Endencia and Jugo v. David Case No. 98 G.R. No.

L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33 FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall beconsidered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to bea diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitutionstates that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not bediminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD: No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease incompensation is a clear interpretation of Which shall not be diminished during theircontinuance in office, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such atask must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on hissalary not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve hisindependence of judicial thought and action. People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87 FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governors letter which he presented as and evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the peace officers are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of peace officer equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted.

People of the Philippines v. Mapa Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89 FACTS:

Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The Courts ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.

People of the Philippines v. Purisima Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16 FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. ISSUE: W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9,it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 11 G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54 FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales,2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court

dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was a valid notice. 2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. HELD: Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them.

Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979)Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14 FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was chargedwith violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, particularly, for overtaking a truck.Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for theissuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the saidordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta,Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 ofAct No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136(The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that alater law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinanceis that it must not contravene the statute for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 190 G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987)Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments andcompensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution mandating thatduring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased, even as it isanathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the generalincome tax applied to all taxpayers. HELD: Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the generalincome tax. According to Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminutionof judges salaries because the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. Endenciavs.

David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer.

However both decisions must be discardedbecause the framers of the fundamental law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), asthe alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms themeaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the salaries of themembers of the judiciary taxable.

People v. Concepcion Case No. 205 G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.202 FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion,S. en C, a co-partnership. Defendants wife was a director of this co-partnership.Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that TheNational Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of theBoard of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. This Section was ineffect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, whichwere repealed by Act No. 2938. HELD: In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and giveeffect to the intention of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No.2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act.Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served totake away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of theLegislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized thesame offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving theCourts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with violations ofthe old law.

People v. Nazario Case No. 218 G.R. No. L-44143 (August 31, 1988)Chapter V, Footnote No.81, Page No. 197 FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him topay municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeateddemands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: Any owner or manager offishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay amunicipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that theordinance is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply tohim as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. ISSUE: 1. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain.2. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused. HELD: No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at bar be saidto be tainted with

vagueness. It is unmistakable from the above provision that theAccused falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comeswithin the term manager. While it appears that the National Government is theowner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in the profits they generated. Itis therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under theordinance. And obviously, the word owner cannot be construed to include theGovernment because of the ancient principle that the government is immune fromtaxes.

Gaanan v. Indeterminate Appellate Court Case No. 108 G.R. No. L-69809 (October 16, 1986)Chapter VI, Page 249, Footnote No. 11 FACTS: Atty. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawalof his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. Thatsame day, Laconico called the Appellant, Atty. Edgardo Gaanan to come to hisoffice and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. Whencomplainant Pintor called up, Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretlylisten to the telephone call through the extension phone. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec.1 of RA 4200. HELD: Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. Theremust be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installationof a device. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as thedevices enumerated in Sec. 1 RA 4200. In order to determine the true intent of thelegislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken asdetached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must beconsidered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of Empire InsuranceCompany v. Rufino , held that the phrase device or arrangement in Sec. 1 of RA4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed tocomprehend instruments of the same nature, that is, instruments the use of whichwould be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Furthermore, it is ageneral rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals Case No. 95 G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997)Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 23 FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registrationof a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs wererepresented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue thepetition. The trial court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. However, itwas found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and exclusive possessionof the subject land since 1938. The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failedto publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuantto a law. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought thecase to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in anoriginal land registration case is mandatory or directory. HELD: It is mandatory. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to bedone by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the courtorder setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative andthus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate isnot an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon itscontext in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term must beunderstood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of dueprocess.

Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank & Trust Case No. 193 G.R. No. L-24670 (December 14, 1979)Chapter VIII, Page 312, Footnote No. 133 FACTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction ofa building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes. Appellantdemanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on thesaid lots. The latter refused to comply, contending that the building was beingconstructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant having filedbuilding and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. ISSUE: W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring LotsNos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of themunicipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant onthe lots in question and if Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to MunicipalResolution No. 27. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the areaalong EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that the samerendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as againstdefendant.

Resolution No. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power tosafeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare ofthe people in the locality.Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant asvendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractualobligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. 27.

Ramos v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-53766 (October 30, 1981) FACTS: The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, availed of the services of the law firm of Cruz Durian & Academia (now Cruz Durian Agabin Atienza & Alday) in a case for land recovery against Maria C. Ramos et al Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and Municipal Attorney of Hagonoy entered their appearance as supervising counsel in the case for land recovery

Ramos moved to disqualify Cruz law firm from serving as counsel for the municipality Trial court denied motion to disqualify since it found that private counsel only wanted to serve his native town Ramos assailed said order by a petition for certoriari with the Court of Appeals, who sustained the ruling of the trial court, thus the case is appealed to the Supreme Court ISSUE: WON the finding of the CA that it is legal for a private counsel to represent LGU is correct HELD: Overturned. As Justice Moreland observes, Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and inserting them there, making them fit personal Ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and construction. There are two specific laws prohibiting private counsels representing the government- Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code states "the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council. Another is Sec. 3 of Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264, which provides that the municipal attorney, as the head of the legal division or office of a municipality, "shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to him by the council"

Diao V. Martinez (LEGAL PROF) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978) Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP ByLaws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void.

Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent.

Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.