Doctrinal Updates

Political Law
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2008 Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license.

Some Rights Reserved.

This document was prepared by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero for the Project Phoenix (2008) of the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL) under the direction of Atty. Jaime N. Soriano. Compiled as PDF, July 2011. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).

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Doctrinal Updates (Atty. Berne Guerrero)

Doctrines declared and reiterated by the Supreme Court Samples from January September 2007 Constitutional Law I Naturalization Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. (So vs. Republic, GR 170603, 29 January 2007; Third Division, Callejo Sr. J.) The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting brain gain for the Philippines. These however, do not justify [the] contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for naturalization by judicial act. (So vs. Republic, GR 170603, 29 January 2007; Third Division, Callejo Sr. J.) C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. (So vs. Republic, GR 170603, 29 January 2007; Third Division, Callejo Sr. J.) A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court. (So vs. Republic, GR 170603, 29 January 2007; Third Division, Callejo Sr. J.) Judicial Review Locus Standi Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,)
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[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita [G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1] requires that the following elements must be established: (1) the public character of the funds or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. [Moreover,] Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando [G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 173] more specifically declares that the transcendental importance of the issues raised must relate to the merits of the petition. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) Moot and Academic The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. (Republic Telecommunications Holdings Inc. vs. Santiago, GR 140338, 7 August 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; Third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 140656, 13 September 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) Judicial Review does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The constitutional provision quoted in Mateo merely gives this Court jurisdiction over such cases. [Under Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution], only paragraphs (1) and (2) speak of jurisdiction over cases. However, this Constitutional provision does not enumerate cases involving mandatory review. Indeed, it would almost be silly to claim that this Court is mandatorily required to review all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. Instead, the significance of the enumeration of this Courts jurisdiction in paragraphs (1) and (2) is that while Section 2 of the same Article VIII of the Constitution gives to Congress the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts, it denies to Congress the power to deprive this Court of jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5. (People vs. Rocha, GR 173797, 31 August 2007; Third Division, Chico-Nazario J.) Separation of Powers Principle
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Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President, and the Judiciary may not encroach on fields allocated to each of them. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The principle presupposes mutual respect by and between the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) Reorganization The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative power. The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) As provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,) Pardon and clemency This Court cannot review, much less preempt, the exercise of executive clemency under the pretext of preventing the accused from evading the penalty of reclusion perpetua or from trifling with our judicial system. Clemency is not a function of the judiciary; it is an executive function. Thus, it is the President, not the judiciary, who should exercise caution and utmost circumspection in the exercise of executive clemency in order to prevent a derision of the criminal justice system. (People vs. Rocha, GR 173797, 31 August 2007; Third Division, Chico-Nazario J.) Acts of State and its agents The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. One exception is when the strict application of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public such as the Torrens system. (San Roque Realty & Development Corp. vs. Republic, GR 163130, 7 September 2007; Third Division, Nachura J.) [As] an exception to the general rule that estoppel cannot lie against the government. [t]he Republic v. Court of Appeals,[361 Phil. 319, 329-333 (1999)] provides an illuminating discourse on when such an exception applies, thus: Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not
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be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals. (Barstowe Philippines Corporation vs. Republic, GR 133110, 28 March 2007; Third Division, Chico-Nazario J.) Congress The formulation of State policy is a legislative concern. Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. (NPC Employees Consolidated Union vs. National Power Corporation, GR 144158, 24 April 2007; First Division, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) Party-List The Court rules that the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula has not modified the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, there was really no other formula approved by the Court other than the Veterans formula in fixing the number of additional seats for the other qualified party-list groups. Also, in Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC, the Court found that the confusion in the computation of additional seats for the other qualified party-list groups arose [from] the way the Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani. We reiterated that the prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans x x x. (Citizens Battle Against Corruption vs. Commission on Elections, GR 172103, 13 April 2007; En Banc, Velasco Jr. J.) Ombudsman The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases against government employees, which includes public school teachers, is vested by no less than Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Estandarte, GR 168670, 13 April 2007; Third Division, Callejo Sr. J.) Investigate and prosecute As a rule, the filing or non-filing of the information is primarily lodged within the full discretion of the Ombudsman who is a constitutional officer. Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is charged with the duty to [i]nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. (Republic vs. Desierto, GR 135123, 22 January 2007; First Division, Azcuna J.) Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three branches of government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence. (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, GR 138142, 19 September 2007; First Division, Corona J.) The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or substance or should he find it otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, GR 138142, 19 September 2007; First Division, Corona J.) In Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice,[G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 70-75] after a thorough review of law and jurisprudence, this Court comprehensively
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discussed the implications of the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman vis--vis the DOJ as to preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees, viz: [T]he Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. (Decin vs. Tayco, GR 149991, 14 February 2007; Third Division, AustriaMartinez J.) Power to directly remove erring official [T]he power of the Ombudsman to directly remove an erring public official has been jurisprudentially settled. In Estarija v. Ranada, [G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 652, it was] ruled: The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. (Office of the Ombudsman, GR 161098, 13 September 2007; First Division, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.; Also in Commission on Audit, Regional Office 13, Butuan City vs. Hinampas, GR 158672, 7 August 2007; En Banc, Garcia J.) In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 437, it was] held: Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination. In interpreting a statute, care should be given that every part thereof be given effect. Hence, the use of the word recommend must be read in conjunction with the words ensure compliance therewith in order not to run counter to the intention of the framers of the Constitution to give the Ombudsman full and complete disciplinary authority, with powers that are not merely persuasive in character. (Office of the Ombudsman, GR 161098, 13 September 2007; First Division, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) Power to place a public officer under preventive suspension There is no dispute as to the power of the Ombudsman to place a public officer charged with an administrative offense under preventive suspension. That power is clearly confined under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Clear it is from the above that the law sets forth two conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, to wit: (1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) Either of the following circumstances coexist with the first requirement: (a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) The respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. (Ombudsman vs. Valeroso, GR 167828, 2 April 2007; First Division, Garcia J.) Special Prosecutor [T]he Office of the Special Prosecutor is but a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and is subject to his supervision and control. In Perez v. Sandiganbayan,[G.R. No. 166062, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 252] this Court held that control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. (Calingin vs. Desierto, GR 145743-89, 10 August 2007; First Division, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.)
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Constitutional Law II Eminent Domain Subject matter of expropriation [A]n easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken.(National Power Corporation vs. Tiangco, GR 170846, 6 February 2007; First Division, Garcia J.) While the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession. However, if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land, in accordance with our ruling in NPC v. Manubay Agro-Industrial [G.R. No. 150936, August 18, 2004, 437 SCRA 60]. (National Power Corporation vs. Tiangco, GR 170846, 6 February 2007; First Division, Garcia J.) Taking In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. (National Power Corporation vs. Tiangco, GR 170846, 6 February 2007; First Division, Garcia J.) Just compensation [E]minent domain cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the States sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights. (San Roque Realty & Development Corp. vs. Republic, GR 163130, 7 September 2007; Third Division, Nachura J.) [I]f the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title covering [the lot.] (San Roque Realty & Development Corp. vs. Republic, GR 163130, 7 September 2007; Third Division, Nachura J.) Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint whichever comes first. (Romonafe Corporation vs. National Power Corporation, GR 168122, 30 January 2007; Second Division, Carpio-Morales J.) Just compensation in Agrarian reform [I]t is inequitable to determine the just compensation based solely on the formula provided by DAR A.O. No. 13, as amended. Thus, [the Court returns] to the guidelines provided under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 since the same remained operative despite the passage of Republic Act No. 6657. On this score, E.O. No. 229, which provides for the mechanism of Rep. Act No. 6657, specifically states: (P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. However, since just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also its payment within a reasonable time from the taking of the land, an interest [should be
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imposed] in the nature of damages for the delay. In line with current jurisprudence, [the Court] set the legal interest at 12% per annum. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Imperial, GR 157753, 12 February 2007; Second Division, Quisumbing J.) [T]he taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. In a number of cases, [the Court has] stated that just compensation in expropriation proceedings represents the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. To compensate is to render something which is equal in value to that taken or received. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Imperial, GR 157753, 12 February 2007; Second Division, Quisumbing J.) Due Process The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. At all events, the due process guarantee cannot be invoked when no vested right has been acquired. (Espinocilla vs. Bagong Tanyag Homeowners Association Inc., GR 151019, 9 August 2007; Second Division, Carpio-Morales J.) Non-Impairment of Contracts The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. In Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co.,[No. L-24670, 14 December 1979, 94 SCRA 533] the Court held that contractual restrictions on the use of property could not prevail over the reasonable exercise of police power through zoning regulations. (United BF Homeowners Association Inc. Vs. The (Municipal) City Mayor, Paranaque City, GR 141010, 7 February 2007; Second Division, Carpio J.) Search and Seizure [The] constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. (People vs. Tuazon, GR 175783, 3 September 2007; Third Division, Chico-Nazario J.) The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures. The seizure and impounding of [a vehicle involved in an accident], on [a policemans] request, were unquestionably violative of the right to be let alone by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution. (Superlines Transportation Co. Inc. vs. Philippine National Construction Company, GR 169596, 28 March 2007; Second Division, Carpio-Morales J.) Moving vehicles In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,[G.R. No. 88017, 21 January 1991, 193 SCRA 122, 128-129, the Supreme] Court had the occasion to elucidate on the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the requirement of search warrant, thus: [T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.(People vs. Tuazon, GR 175783, 3 September 2007; Third Division, Chico-Nazario J.) [T]he exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the police
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authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle. (People vs. Tuazon, GR 175783, 3 September 2007; Third Division, Chico-Nazario J.) Plain view Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (Abenes vs. Court of Appeals, GR 156320, 14 February 2007; Third Division, Austria-Martinez J.) Freedom of Speech Libel stands as an exception to one of the most cherished constitutional rights, that of free expression. While libel laws ensure a modicum of responsibility in ones own speech or expression, a prescribed legal standard that conveniences the easy proliferation of libel suits fosters an atmosphere that inhibits the right to speak freely. When such a prescribed standard is submitted for affirmation before this Court, as is done in this petition, it must receive the highest possible scrutiny, as it may interfere with the most basic of democratic rights. (Chavez vs. People, GR 125813, 6 February 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) Custodial investigation A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily shown to have been obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it must further be tested for voluntariness, that is, if it was given freely by the confessant without any form of coercion or inducement. Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessants choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. If all the foregoing requisites are met, the confession constitutes evidence of a high order because it is presumed that no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the exclusionary rule. (People vs. Rapeza, GR 169431, 3 April 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accusedreflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary. (People vs. Rapeza, GR 169431, 3 April 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. (People vs. Rapeza, GR 169431, 3 April 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. (People vs. Rapeza, GR 169431, 3 April 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.)
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[T]he purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements. And in the event the accused desires to give a confession, it is the duty of his counsel to ensure that the accused understands the legal import of his act and that it is a product of his own free choice. (People vs. Rapeza, GR 169431, 3 April 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) [If it] appears that [the lawyers] participation in the proceeding was confined to the notarization of [accuseds] confession[, such] participation is not the kind of legal assistance that should be accorded to [the accused] in legal contemplation. (People vs. Rapeza, GR 169431, 3 April 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) Writ of Habeas Corpus The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement, detention or deprivation of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. More specifically, it is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is detained. (Barredo vs. Vinarao, GR 168728, 2 August 2007; First Division, Corona J.) The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, the writ may be allowed as a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings leading to the conviction were attended by any of the following exceptional circumstances: (1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or (3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. (Barredo vs. Vinarao, GR 168728, 2 August 2007; First Division, Corona J.) While it is true that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of violations of constitutional right, [t]his Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. As a rule, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus does not extend into questions of conditions of confinement; but only to the fact and duration of confinement. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. It is not a means for the redress of grievances or to seek injunctive relief or damages. (Aquino vs. Esperon, GR 174994, 31 August 2007; Special Third Division, Chico-Nazario J.) Visitation rights [T]he Court had in the past underscored the hands-off doctrinea deference given by courts to military custodians over prison matters, especially on blanket restrictions on contact visit. In Alejano, [the Court] gave reasons for the allowance of such restrictions, thus: Block v. Rutherford [468 U.S. 576 (1984)], which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal conviction. Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect escapes. Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other contraband. The restriction on contact visit was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and weapons. The security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees. Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal of internal security. This case reaffirmed the hands-off doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in deference to administrative expertise. (Aquino vs. Esperon, GR 174994, 31 August 2007; Special Third Division, Chico-Nazario J.) Administrative Law Administrative remedies
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In Land Car, Inc. v. Bachelor Express Inc. and Vallacar Transit, Inc.,[G.R. No. 154377, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 307] the Court ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the [Office of the President] to review any determination or disposition of a department head. In fact, the doctrine requires an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted before the courts judicial power is invoked. (Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Uy, GR 169277, 9 February 2007; Third Division, Callejo Sr. J.) [A] party seeking an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to court action. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Acosta, GR 154068, 3 August 2007; Second Division, Quisumbing J.) Administrative agencies Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such, can only wield such powers as are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1008, provides [that] The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and workmanship, violation of the terms of agreement, interpretation and/or application of contractual time and delays, maintenance and defects, payment, default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost. Excluded from the coverage of the law are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines. (Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc. vs. Equinox Land Corporation, GR 152505-06, 13 September 2007; First Division, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. Under the law, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, namely: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem. The instances when COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant. The Cuison property is private property, having been registered under the Torrens system in the name of petitioner. Thus, the government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. The parties claiming the Cuison property are herein petitioner and private respondents. None of them is a squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural minority. The dispute between the parties was not critical and explosive in nature so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action. (Cayabyab vs. Gomez de Aquino, GR 159974, 5 September 2007; Third Division, Austria-Martinez J.) Public Officers
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In Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, [376 Phil. 191, 198-199 (1999), the Court] ruled that: [I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of a duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. (Apolinario vs. Flores, GR 152789, 22 January 2007; Second Division, Carpio J.) Appointments Appointments of non-eligibles in civil service [A] permanent appointment can issue only to a person who possesses all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility. Differently stated, as a rule, no person may be appointed to a public office unless he or she possesses the requisite qualifications. The exception to the rule is where, in the absence of appropriate eligibles, he or she may be appointed to it merely in a temporary capacity. Such a temporary appointment is not made for the benefit of the appointee. Rather, an acting or temporary appointment seeks to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent appointee. In Cuadra v. Cordova,[103 Phil. 391 (1958)] this Court defined a temporary appointment as one made in an acting capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary character and its terminability at pleasure by the appointing power. Thus, the temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition that he shall surrender the office when called upon to do so by the appointing authority. Under Section 27 (2), Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same Code, the term of a temporary appointment shall be 12 months, unless sooner terminated by the appointing authority. Such pre-termination of a temporary appointment may be with or without cause as the appointee serves merely at the pleasure of the appointing power. (Civil Service Commission vs. Darangina, GR 167472, 31 January 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) [W]here a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, his replacement by another non-eligible is not prohibited. (Civil Service Commission vs. Darangina, GR 167472, 31 January 2007; En Banc, SandovalGutierrez J.) Midnight appointments The practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue midnight appointments, especially after their successors have been proclaimed] does not only cause animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time and energy in defending their appointments instead of attending to their functions. However, not all midnight appointments are invalid. Each appointment must be judged on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of the individual appointment and the circumstances surrounding the same. It is only when the appointments were made en masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been made through hurried maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and propriety that this Court has struck down midnight appointments. (Sales vs. Carreon Jr., GR 160791, 13 February 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) Appointing authority The power of appointment involves considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. The CSC is not authorized to curtail or diminish the exercise of discretion of the appointing power on the nature or kind of appointment to be extended. (Jaucian vs. Gen. Wycoco, GR 164710, 28 September 2007; En Banc, Quisumbing J.) It is State policy that opportunities for government employment shall be open to all qualified citizens and employees shall be selected on the basis of fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of
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the positions.[6] It was precisely in order to ensure transparency and equal opportunity in the recruitment and hiring of government personnel, that Republic Act No. 7041 was enacted. The CSC is required to publish the lists of vacant positions and such publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after they have been reported to the CSC as vacant and only after publication. (Sales vs. Carreon Jr., GR 160791, 13 February 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) Public Accountability in cash or in kind to the Government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies become government funds or property. Even the proceeds of donations cannot be disbursed or disposed of except in accordance with law. Some of the governing rules are found in the GAA, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual. (Manhit vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR 159349, 7 September 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) Separation of employees from service Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 12 (Series of 1994) provides that an employee who goes on AWOL for at least thirty (30) calendar days shall be dropped from the rolls without prior notice. (Jaucian vs. Gen. Wycoco, GR 164710, 28 September 2007; En Banc, Quisumbing J.) Under Section 46, Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, one of the causes for separation from government service of an officer or employee is mental incapacity. Separation from the service for such cause is done by way of a disciplinary proceeding governed by Rule II of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19-99). The minimum procedural requirements thereof are: a) that notice of the charge be served on the officer or employee; and, b) that the latter be given opportunity to be heard. While Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 is silent on this matter, mental incapacity not arising from immoral or vicious habits is also a cause for separation under Section 26 of E.O. No. 292 and Section 2(2), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution, which demand of government officers and employees continuing merit and fitness. Separation from the service for such cause is carried out through a non-disciplinary process governed by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998 (MC 40-98). The only difference between the two modes of separation is that the first carries administrative disabilities, such as forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from employment in the government service, while the second does not. But both result in loss of employment a property right protected under the due process clause. Hence, even if considered a non-disciplinary mode of separation, dropping from the rolls due to mental incapacity not arising from immoral or vicious habits is subject to the requirements of due process. (Romagos vs. Metro Cebu Water District, GR 156100, 12 September 2007; Third Division, Austria-Martinez J.) [B]efore an officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls for mental incapacity, the following elements and process must obtain: first, that it has been observed that the subject officer or employee has been behaving abnormally for an extended period; second, that it has been established through substantial evidence that such abnormal behavior manifests a continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work; third, that a written notice is issued by the subjects immediate supervisor, describing the formers continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work and citing the reports of his co-workers or immediate supervisor, as confirmed by the head of office; and finally, that another notice is issued by the appointing authority or head of office, informing the subject of his separation from the service due to mental incapacity. Thus, a declaration of mental disorder does not automatically translate to a judgment of mental incapacity to perform work. A window remains open for the affected officer or employee to counter opinion on his mental condition and to show that his ability to work remains unimpaired. Only then may the appointing authority or head of office decide on whether said officer or employee is no longer mentally capable of performing his work and should be discharged. These requirements are designed to obviate misuse of non-disciplinary modes of separation for petty vengeance or vicious harassment. (Romagos vs. Metro Cebu Water District, GR 156100, 12 September 2007; Third Division, Austria-Martinez J.) Election Laws
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COMELEC [T]he Constitution invests the COMELEC with broad power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite and other electoral exercises. In the discharge of its legal duties, the COMELEC is provided by the law with tools, ample wherewithal, and considerable latitude in adopting means that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created - to promote free, orderly and honest elections. Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed concomitant powers, COMELEC deserves to be accorded by the Court the greatest measure of presumption of regularity in its course of action and choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government. (Province of Agusan del Norte vs. Commission on Elections, GR 165080, 24 April 2007; En Banc, Garcia J.) [As] stated in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC:[ G.R. No. 133676, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 832] Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances. (Province of Agusan del Norte vs. Commission on Elections, GR 165080, 24 April 2007; En Banc, Garcia J.) Consistent with its broad powers to enforce and administer all election laws, the Comelec has power of supervision and control over the boards of election inspectors and canvassers. This power includes the authority to relieve any member thereof for cause or, as in this case, to appoint a substitute. (Province of Agusan del Norte vs. Commission on Elections, GR 165080, 24 April 2007; En Banc, Garcia J.) Certificate of Candidacy Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,[G.R. No. 105111 and G.R. No. 105384, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 297] which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the case [of Cayat vs. Commission on Elections, GR 163776, 24 April 2007; En Banc, Carpio J.] because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidates disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. (Cayat vs. Commission on Elections, GR 163776, 24 April 2007; En Banc, Carpio J.) To allow a candidate disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the elections to be voted for and have his votes counted is a blatant violation of a mandatory provision of the election law. It creates confusion in the results of the elections and invites needless new litigations from a candidate whose disqualification had long become final before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was never meant to apply to a situation where a candidates disqualification had become final before the elections. (Cayat vs. Commission on Elections, GR 163776, 24 April 2007; En Banc, Carpio J.) Under Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice. The law mandates that the candidates must be notified of the petition against them and should be given the opportunity to present evidence on their behalf. This is the essence of due process. (Luna vs. Commission on Elections, GR 165983, 23 April 2007; En Banc, Carpio J.) When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. (Luna vs. Commission on Elections, GR 165983, 23 April 2007; En Banc, Carpio J.)

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The Election Code allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. There is no provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election. (Luna vs. Commission on Elections, GR 165983, 23 April 2007; En Banc, Carpio J.) The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez v. Del Rosario,[111 Phil. 733 (1961).] the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state, among others, the date of birth of the person filing the certificate. Section 78 of the Election Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy. (Luna vs. Commission on Elections, GR 165983, 23 April 2007; En Banc, Carpio J.) Ballots A ballot indicates the voters will. There is no requirement that the entries in the ballot be written nicely or that the name of the candidate be spelled accurately. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot is presumed valid unless there is a clear reason to justify its rejection. The object in the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in issue, as in this case, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents which involves a question of fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC. (Juan vs. Commission on Elections, GR 166639, 24 April 2007; En Banc, Nachura J.) The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, as it is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings, and decisions rendered by the said Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by [the Supreme] Court. (Balingit vs. Commission on Elections, GR 170300, 9 February 2007; En Banc, AustriaMartinez J.) Marked ballots In order for a ballot to be considered marked, in the sense necessary to invalidate it, it must appear that the voter designedly placed some superfluous sign or mark on the ballot which might serve to identify it thereafter. No ballot should be discarded as a marked ballot unless its character as such is unmistakable. The distinguishing mark which the law forbids to be placed on the ballots is that which the elector may have placed with the intention of facilitating the means of identifying said ballot, for the purpose of defeating the secrecy of suffrage which the law establishes. Thus, marked ballots are ballots containing distinguishing marks, the purpose of which is to identify them. (Perman vs. Commission on Elections, GR 174010, 8 February 2007; En Banc, Tinga J.) In Ong v. Commission on Elections,[G.R. No. 144197, December 13, 2000, 347 SCRA 681, the Court] held that big bold letters that occupy all the spaces for the specific position should be invalidated, inasmuch as this evinces an evident intent to mark the ballot. (Cundangan vs. Commission on Elections, GR 174392, 28 August 2007; En Banc, Quisumbing J.) [T]he distinction should always be between marks that were apparently carelessly or innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely placed thereon by the voter with a view to possible future identification, which invalidates it. The marks which shall be considered sufficient to invalidate the ballot are those which the voter himself deliberately placed on his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafter.
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(Villagracia vs. Commission on Elections, GR 168296, 31 January 2007; En Banc, Puno CJ.) Written by one person In Cundangan vs. Commission on Elections, GR 174392, 28 August 2007, the 89 contested ballots could not have been WBOP [i.e. Written By One Person], considering that there were differences in how particular letters in each of the said ballots were written. Neighborhood rule Cundangan vs. Commission on Elections, GR 174392, 28 August 2007, the COMELEC likewise correctly counted the two claimed ballots in favor of Chua by reason of the neighborhood rule, considering that the name of Chua was written on the first space for Kagawads and that the space for Punong Barangay was left blank. Hearing of Election Cases Election cases must be heard and decided first in division, and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. The procedure for disposition of motions for reconsideration in the COMELEC is found in Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 19 [Motions for Reconsideration] state [that] Sec. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc; [and] Sec. 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Resolution. - The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof [respectively]. (San Juan vs. Commission on Elections, GR 170908, 24 August 2007; En Banc, Quisumbing J) Failure of Elections The jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc over a petition to declare a failure of elections has been affirmed by this Court which ruled that a petition to declare a failure of elections is neither a pre-proclamation controversy nor an election case. A prayer to annul election results and a prayer to declare failure of elections based on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence or analogous causes are actually of the same nature and are denominated similarly in the Omnibus Election Code. (Mutilan vs. Commission on Elections, GR 171248, 2 April 2007; En Banc, Carpio J.) While automatic elevation of a case erroneously filed with the Division to En Banc is not provided in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such action is not prohibited. Section 4 [Means to Effect Jurisdiction], Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides All auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry into effect its powers or jurisdiction may be employed by the Commission; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or these rules, any suitable process or proceeding may be adopted. (Mutilan vs. Commission on Elections, GR 171248, 2 April 2007; En Banc, Carpio J.) Pre-proclamation Controversies [I]t is a well-established rule in pre-proclamation cases that the Board of Canvassers is without jurisdiction to go beyond what appears on the face of the election return. The rationale is that a full reception of evidence aliunde and the meticulous examination of voluminous election documents would run counter to the summary nature of a pre-proclamation controversy. However, this rule is not without any exception. In Lee v. Commission on Elections, we held as follows: [this rule] presupposes that the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face. Where, as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election return. (Ewoc vs. Commission on Elections, GR 171882, 3 April 2007; En Banc,
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Quisumbing J.) While this Court has already stressed that public policy frowns on grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the protest attempts, this policy however, has to be balanced against the clear and present dangers created by a lengthy period of non-proclamation of winners, a period commonly fraught with tension and danger for the public at large. (Ewoc vs. Commission on Elections, GR 171882, 3 April 2007; En Banc, Quisumbing J.) Election Contests Construction of Laws [I]n Jaramilla v. Commission on Elections,[G.R. No. 155717, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 337] the Court held that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. It is highly imperative that the will of the electorate be determined, and technicalities dispensed with if it hampers such determination. A stubborn subservience to technicalities that would result in upholding a patently void proclamation will never be allowed by [the Supreme] Court. (Manago vs. Commission on Elections, GR 167224, 21 September 2007; En Banc, Quisumbing J.) Election, returns, and qualifications The phrase election, returns, and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. (Vinzons-Chato vs. Commission on Elections, GR 172131, 2 April 2007; En Banc, Callejo Sr. J.) HRET With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members. (Vinzons-Chato vs. Commission on Elections, GR 172131, 2 April 2007; En Banc, Callejo Sr. J.) Public Corporations Local Government Sec. 61(c) of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, reads A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory. The final and executory phrase used in the immediatelyquoted provision was construed in Mendoza v. Laxina, Sr.[453 Phil. 1013 (2003)] to be immediately executory, albeit the respondent may appeal the adverse decision to the proper office. (Don vs. Lacsa, GR 170810, 7 August 2007; Second Division, Carpio-Morales J.) Public Corporation The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these
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corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation. (Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals vs. Commission on Audit, GR 169752, 25 September 2007; En Banc, Austria-Martinez, J.) Public International Law Act of state doctrine The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by which States prevent their national courts from deciding disputes which relate to the internal affairs of another State, the other two being immunity and nonjusticiability It is an avoidance technique that is directly related to a States obligation to respect the independence and equality of other States by not requiring them to submit to adjudication in a national court or to settlement of their disputes without their consent. It requires the forum court to exercise restraint in the adjudication of disputes relating to legislative or other governmental acts which a foreign State has performed within its territorial limits. (PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 124772, 14 August 2007; Second Division, Tinga J.) Person as valid subject of international law Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr., GR 153675, 19 April 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) Adherence to convention on human rights The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr., GR 153675, 19 April 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) Extradition Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even
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though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr., GR 153675, 19 April 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) [W]hile extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the machinery of criminal law. This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused if such will best serve the interest of justice. We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state in case of urgency to ask for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition; and that release from provisional arrest shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr., GR 153675, 19 April 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. Temporary detention may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr., GR 153675, 19 April 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr., GR 153675, 19 April 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr., GR 153675, 19 April 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.) In extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed clear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr., GR 153675, 19 April 2007; En Banc, Sandoval-Gutierrez J.)

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