The year 2010 was another disappointing year for the people of Nepal.

The peace process was deadlocked, with extreme polarization within and among the political parties on various issues. Despite the extension of the Constituent Assembly (CA) for a year, the parties could not complete even the rudimentary task of drafting a new constitution. The blame for this unsettled state of affairs was conveniently heaped on the so-called external forces. The only silver lining in the dark clouds was the high-level task force headed by UCPN-Maoist leader Prachanda, which resolved around 100 out of 220 contentious issues, and the formation of the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) secretariat. Throughout the year, the major political parties undertook a number of initiatives to resolve the deadlock. A high level political mechanism (HLPM) was initiated on January 8, 2010 under the leadership of the late G.P. Koirala. His death on March 20 brought the HLPM to a halt. The Maoists announced an indefinite nationwide strike from May 2, after a number of inconclusive dialogues with other parties. After prolonged discussions, the Maoists entered into a three-point agreement with the other political parties on May 28 to extend the tenure of the CA for one year. The differences between the political parties widened further with Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepals resignation on June 30. There have been sixteen rounds of elections to form a new government since July 21, but no candidate has been able to attain a simple majority in the CA. It was difficult to generate consensus among the three main political parties on the issues of PLA integration, restructuring of the country, and formation of a consensus government. The factionalism within the parties and greed for power among the leaders came to the fore and hobbled the process of negotiations. The leaders were seen to be changing their positions in each meeting according to the internal situation within their parties. Interestingly, the ideological differences amongst the Maoist leaders on the future political line of the party surfaced in the Standing Committee meeting on January 27, 2010; some advocated negotiation, while others rooted for peoples revolution if the negotiation would not go in their favour. This widened the gulf of distrust between the Maoists and other major political parties and affected the process of reconciliation. Moreover, the lack of response from the government on the Maoist demands fuelled the suspicions of the Maoist hardliners who claimed that national and international reactionaries were acting not to let the constitution be promulgated on May 28. The Maoist Standing Committee thus decided on March 29 to act against the reactionaries and intensify political dialogue with other parties. During this period, there was an intense effort by the UML chairman, Jhalanath Khanal, to form a national unity government to write the constitution, but the party was divided on the issue; for example, Madhav Kumar Nepal, the Prime Minister, opposed the idea. As uncertainty loomed large on the future of the peace process, the Maoists announced on April 6 the start of a new round of protests demanding civilian supremacy, national integrity and timely constitutiondrafting and peace in the country. The Maoists and some factions in the UML criticized the government as being remotely controlled by New Delhi.

However, despite these differences, major political parties hurriedly entered into a three-point agreement on May 28 to extend the term of the CA for one year. Later, this agreement was interpreted differently by different parties, which resulted in the delay in the resignation of Prime Minister. The Maoists as well as other opposition parties refused to cooperate with the government in passing the budget. The ruling party, UML, was also divided on the issue, which compelled Madhav Kumar Nepal to resign on June 30. Following his resignation, the President asked political parties to form a consensus government within seven days; but consensus proved elusive. The UML and NC refused to support a Maoistled government until the Maoists implemented all past agreements. They suspected that if Maoists came to power without dismantling the PLA and YCL (Young Communist League), it could result in their capturing power for ever; the Maoists vacillated on the issue because they wished to let the PLA continue to be as a political insurance. As the deadline to form a consensus government expired on July 12, the President directed parliament to elect a majority government. The first round of elections for the Prime Ministers post on July 21 ended inconclusively. Since then fifteen rounds of elections have taken place until November 19, 2010, without any results. The Maoists have boycotted the elections but they have not formally withdrawn their candidate, for which constitutionally the process has to go on until either one of the candidates secures the majority vote or all the parties decide to amend the interim constitution and initiate a different procedure. The political deadlock has adversely affected Nepals economy and development. The budget of 2010/11 was delayed for more than four months. The governance system has virtually collapsed. Extortion by armed groups and frequent strikes by ethnic groups and small parties have affected life all around. The security situation in Terai and eastern Nepal remains fragile due to the strong presence of armed groups. There has been mounting public pressure on the parties to end the present deadlock. The deadlock, however, seems far from over. The NC has decided not to withdraw its candidate from the prime ministerial race until the integration issue is resolved. Since November 2010, the parties have been meeting on a number of occasions to resolve the deadlock, but to no avail. The Maoists have shown flexibility on some issues and proposed workable plans on government formation, but the prejudices of the NC and some leaders in the UML have foiled these efforts. Despite Maoist flexibility, they are yet to abandon their dual policy of joining the democratic process on the one hand and retaining the option of restarting peoples war on the other which was visible in their sixth plenum on November 21. The party is yet to reconcile the internal differences and finalize its political line after Prachandas resignation in May 2009. As the CA deadline (May 28, 2011) draws nearer, the Maoists perhaps realise that they would be the biggest losers if the new constitution is not promulgated on time. The Maoists appear eager to resume the regular session of Parliament which was prorogued after Maoist lawmakers assaulted the Finance Minister during the budget presentation on November 19. The Maoists do not seem to favour Presidents Rule because they are not sure of better results in any forthcoming elections at this juncture.

The next session of the CA is due to begin from January 9, 2011. The unresolved issues are likely to come back for detailed discussion again in the new year. This session would be interesting because the Maoists have agreed to the appointment of the chief of the AISC secretariat. It will also be a testing time for the NC and UML to use this issue to remain in power. The UMLs decision to support a majority government may split the party itself. The Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP) has already formally split on December 31, 2010. The second challenging task would be the parties commitment to the peace process and restraining from violence in the absence of UNMIN after January 16. The Maoists are not very happy with UNMINs withdrawal. They have also expressed their displeasure about the AISC secretariats five phases of rehabilitation plan. Given all this, the first half of 2011 will be critical for the future polity of Nepal. As you may or may not already know, Nepal has a long and troubled history of political instability. This political turmoil stems from a 10 year of civil war with Maoist rebels, which finally ended in 2006. Although most of the violence has subsided, tension between political parties reached an all time high this spring. Thousands of Maoist supporters traveled to Kathmandu to voice their displeasure with the current government, demanding that the Prime Minister step down. Days of intense protests shut down the capital of Nepal. Ultimately, the pressure put on the current government lead the Prime Minister to resign just last month. With all that has gone on in Nepal in the past few months, there have been several reports in the media which I encourage you to explore. Recently, CBC put out an article that gives a brief history of the political ongoings, as well as a nice summary of the current political situation in Nepal.
Nepals unending troubles have pushed yet another year into the void, with a political deadlock blocking out all possibilities of progress in both Government formation and the critical drafting of a Constitution. A tiny glimmer of light, however, can be extracted from the fact that, despite the continuous and often abrasive political confrontations, the country has remained relatively free of major acts of violence. Total militancy-related fatalities, according South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP data), have continued their declining trend, with 35 deaths recorded in 2010 (all data till November 28, 2010), as against 50 through 2009, and 480 in the last phase of the Maoist peoples war in 2006, before a peace deal was hammered out with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) after the collapse of the monarchy. Civilian fatalities have seen a dramatic fall, from 35 in 2009 to 12 in 2010, while militant deaths have risen from 14 to 22. Nepal Fatalities: 2009-10* Years 2010* 2009 2008 2007 Civilians 12 35 55 59 SFs 1 1 1 0 Militants/ Terrorists 22 14 25 40 Total 35 50 81 99

2006

61

181

238

480

Source: SATP *Data till November 28 Significantly, of the 12 civilians killed, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (UCPN-M) was responsible for just two deaths. The remaining 10 were killed by Madhesh-based extremist formations, principally the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha Jwala Singh faction (JTMM-J). Of the 22 militants killed, as many as 14 were from the UCPN-M, another two from its youth wing, the Young Communist League, five from JTMM-J, and one unidentified. Significantly, in a departure from previous years, most of the extremist killings have been in factional or party rivalries. 10 UCPN-M cadres were killed by Madhesh-based terrorist groups such as JTMM-J and Sayunkta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (SJTMM), and another four by unidentified assailants. The Maoists, who spearheaded the violent political turmoil in the country for a decade (1996-2006), are evidently no longer actively engaging in armed violence, and the consequent vacuum has created spaces for fringe Madheshi groups to consolidate their power through localized campaigns of intimidation and murder. The Maoist role in the countrys unrelenting political logjam, however, remains central. On November 19, 2010, the Maoists obstructed the passage of the Annual Budget by the caretaker Government led by the Communist Party of Nepal United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), unleashing pandemonium in Parliament and attacking Finance Minister Surendra Pandey. In doing this, the Maoists the countrys main Opposition party backtracked on their pact with the ruling parties to allow the new Budget to be passed. The three principal parties of Nepal UCPN-M, CPN-UML and the Nepali Congress (NC) had, on November 15, decided to form a three-member taskforce comprising former Finance Ministers Bharat Mohan Adhikari, Ram Sharan Mahat and UCPN-M Vice Chairman (VC) Baburam Bhattarai to carry out consultation among parties to present the Budget in Parliament on a consensual basis. After the meeting, Bhattarai had said, "We are close to striking a package deal." On November 17, the three reached an agreement to allow the Budget to pass through Parliament. The obstruction of the Budget was, however, no more than the deepening of an enduring crisis most starkly reflected in the failure to elect a Prime Minister (PM) in more than five months since caretaker PM Madhav Kumar Nepal resigned on July 1, 2010, and with 17 rounds of elections. The attempt to elect the PM was initiated on July 21, with three candidates: Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, the Chairman of the UCPN-M; Jhala Nath Khanal of the CPN-UML; and Rama Chandra Poudel of the NC. While, Jhala Nath Khanal withdrew his candidature after the first round, Prachanda remained a candidate till the seventh round (held on September 7, 2010). Since then, the lone surviving candidate for the post has failed to secure the magic number of 301 in the 601-member Parliament. There is little possibility of a resolution here, unless there is a significant inter-party consensus, given the distribution of seats in the Constituent Assembly: the UCPN-M accounts for 220 seats; NC, 110; CPN-UML, 103; and the Madheshi parties, a combined strength of 82. Maoist support is essential to Government formation by any other party; while the Maoists can secure power only with the support of either the NC or the CPN-UML. Neither of these outcomes has crystallized despite months of hectic politicking. Another conflict that has proven irreducible is the confrontation between the Maoists, on the one hand, and all the other parties massed on the other, over the integration of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) with the Nepal Army (NA). The integration question has been one of the principal causes of the political polarization in the country for over four years, and this has been deepened further by the participation of the PLA in the ongoing Sixth Plenum of the UCPN-M, held in the Gorkha District, which commenced on November 21, 2010. The participation of the PLA in the Plenum has been criticized, not only by political opponents of the Maoists, but by the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as well. On November 24, 2010, Upendra Yadav, Chairman of the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), accused the UCPN-M of breaching the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by involving their former combatants in the party's Plenum, and demanded that the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) should take the matter seriously, as the former Maoist combatants are now under its purview. Similarly, Karin Landgren, the Chief of UNMIN, stated, "PLA presence in the plenum is contrary to the spirit of Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement." The understanding between the SPA and the Maoists on the modalities and regulation of PLA combatants, and their verification, has been the

subject of three different agreements in 2006. Even after four years, however, a stalemate on the question of integration persists. There is further and increasing contention on the role and tenure of UNMIN. Originally, UNMINs tenure was intended to end on January 23, 2008, but has since been extended seven times, the last of these on September 15, 2010, with a four month extension, ending January 15, 2010. It is unlikely that the PLAs integration will be completed (or even see any substantive progress) within this period, and UNMINs credibility can only be further diluted with the passage of time and its evident ineffectiveness. Adding to the overdose of instability is the increasing internal division within the UCPN-M, which has come to a head during the Sixth Plenum. On November 22, Maoist leaders, such as Baburam Bhattarai, Mohan Baidhya and Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda tabled different reports regarding the partys future strategy and line of struggle, with Vice-chairmen (VC) Bhattarai and Baidhya presenting two separate documents contradicting party chairman Prachanda. Bhattarai reiterated the idea of a competitive republic, which was adopted by the Party at its Fourth Plenum at Chubang, Rukum District, in 2005. Baidhya wanted the party to adopt the idea of a peoples republic, as was discussed in the Kharipati (Bhaktapur District) meet of the Party on February 17, 2010 and demanded that that Maoist revolutionaries should have no option to revolt against the party if it plunged into rightist revisionism. On the contrary, Prachanda simultaneously stressed preparations for a new revolt, while staying firm on peace and the Constitution. The two most contentious issues within the UCPN-M are: to decide who the principal enemy is, and what would be the future ideological line of the party. On the principal enemy, Prachanda and Baidhya have similar views. They claim that foreign intervention, particularly by India, is the principal factor for the present political impasse, and such intervention is, consequently, the principal enemy. Prachanda and Baidhya insist that the Party should wage an ideological war against India to preserve national Independence. Bhattarai, on the other hand, on November 22, articulated a softer line, calling for an agitation and not a war against foreign forces a semantic distinction that has been given much significance within the partys polemics, and has been denounced in certain quarter as pro-India. On the future ideological line of the Party, there are three divergent views. Baidhya advocates a hardline revolutionary perspective, declaring, on November 23, 2010, "I have a clear view that democratic republic and democratic constitution cannot address the genuine issues of the people. We should establish a peoples federal democratic republic" Bhattarai, on the same day, advocated a continued commitment to the present peace process, insisting, "We should remain on the peace and constitution processes till the last minute to save the republic, secularism and federalism". Prachandas stand on the future ideological line opportunistically blends these two approaches, preparing for revolution, but staying on in the present peace process. Ideological niceties apart, however, the real struggle in the Party is between Bhattarai and Prachanda over leadership. Prachanda is increasingly threatened by Bhattarais growing popularity; Bhattarai accuses Prachanda of working in the Party as an autocrat. Baidhya, on the other hand, has accused both Prachanda and Bhattarai of deviating from Communist ideology. Earlier divisions in the UCPN-M gave birth to the militant MJF, JTMM-J, Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha Jai Kishan Goit (JTMM-G) and the Matrika Yadav-led Communist Party of Nepal Maoist. Further divisions in the UCPN could result in the creation of other radical formations in the country, violently struggling to secure some prominence in the political landscape. The Madhesh based parties further complicate a difficult situation. In the struggle to elect a PM, with none of the major political formations capable of chalking up the required support on its own, and no two of them willing to sit together to form a Government, relatively minor Madhesh-based parties have begun to wield disproportionate clout in Kathmandu. The demands of the Unified Democratic Madheshi Forum (UDMF), a combination of the four principal Madheshi parties MJF, Madheshi Janadhikar Forum-Loktantrik (MJF-L), Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP) and Sadbhawana Party (SP) remain unacceptable to each of the national political formations. The alliance with 82 members in Parliament crucially, seeks complete regional autonomy and a single Madheshi Provincial State (ek Madhesh ek Pradesh), and an unambiguous right to self-determination, in addition to specific commitments on the peace process and on the drafting of the Constitution, as well as the implementation of past agreements, such as the bulk integration of Madheshi people in security institutions, as the price of its support to any

Prime Ministerial candidate. While the Madheshi parties appear to have become much more central to any resolution of the protracted crisis in Kathmandu, it is far from the case that they offer any easy solution. There is, moreover, little internal coherence even within the Madheshi groupings. There are, for instance, serious divergences of opinion on the question of autonomy, with the Upendra Yadav-led MJF demanding complete autonomy and right to selfdetermination, while armed groups such as the JTMM-G have raised the stakes to a claim of sovereignty. Reports indicate that there are at least 30 underground militant groups operating in the 20 Districts of the Madhesh region. The multiple political disputes in Kathmandu have crystallized into a deadlock on the drafting of the Constitution. The first meeting of the Constituent Assembly (CA) was held on May 28, 2008, and 11 thematic committees were allocated responsibilities to work on different components of the proposed Constitution by the SPA and the UCPNM. A dead line of May 28, 2010, was imposed for the completion of the drafting process. However, with each of the political formations amplifying their disagreements on even the smallest possible issues, the deadline has long gone, and the process itself has lost impetus within the daily political deadlocks in Kathmandu. Repeated Maoist announcements regarding the intention to start a new revolution, and acquisition of capacities for violence by various other political formations, have only added to apprehensions that the political impasse may spiral incrementally into open chaos.

Two years ago, its king stepped aside, following a disastrous attempt at direct rule and, earlier this month, it was the prime minister's turn, setting the stage for a parliamentary vote on Wednesday, July 21, in which the country's lawmakers will try to end the stalemate over the country's fragile peace. For 10 years, ending in 2006, a civil war raged between Nepal's Maoist rebels, who took their inspiration from China's legendary Mao Zedong, and the Nepalese state. The conflict claimed the lives of more than 13,000 people and created huge cleavages in the impoverished mountain country of 28 million. Tens of thousands of Nepalese were displaced, real or suspected enemies were tortured or killed by both sides. As well, children were recruited as rebel fighters and rates of depression and other mental illnesses increased dramatically. So when a peace agreement was signed in November 2006, it seemed as though a corner had been turned. Yet, only four years later, Nepal finds itself again in turmoil.

Deadlines missed
In the spring of 2009, Nepal's Maoists, who had won the largest number of seats in the 2008 parliamentary elections, resigned from the ruling coalition because of disagreements over the firing of the army chief and the integration of their former fighters. Soon after, a new governing coalition was patched together, but it too has failed to bring stability. Then, in late May 2010, the deadline for the passing of a new constitution was missed.

Fearing the consequences, especially since parliament's term was also set to expire, Nepal's political leaders agreed to a last minute compromise to extend the legislature by one year, allowing constitutional negotiations to carry on. Part of the deal was for Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal to resign immediately, to open the door to another coalition. The Maoists wanted their own guy, former rebel leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known by his nom de guerre, Prachanda ("the fierce one"), back in charge. But continuing power struggles and disagreements among the country's political elites prevented this from happening. Prime Minister Nepal balked at resigning for many weeks and his Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist) coalition couldn't bring itself to support Dahal, the result being Wednesday's unusual parliamentary vote to try to clear the air.

Communism's enduring vision

Still, despite the political turmoil, the danger of violence looks to have been averted, at least for now. In the long term, however, peace depends on the resolution of other, much more subtle concerns, which are quite different from the problem of reintegrating thousands of Maoist rebels into the national army, or the debates over the nature of power-sharing. Instead, they reflect the aspirations of Nepal's poor whose hopes have been galvanized by the promises of the Maoists' enduring and all-too-relevant communist message. As an idea, communism's mystique was always driven by what it promised: the creation of a classless society where property would be shared and all could flourish, living in perfect equality. On the other hand, the claims of liberal capitalism, communism's chief ideological rival, have never been quite as bold. In fact, for liberals, the communist utopia is a dangerous illusion. They argue that peace and prosperity require an open and democratic political system, basic rights and an economy that functions according to consumer demands and minimal government interference. Unfortunately, liberal capitalism also sees poverty and inequality as necessary, if unfortunate, evils that can never completely be overcome. What stood out about Maoism was that it made the plight of the rural poor its main concern. Before Mao, only the industrial working class or an enlightened leadership was thought capable of bringing real transformation. Karl Marx even complained about the "idiocy of rural life" and its isolation, which hampered the social unity necessary for revolution.

But, in places like Nepal, Maoism remains relevant because of what it represents to the country's most marginalized citizens. More than 40 per cent of rural Nepalese live in poverty, a rate that is double the urban average. In some regions, this number approaches 70 per cent. Basic services and economic development have been limited to the cities. What's more, an historic legacy of unequal relations between a landlord class and the rural population, combined with decreasing agricultural productivity, has given rise to widespread landlessness.

Caste and politics

In Nepal's case, the problems of inequality have also been exacerbated because of the group known as the Caste-Hill Hindu Elite (CHHE), who represent about a third of the population. A high caste, according to the norms of the country's Hindu system, the CHHE's social, economic and political dominance was enshrined in law in the mid-1800s. The caste system was formally banned in the early 1960s, but its influence has persisted well into the modern day. What this has meant is that non-CHHE members indigenous peoples, women, ethnic and religious minorities and lower-caste groups have been excluded almost completely from Nepal's civil service, parliament, education system and judiciary. It is not too difficult to see, then, why the Maoists drew widespread backing among the poor during the protracted civil war in spite of the fact that the rebel leadership itself hailed from the CHHE class. Fighting a "people's war" against "class enemies" and "exploiters," so that a classless society could be created, spoke to the anger and frustrations of these people in a way that liberal capitalism never could. How this will eventually play out in Nepal is unclear. What is more certain is that even if the Maoists are given a second chance at power Dahal served as prime minister for nine months after the 2008 election until the other parties formed their own coalition they have already sketched the country's fate. The poor are demanding change louder than ever before. The question now is what will happen if the promises that have been made go unfulfilled.