February 21, 2011 5892 Shoreland Trail Orlando, Florida 32807 Minister Louis Farrakhan c/o FCN PUBLISHING

734 West 79th Street Chicago, Illinois 60620 Re: The Petitions for Florida State Citizenship of Michael L. Hodge, a black African American born in New York, New York and myself, a white AngloSaxon born in Chicago, Illinois, and our subsequent damages suit. Dear Reverend Farrakhan: Brought up a Catholic, going to Catholic parochial and high schools, I had problems with the one true church beginning in the sixth grade. And, I dont remember when I first heard it, but it was at a young age: So the last shall be the first, and the first the last; for many be called, but few be chosen. Matthew 20:16. Never had I heard anything so ridiculous in all my lifenor ever would again, I was sure; the world just doesnt work like that. And, now when my 63rd birthday will come on March 27th, Im reminded of the joke where the young man, having grown to be a man, is amazed at how much smarter his father has gotten. The world was never intended to work the way it has for so long, and thats all about to change; and, I can begin to sense the truth in the above-mentioned bible verse. On the issue of damages, consider GRUPO TELEVISA v. TELEMUNDO COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, 485 F.3d 1233, 1242 (CA11, Fla. 2007) (And, although Florida does not generally recognize punitive damages for breach of contract claims, it may recognize them where the acts constituting a breach of contract also amount to a cause of action in tort. HGI ASSOCS. v. WETMORE PRINTING CO., 427 F.3d 867, 876-77 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing GRIFFITH v. SHAMROCK VILL., INC., 94 So.2d 854, 858 (Fla. 1957)). In such cases, the underlying tort must be based on an intentional wrong, willful or wanton misconduct, or culpable negligence, the extent of which amounts to an independent

tort. . . . S. BELL TEL. & TEL. CO. v. HANFT, 436 So.2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1983).); CAPORICCI FOOTWEAR, LTD. v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., 894 F.Supp. 258 (E.D.Va. 1995) (independent tort is one that is factually bound to contractual breach but whose legal elements are distinct from it.); In re BOONE, 164 B.R. 167, 172 (S.D.Fla. 1994) (To obtain tort recovery, there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of [the] breach of contract. AFM CORP. v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE and TELEGRAPH CO., 515 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987) (citing LEWIS v. GUTHARTZ, 428 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 1982). There exists such an independent tort here. Under Florida law, the intentional and unjustifiable interference with contractual relations is actionable as a tort. See 32 Fla.Jur.2d, Interference, 2 (1981). Moreover, it is clear that the Banks interference with the Boon/Ulmer contract, a tort, is distinguishable from and independent of its contract with the Boones. (Emphasis mine)); and, where the Florida Attorney General has allowed interference with the Petitioners ability to contract with Florida state citizens collectively which was provided for in Article 1 of Floridas 1838 Constitution Declaration of Rights and is a tort, this is distinguishable from and independent of his breach of duty as a governmental trustee to the Petitioners. Where the courts have found the federal government to be statutory trustees of American Indians, they have ruled that the government is not entitled to sovereign immunity. UNITED STATES v. WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE, 537 U.S. 465, 472-475, 123 S.Ct. 1126, 155 L.Ed.2d 40 (2003). For state citizens pursuant to Article IV, 2, cl. 1 there is a constitutional basis for stating government is our trustee and accountable to us as such at all times. The consent of the Sovereign and the consent of the governed are related concepts when examined in light of state citizenship. KAWANANAKOA v. POLYBLANK, 205 U.S. 349, 353, 27 S.Ct. 526, 527 (1907) (Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception of obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right

depends. . . . (Citations omitted) As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual administration, originate and change at their will the law of contract and property, from which persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law invoked. Of course it cannot be maintained unless they are so.); and, in the instant case, the Florida political jurisdiction has NOT created any of the laws upon which the Petitioners rights depend; those rights are pre-existing rights derived from state law that was incorporated as a reference into the Constitution for the United States of America as a contract as of December 15, 1791 when the first ten amendments took effect; and they derive from English civil liberties. Where a state constitution is a compact, it is as a covenant between a state citizen individually and all the state citizens collectively, and vice versa. MUNN v. ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113, 124, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876) ([T]hrough their State constitutions, or other forms of social compact, [the original states] undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed necessary for the common good and the security of life and property. . . . A body politic, as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good. (Emphasis mine)); however, state citizens collectively are not to be confused with the body politic. NOAH WEBSTERS FIRST EDITION OF AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1828 Ed., Foundation for American Christian Education, San Francisco, California, 1967 (CORPORATION, n. A body politic or corporate, formed and authorized by law to act as a single person; a society having the capacity of transacting business as an individual. Corporations are aggregate or sole. Corporations aggregate consist of two or more persons united in a society, which is preserved by a succession of members, either forever, or till the corporation is dissolved by the power that formed it, by the death of all its members, by surrender of its charter or franchises, or by forfeiture. Such corporations are the mayor and aldermen of cities, the head and fellows of a college, the dean and chapter of a cathedral church, the stockholders of a bank or insurance company, &c. A corporation sole

consists of one person only and his successors, as a king or a bishop. Blackstone.); state Sovereignty lies in its state citizens collectively, and they bring into existence the body politic or political jurisdiction to exercise sovereignty in a representative capacity. Where body politic is defined as a political corporation or body corporate, it stands to reason that it is synonymous with political jurisdiction; and, the political jurisdiction is where the actual administration of government is performed; private citizens are not involved in the day-to-day activities of government whether they be administrative in nature or governmental sovereign in nature; political jurisdiction within the meaning of all but one of the following cases is the administration of government by and through the executive branch of government in its representative capacity or even in its proprietary capacity, FISHER v. MASTERS, 83 P.2d 212, 217, 59 Idaho 366 (1938) (In KNIGHT v. TRIGG, 16 Idaho 256, 100 P. 1060, this court said [page 1062]: The holding of elections is peculiarly and wholly a matter within the management and control of the political department of government. The word political, as used in this connection, has no reference to partisanship or political parties but rather to the control, management and operation of government. . . .); WELLS v. HOUSING AUTHORITY of CITY of WILMINGTON, 197 S.E. 693, 697, 213 N.C. 744 (1938) ( The word municipal, as originally used in its strictness, applied to cities only, but the word now has a much more extended meaning, and when applied to corporations the words political, municipal, and public are used interchangeably. ); LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP. v. SUPERIOR COURT of L. A. COUNTY, 171 P.2d 21, 24, 28 Cal.2d 481, 166 A.L.R. 701 (1946) ([T]he interference proscribed by the statute is interference with political activities or affiliations, and the test is not membership in or activities connected with any particular group or organization, but whether those activities are related to or connected with the orderly conduct of government and the peaceful organization, regulation and administration of the government.); AKIO KUWAHARA v. ACHESON, 96 F.Supp. 38, 41 (S.D.Cal. 1951) (In Websters New International Dictionary (Unabridged), second edition, 1949, . . . the word political is defined as follows: Of or pertaining to polity, or politics, or the conduct of government, referring in the widest application to the judicial, executive, and legislative branches; of or pertaining to, or incidental to, the exercise of the functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government; relating to the management of affairs of state....

); DE-ANNEXATION of CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY, 102 P.3d 120, 127-128, 2004 OK 60 (Okla. 2004), rehearing denied, (In sum, for governmental action *128* to be political there must be (a) an issue of governing coupled with (b) a mandatory and final resolution by nonjudicial means. (Emphasis in original)), and even if political jurisdiction has a wider application than just to those who, in the conduct of government, execute the laws in contradistinction to those that make the laws or those that judge what the law is, it should be clear that the term applies to those who have been elected or appointed to conduct government as the peoples representatives and not to private citizens. The constitutionsstate and federalare the peoples compacts as covenants, but only as state citizens; these are our laws; and, statutes state and federalare brought into existence by those of the political jurisdiction for their own regulation, but only as public citizens; sometimes the legislative body requires more specific regulation through the administrative procedure act involving statutory authority and implementing regulations, UNITED STATES v. MERSKY, 361 U.S. 431, 437-438, 80 S.Ct. 459, 463, 4 L.Ed.2d 423 (1960) (Here the statute is not complete by itself, since it merely declares the range of its operation and leaves to its progeny the means to be utilized in the effectuation of its command. But it is the statute which creates the offense of the willful removal of the labels of origin and provides the punishment for violations. The regulations, on the other hand, prescribe the identifying language of the label itself, and assign the resulting tags to their respective geographical areas. Once promulgated, [361 U.S. 431, 438] these regulations, called for by the statute itself, have the force of law, and violations thereof incur criminal prosecutions, just as if all the details had been incorporated into the congressional language. The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only together do they have any force. In effect, therefore, the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other.); these are their laws; a constitutionstate or federalis the supreme law of the land; its the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity; statute law is the will of the legislature in their derivative or subordinate capacity. RISON v. FARR, 24 Ark. 161, 87 Am.Dec. 52, 55 (1865) (Paterson, J., in VANHORNE v. DORRANCE, 2 Dall. 308, in defining what a constitution is, says: It is the form of government delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is

certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the legislature, . . . . And in defining what legislatures are, the same learned judge says: They are creatures of the constitution; they owe their existence to the constitution; they derive their powers from the constitution. It is their commission, and therefore all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void. The constitution is the work or will of the people themselves in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity; law is the work or will of the legislature in their derivative or subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the creator, the other of the creature. (Emphasis mine)). This is what Justice Holmes is talking about in KAWANANAKOA v. POLYBLANK, supra; when those of the political jurisdiction violate the constitutional rights (civil liberties) of private citizens of the common law jurisdiction, they have no sovereign immunity. There is a lot of rhetoric in McDONALD v. CITY of CHICAGO, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010) to say that the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary to protect the black man with federal citizenship. This is all in the nature of a complete fabricationa lie. All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. 42 U.S.C.A., 1982.-- Property Rights of Citizens. (Codification of R.S. 1978 from Act April 9, 1866, c. 31, 1, 14 Stat. 27.)

Congress has modified federal common law to give Negroes the same property rights as white citizens which includes state citizenship. JONES v. ALFRED H. MAYER CO., 392 U.S. 409, 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 2189, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968) (We hold that 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the [enjoyment of inheritable property rights], and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. (n. 5 omitted, and emphasis in original)); CITY of MEMPHIS v. GREENE, 451 U.S. 100,

120, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 1597, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981) (To effectuate the remedial purposes of the statute, the Court has broadly construed this language [the language of 1982 itself] to protect not merely the enforceability of property interests acquired by black citizens but also their right to acquire and use property on an equal basis with white citizens.); UNITED STATES v. HARRIS, 106 U.S. 629, 640, 1 S.Ct. 601, 610, 27 L.Ed. 290 (1883) (42 U.S.C.A., 1982 was enacted by virtue of the 13th Amendment.); UNITED STATES v. MORRIS, 125 F. 322, 323 (D.C.Ark. 1903) (The power of Congress to enact such legislation must, therefore, be found in the thirteenth amendment, else it does not exist. That Congress assumed that its power was derived from that amendment, and not from either of the later amendments, is conclusively shown by the fact that at the time this law was enacted, in 1866, neither the fourteenth nor fifteenth amendment had been ratified, or even submitted by Congress to the States. . . .); UNITED STATES v. BROWN, 49 F.3d 1162, 1167 (CA6, Tenn. 1995), rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, denial of habeas corpus affirmed, 62 F.3d 1418, certiorari denied, 516 U.S. 942, 116 S.Ct. 377, 133 L.Ed.2d 301 (We agree with GREER and OLZMAN that non-owners of property who nevertheless have an interest in using or holding that property have a viable property interest protected under Section 1982.); and the fact that Congress enacted a statute for those of statutory jurisdiction makes it no less a cause of action that is unreliant on the Fourteenth Amendment for Michael L. Hodge claiming it has modified federal common law. MAHONE v. WADDLE, 564 F.2d 1018, 1033-1034 & n. 29 (CA3, Pa. 1977), certiorari denied, 438 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3122, 57 L.Ed.2d 1147 (The genesis of [28 U.S.C.A.,] 1343(3) is not the 1871 Act but the 1866 Act. . . . [T]he contention that 1981 (and 1982 which is also derived from section 1 of the 1866 Act) create no cause of action is completely foreclosed by the scores of adjudicated cases concerning 1981 (and 1982) causes of action. (Citations of n. 29 omitted).); and 1982, as it modifies federal common law, protects property rights as well as personal rights. KAO v. RED LION MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY, 381 F.Supp. 1163, 1166 (M.D.Pa. 1974) (While the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act protect property rights as well as personal rights, LYNCH v. HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP., 1972, 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424; BOARD of REGENTS v. ROTH, 1972, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; a trespass to property,

negligent or intentional, is merely a common law tort and does not infringe the federal Constitution. (Citation omitted, and emphasis mine)); fourteenth amendment citizenship is a creature of the federal government and the courts cannot see citizenship as your personal property right in light of it. The Fourteenth Amendment deserves to be struck down. Let me dare say that you might find Michael easier to talk to first because of past dealings he has had. He has been like a brother to me, and I would never have gotten this far without him. Over the years, there have been many books Ive enjoyed reading to learn who the enemy ismy favorite being John Colemans COMMITTEE OF 300. Ive seen how the federal government and media vilify you. It tells me the enemy fears you. It is my heartfelt conviction that you have the inner strength desperately needed in this controversy; it was my idea to make you a letter recipient. Very Truly Yours,

J. Patrick Simpson 321-299-5773 (SU, MO, & TU are days off.) Michael L. Hodges cell phone: 407-745-9449