MWSS are not its employees and therefore not entitled to the benefits due regular government employees Petitioners filed a complaint with the CSC, which was denied; the CSC stated that petitioners were engaged by MWSS through a contract of service, which explicitly provides that a bill collector-contractor is not an MWSS employee Moreover, it found that petitioners were unable to show that they have contractual appointments duly attested by the CSC; in addition, the CSC stated that petitioners, not being permanent employees of MWSS and not included in the list submitted to the concessionaire, are not entitled to severance pay, retirement benefits, and terminal pay
Issue: Whether or not there existed an employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and MWSS, making the petitioners entitled to retirement benefits. Held/Ratio:
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petitioners filed with the DOLE, an Establishment Termination Report for the retrenchment of twenty-one (21) affected employees, including Magno. Upon receipt of his separation pay equivalent to nine (9) years and proportionate 13th month pay in the total amount of P46,182.41, Magno executed a release and quitclaim in favor of petitioners. On 12 January 1999, Magno filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages against petitioners claiming that he was terminated on the pretext that the dredging machine where he was assigned was temporarily stalled while the company primarily adduced to others the Asian financial crisis. On 6 August 1999, after the contending parties submitted their responsive pleadings, Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi promulgated a Decision upholding the validity of retrenchment. Magno appealed the Labor Arbiters Decision to the NLRC which, on 11 October 2000, through a Resolution reversed the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter, deeming the petitioners as unable to establish actual losses, due to the absence of financial reports of independent external auditors for losses for 1996 and 1997. After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners brought case to CA through Petition for Certiorari where they presented financial reports by independent external auditors Banaria, Banaria and Company (BB&C), auditing FFMCs balance sheets and income statements for 1996 and 1997as these reports allegedly could not be submitted earlier as they had not been completed during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the NLRC. As to competency as evidence of the 31 December 1997 and 1996 Financial Statements of petitioners, such were submitted to CA on the pretext that they had not yet been completed by the independent auditor when the case was still pending before the Labor Arbiter. CA ruled that a perusal of the certification issued by BB&C regarding the Financial Statements reveals that the same were executed 9 months prior to the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal and
severance pay equivalent to one (1) month basic pay for every full year of service In view of the Courts finding that petitioners were employees of MWSS, the corresponding severance pay, in accordance with the guidelines, should be given to them. Terminal leave pay are likewise due petitioners, provided they meet the requirements However, petitioners in this case cannot avail of retirement benefits from the GSIS, as when their services were engaged by MWSS, they were not reported as its employees and hence no deductions were made against them for purpose of the GSIS contributions. F.F. MARINE CORPORATION v. NLRC 08 April 2005 Facts: Petitioner F.F. Marine Corporation (FFMC) is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with Eric A. Cruz as its president. It is engaged in ship-repair, drydocking and dredging services, and has a total of 419 employees including private respondent Ricardo M. Magno (Magno). Magno, who began working for FFMC on 7 February 1990, was eventually assigned as Lead Electrician at the Marine Dredging with a monthly salary of P8,500.00. On 26 October 1998, petitioners filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a notice that petitioner corporation was undertaking a retrenchment program due to the Asian economic crisis, that they had already closed down their dry docking and ship repair division on 30 August 1998 and that their dredging services were heavily affected by the slowdown. The retrenchment program would start on 1 November 1998 and affected employees were to remain employed only until 16 December 1998. Petititoners served the affected employees a personal notice of retrenchment, stating that their employment would end at the close of business hours of 16 December 1998, and paying them in advance from 16 November to 16 December 1998, including separation pay (onehalf (1/2) month basic pay per year of service), plus the proportionate 13th month pay. On 11 December 1998 and in compliance with its notice to the DOLE dated 26 October 1998,
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however, showed losses of P18,005,918.08, and P21,316,072.89, respectively. It was only before the Court of Appeals that the financial statements for the years 1996 and 1997 as audited by an independent external auditor were introduced. They were not presented before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC although executed on 30 March 1998, several months prior to the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal by Magno on 12 January 1999. Petitioners failure to adduce financial statements duly audited by independent external auditor casts doubt on their claim of losses for financial statements are easy prey to manipulation and concoction. This Court has ruled that financial statements audited by independent external auditors constitute the normal method of proof of the profit and loss performance of a company but the norm does not compel this Court to accept the contents of the said documents blindly. Petitioners called upon CA to consider alleged new evidence not presented before the Labor Arbiter or NLRC, a course of action unmistakably outside the sphere of that courts certiorari jurisdiction. This Court itself was confronted with the same situation in Matugas v. Commission on Elections, et al. as petitioner therein asked the Court to consider documents which were not presented in evidence before the poll body. The Court rejected petitioners stance, holding that the cause of action sought is clearly beyond the courts certiorari powers. Petitioner did not file a motion for leave to present the alleged new evidence as they simply attached the additional financial statements to their petition. The financial statements do not constitute newly discovered evidence as they had already been prepared by the independent auditors eight (8) months before the filing of the case with the Labor Arbiter. That must have been the reason why petitioners opted not to avail of the prescribed manner for introducing newly discovered evidence. Petitioners cite Caete v. NLRC where the Court upheld the NLRCs consideration of documents submitted to it by the respondent therein for the first time on appeal. The holding is clearly not apropos since the documents were presented to the NLRC, unlike in this case where the new financial statements were submitted for the first time before the Court of Appeals.
could have been offered as evidence before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. CA reproached petitioners for suppressing material evidence. CA found that petitioners failed to substantiate the substantive requirements of a valid retrenchment and the fact that Magno executed a quitclaim in favor of petitionersdid not bar him from filing the instant complaint for illegal dismissal. Issues: W/N the CA erred in (a) finding that petitioners failed to substantiate the substantive requirements of a valid retrenchment and (b) affirming the NLRCs award of separation pay and attorneys fees to Magno. Held/Ratio: (a) No. The petition suffers from lack of merit. Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employees and without prejudice to the latter, resorted to by management during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation. Retrenchment is a valid management prerogative that is subject to faithful compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence. There are three (3) basic requisites for a valid retrenchment to exist, to wit: (a) the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses and such losses are proven; (b) written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one (1) month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; and (c) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least onehalf (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. Petitioners seek to justify the retrenchment on the ground of serious business losses brought about by the Asian economic crisis. To prove their claim, petitioners adduced before the Labor Arbiter the 1994 and 1995 Financial Statements which were prepared by petitioners accountant, Rosalie Bengzon, approved by the manager Bernadette Rosales and were not audited by an independent external auditor. The financial statements show that in 1994 and 1995, petitioner corporation earned an income of only P77,609.79 and P155,339.96, respectively, while the 1996 and 1997 Financial Statements,
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separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and (2) backwages. Magno is entitled to (a) full backwages from 16 December 1998 until the finality of this decision; (b) separation pay equivalent to his one (1) month pay for every year of service, computed from his first day of employment on 7 February 1990 up to finality of this decision less the advanced separation pay of P38,250.00; and (c) attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of his total monetary award. MAQUILING V. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY INC. 04 Feb 2005 Facts: - Maquiling was the Deputy Executive Director of PTS - He failed in doing certain activities causing PTS to lose trust and confidence in him Issues: - WON dismissal was for just cause consisting of loss of trust and confidence - WON the two-notice rule has been complied with by PTS - WON Maquiling deserves to be awarded full back wages (pursuant to SERRANO VS NLRC) Held: - YES, dismissal was for just cause consisting of loss of trust and confidence - NO, the two-notice rule was NOT complied with by PTS - NO, he should not be awarded full back wages Ratio: 1. YES, dismissal was for just cause consisting of loss of trust and confidence DOCTRINE: Recent decisions of this Court distinguish the treatment of managerial from that of rank-and-file personnel insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is concerned. Thus, with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will
SC failed to see any reason to reverse the legal conclusions made by the Court of Appeals. Decisions of the NLRC are reviewable only by the Court of Appeals via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, petitioners failed to act in consonance with the rule that retrenchment shall be a remedy of last resort. Even assuming that the corporation has actually incurred losses by reason of the Asian economic crisis, the retrenchment is not perfectly justified as there was no showing that the retrenchment was the last recourse resorted to by petitioners. (b) No. Considering that the ground for retrenchment availed of by petitioners was not sufficiently and convincingly established, the retrenchment is hereby declared illegal and of no effect. The quitclaims executed by retrenched employees in favor of petitioners were therefore not voluntarily entered into by them. Their consent was similarly vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. As a rule, deeds of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The amounts already received by the retrenched employees as consideration for signing the quitclaims should, however, be deducted from their respective monetary awards. Sad to say, among the retrenched employees, only Magno filed an action for illegal dismissal. Undoubtedly, Magno was illegally dismissed but it must be emphasized that Magno prayed for the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement on the ground of strained relations between him and petitioners. It is well-settled that when a person is illegally dismissed, he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. In the event, however, that reinstatement is no longer feasible, or if the employee decides not to be reinstated, the employer shall pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Such a rule is likewise observed in the case of a strained employer-employee relationship or when the work or position formerly held by the dismissed employee no longer exists. In sum, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement if viable or
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the two-notice rule in dismissal cases that will allow the employee to substantiate the charges specified in the notice with full knowledge at the outset that the investigation to be conducted may result in his dismissal or suspension from employment. 3. NO, he should not be awarded full back wages - Serrano vs NLRC does not apply - The violation of the petitioners? right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court DOCTRINE: The Serrano ruling awarded full back wages and separation pay to the employee who was dismissed for just cause but without the observance of the procedural due process requirement. However, in Agabon v. NLRC, this Court modified the Serrano ruling and awarded nominal damages in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) including holiday pay, service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay to the petitioners in the said case. This case clarified the criticisms and answered the questions created by the Serrano ruling. The Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the dismissal is for just cause but statutory due process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. Where the dismissal is for just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of "dismiss now, pay later," which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer. It may be also argued that actual or compensatory damages may be recovered in employment termination cases. Actual or
not suffice. But as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal - Maquiling delayed GSIS remittances, security of workers compensation was undermined by this act which patently transgressed the constitutional injunction that workers be afforded full protection in their employment - The 7.3 million deficit in PTS 1990 financial statements can be attributed to Maquilings failure to consider the realities of the financial condition of the institution - Renewal of a contract w/ another company evinces another bad managerial move. It dragged PTS into a labor controversy. 2. NO, the two-notice rule was NOT complied with by PTS DOCTRINE: The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute elements of due process in cases of employee's dismissal; the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employers intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employers charges against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. Clearly, the first notice must inform outright the employee that an investigation will be conducted on the charges particularized therein which, if proven, will result to his dismissal. Such notice must not only contain a plain statement of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance but must categorically state the effect on his employment if the charges are proven to be true. - Procedural due process in the instant case was not observed. First confidential memorandum was sent to Maquiling by Soriano requiring him to explain in writing the matters contained therein - It is a mere instruction to explain the matters enumerated therein. It did not apprise Dr. Maquiling of any investigation to be conducted or being conducted that will warrant his dismissal from service if found guilty of charges specified therein. Thus, such notice fell short of the requirement of law that an employee must be afforded the benefit of
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1. Oct 11 1996: (Case no. NCR-OD-M-9610-016) The Petitioners filed with the DOLE a Petition for prohibition, injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction enjoining Gamilla and his fellow officers to cease and desist from performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and function of the officers and directors of the USTFU. The UST Faculty Union holds office in Room 302 of USTs Health Center Building. On Jan 21, 1997, Respondents Gamilla, Cardenas, Aseron and other persons sent a Letter to Petitioners Marino and Alamis demanding that the latter vacate Room 302. The messenger, who was the only person present at the time, was forced by Gamilla and company to step out of the office while they padlocked its door. 2. Feb 5 1997: (Civil Case No. 97-81928) Petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a Complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order over the use of the USTFU office in Room 302. They allege that padlocking of the office was without lawful basis and that the said act denied them from access to personal effects and documents, ultimately precluding them from serving the union members. Feb 11 1997: The respondents sought a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. Meanwhile, Med-Arb Falconi declared the election held on Oct 4 1996 as null and void ab initio. The case from the Med-Arb was appealed to the BLR, which affirmed the Med-Arbs decision. Respondents Gamilla et al. brought the matter to the SC via a special civil action for certiorari, which was subsequently dismissed. Mar 3, 1997: The RTC issued an order granting writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs - ordering respondents to remove the padlocks on Rm 302, and enjoining them to refrain from preventing the plaintiffs from entering the premises. The actual writ was issued on March 5 1997 after the Marinos party posted a bond. March 19, 1997: Respondents filed Petition for Certiorari with the CA saying that the orders of March 3 and 5 were void ab initio for being issued without jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. CA ruled in favor of the respondents on the ground that the civil case in the RTC merely grew out of the labor case filed in the Med-Arb. It also cited Art 254 of the Labor Code prohibiting the
compensatory damages are not available as a matter of right to an employee dismissed for just cause but denied statutory due process. The award must be based on clear factual and legal bases and correspond to such pecuniary loss suffered by the employee as duly proven. Neither will an award for moral damages nor exemplary damages prosper. The instant controversy fails to show that the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith, fraud, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, or that the employer committed an act oppressive to labor to warrant an award for moral damages On the other hand, Dr. Maquiling argues that PTS should have considered his twenty-three (23) years of service in the institution before he was dismissed from service. Such ratiocination is not quite convincing. The jurisprudential law is not bereft of cases which disregarded length of service of an employee for breach of trust and confidence. Although length of service may be considered in reaching a decision in employment termination cases, the same alone is not controlling for other considerations must be taken into account such as the nature of the position he was holding, performance of an employee, quality of work, character and work attitude. Worth stressing is the fact that Dr. Maquiling is holding a managerial position being a Deputy Executive Director. Hence, trust and confidence is an essential factor in determining his eligibility to continue holding his position MARINO, JR., ET AL. v. GAMILLA 31 Jan 2005 Facts: September 21 1996: The officers and directors of USTFU scheduled a general membership meeting on October 5, 1996 for the election of Union officers. Gamilla and the other faculty members however filed a petition with the Med-Arb to stop the said elections. October 2, 1996: Rev Fr. Aligan, Sec Gen of UST issued a Memorandum saying that the faculty was holding a convocation on October 4, 1996. Gamilla and other faculty members proceeded with the election of officers during the latter date despite the issuance of a TRO by the Med-Arb, which they themselves sought. 2 cases were filed by the Petitioners:
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over the provisional reliefs (injunction and restraining order) prayed for because jurisdiction over the latter had already been lodged with the Med-Arbiter. Claim for Damages: The Petitioners were right in saying that the case does not involve a labor dispute but an intra-union dispute. Article 226 of the LC is thus applicable. Exclusive original jurisdiction over intra-union disputes rests on the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor relations Divisions of the DOLE. Unlike the NLRC however, the BLR is not specifically empowered to adjudicate claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from intra-union disputes. In fact, Article 241 LC allows the separate institution before the regular courts of criminal and civil liabilities for violations of the rights and conditions of union membership. Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction, they can only exercise powers specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. Also, where no employeremployee relationship exists and no issue is involved which may be solved by reference to the LC, labor statutes or the CBA, jurisdiction belongs to the regular courts. In the civil case, the petitioners seek payment of a sum of money as damages due to alleged tortious conduct- a matter within the realm not of the labor Code but of Civil Law, hence cognizable by the regular courts. As settled in UST Faculty Union vs. Bitonio, an election conducted in violation of the unions constitution and by-laws is void. The Petitioners at bar still remain to be the rightful officers of the union, hence the respondents had no right to act in behalf of USTFU and include the latter as a petitioner in a civil case. DUNCAN ASSN OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO, ET AL v. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC 17 Sept 2004 Facts: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative, where he signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with coemployees or employees of competing drug
issuance of injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. CA SET ASIDE the Order by the RTC and ordered the latter to dismiss Civil Case No. 97-81928 (Case no.2 above). Petitioners filed MR which was denied, hence this petition to the SC. They allege that the RTC has jurisdiction to try the case because: a) the matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation b) The causes of action cannot be resolved by reference to the Labor Code as they involve a tortious act and a corresponding claim for damages. c) The pendency of the labor case should not militate against the civil case since the civil and criminal aspects on violations of Art 241 LC (on rights and conditions of membership) can be litigated separately. d) The controversy is not a labor dispute by definition and an injunction was called for due to the need to protect their rights, which were trampled upon by the respondents. Respondents maintain that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the issue as to who has the right to use the union office because the same is inextricably linked and intertwined with the issue as to who are the legitimate and duly elected officers of the USTFU, that was subject of a case before DOLE. Issues: 1. WON the RTC has jurisdiction to decide Civil Case 97-81928 on the legality of padlocking the doors to the USTFU Office. 2. WON the RTC has jurisdiction to award damages as a result of tortious conduct. 3. WON the respondents had a right to act in behalf of USTFU and include the latter as a petitioner in the case before the CA Held: 1. No. 2. Yes 3. No. Ratio: The determination of the action filed with the RTC regarding the use of the office is linked inextricably if not dependent on the outcome of the question raised before DOLE on the legitimacy of the petitioners election into office. Jurisdiction once acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated. Pursuant to the Principle of Adherence of Jurisdiction, RTC should not have exercised jurisdiction
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Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees right to marry. On the other hand, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogative, and it likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein. Issue: WON Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution Held/Ratio: Yes. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case, it is a legitimate business practice to guard business
companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with coemployees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a transfer to another department in a noncounterchecking position or preparation for employment outside the company after six months. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals4[3] (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998. Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision, but the same denied the petition, ruling that Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives. Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts Decision, but the motion was denied. Hence this petition.
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confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or employees who are married to a competitor. The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct. The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the company remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual. However, an employees personal decision does not detract the employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith. He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.
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to seek a settlement with PDCP. The first to come to terms with PDCP was Escao, who in December of 1993, entered into a compromise agreement whereby he agreed to pay the bank P1,000,000.00. In exchange, PDCP waived or assigned in favor of Escao one-third (1/3) of its entire claim in the complaint against all of the other defendants in the case. The compromise agreement was approved by the RTC in a Judgment dated 6 January 1994. Ortigas entered into his own compromise agreement with PDCP, allegedly without the knowledge of Escao, Matti and Silos. Thereby, Ortigas agreed to pay PDCP P1,300,000.00 as full satisfaction of the PDCPs claim against Ortigas, in exchange for PDCPs release of Ortigas from any liability or claim arising from the Falcon loan agreement, and a renunciation of its claims against Ortigas. After having settled with PDCP, Ortigas pursued his claims against Escao, Silos and Matti, on the basis of the 1982 Undertaking. He initiated a third-party complaint against Matti and Silos, while he maintained his cross-claim against Escao. the RTC issued the Summary Judgment, ordering Escao, Silos and Matti to pay Ortigas, jointly and severally, the amount of P1,300,000.00, as well as P20,000.00 in attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Summary Judgment. Issue: WON petitioners were correctly held liable to Ortigas on the basis of the 1982 Undertaking in this Summary Judgment Held/Ratio: YES. An examination of the document reveals several clauses that make it clear that the agreement was brought forth by the desire of Ortigas, Inductivo and the Scholeys to be released from their liability under the loan agreement which release was, in turn, part of the consideration for the assignment of their shares in Falcon to petitioners and Matti. The whereas clauses manifest that Ortigas had bound himself with Falcon for the payment of the loan with PDCP, and that amongst the consideration for OBLIGORS and/or their principals aforesaid selling is SURETIES relieving OBLIGORS of any and all liability arising from their said joint and several undertakings with FALCON. is clear that the assumption by petitioners of Ortigass guarantees to PDCP is governed by stipulated terms and conditions as set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (c) of Paragraph 3. First, upon receipt by any of OBLIGORS of any demand from PDCP for the payment of Falcons obligations with it, any of OBLIGORS was to immediately inform SURETIES thereof so that
ESCAO, ET AL. v. RAFAEL ORTIGAS, JR. 29 June 2007 Facts: On 28 April 1980, Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement with Falcon Minerals, Inc. whereby PDCP agreed to make available and lend to Falcon the amount of US$320,000.00, for specific purposes and subject to certain terms and conditions. On the same day, three stockholders-officers of Falcon, namely: respondent Rafael Ortigas, Jr., George A. Scholey and George T. Scholey executed an Assumption of Solidary Liability of the loan contracted by Falcon with PDCP. Two separate guaranties were executed to guarantee the payment of the same loan by other stockholders and officers of Falcon, acting in their personal and individual capacities. One Guaranty was executed by petitioner Escao, while the other by petitioner Silos, Silverio, Inductivo and Rodriguez. Two years later, an agreement developed to cede control of Falcon to Escao, Silos and Matti. Thus, contracts were executed whereby Ortigas, George A. Scholey, Inductivo and the heirs of then already deceased George T. Scholey assigned their shares of stock in Falcon to Escao, Silos and Matti. [6] Part of the consideration that induced the sale of stock was a desire by Ortigas, et al., to relieve themselves of all liability arising from their previous joint and several undertakings with Falcon, including those related to the loan with PDCP. Thus, an Undertaking dated 11 June 1982 was executed by the concerned parties, [7] namely: with Escao, Silos and Matti identified in the document as SURETIES, on one hand, and Ortigas, Inductivo and the Scholeys as OBLIGORS, on the other. Falcon eventually availed of the sum of US$178,655.59 from the credit line extended by PDCP. It would also execute a Deed of Chattel Mortgage over its personal properties to further secure the loan. However, Falcon subsequently defaulted in its payments. After PDCP foreclosed on the chattel mortgage, there remained a subsisting deficiency of P5,031,004.07, which Falcon did not satisfy despite demand. PDCP filed a complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) against Falcon, Ortigas, Escao, Silos, Silverio and Inductivo. Escao, Ortigas and Silos each sought
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from the contract nor demand an increase in the price on account of the higher cost of labor or materials, save when there has been a change in the plans and specifications, provided: (1) Such change has been authorized by the proprietor in writing; and (2) The additional price to be paid to the contractor has been determined in writing by both parties. The CA deemed it inapplicable to the case at bar because Uniwide had already paid, albeit with unwritten reservations, applying Art. 1423 of the NCC and characterized Uniwide's payment of the said amount as a voluntary fulfillment of a natural obligation. Held/Ratio: NO. The distinction pointed out by the CA is material. The issue is no longer centered on the right of the contractor to demand payment for additional works undertaken because payment, whether mistaken or not, was already made by Uniwide. Even if the Court accepts Art. 1724 as applicable, such recognition does not ipso facto accord Uniwide the right to be reimbursed since Art. 1724 does not effect such right of reimbursement. Art. 1724 does not preclude the payment to the contractor who performs additional works without any prior written authorization or agreement as to the price for such works if the owner decides anyway to make such payment. What the provision does preclude is the right of the contractor to insist upon payment for unauthorized additional works. Accordingly, Uniwide has to establish its own right to reimbursement under a different provision of law. This becomes even more crucial in the light of the general presumption contained in Section 3(f), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "money paid by one to another was due to the latter." Uniwide then cites the provisions on solutio indebiti under Arts. 2154 and 2156 of the NCC. However, it is not enough to prove that the payments made by Uniwide to Titan were "not due". There is a further requirement that the payment by the debtor was made either through mistake or under a cloud of doubt. Issue 2: Whether Uniwide is liable for the payment of the VAT on Project 1 in the absence of written stipulation on the matter Uniwide claims that the VAT was already included in the contract price, citing Secs. 99 and 102 of the NIRC, as it is an indirect tax which may be shifted to the buyer it is entirely up to the buyer to agree or not to agree to absorb the VAT. Thus,
the latter can timely take appropriate measures. Second, should any and/or all of OBLIGORS be impleaded by PDCP in a suit for collection of its loan, SURETIES agree[d] to defend OBLIGORS at their own expense, without prejudice to any and/or all of OBLIGORS impleading SURETIES therein for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief in respect to any of the claims of PDCP. Third, if any of the OBLIGORS is for any reason made to pay any amount to [PDCP], SURETIES [were to] reimburse OBLIGORS for said amount/s within seven (7) calendar days from such payment. Petitioners claim that, contrary to paragraph 3(c) of the Undertaking, Ortigas was not made to pay PDCP the amount now sought to be reimbursed, as Ortigas voluntarily paid PDCP the amount of P1.3 Million as an amicable settlement of the claims posed by the bank against him. However, the subject clause in paragraph 3(c) actually reads [i]n the event that any of OBLIGORS is for any reason made to pay any amount to PDCP x x x As pointed out by Ortigas, the phrase for any reason reasonably includes any extra-judicial settlement of obligation such as what Ortigas had undertaken to pay to PDCP, as it is indeed obvious that the phrase was incorporated in the clause to render the eventual payment adverted to therein unlimited and unqualified. UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORP v. TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVT CORPORATION 20 December 2006 Facts: Titan filed an action for a sum of money in the RTC against Uniwide due to the latters nonpayment of claims billed by Titan after completion of 3 projects covered by written agreements. This proceeding was suspended as the case was submitted for arbitration in the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). Uniwide filed counterclaims for alleged overpayment, erroneous payment of VAT and liquidated damages. Issue 1: Whether Uniwide is entitled to a return of the amount it allegedly paid by mistake to Titan for additional works done on Project 1 as they were done without written authorization Uniwide cites Art. 1724 of the New Civil Code (NCC) as basis for its claim. Art. 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any other work for a stipulated price, in conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with the landowner, can neither withdraw
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Furthermore, even assuming delay was admitted, the establishment of the mere fact of delay is not sufficient for the imposition of liquidated damages. It must further be shown that delay was attributable to the contractor if not otherwise justifiable. Issue 4: Whether Uniwide is liable for the unpaid balance of P6,301,075.77 for Project 2 Uniwide claims that Titan failed to submit any "as-built" plans for Project 2 which are allegedly serving as a condition precedent for payment, that the project was overcharged and the construction was defective. Held/Ratio: YES. The submission of such plans is not a pre-requisite for Titan to be paid by Uniwide. The argument that said plans are required by Section 308 of Presidential Decree No. 1098 (National Building Code) and by Section 2.11 of its Implementing Rules before payment can be made is untenable. As regards price, Uniwide is bound by the amount indicated in the agreement. Claims of connivance or fraudulent conspiracy between Titan and Uniwide's representatives which, it is alleged, grossly exaggerated the price may properly be dismissed. There is no evidence to that claim. Uniwide asserts that Titan should not have been allowed to recover on Project 2 because the said project was defective, citing Nakpil and Sons v. Court of Appeals and Art. 1723 of the NCC holding a contractor responsible for damages if the edifice constructed falls within fifteen years from completion on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. Uniwide had the burden of proving that there was defective construction in Project 2 but it failed to discharge this burden. ROMULO V. LAYUG 08 September 2006 Facts: The Spouses Cesar and Nenita Romulo obtained from the Layug Spouses a loan totaling P500,000. The Romulos defaulted in payment of the loan. According to the Layugs, the Romulos offered to sell their house and lot in Paranaque to pay for the loan. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between the two parties. The Romulos, however, stayed as occupants of the house thru a Contract
Uniwide concludes, if there is no provision, it is presumed that the seller would pay. Held/Ratio: YES. The Court agrees with the CIAC and CA that the amount of P2,400,000.00 was paid by Uniwide as VAT for Project 1 not Project 3 as claimed by Uniwide . This conclusion was drawn from an Order of Payment approved by the President of Uniwide that expressly indicated that the project involved was Project 1. The reduced base for the computation of the tax was an indication that the parties agreed to pass the VAT for Project 1 to Uniwide but based on a lower contract price. CIAC states that As explained by Jimmy Gow, VAT is paid on labor only for construction contracts since VAT had already been paid on the materials purchased. Since labor costs is [sic] proportionately placed at 60%-40% of the contract price, simplified accounting computes VAT at 4% of the contract price. Issue 3: Whether Titan is liable for liquidated damages CIAC rejected the claim, holding there is no legal basis for passing upon and resolving Uniwide's claim as no claim for liquidated damages arising from the alleged delay was ever made before the commencement of Titan's complaint, the claim was not included in the counterclaims in Uniwide's answer and it was not an issue agreed upon in the Terms of Reference agreed upon CIAC. Uniwide insists that the CIAC should have applied Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court but the CA held that the CIAC is an arbitration body, which is not necessarily bound by the Rules of Court. Held/Ratio: NO. Arbitration has been defined as "an arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to established tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation." The basic objective is to provide a speedy and inexpensive method of settling dispute. As an arbitration body, the CIAC can only resolve issues brought before it by the parties through the TOR which functions similarly as a pre-trial brief. The Rules of Court cannot be used to contravene the spirit of the CIAC rules.
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secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
of lease. Subsequent to the sale, the Romulos were given 3 additional loan accommodations by the Layugs. The Romulos, however, claim that they never intended to sell their house and that they were merely duped into signing the Deed of Sale. They prayed for the annulment of the abovementioned document, along with the Contract of Lease. The Trial Court decided that an equitable mortgage was intended by the parties since the Romulos remained in the property even after it was supposedly sold, without paying any rent. The Court of Appeals disagreed and declared that an absolute sale was contemplated by the parties based on the express stipulations in the Deed of Absolute Sale and on the acts of ownership by respondents subsequent to its execution Issue: WON the parties intended an equitable mortgage Held/Ratio: YES. The form of the instrument cannot prevail over the true intent of the parties as established by the evidence. In determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the title or name given by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after execution of the agreement. In order to ascertain the intention of the parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts should be considered. Once the intention of the parties has been ascertained, that element is deemed as an integral part of the contract as though it has been originally expressed in unequivocal terms. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove such intention. And, in case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage. When the parties to a contract of sale actually intended such contract to secure the payment of an obligation, it shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage:
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage in any of the following cases: 1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; 2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; XXX 6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall
The existence of any one of the conditions under Article 1602, not a concurrence, or an overwhelming number of such circumstances, suffices to give rise to the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage. When in doubt, courts are generally inclined to construe a transaction purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, which involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests over the property in controversy. In the case at bar, the Romulos remained in possession of the property for more than the reasonable time that would suggest that petitioners were mere lessees thereof. For one, it took respondents more than five years from the time of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Contract of Lease to file the action for ejectment. Within this period, petitioners neither paid any rental nor exercised the option to buy. Also, Based on respondents evidence, petitioners property was valued at P700,000.00 but the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale stated a consideration of only P200,000.00. Contrary to the appellate courts declaration that the inadequacy of the purchase price is not sufficient to set aside the sale, the Court finds the same as clearly indicative of the parties intention to make the property only a collateral security of petitioners debt. . TRADE & INVESTMENT DEVT CORP. OF THE PHILS. v. ROBLETT INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION CORP., ET AL. 19 May 2006 Facts: Under a surety bond, Paramount bound itself jointly and severally with Roblett to pay petitioner Philguarantee to the extent of P11,775,611.35 for whatever damages and liabilities the latter may suffer by virtue of its counterguarantee. Paramount further agreed to pay petitioner interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum. Paramount argues that it is made liable for approximately P48 million, the bulk of which is the interest charge and not the principal amount. It submits that the interest is clearly iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant, thus contrary to morals, citing our ruling in Medel v. Court of Appeals. Issue: WON the interest charge on the principal debt is unconscionable?
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appellants. Oporto decided to sell the whole lot later. Plaintiffs-appellees gave concurring testimonies that plaintiffs-appellees and defendants-appellants requested owner-lessor Antonina Oporto to sell the lot to them. Evidence further shows that the latter acceded to sell the land to the parties. Defendant-appellant however was designated by plaintiffs to negotiate for the lowering of the purchase price. Subsequently, defendant-appellant bought the lot in its entirety for himself from Antonina Oporto. The aggrieved plaintiffs-appellees learned of the transaction only when they were summoned to appear before the barangay captain in anticipation of the filing of the case for unlawful detainer. As a consequence, plaintiffs-appellees impute bad faith on defendant-appellant. Issue: WON a trust relationship existed Held/Ratio: YES. A constructive trust existed! Citing Morales v. CA: Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while implied trusts come into being by operation of law, either through implication of an intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to, any such intention. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold In this case, petitioners assert a right to possess by virtue of their purchase of the property. Private respondents, on the other hand, also claim ownership by virtue of constructive trust. The issue of ownership, being inextricably linked with that of possession, should therefore be
Held: Yes. An interest rate of 12% per annum is more reasonable under the circumstances. Ratio: While the Court recognizes the right of the parties to enter into contracts and who are expected to comply with their terms and obligations, this rule is not absolute. Stipulated interest rates are illegal if they are unconscionable and the Court is allowed to temper interest rates when necessary. In exercising this vested power to determine what is iniquitous and unconscionable, the Court must consider the circumstances of each case. What may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one case, may be just in another. In a number of cases, this Court equitably reduced the interest rate agreed upon by the parties for being iniquitous, unconscionable, and/or exhorbitant. Notably in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, while this Court held that respondents were liable for the stipulated interest rate of 18% per annum, we equitably reduced the same to 10% per annum after finding that the interests and penalty charges alone exceeded the amount of the principal debt. In the instant case, the resulting interest charge has turned out to be excessive in the context of its base computation period, and hence, unwarranted in fact and in operation. We are not unmindful of the length of time this case has been pending in court for which the amount involved has ballooned to the outrageous amount of more than P45 million which is four times the principal debt. While we have sustained the validity of much higher interest rates of 21% per annum in Bautista v. Pilar Development Corporation and 24% per annum in Garcia v. Court of Appeals as the factual circumstances therein warrant, it is well to note that compared to the instant case, the said cases were litigated for a shorter period of time12 years and 3 years, respectively. Here, the complaint was filed in the lower court sixteen (16) years ago. Consequently, the already huge principal debt swelled to a considerably disproportionate sum. DURAN, ET AL. v. CA, ET AL. 02 May 2006 Facts: The complaint is for Reconveyance of certain portions of a parcel of land in the name of defendant-appellant. Plaintiffs-appellees sought to recover the portions on which they have built their respective dwellings. The TCT shows that the prior owner of the lot was Antonina Oporto who leased out the property to the plaintiffs-appellees and the defendants-
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of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Note however that jurisprudence also says that there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. (2) NO. The attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the lefthand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. (3) NO. The will was not notarized before the notary public. The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila." By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. *See also Arts. 805-806 DELFIN, ET AL. v. BILLONES, ET AL. 17 March 2006 Facts: On 29 July 1960, Daos, et. al. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 213 in favor of spouses Delfin. The deed was notarized and on 18 November 1980, spouses Delfin registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds.
resolved for purposes of determining the question of possession. AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. 12 April 2006 Facts: Petitioner Felix Azuela filed a petition for probate with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. He sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent. There were three named witnesses to the will and who affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague. The petition was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Among other things, Castillo claimed that the will was a forgery and that it was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. The oppositor also adds that the attestation does not state the number of pages upon which the will is written. In spite of these defects, the RTC granted the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate, noting that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate. Issue: WON the will is valid. Held/Ratio: (1) NO. The attestation does not state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of probate. The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written is a fatal flaw. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution
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proved may in some cases raise a presumption of its existence. However, while fraud may be proved by circumstances or presumed from them, it cannot be demonstrated by mere construction, but must be proven in all cases. Respondents indeed failed to prove that fraud attended the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale. Their bare and unsupported allegations are not enough to overthrow the presumption of the validity of said agreement or to raise the presumption of fraud. Considering that respondents failed to establish the existence of fraud in the spouses Delfins acquisition of Lots No. 214 and 3414, it cannot be said that implied or constructive trust was created between respondents and the spouses Delfin. The action for reconveyance must fail. Further, in view of respondents failure to show their valid title to Lot No. 3414 or even their occupation thereof, the case cannot prosper even when it is viewed as one for quieting of title. ANTONIO V. REYES 10 March 2006 Facts: Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989, petitioner was 26 years old then while the respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish in Pasig, on 6 December 1990. Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who died five months later. On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, which he enumerated to be as follows: (1) that she concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son who she introduced as the adopted child of her family, (2) that her brother-in-law attempted to rape and kill her when no such incident occurred, (3) that she misrepresented herself to be a psychiatrist or a graduate of BS psychology, when she was neither, (4) that she was a singer or freelance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company, which is not at all true, (5)
On 26 March 1965, an Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute Deed of Sale involving Lot. No. 3414 was made between Daos, et. al. and the spouses Delfin. Said deed was also notarized. The Delfins registered the document on 24 June 1980. They then consolidated Lots No. 213 and 3414 and subdivided the resulting lot into six smaller lots. On 12 April 1994, respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the former owners of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414, filed an action for annulment, reconveyance, recovery of ownership and possession and damages. Respondents averred: (a) that Daos only meant to mortgage of Lot No. 3414 but the Delfin spouses tricked her into signing the Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute Deed of Sale; and (b) that the Deed of Sale covering Lot No. 213 was fictitious and the signatures and thumb marks contained therein were all forged because three (3) of the signatories therein died before the alleged sale in 1960. Issues: 1. WON a constructive trust was established between Daos, et. al. and the spouses Delfin. 2. WON the action is barred by prescription and laches. Held: 1. NO. 2. YES. Ratio: When ones property is registered in anothers name without the formers consent, an implied trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Meanwhile, constructive trusts are created in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. An action for reconveyance based upon an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title, registration being constructive notice to all persons. However, an action for reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts. Fraud may be, and often is, proved by or inferred from circumstances, and the circumstances
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extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. The Court tested the petition of Antonio against this guideline and upheld the decision of the lower court, holding that from the totality of the evidence, the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract
that she made up certain personalities to be her alleged friends, (6) that she represented herself as a person of greater means, even altering her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income, and (7) that she exhibited insecurities and jealousies bordering on paranoia. The respondent denied all the accusations of the petitioner. Both petitioner and respondent presented medical experts to support each of their claims. After trial, the lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It should be noted that shortly before the lower court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties, which annulment was later on upheld by the Roma Rota of the Vatican. Despite such, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to establish the incapacity of the respondent. Issue: Whether or not the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code Held/Ratio: Yes. After discussing the history of Article 36 as a ground to nullify a marriage, the Court expressly regarded that Republic vs. CA, more popularly known as Molina case, established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36 The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
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also found fault with the auction sale, holding that there was a need to individually sell the various shares of stock as they had belonged to different pledgors. Petitioners now argue before this Court that they were authorized to refuse as they did the tender of payment since they were undertaking the auction sale pursuant to the final and executory decision, the amounts consigned could not extinguish the principal loan obligations of respondents since they were not sufficient to cover the interests due on the debt, and that the essential procedural requisites for the auction sale had been satisfied. Issue: WON the CA erred in holding that the pledged shares of stock auctioned off in a notarial sale could still be redeemed by their owners. Held/Ratio: YES. The appellate courts dwelling on the right of redemption is utterly off-tangent. The right of redemption involves payments made by debtors after the foreclosure of their properties, and not those made or attempted to be made, as in this case, before the foreclosure sale. The right of redemption as affirmed under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies only to execution sales, more precisely execution sales of real property. However, the subject sale of pledged shares was an extrajudicial sale, specifically a notarial sale . Moreover, the Court of Appeals expressly asserted the notion that pledged property, necessarily personal in character, may be redeemed by the creditor after being sold at public auction. Yet, as a fundamental matter, does the right of redemption exist over personal property? No law or jurisprudence establishes or affirms such right. Indeed, no such right exists. MACALINAO v. ONG 14 December 2005 Facts: Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver, respectively, at Genetron, a single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian. Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of machinerya reactor/motor for mixing chemicals. While in the process of complying with the order, the elf driven by Ong, hit and bumped the front portion of a private jeepney. Macalinao incurred the most serious injuries among the passengers of the truck. Macalinao later died.
marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted. Hence, the CA decision is reversed.
SPS. BONIFACIO and FAUSTINA PARAY, ET AL. v. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. 24 Jan 2006 Facts: Respondents were the owners of shares of stock in a corporation known as the QuirinoLeonor-Rodriguez Realty Inc. In 1979 to 1980, respondents secured by way of pledge of some of their shares of stock to petitioners Bonifacio and Faustina Paray the payment of certain loan obligations. When the Parays attempted to foreclose the pledges on account of respondents failure to pay their loans, respondents filed complaints with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City seeking the declaration of nullity of the pledge agreements, among others. RTC dismissed the complaint and gave "due course to the foreclosure and sale at public auction of the various pledges. Before the scheduled date of auction, all of respondents caused the consignation with the RTC Clerk of Court of various amounts. It was claimed that respondents had attempted to tender these payments to the Parays, but had been rebuffed. Notwithstanding the consignations, the public auction took place as scheduled, with petitioner Vidal Espeleta successfully bidding the amount of P6,200,000.00 for all of the pledged share causing the respondents to file a complaint seeking the declaration of nullity of the concluded public auction. They claim that tender of payment and subsequent consignations served to extinguish their loan obligations and discharged the pledge contracts. The Cebu City RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that respondents had failed to tender or consign payments within a reasonable period after default and that the proper remedy of respondents was to have participated in the auction sale. The Court of Appeals Eighth Division however reversed the RTC on appeal, ruling that the consignations extinguished the loan obligations and the subject pledge contracts; and the auction sale of 4 November 1991 as null and void. The CA chose to uphold the sufficiency of the consignations owing to an imputed policy of the law that favored redemption and mandated a liberal construction to redemption laws. The CA
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could have shed light on the circumstances is likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge about the cause of the mishap are the two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastians previous employee but his co-respondent in this case as well. In the circumstances, evidence as to the true cause of the accident is, for all intents and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to petitioners. Under local jurisprudence, the following are the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur: (1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; (2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. We are convinced that all the above requisites are present in the case at bar. No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of course unless someone is negligent, thus, the first requisite for the application of the doctrine is present. Ong was driving the Isuzu truck which, from the evidence adduced, appears to have precipitated the collision with the private jeepney. Driving the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it, a fact which shows that the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence could be attributed to Macalinao relative to the happening of the accident since he was merely a passenger in the Isuzu truck. The last requisite is, therefore, likewise present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of Ongs negligence arises. In consonance with the effect of the doctrine, the burden of proving due care at the time in question shifts to respondents. Unfortunately, as previously discussed, aside from blanket allegations that Ong exercised prudence and due care while driving on the day of the accident, respondents proffered no other proof. As a consequence, the prima facie finding of negligence against Ong, remaining unexplained and/or uncontradicted, is deemed established. This in turn warrants a finding that Ong is liable for damages to petitioners.
After trial in the civil action, the RTC declared that based on the evidence, Ong was negligent. It likewise held that Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ong, thus solidarily liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil indemnity for Macalinaos death. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court. It held that the evidence presented by petitioners was woefully scant to support a verdict of negligence against Ong. Issue: WON, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, the evidence conclusively establish fault or negligence on the part of Ong and justify the award of damages in their favor Held/Ratio: YES. While not constituting direct proof of Ongs negligence, the pieces of evidence justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part. The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. This is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since they were not present at the crucial moment. The driver of the private jeepney who
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FABRIGAS V. DEL MONTE 25 November 2005
OF

10) Again they defaulted on their installments! 11) Spouses then paid P10,000 which Del Monte refused to accept because it claimed the payment was intended for satisfaction of Contract #1 which was considered cancelled already. 12) Del Monte sent demand letters again demanding payment of installments underContract #2. 13) Del Monte allowed grace period of 30 days to avoid rescission. 14) It was only then that Del Monte informed the spouses Contract #1 was considered cancelled and they must vacate property. 15) Del Monte instituted an action for Recovery of Possession with Damages against Spouses Fabrigas. Spouses Fabrigas claimed, among others, that Del Monte unilaterally cancelled the first contract and forced petitioner Marcelina to execute the second contract, which materially and unjustly altered the terms and conditions of the original contract. 16) RTC upheld the validity of Contract to Sell #2, and ordered Spouses Fabrigas either to complete payments or to vacate the property. 17) CA affirmed, stating Contract to Sell #1 rescinded pursuant to the automatic rescission clause therein. Also, Contract to Sell #2 was unenforceable for having been executed without petitioner Marcelinas signature, but contract subsequently ratified by husbands installment payment. Issues: Was Contract #1 extinguished through rescission or was it novated by the subsequent Contract #2? 1) If rescinded, did the manner comply with the provisions of RA 6552 (Maceda Law)? 2) If novated, are spouses liable for breach under Contract #2? Held: (Contract rescinded due to the automatic rescission clause BUT since under SECTION 7 of RA 6552, an automatic rescission clause is void, so) Contract #1 considered novated by Contract #2. 1) Del Monte should have complied with requisites of SECTION 4 of RA 6552 2) Yes, spouses liable for breach Ratio: ISSUE #1 1) Spouses defaulted in all monthly installments. They may be credited only with the amount of P30,000.00 paid upon the execution of Contract #1, which should be deemed equivalent to less than 2 years installments. Applicable legal provision on the mode of cancellation of Contract
Main Points: A) Cancellation of a contract under Section 4 of RA 6552 (Maceda Law) is a two-step process!!! 1) First, the seller should extend the buyer a grace period of at least sixty (60) days from the due date of the installment. 2) Second, at the end of the grace period, the seller shall furnish the buyer with a i) notice of cancellation or ii) demand for rescission through a notarial act, effective THIRTY days from the buyers receipt thereof. A mere notice would not suffice! B) Also, automatic cancellation clause is VOID under Section 7 in relation to Section 4 of R.A. 6552. Facts: 1) Contract #1 - Spouses Fabrigas and respondent Del Monte entered into an Contract to Sell agreement where Del Monte would sell spouses a parcel of residential land for and in consideration of the amount of P109,200.00. 2) Agreement stipulated that Spouses Fabrigas shall pay P30,000.00 as downpayment and the balance within ten (10) years in monthly successive installments of P1,285.69. Among the clauses in the contract is an automatic cancellation clause in case of default of payment, including interest within 30 days after due date. Contract will be deemed and considered forfeited and annulled without notice to purchaser, and seller shall be at liberty to dispose land as if the contract never existed. All sums of money already paid will be considered as rentals, and purchaser waives all right to ask or demand return and must vacate premises. 3) After paying P30,000.00, Spouses Fabrigas took possession of the property but failed to make any installment payments on the balance of the purchase price. 4) Del Monte sent demand letters on 4 occasions. 5) 3rd demand letter granted a 15 day grace period. 6) Final 4th letter granted another 15 day grace period and warned of rescission of contract should they still fail to pay. 7) Contract cancelled 15 days letter NO NOTICE given to spouses. 8) Contract #2 Wife Marcelina Fabrigas entered into another agreement with Del Monte covering the same property BUT under restructured terms of payment. 9) Under this 2nd contract New, higher purchase price, and higher monthly installments
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same, it is imperative that 1) it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or 2) that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other. 6) TEST OF INCOMPATIBILITY - whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. OTHER ISSUES: Spouses contend Contract #2 is void because 1) Husband Isaias Fabrigas did not give his consent thereto Held: NOT VOID. Article 173 of the Civil Code expressly classifies a contract executed by the husband without the consent of the wife as merely ANNULLABLE at the instance of the wife. However, there is no comparable provision covering an instance where the wife alone has consented to a contract involving conjugal property. Article 172 of the Civil Code, though, does not expressly declare as void a contract entered by the wife without the husbands consent. It is also not one of the contracts considered as void under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. There is also no express provision in the Civil Code governing a situation where the husband is absent and his absence incapacitates him from administering the conjugal partnership property. The following Civil Code provisions, however, are illuminating:
ARTICLE 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property. ARTICLE 168. The wife may, by express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property. ARTICLE 169. The wife may also, by express authority of the husband appearing in a public instrument, administer the latter's estate.
#1 is Section 4 of RA 6552, applicable to instances where less than two years installments were paid.
SECTION 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than SIXTY days from the date the installment became due. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may CANCEL the contract after THIRTY days from 1) receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or 2) demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act.
3) Cancellation of a contract under Section 4 is a two-step process. First, the seller should extend the buyer a grace period of at least sixty (60) days from the due date of the installment. Second, at the end of the grace period, the seller shall furnish the buyer with a i) notice of cancellation or ii) demand for rescission through a notarial act, effective THIRTY days from the buyers receipt thereof. A mere notice would not suffice! 4) Also, automatic cancellation clause is VOID under Section 7 in relation to Section 4 of R.A. 6552. ISSUE #2 1) Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or modificatory. Extinctive - when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the place of the former. Modificatory - when the old obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible with the amendatory agreement. 2) An extinctive novation results either by changing the object or principal conditions (objective or real), or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor (subjective or personal). 3) Under this mode, novation would have dual functionsone to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its placerequiring a conflux of four essential requisites: (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. 4) Facts show that Contract to Sell #1 is novated by Contract to Sell # 2. Contract #2 accompanied an upward change in the contract price, which constitutes a change in the object or principal conditions of the contract. 5) In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the
Marcelina was not expressly authorized by the husband nor did she seek judicial authority to assume powers of administration. Therefore, contract UNENFORCEABLE. However, the husband ratified it anyway by remitting payments. Ratification of a contract cleanses contract from all its defects from the moment it was constituted.
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requires the debtor to indemnify the guarantor what the latter has paid. There is no basis for petitioners claim that PhilGuarantee was a mere volunteer payor and had no legal obligation to pay TRB. The law does not prohibit the payment by a guarantor on his own volition, heedless of the benefit of excussion. In fact, it recognizes the right of a guarantor to recover what it has paid, even if payment was made before the debt becomes due, or if made without notice to the debtor, subject of course to some conditions. The benefit of excussion, as well as the requirement of consent to extensions of payment, is a protective device pertaining to and conferred on the guarantor. These may be invoked by the guarantor against the creditor as defenses to bar the unwarranted enforcement of the guarantee. However, PhilGuarantee did not avail of these defenses when it paid its obligation according to the tenor of the guarantee once demand was made on it. What is peculiar in the instant case is that petitioners, the principal debtors themselves, are muddling the issues and raising the same defenses against the guarantor, which only the guarantor may invoke against the creditor, to avoid payment of their own obligation to the guarantor. HEIRS OF JUAN & INES PANGANIBAN v. DAYRIT 28 July 2005 Facts: In the amended complaint filed with the trial court, petitioners alleged that they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which they inherited from the late Juan and Ines. The owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering Lot 1436 had been lost but upon petition with the trial court in 1977 by Erlinda B. Pacursa (Erlinda), one of the heirs of Ines and a petitioner herein, the trial court granted the petition. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an owners duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to Erlinda. Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a certain Cristobal Salcedo (Salcedo) asserted ownership over Lot 1436 and believing that it was unregistered, sold a portion of it to respondent. The latter subsequently discovered that what she had bought was registered land. Unable to annotate the deed of sale at the back of OCT No. 7864, respondent fraudulently filed a petition for issuance of the owners copy of said title,
2) The subsequent contract is a contract of adhesion. Held: It still does NOT render a contract void. A contract of adhesion is so-called because its terms are prepared by only one party while the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto. Parties who enter into such contracts are free to reject the stipulations entirely. JN DEVT CORP., ET AL. v. PHIL. EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORP. 31 Aug 2005 Facts: Petitioner JN Development Corp (JN) borrowed from Traders Royal Bank (TRB) P2M. Securing the loan are a real estate mortgage and a letter of guarantee from respondent Philguarantee covering 70% of the loan/credit line. JN failed to pay. TRB requested Philguarantee to make good its guarantee, which it did paying the former P934,824.34. Philguarantee then made several demands on JN, but latter failed to pay. Philguarantee filed a collection suit, but was dismissed by RTC. As per RTC, TRB was able to foreclose the real estate mortgage, thus extinguishing JNs obligation. The failure of TRB to sue JN for the recovery of loan precludes Philguarantee from seeking recoupment what it paid to TRB. Thus, Philguarantees payment to TRB amounts to waiver of its right under Art. 2058 of CC. CA reversed RTC. CA held that extinguishment of the loan via foreclosure sale of mortgaged property had no factual support. It also explained that while the provision states that the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay unless the properties of the debtor are exhausted, the guarantor is not precluded from waiving the benefit of excussion and paying the obligation altogether. Issue: WON Philguarantee should be indemnified by JN despite the former waiving its benefit of excussion. Held/Ratio: YES! While a guarantor enjoys the benefit of excussion, nothing prevents him from paying the obligation once demand is made on him. Excussion, after all, is a right granted to him by law and as such he may opt to make use of it or waive it. PhilGuarantees waiver of the right of excussion cannot prevent it from demanding reimbursement from petitioners. The law clearly
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On 10 August 1992, upon motion duly granted, respondent filed a third-party complaint against the heirs of Salcedo alleging that as such heirs, they carry the burden of warranting that their predecessors in interest were the true, legal and rightful owners of the property in question at the time of the sale. Hence, she prayed therein that she be maintained in peaceful and legal ownership, possession and enjoyment of the questioned property. Answering the third-party complaint, the heirs of Salcedo effectively admitted the existence of the 1978 deed of sale in favor of respondent by their parents and considered the sale as within the personal and legal right of their parents and an act outside their control. The trial court rendered a decision against petitioners and in favor of respondent. The Regional Trial Court Decision was modified by the CA on appeal by petitioners. The appellate court held that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the valid and subsisting duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 was the one issued to Erlinda, not to respondent, considering that respondent had failed to comply with the mandatory jurisdictional requirements of law for the reconstitution of title under Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 26. The CA invoked the doctrine that a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title if the original is in fact not lost. Citing Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the CA held that the reconstituted certificate is itself void once the existence of the original is unquestionably demonstrated. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed in all other respects the ruling of the trial court, including the critical holding that respondent was the owner of the subject property. Petitioners now come before this Court seeking the partial reversal of the decision rendered by the CA. Issues: 1. Whether or not the tax declarations and the alleged adverse possession of respondent and her predecessor-in-interest are conclusive proofs of their ownership of Lot 1436. 2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to possession of the property. Held/Ratio:
docketed as Misc. Case No. 90-018 in March 1990. This petition of the respondent alleged that the copy issued to Erlinda was lost in the fire that razed Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City in 1981. While the petition mentioned Erlinda as the last one in possession of the alleged lost owners duplicate copy of the title, she was not notified of the proceedings. The petition in Misc. Case No. 90-018 was subsequently granted and the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an owners duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to respondent. This second duplicate certificate issued to respondent contained Entry No. 160180, the annotation of a Notice of Adverse Claim filed by Erlinda. The Notice of Adverse Claim dated 24 February 1992 alleged in part that Erlinda is one of the lawful heirs of Juan and Ines, the registered owners of the property, and as such, she has a legitimate claim thereto. Petitioners further alleged that the newly issued owners duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to respondent was prejudicial to their previously issued title which is still in existence. Thus, they prayed among others that they be declared as the rightful owners of the property in question and that the duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 in their possession be deemed valid and subsisting. In her answer to the amended complaint, respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint and set up affirmative and special defenses. She alleged that Lot 1436 was actually sold sometime in 1947 by the petitioners themselves and their father, Mauricio Baconga. The sale was purportedly covered by a Deed of Definite Sale. Salcedo then came into ownership, possession and enjoyment of the property in question. On 14 February 1978, Salcedo sold a portion of Lot 1436 with an area of two thousand twenty- five (2,025) square meters, more or less, to respondent. From then on, the property in question has been in her actual and physical enjoyment, she added. Respondent further alleged that the complaint was barred by the principles of estoppel and laches by virtue of the sales executed by petitioners themselves and their father. The complaint, according to her, also failed to include as defendants, the heirs of Salcedo who are indispensable parties.
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In this case, both the lower court and the appellate court found that contrary to respondents claim of possession, it was Salcedo, respondents predecessor-in-interest who had been in actual possession of the property. It was only in 1992 or forty-five (45) years from the time Salcedo took possession of the property that petitioners made an attempt to claim it as their own. Petitioners declared the property for tax purposes, registered their adverse claim to respondents title, and filed the instant case all in 1992. These actuations of petitioners point to the fact that for forty-five (45) years, they did nothing to assert their right of ownership and possession over the subject property. Petitioners claim that prescription and adverse possession can never militate against the right of a registered owner since a title, once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. They are right in that regard. But their cause is defeated not by prescription and adverse possession, but by laches. PRUDENTIAL BANK v. ALVIAR 28 July 2005 Facts: Respondents, spouses Don A. Alviar and Georgia B. Alviar, are the registered owners of a parcel of land in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 438157 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. On 10 July 1975, they executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner Prudential Bank to secure the payment of a loan worth P250,000.00. This mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No. 438157. On 4 August 1975, respondents executed the corresponding promissory note, PN BD#75/C-252, covering the said loan, which provides that the loan matured on 4 August 1976 at an interest rate of 12% per annum with a 2% service charge, and that the note is secured by a real estate mortgage as aforementioned. Significantly, the real estate mortgage contained the following clause: That for and in consideration of certain loans, overdraft and other credit accommodations obtained from the Mortgagee by the Mortgagor and/or ________________ hereinafter referred to, irrespective of number, as DEBTOR, and to secure the payment of the same and those that may hereafter be obtained, the principal or all of which
1. NO. The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of title in petitioners possession is valid and subsisting. This Court had already ruled in Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of a new title. Since the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 earlier issued to Erlinda is still in existence, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents petition for reconstitution of title. The duplicate certificate of title subsequently issued to respondent is therefore void and of no effect. The registered owners of OCT No. 7864 on the face of the valid and subsisting duplicate certificate of title are still Juan and Ines, petitioners predecessors in interest. Per Section 46 of the Land Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. This rule taken in conjunction with the indefeasibility of a Torrens title leads to the conclusion that the rightful owners of the property in dispute are petitioners. They are indisputably the heirs of the registered owners, both of whom are already dead. 2. NO. Petitioners are no longer entitled to recover possession of the property by virtue of the equitable defense of laches. By laches is meant: the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendants title but only with whether or not by reason of plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. It is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.
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the release of the real estate mortgage for the P450,000.00 loan covering the two (2) lots located at Vam Buren and Madison Streets, North Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. The payment was acknowledged by petitioner who accordingly released the mortgage over the two properties. On 15 January 1980, petitioner moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the property covered by TCT No. 438157. Per petitioners computation, respondents had the total obligation of P1,608,256.68, covering the three (3) promissory notes, plus assessed past due interests and penalty charges. The public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 15 January 1980. Respondents filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Pasig, claiming that they have paid their principal loan secured by the mortgaged property, and thus the mortgage should not be foreclosed. For its part, petitioner averred that the payment of P2,000,000.00 made on 6 March 1979 was not a payment made by respondents, but by G.B. Alviar Realty and Development Inc., which has a separate loan with the bank secured by a separate mortgage. On 15 March 1994, the trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered the Sheriff to proceed with the extra-judicial foreclosure. Respondents sought reconsideration of the decision. On 24 August 1994, the trial court issued an Order setting aside its earlier decision and awarded attorneys fees to respondents. It found that only the P250,000.00 loan is secured by the mortgage on the land covered by TCT No. 438157. On the other hand, the P382,680.83 loan is secured by the foreign currency deposit account of Don A. Alviar, while the P545,000.00 obligation was an unsecured loan, being a mere conversion of the temporary overdraft of Donalco Trading, Inc. in compliance with a Central Bank circular. According to the trial court, the blanket mortgage clause relied upon by petitioner applies only to future loans obtained by the mortgagors, and not by parties other than the said mortgagors, such as Donalco Trading, Inc., for which respondents merely signed as officers thereof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the trial court but deleted the award of attorneys fees. However, it found that respondents have not yet paid the P250,000.00 covered by PN
is hereby fixed at Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as well as those that the Mortgagee may extend to the Mortgagor and/or DEBTOR, including interest and expenses or any other obligation owing to the Mortgagee, whether direct or indirect, principal or secondary as appears in the accounts, books and records of the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor does hereby transfer and convey by way of mortgage unto the Mortgagee, its successors or assigns, the parcels of land which are described in the list inserted on the back of this document, and/or appended hereto, together with all the buildings and improvements now existing or which may hereafter be erected or constructed thereon, of which the Mortgagor declares that he/it is the absolute owner free from all liens and incumbrances. . . . On 22 October 1976, Don Alviar executed another promissory note, PN BD#76/C-345 for P2,640,000.00, secured by D/A SFDX #129, signifying that the loan was secured by a holdout on the mortgagors foreign currency savings account with the bank under Account No. 129, and that the mortgagors passbook is to be surrendered to the bank until the amount secured by the hold-out is settled. On 27 December 1976, respondent spouses executed for Donalco Trading, Inc., of which the husband and wife were President and Chairman of the Board and Vice President, respectively, PN BD#76/C-430 covering P545,000.000. As provided in the note, the loan is secured by Clean-Phase out TOD CA 3923, which means that the temporary overdraft incurred by Donalco Trading, Inc. with petitioner is to be converted into an ordinary loan in compliance with a Central Bank circular directing the discontinuance of overdrafts. On 16 March 1977, petitioner wrote Donalco Trading, Inc., informing the latter of its approval of a straight loan of P545,000.00, the proceeds of which shall be used to liquidate the outstanding loan of P545,000.00 TOD. The letter likewise mentioned that the securities for the loan were the deed of assignment on two promissory notes executed by Bancom Realty Corporation with Deed of Guarantee in favor of A.U. Valencia and Co. and the chattel mortgage on various heavy and transportation equipment. On 06 March 1979, respondents paid petitioner P2,000,000.00, to be applied to the obligations of G.B. Alviar Realty and Development, Inc. and for
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foreclosure of the mortgaged property should only be for the P250,000.00 loan covered by PN BD#75/C-252, and for any amount not covered by the security for the second promissory note. As held in one case, where deeds absolute in form were executed to secure any and all kinds of indebtedness that might subsequently become due, a balance due on a note, after exhausting the special security given for the payment of such note, was in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, within the protection of the mortgage, notwithstanding the giving of the special security. This is recognition that while the dragnet clause subsists, the security specifically executed for subsequent loans must first be exhausted before the mortgaged property can be resorted to. The mortgage contract, as well as the promissory notes subject of this case, is a contract of adhesion, to which respondents only participation was the affixing of their signatures or adhesion thereto. A contract of adhesion is one in which a party imposes a ready-made form of contract which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify. MIJARES, ET AL. v. RANADA, ET AL. 12 April 2005 Facts: On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate) by ten Filipino citizens who alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Courts jurisdiction over the complaint. Plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The US District Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of torture, summary execution and disappearance victims. Trial ensued and a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages
BD#75/C-252 since the payment of P2,000,000.00 adverted to by respondents was issued for the obligations of G.B. Alviar Realty and Development, Inc. Petitioner filed the instant petition. Issues: 1. Whether or not the blanket mortgage clause or the dragnet clause is valid. 2. Wether or not a foreclosure of the mortgaged property for the non-payment of the three loans is proper. Held/Ratio: 1. YES. A blanket mortgage clause, also known as a dragnet clause in American jurisprudence, is one which is specifically phrased to subsume all debts of past or future origins. Such clauses are carefully scrutinized and strictly construed. Mortgages of this character enable the parties to provide continuous dealings, the nature or extent of which may not be known or anticipated at the time, and they avoid the expense and inconvenience of executing a new security on each new transaction. A dragnet clause operates as a convenience and accommodation to the borrowers as it makes available additional funds without their having to execute additional security documents, thereby saving time, travel, loan closing costs, costs of extra legal services, recording fees, et cetera. Indeed, it has been settled in a long line of decisions that mortgages given to secure future advancements are valid and legal contracts, and the amounts named as consideration in said contracts do not limit the amount for which the mortgage may stand as security if from the four corners of the instrument the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, petitioner and respondents intended the real estate mortgage to secure not only the P250,000.00 loan from the petitioner, but also future credit facilities and advancements that may be obtained by the respondents. The terms of the above provision being clear and unambiguous, there is neither need nor excuse to construe it otherwise. 2. NO. It was improper for petitioner in this case to seek foreclosure of the mortgaged property because of non-payment of all the three promissory notes. While the existence and validity of the dragnet clause cannot be denied, there is a need to respect the existence of the other security given for PN BD#76/C-345. The
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1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action. Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, which provides that Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty, a mandate which is essentially defeated by the required exorbitant filing fee. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in this case and urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered, ordering the enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the law when he concluded that the filing fee be computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million. The provision states:
in favor of the plaintiff class. On 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996. On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141. On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined that the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application, and the RTC estimated the filing fees to be approximately P472,000,000.00, which obviously had not been paid. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of respondent judge, praying for the annulment of the questioned orders, and an order directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052 and the conduct of appropriate proceedings thereon. Petitioners claim their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by Section 6, Rule
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a thirdparty, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the started value of the property in litigation, is: 1. Less than P 100,00.00 P 500.00 2. P 100,000.00 or more P 800.00 but less than P 150,000.00 3. P 150,000.00 or more but P 1,000.00 less than P 200,000.00 4. P 200,000.00 or more but less than P 250,000.00 P 1,500.00 5. P 250,000.00 or more but less than P 300,00.00 - P 1,750.00 6. P 300,000.00 or more but not more than P 400,000.00 - P 2,000.00 7. P 350,000.00 or more but not more than P400,000.00 - P 2,250.00 8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of P 400,000.00 P 10.00
Petitioners complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The
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different countriesas affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot and in our jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co. The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the California Act of March 11, 1872. Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century. It is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review are in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and quietness. Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the proposition that the subject matter of the complaintthe enforcement of a foreign judgmentis incapable of pecuniary estimation. While the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for the enforcement of the foreign judgment, but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of
provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish. A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners complaint. Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso on actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The provision reads in full:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.(b) For filing 1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated --P 600.00 2. Special civil actions except judicial foreclosure which shall be governed by paragraph (a) above --P 600.00 3. All other actions not involving property --P 600.00
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does not apply in the case at bar. Neither the complaint nor the award of damages adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate. Respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment. Issue: (a) W/N the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation; (b) W/N the petition should be granted. Held: (a) No, but the corresponding filing fees were in the same amount as those initially paid by petitioners; (b) Yes Ratio: Proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction. The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
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The procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, there is a general right within our body of law and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due to an exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in international law. There are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination, computed in accordance with the applicable laws and standards of the forum. The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative lowincome capacity of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving real property situated in places such as the United States or Scandinavia where real property values are inexorably high. We cannot very well require that the filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as determined by the standards of the country where it is located. As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign judgment. Given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Courts Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of all other actions not involving
argument since there is no denying that the enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money. In all practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the provision indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no other court or office is vested jurisdiction over such complaint. Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. At the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. For this case and other similarly situated instances, we find that Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, other actions not involving property shall apply. Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property. The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint. There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
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2587, allegedly under the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the other hand, petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Respondent claims that all petitioners have occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his own liberality. Respondent developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 occupied by him into a resort known as the Borromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to expand and extend the facilities of the resort that he established on the subject properties, respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to vacate their homes. On 16 February 1994, respondent filed a Complaint for ejectment with the MTC against the petitioners. The MTC ruled that respondent did not have a preferential right of possession over the portions occupied by petitioners, since Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were not yet partitioned nor the disputed portions assigned to respondent as his determinate share. Thus, the MTC held that respondent had no right to evict petitioners therefrom. Consequently, respondents Complaint was dismissed. Issue: WON respondent has the right to eject the petitioners from Lot No. 2587? Held/ Ratio: YES. It is unmistakable that respondent has a right to eject the petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that [a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment, is a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of Lot. No. 2587. This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights. Respondents action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since
property. Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required. Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which states that [F]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right. Given our preceding discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds or unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. RESUENA, ET. AL. VS. CA, ET. AL. 28 March 2005 Facts: Private respondent, the late Juanito Borromeo, Sr. (hereinafter, respondent), is the coowner and overseer of certain parcels of land located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu, designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate. Respondent owns six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587 while the late spouses Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja (Spouses Bascon) own twoeights (2/8) thereof. On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by respondent and the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the proportion of their undivided shares was not determined a quo. Prior to the institution of the present action, petitioners Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena resided in the upper portion of Lot No.
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petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same. Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondents right under Article 487, clearly settles respondents prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. For the same reason, it is of no moment whether indeed, as petitioners claim, there was a verbal contract between Basilisa Maneja and Borromeo when the latter indicated the portions they each were to occupy in Lot No. 2587. Such verbal contract, assuming there was one, does not detract from the fact that the common ownership over Lot No. 2587 remained inchoate and undivided, thus casting doubt and rendering purely speculative any claim that the Spouses Bascon somehow had the capacity to assign or transmit determinate portions of the property to petitioners. Thus, in order that the petition may acquire any whiff of merit, petitioners are obliged to establish a legal basis for their continued occupancy of the properties. The mere tolerance of one of the coowners, assuming that there was such, does not suffice to establish such right. Tolerance in itself does not bear any legal fruit, and it can easily be supplanted by a sudden change of heart on the part of the owner. Petitioners have not adduced any convincing evidence that they have somehow become successors-in-interest of the Spouses Bascon, or any of the owners of Lot No. 2587. LIM, ET.AL. VS. CHUATCO, ET. AL. 11 March 2005 Facts: Spouses Jose Chuatoco and Leoncia Yap were the registered owners of a land with improvements. Jose died. His wife Leoncia and five sonsEduardo, Jorge, Rafael, Felipe and Francisco (herein respondents) proceeded to execute a deed of adjudication and partition. TCT No. 13935 in the name of the spouses Jose and Leoncia was replaced by TCT No. 142406 in the names of Leoncia and their children. Soon thereafter, Leoncia died. Jorge then took over as sole administrator of the school until 1984 when he was joined in this task by Rafaels wife, Teresita.
Respondents alleged that their brother Rafael had in the meantime succeeded in obtaining title to the property in his own name by using a fictitious deed of sale dated 27 February 1979, purportedly executed by them and their deceased mother Leoncia in favor of Rafael by forging their signatures. On 15 April 1982, TCT No. 142406 was cancelled and TCT No. 148821 was issued in the name of Rafael. On 8 May 1986, Rafael through his wife filed a petition for reconstitution of the owners duplicate of TCT No. 148821, alleging that their owners duplicate of the title had been lost. After obtaining the reconstituted title, Rafael, acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Teresita, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale to petitioners Lim covering the disputed property for the sum of P600,000.00. The Lims subsequently caused the cancellation of TCT No. 148821 in the name of Rafael and TCT No. 169859 was issued in their names. Issue 1: WON forgery had attended the execution of the Deed of Sale dated 27 Feb 1979? Held/Ratio: YES. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that forgery had attended the execution of the Deed of Sale, albeit in varying degrees. While the testimony of a person, disavowing the genuineness of his signature may seem selfserving at first blush, such as that proferred by Francisco, it cannot be ignored that such person is in the best position to know whether or not the signature on the check was his, and averments he would have on the matter, if adjudged as truthful, deserve primacy in consideration. On the other hand, the denials of Eduardo and Jorge of their mothers signature may be properly appreciated in evidence, as Section 50, Rule 130 allows the opinion of an ordinary witness to be received in evidence regarding a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity. The appellate court committed no error in ruling that Eduardo would probably be the most reliable witness to testify on the handwriting of his mother because he had worked closely with and exchanged papers and communications with Leoncia on a regular basis, the latter being then the administrator of the properties left by Jose. Issue 2: WON the registration of the property in Rafaels name using the forged deed of sale
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innocent purchasers in good faith. Certainly, the presumption of good faith cannot be overcome by haphazard conjectures premised on a disputed fact. Given the failure to establish that the Lims had known the Chuatoco siblings as the collective owners of the property prior to 1986, it was error on the Court of Appeals to declare that Jaime should have become suspicious enough when he discovered a year after his visit to the United States that title over the property had been issued way back in 1982 to Rafael. There was no demand on the part of the Lims that they become privy to whatever arrangements or transfers the Chuatocos may have had among themselves. The Lims had no obligation to look beyond the face of the Torrens title. Section 39 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, is explicit that "every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate...." It has been held: Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Thus, in order that a purchaser may be considered a purchaser in good faith, it is enough that he examine[s] the latest certificate of title. In line with this principle, all that Tajonera had to do was to examine his transferor's title which was then in the name of Juanita David. He did not have to go behind this title and scrutinize each and every title that preceded it. Not being required under the law to check on the validity of the sale to the original buyer and being without knowledge of any defect in the title appearing on its face, Tajonera falls under the definition of a purchaser in good faith and entitled to protection under the Land Registration Act 2.) The Court of Appeals, in disputing the validity of the deed of sale, makes reference to the fact that the deed of sale was registered only in 1982, or three years after its execution and one year after the death of Leoncia. Respondents cite this circumstance in further maintaining that the Lims should have been sufficiently alerted as to the
dated 27 Feb 1979 is sufficient to vest title to the entire property to him? Held/Ratio: NO. The fraudulent registration of the property in Rafaels name using the forged deed of sale is not sufficient to vest title to the entire property in him. Settled is the rule that a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title; registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. The Torrens system has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership. However, it is a familiar doctrine that a forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title, if the property has already been transferred from the name of the owner to that of the forger. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a person who deals with registered property in good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title. In the final analysis, the resolution of this case depends on whether the petitioners are purchasers in good faith. Issue 3: Whether or not the Lims are purchasers in good faith? Held/Ratio: Yes, the Lims are innocent purchasers for value, hence, have superior right over title. (The Supreme Court made several factual appreciations to determine this) 1.) Given the fact that the Lims did not go to the United States on purpose to meet with Eduardo, but were apparently only there on vacation, it becomes less clear that their frame of mind at that time was that the Chuatoco siblings owned the property. Thus, even though the Lims apparently concede having met with Eduardo in the United States in 1985, it is not evident that they did so with the intent of negotiating with Eduardo, with the perception that he was the co-owner of the property whose consent was indispensable to the sale. The Court is less prepared than the Court of Appeals to deem with any conclusiveness the fact of this meeting. Indeed, it is rather bothersome that this was the only circumstance, flimsy and self-serving as it is, drawn upon by the Court of Appeals to conclude that the Lims were not
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11 March 2005 Facts:
validity of the transfer, so as to require the Lims to inquire from the respondents on this matter. If we adopt this suggestion, however practical it may sound, it would unduly raise the legal bar by which an innocent purchaser for value will be adjudged. The general rule remains that the purchaser is not obligated to look beyond the title. This long entrenched rule cannot be dispensed with by the occasion of a mere shadow of a doubt. It may be gainsaid that there is nothing unusually suspicious with the mere fact that a deed of transfer or conveyance over titled property is registered three years after the execution of the deed. In fact, there is nothing in our land registration law that requires the registration or recording of such deeds within a definite prescribed period of time. The only legal effect of such non-registration is that implied under Section 51 of the Property Registration Decree, which provides that the act of registration becomes the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, though prior to registration, it operates as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. Thus, the mere fact that the deed of sale was recorded with the Register of Deeds only three years after its date of execution did not, in itself, impugn the validity of the instrument. Those aspects of the deed of sale which did affect its validity, involving as they did the forgery of the signatures thereupon, could not have been ascertained by the Lims upon examination of the deed of sale. In fact, it required a full blown trial and the testimony of NBI experts, among others, to conclusively rule that the signatures on the deed of sale were forged. 3.) Moreover, even as the deed of sale was subsequently proven a forgery, the Lims had every reason to rely upon it due to the fact that it is a notarized document. Notarized documents, as public documents, are entitled to full faith and credit upon these face when appreciated by the courts, and so much more when relied upon by the layman. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Lims were innocent purchasers for value, as the allegation to the contrary is based merely on conjecture and, therefore, cannot overcome the presumption of good faith. J.L.T. AGRO INC. v. BALANSAG, ET AL.
The controversy involves a parcel of land originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages. Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement (ComA). On the basis of the compromise agreement the CFI decision declared the land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa (Lot 63) as property owned in common by Don Julian and his 2 children of the first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Par. 13 of the ComA, at the heart of the present dispute, states that in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their onehalf share which they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children. Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of petitioner. Less than a year later, they also executed a Supplemental Deed. This instrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner. Don Julian died intestate. On the strength of the Supplemental Deed, petitioner registered Lot 63 in its own name. Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. They entered into a yearly lease agreement wit respondents. Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner,
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formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir. The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist. Issue #2: Whether or not Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same for his heirs from the second marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement? Held: No At the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime.
respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio. Respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner. Thus, they failed to register the deed. Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus damages. RTC: Dismissed complaint filed by respondents. CA: Reversed the trial courts decision. With par. 13 as basis, it ruled that the adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents. Hence this petition. Issue #1: Whether or not future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian? Held: No.
Blas v. Santos: Future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. Art. 1347 of the NCC is clear that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Art. 1080. For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. The first paragraph of Art. 1080, states that should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. Paras: If the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article. The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the
The crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is wellfounded.
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Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.
Issue #3: Whether or not the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage? Held: No Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir. In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. Issue #4: WHETHER OR NOR DON JULIAN HAD VALIDLY TRANSFERRED OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT LOT DURING HIS LIFETIME? Held: No A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Where the transferee relies on a voluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his name such instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is evident from Sections 53 and 57 of
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should have presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so. In fact, there is absolutely no mention of a reference to said document in the original and transfer certificates of title. This aspect fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT No. 5203 and the consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are not predicated on a valid transaction. Furthermore, the assignment is not supported by any consideration. Art. 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential element and they are not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph (2). The absence of the usual recital of consideration in a transaction which normally should be supported by a consideration such as the assignment made by Don Julian of all 19 lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact that the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the President and Director, forecloses the application of the presumption of existence of consideration established by law. Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. According to Article 749 of the NCC, in order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public document, the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement. In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed,
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of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. RTC: Ruled in favor of respondent. CA: Affirmed the decision with modification. Issue #1: Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late MDJr. as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share? Held: No.
i.e., whether it is valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of the underlying controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument which is at the core of the controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the trial court and the appellate court. Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking down the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to be a blatant nullity. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK v. DAILO 11 March 2005 Facts: Respondent Miguela C. Dailo (MD) and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. (MDJr.) purchased a house and lot from Sandra Dalida. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late MDJr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. MDJr. executed a SPA in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot. Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The transactions, including the execution of the SPA, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent. There was failure to pay the debt thus petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the ownership thereof. In the meantime, MDJr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed
Guiang v. CA: The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. There is no basis to construe Art. 493 of the NCC as an exception to Art. 124 of the FC. MD and MDJr. were married on 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) governed. With the effectivity of the FC, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the FC was made applicable to CPG already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of the spouses even in a suppletory manner. The regime of CPG is a special type of partnership, where the spouses place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the ACP wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the CPG shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on CPG) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the FC and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
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- Complainant arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of the procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety deposit boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened through the use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel. When a registered guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the management who then would assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety deposit box with the two keys - Hotel manager requested hotel employee who took the valuables to sign the promissory note which the latter did and Lopez also signed as a witness. Despite the execution of promissory note, complainant insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. However, hotel manager refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box entitled "Undertaking For the Use Of Safety Deposit Box," specifically paragraphs (2) and (4) thereof, to wit: 2. To release and hold free and blameless TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from any liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the said deposit box for any cause whatsoever, including but not limited to the presentation or use thereof by any other person should the key be lost; 4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE in favor of TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL Issue: Whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers. Held: No, such waivers are invalid. Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the "undertaking" manifestly contravene Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for they allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any
Issue #2: Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late MDJr. the same having redounded to the benefit of the family? Held: No. Under Art. 121 of the FC, for the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late MDJr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the NCC to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and wellbeing of the family as a unit. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditorparty litigant claiming as such. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late MDJr. redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade the Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained redounded to the benefit of the family. Thus, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. Furthermore, nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. YHT REALTY CORPORATION v. CA 17 Feb 2005 Facts:
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Borbajo had not filed application for registration and licenses to sell. The homeowners caused the construction of a guardhouse at the entrance of Hidden View I which adversely affected the residents of the subdivisions at the back as well as Borbajo since her trucks and heavy equipment used in the construction of her housing projects could not pass through the road lots. Thus Borbajo filed an action for damages and injunction against the homeowners and prayed for the issuance of a TRO. RTC: TRO granted and made permanent. CA: RTC decision reversed Complaint dismissed. and set aside.
cause whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from any force majeure. It is the loss through force majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the act of the thief or robber was done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to qualify the same as force majeure. BORBAJO V. HIDDEN VIEW HOMEOWNERS, INC., ET AL. 31 Jan 2005 Facts: Bontuyan et. al. were the registered owners of a parcel of land which was surveyed to convert it into a subdivision. The subdivision plan, which was later on approved, showed 3 road lots. Meanwhile, Bontuyan sold the resulting lots to different individuals. The 3 road lots were sold to Borbajo and Bongo but they obtained titles to the lots more than a month later. Bontuyan developed a subdivision which was named Hidden View Subdivision I. The Housing and Lang Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued him a License to Sell. Borbajo also developed into a subdivision the properties adjacent to Hidden View Subdivision I which she acquired. These were developed into two subdivision named ST Ville Properties and Hidden View Subdivision II respectively. She was also secured Licenses to Sell for the 2 subdivisions. The residents and homeowners of Hidden View I heard that Borbajo had purchased the subdivision from Bontuyan through an oral agreement and such they had no right to use the road lots as it were a property of Borbajo already. Borbajo confirmed her claim of ownership over the subdivision and the road lots, telling the homeowners that they have no right regarding the road right-of-way. Upon inquiry of the homeowners, they learned from an HLURB Officer that the 2 subdivisons of
Issues: 1.WON respondents may legally prevent Borbajo from using and passing through the 3 road lots within Hidden View Subdivision I. 2.WON Borbajo can be granted the TRO Held/Ratio: 1. NO. Borbajo is one of the registered co-owners of the road lots, together with Bongo. As registered co-owner of road lots, she is entitled to avail of all attributes of ownership under the Civil Code jus utendi, fruendi, abutendi, disponendi et vindicandi. Art 428 of the Civil Code states that the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. As such, the respondents cannot close the road lots to prevent Borbajo from using the same The Court of Appeals held that the road lots cannot be sold to any person pursuant to P.D. 957 and pointed out that fraud is manifest in the acquisition of titles thereto. However, it is a settled rule that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. It is a well-known doctrine that the issue to whether a title was procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is noted
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that the latter failed to execute the final deed of sale after the lands had already been sold to him. Babasanta subsequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with TRO to restrain conveyance of the property to other persons. Answer: Lu obtained loans from Babasanta in the amount of P50k and without the knowledge and consent of Miguel Zavalla, the two verbally agreed to transform transaction into a contract to sell with the 50k as downpayment. After payments amounting to 200K, Babasanta failed to pay the balance and asked for a price reduction to which Pacita refused. This prompted Babasanta to rescind contract to sell and revert back to the original loan transaction. Complaint-In-Intervention by SLDC: San Lorenzo Devt Corporation (SLDC) alleged that on Feb 11 1989, Sps Lu executed in their favor, an Option to Buy the lots. They paid an option money of P316,000.00. May 3 1989: After payment amounting to P632,320 or more than of total purchase price of P1.2M, Spouses Lu executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage in SLDCs favor Certificates of title were delivered to it clean and without notice of lis pendens SLDC claims that it is a buyer in good faith, with no obligation to look beyond the titles submitted by Spouses Lu July 30 1993: RTC rendered Decision upholding sale of property with SLDC on the basis of Article 1544 on double sales. It ruled that since neither registered the respective sales in their favor, the first to take possession- in this case SLDC, was the rightful owner. The court equated execution of a public instrument as sufficient delivery. Babasanta appealed to the CA, which reversed the decision and held that the sale with SLDC was null and void, the latter being a purchaser in bad faith. SLDC filed petition with the SC Issues: 1. Who has a better right over the lands?/WON SLDC is a buyer in good faith
that there is a separate case for annulment of titles over the road lots now pending before the court. However, in upholding the efficiency value of the disputed titles for purposes of the present petition, the court is not foreclosing any future determination by appropriate forum on the legality of Borbajos titles over the road lots. If the court finds that the titles of Borbajo were obtained fraudulently, her right to the road lots ceases as well as her right-of-way by virtue of said titles. In the meantime, bound by the value in law and evidentiary weight of titles in name of Borbajo. As long as the titles are not annulled, Borbajo remains registered a co-owner and therefore her right to use the road lots subsists. She is also entitled to an easement of right of way as stated in Art. 49 of the Civil Code where the dominant estate cannot be the servient estate at the same time. One of the characteristics of an easement is that it can be imposed only on the property of another, never on ones own property. An easement can exist only when the servient and the dominant estates belong to different owners. 2. YES. The requisites to justify injunctive relief are: a. the existence of right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected and b. the act against which injunction is to be directed as a violation of such right As Borbajo is the co-owner of the road lots in question, until otherwise decided upon by the court, he has the right to the use of such lots. SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. CA 21 Jan 2005 Facts: Spouses Miguel Lu and Pacita Zavalla owned 2 parcels of land in Sta. Rosa Laguna. Aug 20 1986: They agreed to sell to Pablo Babasanta at P15.00/ sqm. Babasanta made a downpayment of P50,000 evidenced by a memorandum receipt. Babasanta made subsequent payments amounting to P200,000.00. May 1989: Babasanta wrote Lu a letter demanding the execution of final deed of sale so that he could give full payment of purchase price. He received evidence that the spouses sold lands to other buyers and demanded that the latter be cancelled. Complaint: Babasanta filed Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Sps Lu, saying
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necessary in doubles sales, (Art1544) which is not present in this case. The transaction with Babasanta is a Contract to Sell only. B. Assuming that the registration of the sale had been tainted by prior notice of lis pendens and assuming that it was a double sale, SLDCs right still prevails. Abarquez vs. CA: It was held that if a vendee in a double sale registers after knowledge of a previous sale, such registration is deemed made in bad faith. In this case, the Israels registered the sale only after Abarquez registered its deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds. The Court ruled in favor of the Israels who first took possession of the property because registration by Abarquez lacked good faith. CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (CRB) v. CA 17 January 2005 Facts: The 5 Madrid brothers co-owned a parcel of land. Rizal Madrid sold his share (Lot 1), without objection from his brothers, to Dayag and Gamiao who later sold the same to Hernandez (northern half)and Dela Cruz (southern half) . The sale to Dayag and Gamiao was not registered, but they declared it for tax purposes. Later, the Madrid brothers sold Lot 1 to Marquez who registered the sale and subdivided the lot into 8 lots. He mortgaged 4 to CRB, 2 to Rural Bank of Cauayan (RBC) and sold 1 to Calixto. The heirs now question these transactions while the successor-in-interest of Hernandez files to intervene (later dismissed for failure to pay docket fees). Marquez,defendant, alleged that apart from being the first registrant, he was a buyer in good faith and for value. CRB, as defendant, and codefendant RBC insisted that they were mortgagees in good faith and that they had the right to rely on the titles of Marquez which were free from any lien or encumbrance. RTC: Marquez is the owner of the lot. Mortgages to CRB AND RBC valid. CA: RTC reversed. The heirs and Hernandez are lawful owners of the lot. Issue: Who has better right to the property Held: The heirs.
2. WON registration of the sale after knowledge of the transaction in favor of Babasanta defeated the effects of delivery and good faith in favor of SLDC. Held: 1. SLDC has a better right. Yes, it is a buyer in good faith. 2. No. Ratio: 1. A. The agreement between Babasanta and Sps Lu was a mere Contract to Sell not a Contract of Sale, as evidenced by the receipt issued by Lu and Babasantas letter of demand dated May 1989 in which he recognized that title couldnt be transferred without full payment of purchase price. Article 1544 on double sales is not applicable. In a Contract to Sell, title passes to the vendee upon full payment, whereas in a Contract of Sale, ownership passes upon delivery. The perfected contract to sell imposed on Babasanta the obligation to pay the full purchase price. He should have made a tender of payment, or failing the latter, he should have effected consignation to extinguish obligation to pay. No such tender was made, the letter expressing intention to pay not being sufficient. On Good Faith: SLDC immediately took possession and asserted its rights as owner. SLDC had every right to rely on correctness of the CTCs since they bore no adverse claim, encumbrance or lien at the time the lands were sold to it. B. Assuming that it was a Contract of sale, SLDC still has a better right since there was no delivery to Babasanta in whatever mode (actual, symbolic, longa manu, brevi manu, constitutum possessorium). Sale does not by itself transfer or affect ownership. It is tradition or delivery that actually transfers ownership which is lacking in this case.
2. A. At the time the Deed of Absolute Sale was

executed on May 1989 SLDC had no knowledge of the transaction with Babasanta. The annotation of the lis pendens on June 2 1989 came after the sale between SLDC and Sps Lu had already been consummated via delivery. Hence, there was no constructive knowledge of the previous transaction with Babasanta. This need not be discussed because registration in good faith as evidence of superior claim is only
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faith. Evidence shows that at the time of sale, he knew the heirs were claiming the lot and said so in direct examination. One who purchases real property which is in actual possession of others should, at least, make some inquiry concerning the rights of those in possession. The actual possession by people other than the vendor should, at least, put the purchaser upon inquiry. He can scarcely, in the absence of such inquiry, be regarded as a bona fide purchaser as against such possessions. The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. This rule equally applies to mortgagees of real property. With regard to CRB and RBC, banks, their business being impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands. Hence, for merely relying on the certificates of title and for its failure to ascertain the status of the mortgaged properties as is the standard procedure in its operations, we agree with the Court of Appeals that CRB is a mortgagee in bad faith. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA 17 January 2005 Facts: Naguit filed a petition for registration of a parcel of land, but it was opposed by the government and heirs of Rustico Angeles. Evidence on record shows the land was originally owned by Urbano who transferred it to Maming who renounced it in favor of Naguit. Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr as attorney-in-fact and the latter introduced improvements on the property and paid taxes thereon. Issue: Whether it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start Held/Ratio: No. The OSG invokes Director of Lands v. IAC, arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Contrary to the lower courts, the above provision does not apply because it contemplates a case of double or multiple sales by a single vendor. It is necessary that the conveyance must have been made by a party who has an existing right in the thing and the power to dispose of it. In the case at bar, the subject property was not transferred to several purchasers by a single vendor. In the first deed of sale, the vendors were Gamiao and Dayag whose right originated from their acquisition from Rizal Madrid with the conformity of all the other Madrid brothers, followed by their tax declaration of the property. On the other hand, the vendors in the later deed were the Madrid brothers but at that time they were no longer the owners since they had long before disposed of the property in favor of Gamiao and Dayag. Citing Carpio v Exevea, The Court states this is what Art 1544 has failed to express: the necessity for the preexistence of the right on the part of the conveyor. But even if the article does not express it, it would be understood, that that circumstance constitutes one of the assumptions upon which the article is based. In a situation where not all the requisites are present which would warrant the application of Art. 1544, the principle of prior tempore, potior jure or simply "he who is first in time is preferred in right," should apply. The only one who can invoke this is the first vendee. Undisputedly, he is a purchaser in good faith because at the time he bought the real property, there was still no sale to a second vendee. Applying this principle, the heirs have superior right. Assuming arguendo that Art 1544 applies, the claim of Marquez still cannot prevail over the right of the Heirs since according to the evidence he was not a purchaser and registrant in good
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the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2). Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner. Declaration for tax purposes strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. LIM V. SABAN 16 December 2004 Facts: Ybaez, the owner of a 1,000 square meter lot, entered into an Agency Agreement with Saban, authorizing Saban to: look for a buyer of the lot for Php200,000 mark up the selling price to include the amounts needed for payment of taxes, transfer of title and other expenses incident to the sale, as well as Sabans commission for the sale Through Sabans effort, the lot was sold to Lim and the Spouses Lim with Deed of Absolute Sale stipulating that the price of the lot is Php200,000. However, the Lims agreed to purchase the lot at the price of Php600,000, inclusive of taxes and other incidental expenses of the sale. After the sale Lim delivered the payment in the following manner: Php113,257 for taxes due on the transaction Php50,000 as brokers commission 4 postdated checks in the aggregate amount of Php236,743 Subsequently, Ybaez sent a letter to Lim asking the latter to cancel all the checks issued in Sabans favor and to extend another partial payment for the lot in Ybaezs favor. The four checks issued in Sabans favor were dishonored upon presentment. Thus he filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against Ybaez and Lim. Ybaez died during the pendency of the case and the trial court dismissed the case against him without any objection from the parties. RTC decision: dismissed Sabans complaint, declared the four checks as stale and nonnegotiable and absolving Lim from any liability towards Saban Court of Appeals decision:
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. There are three obvious requisites for registration of title: 1. that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain 2. that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation 3. that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The more reasonable interpretation of the provision is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. This interpretation aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals where the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR. Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. Properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then
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consummated through his efforts would be a breach of his contract of agency which expressly states that Saban would be entitled to any excess in purchase price after deducting the amount due to Ybaez, taxes and other incidental expenses of the sale. 2. Lim is not an accommodation party. Section 29 of the Negotiable Instrument Law defines an accommodation party as a person who has signed the negotiable instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value therefor, for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. The accommodation party is one who meets all these 3 requirements: a. He signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser b. He did not receive value for the signature and c. He signed for the purpose of lending his name to some other person In the case at bar, although Lim signed as drawer of the checks, she did not satisfy the 2 other requisites. Lim issued the checks on account of her transaction with Ybaez which was a sale, and therefore, a reciprocal contract. The amounts covered by the checks form part of the consideration from Ybaezs end, as vendor, while the lot represented the consideration on the side of Lim. Thus, Lim received value for her signature on the checks. Neither is there any indication that Lim issued the checks for the purpose of enabling Ybaez or an$y other person to obtain credit or to raise money. It must be noted that Sabans right to receive compensation arises from the Agency Agreement with Ybaez where Lim is not a party to. However, she had knowledge of the fact that the price agreed upon between her and Saban was greater than the price set by Ybaez. Her act of issuing four checks in Sabans favor belies her claim that she and her co-vendees did not agree to purchase the lot at Php600,000. The only logical conclusion is that Lim changed her mind about agreeing to purchase the lot at Php600,000 after talking to Ybaez which resulted to the prejudice of Saban whose efforts led to the completion of the sale between Ybaez and the Lims. This is sufficient basis for concluding that Ybaez and Lim connived to deprive Saban of his commission by dealing with each other directly and reducing the purchase price of the lot and leaving nothing to compensate Saban for his efforts. Thus making them both liable.
Held that Saban was entitled to his commission Ruled that Ybaezs revocation of his contract of agency with Saban was invalid because the agency was coupled with an interest and Ybaez effected the revocation in bad faith Found that Ybaez and Lim connived to deprive Saban of his commission Declared that Lim is liable to pay Saban his commission because she issued the 4 checks knowing that it was Sabans commission as Ybaezs agent. Ruled that in issuing the checks, Lim acted as an accommodation party, thus she is liable to pay Saban as the holder for value of the checks Lim filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied, thus this recourse. Issues: 1. a. WON there was a revocation of the contract of agency between Saban and Ybaez b. WON Saban is entitled to receive his commission from the sale 2. Assuming that Saban is entitled to his sales commission, a. WON Lim acted as an accommodation party b. WON Lim and Ybaez connived to deprive Saban of his commission c. WON Lim is liable to pay Saban his sales commission Held: 1. a.No b.Yes 2. a.No b.Yes c.Yes Ratio: 1. Under Art. 1927 of the Civil Code, an agency cannot be revoked if a bilateral contract depends upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted, or if a partner is appointed manager of a partnership in the contract of partnership and his removal from the management is unjustifiable In the case, Saban is entitled to his commission because the agency was not revoked since Ybaez requested that Lim make stop payment orders for the checks payable to Saban only after the consummation of the sale. At that time, Saban had already performed his obligation as Ybaezs agent. To deprive Saban of his commission subsequent to the sale which was
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Both parties appealed the trial courts Decision to the Court of Appeals. Issues: Whether the termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the non-ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, and the consequent withdrawal of US military forces and personnel from Cubi Point constitute force majeure which would exempt Globe from complying with its obligation to pay rentals under its Agreement with Philcomsat; Whether Globe is liable to pay rentals under the Agreement for the month of December 1992; Whether Philcomsat is entitled to attorneys fees and exemplary damages. Held/Ratio: YES. In order that Globe may be exempt from non-compliance with its obligation to pay rentals under Section 8, the concurrence of the following elements must be established: (1) the event must be independent of the human will; (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the abovementioned requisites are present in the instant case. Philcomsat and Globe had no control over the non-renewal of the term of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement when the same expired in 1991, because the prerogative to ratify the treaty extending the life thereof belonged to the Senate. Neither did the parties have control over the subsequent withdrawal of the US military forces and personnel from Cubi Point in December 1992: YES. Although Globe alleged that it terminated the Agreement with Philcomsat effective 08 November 1992, the trial court found that the US military forces and personnel completely withdrew from Cubi Point only on 31 December 1992. Thus, until that date, the USDCA had control over the earth station and had the option of using the same. Furthermore, Philcomsat could not have removed or rendered ineffective said communication facility until after 31 December 1992 because Cubi Point was accessible only to US naval personnel up to that time. Hence, the Court of Appeals did
PHILCOMSAT v. GLOBE 25 May 2004 Facts: Globe, contracted with Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) for the provision of the communication facilities for the military bases of the United States of America (US) in Clark Air Base. The said contract was entered into on 07 May 1991 and was for a term of 60 months, or five (5) years. In turn, Globe promised to pay Philcomsat monthly rentals for each leased circuit involved. At the time of the execution of the contract, both parties knew that the RP-US Military agreement was to expire in December 1991 but subject to Senates concurrence in the extension of the treaty. However, the Senate decided not to concur in the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security and its Supplementary Agreements. The RP-US Military Bases Agreement, as amended, shall terminate on 31 December 1992, the withdrawal of all US military forces from Subic Naval Base should be completed by said date. In view of this, Globe notified Philcomsat of its intention to discontinue the use of the earth station effective 08 November 1992. Globe invoked as basis for the letter of termination Section 8 (Default) of the Agreement, which provides that neither party shall be held liable or deemed to be in default for any failure to perform its obligation under this Agreement if such failure results directly or indirectly from force majeure or fortuitous event. Philcomsat, on the other hand, demanded from Globe payment of the stipulated rentals for the remaining terms of the Agreement even after Globe shall have discontinued the use of the earth station after November 08, 1992 based on Section 7 of the Agreement. However, Globe refused to heed Philcomsats demand. Philcomsat filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a Complaint against Globe. The trial court ordered Globe to pay Philcomsat US$92,238.00 representing rentals for the month of December 1992 and P300,000.00 Pesos as and for attorneys fees;
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not err when it affirmed the trial courts ruling that Globe is liable for payment of rentals until December 1992. In cases where both parties have legitimate claims against each other and no party actually prevailed, such as in the present case where the claims of both parties were sustained in part, an award of attorneys fees would not be warranted. Exemplary damages may be awarded in cases involving contracts or quasi-contracts, if the erring party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. In the present case, it was not shown that Globe acted wantonly or oppressively in not heeding Philcomsats demands for payment of rentals. It was established during the trial of the case before the trial court that Globe had valid grounds for refusing to comply with its contractual obligations after 1992.
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Held: As held in CIR v. American Express, Sec. 102 (b) (2) of the then Tax Code clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is, for a zero percent VAT rate for services that are performed in the Philippines, "paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the [BSP]." Thus, for the supply of service to be zerorated as an exception, the law merely requires that first, the service be performed in the Philippines; second, the service fall under any of the categories in Section 102(b) of the Tax Code; and, third, it be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP rules and regulations. The service provided by respondent clearly falls under these categories. CIR V. MAGSAYSAY LINES, ET AL 28 July 2006 Facts: Due to a privatization program, NDC transferred 5 vessels and its NMC shares. Among the terms in the public bidding was that the winning bidder was to pay a VAT of 10% on the value of the vessels. Magsaysay Lines, Baliwag Navigation and FIM Ltd of the Mardea Grp (HK) collectively were issued the award. A formal request on a ruling was filed in the BIR on WON the sale was subject to VAT. VAT Ruling 568-88 (14 Dec, 1988) held that the sale was subject to VAT. Thus, more than P15m in taxes were paid. The private respondents filed an appeal and asked for a refund of the VAT payment made. CTA & CA: sale not subject to VAT. The sale of a vessel was an "isolated transaction," not done in the ordinary course of NDCs business, and was thus not subject to VAT, which under Section 99 of the Tax Code, was applied only to sales in the course of trade or business. Issue: WON the sale by NDC of 5 of its vessels is subject to VAT under the 1986 Tax Code Held: NO. The sale was not in the course of the trade or business of NDC, thus outside the coverage of VAT. Section 99 of the Tax Code is sufficient reason for upholding the refund of VAT payments, and the applicability of Sec 100, Tax Code and Sec 4, RR 5-87 are irrelevant. RATIO: VAT is ultimately a tax on consumption, even though it is assessed on many levels of transactions on the basis of a fixed percentage. It is the end user of consumer goods or services
CIR V. PLACER DOME TECHNICAL SERVICES (PHILS.) INC. 08 June 2007 Facts: In 1996, PDTSL was hired by Marcopper Mining Corporation to clean up and rehabilitate the affected areas under the latters mines, as mine tailings from the Taipin Pit started to escape through rivers, causing the cessation of mining and milling operations, and causing potential environmental damage to the rivers and immediate area. PDTSL hired respondnet, its local counterpart, which is a domestic corporation and registered VAT entity. Due to the urgency and potential damage to environment of the said leaks, respondent agreed to immediately implement the project, and the Implementation Agreement between PDTSL and respondent stipulated that all implementation services rendered by respondent even prior to the agreements signing shall be deemed to have been provided pursuant to the said Agreement. The Agreement further stipulated that PDTSL was to pay respondent "an amount of money, in U.S. funds, equal to all Costs incurred for Implementation Services performed under the Agreement, as well as "a fee agreed to one percent (1%) of such Costs." In 1998, respondent amended its quarterly VAT returns for the last two quarters of 1996, and for the four quarters of 1997. In the amended returns, respondent declared a total input VAT payment of P43,015,461.98 for the said quarters, and P42,837,933.60 as its total excess input VAT for the same period. The respondent then filed an administrative claim for refund on its reported total input VAT payments in relation to the project it had contracted from PDTSL, arguing that the revenue derived from services rendered to PDTSL qualified as zero-related sales under Sec. 102 (b) (2) of the then Tax Code. Which states that "services performed by VATregistered persons in the Philippines (other than the processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines), when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the [Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas], are zero-rated." CIR did not act on the respondents claim for refund.
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deemed as sale. It would become necessary to ascertain whether under those two provisions the transaction may be deemed a sale, only if it is settled that the transaction occurred in the course of trade or business in the first place. If the transaction transpired outside the course of trade or business, it would be irrelevant for the purpose of determining VAT liability whether the transaction may be deemed sale, since it anyway is not subject to VAT. CIR v. BPI 26 June 2006 Facts: - BPI is a domestic corporation o The interest which it owns from deposits and similar arrangements are subject to a final withholding tax of 20%. (Section 24(e)(1) in relation to Section 50(a) of the NIRC) o Further, it is liable for a 5% gross receipts tax on all its income. (Section 119 of the NIRC) - For the four (4) quarters of the year 1996, BPI computed its 5% gross receipts tax payments by including in its tax base the 20% final tax on interest income that had been withheld and remitted directly to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) - Subsequently, CTA rendered a decision holding that the 20% final tax withheld on a banks interest income did not form part of its taxable gross receipts tax. - Thus, BPI requested a refund citing the CTA decision. Issue: WON the 20% final tax on a banks passive income, withheld from the bank at source, still forms part of the banks gross income for the purpose of computing its gross receipts tax liability (5%) Held/Ratio: Yes, the 20% should be included for the computation of the gross receipts tax liability *Plain meaning of gross receipts The Tax Code does not provide a definition of the term "gross receipts." Accordingly, the term is properly understood in its plain and ordinary meaning and must be taken to comprise of the entire receipts without any deduction. As commonly understood, the term "gross receipts" means the entire receipts without any deduction. Deducting any amount from the gross receipts changes the result, and the meaning, to net receipts. Any deduction from gross receipts is
which ultimately shoulders the tax, as the liability therefrom is passed on to the end users by the providers of these goods or services who in turn may credit their own VAT liability (or input VAT) from the VAT payments they receive from the final consumer (or output VAT). The final purchase by the end consumer represents the final link in a production chain that itself involves several transactions and several acts of consumption. The VAT system assures fiscal adequacy through the collection of taxes on every level of consumption, yet assuages the manufacturers or providers of goods and services by enabling them to pass on their respective VAT liabilities to the next link of the chain until finally the end consumer shoulders the entire tax liability. The tax is levied only on the sale, barter or exchange of goods or services by persons who engage in such activities, in the course of trade or business. As the sales of goods or services do not occur within the course of trade or business, the providers of such goods or services would hardly, if at all, have the opportunity to appropriately credit any VAT liability as against their own accumulated VAT collections since the accumulation of output VAT arises in the first place only through the ordinary course of trade or business. In Imperial v. CIR (Sept 30, 1955), the term "carrying on business" does not mean the performance of a single disconnected act, but means conducting, prosecuting and continuing business by performing progressively all the acts normally incident thereof; while "doing business" conveys the idea of business being done, not from time to time, but all the time. "Course of business" or "doing business" connotes regularity of activity. In this case, the sale was an isolated transaction. The sale which was involuntary and made pursuant to the declared policy of Government for privatization could no longer be repeated or carried on with regularity. The normal VAT-registered activity of NDC is leasing personal property. Before any portion of Sec 100, or the rest of the law for that matter, may be applied in order to subject a transaction to VAT, it must first be satisfied that the taxpayer and transaction involved is liable for VAT in the first place under Sec 99. Sec 100 and Sec 4(E)(i) of RR 5-87 elaborate on is not the meaning of "in the course of trade or business," but instead the identification of the transactions which may be
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of bookkeeping and accounting for interest on deposits and yield on deposit substitutes that are subjected to FWT are indeed for legal purposes tantamount to delivery, receipt or remittance. Thus, BPI constructively received income by virtue of its acquiescence to the extinguishment of its 20% final tax liability when the withholding agents remitted BPIs income to the government. Consequently, it received the amounts corresponding to the 20% final tax and benefited therefrom. Unless otherwise provided by law, ownership is essential in determining whether interest income forms part of taxable gross receipts. Ownership is the circumstance that makes interest income part of the taxable gross receipts of the taxpayer. When the taxpayer acquires ownership of money representing interest, the money constitutes income or receipt of the taxpayer. In contrast, the trustee or agent does not own the money received in trust and such money does not constitute income or receipt for which the trustee or agent is taxable. This is a fundamental concept in taxation. Thus, funds received by a money remittance agency for transfer and delivery to the beneficiary do not constitute income or gross receipts of the money remittance agency. *No double taxation Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, "x x x taxing the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing." Otherwise described as "direct duplicate taxation," the two taxes must be imposed on the same subject matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and they must be of the same kind or character. Here, the taxes are imposed on 2 different subject matters, the taxing periods they affect are different, the two taxes are of different kinds or characters. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. CIR 02 May 2006 Facts: Petitioner is the trustee of various retirement plans established by several companies for its employees. As trustee of the retirement plans, petitioner was authorized to
inconsistent with a law that mandates a tax on gross receipts, unless the law itself makes an exception. The word "gross" appearing in the term "gross receipts," as used in the ordinance, must have been and was there used as the direct antithesis of the word "net." In its usual and ordinary meaning "gross receipts" of a business is the whole and entire amount of the receipts without deduction. Furthermore, Section 119 (a) of the Tax Code expressly includes interest income as part of the base income from which the gross receipts tax on banks is computed. This express inclusion of interest income in taxable gross receipts creates a presumption that the entire amount of the interest income, without any deduction, is subject to the gross receipts tax. *Excluding the 20% final tax will effectively be a tax exemption The exclusion of the 20% final tax on passive income from the taxpayers tax base is effectively a tax exemption, the application of which is highly disfavored. The rule is that whoever claims an exemption must justify this right by the clearest grant of organic or statute law. Here, BPI has failed to present a clear statutory basis for its claim to take away the interest income withheld from the purview of the levy on gross tax receipts. *BPI Constructively received the 20% withheld Receipt of income may be actual or constructive. We have held that the withholding process results in the taxpayers constructive receipt of the income withheld. Court relied on Article 531 and 532 of the Civil Code. Article 531 of the Civil Code clearly provides that the acquisition of the right of possession is through the proper acts and legal formalities established therefor. The withholding process is one such act. There may not be actual receipt of the income withheld; however, as provided for in Article 532, possession by any person without any power whatsoever shall be considered as acquired when ratified by the person in whose name the act of possession is executed. In our withholding tax system, possession is acquired by the payor as the withholding agent of the government, because the taxpayer ratifies the very act of possession for the government. There is thus constructive receipt. The processes
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therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. **NOTE: in spite of the validity of petitioners claim, the Court ultimately denied the petition for procedural reasons. YAMANE V. BA LEPANTO CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION 25 October 2005 Facts: Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the Corporation). The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its Amended ByLaws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses, capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium. The Corporation received a Notice of Assessment signed by the City Treasurer. The Notice of Assessment stated that the Corporation is liable to pay the correct city business taxes, fees and charges, computed as totaling P1,601,013.77 for the years 1995 to 1997. The Notice of Assessment was silent as to the statutory basis of the business taxes assessed. The Corporation responded with a written tax protest dated 12 February 1999, addressed to the City Treasurer. Proceeding from the premise that its tax liability arose from Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the Corporation proceeded to argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government Code, business is defined as trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit. It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profitmaking activities. The assessments it did collect from the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses. From the denial of the protest, the Corporation filed an Appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The Makati RTC dismissed the
hold, manage, invest and reinvest the assets of these plans. Petitioner utilized such authority to invest these retirement funds in various money market placements, bank deposits, deposit substitute instruments and government securities. These investments necessarily earned interest income. Petitioners claim for refund centers on the tax withheld by the various withholding agents, and paid to the CIR for the four (4) quarters of 1993, on the aforementioned interest income. It is alleged that the total final withholding tax on interest income paid for that year amounted to P6,049,971.83. Issue: WON employee trusts are exempt from income tax Held/Ratio: YES. The Court had first recognized such exemption in the aforementioned CIR v. Court of Appeals case, arising as it did from the enactment of Republic Act No. 4917 which granted exemption from income tax to employees? trusts. The same exemption was provided in Republic Act No. 8424, the Tax Reform Act of 1997, and may now be found under Section 60(B) of the present National Internal Revenue Code. Admittedly, such interest income of the petitioner for 1993 was not subject to income tax. Still, petitioner did pay the income tax it was not liable for when it withheld such tax on interest income for the year 1993. Such taxes were erroneously assessed or collected, and thus, Section 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code then in effect comes into full application. The provision reads:
SEC. 230. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim
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appeal for lack of merit. RTC concluded that the activities of the Corporation fell squarely under the definition of business under Section 13(b) of the Local Government Code, and thus subject to local business taxation. Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay business taxes to the City of Makati. In doing so, the Court of Appeals delved into jurisprudential definitions of profit, and concluded that the Corporation was not engaged in profit. For one, it was held that the very statutory concept of a condominium corporation showed that it was not a juridical entity intended to make profit, as its sole purpose was to hold title to the common areas in the condominium and to maintain the condominium. Issue: WON the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations. Held/Ratio: No. The power of local government units to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself, which recognizes the power of these units to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. These guidelines and limitations as provided by Congress are in main contained in the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code), which provides for comprehensive instances when and how local government units may impose taxes. The significant limitations are enumerated primarily in Section 133 of the Code, which include among others, a prohibition on the imposition of income taxes except when levied on banks and other financial institutions. None of the other general limitations under Section 133 find application to the case at bar. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the Makati Revenue Code (Revenue Code), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92-072. The Revenue Code remains in effect as of this writing. Article A, Chapter III of the Revenue Code governs business taxes in Makati, and it is quite specific as to the particular businesses which are covered by business taxes. Should the comprehensive listing not prove encompassing enough, there is also a catch-all provision similar to that under the Local Government Code. This is found in Section 3A.02(m) of the Revenue Code, which provides:
(m) On owners or operators of any business not specified above shall pay the tax at the rate of two percent (2%) for 1993, two and one-half percent (2 %) for 1994 and 1995, and three percent (3%) for 1996 and the years thereafter of the gross receipts during the preceding year.
The City Treasurer has not stated the exact basis for the tax imposition which she wishes that this Court uphold. Indeed, there is only one thing that prevents this Court from ruling that there has been a due process violation on account of the City Treasurers failure to disclose on paper the statutory basis of the taxthat the Corporation itself does not allege injury arising from such failure on the part of the City Treasurer. As stated earlier, local tax on businesses is authorized under Section 143 of the Local Government Code. The word business itself is defined under Section 131(d) of the Code as trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit. This definition of business takes on importance, since Section 143 allows local government units to impose local taxes on businesses other than those specified under the provision. Moreover, even those business activities specifically named in Section 143 are themselves susceptible to broad interpretation. For example, Section 143(b) authorizes the imposition of business taxes on wholesalers, distributors, or dealers in any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. The creation of the condominium corporation is sanctioned by Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act. To enable the orderly administration over these common areas which are jointly owned by the various unit owners, the Condominium Act permits the creation of a condominium corporation, which is specially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units. The City Treasurer has not posited the claim that the Corporation is engaged in business activities beyond the statutory purposes of a condominium corporation. The assessment appears to be based solely on the Corporations collection of assessments from unit owners, such assessments being utilized to defray the necessary expenses
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effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, especially considering that it is a lawmakers act that imposes such burden. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws. Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative statutes, and the latter should always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict. It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, [t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change. It might be argued that Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, does not preclude the repeal of the tax-exempt status of GSIS, but merely imposes conditions for such to validly occur. Yet these conditions, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. Thus, the same rationale for prohibiting irrepealable laws applies in prohibiting restraints on future amendatory laws. The two conditionalities of Section 33 cannot bear relevance on whether the Local Government Code removed the tax-exempt status of the GSIS. The express withdrawal of all tax exemptions accorded to all persons, natural or juridical, as stated in Section 193 of the Local Government Code, applies without impediment to the present case. The GSISs tax-exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of Davao.
for the Condominium Project and the common areas. There is no contemplation of business, no orientation towards profit in this case. Hence, the assailed tax assessment has no basis under the Local Government Code or the Makati Revenue Code, and the insistence of the city in its collection of the void tax constitutes an attempt at deprivation of property without due process of law. We hold that condominium corporations are generally exempt from local business taxation under the Local Government Code, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise. CITY OF DAVAO, ET AL. v. RTC, ET AL. 18 Aug 2005 Facts: On April 8, 1994, GSIS Davao City Branch office received a Notice of Public Auction for non payment of realty taxes for the year 1992 to 1994. Upon application of GSIS, the RTC issued a TRO. RTC found for GSIS, concluding that despite the enactment of the Local Government Code, GSIS still retained its exemption from all taxes. The RTC cited Section 33 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146, the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as amended by P. D. No. 1981, which mandated such exemption. Although P.D. No. 1146 was enacted prior to the Local Government Code, it however had two conditions in order that the tax exemption provided therein could be withdrawn by future enactments, namely: (1) that Section 33 be expressly and categorically repealed by law; and (2) that a provision be enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the GSIS fund. The RTC concluded that both conditions had not been satisfied by the Local Government Code, thus the GSIS is still taxexempt. Issue: WON Sections 234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax exemptions of government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of the realty taxes sought to be levied by Davao City Held/Ratio: YES. The second paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended,
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enforcing his Decision. Philcemcor filed an opposition, claiming, among others, that it is not this Court but the CTA that has jurisdiction over the application under the law.Southern Cross filed with the CTA a Petition for Review, assailing the DTI Secretarys 25 June 2003 Decision which imposed the definite safeguard measure. Yet Southern Cross did not promptly inform this Court about this filing. In a Manifestation and Motion dated 23 June 2004, the Tariff Commission informed the Court that since no prohibitory injunction or order of such nature had been issued by any court against the Tariff Commission, the Commission proceeded to complete its investigation on the petition for extension, pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA, but opted to defer transmittal of its report to the DTI Secretary pending guidance from this Court on the propriety of such a step considering this pending Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 5 July 2005, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo effective of even date, and until further orders from this Court. Issues/Held: I. Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals Under Section 29 of the SMA The general jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over special civil actions for certiorari is beyond doubt. The special civil action of certiorari is available only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Court proceeded to inquire whether indeed there was no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that would warrant the allowance of Philcemcors special civil action.The answer hinged on the proper interpretation of Section 29 of the SMA.Republic Act No. 9282, expressly vests unto the CTA jurisdiction over [d]ecisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article involving safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.ny future attempts to advance the literalist position of the respondents would consequently fail. However, since Republic Act No. 9282 has no retroactive effect, this Court had to decide whether Section 29 vests jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of the DTI Secretary not to impose a safeguard measure. And the Court, in its assailed Decision, ruled that the CTA is endowed with such jurisdiction.Under Section 29, there are three requisites to enable the CTA to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein: (i) there must
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. v. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSN OF THE PHILS. August 3, 2005 Facts: Philcemcor filed with the DTI a petition seeking the imposition of safeguard measures on gray Portland cement, in accordance with the SMA. The petition was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. The Tariff Commission issued its Formal Investigation Report conveying that no threats of serious injury were found so it recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement. The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission. The DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decisionwhe rein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings. Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.Court of Appeals partially granted Philcemcors petition. It refused to annul the findings of the Tariff Commission, but it held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretarys discretionary review. Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or nonexistence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. DTI Secretary issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures. Southern Cross filed with the Court a Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction (TRO Application), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from
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national development Government. program of the
be a ruling by the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party adversely affected by the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. Obviously, there are differences between a ruling for the imposition of a safeguard measure, and one issued in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure.This Court did not resort to the broadest interpretation possible of the phrase in connection with, but instead sought to bring it into the context of the scope and objectives of the SMA. The ultimate conclusion of the Court was that the phrase includes all rulings of the DTI Secretary which arise from the time an application or motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure is taken. This conclusion was derived from the observation that the imposition of a general safeguard measure is a process, initiated motu proprio or through application, which undergoes several stages upon which the DTI Secretary is obliged or may be called upon to issue a ruling.By utilizing the phrase in connection with, it is the SMA that expressly vests jurisdiction on the CTA over petitions questioning the non-imposition by the DTI Secretary of safeguard measures. The Court likewise stated that the respondents position calls for split jurisdiction, which is judicially abhorred. Section 29 expressly confers CTA jurisdiction over rulings in connection with the imposition of the safeguard measure, and the reassertion of this point in the Decision was a matter of emphasis, not of contrivance. The due process protection does not shield those who remain purposely blind to the express rules that ensure the sporting play of procedural law. II. Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an Indispensable Requisite to the Imposition of General Safeguard Measures The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the country. These safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
The qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations and restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of members of the executive branch. Congress may establish the procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions[50] in the legislatures scheme of things. The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts. There is no question that Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation validly imposed by Congress on the presidential authority under the SMA to impose tariffs and imposts. That the positive final determination operates as an indispensable requisite to the imposition of the safeguard measure, and that it is the Tariff Commission which makes such determination, are legal propositions plainly expressed in Section 5 for the easy comprehension for everyone but respondents. Section 5 expressly states that the DTI Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission. The causal connection in Section 5 between the imposition by the DTI Secretary of the general safeguard measure and the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is patent. But nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to adopt the recommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires that the DTI Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the public interest, notwithstanding the Tariff Commissions
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constitutional demand for such a setup, but its wisdom as policy should be acknowledged. As prescribed by Congress, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary operate within limited frameworks, under which nobody acquires an undue advantage over the other. Congress deemed it necessary to insulate the process in requiring that the factual determination to be made by an ostensibly independent body of specialized competence, the Tariff Commission. It removes from the DTI Secretary jurisdiction over a matter beyond his putative specialized aptitude, the compilation and analysis of picayune facts and determination of their limited causal relations, and instead vests in the Secretary the broad choice on a matter within his unquestionable competence, the selection of what particular safeguard measure would assist the duly beleaguered local industry yet at the same time conform to national trade policy. Even assuming that this prescribed setup made little sense, the Court is bound by propriety not to dispute the wisdom of the legislature as long as its acts do not violate the Constitution. IV. Courts Interpretation of SMA In Harmony with Other Constitutional Provisions By no means does the constitutional provision, Section 12, Article XIII, which mandates that [t]he State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods and adopt measures that help make them competitive. dictate that the Court favor the domestic industry in all competing claims that it may bring before this Court. Also, the vain hope of respondents in divorcing the safeguard measures from the concept of taxation is to exclude from consideration Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. V. Assailed Decision Consistent With Ruling in Taada v. Angara The Decision does not prohibit the imposition of general safeguard measures to protect domestic industries in need of protection. All it affirms is that the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is first required before the general safeguard measures are imposed and implemented, a neutral proposition that gives no regard to the nationalities of the parties involved. we should not construe the SMA to unduly favor or disfavor domestic industries, simply because the law itself provides for a mechanism by virtue of which the claims of these industries are thoroughly evaluated before they are favored or
recommendation on the appropriate safeguard measure upon its positive final determination. Thus, even if the Tariff Commission makes a positive final determination, the DTI Secretary may opt not to impose a general safeguard measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure other than that recommended by the Tariff Commission. It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry. III. DTI Secretary has No Power of Review Over Final Determination of the Tariff Commission Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. The Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative supervision of the DTI. The tradition has been for the Tariff Commission and the DTI to proceed independently in the exercise of their respective functions. Only very recently have our statutes directed any significant interplay between the Tariff Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999 of Republic Act No. 8751 on the imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No. 8752 on the imposition of anti-dumping duties, and of course the promulgation a year later of the SMA. in all three laws, there is no express provision authorizing the DTI Secretary to reverse the factual determination of the Tariff Commission. The Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative control of the DTI, but under the NEDA, pursuant to the Administrative Code. Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. Reference of the binding positive final determination to the Tariff Commission is of course, not a fail-safe means to ensure a biasfree determination. But at least the legislated involvement of the Commission in the process assures some measure of check and balance involving two different governmental agencies with disparate specializations. There is no legal or
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on refined and manufactured mineral oil, motor fuel and diesel fuel that CDCP utilized in its operations as mining concessionaire, totalling P39,849,198.47. As there was no immediate action on the claim, to toll the prescriptive period, on October 08, 1982, CDCP filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), a petition for review of the presumed decision of the Commissioner denying such claim. On January 2, 1984, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue actually denied CDCPs claim for refund. After due trial, on August 09, 1994, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting CDCPs claim for refund only in the amount of P38,461.86, without interest. The tax court ruled that CDCP is entitled to a refund of the specific taxes that it paid during the period September 23, 1980 to June 30, 1982, prior to which the claim had prescribed, but at the rates specified under Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435, without interest." CDCP filed a petition for review before the CA, which on November 9, 1994, rendered a decision modifying that of the CTA ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund to petitioner CDCP Mining Corporation the amount of P1,598,675.25, without interest, equivalent to 25% refund of specific taxes paid on its purchases during the period September 23, 1980 to June 30, 1982, of manufactured oil and other fuel and diesel fuel oil, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435, in relation to Sections 153 and 156 of the Tax Code. CDCP in this present petition assails the appellate courts Decision. CDCP points out that the rates of specific tax on manufactured oils under the 1977 NIRC were increased effective 21 March 1981 by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 262 issued by then President Marcos. According to CDCP, the error of the Court of Appeals consists of its failure to take into account the amendatory E.O. No. 262, and applying only one set of rates for the period in question, 1 July 1980 to June 30, 1982. CDCP argues that while the Court of Appeals computation was correct for the period 23 September 1980 up to 20 March 1981, it failed to utilize the new rates under E.O. No. 262 in computing the refund due for the manufactured oils purchased for the period of 21 March 1981 up to 30 June 1982.
disfavored. What we must do is to simply uphold what the law says. Section 5 says that the DTI Secretary shall impose the general safeguard measures upon the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission. VI. On Forum-Shopping There was no willful and deliberate forumshopping by Southern Cross. The causes of action that animate this present petition for review and the petition for review with the CTA are distinct from each other, even though they relate to similar factual antecedents. VII. Effects of Courts Resolution Court of Appeals Decision was annulled precisely because the appellate court did not have the power to rule on the petition in the first place. Jurisdiction is necessarily the power to decide a case, and a court which does not have the power to adjudicate a case is one that is bereft of jurisdiction. We find no reason to disturb our earlier finding that the Court of Appeals Decision is null and void. . In the DTI Secretarys Decision, he expressly stated that as a result of the Court of Appeals Decision, there is no legal impediment for the Secretary to decide on the application. Yet the truth remained that there was a legal impediment, namely, that the decision of the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Moreover, it was declared null and void, and since the DTI Secretary expressly denominated the Court of Appeals Decision as his basis for deciding to impose the safeguard measures, the latter decision must be voided as well. If the imposition of the general safeguard measure is void as we declared it to be, any extension thereof should likewise be fruitless. The proper remedy instead is to file a new application for the imposition of safeguard measures, subject to the conditions prescribed by the SMA. CDCP MINING CORPORATION v. CIR 28 July 2005 Facts: During the period from July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1982, CDCP purchased from Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. and Caltex (Philippines), Inc. quantities of manufactured mineral oil, motor fuel, diesel and fuel oil, which CDCP used exclusively in the exploitation and operation of its mining concession. On September 06, 1982, CDCP filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a claim for refund in the amount of P9,962,299.71, representing 25% of the specific taxes collected
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goods is liable for output VAT at rates of either 10% or 0% (zero-rated) depending on the classification of the transaction under Sec. 100 of the NIRC. Persons registered under the VAT system are allowed to recognize input VAT, or the VAT due from or paid by it in the course of its trade or business on importation of goods or local purchases of goods or service, including lease or use of properties, from a VAT-registered person. 3. In January of 1988, respondent applied for and was granted by the BIR zero-rated status on its sale of gold to Central Bank. On 28 August 1988, Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue Eufracio D. Santos issued VAT Ruling No. 3788-88, which declared that [t]he sale of gold to Central Bank is considered as export sale subject to zero-rate pursuant to Section 100 of the Tax Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 273. The BIR came out with at least six (6) other issuances reiterating the zero-rating of sale of gold to the Central Bank, the latest of which is VAT Ruling No. 036-90 dated 14 February 1990. 4. Relying on its zero-rated status and the above issuances, respondent sold gold to the Central Bank during the period of 1 August 1989 to 31 July 1991 and entered into transactions that resulted in input VAT incurred in relation to the subject sales of gold. It then filed applications for tax refunds/credits corresponding to input VAT for the amounts of P46,177,861.12, P19,218,738.44, and P84,909,247.96. Respondents applications were either unacted upon or expressly disallowed by petitioner. In addition, petitioner issued a deficiency assessment against respondent when, after applying respondents creditable input VAT costs against the retroactive 10% VAT levy, there resulted a balance of excess output VAT. 5. The express disallowance of respondents application for refunds/credits and the issuance of deficiency assessments against it were based on a BIR ruling-BIR VAT Ruling No. 008-92 dated 23 January 1992-that was issued subsequent to the consummation of the subject sales of gold to the Central Bank which provides that sales of gold to the Central Bank shall not be considered as export sales and thus, shall be subject to 10% VAT. In addition, BIR VAT Ruling No. 008-92 withdrew, modified, and superseded all inconsistent BIR issuances.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied the provisions of the 1977 NIRC in ascertaining the basis for the refund due to CDCP. Held/Ratio: Yes. The present petitions lack of merit owes to the mistaken notion that the 1977 NIRC applies at all to the computation of the refund under R.A. No. 1435. Applicable herein is the pronouncement in Davao Gulf, to wit:
"When the law itself does not explicitly provide that a refund under R.A. No. 1435 may be based on higher rates which were non-existent at the time of its enactment, this Court cannot presume otherwise, A legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat."
CDCPs claim that the amendments to the 1977 NIRC under E.O. No. 672 should apply as well necessarily collapses with the application of the entrenched rule that the 1977 NIRC would not apply in the first place for the computation of the refunds due under Section 5 of R.A. No. 1435. It is obvious that the original and unaltered intent of R.A. No. 1435 is to allow refunds based on the rates of specific taxes specified therein, and not on rates which may have been set later including those established two decades hence. If there was legislative intent to allow the subject refunds based on the rates as subsequently amended, then this would have been enforced or provided for in the subsequent statutes that did increase the rates, such as the 1977 NIRC. CIR v. BENGUET CORP. 08 July 2005 Facts:
1. Respondent
Benguet Corporation (respondent) is a domestic corporation organized and existing by virtue of Philippine laws, engaged in the exploration, development and operation of mineral resources, and the sale or marketing thereof to various entities. Respondent is a value added tax (VAT) registered enterprise. 2. The transactions in question occurred during the period between 1988 and 1991. Under Sec. 99 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 273 s. 1987, then in effect, any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells, barters or exchanges goods, renders services, or engages in similar transactions and any person who imports
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be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers except in the following cases: (a) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return on any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (b) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different form the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
6. The BIR also issued VAT Ruling No. 059-92 dated 28 April 1992 and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 22-92 which decreed that the revocation of VAT Ruling No. 3788-88 by VAT Ruling No. 008-92 would not unduly prejudice mining companies and, thus, could be applied retroactively. Procedure 1. Respondent filed three separate petitions for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), docketed as CTA Case No. 4945, CTA Case No. 4627, and the consolidated cases of CTA Case Nos. 4686 and 4829 o respondent argued that a retroactive application of BIR VAT Ruling No. 008-92 would violate Sec. 246 of the NIRC, which mandates the non-retroactivity of rulings or circulars issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that would operate to prejudice the taxpayer. o CTA dismissed respondents respective petitions. 2. The CTA decisions were appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals. o reversed the Court of Tax Appeals insofar as the latter had ruled that BIR VAT Ruling No. 008-92 did not prejudice the respondent and that the same could be given retroactive effect. Issue: WON the retroactive application of VAT Ruling No. 008-92 is valid. (whether respondents sale of gold to the Central Bank during the period when such was classified by BIR issuances as zero-rated could be taxed validly at a 10% rate after the consummation of the transactions involved) Held/Ratio: Agreed with the Court of Appeals & respondent. This Court has affirmed that the rulings, circular, rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would have no retroactive application if to so apply them would be prejudicial to the taxpayers. In fact, both petitioner and respondent agree that the retroactive application of VAT Ruling No. 008-92 is valid only if such application would not be prejudicial to the respondent pursuant to the explicit mandate under Sec. 246 of the NIRC, thus:
Sec. 246. Non-retroactivity of rulings.- Any revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding Section or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not
In the instant case, the retroactive application of VAT Ruling No. 008-92 unilaterally forfeited or withdrew this option of respondent. The adverse effect is that respondent became the unexpected and unwilling debtor to the BIR of the amount equivalent to the total VAT cost of its product, a liability it previously could have recovered from the BIR in a zero-rated scenario or at least passed on to the Central Bank had it known it would have been taxed at a 10% rate. Thus, it is clear that respondent suffered economic prejudice when its consummated sales of gold to the Central Bank were taken out of the zero-rated category. The change in the VAT rating of respondents transactions with the Central Bank resulted in the twin loss of its exemption from payment of output VAT and its opportunity to recover input VAT, and at the same time subjected it to the 10% VAT sans the option to pass on this cost to the Central Bank, with the total prejudice in money terms being equivalent to the 10% VAT levied on its sales of gold to the Central Bank. PASEO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CA, CTA 13 Oct 2004 Facts: Paseo Realty and Development Corporation seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing its petition for review of the resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which, in turn, denied its claim for refund. Paseo filed its Income Tax Return for 1989; and in 1991 filed with the Comissioner of Internal Review a claim for the refund of excess creditable withholding and income taxes for the years 1989 and 1990. CTA ruled that CIR should refund Paseo. It was later overturned by the CTA upon learning that the refund asked for by petitioner was included in the tax credit for 1990. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and was unsuccessful. The CA used the CTA ratio (Thus, there is really nothing left to be refunded to petitioner for the year 1989. To grant petitioners claim for refund is tantamount to granting twice
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manufacture of fertilizers required Philphos to purchase fuel and petroleum products for its machineries. The fuel supplies are secured domestically from local distributors, in this case, Petron Corporation (Petron), which imports the same and pays the corresponding customs duties to the Bureau of Customs; and, the ad valorem and specific taxes to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. When the fuel and petroleum products are delivered at Philphoss manufacturing plant inside the Leyte Industrial Development Estate, Philphos is billed by Petron the corresponding customs duties imposed on these products. Effectively thus, Philphos reimburses Petron for the customs duties on the purchased fuels and petroleum products which are passed on by the Petron as part of the selling price. Philphos made several purchases from Petron of fuels and other petroleum products from October 1991 until June 1992 during which Philphos indirectly paid as customs duties, P20,149,473.77). Philphos sought the refund of customs duties it had paid pointing out that Philphos, being an enterprise registered with the export processing zone, is entitled to tax incentives under Presidential Decree No. 66 (EPZA Law), referring specifically to Section 17 thereof which exempts from customs and internal revenue laws, supplies brought into the export processing zone. Consequently, Philphos argued that the customs duties billed by Petron on Philphos should be refunded. Issue 1: WON Philphos is entitled to a refund Held/Ratio: YES. The EPZA Law, promulgated in 1972, has since been superseded by Republic Act No. 7916, or The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. However, since the claim for exemption covers the years 1991 and 1992, or before the enactment of Republic Act No. 7916, the provisions of the EPZA Law are applicable in the present petition. The incentives offered to enterprises duly registered with the PEZA consist, among others, of tax exemptions. These benefits may, at first blush, place the government at a disadvantage as they preclude the collection of revenue. Still, the expectation is that the tax breaks ultimately redound to the benefit of the national economy, enticing as they do more enterprises to invest and do business within the zones; thus creating more employment opportunities and infusing more dynamism to the vibrant interplay of market forces.
the refund herein sought to be refunded, to the prejudice of the Government.) Issue: WON alleged excess taxes paid by a corporation during a taxable year should be refunded or credited against its tax liabilities for the succeeding year (1990). Held: The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals decision that Ratio: In this case, petitioners failure to present sufficient evidence to prove its claim for refund is fatal to its cause. Tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are construed strictly against the taxpayer. (Section 69, Chapter IX, Title II of NIRC) Section 76 of Republic Act No. 8424 emphasizes that it is imperative to indicate in the tax return or the final adjustment return whether a tax credit or refund is sought by making the taxpayers choice irrevocable:
Once the option to carry-over and apply the excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years has been made, such option shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable period and no application for cash refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefore
As clearly seen from this provision, the taxpayer is allowed three (3) options if the sum of its quarterly tax payments made during the taxable year is not equal to the total tax due for that year: (a) pay the balance of the tax still due; (b) carry-over the excess credit; or (c) be credited or refunded the amount paid. Had this provision been in effect when the present claim for refund was filed, petitioners excess credits for 1988 could have been properly applied to its 1990 tax liabilities. Unfortunately for petitioner, this is not the case. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. 01 Sept 2004 Facts: Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (Philphos) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and production of fertilizers for domestic and international distribution. Its base of operations is in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate, an export processing zone and is also registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now known as the Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA). The
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a quasi-contract, thus the claim for refund must be commenced within six (6) years from date of payment pursuant to Article 1145(2) of the New Civil Code. Clearly then, Philphoss right to refund has not yet prescribed. Issue 3: WON Philphos is entitled to tax credit under Sec.18 Held/Ratio: NO
SEC. 18. Additional Incentives. A zone registered enterprise shall also enjoy the following incentives: xxx (i)Tax credit. Every registered zone enterprise shall enjoy a tax credit equivalent to the sales, compensating and specific taxes and duties on supplies, raw materials and semi-manufactured products used in the manufacture, processing or production of its export products and forming part thereof; x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Section 17 of the EPZA Law particularizes the tax benefits accorded to duly registered enterprises. It states:
SEC. 17. Tax Treatment of Merchandize in the Zone. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Decree, foreign and domestic merchandise, raw materials, supplies, articles, equipment, machineries, spare parts and wares of every description , except those prohibited by law, brought into the Zone to be sold, stored, broken up, repacked, assembled, installed, sorted, cleaned, graded, or otherwise processed, manipulated, manufactured, mixed with foreign or domestic merchandise or used whether directly or indirectly in such activity, shall not be subject to customs and internal revenue laws and regulations nor to local tax ordinances, the following provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding. (emphasis supplied)
The cited provision certainly covers petroleum supplies used, directly or indirectly, by Philphos to facilitate its production of fertilizers, subject to the minimal requirement that these supplies are brought into the zone. The supplies are not subject to customs and internal revenue laws and regulations, nor to local tax ordinances. It is clear that Section 17(1) considers such supplies exempt even if they are used indirectly, as they had been in this case. Since Section 17(1) treats these supplies for tax purposes as beyond the ambit of customs laws and regulations, the arguments of the Commissioner invoking the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code must fail. Neither would the prescriptive periods or procedural requirements provided under the Tariff and Customs Code serve as a bar for the claim for refund. Issue 2: What is the prescriptive period which a duly registered enterprise should observe in applying for a refund to which it is entitled under the EPZA Law? Held/Ratio: The EPZA Law itself is silent on the matter, and the prescriptive periods under the Tariff and Customs Code and other revenue laws are inapplicable, by specific mandate of Section 17(1) of the EPZA Law. This does not mean though that prescription will not lie, as the Civil Code provisions on solutio indebiti may find application. The Civil Code is not a customs and internal revenue law. The Court has in the past sanctioned the application of the provisions on solutio indebiti in cases when taxes were collected thru error or mistake. Solutio indebiti is
Indubitably, Section 18 does not exclude or otherwise limit the broad grant of benefits accorded by Section 17. These additional incentives under Section 18 are to be enjoyed in conjunction with the incentives under Section 17. This is indicated by the use of the words additional and shall also in the first paragraph of Section 18. Even the Commissioner admits the distinct character of Section 18. The divergent natures of the benefits under Sections 17 and 18 become readily apparent upon examination of the additional incentives enumerated under Section 18. They include allowance of netoperating loss carry-over, accelerated depreciation, exemption from export tax, foreign exchange assistance, financial assistance, exemptions for local taxes and licenses, deductions for labor training services, and deductions for organizational and pre-operating expenses. Section 18 does not serve the purpose of qualifying the benefits provided under Section 17. Instead, it enumerates another class of incentives also available to registered enterprises, in addition to, and apart from, the general benefits accorded under Section 17. There can be no doubt that the additional incentives under Section 18 are separate and distinct from those under the preceding section. A plain reading of Section 18(i) unmistakably indicates that the tax credit as an additional incentive avails only if the supplies actually form part of the export products. There is an apparent distinction between this provision and Section 17(1) which exempts from taxation supplies used indirectly by the registered enterprise. It is apparent that the petroleum supplies in question,
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which physically do not form part of the exportable fertilizers, are exempt from taxation under Section 17(1), but no tax credit could be claimed on them under Section 18(i). Issue 4: Difference between tax credit and tax refund Held/Ratio: Obviously, the relief sought for erroneously paid taxes would be a return to the taxpayer of the amount paid to the government. The Tax Reform Act of 1997 authorizes either a refund or credit as a means of recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. It may be that there is no essential difference between a tax refund and a tax credit since both are modes of recovering taxes erroneously or illegally paid to the government. Yet, there are unmistakable formal and practical differences between the two modes. Formally, a tax refund requires a physical return of the sum erroneously paid by the taxpayer, while a tax credit involves the application of the reimbursable amount against any sum that may be due and collectible from the taxpayer. On the practical side, the taxpayer to whom the tax is refunded would have the option, among others, to invest for profit the returned sum, an option not proximately available if the taxpayer chooses instead to receive a tax credit. The CTA, as affirmed by the CA, ordered the issuance of a Tax Credit Certificate in favor of Philphos. No elaboration was made as to why the relief granted was a tax credit and not a refund, but we can deduce that such was the relief afforded as it was the relief prayed for by Philphos in its Petition before the tax court. However, a slight modification of the award is necessary so as not to render nugatory the proscription under Section 18(i) that a tax credit avails only if the supplies form part of the export product. Instead of awarding a Tax Credit Certificate to Philphos, a refund of the same amount is warranted under the circumstances. SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. V. PHILCEMCOR 08 July 2004 Facts: Philcemcor sought the imposition of safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment, as well as caused depressed local prices.
After preliminary investigation, the DTI found cause to impose provisional measures and then imposed 20.60Php/40kg on all gray Portland cement imports for a period not exceeding 200 days from the date of issuance by the bureau of customs of the Customs Memorandum Order (issued 10 Dec 2001). On 19 Nov 2001, the Tariff Commission (TC) received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement, pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The TC issued its formal report and came up with the recommendation that the elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury were not established, and that no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement. The DTI secretary reviewed the TC report and disagreed with its conclusion. The DTI then requested an opinion from the DOJ on the scope of options in acting on the TCs recommendations. DOJ: Section 13 of the SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commissions negative finding, or finding that a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed. DTI Sec promulgated a decision where he noted the DTIs disagreement with the TC conclusion but that the DOJ says that it is bound by the TC findings. He ruled that the DTI has no alternative but to abide by the TC recommendations, and that the application for safeguard measures is denied. Philcemcor filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI decision, and applied for a TRO to enjoin the DTIa nd BOC from implementing the decision and report. Southern Cross filed its comment, arguing that (1)it is not the CA that has jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, but the CTA that is conferred jurisdiction over safeguard measures. (2) Philcemcors resort to certiorari is improper since what they sought to rectify is not an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion but an error of judgement, and a petition for review is
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ruling in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure belongs to the CTA. While the CAs certiorari powers extend to correcting grave abuse of discretion on the part of an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is available only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 29 of the SMA which provides for the filing of a petition for review by the adversely affected parties with the CTA is a speedy and adequate remedy. Three requisites to enable the CTA to acquire jurisdiction under sec.29 of the SMA: (i) there must be a ruling by the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party adversely affected by the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. Case at bar: i and ii present. In this case, however, the DTI sec. decides not to impose a safeguard measure. Still, CTA. split jurisdiction is abhorred. The power of the DTI Secretary to adopt or withhold a safeguard measure emanates from the same statutory source, and WON he decides to impose, not impose, only one court should have jurisdiction. the text of the law is couched in such a way that it would include non-imposition. the CTA is vested with jurisdiction to review the ruling of the DTI Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. But it does not mean that jurisdiction extends endlessly. The scope and reach is limited to all rulings of the DTI Secretary or Agriculture Secretary which arise from the time an application or motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure is taken, the incidents which require resolution come to the fore only because there is an initial application or action seeking the imposition of a safeguard measure. going with the view that the CTA cannot have jurisdiction since there was no measure imposed would lead to an interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity. Interpretatio Talis In Ambiguis Semper Fienda Est, Ut Evitur Inconveniens Et Absurdum. 2. CA decision in accordance with law? NO.
available. (3) the DOJ opinion precludes a review by the DTI sec of a negative finding of the TC CA granted the writ. Despite the lapse of the period for the imposition of the provisional measure, the BOC continued to impose it. Southern Cross filed an Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Philcemcor was not entitled to provisional relief as well as a clarificatory order as to WON the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction could extend the 200day limit imposed by law. The CA failed to directly resolve the MR and instead rendered a decision, saying they had jurisdiction since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. It refused to annul the findings of the TC citing the rule that the factual findings of administrative agencies are binding upon the courts and that the courts should not interfere with matters involving technical know-how. It held, however, that the DTI sec is not bound by the TC findings since they are merely recommendatory and fall within the Secs discretionary review. TC findings not set aside, assailed DTI sec decision set aside, case remanded to the dti sec. Southern Cross filed the present petition arguing that the CTA, not the CA, has jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition and that thefindings of the TC are binding upon the DTI sec. The filing of the said petition on time prevented the CA decision from becoming final but the dti sec imposed a safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement. Southern Cross applied for a Temporary Restraining Order. Meanwhile Southern Cross manifested that they were forced to cease operations due to the imposition of the safeguard measures Issues, Held, Ratio: 1. Jurisdiction: CA or CTA? CTA. Section 29 of the SMA properly vests jurisdiction on the CTA. any initial judicial review of a DTI
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Sub-issue: WON the DTI sec is bound by the determination made by the TC. YES. According to sec. 5 of the SMA, Two Conditions must be present to impose a general safeguard measure: - positive final determination of TC that the product imported causes serious injury or threat to the domestic industry. - DTI sec established that the safeguard is in the public interest. * The TCs determination (factual findings) is binding upon the DTI while the recommendation (suggested remedial measure)is not. Nothing in the SMA mandates the DTI Secretary to adopt the recommendations made by the TC. The DTI sec does not have the power to review TC findings as the TC is under NEDA, not DTI. =check & balance system. **these conditions make it difficult to impose safeguards since the Philippines is obliged to subscribe to trade liberalization, and not protectionism since it has joined the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) Sub-issue: WON the CA erred in resorting to legislative intent in support of the view that the DTI sec may decide independently of the TC. YES. The law is on the matter is clear such that resort to the congressional records to ascertain legislative intent, which is what the CA did, is unnecessary. Moreover, looking at the law, it may be ascertained that the intent of sec. 5 is to limit the imposition powers of the DTI sec.
3. WON a TRO is warranted? NO.

Granting it would be tantamount to enjoining the collection of taxes by the judiciary which is frowned upon and is prohibited by the Tax Reform Act as well as section 29 of the SMA which says that the filing of a petition for review before the CTA does not stop, suspend, or otherwise toll the imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption of other appropriate safeguard measures
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that it was willing to deposit the subject shares in escrow to allay any fear of dissipation, loss or wastage of the subject shares, the Sandiganbayan ordered that the shares be deposited in escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines. PCGG filed motions for the reconsideration of both resolutions of the Sandiganbayan which has still not been resolved. On 2 May 2006, the PCGG filed a Motion for Execution of this Courts Decision promulgated on 23 January 1995, or more than ten (10) years earlier. It was argued therein that the 1995 Decision became final and executory by virtue of an entry of judgment dated 2 April 1996 which was allegedly received by the PCGG only on 2 March 2006. Desiring to exercise its voting rights as upheld by the Supreme Court, the PCGG prayed of the Sandiganbayan to issue the appropriate order permitting it to vote the sequestered shares or, in the alternative, to order re-enforced and/or reissued the TRO affirmed by the Supreme Court in the 1995 Decision, which enjoined TMEE from voting the sequestered shares. The PCGG filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Reinforce/Re-issue TRO, praying that the Sandiganbayan issue an order re-enforcing and/or re-issuing the TRO issued by this Court and to execute the TRO under the Decision of the Supreme Court dated January 13, 1995. On 22 May 2006, the Sandiganbayan in its resolution declared that the TRO initially issued 14 years ago by the SC in cases that were closed and terminated ten years ago, remained in effect, thus disqualifying TMEE from voting on its shares. The annual stockholders meeting of EPCIB was scheduled on 23 May 2006, or the day after the Resolution was promulgated, leaving questions as to the timing of the promulgation. On the following day TMEE filed a petition for certiorari with the SC assailing the resolution of Sandiganbayan , with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to preserve and maintain the status quo wherein TMEE [was] allowed to vote the shares registered in its name and restraining the respondents from enforcing the Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the motion to re-enforce/re-issue TRO, until the final resolution of this Court.
TRANS MIDDLE EAST (PHILS.) v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL. 09 June 2006 Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of 6M shares of stock in Equitable-PCI Bank. These shares were sequestered by the PCGG on the theory that as they actually belong to Benjamin Romualdez and constitute illegally acquired wealth. PCGG filed a complaint against Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan for the recovery of these shares. Upon motion, TMEE was allowed to intervene by the Sandiganbayan and it sought to enjoin the PCGG from voting these shares. In 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued resolutions that enjoined the PCGG from voting the shares of TMEE and authorized TMEE in exercising its voting rights. However in January 23, 1995 the Court issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the Sandiganbayan resolutions subject to the latters power to modify or terminate the same in the exercise of its sound discretion in light of such evidence as may subsequently be adduced. TMEE filed two motions before the Sandiganbayan, both urging the nullification or lifting of the writ of sequestration. It contended that no valid writ of sequestration was ever issued, the sequestration having been effected through a letter signed by only one PCGG commissioner, in violation of the PCGG Rules and Regulations that required writs of sequestration to be issued by at least two commissioners. While TMEE argued that it was entitled to the actual custody and control of the shares, it nonetheless manifested that it was willing to deposit these shares in escrow to allay any fear of dissipation, loss or wastage of the subject shares. PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Issuance of Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin the holding of the EPCIB stockholders meeting. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the motion of PCGG. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan proceeded to recognize the right of TMEE to vote the shares of stock registered in its name, and to allow it to vote at the stockholders meeting. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to nullify the writ of sequestration of TMEE shares, ruling that the sequestration order null and void as it was issued only by one PCGG Commissioner. At the same time, based on TMEEs manifestation
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right and the privilege of voting on them. The PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a rule, exercise acts of dominion by voting these shares. The registered owner of sequestered shares may only be deprived of these voting rights, and the PCGG authorized to exercise the same, only if it is able to establish that (1) there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are illgotten and thus belong to the State; and (2) there is an imminent danger of dissipation, thus necessitating the continued sequestration of the shares and authority to vote thereupon by the PCGG while the main issue is pending before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the existence of the writ of sequestration alone would not legally justify barring TMEE from voting its shares. Such preclusion may only occur if there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation. The Sandiganbayan or any other court has yet to pronounce any findings to those effects. In fact, the Sandiganbayan, in its 1998 Resolution, instead declared that TMEE possessed a prima facie right as owner of the registered owner of the sequestered shares, and that there appeared to be no strong grounds for apprehension of dissipation or loss of assets of TMEE. Concerns over dissipation have likewise been assuaged that the shares have been deposited in escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines on the initiative of TMEE itself. In any event, the nullification in 2003 of the very writ of sequestration by the Sandiganbayan further militates against any recognition that the sequestration order established a clear legal right that entitled the PCGG to injunctive relief. Issue 3: WON the PCGG is entitled to the injunctive relief? Held/Ratio: No. In this case, it is ineluctable that what the PCGG sought through its motion was injunctive relief that would refrain TMEE from exercising its voting rights in the 2004 EPCIB stockholders meeting, or other meetings for that matter. For injunctive relief to avail to the PCGG, it must be able to demonstrate the existence of a clear legal right to be entitled to such relief. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. There could only be two putative sources of such legal right of the PCGG the 1986 sequestration order and the 1995 Decision of this Court which affirmed the TRO issued by
In the absence of an injunctive order restraining the holding of the stockholders meeting was held. Over the objections of TMEE, the election of a new Board of Directors of EPCIB was held. Since TMEE was not allowed to vote its shares, it was unable to elect any representative to the Board of Directors despite the fact that it maintained enough shares to be entitled to at least one board seat. Issue 1: WON the failure of TMEE to file a motion for reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan precluded the immediate resort to the special civil action of certiorari. Held/Ratio: No. The petition is denominated as one for certiorari with prayer preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, under the ambit of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As a general rule, certiorari as a special civil action does not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court. However, this rule does not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. It is well-settled that the availability of appeal does not foreclose recourse to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari or prohibition where appeal is not adequate, or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequateeither in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of justice could resulta writ of certiorari may still be issued. It cannot evade notice that the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution was promulgated one (1) day before the scheduled stockholders meeting of EPCIB. Evidently, TMEE could no longer have relied on the Sandiganbayan to reverse itself literally overnight, in time for the meeting. The filing of a motion for reconsideration would not have been an adequate or speedy remedy for TMEE. Hence, resort to the special civil action of certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration is justified under the circumstances. Issue 2: WON TMEE may be deprived of its voting shares and WON PCGG may exercise the voting shares? Held/Ratio: No. It is settled that as a general rule, the registered owner of the shares of a corporation, even if they are sequestered by the government through the PCGG, exercises the
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documents of Hans Menzi (HMHMI). The Republic instituted a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan, alleging that Yap and Cojuanco acted as the dummy of Marcos in acquiring substantial shares in Bulletin to prevent disclosure and recovery of illegally obtained assests, and that Zalamea established together with third persons HMHMI which acquired Bulletin. Zalamea was later dropped as defendant in view of the Deed of Assignment which he executed assigning, transferring, and ceding to the government the Bulletin shares registered in his name. The Estate of Menzi was later included as one of the defendants. The Sandiganbayan held that the shares of Cojuanco and the proceeds from the sale of the shares of Campos, Cojuanco, and Zalamea (198 and 214 blocks) which they transferred to HMHMI (and subsequently sold by HMHMI to Bulletin) are ill-gotten wealth of Marcos. It held that the shares (154 block) sold by the late Menzi to US Automotive and the shares in the name of Yap and the Estate of MEnzi are not ill-gotten wealth of Marcos. Issue: Whether the shares of stock of Bulletin registered and issued in the name of Yap, Cojuanco, Zalamea, and the late Menzi are illgotten wealth of Marcos? Held/Ratio: The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed. Its findings that the 154 block was sold to US Automotive while Menzi was still alive and that the executor Montecillo merely accepted payment by virtue of the authority granted him by Menzi are conclusive upon the court. The Corporation Code acknowledges that the delivery of duly indorsed stock certificate is sufficient to transfer ownership of shares of stock and that the absence of a deed of assignment does not render the transfer invalid. The executor, Montecillo, had authority to accept payment of the purchase price of the stocks based on Menzis Last Will and Testament and the Order of the probate court. The 198 and 214 blocks are ill-gotten wealth of Marcos as defined under the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG and as shown by the following: the affidavit of Quimson detailing how Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea became Marcos nominees in Bulletin; the affidavit Teodoro relative to the circumstances surrounding the sale of Menzis substantial shares in Bulletin to Marcos nominees and Menzis
the Supreme Court. Yet closer scrutiny of either reveals no foundational recognition of a clear legal right of the PCGG. While the 1995 Decision maintained the earlier TRO barring TMEE from voting its shares, it also authorized the Sandiganbayan to modify or terminate the same in the exercise of its sound discretion in light of such evidence as may subsequently be adduced. In that sense, the 1995 Decision consisted of two (2) phases. The first phase consists of the affirmation of the TRO, a stance that subsisted as a matter of default. The second phase, however, consists of either the modification or termination of the TRO by the Sandiganbayan in light of the evidence subsequently adduced. Should the condition set in the second phase modification or termination by the Sandiganbayan then the first phase is ended, and the affirmation of the TRO can no longer be acknowledged as the default action. There is no question that the Sandiganbayan did modify the TRO by virtue of its Resolutions. The 1998 Resolution acknowledge[d] the right of TMEE to vote the shares of stocks registered in its name. The 2003 Resolution went even further in declaring null and void the 1986 sequestration order. The 2003 Resolution nullifying the sequestration order over TMEEs shares was based on the fact that the said order was signed by only one PCGG commissioner in violation of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The finding of the Sandiganbayan that the writ of sequestration was null and void was material to the determination whether the PCGG had the right to the injunctive relief it sought. This point is especially relevant, since if the sequestration order against TMEE is declared null and void, the earlier TRO will become functus officio. The TRO cannot continue to exist if the sequestration order is null and void from the beginning. The very existence of the legal right on which the PCGG grounds its right to relief became controverted as a result of the 2003 Resolution. RP v. ESTATE OF MENZI 23 November 2005 Facts: The PCGG sequestered the shares of Marcos, Yap, Cojuanco, and their nominees and agents in Bulletin Publishing Corporation, and the shares of stock, assests, properties, records and
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bank where the main point of contention is the existence of the second deposit of P34,000 which respondent alleged he made in March 15, and which the bank insists was the same deposit made in March 14. Respondent filed a complaint for the recovery of P34,000 plus damages. The RTC ruled for respondent Lim. The CA affirmed with slight modification of the decision, reducing the amount of moral damages. The Bank argues that the award of damages is groundless and the decision is not in accord with law and jurisprudence. Issue: Whether respondent made a deposit of P34,000.00 on 15 March 1988, apart from the deposit of an equal amount the day before? Held/Ratio: The issue is a factual question resolved in the affirmative by the RTC, and categorically affirmed by the CA. The factual issue is beyond the province of the SC to review or disturb. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. The SC said that as found the by the RTC, there were indeed 2 deposits of P34,000 made on Marcy 14 and 15, as shown by respondents duplicate originals of the two deposit slips, each listing different denominations of money totaling P34,000 per deposit slip. Article 1172 of the Civil Code ordains that responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of an obligation is demandable. The failure of the banks employees to credit the amount of P34,000.00 to respondents savings account, resulting as it did in the dishonor of respondents checks, constitutes actionable negligence in law. The negligence of the bank also constitutes a breach of duty to its client. The banking industry is impressed with public interest, and it must observe a high degree of diligence and observe lofty standards of integrity and performance. The banks negligence caused injury to respondents credit standing, which is very important to businessmen. The court sustained the award of moral and exemplary damages. RTC decision was affirmed in full. LEVI STRAUSS & CO., ET AL. V. CLINTON APARELLE, INC. 20 Sept 2005
retention of only 20% of the corporation; the sworn statement of Gapud describing the business interests and associates of Marcos and stating that Bulletin checks were periodically issued to Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea but were deposited after indorsement to Security Bank numbered accounts owned by the Marcoses dividend checks issued to Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea even after their shares have been transferred to HMHMI; the Certificate of Incorporation, Articles of Incorporation and Amended Articles of Incorporation of HMHMI showing that Bulletin shares held by Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea were used to set up HMHMI; Deed of Transfer and Conveyance showing that Campos, Cojuangco, Zalamea and Menzi transferred several shares, including Bulletin shares, to HMHMI in exchange for shares of stock in the latter which shares were not issued; the Inventory of Menzis assets as of May 15, 1985 which does not include Bulletin shares; notes written by Marcos regarding Menzis resignation as aide-de-camp to devote his time to run Bulletins operations and the reduction of his shares in the corporation to 12%; letters and correspondence between Marcos and Menzi regarding the affairs of Bulletin; Campos declaration in his Answers to Direct Interrogatories that he owned a portion of the 198 block per instruction of Marcos and that he became the shareholder per instruction of Marcos; and, Zalameas manifestation in his Deed of Assignment that he does not claim true and beneficial ownership of the Bulletin shares registered in his name and that he voluntarily waived and assigned them in favor of PCGG. PRUDENTIAL BANK V. LIM 11 November 2005 Facts: Respondent Lim, the owner of Rikes Boutique in Baguio, maintained two accounts with Prudential Bank, a savings account and a checking account. He availed of the banks automatic transfer system wherein the funds from his savings account could be transferred to his checking account in case the balance of the latter account was insufficient to cover the checks he issued. On March 14, he deposited P34,000 to his savings account. According to respondent, he made another deposit of an equal amount (P34,000) with the same savings account the next day March 15, 2008. In May, respondent issued two checks, one for the sum of P2,830 and another for P10,000, which were both dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. There was a correspondence between respondent and the
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Clinton Aparelle filed a motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court denied both motions, prompting the respondent to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The CA issued an order granting respondents petition. The CA held that the trial court did not follow the procedure required by law for the issuance of a temporary restraining order as Clinton Aparelle was not duly notified of the date of the summary hearing for its issuance. The CA also held that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is questionable as petitioners failed to sufficiently establish its material and substantial right t have the writ issued. It also questioned the admissibility of the affidavits, which were taken ex-parte. Lastly, it ruled that whatever material injury petitioner would suffer may be sufficiently compensated. Issue: Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court was proper and whether the CA erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court. Held: There is no merit in the petition. Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a curt, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. An extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard. It may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is resorted only when there is pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The resolution of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special recourse before the
Facts: The case stemmed from the complaint for Trademark Infringement, Injunction and Damages filed by petitioners against respondent Clinton Aparelle and alternative defendant Olympian Garments, Inc., before the RTC of QC. The complaint alleged that petitioner is the owner by prior adoption and use since 1986 of the internationally famous Dockers and Design trademark, as evidenced by its valid and existing registrations in various member countries of the Paris Convention, including a registration in the Philippines. The petitioner further alleged that they discovered the presence of jeans under the brand name Paddocks using a device substantially similar to the Dockers and Design trademark owned by petitioner. According to their information, Clinton Aparelle manufactured the said jeans. The petitioner prayed for (1) the issuance of a temporary restraining order, to restrain the defendants from manufacturing, distributing, selling, advertising or otherwise using denims, jeans or pants with their design; (2) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from manufacturing, distributing, selling, advertising or otherwise using denims, jeans or pants with their design; (3) a permanent writ of preliminary injunction be issued after trial on the merits; and (4) the products bearing their design be accordingly destroyed. Neither of the alternative defendants appeared on the first hearing date and the rescheduled hearing date. Clinton Aparelle claimed that it was not notified of such hearing. It alleged that only Olympian Garments had been issued with summons. Despite the absence of the summons, the lower court proceeded with the hearing for the issuance of TRO, and subsequently granted the same. The trial court also subsequently issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in order to maintain status quo. The trial court based its ruling on the following evidence: (1) certified true copy of certificate of trademark registration; (2) pair of Dockers pants bearing the trademark; (3) pair of paddocks pants bearing the logo; (4) survey report purportedly proving that there was confusing similarity between the two; and (5) affidavits.
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together, they must be considered as a single unit. Respondents trademark uses the word Paddocks and an imitation of the logo. There was therefore only a use of a portion of the registered trademark and not the whole. Given this, the right to prevent the respondent from using the challenged paddocks device is far from clear. It is not evident whether the single registration of the trademark confers n the owner the right to prevent the use of a fraction thereof in the course of trade. It is also unclear whether the use without the owners consent of a portion of the trademark constitutes a material or substantial invasion of the owners right. It is also not settled whether the logo or the name is the dominant or central feature of petitioners trademark. There are, in sum, vital matters which have yet and may only be established through a full-blown trial. Petitioner claims an urgent necessity for injunctive relief on the ground of erosion or dilution of their trademark is protectable. Trademark dilution is the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services regardless of the presence or absence of: (1) competition between theowner of the famous mark and other parties; or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. Subject to the principles of equity, theowner of a famous mark is entitled to an injunction against another persons commercial use of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after th mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. To be eligible for protection from dilution, there has to be a finding that: (1) the trademark sought to be protected is famous and distinctive; (2) the use by respondent of Paddocks and Design began after the petitioners mark became famous; and (3) such subsequent use defames petitioners mark. In the case at bar, petitioners have yet to establish the abovementioned elements thus, their cause does not necessarily fall within the ambit of the invoked protection. The lower courts granting of the writ did not adequately detail the reasons for the grant. We also agree with the CA that the damages petitioners had suffered or continue to suffer may be compensated in terms of monetary consideration.
main case can be heard in due course of proceedings. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction: (1) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (2) That the commission, continuance, or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (3) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. Under the provision, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, o future rights. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right. The CA did not err in reviewing proof adduced by petitioners to support its application for the issuance of the writ. The exercise of discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters is generally not interfered with save in cases of manifest abuse. In the present case, we find that there was scant justification for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners anchor their legal right on the Certificate of Registration issued in their favor by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology. Under RA 8293, the said Certificate of Registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of registration. However, petitioners registered trademark consisted of two elements: (1) the word mark Dockers; and (2) the wingshaped design or logo. Having been registered
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the credit to petitioner POLIAND sometime in July 1989. On March 24, 1988, then President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 64, directing NDC and Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (now Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines) to transfer some of their assets to the National Government, through the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for disposition. Among those transferred to the APT were the five GALLEON vessels sold at the foreclosure proceedings. POLIAND instituted a collection suit against NDC, DBP and GALLEON filed on October 10, 1991 with the Regional Trial Court, which found defendants NDC and DBP to be solidarily liable to POLIAND as assignee of the rights of the credit advances/loan accommodations to GALLEON. The Court of Appeals rendered a modified judgment, absolving DBP of any liability in view of POLIANDs failure to clearly prove its action against DBP. However, NDC was held liable to POLIAND for the payment of the preferred maritime lien based on LOI No. 1195 which directed NDC to discharge such maritime liens as may be necessary to allow the foreclosed vessels to engage on the international shipping business, as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit. Issues: 1) Whether NDC or DBP or both are liable to POLIAND on the loan accommodations and credit advances incurred by GALLEON 2) Whether POLIAND has a maritime lien enforceable against NDC or DBP or both. Held/Ratio: 1) No. As a general rule, letters of instructions are simply directives of the President of the Philippines, issued in the exercise of his administrative power of control, to heads of departments and/or officers under the executive branch of the government for observance by the officials and/or employees thereof. However, during the period when then President Marcos exercised extraordinary legislative powers, he issued certain decrees, orders and letters of instruction which the Court has declared as having the force and effect of a statute. But to form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI must be issued by the President in the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976
However, the CA overstepped its authority in declaring that the alleged similarity of the two logos is hardly confusing to the public as this was not part of the issue brought before the said court. Finally, the Court finds no contention against the procedure adopted by the trial court in resolving the application for an injunctive writ and we believe that respondent was accorded due process. POLIAND INDUSTRIAL LIMITED v. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL. 22 Aug 2005 Facts: Galleon had incurred an obligation of US$3,391,084.91 in favor of Asian Hardwood. To finance the acquisition of the vessels, GALLEON obtained loans from Japanese lenders whereby DBP guaranteed the prompt and punctual payment of GALLEONs borrowings. To secure DBPs guarantee under the Deed of Undertaking, GALLEON promised, among others, to secure a first mortgage on the five new vessels and on the second-hand vessels. On January 21, 1981, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1155, directing NDC to acquire the entire shareholdings of GALLEON. In the same LOI, DBP was to advance to GALLEON within three years from its effectivity the principal amount and the interest thereon of GALLEONs maturing obligations. Thereafter, NDC assumed the management and operations of GALLEON. Using its own funds, NDC paid Asian Hardwood on January 15, 1982 the amount of US$1,000,000.00 as partial settlement of GALLEONs obligations. On February 10, 1982, LOI No. 1195 was issued directing the foreclosure of the mortgage on the five vessels. For failure of GALLEON to pay its debt despite repeated demands from DBP, the vessels were extrajudicially foreclosed on various dates and acquired by DBP for the total amount of P539,000,000.00. DBP subsequently sold the vessels to NDC for the same amount. Asian Hardwood assigned its rights over the outstanding obligation of GALLEON of US$2,315,747.32 to World Universal Trading and Investment Company, S.A. (World Universal), embodied in a Deed of Assignment executed on April 29, 1989. World Universal, in turn, assigned
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against DBP under LOI No. 1155. Being a mere administrative issuance, LOI No. 1155 cannot be a valid source of obligation because it did not create any privity of contract between DBP and POLIAND or its predecessors-in-interest. There is nothing from the records of the case to indicate that DBP had acted as surety or guarantor, or had otherwise accommodated GALLEONs obligations to POLIAND or its predecessors-in-interest. 2) Yes, but only NDC. The Court finds that only NDC is liable for the payment of the maritime lien. A maritime lien is akin to a mortgage lien in that in spite of the transfer of ownership, the lien is not extinguished. The maritime lien is inseparable from the vessel and until discharged, it follows the vessel. Considering that DBP subsequently transferred ownership of the vessels to NDC, the Court holds the latter liable on the maritime lien. Notwithstanding the subsequent transfer of the vessels to NDC, the maritime lien subsists. This is a unique situation where the extrajudicial foreclosure of the GALLEON vessels took place without the intervention of GALLEONs other creditors including POLIANDs predecessors-ininterest who were apparently left in the dark about the foreclosure proceedings. At that time, GALLEON was already a failing corporation having borrowed large sums of money from banks and financial institutions. When GALLEON defaulted in the payment of its obligations to DBP, the latter foreclosed on its mortgage over the GALLEON ships. The other creditors, including POLIANDs predecessors-in-interest who apparently had earlier or superior rights over the foreclosed vessels, could not have participated as they were unaware and were not made parties to the case. On this note, the Court believes and so holds that the institution of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings was tainted with bad faith. It took place when NDC had already assumed the management and operations of GALLEON. NDC could not have pleaded ignorance over the existence of a prior or preferential lien on the vessels subject of foreclosure. Thus, NDC cannot claim that it was a subsequent purchaser in good faith because it had knowledge that the vessels were subject to various liens. At the very least, to evince good faith, NDC could have inquired as to the existence of other claims against the vessels apart from DBPs mortgage lien. Considering that NDC was also in a position to know or discover the financial condition of
amendments to the Constitution, whenever in his judgment, there exists a grave emergency or threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action (Parong, et al. v. Minister Enrile). Although LOI No. 1155 was undoubtedly issued at the time when the President exercised legislative powers granted under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, the language and purpose of LOI No. 1155 precludes this Court from declaring that said LOI had the force and effect of law in the absence of any of the conditions set out in Parong. The subject matter of LOI No. 1155 is not connected, directly or remotely, to a grave emergency or threat to the peace and order situation of the nation in particular or to the public interest in general. Nothing in the language of LOI No. 1155 suggests that it was issued to address the security of the nation. Obviously, LOI No. 1155 was in the nature of a mere administrative issuance directed to NDC, DBP and MARINA to undertake a policy measure, that is, to rehabilitate a private corporation. NDC, not liable under the Corporation Code The Court cannot accept POLIANDs theory that with the effectivity of LOI No. 1155, NDC ipso facto acquired the interests in GALLEON without disregarding applicable statutory requirements governing the acquisition of a corporation. The merger, however, does not become effective upon the mere agreement of the constituent corporations. The issuance of the certificate of merger from the SEC is crucial because not only does it bear out SECs approval but also marks the moment whereupon the consequences of a merger take place. By operation of law, upon the effectivity of the merger, the absorbed corporation ceases to exist but its rights, and properties as well as liabilities shall be taken and deemed transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation. The records do not show SEC approval of the merger. In the absence of SEC approval, there was no effective transfer of the shareholdings in GALLEON to NDC. Hence, NDC did not acquire the rights or interests of GALLEON, including its liabilities. DBP, not liable under LOI No. 1155 The Court affirms the appellate courts ruling that POLIAND does not have any cause of action
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On May 6 1992, a stockholders meeting was held to elect a new set of directors. Subsequently, private respondents filed a petition with the SEC questioning the validity of the said meeting, alleging that the quorum for the said meeting should not be based on the 165 issued and outstanding shares as per the stock and transfer book, but on the initial subscribed capital stock of 776 shares, as reflected in the 1952 Articles of Incorporation. The petition was dismissed. Appeal was made to the SEC En Banc, which granted said appeal, holding that the shares of the deceased incorporators should be duly represented by their respective administrators or heirs concerned. The SEC directed the parties to call for a stockholders meeting on the basis of the stockholdings reflected in the articles of incorporation for the purpose of electing a new set of officers for the corporation. Petitioners, PMMSI stockholders, filed a petition for review with the CA. Some stockholders and directors of PMMSI, earlier filed another petition for review of the same SEC En Bancs orders. The petitions were consolidated and essentially raised the main issue as to whether the basis for the outstanding capital stock and accordingly also for determining the quorum at stockholders meetings should be the 1978 stock and transfer book or if it should be the 1952 articles of incorporation. CA held that for purposes of transacting business, the quorum should be based on the outstanding capital stock as found in the articles of incorporation. Petitioners claim that the 1992 stockholders meeting was valid and legal. They submit that reliance on the 1952 articles of incorporation for determining the quorum negates the existence and validity of the stock and transfer book which private respondents themselves prepared. In private respondents Memorandum, they point out that the instant petition raises the same facts and issues as those raised in G.R. No. 131315, which was denied by the SC for failure to show that the CA committed any reversible error. They add that the instant petition should be dismissed due to res judicata. Thus, petitioners and their counsel should be cited for contempt for violating the rule against forum-shopping.
GALLEON when it took over its management, the lack of notice to GALLEONs creditors suggests that the extrajudicial foreclosure was effected to prejudice the rights of GALLEONs other creditors. NDC also cannot rely on Administrative Order No. 64, which directed the transfer of the vessels to the APT, on its hypothesis that such transfer extinguished the lien. APT is a mere conduit through which the assets acquired by the National Government are provisionally held and managed until their eventual disposal or privatization. Administrative Order No. 64 did not divest NDC of its ownership over the GALLEON vessels because APT merely holds the vessels in trust for NDC until the same are disposed. Even if ownership was transferred to APT, that would not be sufficient to discharge the maritime lien and deprive POLIAND of its recourse based on the lien. Such denouement would smack of denial of due process and taking of property without just compensation. LANUZA, ET AL. VS. CA 28 March 2005 Facts: 1952: The Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. (PMMSI) was incorporated, with 700 founders shares and 76 common shares as its initial capital stock subscription reflected in the articles of incorporation. 1978: Private respondents and their predecessors in control of PMMSI registered the companys stock and transfer book for the first time, recording 33 common shares as the only issued and outstanding shares of PMMSI. 1979: A special stockholders meeting was called and held on the basis of what was considered as a quorum of 27 common shares, representing more than 2/3 of the common shares issued and outstanding. 1982: the heirs of one of the original incorporators, Juan Acayan, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the registration of their property rights over 120 founders shares and 12 common shares owned by their father. The SEC hearing officer held that the heirs of Acayan were entitled to the claimed shares and called for a special stockholders meeting to elect a new set of officers. The SEC En Banc affirmed the decision. The shares of Acayan were recorded in the stock and transfer book.
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or that contained in the companys stock and transfer book? Held/Ratio: The Articles of Incorporation should serve as the basis. The articles of incorporation have been described as that which defines the charter of the corporation and the contractual relationships between the State and the corporation, the stockholders and the State, and between the corporation and its stockholders. When PMMSI was incorporated, it complied with the prevailing law which was Act No. 1459, otherwise known as The Corporation Law. The contents of the articles of incorporation are binding, not only on the corporation, but also on its shareholders. In the instant case, the articles of incorporation indicate that at the time of incorporation, the incorporators were bona fide stockholders of 700 founders shares and 76 common shares. Hence, at that time, the corporation had 776 issued and outstanding shares. On the other hand, a stock and transfer book is the book which records the names and addresses of all stockholders arranged alphabetically, the installments paid and unpaid on all stock for which subscription has been made, and the date of payment thereof; a statement of every alienation, sale or transfer of stock made, the date thereof and by and to whom made; and such other entries as may be prescribed by law. A stock and transfer book is necessary as a measure of precaution, expediency and convenience since it provides the only certain and accurate method of establishing the various corporate acts and transactions and of showing the ownership of stock and like matters. However, a stock and transfer book, like other corporate books and records, is not in any sense a public record, and thus is not exclusive evidence of the matters and things which ordinarily are or should be written therein. In fact, it is generally held that the records and minutes of a corporation are not conclusive even against the corporation but are prima facie evidence only. Quorum in meetings is based on the totality of the shares which have been subscribed and issued, whether it be founders shares or common shares. To base the computation of quorum solely on the obviously deficient, if not inaccurate stock and transfer book, and completely disregarding the issued and outstanding shares as indicated in the articles of incorporation would work injustice to the owners
In their Manifestation and Motion, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the instant petition in view of the dismissal of G.R. No. 131315. Issue 1: Does res judicata apply? Held/Ratio: No. Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment, on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The elements of res judicata are (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. There is no dispute as to the identity of subject matter since the crucial point in both cases is the propriety of including the still unproven shares of respondents for purposes of determining the quorum. There is identity of causes of action when the judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior judgment. However, there is no identity of parties between the two cases. The parties in the two petitions have their own rights and interests in relation to the subject matter in litigation. Issue 2: Are petitioners and their counsel guilty of forum-shopping? Held/Ratio: No, petitioners have substantially complied with the rules against forum-shopping. In the Verification/Certification portion of the petition, petitioners clearly stated that there was then a pending motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases, as well as a motion for clarification. Moreover, the records indicate that petitioners filed their Manifestation, informing the Court of their receipt of the petition in G.R. No. 131315 in compliance with their duty to inform the Court of the pendency of another similar petition. Issue 3: What should be the basis of quorum for a stockholders meetingthe outstanding capital stock as indicated in the articles of incorporation
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warned respondent banks that any transfer, release, or disposition of the Securities in favor of LHC would hold the banks liable for liquidated damages. 7. June 2000 LHC declared petitioner in default/delay in the performance of its obligations and demanded from petitioner the payment of US$75,000.00 for each day of delay until actual completion of the Project. LHC also served notice that it would call on the securities for the payment of liquidated damages for the delay. 8. November 2000 Transfield filed a Complaint for Injunction seeking to restrain LHC from calling on the Securities and respondent banks from transferring, paying on, or in any manner disposing of the Securities. RTC denied petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction, ruling that petitioner had no legal right and suffered no irreparable injury to justify the issuance of the writ. Employing the principle of independent contract in letters of credit, the trial court ruled that LHC should be allowed to draw on the Securities for liquidated damages. It debunked petitioners contention that the principle of independent contract could be invoked only by respondent banks since according to it respondent LHC is the ultimate beneficiary of the Securities. The trial court further ruled that the banks were mere custodians of the funds and as such they were obligated to transfer the same to the beneficiary for as long as the latter could submit the required certification of its claims. Petitioner appealed. 9. Upon expiration of the temporary restraining order, representatives of LHC withdrew from the ANZ Bank US$4,950,000.00. 10. 2 February 2001 CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and expressed conformity with the trial courts decision that LHC could call on the Securities. 11. Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, contending that the courts improperly relied on the independence principle on letters of credit when this case falls squarely within the fraud exception rule.---when LHC deliberately misrepresented the supposed existence of delay despite its knowledge that the issue was still pending arbitration. They assert that LHC should be ordered to return the proceeds of the Securities pursuant to the principle against unjust enrichment.
and/or successors in interest of the said shares. The stock and transfer book of PMMSI cannot be used as the sole basis for determining the quorum as it does not reflect the totality of shares which have been subscribed, more so when the articles of incorporation show a significantly larger amount of shares issued and outstanding as compared to that listed in the stock and transfer book. TRANSFIELD PHILIPPINES, INC., V. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION, ET AL. 22 Nov 2004 Facts: 1. 1997 Transfield and LHC entered into a Turnkey Contract where Transfield undertook to construct, on a turnkey basis, a 70Megawatt hydro-electric power station 2. The Turnkey Contract provides that: 1. (1) the target completion date of the Project shall be on 1 June 2000, or such later date as may be agreed ... or in accordance with the contract 2. (2) petitioner is entitled to claim extensions of time (EOT) for reasons enumerated in the Turnkey Contract, among which are variations, force majeure, and delays caused by LHC itself. 3. To secure performance of Transfields obligation, they opened in favor of LHC 2 standby letters of credit (the Securities) with ANZ Bank and SBC 4. In the course of the construction, petitioner sought various EOT to complete the Project, allegedly due to several factors which prevented the completion on target date, such as force majeure occasioned by typhoon Zeb, barricades and demonstrations. LHC denied the requests, giving rise to a series of legal actions. 5. Two arbitration proceedings were filed by LHC before the Construction Industry Arbitrary Commission (CIA) and International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), where the issues presented were: (1) whether typhoon Zeb and any of its associated events constituted force majeure to justify the extension of time sought by petitioner; and (2) whether LHC had the right to terminate the Turnkey Contract for failure of petitioner to complete the Project on target date. 6. Transfield advised respondent banks of the arbitration proceedings already pending, asserted that LHC had no right to call on the Securities until the resolution of disputes and
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Transfield defaults, then LHC can call on these stand-by LC. If the petitioner's argument is adopted--that any dispute must first be resolved by the parties, whether through negotiations or arbitration, before the beneficiary is entitled to call on the letter of credit in essence---then arbitration as a pre-requisite would convert the letter of credit into a mere guarantee. Jurisprudence has laid down a clear distinction between a letter of credit and a guarantee in that the settlement of a dispute between the parties is not a pre-requisite for the release of funds under a letter of credit. If a letter of credit is drawable only after settlement of the dispute on the contract entered into by the applicant and the beneficiary, there would be no practical and beneficial use for letters of credit in commercial transactions. As for the respondent banks, owing to the nature and purpose of the standby letters of credit, the Court rules that the respondent banks were left with little or no alternative but to honor the credit and both of them in fact submitted that it was ministerial for them to honor the call for payment. Furthermore, LHC has a right rooted in the Turnkey Contract to call on the Securities. A careful perusal of the Turnkey Contract reveals the intention of the parties to make the Securities answerable for the liquidated damages occasioned by any delay on the part of petitioner. Even without the use of the independence principle, the Turnkey Contract itself bestows upon LHC the right to call on the Securities in the event of default. SAMSUNG CONSTRTUCTION V. FEBTC 13 Aug 2004 Facts: A certain Roberto Gonzaga presented for payment an FEBTC check payable to cash drawn against Samsung Constructions account for 999,500.00Php. After bank officers were satisfied with the genuineness of Jong (the Samsung accounts sole signatory)s signature, with Sempio (Samsungs assistant accountant) vouching for the same, the check was enchashed. When Kyu, the companys accountant, discovered that the check was encashed when he had not prepared such check to be signed by Jong, he reported the matter to Jong who then went to the bank where he was told that he would be reimbursed the checks amount. Samsung demanded that FEBTC credit them the encashed amount with interest, but FEBTC said
Issue: Whether, by the independence principle, LHC can call on the Securities even while the arbitration proceedings are still pending. Held: Yes. A letter of credit is a written instrument whereby the writer requests or authorizes the addressee to pay money or deliver goods to a third person and assumes responsibility for payment of debt therefor to the addressee. A letter of credit, however, changes its nature as different transactions occur and if carried through to completion ends up as a binding contract between the issuing and honoring banks without any regard or relation to the underlying contract or disputes between the parties thereto. Independence principle assures the seller or the beneficiary of prompt payment independent of any breach of the main contract and precludes the issuing bank from determining whether the main contract is actually accomplished or not. Under this principle, banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any documents, or for the general and/or particular conditions stipulated in the documents or superimposed thereon, nor do they assume any liability or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods represented by any documents, or for the good faith or acts and/or omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the consignor, the carriers, or the insurers of the goods, or any other person whomsoever. However, payment may be enjoined if in the light of the purpose of the credit the payment of the credit would constitute fraudulent abuse of the credit. The Court holds for the LHC, following the independence principle, even granting that there is still issue to be resolved arising from the turn-key project. This issue is not supposed to affect the obligation of the bank to pay the letter of credit in question. The court stressed that a LC accommodation is intended to benefit not only the beneficiary therein but the applicant thereon. On the issue of fraud, the SC held that there is nothing in the turn-key contract which states that all issues between the parties must be resolved first before LHC can call on the stand-by LC but the contract provides that if
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Gonzaga was not an employee of Samsung, the bank should have exercised a higher degree of caution. Banks are engaged in a business impressed with public interest, and it is their duty to protect in return their many clients and depositors who transact business with them. They have the obligation to treat their clients account meticulously and with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required of banks, therefore, is more than that of a good father of a family. FEBTC should have ascertained from Jong personally WON the signature was his. Still, a bank may be liable in paying a forged check even if it exercised utmost diligence as long as the drawer is not precluded from setting up the forgery defense. Applicable Rules: 1. Sec. 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law -forged signature=wholly inoperative. When payment is made, the drawee cannot charge it to the drawers account since the drawee is in the position to detect a forgery and thus must take caution in examining signatures. -forgery is a real and absolute defense by the party whose signature is forged. Liability attaches even if the bank exerts due diligence 2. Brady in The Law of Forged and Altered Checks - bankdepositor, debtorcreditor -the bank owes money to the depositor such that when it encashes a forged check, it has failed to comply with its contract. When a bank pays a forged check, it is paying out its own money, and not the depositors. -even if the forgery is committed by a trusted employee or a confidential agent, the bank must still bear the loss. In robinson v. security bank, the bank was held liable even if the forged check was drawn by the depositors partner. -rule of liability: A bank is bound to know its depositors signature. 3. Nickles in Negotiable Instruments and Other Related Commercial Paper -a check signed by someone other than the authorized signatory is rendered inefeective.
that they were still conducting an investigation. Samsung then filed a complaint for violation of Sec. 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. During trial, Samsung presented an NBI examiner who concluded that Jongs signature had been forged while FEBTC presented a PNP examiner who concluded that it was genuine. The RTC chose to believe the findings of the NBI expert. FEBTC appealed, and the CA reversed the RTC ruling saying that the contradictory findings of the PNP and NBI created doubt as to whether there was forgery and that assuming there was forgery, it was due to the negligence of Samsung and Kyu for their lack of care and prudence in keeping their checks. The CA invoked the ruling in PNB v. National city bank of new York that if a loss, which must be borne by one or two innocent persons, can be traced to the neglect or fault of either, such loss would be borne by the negligent party, even if innocent of intentional fraud. Sub-issue 1: WON the check was forged. YES. The SC upheld the RTCs decision that the NBI examiner was more qualified despite the fact that it was the PNP examiner who had the opportunity to examine the specimen signature card relied upon by the FEBTC employees. The SC held that the crucial issue is WON the check was forged, not WON the bank could have detected the forgery. The SC held that the CA erred in failing to assess Jongs testimony that the signature was not his which was backed by circumstances (Jong immediately reported the forgery and filed charges v. Sempio) that support his claim. Sub-issue 2: WON Samsung is precluded from setting up the defense of forgery due to negligence. NO. The fact that the forgery was committed by Sempio, an employee does not imply negligence. It does not entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer (PCI Bank v. CA) General Rule: drawee bears the loss except when there is negligence on the part of the drawer. Samsungs negligence not established. Main Issue: WON FEBTC may be held liable. YES. Drawee liable for paying out forged check. Since the amount drawn was close to a million php, was made payable to cash, and since
DIGESTS CRIMINAL LAW

VALENZUELA v. PEOPLE 21 June 2007
OF

extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him. In answering the question whether it is frustrated or consummated, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft produced. Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already produced upon the taking of personal property of another without the latters consent. a problem clearly emerges with the Dio/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. While the Dio/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim. PEOPLE V. LIZANO 27 April 2007 Facts: Accused was charged with three counts of rape for allegedly defying his own niece, who was then a minor. She was 11 during the first incident (Jan 1996). The last two incidents happened a year after the first (Jan 1997). The TC convicted him of the 1st rape, and acquitted him for the last two for lack of evidence. Held: The accused was found guilty of statutory rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was punished under the old rape law (Art 335, RPC), which states that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman when xxx (3) the woman is under twelve years of age xxx. The fact that the victim was under twelve years of age was duly established by the presentation of the victims mother as witness, and the victims birth certificate as evidence, which both affirmed that the victim was under the age 12 when she was defied. PEOPLE V. SORIANO 04 April 2007 Facts: Loida Soriano and Lita Miguel were caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal drugs (shabu) through a buy-bust operation and were charged
Facts: The case stems from an Information charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon with the crime of theft. Lago, a security guard, saw petitioner hauling a push cart with cases of Tide. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. He hailed a cab and proceeded to leave with the stolen goods when they were stopped by Lago who asked for a receipt. They fled on foot but was apprehended at the scene; the stolen merchandise were recovered. Petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day after the incident. In a Decision promulgated on February 2000, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela filed a Notice of Appeal, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. In its 2003 decision, the CA rejected this contention and affirmed petitioners conviction. Hence the present Petition for Review which expressly seeks that petitioners conviction be modified to only of Frustrated Theft.In arguing for his case, Valenzuela relied on two decisions by the Court of Appeals: People v. Dio and People v. Flores. Issue: WON there is frustrated theft Held/Ratio: NO. The following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the
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corroborated by the presentation of the marked money in evidence PEOPLE v. CASELA 23 March2007 Facts: At around 10:00 oclock in the evening of 2 January 2003, Makabenta, the victim Rain and three other friends started their drinking spree. Later, at around 3:00 oclock the following morning, Rain excused himself from the ongoing drinking session to buy cigarettes from Naglor Videoke in the next barangay as all the stores in Barangay Sawang were already closed. When the victim did not return, Makabenta decided to go to Naglor Videoke himself. As he approached that establishment, located within the premises of the public market of Barangay Baybay, Makabenta saw Rain being attacked by Insigne and appellant as Rain was about to ride his bike. Makabenta was about three meters away from Rain when he witnessed the latter being successively stabbed by both malefactors. Although Rain was able to run away after the initial assault, he was pursued by Insigne and appellant. Insigne was able to grab the back neckline of Rains shirt, turning the latter towards him as the two accused proceeded to deliver more stabbing blows until Rain fell to the ground. Afraid to get involved, witness Makabenta left the scene and reported the incident to the nearest police station. In his defense, appellant avers that he had no participation in the attack on Rain. He testified that at about 1:00 oclock in the morning of 3 January 2003, he was at Naglor Videoke Bar on a drinking spree with Insigne. Rain allegedly entered the bar, immediately approached their table and asked who their other companions were. Appellant maintained that he did not reply to the Rains query because it was public knowledge that there was a feud between the families of Rain and Insigne, and this being so, he was apprehensive that trouble might erupt inside the bar. Thereafter, Insigne stepped out of the bar and he followed suit. As appellant headed home, about three stores away from the videoke bar, he turned back and saw Insigne stabbing Rain who was holding his bicycle. Appellant also presented SPO4 Teofilo Lucelo (SPO4 Lucelo) to refute the assertions of Makabenta that he had reported the incident to the police and, consequently, to cast doubt on his claim that he had personally witnessed the events that led to the death of Rain.
with a violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 91655. The three police officers involved in the operation positively testified that the sale took place and appellants were the authors thereof. The defendants allege on the other hand that it was a frame-up. They claimed that a certain Junjun approached them peddling his pieces of jewelry when the police officers arrived and arrested them. They were brought to the police station. Lita Miguel alleged that she was told to point to a big-time drug pusher. When she denied any knowledge thereof, she was charged for violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9165 Issues: (1) WON defense of denial/frame-up prevails over the positive testimony of the 3 police officers. NO (2) WON their guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. YES. Ratio: (1) Denial or frame-up has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it is easily concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. This kind of defense requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Bare denials of defendants cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the three police officers. (2) In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. All these elements were established by the positive testimony of the police officers. The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) on the white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachet confiscated from the defendants. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction. This was
penalty of life imprisonment to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved
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The deceased was unarmed and about to ride his bicycle when he was suddenly and successively stabbed by Insigne and then the accusedappellant also joined in the stabbing of the deceased. The deceased tried to run but he was chased and was successfully overtaken by the two assailants. Insigne and the accused-appellant successfully stabbed the deceased until the latter fell to the ground. Both accused were each armed with a bolo. Rain did not have the faintest idea that he was vulnerable to an attack, considering that he was boarding his bicycle, oblivious of the sinister intent of appellant and Insigne. The fact that the victim was facing his malefactors at the time of the latters attack did not erase its treacherous nature. PEOPLE v. SENIERES 23 March 2007 Facts: The prosecution presented as witnesses, the victim AAA, her aunt BBB and Dr. Vladimir Villaseor, the physician who conducted an examination on AAA. AAA testified that on the night of 22 November 1998, she fell asleep on the floor of the sala of her aunt CCCs house. She awoke when she felt the presence of someone beside her. When she opened her eyes, she saw that it was Senieres, her uncle, who had then started removing her shorts and underwear. She said, "No!" but Senieres threatened to harm her younger sister if she did not allow him to proceed. Next, Senieres turned her body to face him. AAA clipped together her legs to resist him but Senieres separated them using his feet. AAA shouted but Senieres covered her mouth with her hands. Senieres then inserted his penis into her vagina and made "push and pull" movements. AAA cried in pain. AAA also felt a mucous-like substance enter her vagina. After satisfying himself, Senieres repeated his threat of harm to AAAs sister and then went back to sleep at the sofa in the sala. AAA put her panty and shorts back on and went back to sleep still crying. When AAA awakened the following day, Senieres was no longer around. She, however, did not report the incident to her aunt CCC or to anyone else as she was afraid that Senieres would make good his threat to harm her younger sister.
The RTC rendered judgment against appellant with the appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of conspiracy, treachery and nighttime, and without any mitigating circumstance. The CA rendered its decision affirming with modification appellants conviction. Having discounted the appreciation of conspiracy and nighttime as generic aggravating circumstances, the crime in the case at bench was not aggravated, and there being no mitigating circumstance, in accordance with Article 61, the lesser penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. Issue: WON appellant is guilty of murder. Held/Ratio: YES. That Makabenta was the sole eyewitness to the killing of Rain presented against appellant is not, by itself, determinative. Criminals are convicted not on the number of witnesses against them but on the quality of the testimony given under oath. The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even of a charge of murder, if it is positive and credible. Makabenta declared under oath and in unequivocal terms that he saw, from a distance of approximately three to six meters, in a well-lit place how appellant and his co-accused had attacked the victim. Moreover, there is no evidence to show any dubious or improper circumstances or motive why Makabenta would falsely implicate appellant and his co-accused in a heinous crime as he was friends not only with the victim, but with appellant and Insigne as well. The trial court and the appellate court ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed, which were both present in this case. With the number, location and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim Ronaldo Rain, there is apparent treachery in the execution of the dastardly acts by the perpetrators. The victim was unarmed and totally defenseless, without any opportunity to defend himself. Accused Artemio Casela, Jr. and Felibert Insigne did not suffer even a single scratch on their body after the stabbing incident.
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not be difficult for him to secure their presence in court if indeed he was with his relatives on those nights or that he spent those nights at San Carlos Heights. Besides, it is not impossible for him to be at the place of the rape at the precise time the sexual acts were committed as it is just a 20minute jeepney ride away from his alleged relatives place. Senieres likewise failed to substantiate his claim that AAA was not in Baguio on 22 November and that she was neither at the place of rape on 17 December 1998. Issue: WON Senieres is guilty of raping his niece. Held/Ratio: YES. Senieres contends that no rape occurred on 22 November 1998 as AAAs injuries could have been sustained even before said date. He also maintains that AAAs injuries could have been caused only by a finger as it was not established that what was inserted inside AAAs vagina was Senieres penis. If at all, he claims he should only be held liable for the crime of acts of lasciviousness. First, it should be reiterated that in a rape case, what is most important is the credible testimony of the victim. A medical examination and a medical certificate are merely corroborative and are not indispensable to a prosecution for rape. In this case, both the courts are in agreement that AAA was candid, natural, forthright and unwavering in her testimony. AAAs credibility is strengthened by the absence of evidence showing that she had any ill-motive in testifying against Senieres. Secondly, Dr. Villaseors report revealed that AAA suffered shallow, healed lacerations at 7 and 9 oclock positions and a deep healed laceration at 3 oclock position and that she was in a nonvirgin state. It should be noted that the examination was made in April 1999, months after the incidents of rape occurred in November and December 1998. The presence of such healed lacerations is consistent with and corroborative of AAAs testimony that she had indeed been raped by Senieres months before the date of the examination. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. And when the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established.
After the incident, AAA stayed at her godmothers house which is a few houses away. On 16 December 1998, she returned to her aunt CCCs house as she thought that Senieres no longer stayed there. On 17 December 1998, while AAA was watching TV, Senieres arrived. In fright, AAA invited her male cousin DDD to go to sleep already. She and DDD slept on the floor facing each other. Again, she awoke when she felt Senieres go down to the floor next to her. Then she felt him remove her panty and shorts. AAA kicked Senieres feet but he managed to remove her shorts and panty. AAA tried to rouse DDD from sleep by elbowing him but he could not be awakened. AAA was lying on her left side, facing DDD, with her thighs bent forward and lower legs bent backwards. Next, Senieres inserted his penis into her anus. She felt a slippery substance and then Senieres pulled his penis out of her anus. He went back to sleep at the sofa. Senieres left the house the following morning. Sometime after the incident, AAA left for her uncle EEEs house in Benguet in order to be away from Senieres. On 28 January 1999, her aunt BBB arrived and took AAA to another town in Benguet. In April 1999, AAA reported for the first time what had happened to her aunt BBB. AAA and her aunt BBB then traveled to Baguio City to give her sworn statement to the Baguio City Police. Dr. Villaseor testified that he found a shallow, healed laceration located at 7 oclock and 9 oclock positions and a deep, healed laceration at 3 oclock position. He stated that based on their number and depth, the lacerations could have only been caused by the insertion of a male genital organ into the vagina. Senieres denied the charges against him, claiming that he could not have raped AAA on 22 November 1998 as he was in the house of a relative in Baguio City and AAA was still in Manila. On 17 December 1998, he was likewise at his relatives house in Baguio City. The trial court favored AAAs version of the events and convicted Senieres of the crimes charged, giving credence to AAAs credibility as he failed to present his alleged relative Mary Jane or any other member of the latters family or any other person to corroborate his claim. It should
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at the Tahanan ng Ama. Asencion Alarcon (Asencion) corroborated his brothers alibi. He allegedly served as the time keeper in the place where appellant worked. He declared that appellant worked from 8:00 am to 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 3, 5, 7, 23 and 24, the dates when he allegedly committed rape and acts of lasciviousness against AAA. However, the daily time record was not presented in evidence. The trial court rendered a Decision finding him guilty of rape, attended by the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. The trial court dismissed appellants alibi as selfserving and held that Asencion failed to submit the time records which would have corroborated appellants alibi that he was working at a shop in Cabuyao, Laguna on those dates. The trial court gave full credence to the categorical and positive testimony of the victim, AAA, which was corroborated by the Rape Case Report. It ruled that the act of AAA in immediately reporting the crime further strengthened her credibility. In downgrading the crime to acts of lasciviousness, the appellate court observed that there was no showing of penetration of the vagina in the recounting of the second incident. The appellate court observed that when AAA testified as to that incident, she merely said, "Dinidikit po niya," when asked how she was molested by appellant. The Court of Appeals modified the trial courts guilty verdict of appellant from rape to acts of lasciviousness. The Court can no longer review this aspect of the Decision without violating the right against double jeopardy, which proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the accused, as in this case. The instant case was brought to this Court by way of automatic review which is mandatory only where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The present appeal should therefore be treated as an appeal only from that aspect of the appellate courts decision finding appellant guilty of qualified rape. Issue: WON appellant is guilty of qualified rape. Held/Ratio: YES. Appellant challenges the credibility of AAA on three (3) grounds: first, considering that the house is small and has only one room, and the fact that they slept side by
Thirdly, inserted felt pain supports
AAA categorically said that Senieres his penis into her vagina and that she when he did. Dr. Villaseors testimony AAAs assertion. PEOPLE v. ALARCON 07 March 2007
Facts: Based on the complaints filed by private complainant AAA, assisted by Sister Laura P. Chavez (Sister Laura), appellant was charged with two (2) counts of statutory rape for having carnal relations with one [AAA], a ten (10) year old minor, his own daughter. The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, who recounted the details of her harrowing experience that began one evening in March 2001 at her home in Los Baos, Laguna, which she shared with her father, the present appellant, and four of her siblings. While they were all sleeping side by side in one room, AAA was awakened by appellant, who removed her panty and told her to remain quiet. He then forced his penis into her vagina. After finishing the act, appellant hit AAA. Later that month, just a few days before 24 March 2001, another similar incident occurred. That afternoon, at their home, appellant ordered AAA to lie down. She refused to obey him but appellant started molesting her by removing her panty and letting his penis touch her vagina. This incident occurred while AAAs two elder (2) siblings were sleeping at home. On 24 March 2001, AAA and her two younger siblings sought refuge at the Tahanan ng Ama Retreat House in Los Baos, Laguna under the management of Sister Laura. AAAs half-sister, BBB, testified that she lived with her four siblings. At around 12:00 p.m. on 24 March 2001, she left the house because she could no longer endure the beating of her father. Prior to leaving, however, she was informed by AAA that the latter was molested by appellant. BBB advised AAA to proceed to Tahanan ng Ama Retreat House. In his defense, appellant denied the charges hurled against him. He claimed that on the dates of the alleged rape incidents, he was working overtime as a welder in Cabuyao, Laguna. He insinuated that Sister Laura may have had an influence in the filing of cases because his children told him that she convinced them to stay
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the incident bespeaks veracity and spontaneity. A few days after the incident, AAA reported the incident to her sister, BBB, who acknowledged this fact in her testimony before the trial court. PEOPLE V. DELANTAR 02 Feb 2007 Facts: The testimony of AAA shows that appellant procured her as a child prostitute for at least two clients: the first, an Arab national named Mr. Hammond and the second, then Congressman Romeo Jalosjos. AAA testified that she was brought to the first client at least eleven (11) times between the period 1994 to June 1996. On each of these occasions, appellant and AAA would go to Ralph Anthony Suites in Manila where the client stayed. Appellant would tell AAA that they had to go to the client because they needed to pay some obligations. Upon their arrival at Ralph Anthony Suites, appellant would talk to the client for a few minutes and then leave AAA alone with the client. Money was usually given by the client to appellant who would leave on the pretext of buying something from Robinsons, a nearby mall. When he returned, usually after two (2) to four (4) hours, appellant would have something for AAA such as food and clothes. Once left alone with AAA, the client would perform lascivious acts on AAA. With the sordid details spread all over the transcript of AAAs testimony as she gave it before the trial court, the recurrent salient points of her harrowing experience revolved around the clients kissing her, touching her breasts, embracing her, and inserting his finger in her private parts. On one occasion, the client even tried to insert his penis inside AAAs vagina but the latter pleaded for him not to. The client thereafter rubbed his penis on AAAs vagina. On the same occasion, the client made AAA sit on him near his groin while his penis was fully erect. The client then made pumping motions while his organ was touching AAAs vagina until "his penis got wet." After their first visit to the client, AAA told appellant that she did not want to go back because the client was "bastos." Appellant promised her that they would no longer go back but the promise was broken as they went back a few more times. AAA continued to complain to appellant about the acts committed on her by the first client but appellant would dismiss the same
side, it would be impossible for the other children not to be awakened when the alleged incidents of rape allegedly took place; second, AAA nurtured ill-feelings towards appellant because the latter maltreated and beat her and her siblings; and third, AAA admitted that the information she relayed before the police came from Sister Laura. Firstly, AAAs testimony categorically established the fact of her defloration at the hands of her father at that. Indeed, she positively identified appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. She was only ten (10) years old when the rape was committed. It is inconceivable for a child to concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of a close kin, her father in this case, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than an earnest desire to seek justice. Thus, it becomes implausible for AAA to make up the rape story over her resentment caused by her fathers beatings. Secondly, there is no evidence on record for Sister Laura to fabricate charges against appellant. Appellant failed to substantiate his allegations during the cross-examination that Sister Laura had wanted his children to stay with her at the Tahanan ng Ama Retreat House. Even assuming the same to be true, this fact does not indicate any ulterior motive on the part of Sister Laura. If at all, it only proves that Sister Laura was genuinely concerned for the lot of the children. On the other hand, appellants alibi is inherently a weak defense. Where it is established only by himself and by his relative, his denial of culpability does not deserve consideration in the face of the affirmative testimony of a credible prosecution witness. The daily time record, which would have supported the alibi of appellant, was not presented in court. Thirdly, appellants argument that rape could not have been committed due to the presence of AAAs siblings by her side is also bereft of merit. Rape is not a respecter of place or time. It is not necessary that the place where the rape is committed be isolated. Rape is not rendered impossible simply because the siblings of the victim who were with her in that small room were not awakened during its commission. The Rape Case Report prepared by Dr. Teresita Samadi-Denani of the Laguna Provincial Hospital sufficiently corroborates AAAs testimony that she was raped. Furthermore, the early reporting of
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The law punishes not only the person who commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with the child but also those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution. Appellant is one such person. As held by this Court in People v. Larin, a child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. If AAA was not coerced into child prostitution under (b) above, she definitely was influenced by appellant to enter into said activity. As the person who had raised and taken care of AAA, appellant had moral ascendancy over AAA. This moral ascendancy coupled with AAAs fear and awe of appellant and her exposure to the world of prostitution at the early age of five had exerted a dominating influence on her being. Further, AAA was doing it so that they could have money to meet their several needs, including her own tuition fees. This engendered in AAA sufficient "consideration" under (a) above to engage or agree to be exploited in prostitution because after every encounter with the clients, AAA would receive either money (ranging from P2,000.00 to P10,000.00) or food and clothing. Aside from the testimony of AAA, the record is replete with evidence of appellants liability beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of Dr.
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means; (3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute; (4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or (5) Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with the intent to engage such child in prostitution. (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and (c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the establishment where the prostitution takes place or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment. Winlaw BarOps 2008 Page 135 of 219
saying that if the clients private part is not inserted in AAAs private part, there is nothing wrong about it. Sometime in June 1996, AAA told appellant that she did not want to go to the client anymore. On that day, AAA and appellant went to Harrison Plaza where appellant instructed AAA to call the client and tell the latter that if he would not give them P5000, they would not go there anymore. AAA complied and told the client exactly what appellant had told her. The client responded by saying that he would only give them P5,000.00 if AAA would have sexual intercourse with him. They did not go to this client anymore. Appellant thereafter started to bring AAA to the second client. As with the first client, appellant would tell AAA that they had to go to the second client because they had obligations to pay During each of these visits, the client would give AAA money ranging from P2,000.00 to P10,000.00. The details of what transpired when AAA was left alone with the second client were vividly recounted in People v. Jalosjos where the second client was convicted of two (2) counts of rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness, all committed against AAA on various dates. Issues: 1. W/N the court erred in convicting the appellant the crime charged w/n the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt 2. W/N the trial court erred in imposing the penalty for the crime charged in its maximum period Held/ Ratio: 1. The prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt There is no doubt, drawing from the evidence, that AAA was a child who was exploited in prostitution as defined in Section 5, Article III6.
6
CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSE SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.?Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: (a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
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is her birth certificate which mentions appellant as the father. However, said document does not bear appellants signature. In fact, appellant, in his testimony, denied that he is AAAs father. He claimed that, sometime in 1983, AAA was brought to him by a certain Salvacion Buela, AAAs real mother, who could not support her. Salvacion Buela told appellant that AAA was born on 11 May 1983 and that her natural father was a Japanese national. As prepared, the birth certificate indicates that AAA was born on "11 May 1985" to "Librada A. Telin" (mother) and "Simplicio R. Delantar" (father) who were married on "14 February 1977" in "Manila." The legible signature which reads "Librada T. Delantar" appears below the printed item "INFORMANT" and above the typewritten name "Librada T. Delantar" and word "Mother." However, nowhere on the face of the birth certificate can the signature of appellant be found. According to appellant, Librada A. Telin is his sister and they did not get married to each other on the date indicated in the birth certificate, or impliedly at least, not ever. While under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the record of birth appearing in the civil register yet the rule is where the birth certificate presented was not signed by the father against whom filiation is asserted, such may not be accepted as evidence of the alleged filiation. At best, appellant is AAA?s de facto guardian. The Court applies, by analogy, the ruling of this Court in People v. Garcia, where it was held that the restrictive concept of guardian, legal or judicial, is required by Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7659. Said provision, by way of amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, ordains that where the victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen years of age and the offender is, inter alia, a guardian of the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed. The Court ruled that the law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellants case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or anothers property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.
Emmanuel L. Aranas, Medico Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who conducted a medical examination on AAA on 23 August 1996, as well as the Medico Legal Report that he prepared showed that, at the time of physical examination, AAA was in a non-virgin state physically and that her hymen had a shallow healed laceration at 3 oclock position and a deep healed laceration at 8 oclock position. Dr. Aranas testified that the lacerations could be caused by the entry either of a finger or an erect male organ a week or more prior to the date of the examination. This testimony proves that AAA was subjected either to lascivious conduct or sexual intercourse before the medical examination. Witness Carolina Buan, for her part, testified that several calls were made from appellants phone to the second client. Exhibits I to I-15-A and J to J20, as well as appellants own admission that he was the subscriber of telephone number 8312423 and that he is the "S. Delantar" indicated in the telephone bill,establish a connection between appellant and the second client. This connection in turn forged the regularity which characterized the communication between the two, indeed the situation that normally obtains between a regular client and a "suking bugaw." 2. The trial court erred in imposing the penalty for the crime charged in its maximum period The penalty prescribed by Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. However, it was not proven that appellant is the parent or guardian of AAA. The establishment of either relationship would have justified the imposition of the penalty provided in the law in its maximum. Thus, there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty which could properly be imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law. After applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper imposable penalty is an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which could properly be imposed (reclusion temporal in its maximum period), and the minimum of which shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the law (reclusion temporal in its medium period). Under R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 31(c), relationship is not a qualifying circumstance but only an ordinary generic aggravating circumstance. In the case at bar, the only evidence presented to establish AAAs alleged relationship to appellant
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daughter and, with his uncles help, hailed a jeep to take his mother to the hospital. Policemen arrived about an hour later and conducted an investigation. SPO1 Fernandez testified that he was on duty on April 15, 2000 and received a report that there was a shooting incident in Brgy. Flores, Umingan, Pangasinan. Together with three (3) other policemen, he went to the crime scene to conduct an investigation. He noticed that Adelaida was wounded. Nonetheless, Adelaida told him that she saw Pascual shoot her husband and then flee. The policemen immediately proceeded to Pascuals house but was told by the latters wife that Pascual left their house just after dinner and might visit his brother in Brgy. Lapaz, Umingan, Pangasinan. Having received this information, they went to Brgy. Lapaz but failed to find Pascual. The policemen decided to put up a checkpoint in Balungao but still failed to locate Pascual. They returned to Pascuals house only to be told by the latters brother that a tricycle arrived at dawn to fetch Pascuals wife. They later received a report that Pascual was residing somewhere in Quezon Province. Pascual was apprehended by virtue of a previously issued warrant of arrest which was forwarded to Lucena City. Issue: W/N Pascuals identity as offender has been sufficiently established by evidence Held/Ratio: Pascuals identity as the offender has been sufficiently established by evidence. Pascual stakes his appeal on the assertion that his identity as the offender has not been established by sufficient evidence. He contends that Adelaida herself admitted that she did not see Pascual actually fire shots at her and her husband. The Court of Appeals and the trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Adelaida who described with reasonable certainty the fact of the killing, as well as identified Pascual as the assailant. It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a witness and his testimony is accorded the highest respect because of the latters untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and thus, to determine whether he is telling the truth.
Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description it may safely be deduced that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAA?s biological parent nor is he AAA?s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. PEOPLE V. PASCUAL 23 January 2007 Facts: According to Adelaida, at about 11:00 oclock in the evening of April 15, 2000, she was on the way home aboard a passenger jeepney driven by her husband, Manuel Perlaoan, the deceased victim in this case. As she and her young granddaughter were alighting from the jeepney, Adelaida heard two (2) successive gunshots. At the time she heard the sound of the first gunshot, she was helping her granddaughter get off the jeepney but got a glimpse of her husband lying face down on the steering wheel. She heard another gunshot and immediately took cover embracing her granddaughter. She felt that she had also been hit by gunfire. A few seconds later, Adelaida stood up and saw Pascual walking away carrying a gun about two (2) feet long. She was then approximately seven (7) meters away from Pascual, whom she recognized because of the light coming from the jeepneys headlights and a street post. She cried out to her son, Noel, shouting that her husband was shot by Pascual. Her son came out of their house, embraced her and noticed that she was also hit because she had blood at her back. He turned off the jeepneys engine and headed for his uncles house, which was two (2) houses away from theirs, to tell his uncle that his father had been shot. He returned to his mother and
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In People v. Raquio, the accused-appellant contended that he could not have been positively identified by the victims son because the latter admitted not having seen the actual shooting incident but only the fleeing of three armed individuals. The Court disagreed with his contention explaining that positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime, as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. In this case, Adelaida was unwavering in her testimony that she saw Pascual at the crime scene and that she could not have been mistaken in identifying Pascual as the assailant because the latter is very familiar to her. She convincingly recounted that she was able to recognize Pascual although he was walking away from her because she is familiar with his distinct gait, describing it as that of a drunken man. The Court is convinced that with the help of the jeepneys headlights and the light from the street lamp in front of the house of the Perlaoans, Adelaida was able to clearly catch sight of and recognize Pascual, her neighbor of many years, as the assailant. PEOPLE V. RODRIGO, ET AL. 23 January 2007 Facts: On 10 September 1996, Oliver Caparas (Oliver), then 13 years of age, was waiting for a ride to school in a corner near his house in Matimbo, Malolos, Bulacan, when four (4) men forcibly seized and boarded him into a car. While inside the car, he was blindfolded. He was later transferred to a van. The van, tailed by a car, traveled to Baguio. While there, they slept overnight inside the van in a parking lot. The following day, Eleazar Caparas (Eleazar), the father of Oliver, received a call from the kidnappers initially asking for P10 million ransom in exchange for the release of Oliver. In the meantime, the kidnappers proceeded to Bonitas Resort in Pangasinan. Oliver was then brought to a room and his blindfold removed. He stayed inside the room for one (1) week. During his stay, a woman, later identified as Lanie dela Cruz (dela Cruz), took care of him by feeding him three (3) times a day.
After three (3) days of negotiation, the kidnappers agreed to lower the ransom to P1.7 million. On 17 September 1996, Pedro Navarro (Pedro), an uncle of Oliver, was instructed by Eleazar Caparas to deliver the ransom money. After receiving a call from the kidnappers, he proceeded to follow the instructions on the dropoff. He eventually gave the money to a man whom he would later describe as "mestizo, 55 or 56 feet tall and wearing sunglasses." Later that night, Oliver was made to board the same van and brought to the Petron Gas Station in Meycauayan Highway. Upon alighting from the van, he was given P500.00 and was told that he would be fetched by his uncle inside a canteen in the gas station. At around 1:00 a.m. of 18 September 1997, the kidnappers called Eleazar again and asked them to go to the Petron Gas Station located between Meycauayan and Marilao along the Expressway. Upon arriving at the Petron Station at 3:00 a.m, Pedro Navarro saw Oliver eating inside the canteen and brought him home where he was reunited with his father. Issues: 1. W/N prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellants 2. W/N dela Cruz could be discharged as a state witness Held/ Ratio: 1. The guilt of the appellants was established beyond reasonable doubt by the testimonies of the victim, the man who paid the ransom, and a fellow participant to the crime, who had turned state witness for the prosecution.
2. Dela Cruz could be discharged as a state

witness. The power to prosecute includes the initial discretion to determine who should be utilized by the government as a state witness. The prosecution has gathered the evidence against the accused and is in a better position to decide the testimonial evidence needed by the State to press its prosecution to a successful conclusion. Dela Cruz satisfies the requirements for a state witness.7
7
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides: When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the Winlaw BarOps 2008 Page 138 of 219
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a. The testimony of dela Cruz was an absolute necessity - Without the testimony of dela Cruz, the prosecution would not be able to bring all the culprits before the bars of justice b. The prosecution has direct evidence in the person of Pedro Navarro and Oliver Caparas, but, apparently, in view of the complex situation the two have found themselves in their testimonies have taken a limited thrust, hence, it becomes the bounden duty of the prosecution to fill in the void with all the resources under its command. Insofar, as the other accused are concerned, no direct evidence is at its disposal at this stage to establish their complicity in the abduction of Caparas. Only dela Cruz, according to them, could supply the much needed information to pin down the whole bunch that took Caparas forcibly for ransom c. The testimony of dela Cruz was substantially corroborated by no less than the victim himself, Oliver, as well as Pedro. d. dela Cruz does not appear to be the most guilty of the accused. The trial court held that dela Cruz was not privy to the kidnap plan and was merely taken in later by the group because they suspected that she already knew too much. PEOPLE V. ARNAIZ 29 November 2006 Facts: The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA herself, Demelen Renton Dela Cruz of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Dr. Anne Soreta Umil of the Medico-Legal Division of the NBI. AAA testified that sometime in December 1995, while her mother went out to go to the market, she was suddenly awakened when she felt her stepfather removing her shorts. The latter pointed a gun at her, removed her underwear and proceeded to rape her. AAA did not struggle for fear that her stepfather will shoot her. When her mother returned home, AAA did not tell her anything for fear of her life. AAA was only 15 years old then. Thereafter, accused succeeded in raping AAA several times more while her mother was out in the market and each time he threatened her with a gun. He also warned her not to leave the house unless she wanted to be shot in the back.
It was only when AAA was already 7 months pregnant that she finally broke her silenced and relayed her unfortunate experience to her grandmother, CCC, who in turn, told AAAs aunt, DDD. Accuseds bestial act produced a child, EEE to whom AAA gave birth. On 1 December 1996, AAA accompanied by CCC and DDD, reported the rape incident to the police and executed a Salaysay. AAA underwent physical examination the following day. The forensic biologist, Ms. Dela Cruz, testified that she conducted blood examinations on the accused, AAA and EEE, and the blood-grouping test she conducted disclosed that EEE is a possible child of AAA and the accused. Dr. Nario, the medico-legal officer who examined AAA was not able to testify as she passed away before the case was tried. In her stead, the prosecution presented Dr. Umil, a medico-legal officer of the NBI to interpret Dr. Narios findings. Dr. Umil testified that the result of the medical examination conducted on AAA showed her hymen was reduced to carunculea myrtoformis due to the fact that she had already given birth. There was no evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on her body at the time of examination possibly due to the lapse of time from the commission of the rape up to the time the actual physical examination was performed on AAA. She stated nonetheless that the presence or absence of extragenital physical injury is not determinative of rape because the extent or severity of such injury would depend on the amount of physical force applied on the victims body, if any. The defense presented a different version of the facts anchored on the claim that the accused and AAA were lovers so that their sexual encounters were consensual. The victims mother, BBB testified for the defense. She testified that since 1995, AAA had become extraordinarily sweet towards her stepfather. She, however, brushed this aside as she did not want to put any malice to it. According to her, she did not notice AAAs pregnancy because the latter had a small belly and always wore large shirts. When AAA gave birth, BBB inquired several times who the father is but AAA would not answer. CCC never discussed the matter with BBB and the latter was
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surprised when her husband was arrested. When she asked the police officers why her husband was being arrested, she was told that he was in possession of a gun. She was not aware that he ever owned one and the police officers found none when they searched their house that same day, unarmed with a search warrant. The accused also took the witness stand. He vehemently denied the charges against him, insisting that he and AAA were having an affair. Their alleged relationship started with a kiss sometime in December 1995 when BBB was in the market. They did not profess any love for each other but he knew they had a mutual understanding. They continued to be intimate with each other until 12 February 1996 when AAA crawled beside him in bed and they had their first sexual intercourse while his wife was in the market. He testified that he initially tried to resist AAAs advances but she would always stop him from leaving her side. They again had sexual intercourse on 4 April 1996 while his wife was out of the house. On both occasions, he alleged that he never forced AAA to have sex with him. He further testified that he did not know that he impregnated AAA. It was only when AAA told him that she wanted to go to Antique to give birth did he learn of her pregnancy. When AAA gave birth to EEE, they did not tell his wife who fathered the child. On 1 December 1996, AAAs aunts, all relatives of his wife, took AAA and EEE away, and had him arrested. Around five to six (6) police officers went to his house, handcuffed him without showing any warrant for his arrest, and proceeded to search their house looking for a gun. When they found none, they brought him to the Coastal Police Headquarters where he finally learned that he was arrested for rape. The RTC, in convicting the accused, gave full faith and credence to AAAs straightforward and unwavering testimony. It rejected the defenses sweetheart theory as highly incredible given AAAs tender age at the time of the rape as well as the fact that accused was like a second father to her, having known him since she was only five years old. According great respect to the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision in its entirety. Issue: WON the accused of guilty of the crime of rape
Held/Ratio: YES. At the core of almost all rape cases is the issue of credibility of witnesses, specifically the complainants, and the trial court is in the best position to resolve the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor during trial. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses unless it is shown that the latter has overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily facts and circumstances of significance to the case. None of the exceptions apply to the case at bar. The Court finds no cogent reason to doubt the veracity of AAAs testimony. Although the medico-legal officer who conducted the physical examination on AAA was not presented in court and that the medical findings do not point to any injury in AAAs hymen as she had already given birth, the same has no bearing on the fact that AAA was indeed raped by the accused. Medical findings are at best corroborative and therefore not indispensable in proving the commission of the crime of rape. The lone credible testimony of AAA is sufficient to convict accused for the crime charged. Well-trenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. AAAs straightforward account of the incident even during rigorous cross-examination clearly established the commission of the crime of rape. That AAA failed to struggle while the accused satisfied his carnal desires is not tantamount to consent on her part. Her stepfather held her at gunpoint just a couple of meters away from her younger siblings. Danger to their lives and hers was not only apparent but also imminent. In People v. Adajio, it was found that fear of bodily harm and fear for the safety of her family prevented therein complainant from shouting for help, caused her to spread her legs upon the order of her rapist and compelled her to follow the latter to the piggery where the second charge of rape occurred. We held therein that physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to the embrace of her rapist because of fear. The same applies to the case at bar. Neither does AAAs failure to tell her mother about the incident nor her long delay in reporting
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unless impelled by a desire to expose the truth and seek justice she so greatly deserves. Thus, we sustain the finding of guilt pronounced by the RTC and CA. Carnal knowledge of a woman through the use of force or intimidation is rape as defined under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the law in force at the time of the rape in question. The crime of rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a step-parent of the victim, in which case, the death penalty shall be imposed as provided under the Death Penalty Law of 1993. In the case at bar, although the victims minority was alleged and established, the qualifying circumstance of her relationship with the accused as the latters step-daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, although proven during trial and not refuted by the accused. Thus, accused may only be convicted of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines which was signed into law on 24 June 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. PEOPLE V. MACABALANG 26 November 2006 Facts: This case involves a buy-bust operation whereby Saidamin Macabalang was arrested for selling shabu and sentenced by the RTC to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of P500,000. The Narcom and Macabalang had different versions of the buy-bust operations. The RTC, in deciding the case relied on the testimonies of the following: PO1 Guste, the poseur-buyer; PO1 Fabia, member of the buy-bust operation team; Insp. Suan, head of the buy-bust team; and Insp. Lodovico, a Forensic Chemist.z The Narcoms version is as follows: Insp. Suan, received a report from a confidential informant that a certain Amin was looking for a buyer of shabu. Insp. Suan instructed his informant to contract with Amin for 2 kilos of shabu. Two hours later, Suan formed a fourteen-man buy-bust team with PO1 Guste acting as poseur-buyer. After the briefing, Insp. Suan gave PO1 Guste two genuine P1,000.00 bills, marked with letters CG and boodle money amounting to P1,000,000.00. At 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to the 4th level of the
the matter to the authorities negate rape. As correctly observed by the OSG, the delay in reporting the rape incident does not weaken the case for the prosecution. It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal assaults on her virtue, especially when the rapist is living with her. In fact, we have previously ruled in People v. Coloma, that even a delay of 8 years is not a sign of fabrication. Furthermore, being AAAs step-father, accused possessed moral ascendancy over her which should be considered a factor in her failure to struggle against him and to immediately report rape incidents. It was observed in People v. Melivo, that, in incestuous rapes, [t]he rapist perverts whatever moral ascendancy and influence he has over his victim in order to intimidate and force the latter to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. In many instances, he succeeds and the crime is forever kept on a lid. In a few cases, the victim suddenly finds the will to summon unknown sources of courage to cry out for help and bring her depraved malefactor to justice. That ascendancy or influence flows from the fathers parental authority over his children and from the latters correlative duty of reverence and respect towards the former. Although we have subsequently held that the moral ascendancy of the accused in incestuous rapes, alone, does not lead to the conclusion that sufficient intimidation was present, it may be considered a contributing factor when coupled with other threatening circumstances such as those in this case. Nevertheless, AAAs clear and categorical narration of the sexual assault against her, free from material inconsistency and coupled with a spontaneous outburst of emotions deserve full faith and credence. We cannot by any stretch of imagination accept the defenses sweetheart theory. Accuseds allegation that he and AAA are lovers is baseless and unsubstantiated. While BBB testified that she noticed AAAs extraordinary sweetness towards her stepfather, BBB likewise testified that she had no knowledge of what transpired at home every time she was away. She also testified that AAA is a very good and obedient daughter to her and the accused ever since she was little. It is highly improbable that AAA, so early in her adolescence would seduce the accused who she looks up to as a father. Neither would she impute to him a crime so grave and subject herself and her whole family to the humiliation and invasive ordeal of public trial
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inside a room and a certain Captain Mendoza entered the room and offered him freedom in exchange for P2,000,000.00 and two (2) signed deeds of absolute sale over the vehicles confiscated from him. When appellant failed to produce the amount on the following day, he was presented to the press people and photographed with the shabu displayed beside him. Defense also presented testimonies from witnesses Duetes and Mostrales (SM Carpark Security detail). Duetes testified for the defense that he was asked by appellant to accompany him to meet some women that they are going to date. When they arrived at the Carpark, he went to buy cigarettes. When he returned, he saw armed men forcibly taking Macabalang. He got scared and hid behind the stairs. When he got home, he relayed the incident to the casier of the store where he works and asked her to tell Macabalangs sister. Mostrales told the court that he noticed a white car running against traffic and saw several armed men getting out of the said car. Three other cars followed and their occupants likewise alighted from these cars. They pointed their firearms on the appellant, took him out of his car, and brought him into one of their vehicles. Upon evaluation of the evidence presented, the RTC rejected the version of the defense. The trial court found the testimony of Duetes as fabricated and proceeded to disprove each and every point raised. The trial court justified the security guards testimony as pertaining only to drama whose prior occurrence he failed to witness. The court found no incompatibility with his testimony and that of the police witnesses. RTC, thus, found Macabalang guilty of selling shabu. CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON Macabalang was guilty of violating RA 6425 for selling shabu Held/Ratio: YES. For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. A buybust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the
SM North Carpark. They observed the area for 2 hours and positioned themselves within the vicinity. PO1 Guste stayed outside the car with the informant while the others were inside their separate vehicles. Two hours thereafter Macabalang arrived in a white lancer. PO1 Guste and the informant approached him and appropriate introductions were made. Macabalang then went to a green Toyota Corolla car, parked next to his car. He opened the rear compartment, took out a yellow box, and gave it to PO1 Guste. When appellant asked for the money, PO1 Guste invited the latter over into his own car. Upon reaching his car, PO1 Guste checked the contents of the box and found 2 plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. He immediately gave the money to appellant and stepped out of the car. As a prearranged signal to his police companions to close in, PO1 Guste removed his cap. The rest of the team members converged to where PO1 Guste, the informant and appellant were situated, introduced themselves as policemen, and apprehended appellant. Appellant was brought to the Narcom office at Camp Crame for investigation. PO1 Guste executed an affidavit narrating the incident. The carton containing shabu and the boodle money were turned over to the investigator. On the following day, the confiscated carton containing two (2) plastic bags was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were examined by Forensic Chemist Lodovico. The test results confirmed that the white crystalline substance sold by appellant was shabu, weighing a total of 1,972.6 grams. In his defense, Macabalang presented a different version of the incident. He came to the SM Carpark, accompanied by Duetes (employee of his sister) in his Toyota car to meet with Mr. Ong who was to provide them with dates. Earlier that day, Ong borrowed his white lancer. Upon reaching the Carpark, Duetes left to buy cigarettes. Macabalang approached Ong and entered the white lancer. When asked where their dates were, Ong said that he would get them and then left. Soon thereafter, a Sedan, followed by 3 other cars sped towards Macabalang. Armed men alighted from the car, poked guns at him, forced him to get out of his car and made him board on of their vehicles. He was blindfolded, handcuffed, and brought to Camp Crame. Upon arrival, his cellular phone, wedding ring, checkbook, and wallet containing P2,000.00 and $35.00 were taken from him by the Narcom operatives. He was then brought
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It is not surprising for Inspector Suan to use his own money during the buy-bust operation. Nor should it be construed as highly irregular. It must be recalled that Inspector Suan formed a team on the same the intended buy-bust operation was to take place. With less than nine (9) hours before the scheduled meeting with appellant, the buy-bust operation team hardly had time to prepare, much less ask for the production of genuine bills to be used for the operation. At any rate, the use of Inspector Suans money does not adversely affect the case against appellant. The failure of Narcom agents to use fluorescent powder on the boodle money does not indicate a failure in the buy-bust operation. It has been held that the use of fluorescent powder is not indispensable in such operations. There is no requirement that the police must apply fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money to prove the commission of the offense. What is material is the delivery of the prohibited drug to the buyer which, in this case, was sufficiently proved by the prosecution through the testimony of the poseur-buyer and the presentation of the article itself before the court. Besides, the money was already marked by the poseur-buyer with his initials, CG. Neither is fingerprinting a requirement in buy-bust operations. There is no law or rule of evidence requiring the use of fluorescent powder or the taking of the culprits fingerprints from the bag containing the shabu. Failure to conduct Surveillance No surveillance of the area or the subject of the entrapment is necessary where the police officers have a reasonable ground to believe that the informer and the information given were reliable, and that a crime is indeed being perpetrated. The buy-bust operation is formed by the police officers precisely to test the veracity of the tip and in order to apprehend the perpetrator, if he in fact commits the offense, before he further endangers society. It is congruent to the very characteristic of prohibited drugsi.e., their being easily concealed and transferred without threat of detection in small and handy quantities, allows its sale, use and delivery with relative facility Failure to Coordinate with SMs Security While the confidential nature of the buy-bust operation might have prevented the police officers from coordinating with the security administration of SM Carpark, it was however established that they were in close coordination
execution of their criminal plan. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. Appellants defense fails in light of the positive identification by prosecution witnesses, which primarily consists of testimonies of police officers who bear the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. PO1 Guste, PO1 Fabian and Insp. Suan gave an unequivocal account of the sale that took place leading to the arrest of appellant; all of which corroborated each other. The testimonies of these police officers categorically proved the sale of shabu. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit. Alleged Irregularities Appellant cites some irregularities attending the alleged buy-bust operation. First, the vehicles used by the police during the operation were not official government vehicles. Second, the buy-bust money was not only personally produced by Inspector Suan. It was not even dusted with fluorescent powder. Third, the police officers failed to verify the information given by the informant considering that it is the first time they heard of the appellant. No surveillance was conducted. Fourth, the police officers did not coordinate with the security detachment of the place where the buy-bust operation was conducted. Fifth, the boxes allegedly containing the shabu and the plastic bags containing money were not subjected to fingerprint examination. Sixth, after the buy-bust operation, the police did not make an inventory of the personal effects seized from appellant. Use of Private Vehicles The type of vehicle used by the police officers does not taint the valid character of the buy-bust operation. In People v. De Guzman, the conviction arising from the buy-bust operation was affirmed despite the use of private vehicles by the NBI agents. In People v. Bongalon, the fact that the buy-bust team used a private vehicle did not affect the outcome of the case against the accused for the illegal sale of shabu. Besides, the police officers explained that no motor vehicle is issued to the Narcom office. Buy-bust Money and Failure to Test Money and shabu for fingerprints
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he signed the receipt of the property seized without the assistance of counsel. Admittedly, it is settled that the signature of the accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged. However, while it is true that appellant signed receipt of the property seized unassisted by counsel, this only renders inadmissible the receipt itself. In fact, in the case at bar, the evidentiary value of the Receipt of Property Seized is irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able to prove that a valid buybust operation was conducted to entrap appellant. The testimony of the poseur-buyer clearly established that the sale of shabu by appellant was consummated. The corpus delicti, which is the shabu, was presented in court and confirmed by the other members of the buy-bust team. They acknowledged that they were the same drugs placed in two (2) plastic bags seized from appellant. Besides, the prosecution did not present in evidence any receipt of property seized relating to the shabu confiscated from the appellant. Appellant may have testified as to having signed such receipt, but it was not introduced in evidence. Imposable Penalty Section 15 in relation to Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 relevantly provides:
with the Central Police District, as evidenced by the pre-operational coordination sheet Failure to take Inventory of Personal Effects According to appellant, the inventory becomes relevant in light of his accusation that a certain Mendoza, presumably Capt. Mendoza of the Narcotics Command, tore a check from his checkbook, forged his signature, and sought to encash it against appellants account. The alleged acts imputed by appellant against Capt. Mendoza were not supported by credible evidence. Appellant initially admitted that the checkbook seized from him was intact, only to retract it later on and claim that a sheet was possibly torn from the checkbook. For failure of appellant to support his claim of stolen check, the absence of an inventory of personal effects seized from appellant becomes immaterial to the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation. Once again, the presumption of regularity on the part of the police officers prevails over these bare assertions. Forensic Evidence The evidence for the prosecution is further reinforced by the Physical Science Report submitted by Insp. Lodovico, a forensic chemist, confirming the contents of the two (2) plastic bags delivered by appellant as shabu Appellant casts doubt on the examination conducted by the forensic chemist, as proof of the exact quantity of shabu allegedly confiscated from him. Appellant asserts that the tests merely established the presence of shabu but did not determine its exact percentage. He insists that a quantitative examination should have at least been undertaken to determine the exact quantity of shabu. Consequently, as appellant argues, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon him, which was derived from the quantity of the regulated drugs involved, is without basis. The Court has consistently held in numerous cases that a sample taken from one of the packages is logically presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by appellant. Absence of a Warrant of Arrest Indubitably, appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in selling shabu, leading to his valid arrest without warrant. This fact was proven by the prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt. Inadmissibilty as evidence of receipts Appellant avers that the evidence allegedly taken from him is inadmissible on the ground that
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs.The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. xxxx SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or instruments of the Crime.The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: xxxx 3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride; xxxx
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operation by a team composed of Narcom officers Castro, Manglo and Luna. Based on tips from an informant, the Narcom officers went to the restaurant where the defendants would allegedly be delivering P100k worth of shabu. When the defendants arrived, Guevarra approached defendant Zarraga. Zarraga asked him if he could afford to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra replied in the affirmative. Zarraga then asked Jose, to bring out the shabu. Jose brought out the shabu, wrapped in plastic and white paper, and handed it over to Zarraga who gave it to Guevarra. The latter, in turn, gave the (marked) money bundle to Zarraga. Guevarra then scratched his head, a pre-arranged signal that the transaction has been consummated. Immediately, Manglo and Luna approached and introduced themselves as Narcom operatives and arrested Zarraga and Jose. The money bundle was recovered from Zarraga. Guevarra handed the shabu to Manglo who, in turn, gave it to Luna. Castro brought Zarraga and Jose to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, where it was confirmed to contain metamphetamine hydrochloride. Defendant Zarraga claims that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti and that the prosecution witnesses presented conflicting testimonies on material points sufficient to engender doubt as to his guilt. Issue: WON the prosecution establish the corpus delicti. was able to
Following Section 20 in relation to Section 15, the sale of 200 grams or more of shabu is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Taking into consideration the report of the forensic chemist with respect to the quantity of shabu taken from appellant amounting to 1,972.6 grams, the SC affirmed the penalties imposed by the trial court. PEOPLE V. CABALQUINTO 19 Sept 2006 Taking the various opinions of the OSG, DSWD, KBP and NPC, into account and in view of recent enactments which unequivocally express the intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in cases involving violence against women and their children, in this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her mother pertains merely to a circumstance that is of little consequence to the question of whether rape was actually committed. Persons who witness an event may perceive it from different points of reference, hence they may have different accounts of how the incident took place. What is important is that their testimonies reinforce each other on the essential facts and that their versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole. Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is rape as defined under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and is qualified when the offender is a parent of the victim, in which case, the death penalty shall be imposed as provided under the Death Penalty Law. In this case, the qualifying circumstances of the victims minority and her relationship with the accused as the latters daughter were properly alleged in the informations, proven during trial and not refuted by Cabalquinto. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed. ZARRAGA v. PEOPLE 14 March 2006 Facts: Defendants Zarraga and Jose were charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The prosecution sought to establish that they were apprehended during a buy-bust
Held/Ratio: NO. Indispensable in all prosecutions for violation of RA 6245, such as the instant case, is the submission of proof that the sale of the illegal drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller. The element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. Further, the corpus delicti must be presented as evidence in court. The corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude. In People v. Laxa, the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged apprehension of the accused-appellant. The Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces doubts as to the origins of the marijuana and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti. Similarly, in People v. Kimura, supra, the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the alleged seized
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intensely feverish passions evoked during the election period in 1988 must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter. In addition, incomplete privilege should be appreciated in his favor, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them. CABUSLAY V. PEOPLE AND SANDIGANBAYAN 30 September 2005 Facts: At around 8:30 in the morning of August 5, 1992, four policemen, while manning a checkpoint at Libertad, stopped a collector named, Paquito Umas-as, who was riding his motorcycle from Lapayan. The police asked the collector to show his identification card. The collector then took the ID from his left pocket and when it reached the front man, the petitioner opened fire at the collector whose right hand was then raised. The petitioner consumed the entire magazine of his M-16 armalite in firing at the collector who was four meters away. The victim fell on the ground still moving and was placed on board the policemens vehicle and was brought to Kolambugan. The defense, however, presented a different set of facts. They claimed that instead of presenting his identification card, Paquito Umas-as took out his gun and shot the petitioners superior officer, Celso Regencia. And that it was due to this and his belief that he was the next target which prompted the petitioner, Jovito Cabuslay to shoot Paquito Umas-as with his M-16. Having acted in defense of his person and that of his superior officer, the petitioner asserted before the court a quo that he has no criminal liability because of the attendance of the following circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the victim; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and in the case of defense of his superior officer, he was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motives. The Sandiganbayan however grave credence to the version of the prosecution and rejected the version of petitioner. The Sandiganbayan noted
marijuana on the night the accused were arrested and to observe the procedure in the seizure and taking custody of the drug. Consequently, we held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti. In this case, there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of Guevarra and Luna particularly with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made. Furthermore, nowhere in the records is there any evidence that the buybust team prepared an inventory of the seized drugs and had Zarraga and Jose sign such inventory as required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 amending Board Regulation No. 7 Series of 1974. Therefore, the SC finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. BRILLANTE V. CA 11 November 2005 Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts Decision affirming Brillantes conviction for the crime of libel with the punishment of fine and imprisonment. Brillante claims that his conviction without the corresponding conviction of the writers, editors, and owners of the newspapers on which the libelous materials were published violates his right to equal protection, that he should have convicted of one count of libel only because the respondents were not defamed separately as each publications was impelled by a single criminal intent, and that there is a semblance of truth to the accusations he made. The Court agreed with the OSG that the issues raised by Brillante have already been thoroughly discussed and passed upon by it in its decision. But the Court decided to reconsider the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon Brillante although this issue was not raised by Brillante since an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects including those not raised by the parties. Issue: Whether the penalty should be both imprisonment and fine? Held/Ratio: No, the court deleted the penalty of imprisonment. The circumstances surrounding the writing of the open letter on which the libelous publications were based similarly warrant the imposition of the penalty of fine only. The
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answers in the negative. Aggression to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that person is seeking to defend. From the testimony it can be observed that the petitioner was not standing in plain sight of the victim. Thus, his claim that he was the victims next target should be disbelieved. Another police officer was on on top of the hummer jeep manning the machine gun. If Regencia had indeed been shot as the defense insists, then Cane was better situated to defend Regencia. The claim of the defense that Paquito shot Regencia on his right thigh is untenable. Petitioner would have the Court believe that Paquito dared challenge five policemen, four of them in full battlegear, at a checkpoint and armed with only a handgun. This is contrary to ordinary human experience, as well as the human instinct which is to flee for dear life and seek safety. The medical certificate presented by Regencia to prove that he had been shot by the victim has no probative value. The physician who signed the same was never presented as witness for the defense. Also the physician who signed said medical certificate is different from the doctor had treated his wounds. It is also worthy of note that the defense never presented in evidence the gun Paquito allegedly use to shoot Regencia. Anent the credibility of Zaragoza, the sole prosecution eyewitness on whose testimony the version of the prosecution is anchored, we find that petitioner failed to impeach his credibility. No evidence was shown that Zaragoza was actuated by an improper motive. As such, there is no cogent reason why the Court should deny Zaragozas testimony the full faith and credit it deserves. All in all, petitioner has failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Without this essential element, petitioner cannot successfully invoke self-defense and defense of a stranger. (2) Reasonable Means. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence. The nature and number of wounds suffered by
grave deficiencies in the evidence of the defense. Hence, petitioner filed this petition. Issue 1: WON the findings of the Sandiganbayan should not be given credence **Since the ponente of the appealed decision was not yet a member of the Third Division when the witnesses testified and when the parties presented their evidence. Held/Ratio: Finding should be respected. After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by respondent court. As held in Hugo v. Court of Appeals, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. For it does not follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in divisions of three Justices each, is a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of view and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote. The ponente of the assailed Decision is not the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. He alone does not speak for and on behalf of his Division. Each Division of the Sandiganbayan is a three-man body whose members each have one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is within its jurisdiction. Issue 2: WON petitioner acted in self-defense and in defense of Regencia Held/Ratio: No. One who invokes self-defense must establish with clear and convincing evidence, the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. Also, in order that defense of a stranger may be appreciated, the ff requisites must concur: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive. (1) Unlawful aggression is the first and primordial element of self-defense. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel. Thus, it is crucial to ask whether the victim Paquito was an unlawful aggressor. Court
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publication prima facie implies malice on the part of the author and publisher towards the person subject thereof. The trial court likewise disregarded the insulative effects of complainants status as a mediaman to the prosecution of the criminal libel charge. It further held that a private reputation is as constitutionally protected as the enjoyment of life, liberty and property such that anybody who attacks a persons reputation by slanderous words or libelous publications is obliged to make full compensation for the damage done. On appeal, the CA modified the penalty imposed but it affirmed the RTCs finding of guilt. The CA likewise held that self-defense was unavailing as a justification since the defendant should not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him. The appellate court asserted that the purpose of self-defense in libel is to repair, minimize or remove the effect of the damage caused to him but it does not license the defendant to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in return for what he received. Held/Ratio: Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. This Court has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard governs the prosecution of criminal libel cases concerning public figures. In Adiong v. COMELEC, the Court cited New York Times in noting that [w]e have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. The Court has likewise extended the actual malice rule to apply not only to public officials, but also to public figures as it did in Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong. A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
Paquito negate any claim of self-defense or defense of a stranger. The Court notes that the victim sustained eight gunshot wounds which were all fatal as they affected vital organs. There was no reason for petitioner to shoot him seven more times, even aiming at his vital organs. It bears repeating that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove a plea for self-defense or defense of stranger because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself. Issue 3: WON killing Paquito resulted from the lawful performance of his duty as a police officer? Held/Ratio: No. Such justifying circumstance may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that the accused acted in the performance of a duty, and the injury or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. These two requisites are wanting in this case. It was not proven that the victim had indeed fired at Regencia. Killing the victim under the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a valid performance of a lawful duty. As stated in People v. de la Cruz, Performance of duties does not include murder. Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim. GUINGUING V. CA 30 Sept 2005 Facts: The case originated from a criminal complaint for libel filed by Cirse Torralba against Lim and petitioner. Complainant was a broadcast journalist who handled two programs for radio stations. Lim caused the publication of records of criminal cases filed against complainants as well as photographs of the latter being arrested. These were published by means of a one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post. Asserting that he had been acquitted in the aces, complainant sought the conviction of the petitioner for libel. He asked for damages as well. Lim alleged that complainant was making scurrilous attacks against him and his family and that he resorted to the newspaper ads to answer the attacks. The lower court concluded that the publication complained of was indeed libelous. Declaring that malice is the most important element of libel, it held that the same was present in the case because every defamatory
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the stage where the amateur singing contest was to be held. During the singing contest, which started at around ten oclock in the evening (10:00 p.m.), Bebong Cambarijan (Cambarijan) approached Gulle to tell him that Rogelio and Nicanor Soplente (the two accused) had asked him and Estoy Provido (Provido), who was tough among the group. Without telling anybody except Leyson and Notarte about the incident, Gulle went to the house of policeman Rudy Penequito (Penequito) to get help. Penequito instructed Gulle to refrain from accosting the Soplente cousins to avoid disturbing the singing contest. Penequito also approached Rogelio and Nicanor and admonished them not to make trouble, but despite the intervention, Gulle, Notarte and Leyson watched the Soplente cousins still. Gulle, along with Bebing Go, then accosted the Soplente cousins and inquired where they came from. Nicanor politely answered that they were staying with Susing Cafi (Susing). Since Gulle and the others knew that Susing was a local resident, they were satisfied with the answer and they left the Soplente cousins alone. Gulle however noticed that Nicanor smelled of liquor. The group of Leyson and the Soplente cousins continued to watch the singing contest being held nearby. Some of Leysons companions were barangay tanods and volunteers, thus, they were equipped with canes while Leyson was armed with a handgun. While awaiting the announcement of winners at about twelve thirty in the early morning (12:30 a.m.) of 4 May 1988, the group of Leyson repaired to a place away from the stage to relieve themselves. Some of the spectators began dispersing at this point. Notarte and Besinga were along one side of San Pedro St. while the others, including Gulle, were on the left side. Suddenly, a commotion ensued as the Soplente cousins passed by. Gulle testified that he saw Notarte fall to the ground, which was followed by a gun burst which he presumed came from Leysons handgun. He saw Leyson, by then clearly wounded, chasing Rogelio. However, Gulle did not see the actual stabbing of either Notarte or Leyson. Besinga testified that he saw the commotion at a distance of about thirty (30) meters while he was walking towards the group of Leyson at the right side of San Pedro St. When he was barely three (3) meters away from them, he saw Rogelio and Leyson approaching each other saying something unintelligible. Notarte was beside Leyson at this juncture. Rogelio then stabbed Leyson, who drew a gun and fired in the air.
affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. There should be little controversy in holding that complainant is a public figure. He is a broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao. The newspaper in question, the Sunday Post, is particularly in circulation in the areas where complainants broadcasts were aired. Certainly, it cannot be denied that the target audience of the newspaper were the same persons who may have listened regularly to the complainants broadcast. As it has been established that complainant was a public figure, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of Lim and petitioner when the latter published the article subject matter of the complaint. This, however, was not proven. The prosecution must have established beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the statements in the advertisement was false or nonetheless proceeded with reckless disregard as to publish it whether or not it was true. It should thus proceed that if the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had. Any statement that does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection. There was nothing untruthful about what was published in the Sunday Post. The criminal cases listed in the advertisement as pending against the complainant had indeed been filed. It may have been inconvenient for the complainant that these matters may have been divulged, yet such information hardly falls within any realm of privacy complainant could invoke, since the pendency of these criminal charges are actually matters of public record. SOPLENTE V. PEOPLE 29 July 2005 Facts: Prosecutions Evidence A group consisting of Leyson, Notarte, Besinga, Gulle, Ewing Bayani, Ralowe Velayo, Ebol Bayani, Reynaldo Jamerlan and Bond de Vera were drinking and conversing in the early evening of 3 May 1988 which was the occasion of the fiesta at Purok Sta. Cruz, San Pedro St., Lagao, General Santos City. They were at the store of a certain Diola which was situated near
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led by Leyson. He shouted at Nicanor to run and the latter immediately scampered away. Leyson drew his gun and fired at Rogelio but the latter was able to parry it by tapping the base of Leysons hand holding the gun. Forthwith, Rogelio stabbed Leyson once. As Notarte had started mauling Rogelio after Leyson had fired his gun, Rogelio also stabbed Notarte. He stabbed both Leyson and Notarte to protect himself from being killed by the group who were armed with canes and a lead pipe aside from Leysons gun. Rogelio managed to escape after that and he sought refuge in the house of Susing. Before dawn, a policeman arrived at Susings house and Rogelio voluntarily gave himself up. The knife he used was also turned over to the police. He was brought to the police substation at Lagao. A few hours later, Nicanor was also picked up by the police. TC: The RTC held that Nicanor had no participation in the fatal incident which occurred in the early morning of 4 May 1988. It also found that there was no evidence of conspiracy. Accordingly, it absolved Nicanor of the crimes charged in both Criminal Case Nos. 5093 (frustrated homicide of Leyson) and 5094 (homicide of Notarte). On the other hand, Rogelios claim of self-defense was deemed legally justified with respect to Leysons injury but not with respect to Notartes death. Thus, while Rogelio was acquitted in Criminal Case No. 5093, he was found guilty of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 5094. The lower court ordered both Nicanor and Rogelio to jointly and severally indemnify the family of Notarte for the latters death and to pay the hospitalization expenses of Leyson in its decision. Both Nicanor and Rogelio filed their respective notices of appeal from the above decision. Later however, Nicanor withdrew his notice of appeal and opted to merely move for a reconsideration of the portion of the decision making him solidarily liable for monetary awards in favor of the victims. The lower court granted Nicanors motion thereby totally absolving him from both criminal and civil liability. Thus, only Rogelios appeal to the CA remained. CA: Concluding that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Notarte which would justify Rogelios claim of self-defense, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Besinga did not notice the others but his companions were nearby mingled with the people going home. Leyson, who survived the attack and sustained a wound on his left arm, claimed to have been taken by surprise when the Soplente cousins suddenly attacked Notarte and himself. The assault was so sudden and fast that while he was standing with arms akimbo, he was stabbed by Rogelio. Leyson reacted by drawing his gun and firing a shot in the air to prevent further attack. Notarte who was a little to the rear but very near his right side was attacked by Nicanor at the same instant that Rogelio had attacked his companion, Leyson. The assaults were done simultaneously with lightning speed, with Rogelio concentrating on Leyson and Nicanor on Notarte. Rogelio fled after the firing of the gun. (But Leyson did not testify whether Nicanor had also taken flight.) Leyson tried to go after Rogelio used but since he was bleeding profusely, a policeman assisted him in going to the Canda clinic for medical treatment. He learned the next day that Notarte died as a result of the stabbing. Defenses Version The cousins, Rogelio and Nicanor, watched the amateur singing contest being held near the Sta. Cruz Chapel at San Pedro St. which started at about nine thirty in the evening (9:30 p.m.). They were standing only a few meters away from the group of people who were drinking in the store of Diola. While engrossed with the singing contest, they were approached by two (2) persons from the group of Leyson who then tapped Nicanors shoulder. They insisted on bringing Nicanor along with them so Nicanor called for Rogelios help. The latter immediately intervened to stop the two from harassing Nicanor. A few minutes after the incident, Nicanor went to the adjacent store of Malig-on and ordered orange. When Malig-on asked him what happened, Nicanor explained that the strangers were provoking him by deliberately stepping on his feet. He claimed however that the incident was nothing to him. At about past eleven oclock in the evening (11:00 p.m.), before the conclusion of the amateur singing contest, Rogelio and Nicanor decided to go home. They related how Nicanor was harassed near the stage of the amateur show to their cousin, Susing and his wife, Bukay. At past midnight, Bukay asked Rogelio and Nicanor to accompany her in looking for her children who had watched the singing contest While on the way home, Rogelio suddenly found himself surrounded by around ten (10) persons
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context, the act of kicking Rogelio by Notarte might seem insufficient as an act of unlawful aggression, considering that Notarte just witnessed his friend, Leyson, being stabbed. Perhaps, this was the context in which the lower courts appreciated Rogelios claim of selfdefense. After all, the immediate vindication even of a stranger is recognized as a justifying circumstance. However, there is a wider context which should be appreciated. As concluded by the trial court, the Soplente cousins were surrounded by Leyson and his companions, some of whom were armed. Animosity between these two sets had been fostered just a few hours earlier. Leyson had drawn first and fired first. At this juncture, Rogelio had every reason to believe that it was not only Leyson who meant him harm, but that Leysons companions were of the same mindset. The fact that Leysons aggression had already been repelled did not eliminate the threat to Rogelios well-being in the hands of Leysons companions. The kicks employed by Notarte did nothing but remind Rogelio that the threats to his life or limb had not ceased, even if those from Leysons had. At the commencement of the attack, Rogelio could not have been obliged to view Notarte, or any other member of the posse for that matter, as a less menacing threat than Leyson. We have to understand that these events occurred spontaneously in a matter of seconds or even simultaneously. Rogelio bore no superhuman power to slow down time or to prevent the events from unfolding at virtual warp speed, to be able to assess with measured certainty the appropriate commensurate response due to each of his aggressors It would be wrong to compel Rogelio to have discerned the appropriate calibrated response to Notartes kicking when he himself was staring at the evil eye of danger. That would be a gargantuan demand even for the coolest under pressure. The second element which is reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression was likewise present in the case at bar. The knife Rogelio habitually carried was the only weapon he had in his person. It was but logical that the knife would be the only thing he could use against his attackers since the latter were collectively armed with canes and a handgun. Anent the third element of self-defense, there was no evidence to show that Rogelio had
Issue: WON petitioner was justified by selfdefense in killing Notarte. Held/Ratio: YES. Our laws on self-defense are supposed to approximate the natural human responses to danger, and not serve as our inconvenient rulebook based on which we should acclimatize our impulses in the face of peril. The lower courts failed to appreciate the fact that Rogelios testimony relative to his claim of selfdefense stands uncontradicted. His testimony coupled with the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently proves the claim of selfdefense The three main witnesses for the prosecution, Gulle, Besinga and Leyson categorically stated that it was Nicanor, not Rogelio who stabbed Notarte The declarations made by the witnesses were categorical and they never even made an attempt to correct themselves. Yet, their categorical declarations were belied by the admission of Rogelio himself who candidly admitted his own acts. Said declarations were also belied by the findings of the trial court which held thus: . . . The version given by Leyson that it was Rogelio who stabbed him and Nicanor who stabbed Notarte who was standing less than a meter from him a little bit to his back on the right side would not be supported by the actual happening because it would appear that the stabbing which he said happened simultaneously is against reality because if it were true that Rogelio and Nicanor were on the left side of Leyson and that Leyson was a little bit forward with Notarte on his right it would have been unlikely if not impossible for the two to simultaneously stab because he (Leyson) would be blocking the way of Nicanor. What is more logical and believable is that after stabbing Leyson Rogelio immediately stabbed Notarte hitting him on the left side of his body below the armpit. In order for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Based on the uncontradicted testimony of Rogelio, he was kicked by Notarte immediately after he stabbed Leyson. Viewed in an isolated
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provoked Notarte into a fight. The lower courts finding on this point is backed by the evidence on record. As the lower court held, it is a fact that Rogelio had not done anything to provoke the victim prior to or at the time of the fatal encounter. GABRIEL v. PEOPLE 06 Oct 2004 Facts: A three-way vehicular accident ensued along Maharlika Highway in San Pablo City Laguna which led to the immediate deaths of Fernando Pitague, Carlos Asistido, and Isabela Banes. A jeepney owned by Marcelino Gabriel moved out of his lane into the opposite lane at high speed. It hit the left side of a Volkswagen Beetle car forcing it out of the road into a shoulder. The jeepney turn turtled and hit the front portion of the truck. Gabriel insists that it was the oncoming vehicle (the Beetle) which bumped him first and forced him to face the other direction. The Regional Trial Court held that the prosecutions version of the facts are more credible and found Gabriel guilty of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Double Homicide. Gabriels plea to the Court of Appeals proved fruitless since they modified RTCs ruling by raising it to Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide. Gabriel raised the issue to the Supreme Court. Issue: WON Gabriel is guilty of multiple homicide or double homicide Held: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the RTC Ratio: Excessive speed combined with other circumstances such as being near a curve constitutes negligence. By failing to slow down, Gabriel acted recklessly and imprudently. His behavior was the proximate cause of the fatal accident. Also, the RTC omitted in its findings the fact that the death of jeepney passenger Banes was likewise brought about by the collision. Yet, the charges in the Information only seek to hold Gabriel liable for the deaths of Pitargue and Asistido. No mention at all was made of Banes in the Information, therefore making it only a double homicide.
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LLAMZON V. LOGRONIO, ET AL. 26 June 2007
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of the order of inhibition dated 21 October 2002, and a motion to cite petitioner in contempt for resuming the administrative investigation upon the expiration of the TRO. Confused with the orders of Judge Vianzon, respondents filed a manifestation seeking clarification whether the judge had recalled his earlier order of inhibition. In his Order dated 15 November 2002, Judge Vianzon clarified that he had indeed recalled his order of inhibition and would proceed to try the case. Meanwhile, respondents motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 565-ML was denied by Judge Vianzon in his Order dated 11 December 2002. Respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Vianzon in: (i) his conduct of the proceedings before him; (ii) vacating his earlier order of inhibition; (iii) issuing the status quo order dated 28 November 2002; and (iv) issuing the 11 December 2002 Order denying their motion to dismiss. Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the 2 December 2002 status quo order, but dismissed the petition with respect to the order dated 11 December 2002 denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner now proposes that the Court of Appeals erred when it: (i) ruled that the TRO and status quo order were wrongfully issued; and (ii) did not dismiss respondents petition despite several defects which should have merited the outright dismissal thereof. Issue: WON Judge Vianzon failed to observe Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning applications for preliminary injunction and TRO Held/Ratio: YES. Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court proscribes the grant of preliminary injunction without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. However, the rule authorizes the court to which an application for preliminary injunction is made to issue a TRO if it should appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, but only for a limited 72-hour period. The rule thus holds that before a TRO may be issued, all parties must be heard in a summary hearing first, after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The only instance when a TRO may be issued ex parte is when the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such circumstance, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective
Facts: Petitioner Miguel M. Llamzon, an Enterprise Service Officer III at the Industrial Relations Unit, Bataan Economic Zone, was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service for having billed Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation overtime fees for unloading of fuel for the dates 28 February 2000 and 20 March 2000, despite knowledge that the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) had discontinued billing registered locator/enterprises for overtime fees since 17 December 1999. Llamzon filed his answer denying the charges against him and requested a formal investigation and the transfer of the venue of the case to the Civil Service Commission. He also requested the PEZA-CBIID to allow the PNP Crime Laboratory to examine the written contents of the billings for overtime fees. Both requests were denied. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondents, with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, for allegedly depriving him of his right to present witnesses for himself and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in the administrative investigation. On the same date, Judge Benjamin Vianzon, presiding judge of RTC, Branch 4, Balanga, Bataan, issued a TRO for twenty (20) days for the maintenance and preservation of the status quo, and scheduled the hearing for preliminary injunction Respondents moved to lift the TRO on the ground of non-holding of a summary hearing and failure of petitioner to show extreme urgency for the issuance of said TRO. Respondents motion was denied by Judge Vianzon. They then filed before the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint for incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice against Judge Vianzon. They also filed a motion for his inhibition in Civil Case No. 565-ML which Judge Vianzon granted. Moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 565-ML but petitioner opposed the motion. In the interim, petitioner filed a motion to maintain the status quo, which Judge Vianzon granted through an Order dated 2 December 2002 (status quo order). Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration
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for 72 hours only. The Executive Judge shall then summon the parties to a conference during which the case should be raffled in their presence. Before the lapse of the 72 hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then conduct a summary hearing to determine whether theTRO can be extended for another period until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard, which period shall in no case exceed 20 days including the original 72 hours. Judge Vianzon erred in issuing a TRO effective, not for 72 hours as prescribed by law in cases of extreme urgency, but for the maximum of 20 days; and he did so without conducting beforehand a summary hearing, and without showing that it falls under the exceptional circumstances enumerated by the Administrative Circular No. 20-95 where a TRO may be issued by the Executive Judge before assignment by raffle to a judge without first conducting a summary hearing. MOLDEX REALTY V. HLURB 21 June 2007 Facts: Moldex Realty, Inc. is the owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I subdivision, and the subdivisions buyers and homeowners formed the Metrogate Complex Village Homeowners Association. Moldex, since the completion of the subdivision, had been subsidizing and paying for the delivery and maintenance of common facilities including the operation of streetlights and the payment of certain electric bills. Moldex then decided to stop paying for such bills and advised the homeowners to assume the obligation. The homeowners refused to pay the bills. Thus, when no one paid, Meralco discontinued its service, prompting the homeowners to file a petition for a preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction with the HLURB against Moldex. The HLURB granted the homeowners petition, citing relevant provisions of PDs 957 and 1216, and HUDCC Res. No. R-562, series of 1994, which stated that "subdivision owners/developers shall continue to maintain street lights facilities and, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract, pay the bills for electric consumption of the subdivision street lights until the facilities in the project are turned over to the local government until after completion of development in accordance with PD 957, PD 1216 and their implementing rules and regulations. Moldex moved for reconsideration, but was ordered to assume the obligation of paying the bills.
Moldex appealed to the CA, by filing a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari, praying not only for the reversal of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, but also for the nullification of the HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, on the ground on that it is unconstitutional. CA dismissed the petition, on the ground that Moldex should have raised the constitutionality of the said resolution directly to the SC. Moldex then appealed to the SC. Issues: 1) WON HUDCC Res. No. R-562 is unconstitutional 2) WON HLURB gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Mandatory Injunction on the basis of a void regulation (HUDCC Res. No. R-562) 3) WON HLURB abused its discretion in not commanding that the obligation to maintain the subdivision Ratio: 1) No The court will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is the very lis mota of the case. 2) & 3) No In the main, petitioner is assailing the constitutionality of Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, issued by the HUDCC. However, the HUDCC, although obviously an indispensable party, was not impleaded either in the instant petition or in the petition before the Court of Appeals. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable parties renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. That is why the case is generally remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. In this case, however, remand is not feasible because the initial action has to be discarded for failure to observe the hierarchy of courts principle. PEOPLE V. RAPEZA 04 April 2007
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Rapeza was not informed of his constitutional
Facts: Jerry Rapeza and Mike Regino were charged with murdering a spouse in Culion, Palawan. It was alleged that Regino was a nephew of Rapeza, and that they planned to murder the spouses out of Reginos revenge. Rapeza, an illiterate fisherman from Samar, was invited by the police alleging that they got a tip from someone that Rapeza wanted to confess. From there they presented an extrajudicial confession to the Court where Rapeza allegedly confessed, in the presence of a lawyer and informed of his rights, his guilt to the murder. The police also alleged the presence of an interpreter for Rapeza as he was not fluent in Tagalog. The extrajudicial confession was the sole basis of the RTC for convicting Rapeza. Appellant mainly contends that the extrajudicial confession suffers from constitutional infirmity as it was extracted in violation of the due process guidelines for custodial investigation. First, he claims that he affixed his thumbmark (in place of a signature) on the extrajudicial confession thinking that it was a release form as he was told it was, and was obtained through violence and intimidation (mauling). Second, he was not informed of his rights during the time of his detention when he was already considered a suspect as the police had already received information of his alleged involvement in the crimes. Third, neither did a competent and independent counsel assist him from the time he was detained until trial began. Assuming Atty. Reyes was indeed designated as counsel, said lawyer was not appellants personal choice. Fourth, there was no showing that his rights under custodial investigation were explained to him in a way that an uneducated person like him could understand. Issue: WON appellants extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence to warrant the verdict of guilt. Held/Ratio: NO. The following are the requisites for an admissible extrajudicial confession: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessants choice; 3) it must be express; and 4) it must be in writing.
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who is investigated in connection with an offense
rights in custodial investigation8. Custodial interrogation or investigation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way (Ppl vs. Ayson). It refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect (Ppl vs. Dueas). It includes the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person
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have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, the interpreter, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However, they were not presented in court. The corroboration that medico-legal findings lend to an extrajudicial confession becomes irrelevant when the latter is considered inadmissible. No motive could be ascribed to appellant. Motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator (due to inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession). Although the confession states that Regino allegedly sought Rapezas help in killing the victims as Regino was his nephew, the fact of their relationship was denied by Rapeza and was never established by the prosecution. AUSTRIA VS. LICHAUCO 04 April 2007 Facts: Parties are siblings & co-owners of 2 parcels of land with permanent improvements in Makati. The titles of the land and improvements (residential bungalow and 2-storey apartment) are registered jointly in the names of the parties as co-owners. In 1996, plaintiffs-appellees informed Austria of their desire to have the properties partitioned based on the percentage of each co-owners share. Due to the inability of the co-owners to mutually agree on an arrangement, on July 1997 plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint with the Makati RTC to partition the subject property. Austria filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Nov. 10, 1997: lower court denied motion to dismiss, directed the defendants to file her answer within the remaining period provided by the Rules. However Austria filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65, ROC) seeking to annul these orders. Petition was dismissed. Austria then filed a petition for review but was also dismissed. During the pendency of Austrias petition for certiorari and prohibition, the plaintiffs-appellees filed with the Makati RTC where the main case is pending, a motion for a declaration of default against all defendants and for plaintiffs to be allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Lower court declared defendants in default and set the reception of ex-parte evidence, Austria filed an MR to cancel plaintiffs ex parte
he is suspected to have committed (RA 7438)9. Assuming he was read his rights, there is no proof that Rapeza had actually understood them. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required necessarily depends on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. In this case the presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established. The officer as witness on the stand did not swear of his personal knowledge as to what Rapeza confessed as it was only relayed to him by an interpreter. Without the testimony of the interpreter, it cannot be said with certainty that Rapeza was informed of his rights and that he understood them. Confession was not made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel of appellants choice. The moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Rapeza did not make any such waiver. Lawyers engaged by the police are generally suspect since the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. There is no evidence of how he assisted Rapeza based on the confessions of the policemen themselves. Confession is not voluntary. A confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved. Confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary, which is what happened here. First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the investigators themselves (like wrong date when the crime was exactly committed). The actual date of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged confession. Second, again appellant was not assisted by counsel Confession was not sufficiently corroborated. As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made or by any other evidence. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police as well as any lingering doubt as to the credibility of the extrajudicial confession could
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1st phase: determination of whether a coownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed, and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end either: (a) with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a coownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or (b) with a determination that a coownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises, and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon 2nd phase: parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. There is co-ownership, and the trial court was correct in decreeing partition in line with the Civil Code provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. However, the proceedings have only reached the first phase. It must be mentioned as an aside that even if the order decreeing partition leaves something more to be done by the trial court for the complete disposition of the case( i.e., the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for the determination of just compensation by the appointed commissioners, the submission of their reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of the partition), it is considered a final order and may be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby Thus, the trial court was wrong when it also authorized the sale of the subject properties to a third party and the division of the proceeds thereof. It is also wrong for the trial court conditioned the sale upon the price and terms acceptable to plaintiffs (respondents herein) only, and adjudicated the proceeds of the sale again only to plaintiffs.
presentation of evidence, which was however denied by the lower court, for lack of merit. The plaintiffs-appellees then presented their evidence ex-parte on January 28, 2000. The assailed decision was subsequently rendered by the lower court on Feb. 14, 2000, finding in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees. Austria insists that the appellate court erred in not reversing the declaration of default despite the fact that she questioned the default order in the petition for review which she seasonably filed with the CA. She also contends that it was error for the trial court to allow the sale of the entire property in dispute. Respondents argued that Austria was correctly declared in default because of her obstinate refusal to file an answer to the complaint despite being ordered to do so by the trial court. They also allege that they cannot be compelled to remain in co-ownership only because of petitioners unjustified refusal to consent to a partition. Issues: 1) WON petitioners insistence that the judgment by default rendered is a denial of her day in court. NO. 2) WON the trial courts decision alternatively ordering the partition of the subject property or authorizing its sale is valid. NO. Ratio: 1) Rules of procedure are intended to be, not tools of delay, but of prompt and just disposition of every partys cause. Having fully availed of, even exploited, these remedies, Austria has been given every opportunity to fully ventilate her side. She was declared in default because of her adamant refusal to file an answer despite being required to do so. Facts of this case suggest an intention on her part to delay the proceedings. Appellate court initially issued a TRO as an incident to the petition for certiorari, but the TRO was lifted after its 60-day validity. This resulted in the running of the prescribed period to file an answer and the continuation of the proceedings before the trial court. Petitioners obstinate refusal to file an answer to the complaint despite these circumstances clearly justifies the declaration of default by the trial court and its affirmation by the Court of Appeals. 2) There are 2 stages in an action for partition:
LAND BANK v. HEIRS OF FERNANDO ALSUA 02 April 2007 Facts: The rules of procedure require that in the service by registered mail, the postmaster is to deliver the same to the addressee himself or to a person of sufficient discretion to receive the
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in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it. Respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry against the Bueno sisters claiming that they constructed a two-story concrete residential structure on his land through stealth and strategy and without his knowledge and consent. He further claimed that despite notice and demand, the Bueno sisters still retained possession of the land and refused to remove the structure. A writ of demolition was issued. Petitioner sought to restrain the enforcement of the writ of demolition claiming that it was being implemented against her although she was not a party to the case. She further claimed that she was a bonafide agricultural tenant of respondent and that she, as such tenant, owned and actually occupied the house sought to be demolished. She offered as proof of such ownership the building permit for the houses construction and a tax declaration covering the house. Was the denial of petitioners prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a writ of demolition issued in another case to which she was not a party tenable? Held: Yes, an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein judgment is binding only upon parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard. However, the rule admits of the exception that even a non-party is bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant. In this case, it is not disputed that petitioner falls under situation (f) above because she is a relative of the Bueno sisters, the defendants in the civil case. She herself admitted this fact when she referred to the Bueno sisters as her legitimate sisters. Indeed, if she truly had an interest in the structure sought to be demolished as she claims, she could have so informed respondent even before the filing of the case to enable the latter to take the necessary and appropriate action. The principle of equitable estoppel would now operate to prevent petitioner from asserting her alleged ownership over the structure and defeating the alias writ of execution. In this case, petitioner had, by her silence, induced respondent to believe that she did not have any interest on respondents property other than being his tenant. Thus,
same. Respondents are the heirs of the late Fernando Alsua, who was the registered owner of various parcels of agricultural land. The Department of Agrarian Reform initiated proceedings to acquire respondents properties under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Petitioner LBP valued the properties at P2,361,799.91, which respondents rejected. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) eventually came out with a decision fixing the value of the properties at P4,806,109.05, to which respondents opposed. Petitioner LBP filed a petition for the determination of just compensation which the trial court dismissed for failure to prosecute within reasonable length of time and affirmed by the CA due to the delay in the filing of its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner contends the fifteen-day period for the filing of its motion for reconsideration should be reckoned from the actual receipt by petitioners counsel of the order of dismissal and not from the delivery thereof to the security guard. Was the petitioner right? Held: No, the paramount consideration is that the registered mail is delivered to the recipients address and received by a person who would be able to appreciate the importance of the papers delivered to him, even if that person is not a subordinate or employee of the recipient or authorized by a special power of attorney. In this case, the receipt by the security guard of the order of dismissal should be deemed receipt by petitioners counsel as well. As admitted by petitioner, the security guard who received the copy of the order of dismissal had been accustomed to the responsibility of receiving papers on behalf of petitioner and of actually delivering them to the intended recipient. Noteworthy also is the fact that the security guard did not delay in handing over the order of dismissal and immediately forwarded the same to petitioners counsel the following day. Petitioner had only itself to blame for its failure to inquire exactly when the order was received or to assume that service of the same was effected on the day it was handed over to petitioners counsel. PASION v. MELEGRITO 28 March 2007 Facts: Sec. 2(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot,
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by different persons. Thus, the presumption of validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale as a notarized document is left unscathed. Respondents failed to substantiate with sufficient evidence their claim that their signatures appearing on the deed of sale were forged. There is also sufficient evidence on record to bolster the presumption that the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was genuine. PEOPLE v. GUMIMBA, ET AL. 27 Feb 2007 Facts: In an Information dated Apr. 17, 1997, appelant Rogelio Gumimba and co-accused Ronnie Abapo were charged before the RTC with the crime of rape with homicide of an eight-year old child. On their arraignment, both of them pleaded not guilty to the crime committed. 2 witnesses were presented when the case proceeded to trial: Emelio Magallano and Sofronio Araas. Magallano and Araas testified that at around 9 o'clock in the evening of 10 April 1997, appellant went to Magallano's home and confessed to him that he alone and by himself raped and killed his niece, the victim, in Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City. Subsequently, Magallano accompanied appellant to the residence of Araas where he reiterated his confession. That same night, Magallano, Araas, appellant and family members of the witnesses proceeded to the home of Barangay Captain Santiago Acapulco, Jr. who conducted an investigation. Appellant repeated his narration and confessed to the barangay captain that he had raped and killed the victim, and that he was alone when he committed the crime. As a result thereof, Acapulco, Jr., in the company of the others, brought appellant to the Ozamiz City Hall and turned him over to the police authorities. However, Gumimba, manifested in the following hearing that he would like to change his plea from not guilty to guilty. The RTC ordered appelants re-arraignment and conducted an inquiry to ascertain the voluntariness of appellants plea and his full comprehension of the consequences thereof. The prosecution presented appellant as witness against his co-accused Abapo. Appellant testified that he and Abapo raped and killed the victim. He likewise explained that he had previously confessed to Magallano, Araas and Acapulco that he alone committed the crime in the hope
respondent rightfully acted on this belief and filed the forcible entry case only against petitioners sisters whom he thought were the owners of the structure constructed on his land. Indeed, petitioner is conclusively estopped from interposing her claim of ownership against the writ of demolition. SPS. PEBLIA and PROSPEROUS ALFARO v. CA 28 March 2007 Facts: Forgery is not presumed; it must be proven by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it. Spouses Bagano (respondents) filed a complaint against Spouses Alfaro (petitioners) for Declaration of Nullity of Sale. Respondents alleged that they were the previous registered owners of a parcel of land; that they executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the lot in favor of petitioners to secure payment of an obligation in the amount of P180,000.00; that upon payment of the mortgage debt, a Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage was executed; that when respondents demanded the return of their title, petitioners refused; that respondents learned that their title had already been cancelled and another title was issued in the name of petitioners by virtue of a spurious Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by respondents. Thus, respondents sought the nullification of the deed of sale on the ground that their signatures thereon were forged. Respondents had engaged an expert to determine the genuineness of the signatures purporting to be theirs; and the questioned signatures were found to be forged. Petitioners also engaged the same expert to examine a different set of documents which contain the signatures of respondents; and concluded that the signatures on the documents were affixed by the same persons. Was there forgery? Held: No, the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized; as such, it enjoys the presumption of regularity and carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. Absent evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant, the presumption must be upheld. Moreover, the expert came out with inconsistent findings. Since the documents are copies of two originals of one and the same deed, his conclusions with respect to the two exhibits should be common, i.e., either the questioned signatures thereon were both affixed by the same persons or they were affixed
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that the parents of the victim, who were relatives of his, might take pity on him. On 10 March 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision. On the basis of appellant's plea of guilty, the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. Appellant was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim. On the other hand, the trial court acquitted Abapo on the ground that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Except for the lone testimony of appellant, the RTC held that no other evidence was adduced to prove the participation of Abapo. Moreover, the court a quo found that appellant's testimony implicating Abapo was not worthy of credence coming as it did from a polluted source. Because of the death penalty being imposed, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review Issues: 1. WON Gumimba should be convicted of the crime based on his improvident plea of guilty and his alleged separate confessions. 2. WON Gumimba is guilty only of simple rape as he himself confessed Held/Ratio: 1. Yes, but his conviction is based on the prosecution being able to prove Gumimbas guild beyond reasonable doubt and not based on his improvident plea of guilty.
Sec.3 , Rule 116 of the 2000
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appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. Apart from his testimony upon changing his plea to a plea of guilty, appellant gave a subsequent testimony when he was presented by the prosecution as a witness against his coaccused. This second testimony which constitutes another judicial confession, replete with details and made consciously as it was, cured the deficiencies which made his earlier plea of guilty improvident. The latter testimony left no room for doubt as to the voluntariness and comprehension on appellant's part of his change of plea, as well as completed his narration of how he raped and killed the victim. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish appelants guilt through the separate testimonies of the appellants as well as those of the other witnesses Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses Magallano and Araas on what appellant had confessed to or told them for being hearsay. The challenge fails. The testimonies, it should be conceded, cannot serve as a proof of extrajudicial confession for an extrajudicial confession has to be in writing, among others, to be admissible in evidence. That is why the testimonies are of use in the case as corroborative evidence only. Such utility, however, cannot be defeated by the hearsay rule. The testimonies covered are independently relevant statements which are not barred by the hearsay rule. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply. The statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure10 When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there are three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by the accused: (1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," or as to the number and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its individual merit. However, the logic behind the rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the imposable penalty is death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. An improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid the Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea It must be conceded at the outset that the trial court failed in its duty to conduct the prescribed "searching inquiry" into the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilty and full comprehension thereof. Amere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. Consequently, appellant's plea of guilty was made improvidently and it is rendered useless. The Court cited certain records of the proceeding that illustrate the courts treatment of appellants change of plea. Moreover, the totality of the evidence for the prosecution undeniably establishes
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Priv-Resp filed Motion to Dismiss which was granted by the court. TC noted Director of Lands exhaustive findings of fact and conclusions of law and held that Pet failed to exploit all available admin remedy of appeal to SANR rendering it final and executory. Also, the civil case was deemed premature, again for failure to exhaust admin remedies. Plus, the decision of DL was final and therefore, res judicata operated to preclure the TC from assuming jurisdiction. Pet filed appeal to CA but the same deision of TC was affirmed since the matters raised were just the same in BL Claim. Motion for recon was also denied, hence these Petitions for Review. Held/Ratio: The grounds relied upon by the TC and the CA in granting the Motion to Dismiss filed by Priv-Resp in civil case were the following: (1) finality of the Director of Lands findings of facts; (2) failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) res judicata. All of which are meritorious. Pets main contention was DLs disregard to the fact that they possessed the lot for about 50yrs. Suffice it to say, however, that pure questions of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is generally confined only to questions of law. Further, findings of the Director of Lands as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In this case, the dismissal of petitioners appeal with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had the effect of rendering the decision of the Director of Lands final and executory. Also, by reason of DLs special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under his jurisdiction, he is in a better position to pass judgment thereon. Thus, his factual findings in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts. As for the Deeds of Sale that were not appreciated by DL, he cannot be faulted for it because such documents were not presented during the BL Claim but only later at the civil case. Further, considering that the Deeds of Sale were allegedly dated 1951, there was no reason for their non-production or presentation in B.L. Claim No. 288(n). Failure to submit evidence
2. No, he is guilty of the crime charged and not just with simple rape. Arguing that the victim may have already been dead after his co-accused had allegedly hacked her first, appellant theorizes that he, at most, would be guilty of an impossible crime. It is extremely doubtful that appellant could have known positively that the victim was already dead when he struck her. The proposition not only completely contradicts his judicial confession, it is also speculative as to cause of death. In light of the particular circumstances of the event, appellant's mere conjecture that the victim had already expired by the time he hacked her cannot be sufficient to support his assertion of an impossible crime. During the proceedings: Q: Why did you stab her, when she was already dead? A: I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive. HEIRS OF WENCESLAO TABIA, ET AL. v. CA 22 Feb 2007 Facts: 16 Apr 1991. Pet filed complaint for Annulment of Free Patent (FP) and Damages and/or Reconveyance of Title against Priv-Resp arising from a Decision last 01 Feb 1989 in BL Claim No. 288 (n), which dismissed Pets claim to the land subject to Free Patent. Said land, as applied by Pet for FP was contested by Priv-Resp alleging ownership and possession for over 50 years, and lack of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Lands inasmuch as the subject property had become private land. An ocular inspection was conducted by BoL, the result of which was the dismissal stated above. Pet filed for Recon but it was denied by Director of Lands and the subsequent appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (SANR) was dismissed for failure of Pet to file an appeal memorandum. Hence, the FP was given to the Priv-Resp. Through a civil case, petitioners accused the Director of Lands of unlawful conspiracy with PrivResp and gross ignorance of the law; that the decision was obtained thru misrepresentation of facts and pursuant to conspiracy for some unlawful and illegal consideration.
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For the 2nd, there is no question was DL has
could only mean that if produced, it would have been adverse to petitioners case. If the inability to produce it was due to their counsels negligence or omission, the same would bind petitioners. Pet anchored their right to, and interest in, the land by virtue of the sale executed by the heirs of Wenceslao Tabia and alleged continuous possession of their respective portions. But since Tabia was not the owner of the land anyway, he cannot therefore have anything to transmit to his heirs. Hence, said heirs has nothing to sell to the Pet. But DLs conclusions were based on affidavits, public documents and records, plus the ocular inspection. All admin remedies available must be first exhausted before going to the court for review. It is by Pets own negligence that their first appeal to SANR was dismissed and they did not even question this dismissal. It is by their own fault that the decision by DL has become final and executory. Although there are certain exceptions to this rule, the case at bar does not fall under any of them. And so res judicata lies. As for the civil case, the issues on WoN Pet have legal personality to institute the action for annulment; WoN DL has jurisdiction to award the FP to Priv-Resp; WoN a constructive trus was created in favour of Pet when FP was awarded to Priv-Resp. For the first, the cancellation is a matter between grantor and grantee since the land was public prior to issuance of the FP so the only one who can question is the SG as the govts representative.
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jurisdiction as provided by law11
OF

PCGG, in behalf of the Republic, filed the Complaint now subject of this Petition. The Complaint also sought the recovery of funds allegedly acquired by the parties illegally. Particularly, that J. Tuvera used his position to influence Marcos to grant the TLA 356 on behalf of Twin Peaks despite existing laws expressly prohibiting the exportation of mahogany of the narra species and Twin Peaks lack of qualification to be a grantee thereof for lack of sufficient logging equipment to engage in the logging business. P45M was also supposedly obtained as revenue by TPs exporting of the timber to Chinese operators. The Complaint prayed that (1) TLA No. 356 be reverted to the State or cancelled; (2) respondents be jointly and severally ordered to pay P48 million as actual damages; and (3) respondents pay moral, temperate and exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and treble judicial costs. It cited as grounds for relief, gross abuse of official position and authority, breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right and power, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Constitution. In their Answer, V. Tuvera and TP alleged that the grant was given after they amended their Articles of Inc; that the P45M was imagined; and that PCGG has no statutory authority to institute the action. They also alleged as a special defense that after the grant, Felipe Ysmael, Jr. and Co., Inc. had filed a motion for the cancellation of the same with the DENR Secretary. When respondents submitted their Answer, the denial by the DENR of the Ysmael motion was under review before the Court. J. Tuvera also denied the allegations. 3 May 1989, resp filed an Omnibus Motion to Nullify Writ of Seq and/or Mission Order.
Petitioners alternative prayer for reconveyance of the lot based on the principle of constructive trust must likewise fail considering that their claimed ownership of the lot was found to be without basis. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person?s name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. Clearly, not being the owners of the lot, petitioners cannot ask for reconveyance of the property to them under the principle of constructive trust. REPUBLIC v. TUVERA, ET AL. 16 Feb 2007 Facts: The instant action originated from a civil complaint for restitution and damages filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Marcos and his longtime aide Juan Tuvera, as well as Tuvera's son Victor and a corporation the younger Tuvera had controlled. Trial on the case against the Tuveras proceeded separately before the Sandiganbayan. After the Republic had presented its evidence, the Tuveras successfully moved for the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence. The demurrer was sustained, and it falls upon this Court to ascertain the absence or existence of sufficient proof to support the relief sought by the Republic against the Tuveras. Twin Peaks was organized on 5 Mar 1984 with principal purpose of engaging in the real estate business. Victor Tuvera, son of resp. Juan Tuvera (Presidential Exec Ass of Pres. Marcos) owned 48% of the shares. Acting on a letter dated 31 May 1984 by Twin Peaks, Marcos granted the award of Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 356 in the formers favor to operate on to operate on 26,000 hectares of forest land with an annual allowable cut of 60,000 cubic meters of timber and to export 10,000 cubic meters of mahogany of the narra species. As a result, Twin Peaks was able to engage in logging operations. As Marcos was ousted and Pres Aquino created PCGG, on 13 June 1988, , the PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration on all assets, properties, records, documents, and shares of stock of Twin Peaks on the ground that all the assets of the corporation are ill-gotten wealth for having been acquired directly or indirectly through fraudulent and illegal means. On 9 December 1988, the
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parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. When there is only identity of issues with no identity of causes of action, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. In Ysmael, the case was between Felipe Ysmael Jr. & Co., Inc. and the Deputy Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development and Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation. The present case, on the other hand, was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. No amount of imagination could let us believe that there was an identity of parties between this case and the one formerly filed by Felipe Ysmael Jr. & Co., Inc. The Sandiganbayans contention on "substantial identity" between the Republic of the Philippines and Felipe Ysmael, Jr. Co., Inc. is untenable. The Court in a number of cases considered the substantial identity of parties in the application of res judicata in instances where there is privity between the two parties, as between their successors in interest by title or where an additional party was simply included in the subsequent case or where one of the parties to a previous case was not impleaded in the succeeding case. The Court finds no basis to declare the Republic as having substantial interest as that of Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. In the first place, the Republic?s cause of action lies in the alleged abuse of power on respondents? part in violation of R.A. No. 3019 and breach of public trust, which in turn warrants its claim for restitution and damages. Ysmael, on the other hand, sought the revocation of TLA No. 356 and the reinstatement of its own timber license agreement. Indeed, there is no identity of parties and no identity of causes of action between the two cases. 2. The general rule is that upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendant loses the right to present his evidence and the appellate court shall then proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiffs evidence. The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for
Sandiganbayan issued TRO against PCGG. 12 The Pre-Trial only had this as issue for litigation: WoN J. Tuvera used his position to secure the grant for TP. Evidence were then presented by both sides. Resp. filed a Demurrer to Evidence. Respondents argued that the Republic failed to present sufficient legal affirmative evidence to prove its claim. Republic filed a Manifestation, contending that the demurrer is not based on the insufficiency of its evidence but on the strength of the evidence of respondents as shown by their own exhibits. The Republic claimed that the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines does not dispense with the requirement of public bidding. The Republic added that Sec. 5 of said law clearly provides that all applications for a timber license agreement must be filed before the Bureau of Forest Development and that respondents still have to prove compliance with the requirements for service contracts. Sandiganbayan held that the validity of TLA No. 356 was already fully adjudicated in a Resolution/Order issued by the Office of the President on 14 August 1987, which had become final and executory with the failure of the aggrieved party to seek a review thereof, also resting on the Ysmael case and res judicata. The Republic now questions the correctness of the Sandiganbayans decision. Issues/Held: 1. WoN a demurrer to evidence may be granted based on the evidence presented by the opposing parties. NO. 2. Following from the previous issue, what then is the course of action to take? PROCEED TO DETERMINING THE MERITS OF THE CASE. RESP WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN THEIR BEHALF. 3. Re: Merits of the Case Ratio: 1. The dismissal was primarily anchored on RPs failure to show its right to relief due to res judicata on the Ysmael case and not on the insufficiency of evidence or on the strength of resps. So then was the Sandiganbayan correct in applying res judicata to the case at bar? For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
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The Complaint adverted to several provisions of law which ostensibly were violated by the grant of the TLA in favor of Twin Peaks. The Republic argues that the absence of a bidding process is patent proof of the irregularity of the issuance of the TLA in favor of Twin Peaks. The Forestry Reform Code prohibits any person from utilizing, exploiting, occupying, possessing or conducting any activity within any forest land unless he had been authorized to do so under a license agreement, lease, license or permit. The Code also mandates that no timber license agreement shall be issued unless the applicant satisfactorily proves that he has the financial resources and technical capability not only to minimize utilization, but also to practice forest protection, conservation and development measures to insure the perpetuation of said forest in productive condition. However, the Code is silent as to the procedure in the acquisition of such timber license agreement. Such procedure is more particularly defined under FAO No. 11 which requires public bidding but also allows for acquiring grant even through negotiation. However, even a person who is granted a TLA through "negotiation" is still required to submit the same requirements and supporting papers as required for public bidding. Even if we consider that Twin Peaks could have acquired the TLA through "negotiation," the prescribed requirements for "negotiation" under the law were still not complied with. The letter directed to Marcos signed and approved by him is beyond his authority with respect to timber, which is merely limited to the amendment, modification, replacement or rescission of any contract, concession, permit, license or any other form of privilege granted by said Code. The Articles of Incorporation of Twin Peaks does not even stipulate that logging was either a principal or secondary purpose of the corporation. Respondents do allege that the Articles was amended prior to the grant in order to accommodate logging as a corporate purpose, yet since respondents have waived their right to present evidence by reason of their resort to demurrer, we cannot consider such allegation as proven. Sec. 18(a)(1) of FAO No. 11 requires a minimum capital per cubic meter. As for TP, they are required to have P1.2M to operate on 26,000
a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendants evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiffs case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiffs evidence. It thus becomes the Court's duty to rule on the merits of the complaint, duly taking into account the evidence presented by the Republic, and without need to consider whatever evidence the Tuveras have, they having waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. 3. Executive Order No. 14-A establishes that the degree of proof required in cases such as this instant case is preponderance of evidence. Thus, the Court recently held in Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, that in establishing the quantum of evidence required for civil cases involving the Marcos wealth held by their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees filed before the Sandiganbayan, that "the Sandiganbayan, x x x was not to look for proof beyond reasonable doubt, but to determine, based on the evidence presented, in light of common human experience, which of the theories proffered by the parties is more worthy of credence." What must be established are: a. the grant to TP was illegal; b. if so, that V. Tuvera is liable in this case should be the ineluctable course; c. to hold J. Tuvera answerable, that his own participation is substantiated. a. Grant is illegal TRUE
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It is a legal principle as embodied by certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
hectares of forest land with an annual allowable cut of 60,000 cubic meters of timber. However, TP only has P312,500.00, which is below minimum. The reasonable assumption to TPs confidence in acquiring the grant is the official and personal proximity of Juan Tuvera to President Marcos, considering that he was the father of Twin Peaks' most substantial stockholder.
b. that V. Tuvera is liable in this case should

be the ineluctable course TRUE Victor Tuvera, as son of Juan Tuvera and a major stockholder of Twin Peaks, was included as respondent for having substantially benefited from this breach of trust. The circumstance of kinship alone may not be enough to disqualify Victor Tuvera from seeking a timber license agreement. Yet the basic ethical principle of delicadeza should have dissuaded Juan Tuvera from any official or unofficial participation or intervention in behalf of the "request" of Twin Peaks for a timber license. Also, there is the strong connection between son and father; the former being a major stockholder and the father as the one who penned the Memorandum stating that Marcos has granted the TLA to TP. c. to hold J. Tuvera answerable, that his own participation is substantiated TRUE The Memorandum establishes at the very least that Tuvera knew about the Twin Peaks "request," and of President Marcos's favorable action on such "request." If Juan Tuvera were truly interested in preventing any misconception that his own position had nothing to do with the favorable action on the "request" lodged by the company controlled by his son, he would not have prepared or signed the Memorandum at all.
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Act. Section 3 of R.A. No. 301913.
OF

the DENR Panel of Arbitrators and the timeliness of its filing. Respondents Climax Mining Ltd., et al., (respondents) filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration and/or Clarification seeking reconsideration of that part of the Decision holding that the case should not be brought for arbitration under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law. Respondents, citing American jurisprudence and the UNCITRAL Model Law argue that the arbitration clause in the Addendum Contract should be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract, and that a claimed rescission of the main contract does not avoid the duty to arbitrate. Respondents add that Gonzaless argument relating to the alleged invalidity of the Addendum Contract still has to be proven and adjudicated on in a proper proceeding; that is, an action separate from the motion to compel arbitration. Pending judgment in such separate action, the Addendum Contract remains valid and binding and so does the arbitration clause therein. G.R. No. 167994 is a Rule 65 petition filed on 6 May 2005, or while the motions for reconsideration in G.R. No. 161957 were pending, wherein Gonzales challenged the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) requiring him to proceed with the arbitration proceedings as sought by Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (Climax-Arimco). Issue: Whether it was proper for the RTC, in the proceeding to compel arbitration under R.A. No. 876, to order the parties to arbitrate even though the defendant therein has raised the twin issues of validity and nullity of the Addendum Contract and, consequently, of the arbitration clause therein as well. Held: Yes, RTC may compel arbitration under RA No. 876. We address the Rule 65 petition in G.R. No. 167994 first from the remedial law perspective. It deserves to be dismissed on procedural grounds, as it was filed in lieu of appeal which is the prescribed remedy and at that far beyond the reglementary period. It is elementary in remedial law that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari and it has been repeatedly stressed that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. As its nature, a petition for certiorari lies
The Memorandum signed by Juan Tuvera can be taken as proof that he "persuaded, induced or influenced" the Director of Forestry to accommodate a timber license agreement in favor of Twin Peaks, despite the failure to undergo public bidding, or to comply with the requisites for the grant of such agreement by negotiation, and in favor of a corporation that did not appear legally capacitated to be granted such agreement. The fact that the principal stockholder of Twin Peaks was his own son establishes his indirect pecuniary interest in the transaction he appears to have intervened in. It may have been possible on the part of Juan Tuvera to prove that he did not persuade, induce or influence the Director of Forestry or any other official in behalf of the timber license agreement of Twin Peaks, but then again, he waived his right to present evidence to acquit himself of such suspicion. Certainly, the circumstances presented by the evidence of the prosecution are sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to Tuvera in establishing that he did not violate the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in relation to the Twin Peaks "request." Unfortunately, having waived his right to present evidence, Juan Tuvera failed to disprove that he failed to act in consonance with his obligations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. GONZALES V CLIMAX MINING LTD. 22 January 2007 Facts: This is a consolidation of two petitions rooted in the same disputed Addendum Contract entered into by the parties. In G.R. No. 161957, the Court in its Decision of 28 February 2005 denied the Rule 45 petition of petitioner Jorge Gonzales (Gonzales). It held that the DENR Panel of Arbitrators had no jurisdiction over the complaint for the annulment of the Addendum Contract on grounds of fraud and violation of the Constitution and that the action should have been brought before the regular courts as it involved judicial issues. Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. Gonzales avers in his Motion for Reconsideration that the Court erred in holding that the DENR Panel of Arbitrators was bereft of jurisdiction, reiterating its argument that the case involves a mining dispute that properly falls within the ambit of the Panels authority. Gonzales adds that the Court failed to rule on other issues he raised relating to the sufficiency of his complaint before
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ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of their agreement (Sec. 6, Republic Act 876). Respondent's arguments touching upon the merits of the dispute are improperly raised herein. They should be addressed to the arbitrators. This proceeding is merely a summary remedy to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. The duty of the court in this case is not to resolve the merits of the parties' claims but only to determine if they should proceed to arbitration or not. Implicit in the summary nature of the judicial proceedings is the separable or independent character of the arbitration clause or agreement. This was highlighted in the cases of Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Trans. Co. and Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals. The doctrine of separability, or severability as other writers call it, enunciates that an arbitration agreement is independent of the main contract. The arbitration agreement is to be treated as a separate agreement and the arbitration agreement does not automatically terminate when the contract of which it is part comes to an end. The separability of the arbitration agreement is especially significant to the determination of whether the invalidity of the main contract also nullifies the arbitration clause. Indeed, the doctrine denotes that the invalidity of the main contract, also referred to as the "container" contract, does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. Irrespective of the fact that the main contract is invalid, the arbitration clause/agreement still remains valid and enforceable. The separability of the arbitration clause is confirmed in Art. 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Art. 21(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. This brings us back to G.R. No. 161957. The adjudication of the petition in G.R. No. 167994 effectively modifies part of the Decision dated 28 February 2005 in G.R. No. 161957. Hence, the Court now holds that the validity of the contract containing the agreement to submit to arbitration does not affect the applicability of the arbitration clause itself. A contrary ruling would suggest that a partys mere repudiation of the main contract is sufficient to avoid arbitration. That is exactly the situation that the separability doctrine, as well as jurisprudence applying it, seeks to avoid. When it
only where there is "no appeal," and "no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." The Arbitration Law specifically provides for an appeal by certiorari, i.e., a petition for review under certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that raises pure questions of law. There is no merit to Gonzaless argument that the use of the permissive term "may" in Sec. 29, R.A. No. 876 in the filing of appeals does not prohibit nor discount the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Proper interpretation of the aforesaid provision of law shows that the term "may" refers only to the filing of an appeal, not to the mode of review to be employed. Indeed, the use of "may" merely reiterates the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with law. It was held in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co. that a submission to arbitration is a contract. A clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract, and in Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals that "[t]he provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that contract and is itself a contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties and produce effect as between them, their assigns and heirs." This special proceeding is the procedural mechanism for the enforcement of the contract to arbitrate. The jurisdiction of the courts in relation to Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 876 as well as the nature of the proceedings therein was expounded upon in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals. There it was held that R.A. No. 876 explicitly confines the court's authority only to the determination of whether or not there is an agreement in writing providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute ordains that the court shall issue an order "summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof." If the court, upon the other hand, finds that no such agreement exists, "the proceeding shall be dismissed." The cited case also stressed that the proceedings are summary in nature. The same thrust was made in the earlier case of Mindanao Portland Cement Corp. v. McDonough Construction Co. of Florida which held, that since there obtains herein a written provision for arbitration as well as failure on respondent's part to comply therewith, the court a quo rightly
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alone could well have led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. C-18337.
was declared in G.R. No. 161957 that the case should not be brought for arbitration, it should be clarified that the case referred to is the case actually filed by Gonzales before the DENR Panel of Arbitrators, which was for the nullification of the main contract on the ground of fraud, as it had already been determined that the case should have been brought before the regular courts involving as it did judicial issues. CITY OF CALOOCAN v. CA 03 May 2006 Facts: Then Mayor Asistio, on behalf of Caloocan City, and Jose Go of Ever Gotesco executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over patrimonial property of the City for P136M. The COA approved the proposed sale on the condition that the selling price is pegged at P182M. Gotesco executed an Amended Deed of Absolute Sale wherein it agreed to buy the subject property for P182M and tendered the said amount to the City Treasurer and Mayor Malonzo. However the latter refused to sign the amended deed of sale and to accept the said payment. Gotesco filed Civil Case No. C18274, seeking the consignation of the purchase price. Meanwhile a TCT over the said property was issued in Gotescos name. Caloocan City filed a petition for prohibition (Civil Case No. C-18308) before the RTC of Caloocan. During the pendency of this suit, another case was filed for annulment of sale and cancellation of title (Civil Case No. C18337). Gotesco moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. C-18337. The CA ruled in favor of Gotesco. Issues: (1) WON the City Legal Officer is without authority to execute the verification, as well as the certification against forum-shopping in the Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. C-18337. (2) WON the petitioner is guilty of forumshopping (3) WON there exists between the parties in the 3 civil cases the elements of litis pendentia and/or res judicata and Held/Ratio: Yes. Yes. Yes. (1) Being the proper party to file such suits, the mayor must necessarily be the one to sign the certification against forum-shopping, and not the City Legal Officer, who, despite being an official of the City, was merely its counsel and not a party to the case. Thus, the certification against forum-shopping in Civil Case No. C-18337 is defective for having been signed by the City Legal Officer and not by Malonzo. This factor
(2) There is forum-shopping where a litigant sues

the same party against whom another action/s for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending. The defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other/others; and, a final judgment is one that would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Civil Case No. C-18308 sought to enjoin respondents from registering the anomalous sale. On the other hand, Civil Case No. C-18337 seeks to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Mayor Asistio in favor of Gotesco; to cancel Certificate of TCT in the name of Gotesco. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. C-18274, was a case for consignation with a prayer to order the City Treasurer to accept the full purchase price tendered by Gotesco. The Court finds that the cases involve the same principal parties, to wit: the City of Caloocan and Gotesco Investments, Inc., while the other parties were merely impleaded as nominal parties. As this Court has previously held, absolute identity of parties is not required. It is enough that there is substantial identity of parties. There is identity of causes of action if the same evidence will sustain the second action. The principle applies even if the relief sought in the two cases may be different. In these cases, the same set of evidence will have to be presented to support the causes of action in the three (3) cases, which as indicated earlier is characterized by singularity. Thus, a finding in one will sustain a finding in the other. The causes of action in Civil Case No. C-18337 being similarly subject of judicial inquiry in Civil Cases Nos. C-18274 and CWinlaw BarOps 2008 Page 171 of 219
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Thus, the lower court refused to assume jurisdiction by insisting that it can only resolve the issue of possession de facto and not de jure, and consequently, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The spouses duly appealed to the RTC which rendered its Decision ordering Serrano, et. al. to vacate the premises and surrender possession of subject lot to the spouses. Interestingly, the trial court cited its approval of the dismissal by the MTC for lack of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, invoking the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, the RTC deemed itself capable of resolving the issue of ownership and thus ruling in favor of the spouses. In its decision, the RTC said that the evidence presented by Serrano, et. al. failed to overturn those of the spouses, esp. The Torrens Title. The RTC further said that Torrens Title unless annulled and/or cancelled is the highest form of evidence of ownership over a parcel of land. Serrano, et. al. appealed to the CA questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC and claiming that as the case involves an agricultural land, the jurisdiction lies with the DARAB. They further question the adjudication of ownership in a mere ejectment case. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. However, contrary to the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, the MTC retains jurisdiction over the ejectment case even if it involved an issue of ownership. Nevertheless, the CA sustained the RTCs direct adjudication of the case instead of remanding the same to the MTC. It observed that since the parties have already presented their evidence on the merits of the case before the MTC and the RTCs decision was based on these evidence, the purpose of remand, which is to afford parties an opportunity to present evidence, has been served. Serrano, et. al. filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this appeal. Issues: (1) WON the MTC erred in dismissing the case (2) WON the RTC erred in applying Rule 40, Sec. 8, par. 2, RoC in taking cognizance of the case. (3) WON the RTC had jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership (4) WON the RTCs decision adjudicating ownership to the spouses was erroneus
18337, Civil Case No. C-18337 is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia. Moreover, the aforesaid cases are intimately related and/or intertwined with one another such that the judgment that may be rendered in one, regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. SERRANO, ET. AL. V. SPOUSES GUTIERREZ 10 Nov 2006 Facts: Spouses Gutierrez were alleged owners of an untenanted agricultural land in Dau, Pampanga Sometime in Feb. 2000, Serrano, et. al. entered the premises, constructed concrete structures and dumped truckloads of lahar filing materials without the knowledge and consent of the spouses The spouses confronted Serrano, et. al. and demanded that they vacate the premises and remove any structures they have constructed thereon, but the latter refused to do so. The spouses then filed a complaint with the MTC for forcible entry. In their Answer, Serrano, et. al. claimed that the land was part of the estate of one Albino Morales; and that as heirs of such Morales, they were in actual, continuous and adverse possession of the land. The MTC ordered the parties to submit their position papers and evidence to support their corresponding claims. The spouses evidence consisted, among others, of the following: (1) Original Certificate of Title; (2) the Deed of Absolute Sale, evidencing petitioners acquisition of said property from Pedro Layug and Guillermo Layug; (3) the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim executed by Ricardo B. Razon in favor of Carmelita Gutierrez and Warren Gutierrez; (4) Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Carmelita Gutierrez; and (5) Tax Declaration in the name of Carmelita Gutierrez. Serrano, et. al., on the other hand, presented the following documents: (1) Tax Declaration and (2) Official Receipts as proofs of tax payment. The MTC rendered its Decision where it found that the real issue involved the question of ownership and not mere possession de facto since both parties claimed that they were the absolute, lawful and legal owners of the aforesaid property.
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purposes of the RTCs appellate jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved. The RTC made an exhaustive and definitive finding on the main cause of action. The trial court is capacitated to make this finding in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, as it would, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Section 8, Rule 40, by allowing the RTC to try the case even if the MTC had no jurisdiction so long as the MTC had conducted trial on the merits, demonstrates that remand is expendable. A remand to the MTC, therefore, has become inefficacious in view of the judgment of the RTC. Given the sufficiency of evidence presented before it, the RTC may, as it did, resolve the case on the merits. (4) NO. The spouses have established by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over the subject property. It is settled law that a certificate of title is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. The Court categorically declared in Spouses Camara v. Spouses Malabao that a party's declaration of real property, his payment of realty taxes and his designation as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey or even in the records of an agency such as the former Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office cannot defeat a certificate of title, as the latter is the absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Finally, the Court found the award of attorneys fees improper. The TC must state the factual, legal or equitable justification for awarding the same, bearing in mind that the award of attorneys fees is the exception, not the general rule, and it is not sound public policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate; nor should attorneys fees be awarded every time a party wins a lawsuit. The award of attorneys fees was merely cited in the dispositive portion of the decision without the RTC stating any legal or factual basis for said award, hence should be deleted. PAREDES et al, vs.VERANO et al 12 October 2006
Serrano, et. al. argue that the RTC erroneously applied the Rule 40, Sec. 8, par. 2, RoC in deciding the ejectment case brought to it on appeal by the spouses. Serrano, et. al. contend that since the MTC acted without jurisdiction, the RTC can only decide the case on appeal if it has original jurisdiction. Serrano, et. al. proffer that the assessed value of the subject property is less than P20,000.00, thus outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. Serrano, et. al. also question the award of attorneys fees for lack of basis. Held/Ratio: (1) YES. As the law now stands, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to decide the question of possession in an ejectment case. (BP 129, Sec. 33, par. 2 and Rule 70, Sec. 16, RoC) (2) YES. The first paragraph of Rule 40, Sec. 8 contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal issued without trial of the case on the merits. On the other hand, the second paragraph deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction. Clearly, the Section is inapplicable to the present case since, as the CA correctly held, the MTC had jurisdiction over this ejectment case even if the question of possession could be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership. (3) YES. The above pronouncements notwithstanding, the RTC had appellate jurisdiction over the case and its decision should be deemed promulgated in the exercise of that jurisdiction. Serrano, et. al. submit that the assessed value of the subject property removes the case from the RTC jurisdiction. This contention has no merit. At first glance, it appears that based on the P13,300.00 assessed value of the subject property as declared by the spouses, the RTC would have no jurisdiction over the case. But BP 129, Sec 19, providing for jurisdictional amounts, refers to the original jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTCs appellate jurisdiction, as that involved here, is provided in BP 129, Sec, 22 which vests upon the RTC the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the MTCs, MetTCs, and MCTCs in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for
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Since the RTC would only consider the evidence presented by respondents, the order strikes at the heart of the case, disallowing as it does any meaningful defense petitioners could have posed. A judgment of default against a defendant who failed to attend pre-trial, or even any defendant who failed to file an answer, implies a waiver only of their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their allegations but not all their other rights. The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. One manner by which due process is assured is through the faithful adherence to the procedural rules that govern the behavior of the party-litigants. The Rules of Court do sanction, on several instances, penalties for violation of the Rules that causes the termination of an action without a ruling on the merits, or bars one party from litigating the same while permitting the other to do so. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 17, the failure of the plaintiff to appear on the date of the presentation of his/her evidence in chief on the complaint is ground for the court to dismiss the complaint. And under Section 5, Rule 18, the failure of the plaintiff or defendant to appear during pre-trial authorizes the court to either dismiss the complaint, if the plaintiff were absent; or to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte, if the defendant were absent. The operation of the above-cited provisions may defeat the cause of action or the defense of the party who violated the procedural rule. Yet it could not be said that any resultant adverse judgment would contravene the due process clause, as the parties are presumed to have known the governing rules and the consequences for the violation of such rules. Any ruling that disposes of an action or precludes a party from presenting evidence in support or against thereof must have basis in law, and any ruling so intentioned without legal basis is deemed as issued with grave abuse of discretion. Simply put, nothing in the Rules of Court authorizes a trial judge to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte on account of the absence during pre-trial of the counsel for defendant. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18 warrant examination:
SEC. 4. Appearance of Parties. It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pretrial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a
Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners, alleging that petitioners had violated their Compromise Agreement regarding right of way. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action. The trial court, presided by Judge Kapili, denied the motion to dismiss. Pre-trial was initially set for 24 April 2003, but this was reset to 3 June 2003 on motion of respondents' counsel. None of the parties appeared however, so pre-trial was reset to 11 November 2003. Petitioner Baybay's counsel moved to reset it to another date on account of a conflicting hearing. However, petitioner Baybay was present in court along with the other defendants, when the case was called on 11 November 2003. The RTC was informed then of a proposed settlement between the parties, although Baybay qualified his reaction by telling the court that he would first have to inform his lawyer of the said proposal. The RTC then commented unfavorably on the absence of petitioners' counsel, even making note of the fact that not once had the counsel appeared before the RTC. At the same time, the RTC acceded and reset the pre-trial for 23 January 2004. Shortly before the new pre-trial date, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation of Willingness to Settle With Request for Cancellation dated 5 January 2004. Apart from manifesting his willingness to settle the complaint, petitioners' counsel through the Manifestation suggested to the opposing counsel that he be informed of the terms of the proposed settlement. Correspondingly, petitioners' counsel requested the cancellation of the 23 January 2004 hearing. However, the hearing still pushed through on 23 January 2004. The private respondents and their counsel were present. So were petitioners Baybay and Paredes, but not their counsel. In said hearing, RTC allowed respondents to present their evidence ex parte for failure of the petitioners counsel to appear before the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the RTC. Issue: WON the absence of the counsel for defendants (herein petitioners) at the pre-trial, with all defendants themselves present, is a ground to declare defendants in default and to authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte. Held/Ratio: NO. The order of the RTC allowing respondents to present evidence ex parte was undoubtedly to the detriment of petitioners.
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Deed of Absolute Sale over patrimonial property of the City for P136M. The COA approved the proposed sale on the condition that the selling price is pegged at P182M. Gotesco executed an Amended Deed of Absolute Sale wherein it agreed to buy the subject property for P182M and tendered the said amount to the City Treasurer and Mayor Malonzo. However the latter refused to sign the amended deed of sale and to accept the said payment. Gotesco filed Civil Case No. C18274, seeking the consignation of the purchase price. Meanwhile a TCT over the said property was issued in Gotescos name. Caloocan City filed a petition for prohibition (Civil Case No. C-18308) before the RTC of Caloocan. During the pendency of this suit, another case was filed for annulment of sale and cancellation of title (Civil Case No. C18337). Gotesco moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. C-18337. The CA ruled in favor of Gotesco. Issues: (1) WON the City Legal Officer is without authority to execute the verification, as well as the certification against forum-shopping in the Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. C-18337. (2) WON the petitioner is guilty of forumshopping (3) WON there exists between the parties in the 3 civil cases the elements of litis pendentia and/or res judicata and Held/Ratio: Yes. Yes. Yes. (1) Being the proper party to file such suits, the mayor must necessarily be the one to sign the certification against forum-shopping, and not the City Legal Officer, who, despite being an official of the City, was merely its counsel and not a party to the case. Thus, the certification against forum-shopping in Civil Case No. C-18337 is defective for having been signed by the City Legal Officer and not by Malonzo. This factor alone could well have led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. C-18337.
representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
Section 4 imposes the duty on litigating parties and their respective counsel during pre-trial. Nothing, however, in Section 4 provides for a sanction should the parties or their respective counsel be absent during pre-trial. Instead, the penalty is provided for in Section 5. Notably, what Section 5 penalizes is the failure to appear of either the plaintiff or the defendant, and not their respective counsel. Hence, we pronounce that the absence of counsel for defendants at pre-trial does not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the presentation of evidence ex parte. It bears stressing that nothing in the Rules of Court sanctions the presentation of evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for defendant is absent during pre-trial. The Rules do not countenance stringent construction at the expense of justice and equity. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty or properties on technicalities. Due process dictates that petitioners be deprived of their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their allegations if, and only if, there exists sufficient basis in fact and in law to do so. There being a manifest lack of such basis in this case, petitioners would be unjustly denied of the opportunity to fully defend themselves should the Court affirm the questioned orders which were evidently issued by the RTC with grave abuse of discretion. CITY OF CALOOCAN v. CA 03 May 2006 Facts: Then Mayor Asistio, on behalf of Caloocan City, and Jose Go of Ever Gotesco executed a
(2) There is forum-shopping where a litigant sues

the same party against whom another action/s for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending. The defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other/others; and, a final judgment is one that would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest.
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vs. NLRC for unfair labor practices, where the union officers and some of its members disregarded the order of the Secretary of Labor to cease and desist from committing acts that would prejudice the other party or exacerbate the situation, thus they were deemed to have lost their employment. The decision of the NLRC was affirmed by the CA and eventually by the SC. The petitioners in this case, whose names allegedly do not appear in the list of employees deemed dismissed by the NLRC, insist that PASVIL persisted in not reinstating them. When they heard of news that PASVIL will be closing down and its properties will be sold, they allegedly informed PASVIL of the unconditional lifting of their picket and pleaded to be allowed to return to work. PASVIL, however, allegedly refused their request and temporarily closed its operations on December 1, 1998. As a consequence, a complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by some 230 complainants. The complaint was dismissed for lack of merit by the labor arbiter, which was affirmed by the NLRC on the ground that the closure of the business operations of PASVIL was due to the cancellation of its franchise over which it had no control. The NLRC further declared that the complainants in the case are the very same employees who defied the return-to-work order of Secretary Confesor and whose employment have been deemed terminated by reason of their abandonment thereof. The NLRC denied reconsideration. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari but the same was dismissed on several technicalities. Issue: WON the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari on technical grounds Held/Ratio: YES. According to the SC, under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure a petition for certiorari "shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46." Citing its decision in the case of Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., were it held that aside from the assailed decision, order or resolution, not every pleading or document mentioned in the petition is required to be submitted, but only those that are pertinent and relevant to the judgment, order or resolution subject of the petition. The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or orders are relevant and pertinent to the petition
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Civil Case No. C-18308 sought to enjoin respondents from registering the anomalous sale. On the other hand, Civil Case No. C-18337 seeks to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Mayor Asistio in favor of Gotesco; to cancel Certificate of TCT in the name of Gotesco. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. C-18274, was a case for consignation with a prayer to order the City Treasurer to accept the full purchase price tendered by Gotesco. The Court finds that the cases involve the same principal parties, to wit: the City of Caloocan and Gotesco Investments, Inc., while the other parties were merely impleaded as nominal parties. As this Court has previously held, absolute identity of parties is not required. It is enough that there is substantial identity of parties. There is identity of causes of action if the same evidence will sustain the second action. The principle applies even if the relief sought in the two cases may be different. In these cases, the same set of evidence will have to be presented to support the causes of action in the three (3) cases, which as indicated earlier is characterized by singularity. Thus, a finding in one will sustain a finding in the other. The causes of action in Civil Case No. C-18337 being similarly subject of judicial inquiry in Civil Cases Nos. C-18274 and C18337, Civil Case No. C-18337 is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia. Moreover, the aforesaid cases are intimately related and/or intertwined with one another such that the judgment that may be rendered in one, regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. SUAN, ET. AL. V. CA, PASCUAL LINER, INC., ET. AL. 27 July 2006 Facts: This case stems from the case of PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc. Workers Union-NAFLU
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interlocutory order, without the conformity of the public prosecutor Held/Ratio: YES, According to the SC, a special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. The term "aggrieved parties" includes the State and the private offended party or complainant. The SC cited the case of Paredes v. Gopengco, where it was held that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. However, the Court also clarified in this case that in case the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. In this case, there is no doubt that petitioner maintains an interest in the litigation of the civil aspect of the case against respondents. Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. Hence, the possible conviction of respondents would concurrently provide a judgment for damages in favor of petitioner. The suspension of the criminal case which petitioner decries would necessarily cause delay in the resolution of the civil aspect of the said case which precisely is the interest and concern of petitioner. Such interest warrants protection from the courts. Significantly, under the present Rules of Court, complainants in B.P. 22 cases have to pay filing fees upon the commencement of such cases in court to protect their interest. PINGA v. SANTIAGO 30 June 2006 Facts: - A complaint for injunction was against Pinga by Santiago - Pinga then filed an Answer Counterclaim filed with
rests on the petitioner. The CA may do the following if upon initial review it determines that additional pleadings/docs are needed: (a) dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings, documents, or orders within a specific period of time; or (c) order the petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required pleadings, documents or orders within a fixed period. If the appellate court chooses to dismiss the petition outright and the petitioner files a motion for the reconsideration of such dismissal, appending thereto the requisite pleadings, documents or orders/resolutions with an explanation for the failure to append the required documents to the original petition, this would constitute substantial compliance with the Rules of Court. The petition should then be reinstated. In this case, the documents and pleadings which were not attached to the petition would not have prevented a comprehensive review of the case since these documents pertain principally to the issue of the legality of the strike conducted by the members of the PASVIL union. Considering further that these documents were submitted by petitioners when they filed their motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals should not have denied reconsideration. It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases which must be decided according to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the controversy. RODRIGUEZ V. GADIANE, ET AL. 17 July 2006 Facts: Rodriguez filed a criminal case against Gadiane and Rafols for violation of BP 22. The MTC suspended the the criminal proceeding on the ground that a prejudicial questions was posed on a separate civil action. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC to set aside the suspension order. RTC dismissed the petition for lack of conformity or signature of the government prosecutor. Issue: WON a private offended party in a criminal proceeding may file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing an
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Section 3, on the other hand, contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him and which, in the present case, was petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits. This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such absence of evidence to prove defendant's counterclaim although the same arises out of the subject matter of the complaint which was merely terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision into Section 3 and wresting a meaning therefrom although neither exists even by mere implication. Thus understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim. The survival of the counterclaim despite the dismissal of the complaint under Section 3 stood irrespective of whether the counterclaim was permissive or compulsory. At present, even Section 2, concerning dismissals on motion of the plaintiff, now recognizes the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim either in the same or separate action notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint, and without regard as to the permissive or compulsory nature of the counterclaim. THUS, the dismissal of a complaint due to fault of the plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute any pending counterclaims of whatever nature in the same or separate action. The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main
- RTC: dismissed the complaint for failure to failure to prosecute. At the same time, it allowed Pinga "to present their evidence exparte." - Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Santiago praying that the entire action be dismissed and Pinga be disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte. - RTC: granted MFR on the ground that there was no opposition on the part of Pinga Issue: WON the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim. Held/Ratio: NO. Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim. RTC erred in granting the MFR on the ground that Pinga did not oppose such motion considering that there is no mandatory rule requiring that an opposition be filed to a motion for reconsideration without need for a court order to that effect; Further, failure to file an opposition to a Motion for Reconsideration is definitely not one among the established grounds for dismissal of the counterclaim. Section 2 and 3 of Rule 17 should be distinguished. It is readily apparent that Sections 2 and 3 thereof envisage different factual and adjective situations. The dismissal of the complaint under Section 2 is at the instance of plaintiff, for whatever reason he is minded to move for such dismissal, and, as a matter of procedure, is without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the order of the court or, for that matter, in plaintiff's motion to dismiss his own complaint. By reason thereof, to curb any dubious or frivolous strategy of plaintiff for his benefit or to obviate possible prejudice to defendant, the former may not dismiss his complaint over the defendant's objection if the latter has a compulsory counterclaim since said counterclaim would necessarily be divested of juridical basis and defendant would be deprived of possible recovery thereon in that same judicial proceeding.
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complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint. SUAREZ vs. VILLARAMA 27 June 2006 Facts: - A complaint for specific performance with prayer for attachment was filed by Suarez against Spouses Ballar - During the trial of the case, there was repeated motions for postponements - Suarez further kept on having the hearing dates moved due to different reasons. - Later, RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to prosecute - MFR was denied - Suarez then filed an appeal to SC via petition for review on certiorari Issue 1: WON the remedy of review on certiorari filed by Suarez is proper. Held/Ratio: NO! It should be remembered that the judgment of the RTC dismissing the case for failure to prosecute is a final order and operates as a judgment on the merits. The same characterization applies to the order denying the motion for reconsideration. Thus, the remedy against such final order is appeal and not certiorari. The three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) RULE 41- ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) RULE 42petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and (3) RULE 45- petition for review to the Supreme Court. HERE, this petition for review on certiorari raises mixed questions of fact and law. Thus, it should have bee brought to the Court of Appeals via the first mode of appeal under the aegis of Rule 41.
Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Issue 2: WON the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time Held/Ratio: YES! Settled is the rule that the 15day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases pending with the Supreme Court as a court of last resort which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. Here, Suarez received the order of dismissal on 20 February 1996. She had until 6 March 1996 to file the motion for reconsideration. The filing of the motion for extension did not toll nor extend the 15-day reglementary period. Hence, the period had already lapsed by the time petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration on 11 March 1996. It is an accepted tenet that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. HERE, Suarez committed a blatant disregard of the basic procedural rules in appeals. The 15-day reglementary period for the filing of the motion for reconsideration is mandatory and jurisdictional. Furthermore, the filing of the wrong mode of appeal to this Court is a patent ground for its dismissal. YU v. CA 29 November 2005 Facts: Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her husband, Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse.
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the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth. As observed by petitioners, the assailed Order was not a mere ruling on the admissibility of evidence; it was, more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.
During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be petitioners illegitimate child. The trial court denied the motion. It ruled that the insurance contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued by the Insurance Commission which presumably prevents insurance companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining to insurance policies. It added that the production of the application and insurance contract would violate Article 280 of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil Registry Law, both of which prohibit the unauthorized identification of the parents of an illegitimate child. Private respondent sought reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was denied by the trial court. Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Hernandez in issuing the Order. The CA ruled in favor of the private respondent. Issues: 12. WON the CA gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it sets aside the Order of the RTC, declaring an application for insurance and an insurance policy as inadmissible evidence. 13. WON by virtue of private respondents tender of excluded evidence, she has rendered moot her petition before the Court of Appeals since the move evinced that she had another speedy and adequate remedy under the law. Held/Ratio: 5. NO. While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered. In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued the assailed Order. Even assuming that the documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the production of
6. NO. While private respondent made a Tender

of Excluded Evidence, such is not the tender contemplated by Section 40, Rule 132, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were not formally offered much less presented before the trial court. At most, said Tender of Excluded Evidence was a manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible by the trial court even before these were presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate remedy which private respondent could have resorted to instead of the petition for certiorari she filed before the Court of Appeals. It did not in any way render the said petition moot. TANCHANCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN 25 November 2005 Facts: 1) Tanchanco - NFA Administrator (1972 1986) 2) Co-petitioner Lacson NFA Deputy Administrator 3) 6 May 1988 - Tanchanco and the PCGG enter into a Cooperation Agreement - desire of Tanchanco to cooperate with the Philippine government in connection with the latters efforts in the location and pursuit of government properties acquired by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, their agents and others who hold property on their behalf. 4) Under the Agreement, Tanchanco must cooperate with any and all Philippine Government investigations or prosecutions, and may include investigations brought about by other governments. 5) The Philippines role under the Cooperation Agreement, among others, is to dismiss all actions that are presently pending against Tanchanco before the Sandiganbayan and any such other courts, and shall not bring any additional civil or criminal charges against Tanchanco, arising from: (A) Service in or for the Marcos government; (B) Any other actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his/her cooperation as defined in this Agreement.
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LEGAL METHOD The undertakings expressed by the Philippine government through the PCGG in the Cooperation Agreement are quite clear-cut, even if broad in scope. Facially, it seemingly encompasses 3 classes of actions committed by Tanchanco: a) those committed while he was in the service of the Marcos government; b) those committed in behalf of the Marcos government; and c) any other act revealed by him in the course of his cooperation with the PCGG. 1) Distinction is laid, as signified by the conjunctive or, between those acts committed by Tanchanco arising from service in the Marcos government and those committed for or in behalf of the Marcos government. The difference between those two classes of acts is crucial, for if the agreement is construed plainly, the immunity covers not only those acts committed by Tanchanco for the benefit or under the instruction of the Marcoses, but even those acts of Tanchanco which may not have been tinged with the involvement of Marcos or his government yet which nevertheless occurred during Tanchancos term as NFA Administrator. 2) Intent of the Agreement was to offer Tanchanco broad protection from criminal prosecution. 3) Yes, immunity is broad, but reason of PCGG in its grants of immunity is beyond scope of judicial inquiry. Such review can go no further than to pass upon [the immunity grants] procedural regularity, and is especially limited to the questions of (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge of its functions; (b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question; and (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused. (Mapa v. Sandiganbayan) Issue 2: Whether the PCGG, in entering into the Cooperation Agreement, acted within the scope of its statutory authority to extend immunity in the first place Held/Ratio: YES!!! 1) Executive Order No. 14, as amended by E.O. No. 14-A, defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos,
6) Tanchanco was called upon as one of the witnesses for the prosecution in the case filed against Imelda Marcos in New York for violation of the so-called RICO Act. 7) His testimony was elicited concerning the transfer of P10,000,000.00 rebate obtained by the NFA from the Philippine National Lines to the Security Bank. 8) Yes he cooperated, but alas! A criminal case was filed in 1991 against Tanchanco with the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds in the amount of P10,000,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank. Tanchanco filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, wherein he argued that the case should be dismissed as he had been granted immunity from the said suit by the PCGG. Case was dismissed. 9) 1997 - Tanchanco charged with 21 counts of Malversation of Public Funds and one count of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts. His deputy Lacson was charged as a co-defendant in four of the informations for Malversation of Public Funds. 10) 26 November 1997, Tanchanco and Lacson filed a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss all 22 cases, citing as basis the Cooperation Agreement which granted immunity to Tanchanco from criminal prosecution. 11) Motion was denied. Sandiganbayan examined SECTION 5 of E.O. 14 which empowered the PCGG to grant immunity from criminal prosecution. Sandiganbayan ruled - the grant of immunity by the PCGG pertained only to offenses which may arise from the act of a person testifying or giving information in connection with the recovery of supposed ill-gotten wealth. 12) Sandiganbayan claims that charges of malversation and failure to render an accounting could not be considered as falling within the immunity granted to Tanchanco as the offenses were not related or connected to the testimony or information furnished by Tanchanco in a proceeding concerning the recovery of the purported ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. 13) Motion for Reconsideration denied Sandiganbayan declared therein that the grant of immunity to crimes to which petitioners were charged are beyond the authority and mandate of the PCGG. Issue 1: WON the grant of immunity under the Cooperation Agreement encompassed the malversation and failure to render accounts charges. Held/Ratio: YES!!!
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4) The variances of immunity given by PCGG in different cases are indicative of the fact that the PCGG has the discretion to vest appropriate levels of criminal immunity according to the particular witness. 5) The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals. 6) Ambiguities in immunity agreements must be construed against the State, and any question of interpretation must be resolved in favor of the defendant. 7) Co defendant Lacson not entitled to immunity, obviously because he was not a party to the Agreement. Criminal immunity must be specifically granted. OTHER ISSUES: CRIM PRO, Rule 117 - accused may move to quash the complaint or information at any time before entering his plea and the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information shall be deemed a waiver of any objection. Tanchanco and Lacson had pleaded not guilty in all the subject cases, two months before they filed the instant Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss. Nonetheless, Section 9 of Rule 117 expressly qualifies that the failure to timely raise the objection of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged cannot be waived, and may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. A claim of immunity from prosecution arising from an immunity statute or agreement is a jurisdictional question. A statutory grant of immunity enjoins the prosecution of a criminal action and thus deprives the court of jurisdiction to proceed. MIAA V. HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. 30 September 2005 Facts: On May 25, 1965, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, w/c was entrusted with the administration, operation, management and control of MIA, entered into individual lease contracts with its employees (lessees) for the lease of portions of a four (4)-hectare lot situated in what is now known as Rivera Village in Pasay
members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees. SECTION 5, as amended authorizes the PCGG to grant immunity from criminal prosecution, in the following manner:
Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the Commission.
2) Sec. 5 is worded in such a manner as it does not provide any express limitations as to the scope of immunity from criminal prosecution that the PCGG is authorized to grant. The qualifications that Section 5 do provide relate to the character of the information or testimony before the PCGG of the grantee of immunity. Issue 3: Whether the available immunity from criminal prosecution relates only to the prosecution of the grantee in like minded cases. Held/Ratio: NO! 1) Chavez v. PCGG - the conditions under which the PCGG may grant criminal immunity were: (1) the person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides information or testifies in an investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or testimony pertains to the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused acquired or accumulated ill-gotten property; and (3) such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove guilt or civil liability of such individual. 2) Likewise, Section 5 of E.O. 14-A does not make any qualification as to classes of criminal acts, offenses, or cases, basta COMPLETELY immunized from prosecution! 3) It has been acknowledged that the PCGG is charged with the herculean task of bailing the country out of the financial bankruptcy and morass of the previous regime and returning to the people what is rightfully theirs. For this reason, the PCGG was granted quasi-judicial functions encompassing special investigatory and prosecutorial powers, among them, the power to grant immunity.
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members of the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the title of the petition, this defect can be cured by the simple expedient of requiring the association to disclose the names of the principals and to amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly. Issue: WON the petition (writ of mandamus and prohibition) filed by respondent with the trial court state a cause of action against petitioner Held/Ratio: No. A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioners legal right to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, the petitioner has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and that respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. In this case, resort to mandamus is evidently premature because there is no showing that the members of the homeowners association have already filed an application or proposal with the NHA to acquire their respective lots which is a requisite under PD 1517 before members of the homeowner may avail of the benefits under the said decree. There is still an administrative remedy open to the members of the homeowners association which they should have first pursued, failing which they cannot invoke judicial action. Whatever rights the members of the homeowners association may have under the relevant laws are still in substantial doubt or dispute. Hence, the petition for mandamus was appropriately dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of prohibition contained in the same petition should also be denied. Writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are prerogative writs of equity and their granting is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts to be exercised on equitable principles. Said writs should only be
City. The leases were for a twenty-five (25)-year period to commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at P20.00 per annum as rental. On May 4, 1982, Executive Order No. (EO) 778 was issued (later amended by EO 903 on July 21, 1983), creating petitioner MIAA, transferring existing assets of the MIA to MIAA, and vesting the latter with the power to administer and operate the MIA. Sometime in January 1995, MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental bills and refused to accept rental payments from the lessees. As a result, respondent Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc. (homeowners association), purportedly representing the lessees, requested MIAA to sell the subject property to its members, invoking the provisions of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016. But MIAA denied the request, claiming that the subject property is included in its Conceptual Development Plan intended for airport-related activities. Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against MIAA and the National Housing Authority. The petition sought to restrain the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual Development Plan insofar as Rivera Village is concerned. It also sought to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the scope of the Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for the disposition of the property in favor of the members of the homeowners association. TC: denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. CA: directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera Village from their dwellings. MIAA files an appeal. Issue: WON the respondent has personality to sue Held/Ratio: Yes. In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently shows that the homeowners association, through its President, is suing in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution attached to the petition. Although the names of the individual
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Four months later, petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent claiming that they were the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners further alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction due to the non-payment of correct docket fees, defective publication and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law, the witness having failed to sign the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by a force and under duress; (5) The decedent had no intention to make the will; (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included properties that no longer belonged to her. Petitioners thus prayed that the letters testamentary be withdrawn and the estate be disposed of under intestate succession. The RTC issued an order denying the petitioners motion for being unmeritorious. It held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and the deficiency in the payment of the docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It merely required the respondent to pay the deficiency. Lastly the RTCs Decision was already final and executory. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC decision. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement which the respondent refused to sign. They argued that the RTC decision should be annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition finding that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own. The CA declared as baseless the petitioners claim that the proceedings in the RTC were attended by extrinsic fraud. There was also no showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC.
issued when the right to the relief is clear. As the findings in this case confirm, the homeowners association failed to establish a clear legal right to the issuance of the writs of mandamus and prohibition prayed for. Issue: WON respondent entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction Held/Ratio: No. Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The writ of preliminary injunction is issued by the court to prevent threatened or continuous irreparable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The writ is issued upon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts which are violative of said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. In this case, the right of the members of the homeowners association to possess and purchase the subject property is still uncertain considering that they have not completed the process for the acquisition of their lots as outlined in PD 1517. Also, Preliminary injunction is a mere ancillary remedy which cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the main case. Having declared that the petition filed before the trial court was correctly dismissed, the determination of the homeowners associations entitlement to a writ of preliminary injunction is already moot and academic. ALABAN, ET AL. V. CA 23 Sept 2005 Facts: On November 8, 2000, private respondent Francisco H. Provido filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado who died in October 26, 2000. Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and executor of her will. The RTC rendered its decision allowing the probate of the will and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
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the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment. However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed Notice of the time and place for proving of the will must be published for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees or devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication that brings the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide. Thus, even if petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. As parties, they could have validly availed of the remedies of MNT or MR or petition for relief from judgment. Petitioners in fact filed a motion to open which was a motion for new trial. However the motion was denied for having been filed out of time. Conceding that petitioners became aware of the decision after it had become final, they still could have filed a petition for relief from judgment. But they failed to avail of the remedy. Even casting aside the procedural requisites, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to hve the final and
Petitioner filed the case before the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA. Respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the remedies provided in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion for new trial. They could also resort to petition for relief from judgment as they learned of the decision only three months after its promulgation. Petitioners, the respondent alleged, were not made parties to the probate proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs. Respondent claimed that even assuming that petitioners are heirs of the decedent, lack of notice to them is not a fatal defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. Lastly, it charged petitioners with forum shopping claiming that a similar case had been filed in a different court where the decedents niece, Dolores Flores filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of General Santos City, claiming that the decedent died intestate without any issue survived by collateral heirs. Petitioners maintained that they were not made parties to the case where the decision was rendered thus they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies. Held: The petition is devoid of merit. Rule 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within 6 months after entry thereof. A Motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings. It has been held that a person who was never a party to
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entrance of the Municipal Court of Pili, Camarines Sur. This notice was published in the 7, 14 and 21 February 1999 issues of the Vox Bikol - a weekly tabloid published every Sunday and circulated in the Bicol region and continents with Bicol communities. Thereafter, Atty. Clavecilla executed a Provisional Certificate of Sale dated 26 April 1999 certifying that on the 22nd day of March 1999, at exactly ten oclock in the morning, he sold at a public auction at the lobby/main entrance of the Regional Trial Court, Hall of Justice, Naga City the mortgaged properties to PNB for Two Hundred Thirteen Million One Hundred Sixty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty- Seven and Fifty Centavos (P213,162,787.50), which amount the latter considered as payment pro tanto of petitioners loan. This Provisional Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur on 3 May 1999 and with the Registry of Deeds of Naga City on 16 June 1999 for the properties respectively covered by their registries. On 26 April 2000, respondents Amado A. Sanao and Sanao Marketing Corporation filed a complaint with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61, against PNB, the Register of Deeds of the City of Naga and the Province of Camarines Sur, and Atty. Clavecilla, for the court to declare the Provisional Certificate of Sale and the auction and foreclosure proceedings null and void. Respondents: The PNB had allegedly failed to submit the application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage to the proper clerk of court after payment of the filing fee, in contravention of Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3 and Administrative Circular No. 3-98. In addition, respondents averred that the foreclosure sale was null and void as it was done at the lobby/main entrance of the RTC Hall of Justice, Naga City and not at the entrance of the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur as published. PNB: The invoked administrative order is not applicable as extrajudicial proceedings conducted by a notary public, as in the case at bar, do not fall within the contemplation of the directive. With regard to the variance of the venues of the auction sale as published in Vox Bikol and as recorded in the Provisional Certificate of Sale, PNB asserted that there was no violation of Act No. 3135 or of the terms of the real estate
executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. It is based only on two grounds: fraud and lack of jurisdiction. A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. Fraud in an action to annul must be fraud that is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic when it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. To sustain this allegation, petitioner asserts that due to the mission of their names ages and residences, they were denied their day in court. This lacks merit. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. He thus did not have any legal obligation to mention petitioners in the probate proceedings. Besides, assuming that there was a legal obligation, the publication cured the defect. PNB V. SANAO MARKETING CORPORATION, ET AL. 29 July 2005 Facts: In July 1997, Sanao Marketing Corporation, the spouses Amado A. Sanao and Soledad F. Sanao and the spouses William (Willy) F. Sanao and Helen Sanao (all respondents herein), as joint and solidary debtors, obtained a loan in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000.00) from PNB secured by a real estate mortgage of several parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Pili, Tigaon and Camaligan, all of Camarines Sur, and Naga City. The contract expressly provided that the mortgage shall be governed by the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended. For failure of respondents to fully pay the loan upon its maturity, PNB caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage through a certain Atty. Marvel C. Clavecilla (Atty. Clavecilla), a notary public for and in the City of Naga. The Notice of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Sale announced that the sale of 13 titles consisting of 14 parcels of land located in Camarines Sur and Naga City is scheduled on 22 March 1999 at nine oclock in the morning or soon thereafter, at the
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A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it to the person entitled under the judgment. A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances: (1)in land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) in a judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) in execution sales (last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). The present case falls under the third instance. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. As the purchaser of the properties in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, the PNB is entitled to a writ of possession therefore. The law on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage provides that a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale may take possession of the foreclosed property even before the expiration of the redemption period, provided he furnishes the necessary bond. Possession of the property may be obtained by filing an ex parte motion with the regional trial court of the province or place where the property is situated. Upon filing of the motion and the required bond, it becomes a ministerial duty of the court to order the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. After the expiration of the one-year period without redemption being effected by the property owner, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute. The basis of this right to possession is the purchasers ownership of the property. Mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of the writ of possession would suffice, and no bond is required. PNB has sufficiently established its right to the writ of possession. It presented as documentary exhibits the contract of real estate mortgage and the Provisional Certificate of Sale on the face of which appears proof of its registration with the Registry of Deeds in Camarines Sur on 3 May 1999. There is also no dispute that the lands were not redeemed within one year from the
mortgage contract, as the sale of the mortgaged properties located in Camarines Sur were held in Naga City which is well within the territorial jurisdiction of said province. On 11 August 2000, PNB filed with the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, docketed therein as Spec. Proc. P-1182, over the properties located in Pili. TC: On 24 November 2000, the RTC of Pili issued its first assailed order, granting the writ of possession prayed for by PNB. Amado A. Sanao and Sanao Marketing Corporation filed a Motion for Reconsideration w/ Opposition to the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, which was denied per the second assailed order dated 24 January 2001 of the RTC of Pili. Respondents then filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC of Pili in the issuance of the two assailed orders. The Petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. CA: It granted on 15 February 2001 the petition of respondents, enjoining the RTC of Pili and PNB from implementing the challenged orders. The Court of Appeals held that the Provisional Certificate of Sale, upon which the issuance of the writ of possession was based, is fatally infirm, and that consequently, the writ of possession was not validly issued as the procedural requirements for its issuance were not satisfied. It declared null and void the two assailed orders of the RTC of Pili for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Issue: WON the issuance of the RTC of Pili of the writ of possession prayed for by PNB was proper in this case. Held/Ratio: YES. It has been consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial. Such writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. The court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.
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owner of Lot 774, covered by Tax Declaration No. 009087, and that persons forcibly entered said Lot 774 by destroying the fence and started erecting a structure thereon. When plaintiff went to Lot 774, defendants and their workers threatened him with harm if he were to interfere with their work. Before filing their Answer, respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and not the MCTC that has jurisdiction over the case. Said motion was denied. In their Answer, the Cordovas contended that David is not a co-owner of the subject property, it being owned by the Government as said property forms part and parcel of the Dinalupihan Landed. The Cordovas questioned the jurisdiction of the MCTC to take cognizance of the case as allegedly the subject property is under the disposition and administration of DAR which will award it to qualified beneficiaries such as respondents. FMCTC -- Judgment in favor of David. The Cordovas thereafter filed with the RTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to nullify the decision of the lower court for having been issued without jurisdiction. RTC Dismissed the petition. The Cordovas filed another petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC of Bataan to annul the MCTC decision, reiterating their previous contention that the inferior court had no jurisdiction to entertain the forcible entry case considering that subject property is governmentowned and falls within the administration and disposition of the DAR. RTC Petition dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The Cordovas then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. They restated their previous assertion re MCTCs lack of jurisdiction. Also, for the first time, they raised the argument that the Complaint for forcible entry suffers from a fatal flaw as it failed to allege prior physical possession of the property by David. CA Granted the petition. According to the CA, the MCTC was bereft of jurisdiction because: (1) the Complaint failed to allege Davids prior physical possession and his dispossession by any
registration of the Provisional Certificate of Sale. It should follow, therefore, that PNB has acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the writ of possession. The RTC of Pili had the ministerial duty to issue that writ, as it did actually, upon mere motion, conformably to Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. The judge to whom an application for writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. In the issuance of a writ of possession, no discretion is left to the trial court. Any question regarding the cancellation of the writ or in respect of the validity and regularity of the public sale should be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135. It is worthy of note that the pendency of the case for annulment of the foreclosure proceedings is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession. Pending such proceedings whose subject is the validity of the foreclosure proceedings, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of property. Until such time the foreclosure sale is annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial on the part of the RTC of Pili. Considering that the RTC of Pili issued the writ of possession in compliance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended, it cannot be charged with having acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Absent grave abuse of discretion, respondents should have filed an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for certiorari. The soundness of the order granting the writ of possession is a matter of judgment with respect to which the remedy is ordinary appeal. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of discretion. Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari.
DAVID V. CORDOVA 28 July 2005 Facts: David filed a Complaint for forcible entry the First MCTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan against Nelson and Danny Cordova (the Cordovas). The Complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the co-
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operate to divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such property. Indeed, the public character of the land does not preclude inferior courts from exercising jurisdiction over forcible entry cases. It has been held in the case of Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et al. that the land spoken of in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Moreover, ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. (Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals) In addition, the instant case does not involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter nor an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of DAR. As such, possessory actions involving the land in dispute rightfully falls within the jurisdiction of the MCTC. The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of their respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition. (Pitargue v. Sevilla) ORBETA, ET AL. v. SENDIONG 08 July 2005
modes on which an action for forcible entry is based; and (2) the lot in question is a public agricultural land. Issue: WON the MCTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry/Whether the CA erred in upholding the Cordovas based on (1) and (2) above. Held/Ratio: Yes/Yes! (Discussion based on the 2 holdings of the CA) (1) Davids prior physical possession of the subject property and deprivation thereof are clear from the allegation that he is the owner of the subject property which the Cordovas forcibly entered, of which he was unlawfully turned out of possession and for which he prays to be restored in possession. The acts of the Cordovas in unlawfully entering the land, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would also imply the use of force. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property and this is all that is necessary. Thus, the foregoing averments are sufficient to show that the action is based upon the proviso of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the Cordovas are estopped by laches from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground that the Complaint filed by David lacked the material averments sufficient to make out a case for forcible entry. It is too late in the day for the Cordovas to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground that the Complaint failed to assert the necessary jurisdictional facts. The Cordovas first raised the issue in its petition for certiorari before the CA. After participating in all stages of the case before the lower court, the Cordovas are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the MCTCs jurisdiction. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower courts decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against ones opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be raised any time, this, however, admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. (2) Regarding the alleged public character of the land, the matter is of no moment and does not
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On 18 May 1992, the heirs of Simeona Montenegro, as well as the heirs of the spouses Orbeta herein petitioners filed before the RTC of Negros Oriental a complaint against Mr. & Mrs. Benedicto Pajulas, otherwise known as the spouses Pretzylou Sendiong, for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 10173 o Petitioners asserted that Maximo Orbeta, whom they claim as having sold the subject property to the spouses Juan Sendiong and Exequila Castellanes without the consent of his wife, could have conveyed only his conjugal share in the propertywhich comprised of 2,311 square meters or one-half of 4,622 square meters of the subject land that Simeona Montenegro had actually sold to spouses Orbeta. The heirs of Simeona Montenegro also reiterated their claim over the 884-square meter portion that had been excluded in the 1925 sale. o In their Complaint, petitioners prayed that they be declared absolute co-owners of the subject property except for the 2,311.00 SQUARE METERS conveyed by Maximo Orbeta to Spouses Juan Sendiong and Exequila Castellanes. o In their Answer, dated 11 September 1992, defendant spouses claimed that in the 1925 sale, Simeona Montenegro had actually sold Lot 606 in its entirety, including the aforementioned 884-square meters. 3. On 17 November 1993, defendant spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, in view of the fact that the heirs of Luis Sendiong have not been impleaded as indispensable parties. o In its Order of 17 December 1993, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court, in its Order dated 31 January 1994, also denied the defendant spouses motion for reconsideration. 4. On 22 November 1994, the defendant spouses filed a Motion to Include Indispensable Parties o In its Order, dated 13 March 1995, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion. 5. On 16 April 1998, the trial court rendered the decision that was eventually annulled by the Court of Appeals. o The trial court found that what Simeona Montenegro had actually sold in 1935 was the subject land, which did not include the 884square meter portion claimed by her heirs.
2.
1. On 24 March 1925, Simeona Montenegro

sold to the spouses Maximo Orbeta and Basilisa Teves (spouses Orbeta) a portion, comprising of 4,622 square meters, of a parcel of land designated as Lot 606 of the Cadastral Survey of the Municipality of Dumaguete (subject land), by virtue of a document denominated Escritura de Compra Venta. The subject land was exclusive of a 884-square meter site occupied by the house of Simeona Montenegros grandmother which was not included in the sale. 2. On 25 January 1934, Maximo Orbeta, in turn, sold to the spouses Juan Sendiong and Exequila Castellanes the subject land, with all the improvements existing thereon. 3. On 30 September 1968, upon the instance of the heirs of the spouses Orbeta, Simeona Montenegro executed in their favor a Deed of Confirmation of Sale and Quitclaim, acknowledging and ratifying the sale of the subject land to the spouses Orbeta. On the same day, the said heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition pertaining to the estate of their mother, Basilisa TevesOrbeta, which deed included the latters alleged conjugal share in the subject land consisting of 2,311 square meters. 4. On 29 December 1956, the spouses Juan Sendiong and Exequila Castellanes donated the subject land in favor of Luis Sendiong who therafter sold the easternmost one-half (1/2) undivided portion thereof to the spouses Pretzylou Sendiong on 9 June 1973. Apparently, Luis Sendiong kept the other undivided half for himself. Procedure 1. Simeona Montenegro, having apparently lost possession over the 884-square meter portion that was excluded in the 1925 sale, filed a complaint on 25 May 1972 against Luis Sendiong for recovery of possession of the said portion, and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 5442 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental. The heirs of Basilisa Teves-Orbeta, for their part, filed a complaint-in-intervention dated 26 December 1973, praying for the recovery of possession of their portion in the subject land comprising of 2,311 square meters. However, during the pendency of this case, the case records were destroyed in a fire which razed the sala of the RTC hearing the complaint. Said records were not reconstituted, and it seems the complaint was never pursued.
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challenged the validity of the donation of the subject property to Luis Sendiong, predecessor-in-interest of respondent, and accordingly, any judgment regarding petitioners claims would affect respondents interests in the subject land. Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court ruled that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint, including the judgment, and that all subsequent actuations of the court are null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present. Issue: WON annulment of judgment is proper in this case. Held/Ratio: We find that the appellate court correctly determined the existence of the requisites for annulment of judgment, and accordingly deny the petition. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If the action is based on extrinsic fraud, it must be brought within four (4) years from discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Respondents petition for annulment is grounded on lack of jurisdiction, owing to the failure to implead the indispensable parties. The cited ground is ample basis for annulment of judgment. We have long held that the joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. On the matter of whether respondent is otherwise barred from seeking the annulment of judgment by estoppel, laches, or procedural infirmities. Neither laches nor estoppel serves as a bar. The petition for annulment alleges that respondent learned of the existence of Civil Case No. 10173 only in 1999, or one year after the decision therein had been rendered. Since he was not impleaded in Civil Case No. 10173, there is no
Accordingly, it recognized the absolute ownership of the Montenegro heirs over the said portion. The trial court also found that the spouses Juan Sendiong and Exequila Castellanes could have only acquired ownership over the conjugal share of Maximo Orbeta in the subject land considering that the latter had sold the same in 1934 without the consent of his spouse, Basilia TevesOrbeta. The trial court also declared null and void the sale made by Maximo Orbeta with respect to the conjugal share of his spouse, and ordered the spouses Pretzylou and Genosa Sendiong to restore to petitioners the title to and possession of their respective shares in the subject land. 6. On 28 August 2000, respondent, represented by his attorney-in-fact and daughter Mae A. Sendiong, filed a Petition for Annulment of Decision with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals, in respect to the decision in Civil Case No. 10173. o Respondent, as petitioner therein, alleged having learned of the decision sought to be annulled only in 1999, as he was not made a party thereto. Asserting his right to the property as an heir of Luis Sendiong, respondent noted that the petitioners did not implead him as a defendant in Civil Case No. 10173, and that the trial court had refused to implead him as an indispensable party despite repeated motions to that effect by the defendants in the civil case. Private respondent argued that the decision in Civil Case No. 10173 encroached on the hereditary rights of himself and Lourdes Sendiong without having even given the elementary courtesy of due process. On the premise that he and Lourdes Sendiong were indispensable parties in Civil Case No. 10173 but not made parties thereto, respondent invoked Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and jurisprudence in positing that the RTC decision was null and void. 7. In its Decision dated 20 May 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for annulment of judgment and nullified the decision in Civil Case No. 10173. o It ruled that respondent and Lourdes Sendiong were indeed indispensable parties in Civil Case No. 10173, considering that the complaint had prayed that petitioners be declared as absolute co-owners of the subject property. Moreover, petitioners had
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respondent Judge be ordered to immediately transmit the complete records, together with the Notice of Appeal in accordance with Section 8, Rule 12; the Petition was denied The appellate court cited Section 7, Rule 5 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which provides that appeals from orders of confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds shall be treated as appeals in civil cases, and Section 3, Rule 5 of the same Rules which ordains that no payment of docketing and other legal fees shall be required in criminal cases except in petitions for review of criminal cases and appeals from confiscation or forfeiture of bail bond. Issue: Whether or not Reliance was obligated to pay the corresponding docket fee, failure to do so a valid ground to dismissing its appeal. Held/Ratio: Reliance proceeds from the premise that the twin denials of its Motion to Set Aside Orders/Writs of Execution and the succeeding Notice of Appeal serve as the linchpin on which its attempt to acquit itself of liability from the bonds should hinge However, it is evident from the record that Reliance, long before it filed its motion, was already afforded the opportunity to timely challenge liability on these bonds, yet failed to Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board of directors Once the obligation of bail is assumed, the bondsman or surety becomes in law the jailer of the accused and is subrogated to all the rights and means which the government possesses to make his control of him effective Section 21, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, in force at the time of the subject incidents, provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be forfeited, and judgment on the bond rendered against the surety:
SEC. 21. Forfeiture of bailbond. When the presence of the accused is required by the court, or these Rules, his bondsman shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, the bond shall be declared forfeited and the bondsman are given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why judgment should not be rendered Winlaw BarOps 2008 Page 192 of 219
basis to presume that respondent was aware of the civil case during its pendency before the RTC. Moreover, at the time respondent according to petitioners learned of the civil case, there was no pending appeal from the RTC decision therein, the Notice of Appeal having been earlier denied. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to discern how in 1999 respondent could have still participated in Civil Case No. 10173. There was no pending appeal to speak of which he could have involved himself. Nor could have he participated in the special civil action for certiorari, an original action, then pending before the Court of Appeals. RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE CO. V. AMANTE 30 June 2005 Facts:
Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. (Reliance), a duly organized insurance firm, received several letters from the Insurance Commission enclosing copies of the orders Orders/Judgments and Writs of Execution against the bailbonds allegedly issued by it; Reliance replied to the letters stating that the bonds mentioned are false and spurious Reliance then entered its special appearance in each of the above-cited criminal cases, at the same time seeking to set aside the cited writs of execution; it alleged that the such bonds were issued by one Evelyn Tinio, against whom it had since lodged a criminal case The judge issued an Order denying Reliances motion and stressed that the controversy could only be resolved with authority and finality by the Insurance Commission Reliance then filed a Notice of Appeal, which was disallowed on the ground that Reliance failed to pay the corresponding appeal fee pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 1 (c), Rule 50 Reliance sought the reconsideration of the disallowance of the appeal, stressing that the rules cited were inapplicable, as they pertained to civil actions and not to criminal cases, and that there was nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure that requires the payment of appeal fees in criminal cases; the motion was denied in an Order Reliance then filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Court of Appeals, praying that the orders disallowing the Notice of Appeal be declared null and void, and that
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certiorari, though qualified again by the limited circumstances under which certiorari may avail Reliance, in each of the criminal cases, had been served notice of the forfeiture of the bail bond and required to show cause why it should not be held liable, and later likewise served notice of the adverse judgment on the bond; it had the opportunity, prior to the rendition of judgment on the bond, to argue before the RTC that the bond was spurious, and such argument could very well have been deemed meritorious, considering the established rule of liberality in acceptance of the bondsmens explanation Finally, Reliance filed the Motion to Set Aside Orders/Writs of Execution only nine months after receipt of the most recently dated writ of execution, and four years after the first writ had been issued, and interestingly, Reliance does not refer at all to the judgments on the bail bonds that would have preceded the writs of execution, thus apparently conceding the validity of these judgments Certainly, courts have justifiable reason to view with distaste a judgment obligor who begins to actively participate in litigation only after the judgment has long become final Despite the numerous errors of procedure already committed by Reliance, there still was leeway for the allowance of its prayer for discharge, since the quashal of writs of execution was obtainable as a remedy against issuances of inequitable nature; however, Reliance instead again committed another fundamental procedural error, one that whisks away whatever sympathy it may have acquired owing to its basic position Simply put, appeal does not lie as the remedy from an order denying a motion to set aside a writ of execution; appeal avails as a remedy only against judgments or final orders, a general rule that holds true whether for civil or criminal procedure, it cannot be undertaken from the RTCs Order, arising as it did, at the execution stage. GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN 02 June 2005 Facts:
against them for the amount of their bond. Within the said period, the bondsmen: (a) must produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and (b) must explain satisfactorily why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so. Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bond, and the court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, except when the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.
Therefore, there are two occasions upon which the trial court judge may rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases when the accused fails to appear in court: (1) the nonappearance by the accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited and (2) the bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given thirty days within which to produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond It is only after this thirty-day period, during which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court, that the trial court may render a judgment on the bond against the bondsmen; judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so The judgment against the bondsmen on the bond may be construed as a final order, hence subject to appeal; indeed, from a judgment on the bond, a writ of execution may immediately issue, and need not be effected through a separate action, and an appeal from a judgment on the bond is subsumed under Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that appeals in criminal cases avail only from a judgment or final order, and Section 6 of the same Rule which requires that the appeal be taken within fifteen days from notice of the final order appealed from The special civil action of certiorari to assail a judgment of forfeiture may be available under exceptional circumstances, although the availability of appeal as a remedy to such judgment greatly raises the bar for the allowance of the certiorari action; the writ of execution itself may, in theory, be assailed through the special civil action for
A complaint against Major General Carlos F. Garcia was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for violations of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act No. 6713, Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and
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the petition for forfeiture it being civil in nature and the Sandiganbayan allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil actions collapses completely It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty The soundness of this reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the respondent officer or employees incumbency and in relation to his office This is in line with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft courtto address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies
Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service Law A petition with application for issuance of writ of preliminary attachment was then filed before the Sandiganbayan, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the relief prayed for; the corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was subsequently issued Garcia then filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to annul and set aside the Sandiganbayans Resolution and Writ of Preliminary Attachment Issues: 1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture; 2. Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture Held/Ratio: 1. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first recognized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus: [T]he rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and, therefore, civil in nature this ruling, however, could not have taken into consideration R.A. 8249, which has not yet been enacted at that time Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989, specifically including Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank In the face of the present state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners argumentthat the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
2. The Office of the Ombudsman has the

authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute petitions for forfeiture. Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Courts of First Instance P.D. No. Decree No. 1486 was later issued vesting the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture proceedings; Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases This may be taken as an implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former Courts of First Instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively an implied repeal is one which takes place when a new law contains some provisions which are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal those of a former law
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Sandiganbayan or the proper court or administrative agency against any public personnel who has acted in a manner warranting criminal and disciplinary action or proceedings was also transferred from the Chief Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan At present, the powers of the Ombudsman is defined in R.A. No. 6770 it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 However, the Ombudsmans exercise of the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten/unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of illgotten/unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986; as regards such wealth accumulated on or before said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan such forfeiture actionthis authority belongs to the Solicitor General although he has the authority to investigate such cases for forfeiture even before 25 February 1986, pursuant to the Ombudsmans general investigatory power under R.A. No. 6770. YUPANGCO v. MENDOZA, ET AL. 31 March 2005 Facts: 1986: Development Bank of the Philippines foreclosed the properties mortgaged to it by Artex Devt Co. The loan of Artex was then transferred to the Assets Privatization Trust, which created a Direct Debt Buy-Out Scheme to enable Artex to pay its loans. 1989: Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. bought the Artex Compound in Panghulo, Malabon. Later, new transfer certificates of title over these properties were issued to Yupangco. 1990: Samahang Manggagawa ng Artex Union filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission for underpayment of wages against Artex. The Labor Arbiter found Artex liable and ordered it to pay the complaining members of SAMAR wage differentials. Labor Arbiter later issued the writ of execution. The Sheriff of the NLRC together with officers of SAMAR went to the Artex Compound to implement the writ but failed to do so because security guards prevented their entry. SAMAR filed a motion for the issuance of a break-open order so that the writ could be implemented.
On the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was enacted, P.D. No. 1487 creating the Office of the Ombudsman (then Tanodbayan) was passed; the Tanodbayan initially had no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, such jurisdiction being vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier mentioned P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486; issued on the same date was P.D. No. 1607, which amended the powers of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative complaints and created the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor P.D. No. 1607 provided said Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor with exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file informations therefor, and direct and control the prosecution of said cases; P.D. No. 1607 also removed from the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file actions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided From this it may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise Hence, the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor The Tanodbayans authority was further expanded by P.D. No. 1630, giving it the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefore and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases The power to conduct the necessary investigation and to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal and administrative cases before the
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Yupangco filed a Complaint/Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan. It stated that respondents Sheriffs together with armed men forcibly entered the Artex Compound and forcibly opened the padlocks, chains and wooden barricades of the doors of certain buildings and carried away truckloads of generators, machines, equipment, motors and fabrics. It alleged that among those hauled were properties not listed among those levied and eventually sold on execution to SAMAR. Yupangco charged the said persons for robbery with intimidation and robbery with the use of force upon things under Arts. 293, 294 and 299 (RPC). May 20, 1996: In a Resolution, the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of informations against Mendoza, the Sheriffs and company for 3 counts of robbery. He said that the acts of the respondents constitute robbery committed on 3 separate and distinct occasions and that respondents could not hide under the cloak of legality of their acts because the writ specified Artex, not Yupangco, as owner. The Levy and Certificate of Sale may be valid but when the respondents found out that the properties already belonged to Yupangco, their taking became unlawful. Even assuming that the levy was validly done, respondents act of taking properties outside those listed in the levy is unlawful taking, the intent to gain being presumed from the act of taking beyond what is listed in the levy. The CA dismissed one of the cases filed by Yupangco finding it guilty of forum-shopping. It also dismissed Yupangcos MFR. Later, Yupangco filed a petition with the SC, seeking review of the dismissal of its petition in the CA. June 17, 1996: 3 informations for robbery were filed against respondents in Malabon. Meanwhile, a petition for review of the City Prosecutors resolution was filed before the Department of Justice. The Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petition for review and found sufficient basis to file the criminal informations. Respondents (Mendoza, Sheriffs, & co.) moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal but was denied by the Secretary of Justice. Meanwhile, the Labor Arbiter, in another case, declared that Yupangco had become the absolute owner and possessor of the properties in the Artex Compound since May 1989. Hence, its Third Party Claim is valid.
The Malabon Municipal Assessor issued a certification that the Artex Compound had been transferred to Yupangco since Feb. 1991. This was reflected in the Sheriffs Return. Nonetheless, a break-open order was issued by the Labor Arbiter. April 22, 1995: The Labor Arbiter issued an Order instructing the Sheriff and his assistants with the assistance of the police or military, if necessary, to gain access to the Artex compound by breaking open doors, windows, gates and other obstacles leading to said properties. An Alias Writ of Execution was issued. May 4, 1995: Yupangco filed a Notice of Third Party Claim with the NLRC, claiming ownership over the Artex Compound and praying for the stay of any break-open order until further hearing of the case. July 3, 1995: the Sheriff levied all the properties found inside the Artex Compound. A day later, Yupangco filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim claiming that it is the owner of all the properties of Artex. This was dismissed. Yupangco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC of Manila which was dismissed. The RTC ruled that the dismissal of Yupangcos third party claim is appealable to the NLRC, not to the regular courts. SAMAR moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution & a third one was issued. After the filing of an indemnity bond of P10 million by SAMAR, with due publication and notice, the sheriff sold the levied properties in a public auction wherein SAMAR was the winning bidder. Thereafter, SAMAR sold the properties to Rodrigo Sy Mendoza. November 14, 1995: sheriff started to withdraw from Artex Compound the levied properties sold at the execution sale. In summary, Yupangco continued to file one case after another in an attempt to stop the hauling of the properties. These were dismissed. Upon orders of the NLRC, SAMAR and Mendoza, with the assistance of Sheriffs Timbayan and Masilungan and some members of the Malabon police force, on 3 separate occasions, went to the Artex Compound to haul the properties bought at the public auction.
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execution of judgment was continued despite the filing of a third-party claim/notice of adverse claim by Yupangco because SAMAR put up an indemnity bond. Thus, respondent sheriffs cannot be charged with robbery for their faithful compliance with the writ of execution, or with their duties in accordance with the Manual. With greater reason, Mendoza, who merely purchased the property from SAMAR, cannot be held liable for robbery. So long as the officer confines his acts to the mandate of the writ, he is not liable; but all of his acts that are not as justified by the writ are without authority of law. While Yupangcos ownership of the subject properties has been settled, respondents taking of the same does not constitute robbery. The taking was made from 1995 to 1996, way before Yupangco was declared owner of the property. At the time the taking was done, respondents had acted by virtue of a presumptively valid levy and writ of execution. Thus, there can be no unlawful taking as the hauling of the properties was made by virtue of the alias writs of execution duly issued by the Labor Arbiter. There was no basis for Yupangcos allegation that intent to gain and use of force and violence were present in the execution. The assistance provided by the Malabon police and other officers, which was primarily the basis for Yupangcos allegation of force and/or intimidation, was authorized by the Labor Arbiter in the writ of execution. Yupangco still claims that the taking was unlawful as it involved properties not included in the writ of execution. However, Yupangco was unable to identify the items taken which were allegedly not listed in the levy. Even assuming that properties not listed in the notice of levy or certificate of sale were taken, a criminal action for robbery would still not prosper. A sheriffs role in the execution of judgment is purely ministerial and he has no discretion whether or not to execute the judgment. Any objection against the levy and sale must be addressed to the judgment of the tribunal which issued the order, because it is within its jurisdiction to correct the errors or excesses of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. Thus, the remedy of Yupangco, if any, is not the filing of a criminal action, but an action before the NLRC which had control over the respondent sheriffs. Absent sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of respondents for the
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the finding that there was probable cause for the filing of robbery charges against the respondents. CA granted the petition, set aside the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice and Chief State Prosecutor, and directed the RTC of Malabon to dismiss the said criminal cases. CA held that Yupangco was not able to show unlawful taking on the part of respondents to substantiate the charge of robbery. MFR was also denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition. Issue: W/N it was proper to file robbery charges against the sheriffs and the buyer of the properties at the execution sale, for hauling properties subsequently declared to be owned by petitioner. Held/Ratio: No, the CA correctly ruled that NO probable cause exists in this case. To constitute the crime of robbery, the following elements must be established: (1) the subject is personal property belonging to another; (2) there is unlawful taking of that property; (3) the taking is with the intent to gain; and (4) there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon things. From the records of the case and prevailing jurisprudence, respondents cannot be held liable for robbery; nor does there exist probable cause for the filing of robbery charges against them. The general rule is that the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. The Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations leaving this matter to the investigating prosecutors discretion. This policy, however, admits several exceptions. In the case at bar, the determination of whether robbery was committed, most especially by respondent sheriffs, has to be related to the orderly administration of justice and the unhampered performance of the sheriffs role in our judicial system. Based on the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment, the sheriff is required to serve all writs, execute all processes & carry into effect any judgment as defined therein. If a third-party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to proceed with the levy of the property unless he is given by the judgment creditor an indemnity bond against the claim. In this case,
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name sought in the petition did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. TC ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Petitioner filed an MFR of the decision which was denied. TC maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, agreed with the TCs decision. Issue: W/N the correction of name of the petitioner minor (by dropping his middle name) should be allowed. Held/Ratio: No, TC correctly ruled in denying it. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable
crime of robbery, the filing of informations against respondents constitutes grave abuse of discretion. However, Yupangco is not left without any remedy. It still has a venue to ventilate its grievance against respondents with the Court in an already pending case paving the way for the continuation of its action for recovery and damages against respondents.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG v. CEBU CITY CIVIL REG. 30 March 2005 Facts:
September 22, 2002: Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time and will let him study there. Since in Singapore, middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the change of name is requested. April 30, 2003: RTC denied the petition because the reason given for the change of
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clearly established. Petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous reason on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.
cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court. The present petition is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname. The law does not allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. However, the factual antecedents of the cases he cites, Oshita v. Republic, Calderon v. Republic, and Alfon v. Republic are not analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their surnames. Reasonable or compelling grounds to effect a change of name had also been found in the said cases. In Calderon, the Court granted the petition for change of name because it gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not
DIGESTS LEGAL ETHICS

PENA v. APARICIO 25 June 2007
OF

NLRC. Complainant Pena received a notice from NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In the conference, Atty. Aparicio submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Pena rejected the claim as being baseless and subsequently sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice, Atty. Aparicio wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his client's claim for separation pay. The letter also contained the threats of filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents if the separation pay is not paid before August 10, 2005. Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards, complainant filed an administrative complaint2 with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. A mandatory conference was held but respondent failed to appear. Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers. The Commissioner found that complainant failed to file his position paper and to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
11
Facts: This is an administrative complaint against a lawyer for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Atty. Aparicio is the legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the
discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
8
1987 Consti, Art.3, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him
9
R.A. 7438, approved on 15 May 1992, has reinforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation. The pertinent provisions read: SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers:a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer private with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided by with a competent and independent counsel. 10 Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Section 4 of C.A. No. 141 states that Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 12 From 1988 to 1993, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were delayed owing to the difficulty of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of President Marcos, who was by then already in exile. Thus, upon motion by respondents, the Sandiganbayan granted them a separate pre-trial/trial from President Marcos.
13
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.?In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to commit such violation or offense. xxxx (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. Winlaw BarOps 2008 Page 200 of 219
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documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail. However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his client's interests. The more appropriate penalty is reprimand. KARA-AN V. LINDO 19 April 2007 Facts: This is an administrative complaint against Judge Lindo and Judge Quintin for Dishonesty; Gross Misconduct; Gross Ignorance of the Laws, Rules and Procedures; Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to a Civil Case where Kara-an was the plaintiff. Judge Lindo issued an Order dated 6 March 2002 voluntarily inhibiting himself from trying the Civil Case. On the same day the order of inhibition was transmitted to and was received by Branch 56, presided over by respondent Judge Quintin who was then the Executive Judge of Malabon MeTC. Kara-an claims that although Judge Quintins office received a copy of Judge Lindo?s order of inhibition on the same date, Judge Quintin did not take any action thereon until 3 February 2004. Complainant contends that Judge Quintin violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case within three (3) months from 6 March 2002, citing Sec. 16, Art. III and Sec. 15 (1) of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Judge Quintin responds by stating that although the order of inhibition had been received by his office on 6 March 2002, the same did not reach his personal attention until Judge Lindo asked him to duly act on it. Since the order could not be located, Judge Quintin requested the transmittal of the records of the Civil Case. Upon receipt of the said records on January 2004, he issued the assailed Order of inhibition on February 2004. Issue: WON Judge Quintin is guilty of Gross Inefficiency. Held/Ratio: YES. Judge Quintin is guilty of delay in resolving the order of inhibition. Record reveals that Judge Lindos order of inhibition
Based on the records, the Pena did file his position paper by registered mail. However, he omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court for his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent. Pena accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition on the merits. Issue/s: 1. WON a certification against forum shopping is required for disbarment proceedings. 2. WON the respondent should be disbarred for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the CPR Held/Ratio: 1. NO. The rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either "taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person." Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. The rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. 2. NO. In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of
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because she was merely performing a judicial function. Issue: WON Misconduct. Judge is guilty of Serious
dated 6 March 2002 was received by Judge Quintins sala on the same day, but no action had been taken on the order until 3 February 2004. It appears that the order of inhibition was misplaced and could not be found as Judge Quintin required the transmittal of the records of the Civil Case. Nevertheless, Judge Quintin cannot escape liability simply because the order was not brought to his personal attention. If indeed the order got lost or misplaced, Judge Quintin should have conducted an inquiry into the matter. His inaction on the order for almost two (2) years is not excused. Judge Quintin likewise cannot escape liability by ascribing blame to his court employees in that the order was never brought to his attention. Judges are ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in their courts. It is the duty of judges to devise an efficient recording and filing system in their courts to enable them to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition. SAVELLA VS. INES 19 April 2007 Facts: This is a complaint for Serious Misconduct against Judge Ines of MTC-Sinait, Ilocos Sur. Complainant Savella filed a crim complaint against a certain Isabel Ibaez in MTCC-Vigan. Warrant of arrest was served on the accused. However, she was not found in her residence. Instead, her daughter produced a copy of the Order issued by Judge Ines directing the provisional release of the accused upon posting of a P12,000.00 bail bond. Savella alleges that the order of respondent judge was highly irregular for it gave undue favor and illegal accommodation to the accused who is known to be a close friend of respondent judge. Also, the Clerk of Court of MTC-Sinait did not forward the bail bond papers to the court where the case was pending. Judge Ines defends by saying that, on account of the Holy Week and the heavy workload in her court, she forgot to transmit the bail bond papers to MTCC-Vigan (court of pending crim case) until she was reminded by her Clerk of Court when the latter was "ordered" by Judge Ante of MTCC-Vigan to immediately forward the bail bond papers of the accused. Neither can the approval of the bail be construed as serious misconduct as well
Held/Ratio: NO. Only Gross Ignorance of the Law14. Judge Ines failed to properly apply the rule regarding the bail bond application. Section 17, Rule 114 ROC: bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge of the province or city or municipality." The crim case against the accused was filed before the MTCC-Vigan presided by Judge Ante. There was no showing of the unavailability of Judge Ante at that time so Judge Ines clearly erred in entertaining the bail application despite knowledge of the pendency of the crim case before MTCC-Vigan. Assuming arguendo that respondent judge rightfully granted bail to accused, her failure to transmit the order of release and other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending constitutes another violation of the rules ( Sec19, Rule 114). Judge Ines should have forwarded the records pertaining to the bail bond immediately after she received them. When the law is sufficiently basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law. But since this is the first administrative offense of respondent judge, the Court deems it proper to impose only a fine of P20,000.00. ALEGRIA v. JUDGE MANUEL N. DUQUE 04 April 2007 Facts: In the implementation of the Courts zerotolerance policy towards erring members of the judiciary, it ensures that the requirements of due process are observed, such that substantial
14
Sec 8, A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC---Sanctions: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding (6) months; or 3. A fine of not more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Winlaw BarOps 2008 Page 202 of 219
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(HLURB), appeared as counsel for the spouses De Gracia. In a Resolution dated February 19, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted a Report dated September 29, 2005, finding merit in the Complaint and recommending that Atty. Deloria be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and/or be fined in the amount of P20,000.00. This recommendation was annulled and set aside by the IBP in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-279 dated May 26, 2006. The case was instead dismissed for lack of merit. The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner appears to be based solely on the Rollo of the case which the Court sent to the IBP pursuant to the Resolution dated February 19, 2001. The Investigating Commissioner did not conduct any hearing to determine the veracity of the allegations in Villanuevas Complaint and the truthfulness of Atty. Delorias answers thereto. A formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons. In Baldomar v. Paras the Court held: Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex-parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for investigation in disbarment and disciplinary proceedings against attorneys before the IBP. Due observance of the foregoing rules is necessary for the proper resolution of this case. The instant administrative case is REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further
evidence is required to prove the charge against a judge. Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. Complainant, then Clerk III of the RTC, filed an Affidavit-Complaint charging respondent Judge Manuel N. Duque for committing acts insulting to and belittling her morals and decency by kissing her in his office, embracing her, and asking her to a date. In addition to his denial and refutation of the alleged acts of sexual harassment, respondent further stated other matters with respect to complainants appointment, performance, and efficiency as Clerk of his court. Is the complaint adequately substantiated by evidence? Held: No, in this case, while it is true that the element of moral ascendancy is present, respondent being the person who recommended complainant to her present position, complainant has failed to prove the alleged sexual advances by evidence other than her bare allegations in the affidavit-complaint. Even her own actions or omissions operate to cast doubt on her claim. There appears to be a strong motive on her part to make up charges against respondent judge. Even before the alleged incident, complainant was a recipient of at least four memoranda from the Branch Clerk of Court, all of which called her to task for her poor performance as clerk in charge of civil cases. In addition, a month before complainant filed the instant case, the Office of the Court Administrator had directed complainant to explain her unauthorized absences. Complainant was further warned that upon her failure to comply with these directives will constrain said office to recommend her dropping from the rolls. Considering that complainant has failed to substantiate her allegations, failing even to attest to her claims before the investigator appointed by this Court, elementary justice dictates respondents exoneration of the charge. VILLANUEVA V. DELORIA 26 January 2007 Resolution: This treats of the Complaint for Disbarment dated February 17, 1999 filed by Rogelio H. Villanueva (Villanueva) against Atty. Amado B. Deloria in connection with HLRB Case No. REM-080592-5166, entitled "Spouses Conrado De Gracia v. Estate of Jaime Gonzales, et al." Atty. Deloria, a former full-time Commissioner of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
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mother. They also purportedly went to Cebu City to meet complainants eldest child. 11. Complainant claimed that in the beginning, respondent diligently attended to her cases and advised her not to appear at the hearings before the Office of the Prosecutor, assuring her that he would attempt at a compromise agreement with the adverse parties. 12. For this purpose, between February and July 2004, complainant purportedly entrusted to respondent varying amounts of money totaling Four Hundred Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P431,000.00) based on his assurance that her cases merely involved money claims which can be settled amicably. 13. Complainant claimed that she had to ask this amount from her parents. Complainant did not ask from respondent for any receipt evidencing the transaction. 14. Complainant further alleged that she and respondent moved to a unit at Parrison Tower at F.B. Harrison, Pasay City sometime in April 2004, where they started living together as husband and wife. The unit was purportedly owned by a client of respondent who agreed to offset the amount of rental with the legal fees due him. 15. To corroborate her allegation that they lived together as husband and wife, complainant annexed to her complaint-affidavit five (5) photographs, three of which show intimate poses of complainant and respondent. 16. Complainant also recounted that during respondents birthday celebration held on May 28, 2004 at the rooftop of the Parrison Tower, he supposedly introduced complainant as his wife to his guests. 17. Complainant attached a VCD copy documenting the event to her reply to respondents answer. 18. As averred, at the start of the video, complainant can be seen entertaining the guests and overseeing the food preparation. Early in the party, complainants three children arrived. While respondent was walking around and entertaining the guests, complainant stood behind the buffet table supervising last minute preparation before the food was served. As the guests started to get food from the buffet table, complainant approached respondent. Respondent placed his hand on the hips of complainant while the latter whispered at him. All throughout the video, complainant was either standing behind the buffet table or conversing with respondent and the guests. 19. Complainant found out that she was pregnant sometime in June 2004. 20. August 4, 2004- complainant and respondent allegedly wed in a rite solemnized in
proceedings. The IBP is also directed to act on this referral with deliberate dispatch. FERANCULLO v. FERANCULLO, JR. 30 Nov 2006 Facts: Administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent due to alleged estafa, bigamy and violation of the lawyers oath Complainants allegations: 1. December 17, 2004- complainant claims that respondent took advantage of their attorneyclient relationship to extort money from her in consideration of the out-of-court settlement of her criminal cases and deceived her into marrying him by concealing his previous marriage. 2. Complainant narrated that sometime in February 2004, a certain SPO1 Lino Taytay referred her to respondent as she was in need of legal aid concerning a string of complaints for estafa filed against her. 3. They allegedly agreed to a monthly retainer fee of P10,000.00 in consideration for respondents legal services; the first payment thereof made in the same month of February at her residence in Central Park Condominium, Pasay City. 4. Respondent purportedly advised complainant to stay for the meantime at his office in Pasay City to avoid arrest and to keep her safe from the people suing and threatening her. He allegedly went to the extent of sending his cousinto fetch complainant from her residence. At night, complainant and respondent, together with the latters office staff, went out for dining and relaxation. 5. Complainant recounted that respondent prodded her to move into a more secure location, the Youth and Student Travel Association of the Philippines in Paraaque. 6. That allegedly became the start of his courtship. Complainant averred that respondent would send her breakfast and flowers. 7. When asked about his personal circumstances, respondent supposedly told complainant that he was still single although he had a child out of wedlock. 8. Complainant also maintained that she saw no apparent indications suggesting that respondent was married. 9. As indicative of their romantic relationship, respondent and complainant allegedly traveled to different places. 10. According to complainant, respondent took her to Antipolo to meet his relatives and to Mindoro to attend the birthday celebration of his
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dates of payments, he was out for court appearances. 7. He admitted going to Cebu City upon the behest of complainant who shouldered all his expenses, but the visit was only for the purpose of discussing the cases with complainants parents. 8. Respondent denied meeting complainants eldest child in Cebu City and all the other alleged trips they took together. 9. Respondent likewise denied courting complainant asserting that the latter had already known since February 2004 that he was married. He claimed to be happily married to his legal wife. 10. He denied living in together with complainant or providing a residence for complainant. According to him, complainant vacated her residence at Central Park Condominium, Pasay City because her lease application was denied. 11. While he admitted that the unit at Parrison Tower at F.B. Harrison, Pasay City belonged to his client, respondent insisted that his relatives had been occupying the same since March 2004, thus making it impossible for complainant to have transferred to said unit in April 2004. 12. Respondent described as contrary to human experience the allegation of complainant that he introduced her as his wife during his birthday celebration on 28 May 2004, where his brothers and sisters were also present. To support this claim, he submitted the affidavits of fifteen guests in his party, stating that respondent did not introduce complainant as his wife. 13. Respondent also denied that a marriage celebration between him and complainant took place on 4 August 2004 or that he signed the marriage certificate and or that he got her pregnant. He had already instituted corresponding criminal complaints against complainant for the alleged falsification of his signature in the marriage certificate. 14. Respondent claimed that complainant was extorting money from him, hence the filing of the administrative complaint. Complainant submitted a Replyto respondents answer to rebut his allegations. Annexed to her reply were receipts of payments on utilities to prove that she actually lived at Parrison Tower and a VCD copy showing the video clip of respondents birthday celebration held on 28 May 2004.
Kawit, Cavite.In support of this averment, complainant annexed to the complaint a photocopy of the marriage certificate. 21. Two months later, in a casual conversation with a certain Teresita Santos, another client of respondent, Santos told complainant that respondent was already married to a certain Marlin M. Maranan. 22. Complainant then confronted respondent who allegedly admitted that he was married but assured complainant that he was ready to leave his wife so that they can be together. The relationship between complainant and respondent turned sour eventually leading to their separation. 23. Complainant sought assistance from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 24. In a letter dated 14 October 2006, Atty. Romarico Ayson sent a demand letter to respondent, urging the latter to shoulder complainants hospitalization until her delivery and provide monthly support for the child in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) thereafter. 25. Complainant averred that since their separation, respondent and his agents had been threatening her with arrest and lawsuits. 26. She also discovered that the criminal complaints remained pending filed against her with the Office of the Prosecutor. 27. She claimed that respondent himself had been exerting efforts so that the criminal complaints against her would proceed. Respondents answer: 1. In compliance with the IBP Order dated 6 January 2005, respondent filed an answer, denying the allegations that he committed estafa, maintained an illicit relationship and contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant. 2. While admitting that complainant sought his legal services in connection with the latters cases for estafa and illegal recruitment pending before the Office of the Prosecutor, respondent insisted that his relationship with complainant was purely professional. 3. He claimed that the purpose of his visits to complainants residence was to show her court orders issued in relation to her cases. 4. He also averred that it was complainant who sought refuge in his office and invited him and his legal staff for dinners to discuss her cases. 5. Respondent maintained that complainant insisted on skipping the scheduled hearings before the Office of the Prosecutor. 6. He also denied receiving P431,000.00 from complainant, arguing that on the alleged
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disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. Contrary to the IBPs opinion, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent maintained an illicit relationship with complainant who was not his legal wife. It also appears that respondent contracted a second marriage with complainant as evidenced by their marriage certificate. Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage certificate plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between respondent and complainant on 4 August 2004, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. The marriage certificate should prevail over respondents claim that the marriage certificate or his signature therein was falsified. The rule is that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. The Court finds that complainants version is more credible, with the caveat that the Court is not accepting hook line and sinker every allegation of complainant. There is substantial evidence suggesting that more than a business or professional relationship existed between complainant and respondent. Complainant presented certain evidence either proving her claim or demonstrating as incredible respondents defense that complainant was merely extorting money from him. For instance, to prove her allegation that she and respondent lived together, complainant presented the original of the retainer agreement between respondent and the owner of the condominium building where they allegedly lived together.
Complainant and respondent also filed their respective position papers. In addition, complainant filed a Manifestation and Reply with the following annexes: (1) a blue polo barong and pants allegedly worn by respondent during his birthday celebration on 28 May 2004; (2) the original bank statement reciting the deposits made by complainants parents of the amount of P431,000.00; (3) the original passbook in the names of complainant and respondent; and (4) the certified xerox copy from the original of their marriage contract. Respondent moved to expunge from the records the annexes to complainants Manifestation and Replyon the ground that he was not furnished a copy of said annexes and that the Manifestation and Reply was an unsigned pleading. Complainant filed an opposition thereto. 20 January 2006 - the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued its Report and Recommendation to dismiss the complaint against respondent for lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution dated 20 March 2006, finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the complaint lacked merit. IBP findings: (1) complainant failed to present a clear, convincing and satisfactory proof to warrant the disbarment or suspension of respondent; (2) IBP also ruled that the pictures and VCD not having been duly authenticated could not be received in evidence. Issue: WON respondent was guilty of ethical breaches violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility Held/Ratio: YES. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the
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charging Judge Garfin with grave abuse of judicial discretion and gross ignorance of the law; and Clerk of Court Atty. Mampo and Sheriff Bolivar with abuse of authority relative to the issuance and implementation of a writ of execution. Complainant was the defendant in a case for unlawful detainer before the MTCC, in which he was ordered to vacate the subject premises and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiffs. Complainant appealed but the RTC affirmed the MTCC. While complainant's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, the RTC through Judge Garfin ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Complainant's motion for reconsideration was denied, so he elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the meantime, Clerk of Court Atty. Mampo issued a Writ pursuant to Judge Garfin's order. Sheriff Bolivar then proceeded to eject complainant from the premises. Complainant anchors his complaint on the alleged spurious and anomalous issuance and implementation of the Writ. He avers that it was issued beyond the 5-year period provided in the Rules of Court, that it was issued when the case had already been appealed to this Court, and that he was not notified of the motion for execution which led to the issuance of the Writ. Judge Garfin claims that complainant's remedy lies with the proper court through a proper judicial action and not with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint. She likewise contends that the complaint is baseless as it does not allege fraud, dishonesty or corruption on her part and does not show that she acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do injustice in issuing the assailed orders. Issue: WON this is a proper administrative case against Judge Garfin Held/Ratio: NO. Time and again, we have ruled that the acts of a judge pertaining to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary action unless they are tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. These, however, are absent in this case. The assailed acts of Judge Garfin being judicial in nature may not be the proper subject of an administrative complaint. Neither will the complaint prosper against Atty. Mampo and Bolivar. There is clearly nothing irregular with Atty. Mampo's issuance of the Writ. As the rule now stands, the clerk of court may,
Complainant also attached to her reply copies of receipts of payments on utilities and the original passbook of an account in the names of both complainant and respondent. These pieces of evidence were supposed to be under the control or custody of respondent, but the latter offered no explanation as to how complainant was able to produce them. The VCD documenting respondents birthday celebration on 28 May 2004 belied respondents claim that he acted as complainants legal counsel only and the concomitant assumption that she was there herself as a guest only. In said party, complainant entertained the guests and supervised the food preparation. Obviously, these are not the usual actuations of a client or a guest merely invited to a party. The Court, however, finds no sufficient evidence indicating that respondent falsely promised the settlement of complainants criminal cases in consideration of the amount of P431,000.00. The bank statements showing the deposits made by complainants parents are not conclusive of said claim because they do not prove that said amounts were received by respondent. Respondents intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife shows his moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired. The exacerbating circumstances present in previous cases where disbarment was imposed are absent in this case. Moreover, complainant failed to prove that respondent misappropriated her money. Thus, the Court finds that suspension from the practice of law is adequate to penalize respondent for his grossly immoral conduct. MARIANO v. JUDGE GARFIN, ET AL. 17 October 2006 Facts: Under consideration is the administrative complaint filed by Mariano (complainant)
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1. NO. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended from practice for any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, violation of the lawyers oath, willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or willful and unauthorized appearance for a party to a case, as specified in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A deceitful act, in particular, constitutes a violation of Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
under the direction of the court or judge, make out and sign all writs and processes issuing from the court. When Judge Garfin issued an order directing the issuance of the Writ, Atty. Mampo was left with no choice but to issue the Writ as directed, it being a ministerial duty on her part as provided in the Manual for Clerks of Court and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court. We likewise find no irregularity in Bolivar's implementation of the Writ as complainant failed to adduce an iota of evidence in support of his allegations. Nevertheless, we cannot let complainant go unscathed. He has to explain the filing of what appears to be a clearly baseless suit against respondents. SANTOS V. CACHO - CALICDAN 19 Sept 2006 Facts: In 2000, Estifanio Biasura filed an administrative charge against DENR Officer Orlando Angleo Santos. The case was assigned to to respondent Atty. Maria Viviane Cacho Calicdan, a Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman, who acted as the hearing officer in the administrative case against complainant. Santos filed an administrative complaint in the Civil Service Commission against Atty. Calicdan. Three areas of concern were identified to be the subject of the administrative complaint, namely: (1) Order of 24 September 1998, wherein Santos was advised by Calicdan to limit his crossexamination to the facts stated by Biasura (2) utterances made by respondent to Santos during the hearings (such as You concentrate in proving your innocence.) and (3) alleged intervention of respondent in the preparation of the transcript of stenographic notes of the 25 June 1998 hearing, where Calicdan merely suspended the crossexamination being conducted by the former on Biasura. Santos accused respondent of altering the transcript of proceedings by making it appear that the hearing was reset to 5 August and complainant was required to submit his position paper. The complaint was referred to the Ombudsman, then transferred to the IBP. IBP dismissed the case for lack of merit. Issues: 1. WON Calicdan should be disbarred for deceit 2. WON Calicdan was biased against Santos Held:
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. In disbarment proceedings, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof, the burden of which rests upon the complainant. Only a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar will warrant disbarment. In the instant case, complainant failed to substantiate his charges of falsification, to establish the basis of respondents disbarment. The complainant, in questioning the veracity of the transcript of the proceedings, failed to present evidence that the said transcript has been altered. Against his bare allegations, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed prevails. Otherwise stated, it is presumed that a public official properly and regularly discharges his duties, or performs act required by law; in accordance with the law and the authority conferred on him; and that he will not do any act contrary to his official duty or omit to do anything which such duty may require. Accordingly, we uphold the assailed transcript of proceedings as the faithful and accurate recording of all matters that transpired during the 25 June 1998 hearing. 2. NO. The assailed un neither convey bias nor partiality. Calicdan was was merely guiding complainant, who was not assisted by a lawyer, on how to pose the proper questions, in no way exhibiting bias against his cause. In fact, in the Order] of 24 September 1998, respondent reminded complainant to limit his crossexamination only to the facts testified to by Biasura. VITUG V. RONGCAL 07 September 2006
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lawyer-client relationship. Meted out a penalty of 1 year SUSPENSION with a stern warning. Atty. Rongcal must return P58,000 to Vitug. Issues: 1. WON Atty. Rongcal violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01 a. by having extra-marital sexual relations with Vitug b. making Vitug sign a clearly disadvantageous Affidavit 2. WON Atty. Rongcal a) failed to account for Vitugs money in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and, b)commingled the settlement money with his personal funds in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.02
Facts: In 2000, Catherine Vitug (complainant) searched for a lawyer to assist her in getting financial support from the biological father (Aquino) of her daughter. She was introduced to Atty. Diosdado Rongcal (respondent). After several meetings, The latter sent a demand letter to Aquino, asking for monthly child support and P300,000 for the surgical operation of the childs congenital heart disease. According to Vitug: Atty. Rongcal took advantage of her vulnerable state and induced her into having a sexual relationship with him by promising her a job, financial security and free legal services. He misrepresented that he was free to marry her since his marriage to his wife has already been annulled. He worked against her interests as a client when he convinced Vitug to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit. Atty. Rongcal also misappropriated P58,000 of the settlement money that Vitug got. He also commingled the P150,000 of Vitugs money into his own personal account. Vitug argues that respondents aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. According to Atty. Rongcal: Rongcal admits his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a chemistry between two consensual adults, complainant then being in her thirties. Vitug very well knew that he was married as she has met and talked to his wife several times. He had terminated their illicit affair years ago, but Vitug kept on badgering him for financial aid. The present case was actually filed by Vitug because he refused to give her money for a business. Rongcal alleged that Vitug, a college graduate, understood and voluntarily signed the affidavit after he explained all her options. As to the settlement money, he admits that he took the P150,000 cash from Aquino and that he issued a personal check of the same amount to Vitug only because the latter didnt want to carry a huge amount of cash. The P38,000 was given to her by Vitug as his attorneys fees. IBP: Atty. Rongcal lacked good moral character, as exemplified by taking advantage of their
3.
WON Vitug may claim moral damages and Attorneys Fees in an administrative complaint.
Held: 1.a. YES The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 1.b. NO. Vitug was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the
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parcels of land owned by the corporation were used to obtain loans from Philippine Business Bank (PBB), with the real estate mortgage annotated at the back of the titles covering the properties. Upon verification, he learned that John Dennis Chua, representing CST, mortgaged the properties. He was purportedly authorized by the Board of Directors of the corporation as shown by the Corporate Secretarys Certificate signed by respondent Atty. Jaime N. Soriano . On 28 May 2002, petitioner Tan filed as minority stockholder of CST under a derivative action, a letter-complaint with the IBP charging respondent Soriano of deceit, malpractice, falsification of public documents, gross misconduct and violation of oath of office. According to him, respondent has never been elected as corporate secretary nor acted as such for CST, and in fact no board meeting was held on 30 March 2001 to so authorize John Dennis Chua because on the said date two of three directors, petitioner Tan and Felipe Chua, were out of the country. Petitioners also filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a civil case for Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, Damages, etc. with Prayer for Issuance of TRO/ Preliminary Injunction, against respondent, Atty. Stephen Z. Taala and PBB, along with other persons. On 16 June 2003, petitioners filed with the IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) a Motion to Amend/Supplement the Complaint with Motion to Admit Amended/Supplemental Complaint, claiming that respondent and Atty. Taala had facilitated and recommended the approval of the allegedly spurious loans and mortgage entered into by John Dennis Chua. The Commission, however, denied the motion on 28 December 2003 on the ground that the amendments/supplements involve proceedings pending before the trial courts and that the determination of the matters presented belong to RTC which have already acquired jurisdiction over them. Assailing the denial of the motion for the admission of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, wherein they impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission. Petitioners submit that respondent and Atty. Taala through false testimonies intend to bind CST to the spurious loans and real estate mortgage to its damage and
Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent. It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court 2. Remand to IBP There is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainants claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. But there is no single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. The case must be remanded to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect 3. NO. An administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action. It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyers alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. TAN, ET AL. V. IBP 05 Sept 2006 Facts: This petition stemmed from a pending disbarment case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Sometime in January of 2002, petitioner Tomas G. Tan (petitioner Tan), stockholder and director of CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), discovered that two
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Issue: W/N the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners Amended/ Supplemental Complaint. Held/Ratio: No grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners have filed Civil Case No. 02-299, seeking the declaration of unenforceability of promissory notes and mortgage, nullity of secretarys certificate, injunction, damages, and the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. In the said case, petitioners allege that the loans contracted by CST from PBB were not sanctioned nor ratified by the CST, but were only facilitated by respondent and Atty. Taala through the use of the spurious Secretarys Certificate. Likewise pending is another case against respondent and John Dennis Chua, et al. for estafa through falsification of public documentsin the RTC of Makati involving the same allegedly unauthorized mortgage. The Court notes that petitioners are seeking similar, if not identical, reliefs from the regular courts and the Commission. Thus, in addition to the prayer to disbar respondent and Atty. Taala, petitioners implore the Commission to make a finding that respondent lawyers be found liable for using untruthful statements under oath, conspiracy to commit estafa, employing deceit and other manipulative acts as well as fraud, and falsification of public documents charges which are included in his allegations in the civil and criminal cases. Obviously, the Commission is not empowered to resolve matters which are pending resolution by the regular courts to which jurisdiction properly pertains. The IBP, particularly the Commission on Bar Discipline, is merely tasked to investigate and make recommendations on complaints for disbarment, suspension and discipline of lawyers. It is not a regular court and thus is not endowed with the power to investigate and resolve judicial matters pending before the regular courts. To cite a specific vital aspect. In the proposed Amended/Supplemental Complaint, petitioners seek to hold respondent administratively liable for his untruthful and perjurious statements in his Verified Answer in the administrative case. Precisely, however, the truth or falsity of said statements are still to be litigated in the civil case. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis, they belong to a class of their own, and are distinct from that of civil or criminal actions. To be sure, a
prejudice. They claim that the denial to admit the Amended/Supplemental Complaint would have the effect of preventing petitioners from filing a new complaint against respondent along with Atty. Taala for their conspiratorial illegal acts involving the same loan transactions, as any judgment of the Commission on the original complaint may serve as res judicata to bar judgment on the other acts complained of in the Amended/Supplemental Complaint. Likewise, limiting the facts and issues to those defined in the original complaint would make respondent answerable only for the less serious charges subject of the original complaint but not for the graver charges in the Amended/Supplemental Complaint regarding respondents untruthful allegations. In addition, petitioners claim that respondents allegations in his Verified Answer are untruthful and perjurious as he knowingly cited untruthful testimonies and affidavits from the records of the civil case with the RTC of Makati. Finally, petitioners aver that the proceeds of the spurious loans amounting to P91.1 Million Pesos covered by the real estate mortgage on CSTs real estate properties were funneled to the Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., a corporation where respondent is the incorporator, stockholder and President. Petitioners thus pray of this Court to set aside the Commissions order denying admission of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint, or in the alternative, allow petitioner to file a new complaint against respondent and Atty. Taala based on the same loan transactions. Respondent claims that petitioners breached the rule that proceedings against attorneys should be kept private and confidential, when the latter disclosed in Civil Case No. 02-299 the contents of his Verified Answer filed before the Commission, quoting almost verbatim said contents. This had the effect of announcing to the whole world the pending disbarment case, meant to harass and vex him even before a final verdict is reached by the Commission. Respondent questions petitioners motive in not filing a separate case before the IBP against Atty. Taala and accordingly having him tried separately. Finally, respondent posits that the Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to amend its complaint since the nullity or regularity of the mortgage loan in CSTs name is not an issue in the administrative case against him.
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Bonifacio was the duly elected Punong Barangay and ordering Gaspar to vacate the position and deliver the same to Bonifacio in a peaceful manner. Gaspar maintains that respondent Judge should be held liable for criminal and administrative charges for rendering the decision while under suspension. Respondent judge claims that he rendered the decision in the election case in good faith. He argues that the Courts use of the word or in its Resolution indicates two alternatives with regard to the period of his suspension. Under the first alternative, he believed that his suspension had been lifted with the dismissal of the criminal action against him. Under the second, he believed that the Court must issue a resolution or order further suspending him even after the dismissal of the criminal complaint. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its Report submitted that respondent judge violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA opined that if respondent judge indeed was in good faith, he should have prudently awaited the Courts pronouncement on the status of his suspension before promulgating the decision, and recommended that he be fined in the amount of P10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Executive Judge Adriano, to whom the case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation, found that respondent judge wilfully violated the Courts Resolution suspending the latter until further orders from the Court and recommended that he be adjudged guilty of grave misconduct and suffer the penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay, in lieu of dismissal. Issue: WON Judge Adaoag violated the Code of Judicial Conduct Held/Ratio: YES. It is an imperative for judges to comply with resolutions issued by the Court. By promulgating a decision in the election case whilst under suspension per resolution of the Court, indeed respondent judge miserably failed to render such obeisance to the Courts mandate. As we have aptly held in Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, Jr., to wit: Directives issued by this Court are not to be treated lightly, certainly not on the pretext that one has misapprehended the meaning of said directives. Effective and efficient administration of justice demands nothing than a faithful adherence to the rules and orders laid down by this Court x x x
finding of liability in a civil case or a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an administrative proceeding. However, in the instant case, the civil and criminal cases involving the acts referred to in the proposed amended/supplemental complaint are still pending adjudication before the regular courts. Prudence dictates that the action of the Commission related to the proposed amended/supplemental complaint in the administrative case be sustained in order to avoid contradictory findings in that case and in the court cases. Regarding the confidentiality of lawyer-client information, respondent charges petitioners with violating of Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are private and confidential until its final determination. The confidential nature of the proceedings has a three-fold purpose, to wit: (i) to enable the court and the investigator to make the investigation free from any extraneous influence or interference; (ii) to protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting the publication of such charges pending their resolution; and (iii) to deter the press from publishing the charges or proceedings based thereon. Petitioners had in effect announced to the world the pending disbarment case against respondent. Not only did they disclose the ongoing proceedings, they also divulged most, if not all of the contents of respondents Verified Answer. Clearly, petitioners acts impinged on the confidential nature of the disbarment proceedings against Atty. Soriano. GASPAR v. ADAOAG 16 Aug 2006 Facts: Rolando Gaspar alleges that he was the elected chairman of Barangay Pance, Ramos, Tarlac during the 2002 elections. However, an election protest was filed against him by Anastacio Bonifacio before the MCTC of GeronaRamos-Pura where respondent Judge Luisito Adaoag presides. While the election case was pending, respondent judge was suspended by the First Division of the Court, pending the final outcome of the criminal proceedings against him. Gaspar contends that even while under suspension, respondent judge rendered a Decision in 2003 in the election case holding that
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the trial has been conducted, the Court shall promulgate the judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the termination of trial. Delay in the disposition and resolution of cases constitutes a serious violation of the parties constitutional right to speedy disposition of their grievances in court. The failure of respondent judge to decide the criminal case with dispatch as mandated by the Rules speaks of his arrant negligence. Worse, respondent judge did not even offer a plausible explanation why the criminal case took so long to be resolved. His proffered excuse that he was merely an acting presiding judge of the MTC, Cabuyao, Laguna is unacceptable. All judges are required to ensure that the administration of justice is unhampered by delays that deprive litigants of their right to speedy disposition of their cases. The Court also deems it fit to discuss the absence of the TSNs of the criminal case from the record even after the lapse of a considerable length of time. Although it is the duty of the court stenographer to transcribe the stenographic notes, it is a given fact that the judge exercises supervision over his court personnel. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to organize and supervise court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and to require the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity at all times. It is of no moment that Moncada filed his complaint one (1) day after the retirement of respondent judge. It should be stressed that the administrative case Moncada filed against him was in relation to his duties as a judge. As such, even if he has retired from the service, if found to be remiss in upholding his sworn responsibility, he could still be penalized for the infractions he has committed. REQUEST OF JUDGE FATIMA 11 July 2006 Facts: Judge Asdala sent a letter requesting an extension of 90 days within which to decide 15 cases which has been pending in her sala on the ground that the delay was due to her Legal Researcher who failed to submit the records of this case. She was granted such extension and the Legal researcher was asked to comment on this. Legal researcher alleges that the delay was not due to his fault and said that the court records
In this regard, respondent judge fell short of showing such adherence. Respondent judge instead openly defied the Courts order which should have been implemented without delay. He continued his judicial functions and even rendered the decision in the election case in 25 November 2003 despite knowledge of his suspension ordered by the Court in the Resolution dated 4 August 2003. He cannot hide behind the defense of good faith and misinterpretation of the edict as circumstances noted by the Executive Judge show that he was fully aware of his suspension. And in fact, per our ruling in Alday, the defense of misapprehension will not even work to excuse him from liability. In view of the fact that respondent judge had already been suspended indefinitely, the Court is moved to temper justice with mercy and is inclined to adopt the OCAs recommendation that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00. MONCADA V. JUDGE CERVANTES 28 July 2006 Facts: Moncada filed an admin complaint against Judge Alden V. Cervantes for undue delay in the resolution of a criminal case for Usurpation of Real Property and Real Rights filed before his sala as Municipal Trial Court judge of Cabuyao, Laguna. The complaint charged the judge with violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 3, and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Moncada was arraigned on May 24, 2001 and the case dragged on until January 16, 2006. Moncada further alleges on his complaint that the stenographic notes taken during the hearings of the case have not been transcribed and that, as of the time of the filing of the instant complaint, no transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs) were attached to the records of the case. A day before the complaint was filed against Judge Cervantes, he retired. The OCA recommended a fine of Php20,000.00 against said judge, it found that the charge of ignorance of the law for denying Moncadas motion to dismiss bereft of merit but as regards the delay in the disposition of the criminal case before respondent judge?s court, the OCA held that the latter was evidently remiss in his duty to resolve the same on time. Held/Ratio: YES, The SC emphasized that the nature of the criminal case against Moncada is one that entails the disposition of the case under the Rules. Section 17 thereof provides that when
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Adecer against Attorney Emmanuel A. Akut. The petition was an offshoot of a criminal case where the Adecer spouses were charged. In that case, Akut received a copy of the decision convicting complainants and where they were also ordered to pay civil liability. Complainants received a copy of the Decision via registered mail on 4 April 1997. Respondent received an additional copy of the Decision on even date. Respondent had fifteen (15) days from the decision to file either an appeal or a petition for probation in behalf of the complainants. However, it was only a month after the Decision had become final and executory that respondent filed a Petition for Probation. The Petition for Probation was denied. On 7 November 2003, the records of the case were reconstituted. Stipulations were made and the parties agreed that the case would be deemed submitted for decision upon their filing of their respective Supplemental Position Papers.Furthermore, despite complainants? several allusions to deceit on the part of respondent, the parties agreed on a single issue for resolution, i.e., whether respondent is administratively liable for a violating the principles of legal ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility in filing the Petition for Probation beyond the reglementary period Issue: WON Respondent was negligent Held/Ratio: First, despite his receipt of a copy of the Decision and the consequent running of the fifteen (15)-day period to file a petition for probation, respondent went out of town without contacting complainants to give them proper legal advice. Furthermore, his admission that complainants were [1] under the impression that they first had to pay off their civil liabilities prior to filing a petition for probation and [2] unaware that they had only fifteen (15) days from their counsels receipt of a copy of the decision to file their petition, proves that he failed to give complainants timely legal advise. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. He shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Nor shall he neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. BARBA v. SALAZAR, ET AL. 31 March 2006
were personally brought to the court by him and these cases were listed in the court whiteboard. Office of the Court Administrator recommends that Judge Asdala be fined with P15k. Issue: WON Judge Asdala should be fined. Held/Ratio: YES! The publics faith and confidence in the judicial system depends, to a large extent, on the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and other matters pending before the courts. The Constitution, no less, fixes a reglementary period of 90 days within which judges must resolve motions or incidents pending before them. Their failure to so decide a case or resolve a motion within this reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against the erring magistrate. Here, Judge Asdala failed to decide cases within such period. Judge Asdalas proferred excuse is unpersuasive. Judges cannot be allowed to use their staff as shields to evade responsibility for mistakes and mishaps in the course of the performance of their duties. They should not depend on the clerk of court for the calendaring of cases, for court management is ultimately their responsibility. A judge is expected to keep his own record of cases and to note therein the status of each case so that they may be acted upon accordingly and promptly. He must adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to bolster the prompt and effective dispatch of business. The fact that she requested an extension of time to decide the pending cases does not excuse her failure to decide them on time given that the request was filed when the reglementary period had already elapsed. The Court has consistently been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time to decide cases, mindful of the heavy caseload of judges. However, applications for extension must be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period. Thus, Judge Asdala is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision or order. SPS. ADECER v. AKUT 03 May 2006 Facts: Before the Court is a petition for disbarment filed by Spouses William and Teresita
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Canon 2 mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety, or even an appearance of impropriety in all his conduct as a magistrate. Respondent judges irregular obtention of the three (3) checks, and their subsequent loss in her custody, stand as the proximate cause of the illegal encashment of these checks to the financial damage of the Supreme Court. Even if there is no substantial evidence establishing respondents participation or acquiescence to the encashment of the checks, her negligence is sufficiently proved, and administrative sanction warranted. FRANCISCO, ET AL. v. PORTUGAL 14 March 2006 Facts: Complainants engaged the services of respondent after the accused (relatives of complainants) were found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of homicide and attempted homicide. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration. Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with the SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002. Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address. More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees. Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing. In his defense, respondent averred that he wrote a letter to PO3 Joaquin, who served as the contact person between him and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw
Facts: Barba filed a complaint against MCTC Judge Salazar for Conduct Unbecoming and/or Abuse of Discretion and Gross Dishonesty. She alleged that she is the mother of Rosette Pineda, Clerk of the MCTC, who resigned from her post effective 1 March 2004 to work abroad. Even after her resignation, Pinedas name remained in the payroll and several checks were still issued in her favor. Complainant claimed that her daughter did not receive any of the checks. Yet three of the checks were allegedly encashed by respondent judge. The investigating judge found that the midyear bonus and clothing allowance checks were encashed at Lands Merchandising Store by respondent judges son. On the other hand, the fiscal autonomy allowance check was encashed at Co Chiok Department Store. The signature of respondent judge appeared on the dorsal portion of the said check. Issue: WON respondent administratively charged. judge should be
Held/Ratio: YES. Respondents act of taking the three (3) checks, even if with honorable intentions, does not excuse her from the eventual consequences prejudicing Pineda and more importantly, the Judiciary. Respondent judge clearly overstepped her responsibilities when she went the extra mile to go to the post office on three separate occasions to claim Pinedas checks. That circumstance alone is already a cause for suspicion. In so doing, respondent judge violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." The Court has said time and time again that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the administration and disposition of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility and free from any suspicion that may taint the well-guarded image of the judiciary. The conduct of judges and court personnel must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum at all times, but must also be above suspicion. Verily, the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the men and women, from the judge to the lowest employee, hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice. Thus, every employee of the court should be an exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and honesty.
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court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause. The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. LEGASPI 14 March 2006 Facts: A judicial audit report recommended that RTC Presiding Judge Marietta A. Legaspi be reprimanded for her failure to implement an effective and efficient record management system for the prompt disposition of the courts business. Acting on this directive, CA Justice Guaria proceeded with his investigation. In his report, he summarized the charges against Judge Legaspi into eight categories. First, her failure to decide four (4) cases on her docket within the reglementary period. Second, her failure for a considerable length of time to set four (4) criminal cases for trial. Third, her failure in three criminal cases to set the arraignment for a considerable length of time. Fourth, her failure in several cases to act on pending incidents for a considerable length of time. Fifth, her failure to act after warrants were issued in seven criminal
which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter. Issues: 1. WON respondents withdrawal of his appearance for the accused was valid. 2. WON respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling the case. Held: 1. NO. 2. YES. Ratio: Respondent fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. Although he represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents office would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondents office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls. Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the
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devise an efficient recording and filing system in their courts so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Based on the findings of Justice Guaria, haphazard filing practices of Judge Legaspis staff contributed to the delay in the rendition of the judgments in the three cases. While she may have since rebuked her staff for these missteps, her ultimate responsibility cannot be avoided. We have held that the delay in the disposition of even one case constitutes gross inefficiency which this Court will not tolerate. Since the delays in these cases were attributable to causes within the control of Judge Legaspi, proper administrative sanction should be delivered. SOLATAN v. INOCENTES 09 Aug 2005 Facts: Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law office, to which Attys Inocentes and Camano belong, represented spouses Genito when their apartment was sequestered by PCGG and in ejectment cases against delinquent tenants. George Solatan's sister Gliceria was a tenant of Genito Apartments but when she left for the US George Solatan occupied the apartment unit. An ejectment case for non-payment of rentals was filed against Gliceria Solatan whcich was decided against her. Prior to the implementation of a writ to execute the judgment, George and his mother, Elvira Solatan, approached Atty. Inocentes and said that he wanted an execution of a lease contract that would make him the new lessee of the apartment so he can still stay in the apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred them to, Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of the ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito apartments. A verbal agreement was made where Solatan agreed to pay judgment debt of Gliceria Solatan, attorneys fees and costs of suit provided that complainant will continue to stay at the Genito Apartments. In partial compliance with the agreement, complainant issued in the name Atty. Camano a check for P5,000.00 representing half of the P10,000.00 attorneys fees. When they failed to make any other payment so atty. Camano enforced writ. But as Solatan issued 4 checks, to pay debt of Gliceria Solatan and half to pay his rentals, Atty Camano advised Solatan to present affidavit of ownership to the police for the release of levied items. Upon presentation of affidavit the items were released save for a stove which was kept by Atty Camano. Solatan filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Inocentes and Atty. Camano. IBP suspended Atty Camano for 1 year and Reprimanded Atty Inocentes. Atty.
cases. Sixth, her failure to issue appropriate orders in 64 cases of various natures. Seventh, her failure to submit the monthly report of cases and semestral docket inventory within the prescribed period. And eighth, her failure to maintain civil and criminal docket books since 1983. Nonetheless, he did not find substantial basis to hold the respondent administratively liable for the charges brought against because she has adequately explained these charges with support from the records. Issue: WON there is cause to hold respondent administratively accountable for the undue delay in the promulgation of cases submitted for decision. Held/Ratio: YES. The Constitution mandates that all decisions be decided or resolved by lower courts within three (3) months from submission. The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. It is clear that in three instances, there was undue delay in the promulgation of cases submitted for decision. Justice Guaria III concluded that the delays in these cases were due to clerical errors on the part of Judge Legaspis staff, which according to him, were "isolated" and "not systemic." Even conceding that Judge Legaspis intention to decide these cases within the reglementary period was frustrated by the incompetence of her staff, she cannot be wholly acquitted of administrative responsibility thereupon. A judge cannot simply take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his/her court personnel, for the latter are not the guardians of the former's responsibility. Moreover, the trial judge is expected to adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to bolster the prompt and effective dispatch of business. Proper and efficient court management is the responsibility of the judge. It is incumbent upon judges to
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a person under his charge. An admonition is appropriate under the circumstances. CANOY V. ORTIZ 16 March 2005 Facts: Elmer Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City. Atty. Jose Max Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy, an indigent litigant, in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing the complaint ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers. The dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper. This Complaint dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by Canoy accusing Atty.Ortiz of misconduct and malpractice. Issue 1: WON Atty. Ortiz is guilty of misconduct and malpractice? Held/Ratio: YES. Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against the sort of conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoys case.
Inocentes contested the resolution of the IBP, as he questions the propriety of his being held administratively liable for acts done by Atty. Camano. Issue 1: WON 1year suspension of Atty Camano was proper Held/Ratio: Yes. IBP held that Atty. Camanos act of giving unsolicited advice to complainant is a culpable act because the advice conflicted with the interest of his clients, the spouses Genito in violation of rule on conflicting interests, established in Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although the act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be returned to him upon showing proof of his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest of the spouses Genito, this circumstance, lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal of the latters confidence so as to deserve outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his clients cause.Tthe statement of Atty. Camano in such a context should not be construed by this Court as giving advice in conflict against the interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest over the incorrectly levied properties. But the court holds the 1 year suspension as proper based on his other culpable acts which tend to degrade the profession and foment distrust in the integrity of court processes. Issue 2: WON Atty Inocentes can be held liable for acts done by Atty. Camano Held/Ratio: Yes. Although, the firm name Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office does not automatically make Atty. Inocentes the default lawyer acting in a supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano. It did, however, behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert ordinary diligence to find out what was going on in his law firm.as name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility.The IBP found that Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latters dealings with complainant. This indicates Atty. Inocentess supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof.But t appears from the records that Atty. Inocentes is a former judge and a lawyer who, as of yet, is in good standing and it is the first time in which Atty. Inocentes has been made to answer vicariously for the misconduct of
CANON 17A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. CANON 22A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
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severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case. Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel. Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill afford legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation. They deserve quality representation as well.
Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. If indeed Atty. Ortizs schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be avoided. That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case, hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper is per se a violation of Rule 18.03. Issue 2: WON Atty. Ortiz is justified in terminating his services with his election as city councillor of Bacolod City? Held/Ratio: NO, he is not justified in terminating his services. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office. Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors, and in such instance, the attorney-client relationship is terminated. However, city councilors are allowed to practice their profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this case. In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her services. Still, the

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DIGESTS POLITICAL LAW

JAINAL v. COMELEC 07 Mar 2007

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1. Taada v. Angara: where an action of the

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Winlaw BarOps 2008 Page 36 of 219

DIGESTS LABOR LAW

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contracts with petitioner. The set aside the Labor Arbiter's

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VELASCO vs. NLRC 26 June 2006 Facts:

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Winlaw BarOps 2008 Page 52 of 219

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