CooperationforPeaceandUnity(CPAU)

Workingonconflict
AsummaryofanassessmentforActionAidAfghanistan

Summary
ThisisasummaryofareviewcarriedoutforActionAidAfghanistan(AAA)byCooperationforPeaceandUnity(CPAU)aboutthepotentialforprogrammesandactivitieson conflictinAfghanistan.AsthisreviewindicatesmanyofthecorepartsofAfghanidentity,society,politicalandeconomiclifeareconflictual.Thisisfurthercomplicatedby thevarietyofpeoples,culturesandeconomiclivelihoodsacrossthecountry.Thismeansthatsingleinterpretationsofconflictareunlikelytobecomprehensiveenoughto giveasolidunderstandingoftherangeofconflictsthatareongoing.HoweverplayingonthestrengthsofrightsbasedNGOsitshouldbepossiblethroughsustained relationshipswithcommunitiesatagrassrootleveltodevelopanuancedunderstandingofconflictsandpotentiallyhowtoaddressthem.Howevertheymustbeableto takeintoconsiderationthewiderangeoffactorsinAfghanistanthatcausesconflictaswellasunderstandingtheirimpacts,bothlongandshorttermandstarttounravel themsothatprogrammeinterventionscanbedesignedtoaddresstheconflictdrivers.

Drivers
Inassessingthehistoricalandrecentcauses,andlongandshorttermeffectsofconflictitisnecessarytorationalizetheareaswearediscussing.Thesecanbroadlybesplit intofivegroups;Statehood;Socialidentity;Poverty;Armedgroups;Licitandillicittrade.

Statehood
Theconflictofthelast30yearshasalsoledtoadeteriorationanddegradationofeffectivestateinstitutionsinmostpartsoftheruralAfghanistan.Howeverbyrebuilding thestatetheinternationalcommunityandinternationalmilitaryforcesarealsointheprocessofrebuildingakeydriverofconflictinAfghanistan:theAfghanstate.The natureoftheAfghanstatehasneverbeencategoricallydefineditisstillbeingcontestedondailybasisandhasbeencontestedforseveralhundredyears.Theaimsofthe internationalcommunityarethereforehindered,fromagoodgovernanceperspective,bythepoorqualityofgovernanceprovidedbyAfghaninstitutions(securityrelated ornot).HowevertheAfghanstatehasitsownagencyinthecurrentrebuildingprocesswhichisstilldominatedbyanumberoffactionswhohaveastakeinconflictandthe Afghanstatecontinuestobeaprimarydriverofinstabilityinsomeareaswhichisassociatedwithcriminality,corruptionandpredatoryactivity.

Socialidentity
Socialidentities,basedonethnicity,qawmorsubtribeareparticularlystrongandprovidenumerouspotentialcleavagesforconflict.Butsocialidentitiesdonotjust provideanarrativeforthelargerconflicts;theypermeatealllevelsofconflictfromwithinfamilies,betweenfamiliesandwithincommunitiesupuntilnationalandsub regionalidentities.Furtherethnicidentitiesareoftenthetoplayerofanumberoflowerorderidentities,includingtribeandsubtribeaswellasreligiousaffiliation. Conflictswithinandbetweencommunitiesareoftendriveninpartbytheseidentities,orbelligerentsaremobilizedalongthoselines.Thelargerconflictsthatrageoverthe nature,orexistenceofthestate,areoftensuperimposedoverexistingrivalriesandlocalnetworksofpowerandsocialidentity.Thesearecausesanddriversofconflict withalongtermhorizon,andnewconflictscanalter,reformandremouldtheseidentitiesinnewwayswhichcancreatefurtherroundsofconflictandlevelsof complexity.TheinternationalcommunityhasseemedtoplaydowntherealitiesofethnicityinitsengagementinAfghanistan,whileitremainsakeyfactor,inAfghaneyes, ThissummarypaperistakenfromaconflictassessmentcarriedoutbyCooperationforPeaceandUnity(CPAU)forActionAidAfghanistaninJune2008.Formore informationabouttheassessmentpleasecontact:KanishkaNawabiDirectorCPAUkanishka.nawabi@cpau.org.af,ChristianDennys,Representative,CPAU christian.dennys@cpau.org.aforMudasserSiddiquimudasser@actionaidafg.org

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intheappointmentofofficialsparticularlyinthesecurityrelatedministries.Inthecurrentcontextthereseemstobeareemergenceofethnicityasamobilisingfactor possiblyasaresultofthedemocraticmodelofgovernancewhichisnowbeingpromoted. Ethnicityishowevernotmonolithicandthroughouttheconflictsofthelast30yearscommandersofdifferentfactionshaveworkedwithandforcommandersofother ethnicitiesforavarietyofreasons.Ethnicmobilisationoftheelectorateseemstobestrongbutagainnotcohesiveenoughtoruleoutleadersmakingcompromiseswith othergroupstofurthertheirgoals.

Poverty
Povertyisacomplexandsubtledriverofconflict.Historicallypovertyinandofitselfwasnotadriverofopenconflict;thepoorestmostmarginalisedpartsofthecountry haveoftenbeenhavensofsecurity.HoweverpovertyiscausingalargernumberofAfghansintopotentiallyconflictualrelationshipswithlocalpowerholders.Twotrends areparticularlyconcerning,theabilityofarmedgroupsandopiumproducerstopayforfighters/harvestersprovidingacashincomethatishardtorivalinacontextof risingfoodandfuelprices;andincreasedpressureonlandandresourceswhichcanleadto(ethnicallybased)conflicts.Thepracticalchallengesfacingeconomic developmentinAfghanistanaresignificantanditwillbeyearsbeforethedevelopmentofsomesectorswillbegintobefelt.Vulnerabilitylookssettoremainanunderlying driverofconflict,thoughreducingvulnerabilitymaynotleadtoreducedconflict.

Armedgroups
ArmedgroupsinAfghanistanincludesociallyorganisedformations,politicallyorientatedpartiesaswellasstateinstitutionsthelinesbetweenwhichareoftenblurred. Personalweaponownershiphasalonghistoryandcouldbeusedinlocalconflicts,thoughtheirusewasnormallyproscribedbysocialconventions.Thechannellingofvast weaponssuppliedtotheMujahedeenandgovernmentbackedmilitiasinthe1980smeansthatweaponownershipwasthennotjustsociallyacceptableasbefore,but essentialforindividualfamilyandgroupsafety.Thecontrolofarmedgroupshasthenmovedawayfromstrongsocialstructuressuchasthetribeorcentralgovernment andmovedintotheindependentarmedgroup.CurrentattemptsatdisarminggroupsthroughtheDDRandDIAGprogrammeshavelargelybeenineffectiveinreducingthe numberofweaponsincirculationandseemtobeunderminedbyinternationalmilitaryforcespreferenceforusingandemployinginformalmilitiasforarangeoftasks includingbothstaticdefenceandoffensiveoperations.Thepresenceofsuchalargevolumeofweaponryandageneralacceptancethatweaponscanbuypower, protectionandinfluencewillbeacontinueddriverofconflict.

Licitandillicittrade
TradeinAfghanistanisextensivehowevereventhetradethatislegalisoftentradedinformally.Stateactorsarelargelyunableandunwillingtopoliceandtaxtrade,licit orillicit,anditremainsasignificantgapofgovernance.ThisishoweverhowstatecitizenrelationshipshaveworkedinAfghanistanforcenturies,andithassuitedboththe stateandcitizensatvaryingtimes.Itmeanshoweverthatattemptsbythegovernmenttoreformthesocialcontract,includingtheprovisionofserviceswhichitmustpay forthroughtaxation,islikelytobeconflictual.Tradeisflourishingatthemomentandattemptstomanageit,orreducetheillegalparts,couldbedamagingtostate stabilityandincreaselocallevelconflictsaspartiesseeknewaccommodationswithlocalstateactors(possiblythroughcorruption).

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Approaches
InasensetherearethreelevelsofconflictresolutionactivitiesinAfghanistan,thosepromotedbythestate,thoseusedbycommunitiesandthosepromotedbycivil society.Thosefavouredbythestate,includingtheformaljusticesector,areoftenperceivedtobefuellingfurtherconflictaslevelsoftrustinthegovernancestructures (police,armyandjudiciary)areverylow.Equallythoseincommunitiesareviewedwithsuspicionbysomesectionsofthestate,andbyexternalobserversforbeing arbitrary,attimesunfairandnotproactive.Theydohoweverhaveasignificantamountoflegitimacywithincommunitiesmakingthedecisionsandactionsmore acceptablelocally.Civilsocietyactivitieshavebeenidentifiedwithbothstatesponsoredformalmechanismforconflictresolutionaswellascommunitybased interventions.ThefollowingtableisasummaryofsomeofthetypesofactivitiesthatarebeingcarriedoutinAfghanistan.Importantlessonslearnedfromconflict programminginclude;1)Theneedformuchgreatercoordinationbetweenactorstoavoidduplication;2)Projectsshouldalsonotbesosmallastobelargelyirrelevant;3) Projectscancauseaswellasmitigateconflict;4)Thereseemstobecommunityacceptancethatwhilsttheinformaljusticesectororinformalconflictresolutionisoften difficulttoworkwithitprovidesthemoststableenvironmenttoworkwithingiventheongoingcontestationoverthestate. Typeofactivity Potentialimpact Institutionalinvestment Internal Mainstreamingconflictresolutiontraining Reducingormitigatingconflictscausedbythe inexistingprogrammes(i.e.inCDCs) implementationoftheNationalSolidarityProgramme. Initiatinganindependentprogramme workingononemajorconflict(provincial level)inanareaofcurrentoperations. WorkonpoliciesoftheAfghanand internationalgovernmentswhichaffect local,provincialornationalconflicts. Yes,mainlyforexistingCDC trainers External Yes,forCDCs,addingatleast onemoduleoftraining

Yes,significanttrainingand Possiblyreducingconflictbetweentwofactionswithina resourcemobilisationfor provinceallowingdevelopment/humanitarian monitoringtheconflictandacting programmingtobeundertakenmoreeffectively. onitappropriately Thiscouldbetoworkonapolicytoreducefuture conflicts,suchaslegalreform,disasterriskreductionor healthpolicies. Thiscouldaugmentongoingeducationprogrammesof anorganisationloweringdomesticviolence,violencein schoolsandpromotingnonviolentconflictresolution amongstthetargetpopulation. Reducingconflictswithinlocalcommunities,and possiblybetweenlocalisedcommunities. Low,possiblyjustwithinsenior staff.

Dependsontheconflict.

Possiblyhighdependingon howworkisapproachedwith thespecificinstitution. Yes,bothinstitutionally,with theMinistryofEducation, andforschoolchildren. Yes,forcommunitycouncil members.

Implementingpeaceeducation

Yes,trainingforinternalstaff,but canberelativelyeasilyachieved. Yes,trainingforinternalstaff,but canberelativelyeasilyachieved.

Implementingpeacebuildingactivities alongsideexistingprogrammes

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Challenges,gapsandopportunities
TheoverridingoperationalchallengeforNGOsisthattheyareassociatedwiththelargerconflictsoccurringinAfghanistanandtheyaretargetedbysomegroupsinthe country.Inadditiondevelopmentsinherentlydynamicengagementwithcommunitiescanexacerbateexistingconflictsandcreatenewones.PracticingDonoharmisvery challenginginAfghanistanunlessorganisationsdeploysignificantresources. ThecontextinAfghanistan,particularlythesourcesoffunding,overlappingmandatesandareasofoperationandfluctuatingrelationshipbetweenNGOsandstateand nonstateactorsareallproblematic.Thefollowingtableattemptstoshowwhatthechallenges,gapsandopportunitiesareforworkingonconflictaccordingtothree interrelatedapproachesthatareimportantforarightsbasedNGO. Rightsbasedapproaches Challenges Humanrights,andrightsbasedapproaches,maybe resistedbysomepowerholdersleadingtothepotential forconflictinimplementingsomeformsofconflict resolution(particularlywithissuesrelatingtowomen) Rightsbasedapproachesarenotoftenusedin programmingbyAfghanorganisations. Rightsbasedapproachesareoftennotwellunderstood acrosstheAfghanNGOsectorandnotallinternational NGOssubscribetothisapproacheither.Theremaybea roleinimprovingormodifyingsomeconflict methodologiesimplementedbyotherorganisations. Participatoryapproaches Participatoryapproachesareoftenwellunderstoodin Afghanculturewithapreferenceforconsensual decisionmaking.Thisdoesnotmakedecisionequitable particularlyproblemsthevulnerableandwomen. Conflictresolutionprogramming Accessremainsthekeychallengeacrossall typesofNGOprogramming.

Opportunities Gaps

Mobilisationthroughconflictresolution Theredoesseemtobeagapinbroadeningparticipation programmingrequiresaccessandincreasing beyondacommunityorvillagetobringinotheractors areasofthecountryremainclosedtoNGO suchasthecourtsandformalsystem. activity. Therearewelldevelopedparticipatoryconflict resolutionprogrammesbyotherorganisationsand replicatingtheminnewareaswouldbefeasible. Communitiesoftenhavepreexistingskillsin conflictresolutionandtrainingandcapacity buildingforthemtoresolvetheirconflicts maybebeneficialandinsomeareashas becomeselfsustaining.

Alongwiththeapproachspecificconcernstherewerethreeothersectoralororganisationalissues; NGOprogrammingforworkingonconflictisnotharmonisedacrossthecountry,evenwithinnationalprogrammes.Thereisapotentialforagreaterappreciation forlessonslearnedandbestpracticetobeshared.Thereisconsiderableexperienceinalimitednumberoforganisationsforworkingonconflictandexpanding capacitybuildingandtrainingofstaffinternallymaybebeneficial. BetweenNGOstherecontinuestobepoorcoordination.Wehavenotfoundsolidexamplesoforganisationssupportingeachotherinresolvingconflictsandthis mayoffersomeopportunities. Coverageofprogrammesisoftennotnational,especiallyonissueswhereahighlevelofexpertiseisrequired,namelyconflictresolutionprogrammingandlegal inputsintolandconflicts.Forindividualsandfamiliesthereisasignificantlackofinformationabouthowtheycandealwithconflictsnonviolently.