1. Cayetano v. Monsod G.R. No.

100113, September 3, 1991 Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Issue: Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution? Held: The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court said that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. 2. Philippine Lawyer s Association vs. Agrava

Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to said circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified. Petitioners contend that one who has passed the bar exams and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said office. On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training. ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included in the practice of law HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles. Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the said office, without further examination or other qualification. 3. People of the Philippines vs. Villanueva

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On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused. Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos is handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party. WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the appearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs. The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits. Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant. 4. Cui vs. Cui

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui. The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926. Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows: Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu. Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.

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Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision. Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position. Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation. As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion." The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili. The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor. We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value - for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset. Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character - a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443) Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

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The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816). As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out. This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose. Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator; Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator. Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio. Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal. On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action - all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161. Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the complaints as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

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5. Facts: y y y y

IN RE: ALMACEN [1970] In the civil case Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, in w/c Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant, the TC rendered judgment against Almacen s client. After Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time & place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. TC denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his 1st MFR, he filed a 2ndMFR to w/c he attached the required registry return card. This 2nd MFR, however, was ordered withdrawn by the TC upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier had already perfected the appeal. TC elevated the case to the CA. CA, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.Batu Construction & Co. dismissed the appeal for having failed to indicate notice of time and place of hearing. Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution he filed pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing RPvs. Gregorio A. Venturanza as the applicable case but the CA again denied MFR, stating that RP vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue. He then appealed to SC w/c was denied by a minute resolution. Likewise, his MFR and leave to file a 2nd MFR & for extension of time were denied. Entry of judgment was then made. Then, Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title" a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional(check the case for what s written) He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the petition and some parts were published in some newspapers. The SC decided by resolution to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. But no word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, w/c he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. But he manifested that he has no pending petition in connection w/ Calero vs. Yaptinchay Case. SC require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." He denied the charges and asked for permission "to give reasons &cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him...in an open & public hearing" & later also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person" w/c the court granted. But his written answer, as undignified & cynical as it is unchastened, offers no apology but instead unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.

y y

y y

Issue: WON Atty. Almacen s grievances are with merit y NO. He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. But truths to tell, most petitions rejected by the SC are utterly frivolous & ought never to have been lodged at all. Besides, were the SC to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition they reject, they d be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon them by the Constitution y The Court underscores the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the CA have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the CA is not intended to give every losing party another hearing, as implied in sec. 4 of Rule 46 ROC. y Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, the Court held that the CA had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power. y Regarding the MFR, Atty. Almacen knew, or ought to have known, that for MFR to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not) as articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co. If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. y It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. WON Atty. Almacen s actuations merit penalty y YES. Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. y Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. As citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. y To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts & judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice & who might consider it their duty, to speak disparagingly. y But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. A lawyer vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity... to the courts (Sec. 3, Rule 138) and the ROC constantly remind him to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers."(Sec. 20(b), Rule 138) The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." y In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. y An examination of relevant parallel precedents [State v. Calhoon, In Re Glenn, In Re Humphrey, People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, In Re Troy, In Re Rockmore ,In Re Mitchell, State ex rel Dabney v. Breckenridge, Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v.Philbrook, State Board of Examiners v. Hart, Cobb v. United States, In Re Graves, InRe Doss, State v. Grimes] imparts the lesson that post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian' of the morals & ethics of the legal fraternity. y The cases Salcedo vs. Hernandez, In re Sotto, Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., Medina vs. Rivera, In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba, Contempt proceedings against Antonio Franco, People vs. Carillo, People vs. Venturanza, et al., De Joya, et al. vs.CFI of Rizal, Sison vs. Sandejas, Parangas vs. Cruz, and Cornejo vs. Tan all involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending

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y y

litigation. However, although the doctrinal rule is that protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, that rule cannot be availed of by Atty. Almacen (who made the comments after this Court had written finis to his appeal) because such rule has lost much of its vitality. Although for some time, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction, the first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the majority holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. Then a complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes. Thus, Atty. Almacen could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. Besides, pendancy or non-pendancy is here immaterial. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with duties & responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely protestative on Atty. Almacen's part. But then, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Although, like any other Gov t. entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not above criticism, a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by philosophy. It is not accurate to say that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. Disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generic. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. The nature & extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment(Sec. 27, Rule 138, ROC) and the discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained. The Court thus held that Atty. Almacen be suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the merit of this choice being best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

Holding: Suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. 6. IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN, Petitioner This is an administrative case involving a member of the Bar, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman. In Civil Case No. 71648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled: "Lagrimas Lapatha, et al. versus Vicente Floro, et al.", the Hon. Jesus de Veyra rendered on 1 July 23, 1968, a decision the dispositive portion of which reads: Judgment is, therefore, rendered setting aside the judgment of the City Court in Civil Case No. 165187 entitled Floro v. Lapatha as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, and remanding this case to the City Court of Manila in order to give Petitioner her day in Court. Defendant Floro shall pay the costs. Let copy of this decision be furnished the Supreme Court to take whatever disciplinary action it may deem fit against Atty. Felizardo de Guzman for his manner of behavior in the proceedings before the City Court of Manila. (Emphasis Ours) Upon receipt of copy of the above-mentioned decision, this Court in its Resolution of August 16, 1968, required Atty. Felizardo de Guzman to answer, and the latter 3 4 complied on August 30, 1968. On September 10, 1968 the matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigate report and recommendation. On November 5 20, 1973, we received the Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General. At the hearing conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General during which none of the parties, with the exception of respondent, Atty. Felizardo de Guzman, appeared despite due notice, the following incidents were brought out: Sometime on October 12, 1967, a complaint for ejectment was filed with the City Court of Manila by Vicente Floro against Lagrimas Lapatha which was docketed as 6 Civil Case No. 165187 of said court. On November 2, 1967, a decision was rendered by the City Court, Branch VIII, presided by Judge Roman Cansino, Jr., to this 7 effect: BY CONFESSION, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant and all persons claiming under her to vacate premises described in the complaint and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff; to pay unto the plaintiff the unpaid rentals in the sum of P795.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 12, 1967 until fully paid; the sum of P150.00 as attorney's fees plus the costs of the suit. On December 29, 1967, Lagrimas Lapatha filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "Petition for Relief from Judgment, Orders & other Proceedings in the 8 Inferior Court with a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", naming therein Vicente Floro and the Sheriff of Manila as party-respondents. In the Petition it was alleged by petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha that at the initial hearing of Civil Case No. 165187 in the City Court of Manila held at 8:30 o'clock in the morning of November 2, 1967, she appeared without counsel; she approach Atty. Felizardo de Guzman, the lawyer of Vicente Floro, and begged for a five-day postponement of the trial to which Atty. de Guzman verbally agreed; Atty. de Guzman then asked her to affix her signature on the court's "expediente" which she did, and after signing she left the courtroom; on November 16, 1967, she gave to Atty. Felizardo de Guzman a check for P350.00 in partial payment of her arrears in the rentals; on November 20, 1967, she was surprised to receive copy of a decision from the City Court dated November 2, 1967, wherein it appeared that she confessed judgment when in truth and in fact she asked for postponement of that initial hearing with the conformity of Atty. Felizardo de Guzman; upon verification of the "expediente" of the case, she discovered that below the signature which she affixed at the request of Atty. de Guzman, the latter had written "CONFESS JUDGMENT", without her knowledge and consent; hence her petition for relief from the judgment rendered by the City Court. Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition for relief and he alleged that the decision of the City Court was based on an admission made in open court by petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha on the basis of which the words "Confession of judgment" were written on the "expediente" of the case and underneath were affixed the signature of said petitioner and that of Atty. Felizardo de Guzman; that the alleged payments of Lagrimas Lapatha were made after the rendition of the decision to forestall immediate execution of the judgment; that when petitioner filed with the City Court a motion for reconsideration of the decision alleging fraud, the true circumstances attending the hearing of November 2, 1967, were brought out to the satisfaction of petitioner's counsel, for which reason the City Court denied the motion for reconsideration; that during the hearing on petitioner's motion for reconsideration Atty. de Guzman agreed not to press for the execution of
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the judgment on the assurance of petitioner that she vacate the premises by January 15, 1968, however, petitioner did not comply with her promise and instead filed 9 the Petition for Relief. 10 On July 23, 1968, His Honor, Judge Jesus de Veyra, rendered his decision in the above-mentioned Petition for Relief favorable to petitioner Lapatha, the dispositive portion of which we quoted in page two of this Resolution. Judge de Veyra stated in his decision that due to the "machinations unworthy of an attorney" committed by respondent herein, Lagrimas Lapatha was deprived of her day in court, said lawyer having agreed to a postponement of the hearing and even accepted partial payment so the case would not proceed, but behind her back 11 wrote the words "confessed judgment" over her signature and prevailed upon the City Court to render judgment. Judge de Veyra based his findings on the alleged testimonies of Lagrimas Lapatha and one Atty. Vargas given during the trial of the Petition for Relief. We are constrained, however, to agree with the Solicitor General that the above-mentioned findings of Judge de Veyra were not only left unsubstantiated at the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General's Office for failure of said witnesses to appear notwithstanding due notice that they were satisfactorily controverted by the evidence submitted by respondent at said hearing. Thus: The records of Civil Case No. 71648 (Petition for Relief) show that the clerk of the City Court of Manila testified that when the ejectment case was called for hearing on November 2, 1967, both Lagrimas Lapatha and Atty. de Guzman made their appearances, and when the trial Judge asked Lapatha if she admitted the indebtedness alleged in the complaint, she answered in the affirmative and forthwith the words "confessed judgment" were written on the 12 "expediente" of the case after which Atty. de Guzman and Lapatha affixed their signatures. As aptly observed in the Report of the Solicitor General, the aforementioned testimony of the clerk of court deserves credit because the clerk was present at the hearing of November 2 and his testimony is 13 substantiated by the decision of the City Judge who, We state, is presumed, sans evidence to the contrary, to have regularly performed his official 14 15 duty and passed upon the matters before him in the manner stated in his decision. On the other hand, Atty. Vargas on whom Judge de Veyra relied, was not in Court on the date of the hearing so that his testimony was simply based on the supposed statement to him of his secretary that the latter asked 16 Atty. de Guzman for a postponement of the trial. 2. The check for P350.00 was given by either Atty. Vargas or Lagrimas Lapatha to Atty. de Guzman not for the purpose of securing a postponement, for said check was paid on November 16 several days after the hearing, but in partial payment of the arrears in the rentals to which Lapatha "confessed judgment" 17 and in order to forestall the immediate execution of the City Court's decision. As a matter of fact, during the hearing of Lapatha's motion for reconsideration of the decision of the City Court, Lapatha agreed to vacate the premises by January 15, 1968, and Atty. de Guzman in turn waived the 18 collection of the rentals for the months of November, 1967, up to January 15, 1968. 3. The only objective of Lagrimas Lapatha in filing her Petition for Relief before Judge de Veyra was to gain more time to stay in the leased premises notwithstanding her commitment to vacate as of January 15, 1968, and in fact, she accomplished her purpose as shown by the "Compromise Agreement" entered into between her and the lessor, Vicente Floro, before Judge de Veyra in Civil Case No. 71 which reads: Plaintiff agrees to vacate the premises at 821 Second Floor, Isabel Street, Manila, on or before October 31, 1968 and in the Defendant V. Floro agrees to condone all rentals past up to October 31, 1968 plus attorney's fees and costs. Manila, Philippines, October 22, 1968 (Sgd.) LAGRIMAS LAPATHA (Sgd.) VICENTE FLORO (See Exh. "B" page 53 rollo) We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the evidence is wanting" to sustain a finding that respondent committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court of Manila. In Go vs. Candoy, this Court said: "It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated." An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved, and as an officer of the court, that he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. Thus, the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against a respondent attorney. (Moran, Revised Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., vol. 6, p. 243, citing In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191) WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint is dismissed and respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, is exonerated of the charge. 7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
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After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars: (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom - which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education". Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

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Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous"). Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered. 8. KHAN, JR. V SIMBILLO YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 19, 2003 NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court and SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. FACTS - Atty. Rizalino Simbillo publicized his legal services in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer via a paid advertisement which read: Annulment of Marriage Specialist 532-4333/521-2667. - A staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court took notice and called the number posing as an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who said that her husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, and that the fee was P48, 000. - Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar ads were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Star. - Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. - The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. - IBP found respondent guilty - Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied - Hence, this petition for certiorari ISSUE WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court HELD Yes. Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Ratio The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the primary consideration. Reasoning - Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. - Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. - Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. - The following elements distinguish legal profession from business: 1. A duty of public service 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. - Respondent advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage encouraging people who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. - Solicitation of legal business sis not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. 9. ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent.

Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case. Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor because he was too busy. Eventually, he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services. Complainant filed this complaint but later on withdrew . Held: SUSPENDED: (1) month, with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely.

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Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.

Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel. There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in this case. 10. Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap, Inc. 399 SCRA 601 (2003)

DOCTRINE: "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one s self to the public as a lawyer. FACTS: Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving a one-storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila, Quezon City. Pursuant to the lease, Sulyap, Inc. paid, among others, advance rentals, association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone expenses. Upon the expiration of their lease contract, Sulyap demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues and deposit but Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money against Borja. Subsequently, the parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a Compromise Agreement stating that Borja is bound to pay the amounts P30, 575 and P50, 000 and in case any amount due is not paid within the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month until fully paid plus 25% attorney s fees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued as a matter of right. Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise. Sulyapfiled a writ of execution against Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja motioned to quash the writ by stating that his failure to pay the amounts within the agreed period was due to Sulyap s fault; therefore, the penalty clause should not be imposed. Borja filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of execution and modification of the decision. This time, he contended that there was fraud in the execution of the compromise agreement. He claimed that 3 sets of compromise agreement were submitted for his approval. Among them, he allegedly chose and signed the compromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to the payment of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney s fees in case of default in payment. He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the said agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the court in order to make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein. Sulyap presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney s fees in the compromise agreement. He added that the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed by the petitioner inside the courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed that the penalty clause of 2% interest per month until full payment of the amount due, plus 25% thereof as attorney s fees, in case of default in payment, was actually chosen by the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor of Sulyap because it gave credence to the testimony of Atty. Cruz and even noted that it was more than one year from receipt of the judgment on compromise on October 25, 1995, when he questioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the approved compromise agreement despite several opportunities to raise said objection. ISSUE: Whether Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement. HELD: YES. While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground of vitiated consent or forgery, we find that the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of fraud in the instant case. No evidence was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his former counsel fraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature to the compromise agreement submitted to the court. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the compromise agreement approved by the court. When he received the judgment reproducing the full text of the compromise agreement, to February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent inclusion of the penalty clause in their agreement. We note that petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must have read and understood the contents of the judgment on compromise. In fact, on November 13, 1995, he filed, without the assistance of counsel, a motion praying that the amounts of P50,000.00 and 37,575.00 be withheld from his total obligation and instead be applied to the expenses for the repair of the leased premises which was allegedly vandalized by the private respondent Even assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of the said clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified.17 Indeed, petitioner s failure to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney s fees in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was tantamount to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity thereof. Finally, we find no merit in petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement should be annulled because Atty. Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then an employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in the private practice of his profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited "private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one s self to the public as a lawyer. Such was never established in the instant case. 11. LUTHER SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent.

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Atty. Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates that all disputes, except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong not included), between and among residents of the same city or municipality should be brought first under the system of barangay conciliation before recourse to the court can be allowed. Because of respondent s transgressions, his client was hailed to court as part-defendant. Respondent also refused to return petitioner s money in spite of his meager service.

Held: GUILTY of negligence and incompetence. SUSPENDED for (6) months. RETURN the money of complainant with interest. STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The breach of respondent s sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards he was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently established. Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar. CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent erred in not returning complainant s money despite demands after his failure to file the case and his devious act of compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he has no financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of complainant s papers. This conduct violated the following Canon: CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT. Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand. The failure of an attorney to return the client s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. In short, it is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness. 12. LEDESMA vs. CLIMACO [1974] Facts: Prior to his appointment as election registrar for Cadiz, Negros Occ. on Oct 30, 1964, petitioner was counsel de parte as an accused in a pending case in the sala of the respondent. Citing the demands of his appointive post and the conflict that may arise between the discharge of his duties as election registrar and officer of the court, petitioner moved to withdraw as counsel. Respondent not only denied the motion, but appointed petitioner as counsel de oficio for the two other accused. Petitioner now comes before the SC to have the order of the respondent judge reversed on certiorari. Issue: WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. NO The principal reason behind respondent s denial of the motion to withdraw of petitioner is because of its effect to delay the case further. The criminal proceeding had already been postponed several times, and to grant the petitioner s motion would have been tantamount to denial the accused s rights. The fact that the respondent already appointed the petitioner as counsel de oficio other than the de parte, renders the latter s excuse of the demand of his job as registrar inutile. There is no reason for him to compromise the accused; defense for want of time with the demands on the time of counsel de oficio is less than that of de parte. It is thus, clear that petitioner is merely reluctant to represent the accused, membership in the Bar requires the responsibility to live up to its exacting standard, which includes assisting the state when called upon to administer justice, the law is not a trade or a craft, but a profession. As such, the facts that petitioner will not be compensated for his trouble should not hinder him from defending the accused to the best of his ability. The right of the accused to counsel is a constitutionally protected right, such that any frustration thereof by petitioner amounts to a serious affront to the profession. Decision: Petition is dismissed. Petitioner is admonished. 13. CARLOS REYES vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS VITANA.C. No.5835 Apr 15, 2005

Facts: Carlos Reyes availed of the services of Atty. Vitan to file the appropriate complaint against certain individuals who failed to comply with a court order for partition of properties in his favor. It was alleged that after having received 17,000, Atty. Vitan did not act on his case. Hence, he filed an administrative case for disbarment against the said lawyer for gross negligence. Issue: W/N Atty. Vitan violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in failing to file the required complaint for his client Held: Yes, Atty. Vitan is liable for gross negligence. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve his clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render them liable. n this case, the act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services but subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of the abovementioned rule. However, the Court held that the recommended penalty by the IBP of two years suspension is too harsh. Jurisprudence shows that lighter sanctions have been imposed for the same violations. Hence, Atty. Vitan was suspended for a period of only six months. 14. Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE AC-5365. April 27, 2005

Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault. Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics,

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and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. By taking the lawyer s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public s faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent s full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately. 15. Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso Perez v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, Ricardo Hermoso & City Sheriff of Manila(1968)

Original Petition in the SC.Ceriorari w/ preliminary injunction. FACTS: Feb 1959: respondent Hermoso filed civil case against petitioner Damaso Perez& one Gregorio Subong for recovery of principal sum PhP17, 309.44 as unpaid purchases of leather materials used in the shoe manufacturing business of Perez. April 1960: Judgment rendered ordering petitioner to pay the sum w/ interest, atty s fees and costs. June 1960: Appeal to CA by Perez & Subong dismissed for it was filed beyond the reglementary pd. Aug 1961: Writ of execution was issued after the case was remanded to the court of origin. 1st notice: Sept 1961, respondent Sheriff of Mla scheduled auction sale of levied 3,573 shares of common stock registered in the name of Damaso Perez w/Republic Bank. Judge suspended such sale on the ground that it was highlyexcessive & unjust, debt was only PhP17,309.44 while value of shares wasPhP357,300. 2nd notice: Oct 1961, cancelled by CA pending hearing of Perez motion for mandamus & certiorari w/ prelim injunction 3rd notice: Jan 1963, sale was lowered to 210 shares of stock. But was later enjoined by the ff complaint. New twist: in the same month, Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, W of Damaso, filed a complaint against respondents wherein she contended that the levied shares are conjugal assets w/c are not answerable for the judgment debt of her H, it being a personal nature of obligation and contracted not for the benefit/interest of their conjugal partnership. Case was later dismissed upon the motion of W herself. 4th notice: Oct 1963, auction sale of 220 shares of stock scheduled by Sheriff but was suspended due to Mrs Cobb-Perez filing a 3rd party claim over the shares of stocks. 5th notice: Nov 63 but was later suspended by Mr Perez s offer of his alleged cash dividends in same bank worth PhP19, 985.His motion/offer denied. 6th notice: Jan 65: auction sale of 240 shares of stock. Sheriff enjoined for petitioners posted a bond of PhP10, 000 for writ of preliminary injunction prayed ISSUE: WON judgment debt is H s exclusive & private debt HELD: Petition dismissed. Preliminary injunction dissolved. RATIO: 1) No, debts contracted by H, as head of the family and administrator of the conjugal partnership, in the exercise of an industry or profession by w/c he contributes to the support of the family cannot be his exclusive debts. The said debt was contracted in the purchase of leather used in the shoe manufacturing business of the H and said business is an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain, in the pursuit of w/c Damaso Perez had the right to embark the partnership. Moreover, the presumption that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership under Art 160 CC must be accompanied by proof of acquisition of property. Since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the Halone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to him. NOTES: In the case, the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain motion to quash the writ of execution for none of the ff grounds were present. It can only do so when: (1)writ has been improvidently issued, (2) it has been issued against the wrong party,(3) it is defective in substance, (4) judgment debt has been paid, (5) writ has been issued w/o authority, (6) there has been a change in the situation of the parties w/c makes execution inequitable, or (7) controversy has never been submitted to court and therefore no judgment has been rendered

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