The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso

The Brazilian Military under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis Author(s): Joao R.
Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), pp. vi+143-170 Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/166441 Accessed: 28/11/2010 12:36
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After Pinochet: Civilian Policies Toward the Military in the 1990s Chilean Democracy Comparing the Aylwin and Frei administrations, this article probes the question of why civilian authorities did not always use the legal and political tools they had acquired to respond to the military's institutional and political demands. Actors' preferences, leadership style, and strategic decisions influence the way civilian leaders use those tools. Civilian responses have important and sometimes unintended consequences for the stabilization of the civil-military relationship in new democratic regimes. The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis In Brazil, an era of military confusion and dissatisfaction that followed the end of the Cold War has largely dissipated since the mid-1990s. Despite scarce federal resources under current economic policies, the Cardoso government has managed to eliminate the most immediate budgetary causes of military unrest. Military authoritarian influence remains, moreover, in areas such as Amazonia. The military's own efforts, the president's moral and economic support, and the legislature's traditional apathy toward relevant issues have fostered a new form of military influence in the Brazilian democracy.
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The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso: Overcomingthe Identity Crisis

Joao R. Martins Filho Daniel Zirker
t the end of Itamar Franco's presidency (1992-94), the minister of the Brazilian navy, Admiral Ivan de Silveira Serpa, told an audience of strategy specialists and war materiel entrepreneurs that in Brazil, "the esteem for the armed forces has disappeared" (Serpa 1994J. At about the same time, General Manuel Augusto Teixeira, the former deputy chief of staff of the Brazilian army, characterized the morale of his branch as the consequence of two crises: a "crisis of sociability" and an "existential crisis." According to Teixeira, the cause of the first was that "in Brazil, the Army is receiving very little [support], salaries are very low, and officers do not have the means to socialize with people of the same intellectual level." The second crisis, he said, derived from a characteristic of the military profession: "the military officer develops [e atualizado] through something that never occurs: war" (Teixeira 1994). Teixeira's comments directly address the dilemma of the armed forces in the aftermath of the Cold War. Wendy Hunter has noted, "the failure to arrive at a well-defined consensus of the military's place in society will perpetuate the identity crisis that currently exists" (Hunter 1994, 44). Others have observed the re-emergence within the Brazilian military of nationalistic and defensive discourse, seen as possibly a reflex reaction to the military's declining prestige, to external pressures for reductions in military expenditures, or even to the subtle but pervasive redefinition of the role of the armed forces-whether they should turn almost exclusively to combating drug trafficking or assume the functions of a national guard (Martins Filho and Zirker 1996). For these reasons, it is significant that the Second Brazilian National Conference on Strategic Studies, held at the Universidade de Sao Paulo in August 1995 and sponsored by a number of universities and military offices, included in its program a panel discussion titled "Scenario 2000: Armed Forces for What?" Over the past three years, however, this era of confusion and dissatisfaction in the military has largely dissipated. The military's own efforts, the moral and economic support of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and the traditional legislative apathy toward the military and strategic issues have all made it difficult for observers to maintain that a military identity crisis is occurring in Brazil today. This change is illustrated in the statements of the chief of the Brazil143
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ian Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Benedito Onofre Bezerra Leonel, to a widely circulated Brazilian news magazine. In response to the question, "are the armed forces having a honeymoon with President Fernando the Henrique [Cardoso]?" general responded, "Ican confirm that we have never been so well" (Veja 1998a). Some time before this, in an interview with the national financial newspaper Gazeta Mercantil, the chief of the MilitaryHousehold (Casa Militar) of the president, General Alberto Cardoso, questioned about possible differences that the military chiefs might have with the government's privatization policies-an earlier focal point of military opposition-affirmed, "in a word, the Brazilian armed forces are perfectly in accord with this philosophy of President Fernando Henrique" (Gazeta Mercantil n.d.). This virtual barrage of supportive statements probably began in September 1995, when the minister of the navy, Mauro Cesar Pereira, recognized that the resources the government had committed for defense for the subsequent four years were "almost paradise" compared to their previous shortfalls (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1995f). The earlier crisis had been defined by the difficult process of adapting to two diverse processes whose effects were evident simultaneously at the beginning of the 1990s. First, changes occurred in the international arena with the end of communism and the Soviet threat, and with the consequent projection of the United States as the great victor in the bipolar conflict. Second, the administration of Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92) took steps to extinguish the National Information Service (SNI) and the National Security Council, two agencies fundamental to the exercise of military tutelage over civilian political power. This significantly changed the pattern that had existed during Jose Sarney's presidency (1985-89), in which the minister of the army clearly played the role of eminence noir in the regime. The impact on the military of these changes was aggravated, moreover, by officers' perception that civilians were very little aware of the importance of the armed forces. The salary crisis, the lack of modern equipment, and external proposals (particularly those from the United States) for reorienting the functions of the armed forces of the Third World agitated this medley of uncertainty. Overcoming that uncertainty has required several stages, the description of which is largely beyond the scope of this study. Clearly, however, the military has shown great facility in adapting to the new era. Its success would have been impossible without the support of President Cardoso, whose military policy seems to have been dominated by the single purpose of avoiding any hint of a conflict with the military in the interests of bolstering economic policy formation. Also important in this process was the virtual absence of the legislature, which has traditionally proven incapable of significant interference in military matters, except in the form of isolated protests to already consummated policies.
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The military retained some of its more traditional prerogatives, including preeminence in aspects of Amazonian development policymaking and policy implementation, open ideological support for the rights to property ownership without social limitations, and effective political resistence to the redress of human rights violations. This further attenuated the impact of the changes on the institution. Another factor was the military's readiness to accommodate itself to an external influence; the U.S. government actively avoided providing pretexts for nationalistic responses within the armed forces of the hemisphere, and provided a quid pro quo for those establishments that adapted. In the following pages we will examine two lines of analysis that diverge in their predictions regarding the evolution of civil-military relations in Brazil. In the approach exemplified by the work of Wendy Hunter, an optimistic line suggests that the simple evolution of the democratic electoral processes tends to resolve the question of the political influence of military officers. The analysis of Jorge Zaverucha, by contrast, offers a far more pessimistic vision, one that emphasizes the civilian predisposition opportunistically (and sporadically) to strengthen the political prerogatives of the Brazilian military establishment. Our own approach, to the extent that it can be compared to those of Hunter and Zaverucha, points to the rise of a new kind of military influence, directly contrasting with Hunter's conclusions while remaining complementary to those of Zaverucha. Contrary to Hunter's interpretation, it appears that neither the Brazilian congress nor the president has reduced the extent of the military'spolitical influence. The evidence, moreover, does not support the argument that the military establishment has passively accepted a gradual decline in its political power. Instead, we will argue that, confronting the new conditions of internal democratic stability and the decline of traditional external threats, the strategists of Brazil's armed forces have developed a complex plan, based on political retreats and advances, that has allowed them to overcome the budgetary and political crisis of the early 1990s and to retain significant influence over the internal state structure. There are a number of explanations for this, but one clearly stands out: it was fundamental to the initial politics of the Cardoso presidency to save this part of the state from the wholesale destruction experienced by the social sectors following the implementation of the Real Plan. How this was done we will attempt to show. A PAPER TIGER? Hunter's book Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers (1997) constitutes the longest and most consistent defense of the thesis that the military is destined to lose political influence in the
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new Brazilian democratic system. Hunter emphatically defends the contention that "the strategic calculations of self-interested politicians" and "the unfolding of the rules and norms of democracy" confer on civil-military relations a dynamic character, one whose principal tendency is the erosion of military influence. This process is said to be reinforced by external conditions related to the end of the Cold War.The combination of these internal and external factors will result, in Hunter's view, in a process of declining military influence in Brazil. She concludes that "at the risk of exaggeration, conditions of the 1980s and 1990s have rendered the Brazilian military somewhat of a paper tiger" (1997, 23). The tension between political-electoral and militaryinterests regarding the democratic competition for resources is said to constitute the principal cause of the decline of military influence. According to Hunter, like presidents, legislators seek to extend their own power and influence.If the armedforces are judgedto interfere with this goal, legislators will want to remove them from relevant institutional spheres and possibly reduce their reachoverall.(1997, 70) "Likelegislators," moreover, "presidents are motivated to remain in good standing with the electorate" (1997, 70). Even if these tendencies are counterbalanced by the fear of angering the military and placing the government's survival at risk, nevertheless, the argument goes, presidents will tend to limit military influence. Only during a crisis of governability or a period of weak popular support are chief executives tempted to make major concessions to the armed forces. For Hunter, the clearest evidence of the diminution of military power is the decline of military expenditures in the national budget under civilian rule (1997, 95). Thus, competition between civilians and the military for budgetary allocations acts, in Hunter's view, as a strong (and effective) incentive to cut expenditures for the armed forces. Enduringand widespread are the competing demands for state fundsthatdemocracycreates,and the inducementsdemocracyprovides for politiciansto expand social and economic spendingat the expense of military funding.(1997, 96) Although the frequent use of presidential prerogative to make supplementary allocations favoring the military continues to demonstrate that "the armed forces remain an important factor of power in the calculus of Brazilian executives" (1997, 99), the strongest tendency, according to Hunter, is the decline of military participation in federal expenditures: "should the competitive dynamic of democracy continue to be played out, the overall trend toward modest military budgets will persist" (113). In Hunter's view, moreover, political stability guarantees that this process will continue.
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The combined calculation of legislators and presidents suggests that as long as Congress retains ample decision-making power over the budget, and as long as Brazilian executives manage to preside over fairly stable governments, defense shares will remain relatively modest and may even decline further. (1997, 100) From this perspective, it could be said that the Brazilian military problem has tended to resolve itself through the political calculations of parliamentarians and presidents. Nevertheless, Hunter, paradoxically, seems to regard military officers as if they were almost incapable of action or reaction; that is, as if they were politically devoid of initiative and condemned to accept passively the decline of their influence within the power system. Surprisingly, not even the Constitutional Convention of 1988, in which officers were apparently quite effective in promoting their prerogatives, is evidence for Hunter of their capacity for independent political action.' To the contrary; for Hunter, "on balance, the armed forces had mixed success in Brazil's new constitution" and, moreover, it could be said that in this process, "the military did suffer important defeats" (1997, 57, 60). THE PERSISTENCE OF MILITARY PREROGATIVES
Jorge Zaverucha has underscored the persistent influence and political privileges of the military officers of the postdictatorial period (1994; 1997). Of central importance in his analysis is the Constitution of 1988 and particularly its Article 142, which defines the military establishment as the guardian of constitutional powers, of the law, and of public order. For Zaverucha, this general prerogative hangs like the sword of Damocles over the Constitution, serving as a constant potential source of political crisis (Zaverucha 1997; for the initial definition of "prerogatives," see Stepan 1988). The constitutional design of ministerial power also favors military influence: five ministerial (cabinet) positions were reserved for the armed forces-one for each of the three branches, one for the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (chefe do Estado Maior), and one for the chief of the Military Household, or Military Cabinet (chefe da Casa Militar)until June 1999, when the new Ministry of Defense, headed by a civilian minister, was finally implemented.2 This change, while too recent to evaluate fully, clearly represents a significant retreat from the complex of political prerogatives. Zaverucha recognizes Cardoso's intent to take this historic step with his publication of the National Defense Policy (PDN) at the end of 1996, but emphasizes that the profound delay in implementing the policy and the unwillingness to spell out the terms for doing so underscore the ongoing political struggle between the military and the government.
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Continued militarycontrol over key intelligence agencies-beyond the oversight of Congress-represents for Zaverucha another institutional factor helping to preserve the armed forces' political influence. The secret services of the three military branches apparently function beyond any civilian control and do not distinguish between domestic and external, or civilian and military, intelligence activities. There is a new civilian Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN)-which was immediately beset with scandal and reorganization under the direction of General Alberto Cardoso-but Zaverucha believes that this problem will persist because "there is no discussion of the way in which the military intelligence services will cease to conduct political espionage" (1997, 37). The problem, moreover, is aggravated by the lack of routine legislative oversight of defense matters. The committees on defense in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have been marginalized; participation on them clearly does not produce popular votes. Zaverucha also points to the risk that the military could become an independent force during an internal policing operation. "Operation Rio," the coordination of military operations to combat criminal behavior, including drug trafficking, in the slums of Rio de Janeiro at the end of 1994, demonstrated for Zaverucha that "the military acted without any political control," lending credence to the risk that "federal troops used in public security operations come to subordinate their actions to the military hierarchy, rather than acting as an arm of [civilian] political power" (1997, 40).3 Zaverucha's interpretation clearly contrasts with Hunter's arguments for eroding military influence in Brazil, and directly challenges her characterization of the military's transformation into a "paper tiger" through the growth of democracy. Zaverucha, instead, continually points to the preservation of military prerogatives and the unwillingness of civilian politicians to limit them.4 Yet although such elements may help us to understand the apparent complicity of the executive and legislature in preserving some of the nondemocratic elements of military influence, and to question the perhaps optimistic views expressed by Hunter, these aspects do not effectively explain the capacity of the Brazilian military to adapt to a new era. INTERMEDIATE PERSPECTIVES The perspectives of Hunter and Zaverucha exemplify two opposite poles that define the range of arguments on this complex subject. Within that range, Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira and Samuel Alves Soares have taken a more modified approach. They point to certain advances in the quality of civil-militaryrelations made by the Cardoso administration,including the creation of the civilian-led Ministryof Defense and the passage of the Law
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on Disappearances. Rizzo de Oliveira and Soares do not attribute these ameliorative changes to the national congress, as does Hunter; instead, they attribute them exclusively to executive fiat. They regard progress in civilian control over the military, moreover, as an open process, subject to significant political and cultural obstacles. (For the most recent version of these positions, see Rizzo de Oliveira and Alves Soares 1999.) On the other hand, Rene Dreifuss affirms, ArmedForces it is quite clearthatin the past ten years,the Brazilian with the cultural have redesignedtheirrelationship agenciesof govof ernmentand with the politicalinstitutions the country.Theyhave in become "civilianized" a very singularway in this process:instead of actingaccordingto a set of rules defined by the civilian forces, they have retrained themselves (though not retrained) in the absence of a definition.(Dreifuss1999) This perspective stresses (as we attempt to do in this study) the active role of the military, in contrast to Hunter's analysis, while at the same time considering the possibility that the military has voluntarily renounced some of its institutional prerogatives, a position that would be inconsistent to some extent with Zaverucha's analysis. Our own analysis, then, should probably begin with a further statement from General Leonel in the aforementioned 1998 interview. Afterassumingpower,the presidentmade a correctobservation. He said thatwe need to preparethe armedforces for the challengesof the future.That is right.We are tryingto adaptourselves [nos adequad to the future.(Veja1998a)5 In our view, this brief statement includes two fundamental aspects of the Cardoso government's military policy. One is the existence of a clear plan for the recuperation and preservation of the armed forces, particularly in the general context of bitter contention over scarce public expenditures. The other is the importance of military initiative, its capacity to adapt itself (se adequar) to current and future conditions. These points are particularly relevant to the four central hurdles in the military's campaign to overcome its complex materiel and identity crises of the early 1990s: the salary problem, the need to influence state investments in military modernization, the routinization of employing troops in matters of internal order, and questions relating to Amazonia. Political controversy over the redress of human rights violations, while of lesser stature, has also figured prominently during the past two years. MILITARY PAY It is highly significant that during the Cardoso administration the military has been able to remain outside of the contentious government
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salary policies established by the Real Plan (1994). Shortly after Cardoso assumed the presidency in 1995, the military leaders let him know that they would not accept a salary policy that they regarded as inappropriate for the institution. "Any solution for the salary of soldiers must come in a block," Air Force Minister Mauro Gandra insisted, when studies were reported of the possibility of raising high-ranking officers' salaries to the level of executive secretaries of the civilian ministries. "Wewill not accept a measure that benefits some, leaving subordinates out," Gandra averred (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1995a). While such military arguments ultimately succeeded, they created tension between the armed forces and economic policymakers. They were initially raised by the presidents of the three military clubs (groups of retired officers), who publicly declared that there was serious unrest in the nation's barracks over military salary constriction. The air force minister spoke out again, noting that the club presidents had expressed the views of the armed forces. According to Gandra, the clubs had the "freedom to express things that the military minister sometimes could not say, should not say, but would have difficulty justifying to his troops had he not said them." In his view, furthermore. the new Cardoso government was "a child who had not yet learned to walk," and thus deserved a modicum of forbearance (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1995a). The new government clearly understood the message. In August 1995, Cardoso announced that his economic team was studying, along with the Joint Chiefs, the possibility of significantly raising military earnings (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1995b). In March 1996 the president took the decisive step of proposing a special formula for resolving the military salary question. He sent Congress a constitutional amendment (PEC 338) that defined military jobs as "characteristicstate careers" (carreiras tipicas de Estado). This not only allowed him to separate the military salary policy from those for civilian agencies, but it proposed that laws dealing with military pay would no longer be at the initiative of Congress; the president, instead, would now take on this power (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1996a, 1996b). Federal Deputy Jose Genoino (PT-SP) pointed to the amendment's democratic potential, in that it defined military personnel as "servants of a public character whose function consists in defending national sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional powers" (Genoino 1997). The Senate Justice Committee approved the amendment in December 1997 by a vote of 15 to 2, after the Chamber of Deputies had passed it in September (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1997h). Final approval took place in a special session of Congress, and Constitutional Amendment 18 was promulgated on February 5, 1998.6 On the same day the amendment passed in the Senate committee, President Cardoso announced to 150 general officers of the three
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military branches that it would be possible in 1998 to raise the Special Work Bonus, a pay category that represented 36 percent of salaries (an increase of 100 percent in this category would boost salaries by 30 percent). The president also promised to support modernization efforts and emphasized the military's growing social prestige, which had been demonstrated in public opinion polls showing a credibility rating of over 80 percent (Estado de Sao Paulo 1997i). The newspaper commented, At the presidential palace,there areguaranteesthatthe raisewill go the opposition of economic advisers,because it through,despite was a clear decision of the president.On the military side, officers think it important the governmentnot delay, as the situationis that serious. (Estadode Sao Paulo 1998b) Subsequent events demonstrated that there was, indeed, no delay. While the amendment was still moving through Congress, the president authorized a retroactive pay adjustment.7 It was not until May that the 113 percent increase in bonuses was approved-this even greater than the initial readjustment of 100 percent that the military had implemented, and with another predicted increase of 30 percent for 1999 (O Estado do Parand 1998b). Thus was ended the military dissatisfaction over pay, despite the apparent inequity of the Real Plan's restrictions on the salaries of civil servants. It is useful to recall that the central element of the military identity crisis of the early 1990s-the salary question-was effectively resolved under the cloud of a highly restrictive economic stabilization policy. The separation of the "militarycategory" from the rest of the bureaucracy was crucial in this. Thus it was probably not a coincidence that, in the first few weeks of the Cardoso government, the minister of the air force declared that the recognition of military personnel as "servants of the state" represented "the administrative and psychological goal [that is] most important to the armed forces today," adding that resolution of the "problem"was "indispensable to the peace [tranquilidadel of the government itself' (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1995a). The constitutional amendment that resolved the problem, PEC338, was approved in less than two years, with the president's firm support. MONEY FOR MODERNIZATION As for the other key aspect of the military budget, investing in modernization and reequipmemt, there is evidence that here, too, the Cardoso government has fully satisfied the armed forces' expectations-to the military chiefs' public praise. These allocations have been made without any legislative oversight and seemingly without even following the pro-
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cedures of the new Policy of National Defense, published in late 1996. Some of the acquisitions have been justified on the basis of opportunities to obtain modern arms at good prices on the post-Cold War international market.8 Military pressure for such purchases, in conjunction with the president's positive predisposition and the legislature's apathy, adds an additional risk: that of simply resuming projects that were interrupted, without any assessment of their content or relevance, such as the military's Calha Norte Project in the state of Para (see Estado de Sao Paulo 1999, 2000). The Cardoso government has raised military enthusiasm regarding the prospects for modernization. Recent data collected by a new institution dedicated to the study of the strategic balance in South America point to a significant resumption of expenditures for the modernization of Brazilian military equipment (Centro de Estudios Uni6n para la Nueva Mayoria, 1997). The study appraised and compared the status of land, naval, and air forces in five countries. Regarding land forces, the report notes, "a good part of the primary materiel in all of the armies of the region, from combat vehicles to armament, is old or, if still operational, is obsolete." Nevertheless, it emphasizes, "Chile and Brazil lead the way in acquisitions for reequipping and modernization" (Centro de Estudios 1997, 41). Brazil, unlike Argentina (which effectively destroyed its military industry), has been able to maintain its expenditures in this category. Data available from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, moreover, reinforce this impression, showing a striking increase in Brazil's overall military expenditures after 1995. These data show that constant U.S. dollar expenditures jumped from US$7.4 billion in 1994 to US$10.9 billion in 1995. By 1998 (the most recent figures available), expenditures were estimated at US$13.1 billion (SIPRIn.d.). For naval power, the Centro de Estudios document affirms that in operating capacity (which depends largely on the capacity for naval construction), "the Brazilian navy today is the most advanced and evinces a light naval advantage in Latin America, besides being one of five countries in the world capable of building submarines." The Argentine specialists who prepared this report already speak of a "growing imbalance in the region" in terms of "offensive power," which "defines the capacity to carry out naval operations [leading to] projecting power." For them, "Brazil and Chile have increased [their naval power] significantly by incorporating submarines, amphibious vehicles (naval landing craft, etc.), aeronaval units (helicopters on frigates and destroyers with Exocet AM39 missiles), long-range missiles on destroyers, frigates and corvettes and logistical units to supply task forces" (Centro de Estudios 1997, 58). Finally, observing military air power, the study warns that "the great potential that favors Brazil with its relatively large number of
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planes is substantially reduced by total operational capacity, if the levels of training, maintenance and advanced equipment are considered" (67). Nevertheless, this sector also shows signs of recuperating capacity. air Despite budgetaryrestrictions,[Brazil's] force continues proand gramsof modernization reequippingwhich were only delayed. Besides this, [Brazil]changed direction in its policy of materiel nationalproductionand capturing cuttingencouraging acquisition, of edge technologies, creating an industrialinfrastructure great magnitude and large-scalelogistical means. (Centrode Estudios 1997,67) Furthermore, says the document,."Brazil plans in 1998 to buy 120 combat aircraft.The American company Boeing has offered the F-18 in a deal that has a $2 billion base."9The study further notes, "the tendency observed as to air combat materiel indicates that the Brazilian air force is inclined toward coproduction or production under license (AMXXavante) and toward modernization (Mirage III and F-5e)" (Centro de Estudios 1997, 67). In its conclusion, the Argentine report observes, "Brazildevotes approximately $550 million to $600 million annually to military reequipping, approximately double that of Chile"(94). It is clear from these observations alone that the putative scrapping of the Brazilian armed forces has at least been interrupted. In this light, the resumption of military expenditures in the Cardoso administration, and the military'sgrowing autonomy in defining its modernization priority, are significant. In the first months of Cardoso's presidency, the military chiefs received the new president's support for their argument that general cuts in federal government expenditures for 1995 should not extend to the armed forces. This forced Minister of Planning Jose Serra to withdraw his proposal to cut R$1 billion in this area (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1995b). In September of that year, the military ministers celebrated an allocation of R$5.6 billion in the Pluriannual Plan (1996-99), a total greater than that for national education (R$4.9 billion) or health (R$4.5 billion) (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1995e). At the same time, the press noted that the president had promised the military that he would fully approve the projected expenditures for reequipping the armed forces that were contained in the 1996 budget draft legislation (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1995g).10Another campaign by the military ministers took place shortly after the government applied massive resources to the bank protection program. In March 1996, the Army High Command urgently requested that the president order the secretary of the treasury immediately to release R$120 million to pay the debt to its suppliers (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1996a). In May 1998, a formal project to equip and modernize the armed forces was announced as the result of the projected creation of the new Ministry of Defense. Expenditures for this were forecast at R$4 billion
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by the end of 2015. According to a news release from Agencia O Globo, "this money is the product of the use of external credit authorized by the Senate and mediated through the Banco do Brasil" (printed in Estado do Parand 1998a). The largest part of these expenditures will go to the air force, allowing for the purchase of 43 fighters to replace F-5s and F-103 Mirages. The program for reequipping this branch has been named the Plano Fenix. Army funds will go primarily to fund radio communication equipment, computer equipment, and vehicle and helicopter support. Expenditures for the navy are projected to be spent for seven UH-12 Esquilo helicopters, the modernization of six antisubmarine helicopters and the acquisition of 23 Skyhawk A-4 attack bombers, to be used on the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais following the recent decision that the navy will again be allowed to have fixed-wing aircraft, previously restricted to the air force. Such internal developments have, in the context of international changes, provided for increasing speculation that a new arms race is brewing in South America. The U.S. decision to resume selling sophisticated militaryequipment to LatinAmerican countries, authorized by President Clinton in July 1997, is paramount in this regard (Estado de Sao Paulo 1997a; Washington Post 1997). It underscores the risks incurred with continuing military autonomy. In a September 1996 interview, President Cardoso stridently denied that such sales had been resumed and insisted that the final decision in such matters remained his alone: "One thing, I believe, that the Americans do not understand is that I am the supreme commander of the armed forces, an office that I exercise fully." Cardoso's statement was motivated by rumors that Pentagon officials or representatives of U.S. arms industries had suggested to the Brazilian air force that it send Washington a request for information about its eventual purchase of first-generation fighters, ostensibly to aid lobbying efforts to revise the restrictive arms sales policy (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1997c). Cardoso's words apparently did not translate into control over military autonomy, however. In mid-1997, the president signed a decree authorizing the armed forces to purchase war materiel and to contract for technical services without submitting such projects to public bids "when revealing locale, need, characteristics of its objectives, specifications or quantity would place at risk national security objectives" (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1997e). The publication of the decree evoked responses from members of the Committee on External Relations and National Defense (CREDN) of the Chamber of Deputies. Deputy Jose Genoino, earlier defender of the military on the salary issue, declared that he would "propose a legislative decree in order to revoke the government's initiative," as that measure "allows even the purchase of arms to be carried out in secret" (Estado de Sao Paulo 1997b).
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The suspension of the open bid process does not bode well for the future of civilian oversight and control over military expenditures. With the loss of parliamentary controls before purchases, the power to define priorities is also lost (Pereira 1997). Indeed, this extensive broadening of military largesse is recognized by key officers. Admiral Mario Cesar Flores noted, for example, in arguing for the creation of a Ministry of Defense, that the armed forces as are largelyfree within theirbudgetaryconstraints, defined technocraticallyand politically,and do not have objective concerns. This freedom has not assured an integratedmilitarypower indisputablyin tune with the needs of the country;rather,it has given Brazilthe naval, land and air power seen as necessaryand practicable within the respectivebudgetsof the Branches.(Flores1997) There is abundant evidence that the Cardoso government has not altered this state of affairs, even after the establishment of the National Defense Policy. The navy's purchase of A-4 Skyhawk attack bombers is an example (Estado de Sao Paulo 1997j). According to a journalist who specializes in defense matters, "what is serious is the form the purchase of the Skyhawks took and, finally, the way it was presented to the president of the republic as a politically consummated fact" (Pereira 1997). The same writer maintains that the navy's decision "deprecates the National Defense Policy sanctioned by the president... and consecrates the complete lack of cooperation between the branches." The Skyhawk case, in his view, "characterizes a degree of autonomy incompatible with the nature of a democratic regime" (Pereira 1997). The navy, in this interpretation, made three "assaults"on the president. In the first, without refusing to seek authorization, it sought to gain time, arguing that the National Defense Policy was not yet defined. The second included another delay in adhering to the defense policy, based on the argument that it was first necessary to resolve major problems in reequipping the air force. The third request was presented as an irreplaceablebusiness not Fernando opportunity, to be left to President HenriqueCardoso without confirmingthe terms of the previous meeting and adding that the navy planes should only go into operationafterthe Ministryof the AirForce renovatedits planes. (Pereira1998) For that analyst, however, in view of the major difficulties confronting the air force, "itwould not be surprising if the Skyhawks began operating before the agreement [stipulated]"(Pereira 1998). The resumption of military expenditures without curbing levels of military autonomy deeply affects the question of civilian control over military projects, which, incidently, thus remain largely secret. A key example is the reactivation of the army's gas-graphite reactor project,
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capable of producing plutonium, which was located inside the Guaratiba ecological reserve in Rio de Janeiro. The Collor government had suspended the so-called Atlantic Project; the reactivation was noted in news reports in mid-1997 (Jornal do Brasil 1997a, b). On all the recent occasions when military autonomy has been reaffirmed, the legislature's reaction has been late and inarticulate (Deputy Genoino is one exception). While Deputy Arlindo Chinaglia (PT-SP), chair of the Committee for Fiscal Inspection and Control of the [Congressional] Chambers, promised to summon the Ministry of the Navy to explain the purchase of the Skyhawks (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1998a), his protest apparently had few consequences. Deputy Paulo Bornhausen (PFL-SP)sent the president a petition requesting that he avoid involving Brazil in an international arms race. This occurred just before President Clinton arrived in Brazil for a state visit (Estado de Sao Paulo 1997f). A month earlier, Deputy Paulo Delgado (PT-MG), a member of CREDN, had taken aim at the suspension of the U.S. arms embargo on Latin America and the selection of Argentina as a non-NATO U.S. military ally; he asked Cardoso to request clarification from the United States (O Globo 1997). While these observations do not discount the CREDN's activities,they do support the hypothesis that in the Cardoso government, both legislative inertia and the military'sability to anticipate civilian policies largely explain why civilian control over militaryinitiatives has not significantlyincreased. Military autonomy in budgetary mattersapparentlyhas increased, based on continued presidential support of militaryappropriations. THE FUNCTION OF INTERNAL SECURITY The routine employment of the armed forces, principally the army, in tasks related to internal order is beyond the scope of the 1996 National Defense Policy, which is "directed at external threats." (For the full text, see Presidency of the Republic 1996.) Nevertheless, the issue continues to occupy an important place in Brazilian military thought. Of the three branches, the army is the center of such concerns; the air force and the navy seem to be increasingly dedicated to the role of external defense (see Serpa 1994). In August 1995, speaking at the Second National Conference of Strategic Studies (ENEE), General Leonel, the Joint Chiefs chairman, defined the parameters for the deployment of the armed forces, dividing them into four situations: war, prevention of war, "insecurity,"and peace (Leonel 1995, 29-30). Under insecurity, he included a series of threats: historical, religious, racial, and socioeconomic antagonisms; urban violence; and the performance of the police forces. All these were previously understood to fall within the concept of national security.
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In the situation of peace, Leonel mentioned "the importance of information (intelligence) as 'warning' and as the basic constituent in the process of decisionmaking" and "preventive actions" in internal matters. In a reference to military "concerns," he underscored "the achievement of 'internal peace' as an essential condition" (Leonel 1995, 31). These views help to explain Leonel's reaction sometime later to a confrontation at Eldorado dos Carajas,Para, between workers affiliated with Brazil's Landless Movement (MST) and the largely civilian "militarized police" (who are not directly part of the military in Brazil). The militarized police massacred some of the workers; army troops had to be called in to quell the violence. "There are two views of the conflictone political and the other military," Leonel asserted. "I will only respond to the military view. The Landless Movement is a low-intensity conflict" (Jornal do Brasil 1996). General Alberto Cardoso, chief of the Military Household, declared that he was "shocked by" the attitude of the civilian-controlled militarized police (Jornal do Brasil 1996). At the same conference, General Paulo Aquino, the military commander of Brazil's southeast region, referred to low-intensity conflict in the context of the "New World Order,"in which there are said to be no more conventional ideological threats. Among low-intensity conflicts, he included "unconventional forms of taking power," understood to include social movements and even class-based organizations. In referring to high-intensity threats, he mentioned revolutionary movements; in this category, the real threats were uncertainty and instability (Aquino 1995). In contrast, representatives of the other branches, Vice Admiral Arlindo Vianna Filho (of the Naval Commission) and Major Brigadier Valter Brauer (of the Fourth Regional Air Command), made no reference to problems of internal order in their presentations (Vianna Filho 1995; Brauer 1995).11 Considering that this conference took place during the first year of the Cardoso government, it is worth examining a similar debate that occurred at the Fourth ENEEin May 1998, when strategic military planners with the Joint Chiefs of Staff publicly stated their views of the positions of the three branches. Again, the army's representative, Division General Gilberto Pimentel, was the only one to emphasize threats to internal order as strategic military concerns; he mentioned increasing internal conflicts (narcotrafficking, organized crime, and land struggles) as a focus (Pimentel 1998). In contrast, Air Force Flight Colonel Delano Menezes spoke only of combating internal crime through collaboration with the Ministry of Justice "in response to a presidential directive," and the use of the Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM)in internal defense "without the use of arms" (Menezes 1998). The representative of the Naval Joint Chiefs, Rear Admiral Wellington Liberatti, preferred to emphasize the speed with which the navy had adapted to the National
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Defense Policy, citing the document National Defense Policy: The Brazilian Navy (Servico de Relagoes Publicas da Marinha 1997). Virtually all his emphasis was on the external mission (Liberatti 1998). The Cardoso government's use of the military in maintaining internal order began early. The first order from the presidential palace came in May 1995, as part of the government's efforts to end the national petroleum workers' strike after it had paralyzed the industry for 23 days, and following a Supreme Court decision that labeled the strike as an abuse of power. It is important to note, however, that within one week after the strike began, the government had already ordered five of the six military commands on alert. The government was clearly assessing whether this strike constituted a crucial test of the unions' capacity to resist privatization, a key part of the follow-up policies of the Real Plan (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1995c; Jornal do Brasil 1995a; Pontes 1995). On May 24, Cardoso ordered army troops to occupy 4 of the 11 Petrobras refineries at dawn, following a meeting with the Ministers of the Army and Mines and Energy, and surprising the union movement. Three of the refineries were in Sao Paulo and one in Parana (Folha de Sao Paulo 1995d). The operation at the refinery in Paulinia alone required "300 soldiers armed with machine guns, rifles and tear gas" (Jornal do Brasil 1995a). To justify the occupations, the government claimed the need to "protect the public patrimony" and to "provide guarantees to those who wished to return to work." The minister of mines and energy said the troops were called in to ensure that work resumed without incident (Jornal do Brasil 1995b). The legality of using the army in civil affairs is not a question in our analysis; it is assured in the Constitution of 1988. Our focus is on the facility with which the president turned to the armed forces at the first sign of union mobilization. It was thus left up to the army to avoid a repetition of the tragic Volta Redonda episode of late 1988, when the military invaded worker-occupied steel mills during a shutout and shot three workers to death. The minister of the army therefore advised the press of his concern that the troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible. To avoid confrontation, the army ordered that suppression of protestors at the refinery gates be carried out only by the largely civilian "militarized police." The minister of the army loudly declared that the occupation was on the president's orders and that it in no way implied the army's views about the merits of the strike. Nevertheless, he admitted that the plans for the operation could be implemented rapidly because the armed forces had a permanent plan for occupying "strategic points" in the country (Jornal do Brasil 1995c). The refinery action concluded in defeat of the strike but no pitched battles with troops. Another use of the army against social movements was the episode in Eldorado dos Carajas, the incident on
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which Generals Leonel and Cardoso later commented. President Cardoso called in the troops after meeting with the ministers of justice, the army, and the civilian household, as a way of investigating the causes of the conflict and helping to find possible victims who had not yet been identified (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1996b). The president also sent his chief of military household to assess the situation. Although this represented further evidence of the facility with which the executive resorted to the military to deal with social crises, Alberto Cardoso's comments seem surprising. He spoke out against the police violence and assured the president of the Central Workers' Union that the incident could represent "a turning point for agrarian reform" (Jornal do Brasil 1996; Estado de Sdo Paulo 1996c). Still, it is General Leonel's "low-intensity conflict" that underscores the latent danger in militarizing such social questions. The same holds true for the subsequent decision to send three detachments of the army, a total of more than three hundred troops, "with the objective of rendering services in landless settlements 350 kilometers south of Belem, Para" (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1996c). Indeed, the intensified use of the militaryin activities of agrarian reform-to construct roads, water systems, and reservoirs and to survey plots of land-was even a topic at the National Defense Council's mid-1996 meeting (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1996d). Evidence abounds, moreover, that army intelligence has permanent files on the Landless Movement (MST).The army's Center for Social Communication recently admitted the existence of "intelligence companies," although they were described as having no "ideological function" (Jornal do Brasil 1997c).12Sources in the Army High Command also admited to the press that satellite images had been used to monitor MST activities (Correio Popular 1996). The army's presence in activities related to the MST has been a constant feature of the Cardoso administration. In May 1997, a plan to impede the occupation of lands of the Vale do Rio Doce (parastatal) Company (CVRD) in Parauapebas, southern Para, came to light. Military activity included the encampment of 600 troops of the 52nd Battalion of the Forest Infantry at Clube Serra Norte, on CVRD property (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1996d). This occupation repeated an October 1996 operation in Curionopolis, Para, involving 1,000 army troops and 63 federal police, to dismantle the Serra Pelada Liberation Movement, formed by prospectors who obstructed the CVRD's local mineral explorations (Folba de Sdo Paulo 1996e; Estado de Sdo Paulo 1996e). In April 1998, the army was again asked to .conduct Operation Presence, with the purpose of preventing conflict between landowners and landless peasants in Parauapebas. Again, troops of the 52nd Forest Infantry Battalion were used, including a company of 140 men, 7 jeeps, 1 ambulance, and 13 trucks (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1998c). Workers
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sought out the lieutenant colonel in charge of the operation to ask that the troops protect a Landless Movement encampment; but this action apparently did not lessen the risk of military intervention in this social conflict (Estado de Sdo Paulo 1998d). This operation, moreover, inaugurated a new pattern of behavior on the part of the government. The federal minister of justice transferred to the governor of Par: the power to call up military force to deal with "situations that involve land conflicts" without previously consulting the president. The governor activated the Amaz6nia Military Command (Estado de Sao Paulo 1998e). A week later, on the anniversary of the massacre of Eldorado dos Carajas,the army reinforced its contingent in the Parauapebas region with an additional 150 soldiers, bringing the total to 550 troops, according to its own report (Estado de Sao Paulo 1998f). By the end of May, the new policy appeared to have been consolidated. According to Estado de Sao Paulo, "The army has already begun to coordinate all government activities in southern Para, with the power to intervene even in agrarian reform and with an attitude of 'zero tolerance' in conflicts" (1998g). It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the army's intervention in the rebellion of the largely civilian "militarizedpolice" in June 1997, or the use of troops in 1998 to escort food convoys to the drought regions, where frequent looting had occurred with the participation of the MST (Talento 1998). Nor will we explore the topic of civic action, including Operation Asa Branca III, which involved 1,500 troops in a series of military exercises in the sertao (backlands) of Pernambuco, a region of extensive marijuana cultivation The military described this action as an effort to "demonstrate to the population of the cities that the presence of the organization [corpora.aol will serve to resolve urgent problems whose solutions would otherwise be delayed for years" (Didrio de Pernambuco 1997a). In our view, this reinforces another of our hypotheses: the surprising agility with which the army manages to occupy political spaces (relative to the executive and legislature). This skill shows no sign of weakening in the near future. HEGEMONY IN AMAZONIA Another category of evidence points to the persistence, and even strengthening, of traditional military tendencies toward authoritarianism in certain limited areas. It includes ongoing institutional concerns with the Amazon region, questions of national security (reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s), and the maintenance of unrestricted private property rights in Brazil. While limited in scope, these manifestations of military behavior remain frankly authoritarian in character. They may indicate the extent of any permanent and substantive break with the past.
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Continuing development in the Amazon has remained perhaps the last bastion of an orthodox military mission.'3 Over the past two decades, a particularly invasive form of developmentalism has been adopted in Amazonia: civilian economic interests linked to slash-andburn cattle ranching, large- and small-scale mining, and massive forestry and agricultural enterprises have come to see themselves, along with the military, as the nationalistic heroes of a nation threatened by international ecological imperialism. National security, a term military ideologues have repeatedly defined and redefined over the past three decades, has recently come to include this kind of colonization-populating, though not necessarily democratizing, what they regard as a zone of likely future threats to national security while intensifying radar and direct surveillance. Suspicions of U.S. intentions in the Amazon region swept the Brazilian officer corps in the early 1990s. (The contract for SIVAM,the regional electronic surveillance program, went nevertheless to Raytheon, the U.S. multinational. See Veja 1995.) To the rallying cry A Amazonia e nossa (Amazonia is ours), borrowed from the nationalism of the 1950s (when the cry was Opetroleo e nosso), a loose civil-military political pact emerged in the early 1990s to support this kind of regional development. The current ideological bases of military hegemony in Amazonian policymaking date at least to the 1950s, when the geopolitics associated with such militaryideologues as General Golbery do Couto e Silva began to shape military institutions such as the Superior War College (ESG). Amazonia's "natural permeability" figured prominently in Silva's conclusion that the region would have to be penetrated, integrated, and "valorized" as national territory (Silva 1967, 47). The militarydictatorship launched a series of development plans for Amazonia in the 1960s and 1970s, most of which related to a master program, the National Integration Plan (PIN). This called for building a road network, the TransAmazonica; implementing a related colonization scheme; and stepping up large-scale mining and forestry projects, ostensibly to be based on foreign investment and geared toward export. Land ownership had become an overriding concern in this and other regional development programs. Conflicts, particularly between peasants and major landowners, long a problem in the Northeast, had gradually increased in Amazonia.14 By 1980, "land conflicts [began] to be regarded as a question of national security" (Berno de Almeida 1990). Questions relating to land ownership and Indian affairs, moreover, were increasingly "militarized." As the transition to civilian government approached, the nation's military rulers mechanismsin the countryside,and particuapplied authoritarian These new measures,togetherwith those related larlyin Amaz6nia. to the earlier creation of [regionalprograms],made it clear that
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democracywould not be allowed to prevailin the countryside,and (Berno de Almeida1990, 233-34) especially not on the frontier. Military encouragement of large mining and agricultural investments in Amazonia, reinforced with fiscal incentives, increasingly became the primary stimuli of violent conflicts over land (Bakx 1990, 67). Indians, peasants, and forest workers, such as rubber tappers, were displaced. The military itself, furthermore, was Brazil's largest landowner; the army directly controlled five million hectares in Amaz6nia, and the general staff of the armed forces another four million (Veja 1988b). The military expressed unqualified opposition to agrarian reform when it was first launched in earnest in 1985. The subsequent explosion of the Landless Movement has fueled these issues while occasionally putting the armed forces into policing roles. Mutual hostility has grown. In July 1997, for example, Alberto Cardoso expressed concern that the participation of MST and industrial union members in police strikes represented a plot by leftist opposition parties to destabilize the military and put it in a "difficult situation" before the populace (Monteiro 1997). Numerous "invasions"by peasant squatters of (largely unproductive) land holdings have occurred over the past decade. Fernando Henrique Cardoso has taken a surprisingly inflexible position toward the invasions, given his leftist political and academic background. Couching its concerns in the language of national security, the miland the National Security Council (CSN) drafted the Calha Norte itary (Northern Trench) project shortly after the transfer to civilian government in 1985 "to promote the occupation of the frontier strip along Brazil's northern borders" (Santilli 1989, 42). The proximity of the traditional lands of the Yanomami Indians to the Venezuelan border, the growth of drug smuggling in the region, the fear of a recurrence of Amazonian guerrilla activity similar to that experienced in Araguaia in the 1970s, even alleged international attacks from Colombian guerrillas-all served as formal, although decidedly unconvincing, justifications for the project, which was launched as a "confidential"document. Its very existence remained unknown to the Brazilian Congress for two years after its creation (Oliveira Filho 1990, 156). While some observers suspected that the CSN had posited the unlikely scenario of a future war in a relatively narrow 150-kilometer frontier strip (Santilli 1989, 43), this "northern trench" is far larger, encompassing as much as 14 percent of Brazil's territoryand 24 percent of Amazonia (Hecht and Cockburn 1990, 136). Its implications for militherefore are much tary autonomy in defining national security "threats" broader. Indeed, it appears to represent the armed forces' most nationalistic aspirations. In late 1997, furthermore, the Brazilian air force openly opposed the Boeing Corporation's interest in taking over the
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Brazilian missile-launching sight at Alcantara, Maranhao (Folha de Sao Paulo 1997). Tension between the military and environmentalists has been the norm since 1985. Although the military has reluctantly become involved in attempts to limit the annual burning of forests, and has even trained special environmental agents to police illegal burning (New YorkTimes 1991), strong criticism of international efforts to save the rainforest has figured prominently in statements by the ESG;the implication has been that there is an international plot to take over the region (Latin American WeeklyReport 1991). Extreme hostility toward Environment Minister Jose Lutzenberger, the first environmentalist to hold a Brazilian cabinet post, became the norm before he was fired in March 1992. The criticism was tinged, significantly, with the language of anticommunism.'5 If anticommunism had become an obsolete buttress of military prerogatives, antienvironmentalism seemed poised to replace it. CONCLUSIONS The Cardoso government has routinized the use of the military in situations of social conflict, establishing a new pattern of interrelations, principally involving the army; and it has done relatively little to curb traditional spheres of military influence. This attitude from the executive reinforces the army's tendency to view social questions as part of its strategic concerns. Given the crisis of the police structure and the apathy of the legislature, this could become a permanent feature of Brazilian politics. Once more, it is very difficult to accept the argument that the military is losing influence within the Brazilian state structure.16 It should not be surprising, then, that the military officers have declared themselves satisfied with the government of President Cardoso. Their salary question has been resolved, and the military has been differentiated from the rest of the federal bureaucracy. The legal means and the political autonomy necessary to launch major investments in new armaments have been granted, and the funds necessary to do this have been released. The executive has initiated a policy of routinizing military intervention in civilian conflicts apparently unrelated to national defense. Finally, it has done little to attenuate the authoritarianremnants still evident in such areas as Amazonia or spontaneous military expressions of hostility toward the Landless Movement. Amid a profound shortage of federal resources because of current economic policies, the present government has found the means to eliminate the most immediate causes of military unrest. In this context, in our view, the creation during the second Cardoso administration of a new Ministry of Defense and a new kind of (civilian) intelligence agency, ABIN-both beset with scandal and political conflict from their
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significant. The military's apparent retreat from these preinception-is rogatives should not distract us from further examination of the apparent emergence of a new form of military influence, nestled in the framework of Brazilian democracy at the beginning of the new millennium.
ACRONYMS
ABIN .................. CREDN .............. CSN ................. ENEE ................. ESG ................... MST .................... PDN.................... PIN .................... SIVAM ................ Agencia Brasileira de Inteligencia Comissao de Rela~6es Exteriores e Defesa Nacional Conselho de SeguranCa Nacional Encontro Nacional de Estudos Estrategicos Escola Superior de Guerra Movimento dos Sem-Terra Politica de Defesa Nacional Plano de Integradao Nacional Sistema de Vigilancia da Amazonia
NoTEs
Dr. Martins Filho would like to thank the Brazilian agency FAPESPfor a grant that facilitated research and travel. Dr. Zirker would like to thank Dr. Ron Sexton, Chancellor; Dr. Janie C. Park, Provost; and Ms. Cindy Krieger, Administrative Assistant, of Montana State University, Billings, for their assistance in facilitating this project. The authors would also like to thank the managing editor and the four anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. 1. This happened before the 1990s identity crisis. For one analyst of the period, "the armed forces made the Constitutional Convention hear its voice regarding its interest in reordering the country. ... it did so in an ordered and disciplined [escalonada] way on the Subcommittee for Defense.... When [they] judged it to be necessary ... the military ministers forced the Constitutional Convention to feel the full weight of their political pressures" (Rizzo de Oliveira 1994, 170). 2. The heads of the military branches have since become "commandants" and have ostensibly lost their cabinet status. 3. As a detailed description of this operation demonstrates, tragic consequences were avoided in Rio because of the serendipitous good sense of specific military commanders (see Fuccille 1996). 4. The remaining prerogatives that Zaverucha mentions appear, to us, less important in defining military influence: absence of Congressional participation in the promotion of military officers; placing the (mostly civilian) militarized police and firefighters under partial military control; the low probability that active military personnel will be tried in civilian courts for common crimes; the role of the military in presidential security. Zaverucha 1994, 1997. 5. General Leonel was born in 1930, as were General Zenildo Lucena (minister of the army for both Itamar Franco and Cardoso) and Cardoso himself.
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Leonel belongs to a generation of officers whose military careers took place, for the most part, during the military dictatorship. Generational cohorts offer interesting insights into sources of changes in mentality in the military. A contrasting example is that of General Alberto Cardoso, chief of the military household and perhaps the most visible officer in the Cardoso administration, who was born in 1940 (Minist6rio do Exercito 1975). 6. Not every initiative was successful. In October 1997, military morale dipped when the Senate, voting on a social welfare reform measure, retracted the portion referring to the special retirement status of military personnel. O Estado de Sdo Paulo (1997g) noted that the president, "who is familiar with the peculiarities of the profession, supports the special retirement status of military personnel, and was surprised by the decision of the senate." 7. The Jornal do Brasil (1998) called its readers' attention to the nature of the decision: "The president sent the draft to Congress, the military ministers included the pay raise in the counter checks for that month, and Cardoso brought down a decree allowing the readjustment to be paid in advance. In other words, [it was] a complex of advantages and even illegalities that the government did not concede to other civil servants." 8. Physicist Luis Pinguelli Rosa argues, "the reequipping of the armed forces is necessary and should be defined according to national needs ... but not to please the military establishment or to attend to a model of globalization, for which there will be no shortage of foreign arms dealers to sell here whatever they can. This is not the real question in redefining the role of LatinAmerican armed forces" (Rosa 1996). 9. The likely source for the first statement was an article published in the New YorkTimes and reprinted in O Estado de Sdo Paulo (1997d). 10. To understand the significance of this measure, it is important to note that the military ministries, unlike other budget claimants, generally can spend the resources designated for them in the draft legislation. In their case, as a specialist in military affairs explains, "the difference between the budgeted and expended [amounts] in the last five years has been minimal. They have lost little in the last four years and gained a bit in 1993" (Pereira 1996). 11. At this second annual ENEE, held in the midst of the military's identity crisis, General Leonel observed, "disinformation about the armed forces in our society, especially on the part of the elites, has represented a great impediment to balance in questions regarding the three branches and officers.... our system of social communication needs to be perfected" (Leonel 1995, 23-24). The Fourth ENEE,in May 1998, had no panel on a similar topic. Also notable is that at the 1998 conference, all officers appeared in mufti; in 1995, uniforms clearly distinguished military from civilian participants. 12. The note from the army refers to documents divulged by a former agent and announced by Deputy Pedro Wilson (PT-GO) at a meeting of the Committee on Human Rights of the federal Chamber of Deputies. For Deputy Fernando Gabeira (PV-RJ),the revelation that the official secret service continues to operate undermines the new Brazilian Intelligence Agency: "The government cannot create one transparent structure and another clandestine one" (Jornal do Brasil 1997c). 13. Hunter notes, "the defense of the Amazon borders is probably the
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STUDIES ANDWORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL INTERAMERICAN OF
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most credible external role the Brazilian military could perform in the late twentieth century. The military institution's marginalization in the sphere of Brazil's political life renders its Amazon claims especially vital. The armed forces do not appear to have any expansionist designs in the region, but they do make much ado of anything that can be construed as a threat. There is virtual consensus within the armed forces for fortifying security in the region" (1996, 23). 14. One of the primary rationalizations for military intervention in 1964 had been the alleged threat to national security posed by the Peasant Leagues (ligas camponesas) in the Northeast. 15. General Leonidas Pires Gonialves, former minister of the army under Sarney, proclaimed that Lutzenberger was guilty of "selling out" (entreguismo) and that he inspired "the same hatred I felt for the communist leader Luiz Carlos Prestes" (Estado de Sao Paulo 1991). 16. The federal example has begun to stimulate similar requests from municipal authorities. Examples are Campinas, which had the 11th Armored Infantry Brigade erect preventive roadblocks around it (Correlo Popular 1997); and the mayors of the sertdo of Pernambuco, who asked Governor Miguel Arraes to help bring army intervention against crime and marijuana trafficking in the region (Didrio de Pernambuco 1997b). This request resulted in a meeting the next day between the governor and the president, in the presence of the chief of the military household. Nothing came of the meeting, however (Didrio de Pernambuco 1997c). REFERENCES Actualizagao do planejamento estrategico militar brasileiro [Modernizing Brazilian Strategic Military Planning]. 1998. Mesa-redonda [roundtable] held at the 4o Encontro Nacional de Estudos Estrategicos, Unicamp, May 12. Aquino, Paulo Neves. 1995. lUntitled.] Presentation at the roundtable "Cenario 2000-Forgas Armadas para que?" 1995. Notes by Joao Martins Filho. Bakx, Keith. 1990. The Shanty Town: Final Stage of Rural Development? In Goodman and Hall 1990. 49-69. Berno de Almeida, Alfredo Wagner. 1990. The State and Land Conflicts in Amazonia, 1964-1988. In Goodman and Hall 1990. 226-44. Brauer, Valter Werner. 1995. [Untitled.] Presentation at the roundtable "Cenario 2000-Forgas Armadas para que?" 1995. Notes by Joao Martins Filho. Brazil. Presidency of the Republic. 1996. Politica de defesa nacional [National Defense Policy]. Brasilia. Cardoso, Alberto A. 1996. ForGasarmadas e poder civil. Folha de S4o Paulo, March 18. Cenario 2000-Forgas Armadas para qua? [Scenario 2000-Armed Forces for What?].1995. Mesa-rondada [roundtable] held at the 2o Encontro Nacional de Estudos Estrategicos, Universidade de Sao Paulo, August 16. Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayoria. 1997. Balance militar del Cono Sur, 1997-1998. Argentina-Brasil-Chile-Paraguay-Uruguay. Buenos Aires: Colecci6n Estudios 34. Correio Popular (Campinas). 1996. Exercito usa satelite para vigiar sem-terra. December 11. <http://www.cosmo.com.br/cpopular/digital/default.shtm>
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. 1997. Prefeiro quer exercito combatendo o crime. June 6. Didrio de Pernambuco (Recife). 1997a. Exercito quer combater trafico. October 28. <http://www.dpnet.com.br> _ 1997b. Prefeitos pedem acao militar. October 29. 1997c. Ayoes de combate a violencia. October 30. Dreifuss, Rene. 1999. Challenges and New Perspectives: Some Thoughts on the Future of the Brazilian Military. Paper delivered at the 1999 International Conference on Nationalism and National Security, Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society, International Political Sciences Association, Sde Boker, Israel, July 13-16. Estado de Sao Paulo. 1991. October 11: 5. . 1995a. Ministro militar descarta equiparadao de salarios. January 23. <http://www.estado.com.br> . 1995b. FH promete dar aumento para militares. August 19. . 1996a. Militares querem politica salarial pr6pria. March 30. . 1996b. Exercito fara varredura da area de conflito. April 20. _ 1996c. Chefe do Gabinete Militardiz estar "impressionado." April 20. . 1996d. Exercito faz plano para impedir aiao do MST no Para. May 5. . 1996e. Vale reativa sondas em Serra Pelada. October 28. 1997a. EUA poderao vender armas a America Latina.January 17. ? 1997b. Decreto dispensa licitagao para armamentos. August 6. . 1997c. EUA tentam vender ao Brasil desde 1996. August 7. . 1997d. Boeing quer vender 120 capas ao pais. August 8. _. 1997e. Decreto facilita "projetos especiais" de militares. August 8. . 1997f. Deputados articulam contra compra de armas. October 7. . 1997g. Fim de aposentadoria especial divide militares. October 14. . 1997h. Comissao aprova emenda que diferencia militares. December 11. . 1997i. FHC promete reajuste para forgas armadas. December 11. . 1997j. A marinha compra avioes. December 30. . 1998a. Ministro pode ser convocado a explicar compra. January 2. . 1998b. General acha que MST nao influira na campanha. February 12. . 1998c. Chegada do Exercito ao Para inquieta o MST.April 1. . 1998d. Governo amplia verba para assentados. April 2. . 1998e. Ex6rcito pode atuar em conflitos no Estado. April 10. . 1998f. Exercito reforga contingente no sul do Para. April 16. 1998g. Exercito coordena agoes no sul do Para. May 7. . 1999. Minist6rio quer ampliar explora;ao de Madeira. November 1. . 2000. Reivindica,oes militares serao levadas a FHC.January 9. Estado do Parana (Curitiba). 1998a. Forgas armadas se modernizam. May 5. <http://www.zip.net/parana-online> . 1998b. Sai reajuste para militares. June 5. Flores, Mario Cesar. 1997. Rumos para a defesa. Jornal do Brasil, April 1: 9. Folha de Sdo Paulo. 1995a. Gandra fala em incerteza e inseguranpa. March 24. <http://www.uol.com. br/fsp> . 1995b. Impasse cor os militares atrasa cortes. April 5. . 1995c. Exercito pode intervir em usina e refineria. May 13. . 1995d. Exercito ocupa refinerias. May 25. . 1995e. Marinhacomemora verbas; FHCnega privilegio militar.September 7.
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The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso

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The Brazilian Military under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis Author(s): Joao R.

The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso: Overcomingthe Identity Crisis

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

BRAZILIAN MILITARY FILHOAND ZIRKER: MARTINS

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

MARTINS FILHOAND ZIRKER: BRAZILIAN MILITARY

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

MARTINS BRAZILIAN MILITARY FILHOAND ZIRKER:

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

BRAZILIAN MILITARY FILHOAND ZIRKER: MARTINS

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

MARTINS FILHOAND ZIRKER: BRAZILIAN MILITARY

JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

BRAZILIAN MILITARY MARTINS FILHOAND ZIRKER:

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

BRAZILIAN FILHOAND ZIRKER: MILITARY MARTINS

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

MARTINS FILHOAND ZIRKER: BRAZILIAN MILITARY

JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

MARTINS FILHOAND ZIRKER: BRAZILIAN MILITARY

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

MARTINS FILHOAND ZIRKER: BRAZILIAN MILITARY

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

BRAZILIAN MILITARY MARTINS FILHOAND ZIRKER:

STUDIES ANDWORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL INTERAMERICAN OF

MARTINS FILHOAND ZIRKER: BRAZILIAN MILITARY

STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

BRAZILIAN MILITARY FILHOAND ZIRKER: MARTINS

JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS

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