Facts: Garcia Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils.

without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils. Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar. Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the phils., for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils.

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well as other information regarding Cojuangco. Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name? Held: NO. As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. 1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. 2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been

established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. 3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. Except: 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged. That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.

cOBB-PEREZ vs. LANTIN [1968] Facts: A motion for reconsideration was filed in relation to the observation1 made by the court in its decision dated May 22, 1968. The court assessed treble costs against the petitioners to be paid by their counsels. Attys. Baizas and Bolinao seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their professional conduct and condemns them to pay the treble costs. November 5, 1962 - Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue. The petitioners and their counsel chose to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. Perez spouses as represented by their counsel sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. Issue: WON Attys. Baizas and Bolinao used devices to delay the execution of the judgment? YES Ratio:

 Mrs. Perez and her counsel, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal The circumstances relative to the motion for reconsideration clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." The Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. Attys. Baizas and Bolinao contends that if there was delay it was because they happened to be more assertive, a quality of lawyers which is not to be condemned. The court replied that a counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his clients if he he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. Decision: Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners. 1 We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice LEDESMA vs. CLIMACO [1974] Personalities: Ponente : Fernando, J Facts: Prior to his appointment as election registrar for Cadiz, Negros Occ. on Oct 30, 1964, petitioner was counsel de parte as an accused in a pending case in the sala of the

respondent. Citing the demands of his appointive post and the conflict that may arise between the discharge of his duties as election registrar and officer of the court, petitioner moved to withdraw as counsel. Respondent not only denied the motion, but appointed petitioner as counsel de oficio for the two other accused. Petitioner now comes before the SC to have the order of the respondent judge reversed on certiorari. Issue: WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. NO The principal reason behind respondents denial of the motion to withdraw of petitioner is because of its effect to delay the case further. The criminal proceeding had already been postponed several times, and to grant the petitioners motion would have been tantamount to a denial the accuseds rights. The fact that the respondent already appointed the petitioner as counsel de oficio other than the de parte, renders the latters excuse of the demand of his job as registrar inutile. There is no reason for him to compromise the accused, defense for want of time with the demands on the time of counsel de oficio is less than that of de parte. It is thus, clear that petitioner is merely reluctant to represent the accused, membership in the Bar requires the responsibility to live up to its exacting standard, which includes assisting the state when called upon to administer justice, the law is not a trade or a craft, but a profession. As such, the facts that petitioner will not be compensated for his trouble should not hinder him from defending the accused to the best of his ability. The right of the accused to counsel is a constitutionally protected right, such that any frustration thereof by petitioner amounts to a serious affront to the profession.