THE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

FIELD REPORT
Covering Air-Raid Protection
and Allied Subjects in
OSAKA, JAPAN
I
I
THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
FIELD REpORT
Covering AirRaid Protection
and Allied Subjects in
OSAKA, JAPAN
G"ilian Defense O i v i s i ~
Dales of Suney:
18 October 1945-28 Oaobu 1945
Dale of Publication;
May 1947
RESTRICTED
FOREWORD
This report was written primarily for the use of the United Statea Stra.
tegic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more com.
prehensh'e nature. Any conclU5ions or opinion5 expressed in this report
must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subjeet
to further interpretation in the light of further studies crmdueted by the
Survey.
"
The United Statell Strategic Bambltl&' Survey
'1'1\.11 e"tabliahed by Uul Seeretary of War on 3
November 1944. pUNllumt toa directke from the
late President Roosevelt. lUI miSllion '1'1\.11 to con
duct an impartial and expert study of the effects
of Our aerial attack on Gennany, to be used
in conneetion with air attacks on Japan and to
establish a basis for evaluating the importance
and potentialities of air power as an instrument
of military strategy for planning the future de-
velopmentofthe United States armed forces and
for determining future economic policies with
respect to the national defense. A summary re-
port lind 8Qme 200 supporting reportll containing
the findinpof the Survey in Germany have been
published.
On 15 Aligust 1945, President Truman reo
quested that the Survey conduct a similar stud}'
of the etfeeta of all types of air IIttack in the
war again5t Japan, submitting reporta in
duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the
Secreta')' (If the Navy. The (lf6cers (If the Survey
during ita Japanese phase "'ere:
Franklin D'Olier, Cfutirman.
Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice
Chairmen.
Harry L. Bowman.
J. Kenneth Galbraith,
Rensis Likert,
Frank A. McNamee, Jr..
Fred Searls, Jr..
M(lnroe E. Spaght,
Dr. Le,,';s R. Thompson,
Theodore P. Wright, Dirutl>rs.
Walter Wild'l, SccrMary.
The Survey's cumplement provided fl>r 300
civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The
'"
military IMlPDf!nt of the ol"plliution _lInnrJa
from the Army to the extent of 60 percat, IDd
from the Navy to the elrtent of 40 penent. Both
the Arm}' and the Navy g8\'e the Survqall poed..
ble 8.88istance in furnishing men, supplies.
POrt, and infonnation. The operated
from headquarter!! established in Tokyoearly in
September 1945, with aubhead'luarlers in Na.
gOJ'a, Osaka, Hiro5bima.and Nagasaki,and with
mobile teams operating in other parts of Japan,
tile islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic main_
land.
It was po8!!ible to reconstruct much of wartime
Japanese military planning and exeeution, en.
gagement by engagement. and campaign by cam.
paign. and to secure re&lIOnabIJ' accurate sta
tistics on Japan's economy and war production,
plant by plant, and industl'}' by industry. In ad.
dition. studies were cunducted On Japan's over-
all strategic plana and the background of her
entl'}' into the war, the internal discU.'l8ions and
negotiations leading to her acceptance of uncun
ditional surrender, the course of health and
morsle among tbe civilian population. the elfe<:
th'eness of the Japanese Cil';!iSn de!enseorgani_
and the effcc1.8 of the atomic bombs.
Separate reports will be i8!!ued covering each
phase of the 5tudy.
The Sun'e}' interrogated Il\(Ire than 700 Japa.
nese military, go,ernment. and industrial offi.
cials. It also recol'ered and translated many
documents which nOI onl)' hsve been useful to the
Sun'ey. but slso will furnish data valuable for
other studie",Arrangementa hal'e been msde 10
turn ol'er the Sun'CJ"s files to Central In_
telligence Group, through ,"'hieh ther will be
avai1sble (or further examination and distribu
tion.
II. 8PBcw. ClVIWH DIIn:Ng AaBNcIa..
AuD1iary Police and Fire Ualla. .. .. . _. . . _, _.
Nelcbborbood GJ'OlIlM. 810dc aDd '''ted
8
III. ORGANI7.4nON AND OPERATION or JAtANEllE CJVlUAH DBrBMs& 8
AirRaid 8
Control Centen. It
Incident Control. 12
UDeJ:ploded Bomt.. 13
Fire Serviees. 14
Fire Protection. 14.
Fire Prevention. 32
Emergency Medical Servicell 39
Emergency Medical Service. 39
Mortuary Service 4.2
Red Cross.. 42
Re!!eue Service. 44.
Post-Raid Clearance and Repair. 47
"
"
57
"
60
"
"
"
63
TAIIUJ or C<lI'_
IV. PROTECTIO:< 01' FACTORIES, UTILITIES, A.-':[)
BUILDJIoOOS DEI'01'l:D TO PUBLIC USE
Factory Air-Raid Protecti'm
Air-Raid Protection for School .
Railroad Air-Raid Protection.
National Communicatio,,", Air_Raid Protection
Post Olliee Air Raid Protection.
Telephone S}'s\.em AirRaid Protection.
Telegraph System Air-Raid Protection
Harbor Air-Raid Protection and Port Security._
-
I. ltnwlovcnox .

V. PASSIVE DEFESSE ISSTAU....TIOl'S .. "'"

Protecti,"e Lighting
Shelters.
Gas Protection Service.
Camouflage.
Conduct or Public during Raids.
63
63
72
75
"
82
VI. EVACUATIO:- WBU'ARB.
Evacuation.
PO$t_Raid Emergency Welfaro.
War Damage Claims...
"
"82
93
VII. OF" CIVIU.u.: OI>F:ENSE Mm GE."l>ll"L
PUBLIC.
VIII. RI>n;Rt::-ct: NoTI>S.
98
HlO
by the attMk .. c.JM.'."
1ndutrfa1 o.ta.... -udI1deeM4. ...
older 1Dl!astrieeaach.. textne.. food hi.
eenmb, wood, and,.per PfOdaeta __.....
metallurgleal, IllaChiDe tool, and eheJzIicaI bldaa-
triell (i.e., tboee readily ackpted. to _
production). By 1941, Oeaka wall an iDlportaot
centel'" for the production of muoitiolls, airlIIue
part.ll, and heavy military and na"al equipmeat.
3. PhI/mal oepecl'.---Q. Osaka la lit\ulted 011
a 10.... ftat plain (the delta of the Vodo River).
and is crill'l-Croued by 20 large anals snd num.
erous smaller one/!. The la'lre anals are tnlllk:
lanes for siuble Jlampall!. laden with he&Vf
"""..
b. By Amerian 8landardS much of the cit}' i.
little better than an extended slum area, and,
prior to the air raids. it "''all extremely over.
crowded. In the density of population "'M
well O"a- 35,000 per square mile, the highe/!t of
an)' Japanese city. E"en middle class d"'ellings
contained more penon. per llQuare )'ard of floor
apaee than many American slum buildings.
Flimsy and highly inllammable nath'e stnlctures
were built sbutting narrow streetll and canals---
literally wall to wall.
4. p...,tl."or effort" 101l.'Oni
In 191)9 a fire burned owr onethird of the city.
In rebuilding. limited improvemenu were made,
including the oo11Btruction of a fe"" broad dreets
through the maze of narro..., crowdOO lanes
t)'pical of O!SSka.
b. A further effort to,,'ard improvement was
made br a cit)'-planning oommission appointed
in 191i. which actuaU," beg1lll operationa only
after 5 years of deliberation and planning. The
city wMdi\"ided by the commission into (I) resi.
dential, (2) commf!rcJlll. and (3) industrial
(factor)') ZOnes. Zoning regulations were not
retroactive. howe"er, and the older factories eon
tinued to operate in mall}' parts of the cit). The
"el')' small machine shops (often famil" units)
oontinued to operate in all parts of the cit)' up to
the time of the air raids. Following the Tok)'o
earthquake and fire of 1923. drastic re"isions in
the city building program were instituted.
iog some v 234.5;0,000. These pro;'I'
sions for "fireproof islands" (Le.. areas In.which
onl.r fire_re!list.ant buildings "'ere
Although th""", pl.ns were onl)' partJall)' exe-
0:-...,. Ip..........
1 - ...,
.. , - ...
.. , _ .. m.rr.
...................
........, .. _m
.._- ....,....
I.'... ..,. "'''-_
The last official census of the national g'J\'ern-
ment was taken in 1940. Other figures are based
on a local census by the police department of
Osaka Prefecture. with the exception of the
figure for 1 September 1945. which is a police
department estimate.
c. The ligures for reflect the
traHution of industry, because some of the
important war industries moved into the rural
areas of the prefecture as a safety measure. The
devalltatinll' effect of the four largest air raids
(March-June 1945. inc1usi"e) is also reflected
in the population figure of 1 September 1945.
which is less than une-half of the figure for 1
January of the same year and less than one-third
of the prewar population figure.
2. The rise of bQsie teor ind'llItrits._.
Throughout the period between the First and
the Second World Wars the primary industries
of the city were quick 10 adopt new technical
developments, ami. aM a result. the industrial
sections el<panded rapidly. Osaka. for
became one of the world's gTeatest rayon pro-
ducing centers.
b. The shift to a war e<:Dllom)' in Japan began
with the ril\! of the militari818 in 1931. and wRS
I. 1NTIl0DUCn0N
RESTRICTED
I ." , ...
,... ,..,
IS.. , ...
,... ,...
I'.. ,.,,_
IS.. ,
,-,...
1. &IatW/I imporlG_ of 0'-'-'1. man,
I'IllIpeeta. Oak&, before the air raid&. ... the
Chfcqo 01 Japall. It wu JaPfln'llIeCOJId larpat
city, Ioeated near ttl reollnphieal center. IIDd
it had a prewar population (3,394.200) about
equal to Chicago',. It wu a great lndultrlal,
commercial, and tl'an8porl.ation center contain-
ing the great central wholesale markelJl. and it
was the fleat of the orpnired commodity ex.
change. (riee, aupr, raw cotton. cotton )'arna,
and rayon).
b. The cityQf OJlll\rn is 7111Quare mile8 inarea.
The following table indicate. the change9 in the
population of the city and the prefectures from
I January 1940 to 1 September 1945.
135
l2<
180
122
118
117
109
llO
B.
B.
F.
c.
J.
o.
u.
T.
c.
H.
s
Q.
R
L.
o.
P.
K.
N.
M.
IX. EXHI8ml
- -- . . tant in iJ"aka dllliaDated by
A. Map showmJ! . , Faclq p.l02 (1)
prewar law ..... Osaka by the raid, of 14.
Map June 19o16 FaciIl8' p. 102 (2)
March, 1 une, , .' entral at the Central Army
Description of \\armng C .' of operationa'
Headquarters in iJ"aka; deaenptlon , 103
illustratioltll : " 'Fi" ..
List of persons interviewed in comp,latlon of
report ,., ,., ..
Oat.a on air-raid damage in Osaka .' : . , .. - ....
Ma 'of Osaka city and suburbs, showing of fire
battalion StatiOllll, substations, temporary 114
substations" " - " , : .
of Osaka city. showing locations of fire slatlons de- 115
stroyed by air raids. _ ' .. ,. ... . ...
1.1 f Osaka showing locations of firebreaks cleared by
, ap 0.. f'b ,d,,"'" Facing p. 06
demohtlon 0 UI .. . .. .. . .
T slation of table of eontentll ot pamphlet, dated J
ber on the mobilizatIOn of Osaka school
and rest!nes. Published by OS'lka
prefecture " _ , .. , .
of Osaka di,-ision of govemment
. showing locations of material dumps and repair trams: ..
Translation of table of contents of governmg
air-raid protection of the Osaka railway dIvIsIon. __ .....
Pian for air_raid protection of the Osaka commumcaUons
180
bureau ,_ .
Chart of air-raid protection for the central
Osaka telephone building..... . .
Charts showing applications of light control regulattoltll:
No. 1. Ceneral outdoor light of No.2. Gener:tl
indoor lights; No.3, General traffic hghts; No.4. Ratl- 123
way lights. ..:"..... .
Map of Osaka harbor district. . ... Facmg p. 126
Translation of instructions for the evacuatIon and refuge of
school children of Osaka prefecture; parts I, II, and III.
Published by Osaka prefecture in June and July 19H.
Translation of "certificate for changing districts".
Translation of questionnaire to be filled out by voluntary
131 evacuees _,. _,. " , , .
"Secret" bulletin on principle of camouflnge published ?y
the Osaka prefectural police for distribution to pollce
stations. Original Japanese document and translatIon. , . 132
Report of inspection of airraid proteetion organization and
facilities of the Nakayama Steel Works, Ltd" Osaka....
Translation of regulations of special airraid defense corps
established by the Mitsubishi Light-Alloy Industrial Co.,
Mikuni factory.. 141
II, SPECIAL CIVILIAN DEFE1.... SE AGEl"C1ES
AUXIUARY POUCE A."'D flltE L'NI-ni /K.IBOOA.,,"1
119._ in question &lao pnn"ided fortbe fotmdiag
of organwtions ... pplementary to the auxiliary
police and fire uniu AI the Deed
2. O....n:.lio!l.-.
the an:r:lliary police &lid fire units ...._ operated
U bonorary organiu.tions and the mernben
receI"ed no pay. althoup they did receI\-e aub..
sistellC\! If tbey l'Wftained oa dill]'" far a amtin-
uous period of 2t hours Or moft. The members
....ere ci,'ili.n males bet'Wn the ages af 18 and
60, choeen for their character &lid ataDdiltl" in
the rommunit)', rather than for teehllical abilil]'".
b. Arw.-In Osaka Cily, there areat present
23 reautar polite diatricta and S harbor poIioe
distrirts. Before the "er there '"'no 28 rf'I'Iltar
but;; of!.hoae ha"e been lbeorlred into
others. Aa " ... allo..ed to its
own auxilial}' police and fire unit areas xmrd-
ing to its own poarticular needa and geographic
condition, UreJT&lllmarod>ool dislricu in Osaka
"'en' choaenu thellandard area, ....ith each unit
making I grammar IChooi headquarterll I.Od
desilfMting iuelf by the name of the achooL It
is interesting to note that in Oseka the lrea of
thelle unila rorresponded "'ith the area of a red
er'1lted block &s.IOtiation (Rengo Choksil. Con-
.........
............-
. EYidInc. III.....,. ... 01 ...........
tlon Of'PIIiIaUon .... opentloM ...."..
porta the View thlt, prior 10 tile rUde 01 .....
1941i, both the Olalla oGIdIlI .... U. .......
of the Olalla civilian air-lUI prlIlediaa orpa.
lutlone underestimlted the mapitude 01 a_
air raid, and that they did not coml'"beDd U.
....ture of the di/llcv.ltiea the,. _Id face when
the mue raida occulTed. E\"en If they had clearly
fo..-n the raida that "'ere to come, the nlture
of the city and tbe equipment " ..itable in JaPlll
were luch that ,t il imJH'l)blble thet any a"ailable
air_raid protection rMaauf'ft or orpnization
COQld ha,'f' prevented Ill!r1oUS to Oaab..
In any cue, the deetrvction of equipment &lid
the dieorpnlution reeulting from the raid of
14 )larch, mede it to take fuD ad-
unta,.. of the opportunities ror air.raid
pr1ltection Ifforded by the burned-out are:aa. It
.... Uren too late to ..\"e the city.
1. l"trod"dio"._. Osaka, U
in other J.panese cities, fire, 11ood, hUrr1eene
and eenhquake!l heve long been a constant men_
ate. The population ....a.aoften foroed to rall back
on ;u 0 ...... for Mllfprotection,
all)' Urrough "olunteer citizen groups. The pre:a--
ent auxiliary and fire (Keibodan)
are an outgrowth of these organizations and
ha"e their mota in the latter part of the Toku-
gawaera (approIimatel)1;;75-186ii).
b. f'olllldiJIg.-ln 1939, along ",iUr Japlln'.
other preparationa for war, it became otrdolls
that some form of ch;lian defell!e group ....ould
be to supplement the regular police
Ind fire dep;'rtmenta in airraid-prolection lIl'n'-
ire. Consequentl)', the PrIM'ot auxili,uj' polite
Ind fire uniLa were established by" of
Home Affairs ordinance, Janual}' 1939. Al-
though initiated by a single regulation. this
la'" allowed considerable elll.'lticitl' in the 1"".1
organi .... tions and. lIS a !.he au:r:ili
1\1')' police and lire unit/! of the .-arious citit!ll of
Japan "'ill be found to dill'er according to !.he
needs and opinion$ of the mal'Orll, municipal
officials and police chiefs who were relpoll$ible
for their establishment and opt!Mltion. The ordi-
ertpjoelvu. cut iron and llteel temporrlnr planta.
nomerou.t .mail lhopi and n:eldenUII _
/. In termJI of Ure deetructlon of life and prop-
erty (all well all the eize of the areu deetroyed)
(Ellhlblt B) lNre waa a progr't!Qive decline In
the effeetiveneae of the four major ralde, al-
Ihollj:h in the Iut raid co11.lliderably rrnter
tonnaae of bombe was dropped than in the pre-
vious ones, Thils was not due to In inc:reaae In
Ure ell'ecti"eneas of air-raid protection rne.uuns.
The lou or equipment and personnel in the lint
raid, and the i'i'neral disorganiution resulting
more than offset any effort to tighten
up and improve air_raid preeautioflll,
II The weather WAI mo", b"orable at Ure time
of the IIrst raid than it ""15 during the other
three. Equally important ia the fact that the
fint raid burned out the central and ll>Ol'!It in-
ftammable ares and that each new burned-out
area acted aa a fire-brea.k against the fIrea
by the illC\!ooial}' raid$. The 1atger
b. The raid of 13-14 Mlrch 0,732.6 toni of
bombs) was b)' far the moet delltruetlve, II-
though the of bombs dropped Wall leu
than that of any of the other major Oukl raid..
The heart of the city ....aa burned out, Includlnr
commercial and busln_ bo..-. deparlment
stores, banj(a, man)' retatllhopor UKI tmlll
sen'ite concerns typical of Japanne e1tla.
Throughout most of the central al'M nothln.
but rubble was left. The Oaaka tub.....,.. a lingle
line, resumed operations immediately, however.
and b)' dearing the streetJI and Itrinwina nn'
trolley "'ires, the atreet..car !It!f'\'ice waa relIumed
within 10 days. One plant, containing al:r: ateam
turbine water pumps repre!lenting over one-
third of Osaka's .....ter pumping capacity, .U
de$troyed.
c. The raid of 1 June (2,788.5 tons of bomllll)
centered on the waterfront area on the "'eatern
side of the cit). It was the second mOllt destrue-
of the four major raida. especiall)' to ship-
ping and manufacturing. Shipbuilding planLa.
doc:u, ....rehouaea (many of them containing
and Na")" lIuppliesl, lIteel works, cement
p1anu, petroleum refineries, oil and gasoline
storage tanks, electrical equipment factories and
an airpblK' propeller factory were dealro)'ed, A
number of llmalktrareaa (containing retail ahop"
and many lImali factories) exlendina northward
from the harbor between the Yodo and Dojima
ri"ers, were burned out. The central car barn
was burned in this raid, including t"'o-thirdl of
the a"aHable streetcars. seri<>usl)' crippling local
tralUlportation. A number of amaller town!
adjacent to Osaka ....ere deatro)'ed in the
..ame raid.
d. The raid of 7 June 0,993 tona of bomba)
centered on a large area immediately northeast
of the heart of the city, including a wide \'ariet)
of district.!!. Important textile plant1l, numeroul
small machine abopa and !lOme poorer reaidelltial
areaa were destroyed, Electrical equil)ment IlUp-
plying po....er to the water IlIlmpa was knocked
nuL There waa nO water in the maina for o"e'
a month, during which time drinking water wal
obtained from local wells.
e. The raid of I()June (3,157,3tonaofbomba)
Will more acatlered than any of the other major
raids, and destroyed numeroua ,mailer ureal
east and south,as well as northweat Of tho center
or the city. Theile included an anenlll, some
fertilizer planlJ, cOll\'orted to the productioll of
....... ...w" ......
.... ,.. ,.
_.
-_.... ,_..
.-
,.
n...I_.... ,_..

,.
,.
_._11_-

,-
".
..........-..
."
M
__.... "_01
''''II'
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-_.... ,,_..
on


". LIIO I
,-
,-
.-
_. _.
,
6, TIl. fOllr IIrtat rail" ON Olll.l:o._. Those
who Ih'ed in the city throughout the period of the
raids refer to the raids of 13-14 March, 1 June,
7 June, and 15 June 1945, as "the four great
Oaaka air In theile, the bombl dropped
were moatly lncendiuie!l,and thedamalCC caused
by tire i'r-eatly exceeded that caused by high
e>:plOllivell.
-. ... (00_
__.. __ 1. __ ....
--_' 0__--
__.. __...
--
ted and the lIrt-rcaiatant llreaa failed to meet
tiona, what llttle remalna in the wa}' of
::uildinp in Oaaka toda)' ,is due to
the exiawnte of auch areal (t.Xhlhlt ,I).
r, In Ipite of the ell'orts of offidaLa, pre....ar
Osaka wl8 the mOllt denaell' po\IUlated, and, It
the..ame time, the mOllt inllammahle of the If"!at
cities of Japan.
S. E8ull 0/ lIir raitU,-Reporb on the
del!trucoon of life and property were made hy
the dilstricu foJlo....in. each raid.
tOll\"ther with ",poru provided br the MunICipal
.'o!re ll8IImlb1l and analyzed in the air_
defellM! RCtion (Bob Ka) of the offite of the
chief of police, A final combined report ....s then
submitted t.o the iO\"emor, A atatistical lum-
mal'}" bued on theH reporU, is wi"en below:
II, O.,bl Air R"id-I',t"l Stlltialia
-
.-
M_
':7",
I 1
..... _............

--
"Ull
___,_01
--


1'''-
.-....... ---
-- --
..

_... _11'-" ...
--
c In_
NIlo __._"

. _... _It_..
m ,0.

--_.. _..


.,

"
_.111
-----
-
._.
.-
_..
,--
tb 'ere from 6 to 18 1l1ll<iIillry
to II police district. The
po Ice an . d II unit
t each auxiliary pollee lin re
, f f m "00 to ",,0 neighborhood groUPll
there ore. ro - . ell to
(Tonari Gumi). ?"e Unit WlI$ lI.$lIlgn
the harllor police d,stncts. . .
e Liaison lutween Ilnil,.-To halson
auxilhuT police and lire ",nIts In en:
er
-
gencies all the units in.me firesllltlOn area "e.re
formed'into a block. If too n1I1TlJ' lIu:dliary U"':$
in this srell made such 1I block cumber.w1l1e. th l'
"'ere divided into 1"'0 blocks. The leader of the
auxiliary po;>lice /Iud fIre unit having the
area in this block "'II.:! considered :he nOlnmll1
leader of the block orgtmizMion. Th,s block WIIS
used for mutual assistance 0;1Il1).
d. Tab/to! orgoll1.:alioll.-The tsbleof.organ-
iUlion of the Ilwdliary police Units WIIS
t 197 members (or each Ulllt In the city of
into a leader, threeaS!Slstant lead-
d four arlllS: a liaison IIrm (Renrakubu),
a:
mbers
: a guard IIrm (Keibibu), 82 mem-
b;;, a fire arm (SMOObu). 57 members: and
an medical ann (Kyug(lbu-literally.
"SIIW and Help"). 42 members. . .
c. The It(lder.-The leader of each auxlha.r
y
unit was chosen bJ' the chief of the local pollce
I
a man of outstanding character and
sta Ion . h f
b
lh. He issued orders for the dlspatc mg 0
a I",. . dh .
personnel and equipment, maintame. annon}
in air defense matters ,,-ith the
groups (Tonari Gumi) and
(Chokai). and pro"ided liaison With mumcIpa)
,_.
f. Auidallt leade.r men
of oUbtanding characteristics in hIs umt as as-
sistant leaders and assigned them duties of
son between hinuelf and the emergency medical
ann. the guard ann. and the fire and liaison
anna jointl)'. The senior assistant usually suc-
ceeded to the post of leader. if the leader was
unable to continue his command. syatem
differed among "arious units.)
q. LiailOll arm (llcllhakllbu).-The liaison
armconsisted of a leader, an assistant leader and
t..o squads of fi"e men each. Membera of one of
theac squads acted as bicycle messengers; the
othel1l did the adminiatrative work of the unit.
h. Gwtrd arm guard arm
was ooml105'!d of a leader, an assistant leader
and 8 squads of 10 men each. These squads and
their dutiell were 118 follows;

(1) PolilKtiJ tltollqhUq,uut(C"ilIlI1unI).

_This squad's dutlea conaisted chlefty of
rumor control. Originators and of
rumors and "dangerous thoughtB weN
reported to the local police. The memben of
this squad had. however. no power of arreat
but only reported violationa. . .
(2) Troffic control 8Qua4 (Kot811 SClM-
hlUl)._During raids this squad controlled
traffic, fOrCild drivers and pedestrlana to
shelters and. if necessary, controlled crowda
at incident8.
(3) Une:rploded bomb squad (F'ttAatau-
dan Sh"rihan).-This squad reported unex-
ploded bombs to the police and cordoned off
danger areas. .
(4) Obsm"lJation squad (Kallshlhan).-
This !j{Juad mounted to elevated places at
the time of the alert and remained there
after the raid alarm to warn people of the
actual coming of plnnes by ringing bells
and shouting. "Shelter:'
(li) Glu"de squGd (l'ltdQhan). This. squad
guided pen;onnel. especially the old. ll\firm,
and children to shelters, and rescued
persons trapped in buildings. .
(6) Alarm squad (Keihornlll).-ThlS
aquad relaJ'cd all sig-Mls to the area for
which they were responsible.
(7) f.iyht control sqlwd (Toka Ka>lsei-
lIan).-This !j{Juad directed the dim-out at
sundown and the black-out IIpon the sound-
ing of the first air-raid signal.
(8) Labor squad
squad rescued per'l(lnnel and cleal'ed debns.
i. I-ire arm (Shobobu).-The fire arm
composed of a leader, an l\ssistant leader and rm
members. Since theae members were uaualll'
divided into squads according to the number of
pumps which a unit the
organization was not defimtely set. Their dut}
was exchisi"ely to extinguish fires.
j. The emergency finl-flid arm
This arm consisted of a leader, an IIS$lstan
leader. and .10 members. As in the fire arm,
was no set table of organization for this first-SId
g'l.,)up and each unit formed M many !!Quads l\.!
it felt: were necessary to accomplish adequate
firat-a.id senice. Although all members we.re
supposed to be trained in first-aid teehniflUes,
equipment was rudimentary and ita
usually consisted of only very elementarr treat
ment, and of tranaportatloD of patient. to hlaher
echelons for enterrencY medleal taN.
S. TVJlU.-Elaborate plana
had been made to outfit fully each au:dliary
police and fire unit In Ollllka with fairly complete
alr-defenllC equipment, but the ahortaae of aup.
pllea during the war and the dunage caused by
did not permit. Aa a result. the equipment
of the units usually conaisted of approximately
two gasoline fire (although sorne organi_
zations had as many as four), a number of large
hand_pumps. ladders, bucket.aand other materiel
supplementary to the fire-lighting equipment of
each individual houae. The guard arm
equipped with a certain number of shovels,
picks. mlluls, ropes and other hand tools. The
equipment of the emergency first-aid ann con_
siating mostly of crude litters. elementarJ'
bandages. lind tourniquets. Although It wu
originally planned to isaue bicycles to liaison arm
measengers, moot of them were forced to supply
their own.
b. Sonrce.-By original ]llans, the cil)' of
O'laka would aupply all equipment for the auxil-
iary police and fire units, but in time. w; it
became obvious that the city would be unable to
do so. the citizens of the richer unit districts
made contributions ror a portion of the units'
equipment. This accounts for the fact that some
units had four gasoline pumps while others had
none.
4. Operations.--a. General operalio'lS.-The
headquarters of the unit was open :201 hours a
day; two to four members stood watch on an
alternating weeki}' shift. At the soundinll" of the
warning alert. all members reported immedi
ately to the headquartera. As incidents got
beyond the control of individual householders
and neighborhood groups. the auxiliary poliCil
and fire units WeN! called upon for help and were
dispatched at the discrf!lion of the leader. The
auxiliary police ami fire unit officer. upon arrh'-
ing at the incident. assumed charge until he. in
turn. waS superseded bl' municipal officials.
When an incident got be)'ond the control of the
available auxiliary police and fire unit's e<juip-
ment, aid was requested from the regular police
and fire departments. An alternative to this was
to request lUIsistance from a neighboring auxil
iary police and fire unit. which would be ll"ranted
if the neighboring unit \\"8$ not bua)' itself. Upon
the arrh'al of munici]lal equipment. the auxll
IarJ pollee aDd_ aw.nAJ ..
at the dlapou] of the JIUIIdeipI;I .....
(l. of
grollpll _ reqw...s to Nporl aD IDeIdaaIa lit
their area to the auU1iary polke aDd f1NlId
of their area. Thia was 1"IlqUlf'ed even tboqta It
appeared that the unit could handle the Inddaat
withO\lt aid. The unit in tum reported tM.
Incidents to either the police or fire ltatlon with
whom the unit leader kept in eonat.nt toudt
during a raid.
a. Traillinq.-According to the ordilWlcc of
20 January 1939, under ,...hich the auxiliary
police and fire unilJl were established. the muni
cipal otlieiala, in particular the police ollleiala.
were responsible ror the training of auxilial)'
police and fire unit personnel. Howe"er, since
membership was on an honorary basis and memo
bers undertook no respollllibility sa"e their
actions at times of emergency. training was not
compulsory. although the majorit} of the
members took it. Training in the iia.ison and
guard arms was under the police statiom; train-
ing nf the fire arm was under the fire lItations:
and training of the emergency first-aid arm "'as
under individual doctors and special medical air
defense associations.
6. Preu'ltt the auxiliary
poliCil and fire units functioned aomewhat dur-
ing minor TlIids, at the time of saturation incen-
diary bombings they ...-ere Illlralyzed. i.'I were
most Jallllnese air-defense bodies. As a conse-
quence. many of them ...-ent out of operstion
before the end of hostilities and at present the}"
are awaiting another ordinance from the )lin;"'"
try of Home Affairs "'hich ...-ilI either disband
them altogether or reorganize them under s ne....
plan for fi", figlling a.nd other emergency duties
in peacetime.
7. Gomm.... tI.-These units as a prompt
"second echelon" $Cn'iCil follo"'ing initial "on-
'he-acene" action the neighborhood groups.,
constituted a \"Bluable lIC"';Cil. combinlnll the
functions of Be"eml of the similar \"Olunteer or-
ganiZlllions in the United (auxiliary po-
liCil. auxiliary firemen and bask first-aid groups).
Obser,a.tions in O..",ka indicate creditsble se",'-
ice of these units in pN!venting spread of small
fires. although the conftagrationa caused by the
saturation raids commencing 14 March
presented a situation "'ith which their limited
personnel lind equipment could not rope. Such
a r('Ault did nQt indIcate futiht)' of
iees; for, the)' were ne\'erdcsigned U II prUlClpll1
service but as lin auxilillry force to
the municipAl llOllCi! lnd lire senices.
NEIGH80RHooD GROUPS GUMIl,
BLOCK ASSOCIATIONS (OiOlU.ll
ANO FEDERATED BLOCK ASSOCIATiONS
(RENGO OiOlU.l) ,
1. Jlltn:>!1""tioll,-The J apanel'le political S)'8-
tem has al,,.,. to,,'ard complete pe\'llOn-
alize<! "Olltrol of the indi,idulIl. Consequentl)..
in the springoC 19S5 ,'arioua communal associa
tlo.... "'hieh had aprung up ill the cit)' of Osaka,
"'ere organized b)' la'" and ..ere designated &lI
block _iatio,,- (Chokai), In original organi
&ation, the .,,-hole area orthecit) ""&II di"ided into
numerous block _iatiol1$ ,,ho.se principal
function..-u toestablish a eomplele pef'llOnaliz.ed
Ilaoon between the Indh'idual household and
lChelons of municipal 1l';l\"ernment. During this
earl)' period. hOll"e\'er. it "'&II found thaI the
bloek _iation's are&!l .'ere too to allow
for complete indh'idual contacl.s with each sepa-
rate household and. in the autumn of 1938, w}'
Wl're di\ided into neighborhood groups( Tonari
Gull1il. At approximately the ume time the
Cfderated block auoclatioM (Rengo Chokai)
were formed ... the next higher echelon. This
existed in the dacribed form in nearly all
the larp a"tiell of Japan. bl.lt minor "ariations
wiU roolld in illloperation among
the \'ar!0IllI municipalities.
Nt1lhbodoood Grcur- (Tooui Gumi)
2. Orpaaimtioll.-In Osaka the Mighborhood
IfO\Ip ...... comllf*doffrorn 1010
depend.inll.lpoll the density of population in il$
paniClllar al'l!L Forn..mple, a large apartment
hou.H 1rO\l1d beconsidtred a neighborhood group
in itAIM, ..bile in suburbt.n distriet.s a neighbor.
hood gr'OIlp mirht stretch o"er a oomparatl\'el)'
u:tensl\'e 'l'l!L The fact that a household ,,'as
louted ..ithin an area I.lnder jurisdiction of a
paniclilar neighborhood group was suffieient to
make it member of that group, An)' member
of the rroup who did nOt cooperate with his
neighbol'* w.. bol'cotted asanti-lIOCiall.lntil
time as he chOlt to cooperate. It i. evident, how.
e,u. that II.lCII ea_ wert rart, There were no
Ht retsOf dllta which were payable to the neigh-
borhood group and what minor did
were paid hy membera or the group
IIttOrd'ng to their finandalalatu'.
3 l.elldera.--<J. UC/llllllr leader
of II' ncigtJoorhood KroUI) wu ch04f!n by popular
,'ote of the hOl.l!ll':holds in hou_
hold ,oting all one unit, Ills dulle. conallted or
the direction lind operation of the Wl'Qup In IlOr
mal peacelime lind wartime funclions,
thO!ll': falling within the categon' of 'Ir-raid
defense. He no 8IIlary al leader. the
honor conferred by the poIIition generapr beln.
ronsidered suffident compen..tion. NeIghbor-
hood groU11li were made up of all membel'll of the
houaehold. ooth mille and female. In. that, ron
nectton it is interesting to note thllt, aplle of
the seJr-effacement tradition go\'crmng Jap-
anelt; women, there "'ere calleS in 08llkll when!
women ha,'C group leaden,
b. Tlot /Iir_rllid de/e.....e IUldtr (11ob. Sinl.
r:illl.-In man)' ClUell the leader of
nf'cig!lborhood group, selected bec.use of the re-
spect he rommanded, ...... one of the elders of the
group lind incapable of fulfilling the act;\'e poei_
tion or leader in time of air raid, For that reason
the nf'cighborhood grol.lP elected a man to act IIlI
air-raid defense leader. In IlOme C&lleS the regu-
lar leader Willi the air-raid defenH leader. The
air-raid defell.'!e leader trained all pe\'llOlI8 in O'le
neighborhood group in rudimentan' air_raid
functioll8.nd lead tMm in time of air
raid. If the .ir-defellH leader, or the group u a
whole, decided that it ...... neees.sary to deputiz.e
certain of hi. airraid defen.w functions to other
members of the group, that "'as permissible. al-
though no standard rule go\'erned .oeh COn-
tingenc)'.
4. "'.lIdio-ltll--<l. Ordill/lrJ',-ln wartime the
main functions of the neighborhood group. other
than air-raid defense, were oornmunai saving
and control of rationing. As each lellder had per-
so;",al contact .... ith e"en' individulIl hou!ll!hold
of the group, it can easily be _n how readily
the neighborhood group lent it$l'lf to those
acthities. In !lOme area.!!, the neighborhood
group alrso formed II lIuper-eontrol for
ous thDughU" among il$ indi\'iduai members.
although Osaka informllnta have denied thai
such was the ease there.
b. Air-rllid de/clI,II.-The principal air-raid
defense equipment of the indh'idual neighbor
hood group "'as a two-man hllnd pump, supplied
by the city, and under the command of the grouP
air-raid defense leader. It was considered the
dut)' of each indi\'idual householder to control
incldtnta directly affecting him, Wben It bec:ame
evident that control_.. beyond the eapabiliUu
of O'le individual household. the air-raid defense
leader brought up the hand pump, mounted on a
small and attempted, with the aid or
able-bodied member&, to extinruish the confta..
wraUon. Althol.lgh it had been planned that each
neighborhood group trOUld be wued a halld
pump by the city, in some casea O'le elty _..
unable to comply and under luch circumstanCft
neighborhood grouJlll _ould pool their hand
pum,", at O'le block &SllOC;iation headquartera. Bo-
aides the PUmP. the principal items or equip-
ment consisted of one Or two ladders, apare
bucketaand supplementary material for indh.id_
ual households. The lIir-raid defell5l! leader of
the neighborhood group .u responJoible for re-
porting-each incident which oecum!d in his area
to O'leauxillary police alld fire units
,,hieh. in tum. reported the incidents to higher
echelons. Besides fil\!-fighting duties, O'le neigh_
borhood group ..... also respollllible for the l\!-
mO"al or its 00<11 aged, infirm alld children to
shellers, and for $Orne primary finwid in case
of minor wounds. The training of tho!! Mishbor-
hood groaps in air-raid defell&l! procedure .....
aomplished b)' indi\'idual members or the
group who to an suxiliary police and
fin! unit, and b)' lectures and demonstrationa,
ghen 11)' traveling police and fire department
om.
81ol:k AJllociuioa (Shokail
5. Orgtlllimti01l aM Opn'llti01ll.-The block
lISIlOCiation ..... an organization composed of all
the leaders or neighborhood grollJlli ..'ithin its
area, These numbef"fld between 20 and 35, ....ry_
inl according to population dens.It)'. The aaao-
ciation met at specified Inten'als chieft)' for pur-
.-of adminiltra.tion and liaison upward 10
the ward offiee:tl and the municipal go\'emment
and dOWTlward to the neighborhood groll))S and
the indh'idual household. These neighborhood
group leaders selected in turn" leader for the
block _illtion. He could be OM of them or he
could be a man of particular ability ..ho had
been passed over in the ehoiCi! of neighborhood
group leaden. The headqullrten of the block
aS4OCiation Wllll generally in his hol.lse, The func.
tions of the block association oonailted, in w:ar
time,or-.a ...
and tJIe 8IIPPb1acot btl ...
to the varioua 1IIIaItborbood 1ftIIIpa ..
leaden oC tM.t P'DIIPI- AJtbDap the f6
the bJoclr; aaaodaUou recal.... Do aaIary ...
_en coilected 'rem -eft IIouaehaJd bY ..
I"NP '-den ror tht 01
malntalnlnl the 'nIoeIl &SIOci..Ition olIIeea. "..
dues ..'ere Ir.ied aoeordinr to the abIlity-to-pq
or the Individual hul.llehold. The block ____
lion had no airrald dutiea other than the ilaui....
of eqllipment til the neipborhood lJ'<l\IP&-
FeMn"ed 810de "-cia,;o., (lIaop O>ok:ai)
6, Or/ll'llllmtin IUld rfder.
ated hIol:k -.-lations; Q)\'ered an area of from
10 to 20 block -.-lations; and acted &II a liaison
agency between tho!! block aseociations; and the
eebelolll. In reality it ..... IIIUl!'ly a pth.
enn. of bJoclr; &SIOci..Ition \eaders., jU.1 .. the
block aaeociation ..... a ptheriq of neighbor-
hood &rouP leadera. The Jeader of the fftierated
'nIoeIl .-odation .... eleeted bT tIleR Ieade.....
Sometimel M .... one of the memben and __
a man of .pecial abililJ" ..ho had been hekI
In nlRn'e for the por;ition. 1llere DO dues
in thi. orpoiution and no tel oIfice &Uc:h as
there .. in the block IlAMriatioM. The main
dl.ltiea or the bIoek a.ssoeiation .-eJ\!
the puaing or rnattriaJ and infonnation from
higher eeheIolll tOthe block it
"'ent in tum to the nrighborbood group. 1lle
Woell: &S!IOciItion had DO actual air.
nid duties.
7, Co_--",,-The et6cacy of utilli:illg the
pre'iiously eatablilbed neighborhood JnIIIp as
the foundation or Japanese cinlian defense 'nS
a 1o&ical step in the e>lIlutioD of this orpoiu_
tion, A.s an 'ont.Jle.4pot" it .... able til
direct illl _ntnled dona on s single iDcl
dent a1mo&t immediately after the inception of
the incident. when tho!! time faetor in such aetlon
....... of trelMDdOUI importance. The intensilY
and number or inc>denta b)' ..toration
raids on Osab precluded much effecth-e opera--
tion, especially in vie.. of the rudimental)' air-
raid_protl!e:tlon equipment ..-Ith .-hich these
neighborhood rroups were equipped, an upe--
rienet! ahaf"fld by oO'ler \'Oluntter ch'lIian defen.oe
agenda
AIR-RAID WAttNlNG . 'd
I IlItrod"eliOll. _ The subject of alr_ral
"'a':"ing embraces the In\"eStigation of the me:::-
ods b)' which enelll)' .il"Craft are
channels of eommunication through ,,b1ch. . IS
information is passed, the of thIS 111-
fonnation snd d...,ision to announce slgnab, and.
tl.nall}'. the meaM b}' ,,'hich the Pf'Obable area
of attack is ....rned of the impending d:-nlfl!.r.
R8poMibility for the oPl'ration of the aIr-raId
.... minll' lI}'stem ""18 \'e.slo!d in the
Army. The Central Army
0sa1ta ..-as for gi\'inll' alarms WIthIn
the Fifteenth Aml}' .rea ,,'hich included all of
the lower end of HOnM1\l Island up to. line run_
ning If"'nerall,y north.oo south alonll"the eutern
boundaries of Fukui. Ship., and N.ra prefee-
tUI't:i. plus the island of Shikoku.
.....""'
? Information of the night of enemy craft
... obtained from the following: sourees which
are gi,'en in the order or the llrobllble sequence
of detection: .
R dio interception enl'hest
detection of el\Cmr air neti"ity was
through the use of wo....wllve radio interception
equipment b}' which conversations anIong enemy
planes and between eneTTl}' planes and ground
installatiol1.ll o:<luld be heard. Frequentl)
air uti"ity on Saipan o:<luld be detected 111 thL5
manner. from this source $Orne idea could be
pthered of the siR of the assembling aa
nil as the probable time of attack. I.e" the
preaent dar or the da)' after. Such
unita were installed .t Ouka.nd at OmaWlkl.
/). Aclt"4lllCe radIIr ........_Radar inatall.-
tionI 1n're kIeated on advanced ialand posta, at
Cbiehi lima (Army) aDd Haha Jima (Navy).
Information received b7 ach.nced island posta
..... ndioed to Anny headqu.rten at To1l:)'o and
relay@d irnmldiately to Osaka. and to Na\'}'
headquarten in Yokollub. Such detection was
usually the first indication of the general direc
tion of the lIigbt, p"e llOllle idea of the liu of
the sttae.1l:ing fof'Ce, and. at tim8, the approlt-
imate attitude.
e.. Po.trol boo.tI.-Inquiry of Rear Admiral
Aklra Mauu:r.akl. chief of staff of the Osaka
naval ruard \Init, indieatea that inlufficient
naval craft were s\'ailable in hil tommand for
III, ORG....NIZATION
AND OPERATION OF JAPANESE CIVILI....N DEfENSE
offshore aircrdt ...er -.ervice. HO"'cver, 12
6Y1ing boau....aryln' from 11 to flO \oIlS. ware
used in thie sar...ice, TheM boats rallpd off-
shore to. distance of GO to 100 mi'" and _re
with radio for tranamitting. They op-
rated in shifts, with four boats on dut)' at all
Only "isual sia:nallinC wu a"ailabla
:mollg the boau, Inronnatlon """"h'ed,
thell! boaU b)' radio wu to the &lr_rald
ramingcentral at Central Ann)'
d SIlon rado:r iuto.liGliou.-lnformabon of
AighU pi(ked up by Bhore radar inatalla
was tent immedi.tely to Central Anny
.....rningcentral and wu.1eo broadeast b):
....\.e from each r.dar installation to all mlbtan'
installatiol1&
e.. Ob.ert'Cltioll Corp. (Bo/ni1rQ:lI-
.hitai},-A saries of ch'ilian posta
(Minkanshisho) opeY1lted by the AIr-Defense
Ob!len'alion Corpa (Bokukanshitlli). was estab-
lished thoughout the (ountry. The location of
these posts was determined by the and
they "'ere established Ilt such places and In such
manner as to insure complete coverage of the
area. Sele<;tion of the posts was then reported to
the respective prefectural governments, and or-
ganiution and operation of the was as-
sumed by the Air_Defenlle ObolervatIOn Corps.
This corps waa compo$ed of civilian \'Oluntee...
and in the latter months of the war, contained
moa'tly ,,'Omen and those men unavailable for
military sen'Ice. Each of the obsen'er po!Ita
manned b)' a rotating TOIIter of memben, wh.ich
insured complete operation at all timell- Infonn-
ation of planes detected b}' these posta WI..!!
phbned to a central post iI.eadquarters loeated
in the prefectura and from there relayed to tbt'
Central Anny Headquarters in Osaka, These
posta: were equipped with binoculars.
telephonell, and maps or diagralll$ of
diate \'ieinity for purpoM:S of detemumng di-
redion of ftight.
f MiJitIlTw It
anti-aircraft batteries communicated infonoa-
tion of enemy flights to their division headqual'-
ters. It Will then forwarded to the centr)\
headquarters at Osaka.
AirRaid Signab . to
3. Aldllority to WI/lId "igIUlU,_AuthO
n
t1,tj.
give air.raid 8ignal8 rested solely with the IYIl
tary, In the .... cxwered by the FlfteeJlth Anny
arM (Parqraph I above) all W&nlIDp __
nated from the alr-n.id ....mln. eeDU'a\ of Cea-
tral .... nny Headquarten. which '1"" illllta11ed In
a MllCrete buildin.. located ill
the ..-nda nf tbe old Aaako c:aatle. A detailed
and Uluatrated explallStion of the operation of
thil waMIin, central is attaehed .. E.dr.ibit C
During the early dayl of the war, .ir_raid Ii.:
nals ... KlIlnded at "'el')' .ppearance of enmIy
.Ireran. JU the raids became more frequent,
however. air-raid warninp 'II'Ul! IlOt llptJll
the appearanee of indi\'idlla1 Or lIe\'eral enemy
bomben or for obsel"\'ation eran. (U"pon the ad_
"ent of the fint atom>.: bomb, the prae,.
tioe of gi.'inll' air-raid alarnu for liqle pla.ns
..... resumed.) In the earl}' de}', of the "'ar the
lignals were given throughout the entire a.rea
but frequent raids showed the inadvisability
of .....minll' such a large arN simultaneoualy. It
WIIA then deeided to g1\'e wliminga by prefec-
tures,
4. Tllpe, o[ ,igJl(lu,_The air_raid Ilgnale d&-
IlCribed below were eatabliIshed by law, \I'ith the
eJCooption of the "relell$l!-rrom-the-air_rald
alert"-in other words, the "all clear." During
the early da}'s of the war the was not used
to announce this signal. Before the audible siren
Wall adopted, the "releasc-from_alert" waa di8.-
seminated b}' radio and by telephone to the mu_
niclpal departmentll and civilian _iatIOM.
\I'hlch rell,}'ed the mesaage to the general p\lbHc.
In July howe\'er, an a\ldible "all clear"
,ign.1 Will adopted for sounding on the siren
s,'stem. (In reading the following dellCription
of the lirnals. it is interesting to note the marked
similarity of the Japa_s)"Stem and that UM:I
in the United States.)
a. Cnfilit:rl1io.I1lt'CTllillg.-WMn information
of an enemy lIight..-..s fl'lllll which it
CO\1Id be inferred that an attack on _ part of
the Ou.ta w.ming area COlIId be u:pected, a c0n-
fidential caution message ..... telepboDed to mill_
tary and municipal headquarters. utility in8tal-
latiOTl8 and to a list of _ntial industries. Thia
information was not gi\'en to the public
during the early dl,}'s of operation. but later, ..
raids became hea,'ier .nd more frequent, radio
wamin, of impending raids ""18 gi"en to the
public.
b. Ai.....,.wt ..l#t.-When theenemyftight was
approximately 20 to 80 minutesllyitll" time away
..................
L'POD I '''.-...11&
out ... pg1 btIo ... bit .....
UP'" __ permttW til -..tr *-l1li.
PreveDt opwanI ...,.. Tn5e ...
one was required to tab .......
c.
about. t:i to 210 mill'llta a...., .. afr.nIId
alarm .... L'PllOIthe_lldi... ofdUaq..
naI the disabled. qed, and chilllrea -.ft ..
to Bhelter, a\'ilian ddl"ll8eot!&ciab aaumad dIeir
poIU .nd the tueral public _oed to.anI
8belterbut Wel'1! not required to enteT. Wa&doera
appointed by the Micbborhood rroops (Tonari
Gumi) or aI1Iilial"J police and lire unlta (Keibo-
dan) watched for the of planes and
-:nen the planes "'ere Been or heard, Cl"idIy
dlreo:ted people to IbeJwo. b,- the oontin1lOUll
ringin, of bella.nd the loud. cry of Mabelter."
d. ReUau [ro_IliM'flitl do:I .....-As moo a.s
the enem)'lIigbt had cleared the.rea to a re.aaoo-
able distance, a .imal ..... g!,'en which termin-
ated the period of air_raid alarm and re-
turned the area to a mtus of aIr_raid alert
described abo'e. This lignal, quite approprl_
atel}', Wall the same all that used to indieate the
air_raid alert. Tilia signal .I...a'.. follo,,'ed the
airraid alarm.
[","'/Iir-raid-alert or"lIlldecr."_
it was e"ident that the enemy planes h.ad
completed their mi8lllun and had left the Japan-
ese mainland, aaignal 'II'a.!I g!"en which illdieated.
the termiMtiOll of the alert 1tatIa, the "all

5. J/el1.otlr of P"blie IIir-nriri
.......u.g rigH/.I.-&. SilYlU.- Twmty4le si-
rens in Osaka City WV1! l:OrItroIled b7" a oentnl
.witcla in the Dub EJectrieaI Sciellce
The sirens WV1! located on the roofs of factories.
sehooIs. ltatiolu and other taD bIIildiqs.
Outside the city the aiTelu ..-ere -.Dded. npoll
receipt of direetiona tnm the polite ltations or
upon receipt of the ndio an_1ICJUDeJIt- (For
delotripticm of the ...I"iou ann aipa!s Ie! P-
10.)
/). ROIlNl.-Upon theautborilation ofthefim
public .udible signal. the aim, radio
anDOUncernenta of the Ilipala gi.-m 1n're made
by Centnl Ann:y lleadquanua iD Ouka. The8e
delotribl the IiRnaJ sllthorised
and the .rea in which it ..... (iVell, A oootin-
uing nal'Tlltion of the tl.igbt of the planes and
..
SCHEDULE Of AIRRAID
"'-"- ......
.._..................
-"
"....... ",- 1'''-''
1",'0-1
-
.......... "..
0-,., .....1
"-
....... "..., ...........
""__' 1-....
.,........ -. .. '.... ,
_'.......'w .............-
--
., .,......-.. -.. ,. .. .
... .....
l... , ..... M.... _
'........... -
l... " .... M .... _
.. ......' '- M'....
M..,' ......... .....,'-r ...........
.....'..
.." 1'''000'''1 ... _, .,...... M'...
..,.-- ., ...
-..- II"""" GUMII
..,......,... - ....

........... "., .,.'"

'0.-.. ' ....... _." ' ...... ,.., _.
........., ... "............, .......,
0... ..........., ., .... 0... .... ' ......., '"
0...... "","_., " ,_
0... .... ""'"_"',_
.." ..... I'''' ,,0
_.......
-' ....'
.,..' ....'
.__.... ...
. ....-'.. .
""
..... ...."


...
.-
..

... S"
...
o.
..." ."
,........ ............ ' ...........,_........ .....r.... "" '" .,._ I,.'" ..........,...
...... ...........
'.. _.........-,.
....... .........
... 1 '.........
<.." .....'-'.... -
"N" " ., _-' ..... ..'N"- .......' '-
--............,..
.,..... {,..... .. .,...
"

..-' ......,.....
c......

-

__m
<-

..." ....
_"c_. ..
-
...' .._......'_.,
...
c..... ___c_
.-
-
...,................. _..,......,........ _...... -...........
"'..... ..__..................... ".. -
, ..... _c__"--,_
""-
r.I...... --.., _ .. ... _ ........ _ ..._ ,. '-
_.. __..............
".
., BO"9'''a SUR
CIVILIAN OCfENSE OIVISION
OSAU fll!:LO
other Information of the enem), nllfht w.. al80
lfiven. (p. 10.) Toward thI end of tile war. III-
formation of lar1rJ;! enelll)' night. ... broadeut
to the public IlllllOOn .. It COIlcluded that an
Ilttaek on the Oeaka area probable.
e. OI1lermelltOO.r._Belia. flapor aieeves.and
lightB werealll(l ulled to announce air-raid ....arn.
inp. (For a dellCriptinn of such use see p. 10.)
Membel'll of the neighborhood If!'OUPB (Tonari
Gum!) and aUllmal'}' police and ftre aaaoci.atioJa
(Kelbodao) also circulated throughout an ....
signed area shouting the signals JIO that all per_
!10M would be warned.
6. CommeD/B.-The scheme or detedlon of
enemy aircraft. the operatinn and equipment of
the (;(o,ntral Army Headquartel"ll in Osaka, the
s)'atem of signals, and the me<:hanical meana of
dissemination or the public alarms were well
planned and operated efficiently during the raida
here. The operations room of Central Army
Headquartel"!l. from which airraid signals em.
anated. was located in one of the few buildinlr-l
seen thus far which had been reinforced to gh'e
protection against bombing. lndil'idual siren op-
eration as an auxiliary to the central control
assured operation of sirens in the el'ent of de-
struction of power lines.
CONTROL CENTERS
1. lll/rod"ctiQJl.-An examination of c.i,i]ian
defense forces operation in Osaka indicates Ihe
presence of two C<lntrol centel"!l in the chain of
command. that ia. two control centers in Ihe
American senso--a headquarters where report5
of air-raid incident5 were rocei"ed and from
lI'hkh the various air_raid sen'ices were dis-
patched. The lowest. or first in actual operation.
was that of the auxiliary police and fire unilS
(Kcibodan) and. at the highest e<:helon of com-
mand in the citr, the control room (Reihi
lIombu) of the prefe<:tual police bureau guard
section.
2. OperaUctn.-. Control room 01 lhe aurili-
ary police 'wd fire units (KeiOOdan}.-The area
of each of the auxiliary police and fire unit5 was
coterminous with the gTlImmer school diatrlet in
which it was located. The unit headquartel"5 was
in II room of the central schoollwuse in the area,
and'the organiution'a equlpment ....lIl! housed at
or near the $arne place. The headquarters of tJtia
unit waa the first control room to receil'e report!
and to dispatch I'arioua air-raid sel"l'lces. The
'1>1'_' -l
table of orp"'."
.vaJlabll for alNUt
at IenfthIntld.Npllrt......
.,y Pollee Il!ld Fire Uaka." '1'bI
contained a larp detaiIect map of 1MaN

wen! reported by the aeIJhborbood &nlUPIo tIMr
wen! plotted on the map. FIN equ!P!I*It
patclted to the reported Incident. W8lI u.o
Roted 011 the map by the 1150 of toy-abed
replieall. The leader or the lInlt maintained lJal.
lIOn with adjoioiog unitll from which he mlpt
reqU"lIt relnforcementll.
b. The u;r.ffe/CfT8e hcadqllQrler, co-TltrQ! ecnler
(Keil>i HOlllbll)._AII reportll of bombing inci_
dentll which reached the control c:entllr of the
auxiliat) police and lire unitll were forwarded
immediate!} to the Osaka municipal fire and
police atatiun!. In addition to those reportll. the
municipal police departmentll "'ere able to de-
teet fires from high ubsen'ation towers erected
On toD of fire statiollll. Fire equipment was dill-
patched regardless of the reco.'iptof information
from au:dlial'}' police and fire unit5, Reportll re-
ceh'ed from the auxilian' police and lire unitll
were immediately relared to the conlrol center
of the air-<lefense headquarters in the prefec-
tural building. Thla center "'aa manne(! upon
the llO\Indingofthe airraid warning. The direc
tor of the prefectural police bureau was in com-
mand of the center and chiefs of all branches
of the prefectural g.:wernment ,,'ere in attend_
ance. A loudspeaker S}'Steln connected the con-
trol center with all the departmental offices for
the tnllu;mission of raid information and the
director's decl!!iclDs to those officials who might
be in their O"'n offices at the time. Reportll of
bombing incident5 were received in a telephone
central adjoining the wntrol room and from
there sent to the director. Dispatching of the
municipal fire apparatus to different parts of
the area was done on orders of the chf<!f of the
fire ann on his own Iniliathe. There was. how-
ever. a cenlral fire rese.ne, localed adj""""t to
the prefectural building. which "'as dispatched
only on orders of the din'Cl-or of the control
center. Deciaion reprding the entplo}'ment of
thia resen'e was usually made b)' the direclor
after ronsultetion "'ith the chief of the fire arm.
A police I'eSet'l"l! "'" also alailable. equipped
....ith radio and loudspeaker cars. Another im.
llOrtant re!len'e available for Ben'lce al this head.
n

{Tailled police unit knuwn all

quam... d 'bed in
K lb"lal (Thlll unit i. more fully
under the he.dinK Itt w:lS
tined and equilllled chien), for Ihe per orm-
r. r relICU" work. but it .1110 made emergency
::;:i':.. of utilities. deaN'd debri" and prewnted
loot!n, Sections of this umt were II>lSembled at
three c'entrall,r-loo:ated poinu in the city. All
Iruckll and buM'll "'ere to report
de!l;l\'l11lted poliel! or lire statiOns or to Ihe ron
trol .-enter as II mobill" reM'ne (or emergency
service to pro,ide ambulanees, fa haul re-
M'r\"i! J)l"nonnel. ernergeM)' .
and medicine. This tralUlportalLon re!er\e "11.$
under the rontrol of and dispatt:hed by the
trol center. An opel1lUoIl8 map "'1.$ also mam-
tained on ..hkh reponed inddenu were plotted.
A paneled board "... to m:ord the shirt.
ing of poliee resen"es. In the e'-cnt an .....-
io:e!l a,-ailable ..ithin (h.aka proved lMu/fie,ent,
the "':aMr of the ronlrol room requested rein-
fOft'elllfllt.l from neart,' cities. In in-
sta-. the cities of Kobe and Kroto. ha,'ing
INrned of the bombing of Osaka, dispakhed aid
e'I'en before a reqUMt for htlp 11'1..5 re<"'ti,ed.
3, ..-In addition to the immediate re-
ports of incidtnt.l 511!nt from tht neighborhood
lJ1"lMlJl' to tht auxiHal")' police and fire _ia
OOIl5 and from tMre through tht munkipal fire
and police dtpartrrltnta to the control .:tnter.
writun reporta orere also compiled after urn
raid. These reporta ",ere madf! b}' the police and
fire deparuneota and aubmitted to the air-de-
fellM general headquarten control center. The
fire reporta showed damage to hou-'ts, private
buildinp, factories. utilities and public build
ings. Police reportl also indudtd information
of alIualities (penona killed, badlr injured.
8lightl), injured, and and li,-estlll:k lost),
and a record of born! dropped (inetndiaries.
high-uplo4i,'e and unexploded bombs). In-
formation (i,'en In the report by the fire and
poli.:t depanmenu \I'U lIUrt!d from the head
quarte... of the auxiliu)' police and fire unilA
Reporta \I'tre consolidated by the control center
and submitted to the go"ernor of the prefecture,
to the Arm)' Headquarters and to the of
Home Alfaira in TokJ'o.
4. Comm.mt41,_lntermgation of con.
cerned indicated the efficient operatinn of the
main prefectural control center and the smaller
centers of the auxililll'}' police and fire units.
"
Of alriking note ill the faUure to plan lor alte...
nate eenlen, especially in the cue 01 the main
control center which ..... located In th' hue-
ment of the prefectural buUdlntr where It ...
,'ulnerable to both bombinll" and lin!. The ca..
atruction of thia center would have _1ou.al7 iJn.
paired central control of the civilian dellJUl
foreea in this prefedure.
INOOENT CONTJU)L
I. /atrodaclioll.-Supen'illion or control Of
air-raid-defensc operations at the scene of aa
incident shifted through lIucceeding leaden of
!ll!n'ice echelons rather than
ing in one speciall}' designated "incident control
officer. H from the time of the landing of a bomb
until the need foremergenC)' !ll!n'icea had PBMtd.
In that respect the Japanese practice resembled
the German lI}'stem,
2. Operotioll.-Pre,'ious diKu.sion of the op-
eration of the neighborhood group (Tonari
Gumi) ahOIl'S that the trained air-raid-defense
leader of such unit was quick to go to any of
the homes in the group under his lIUpervision
in the e"ent of bombing. Upon arrh'al, the
leader and his helpe" joined with and lIuper_
'ised the members of the particular househol(l
and the neighbora who \I'eI'\!! then engaged in
(:(lmbating the effecta of enemy action, Thill
leader WlL'l thus the nl'St to a.uume the role lIimi.
Iar to that of an control officer. If it
became e"ident that the group then in opera-
tion was unable to meet the an im_
mediate request WIJI made to the appropriate
auxiliary police and lire unit (Keibodan) (allO
diseussed in this report) for a.uistance. Upon
arrival of help from this unit the leader thel'\!!Of
assumed control of the operations. If the situll'
tion n!quired a.uistance from the municipal fire
department. the commander of that unit as-
sumed authorit)' to direct all Ollel1ltions. As in-
dicated in another section of this report under
the title "control centers" there existed in
Osaka a regen'e fire-lighting organiution which
was located and kept under eontrol of
the prefectural control center. In the event of
the of a unit of that foree to an ind-
dent, the commllnder of the rellen-e unit or of
the group already in operation, whOOl'er 'WIIS
senior. took command.
3. Conflict of allthQritj/,-ln the hypothetical
illustration used abo"e, in the event of the ar-
rival 01 all adjoillina neiPborhood rroup 10 _
alat one already 011 the job. or upon the arrival
01 a I'\!!inlordntr auxiliary pollee and ftre unit,
the leader 01 the particular ..rvlee aln!ady In
operation ('(lnUnued in charp of the
However. in a like inata.nce, 8lI between ftre de-
panmenta, the senior ot!Icer would be the eon.
trolling authority. exoept in the calIII! of the
arri ...l of a fire !ll!n'ice from an outside munici_
pality. It is to be noted that where a munidpal
ruanl rellCue unit (Keibitai) under
"Reseue,") was in operation simultaneou..ly with
a fire-fighting group, perfectural In.. dieu.ted
that the leader of the rtsc:ue rouP wwld be in
command, on the theory that it waa far more
important to sa"e s life than to sa"e a IloIue..
FurthemlOn!, in the when! police and fire
unlta were in Operation at the same time, the
leader of the fire service was in command.
COM... resemblanee of the Jap.-
an_ I)'atem of incident control to that of the
German is note"..orth}. Oflio:ials intelTOgated in.
dicated no kno""ledg\! of it, bill l!\'idenees of
familiaritr "ith German air-raid defeMe experi_
enee pointed to its innuenee on Japa_
planning for incident control. While the Bilift of
control to&Utteedingofficen might_m produe-
ti,'e of rennin of authorit)', no l!\'idence of auc:h
was found.
U1'o'EXPWDD BOMBS
I. 1I.trothu-tioJr._The Japanese Ann,.. ""1lI
for the dils;position of unexploded
bombs, with the exception of incendiaries ..-hid!
"'ere disposed of by the chilian population or
10eaI senices. Howe'er. the :-ia'T 'II'" charged
"'ith thedisposition of marine mines \I'hkh 'II"!!n!
washed ashore. A re"iew of operations reportl
of the AAF indicat.e:!l that a relatil'elJ' llIDan
number of high explosive bomb!! WIJI dropped
on Ouka. Consequentlr, bomb disposal sqlL&.ds
of the Japanese Army in this area \I'ere De"er
called upon for eJl:tensh'e sen'iee.lnterrogation
of a bomb disposal officer, IIttached to head-
quartel1l of the Central Army at Osaka, re,_led
that ..eM-ice of soldiers in the disposition of un_
exploded bombs ",lUI an addition 10 the nom,.l
,"lIilan' duties. They were not n!1.",!lllrly formed
lUI bomb dispo!llll units but assumed such dutiel!
on1)' when fGr th.. purpose. While the
dispollilion of unexploded high-exllloai"e bombs
was quite prOlIerly the duty of th.. mililar)'
10..-, die '--''''''
OIttbt ":::':"::::
.trikIaa', tile.... 0 .... II
lnata_ when chtJIua" '--till.
_ 1)'pea 01 bombt. NpOI'tad tile ..-II
i_Rdiari. to the mUltal)' wIdda -.... fa
the un_ry101'lDatioll and diI;pddt of......
dispoq!aquads,
2.. Opuatioll._.
The Pl'\!!Hnce ot an unuploded bomb or 01 a holt
lndieaUng the likelihood of a bomb ....
immediate'ly br the diloeol"erer to the
police station Or hea.dquarte'n of the au:dllary
police and fire unit. whiehe"er wu the more
con,'tnient. If reported to the latter. thatorpn-
iu.tion relayed the report promptlr to the uea:r-
est police .tallon with whic.hc:onstantliaiso.nI'U
maintained. The police dtpu'tll'lent then for-
earded the report to the military poliee branch
of tht Army which di.o..tdled the meMag\! to a
desirnated military unit. The reporta of UDeJ[_
p10ded bambi! c:ontaillf!d infonn&tion giving the
Ioeation and d.eription of the bomb. if risible,
or the Slr.e of the bole it the bomb tII'Q imbedded.
and the time of disnn-ery,
b. PI"U\lItt.o-,.. _....-n._Prior to the
atri,'a! of the bomb dispoq! squad. the poIiee
directed the eI"KIIation of I.Jl area estimated to
be lulllcient for safll'tr in thee'<"ent of the bomb'II
uplolion.. Q:rta.in pe.--nel of the allxillary
police and fire lIniu aui5ted the municipal police
in clearing the area. No other precautionary
meuurea. sudl as theom'triqnfthe bambwith
turf. mata or O)thror malerial. "'ere taken b5' ci-
,ilian ofticia1a. l'JXln the arri'-aI of the bomb
dispoaa!lQuad. the leader, aRer determining the
size nf the bomb, decided "'hether nr not the
c:ordonned I'" .... nf the JlrOllI'I" diameter.
and if no!., marfe it ID.
c. DilpHit"'.-M ia indieated abln''''' spe-
cial!}' designated bomb dlJpoaa!lQuaw. "'ere not
In operation in theJapanese AnIl}', but all ann5
in an AnIl}' dil"iaion contained men
Inined in bomb disposal l.'"pon re-
ceipt of the n!port of an unexploclM bomb, a
disposal In"O"P Wall a;lil!mb1ed and dislMtehed
to the location. The bomb di&posal squad ......
compoHd of a non"ODlmissioned leader and nine
men, The k-ader supen'ised but did not aetuall)'
enpl."e in the dilJ,lOllllI operation. T"'G of the
men were specially trained in disposal work and
neutralized the bornb. Theother $l!"en men ,..ere
"
-.t mueJ,. for digJ'iq around lhe bomb .nd
similar work, Upon .lTh.1 at lhe location of tho
bomb. steps 10 neutraHu il promptl).
Thia ,,'Ual'<'Omplished by lin .ppllcatlon of ther-
mile 10 Ihe of lhe bomb easing, ....hich pene-
lrated the easing and burned out the explollh'e
inside. An infortTlant lltaled that thill
.pplication wu made about half"..)" between
Ihe nO$f! and tail of the bomb where it ,,'as estim-
ated the cll.i!inll" wall would be droft
WllS made 10 "eutraliZl" the oomb b)' defusing.
If tho bomb ...... in Ihe ground. its
euct Ioealion .nd depth "'ere determined b)-
careful probing lind UlmiMtion of Ihe hole.
After !<Xating it. a lrench was dug alonpide so
that the bomb would become [t
then rendered harmless by the thermite method
described .bo'e. Bombs I)'iug in spots near im-
porum installations or areas "'ere h.ndled
promptly but noetrort 11'&1 made ..ithin 48 hours
10 dillpoee of bomb!! which "'ere I)ing in places
wheredelo"al;O" "'ould Im"e no scrious effect.
3. CommeNt.-Because of the relati"cly small
number of high-upIOlli"e oomb!! dropped on
Osaka. the system of diap<ul 1\'U not greatly
taxed. The planning .....1$ sound .nd it is fair
10 assume that the dillpou.l pl"Odure would
ha"e stood lip as well under greater streas pro-
"ided all parties to it had adhered to illl pro_
,isiona. One instance Will found, howe'er. where
the police. instead of calling on the Arml'. had
directed .n unexploded bomb 10 be co"em:! o,'u
with dirt without makine an)' etrort to neutral-
ue it.
fiRE SERVICES
fire PtlXCCtioa
I. IIttrodac!wlt._. The information in thill
report of Osaka eit) .... obtained by inter...ie.,.-s
....ith olficiala in Ihe fire and ...ater departments;
by checking tire brigade records; inspecting tire
equipment and tire stalions; by observing tire
drills and Iraining;and. in addition, b)' a cursor)'
lD.!pection of the Osaka cil)" municipal "'ater
department planl (Exhibit 0).
b. Size .ltd fIOpttIa!ioJt. 01 Osaka citl'.-osaka
has a total of 71 square: miles. and is divided
into 22 wards (J(U). In 19421hc jJOpulaticn of
3.1:;;),600 persont WlU housed in 600.000 homes.
Today the population is estimated at 1,109,274
penons, who are housed in the n!maining 285-
126 dwellings (Exhibit E, Table I,A).
"
r. ' ....trial arw.-'J'ho IndutriaJ __
ered approximately 2S pen:eut of the cit)', At tile
peak of the war the,., were l>OO ImportaDt
tacll employloll" more than 500 persons, and ..
additiollllMlO plants which employed InOI'e tbaa
100 persont each, There were Z&,OOO ama1I f_
10rm, ...ch employ!ne Iesa than 100 peno....
Of the 26,000 factories of all lIizea, there aN
less than 10,000 In exilltence at tht preIIIi'nt tUne.
induding "ery few which employ more than 100
persons (Exhibit b'. Table SA and 58).
2, Oauk4 vrcleet"re fin brigade 'l"!e1It._
II. Orgalti=lItiOll.-The go\"ernor of Oulta Pre-
fer:ttlre is the .dmini.trath'e head of the Osaka
tire department. The director of the police bur_
eau. b)' oroer of the g<l\"ernor. supervises admin.
istrnti\"e mnttHII I"(!lated to the fi,"(! department.
The chief of the police department directs the
chid of the fire department in administratil'e
matters b)' authority of the
supervisors. (Reference items 1'os. I lind 2, tirt
department organization chart.)
b. S'llmr/>(m titie8 fire departltlCllt8.-The
tire departments of the suburbnn cities of Suksr,
Fuse. and Suits (populations 200.000. 160,000
.nd 50,000. respecti\'el)") all! under the super-
\'ision lind tl"llining of Osaka prl!fecture (_
Exhibit 1).
c. Fire delHlrtment perso.md.-In Dl."<:ember
there were 1.33l) regular firemen emplo)'ed
b)' the Osaka prefecture. At the time of the larg_
est air raid on 14 March 1945. the fire depart-
ment had iJl<'reased its; personnel 10 5.981 (Exhi_
bit E, Table 98). The tire department nOW em-
plo)'s 3,030 firemen. (Reference item :\"0. 2,
Osaka prefectural fire-brigade outline.)
d. Firedepartmellt rerrlli!f._Applicants for
the tin! scl'\'iee in I were required 10 be be-
tween 19 and 39 )'ears of llge, Bo)"s between the
ages of I" and 17 were recruited as junior fire-
men. Their duties consisted primarily or serving
1l$ mes!lengers, fire nlnnn ClX!ratOl'S, and office
oo)'s. After "'ar ,,-as declared the minimum age
for firemen ....1$ redu(e(l to 17 )'ean and the
muimum age int;reaaed to 44 An appli-
cant wu required to be at least. 5 feet 3 iJl<'hes
tall with a chest measurement cf not IC!!.'! than
one-half his height lind to weigh a minimum of
132 pounds. All applicants had to sbow proof of
8 l'eara schooling. Approximatel)' 10 llercent of
the men in the tire St!1'\'lce ha\'e had more than
the 8 year!! I"l!quired schooling and a fe.... han
had some eollelt'e tnining.
e. Worm....Aed...._Fun lime
"N!meo work a two platoon frtaaJar)
duty: and 24 hours oft'. AU o:c::mil 24 houn on
required to relJOrt to the , remeowere
IJons ulJOn the receipt of a:air:=::"7 ala-
I. 11",gu._ 111 01'.
(I) First-)"ear unma....:... ,
I 70 ' , -.. remen re-
ce 'e yenpermcnth TIl h
ried but ba,. .' ose w (l are mar
e no ch,ldren reeche 90 )'en
:e
r
and married tiremen ....ith chil_
ren reeell'e 120 nn a month
firemen' (sc.-.nnl.o)
". are unmarried reeei"e 80 yen Per
Those. "'ho are marrIed but ba,-.., no
chl1d:c
n
rccel\'e lOll )'en ller month while
mal'rled firemen .... ilh children 130
)'en per month
"t1oan! unmarried
110 l"",n Per month. 1'hoole ...ho are
married but ha"e no children recei\"e 150
)'en ller and Ihose who are married
allll ha\e Children receh'e 190 ,.,
month. n per
(I) Subofficers 1'eC<l!i\'e the same pa
enKineering officei'll. yas
Local commander IbUtalion chieO
receives a or 200 10 250 yen per
month, deJl\'lldlng On )'ears of sen'ice.
The chief ot the fire departmeot
(chief of tire brigade section) receivell a
salal')' of 300 l"",n per month.
g. p4rt<.-Firemen sergeants; and
subofficers ar: eligible ror a pension afler 12
yeaf3 of sen'lee. The)' may retire at one-third
of their pn)'. if their re<:ord is clear. If they
a.re til and IlO desi,.,. the)' mal' COn_
On act"'e duty and recei,"", additional pen_
"':'0. beneti,: for each ).... 1" of scn'ice O"er tho
mlmmum I_lea.... All grades abne the rank of
sUboffice:r mUll: &:",n'e a minimum of 17 )'ears be-
fore bemg ehglble to retire. Their pen!ion
from 5000 10 600 )'en annua]ll. The rna.
Jont) of tirem..... in all grades continueon active
are eligible 10 retire. Firemen in-
JUm:! In hne of a,., entitled 10 a Pension.
the amounl of which depends upon the extenl
of their Injur)'.
h. Medicat nid.-FiN!men injured at tires re-
eeh'e flft hospitalillltion and medkal service..
i. Acl",,"ullteJI! ill RQJtk.-
(1) Second-)'nr fil'l!men ad\'anee 10 aer_

-- .
(2)" afllrl,....
"aDcetowi Ac.,. I ' ....
aaml..-.,
(l) &IIt 1Ic:n............,..5
in 1"'Sde. 1ft to h--" ,...
merit and ablUty orIthout an eJ:anlI 1"aIIb.
j. KilUd Qrt illj"rtt/. ill 1i0U! of dtdl'.-:::--- ....
.....,.there kiIled.1&
Injured and 3711Iiptl) injured"fI'IUle
fires cauaed by air raWb. Firemen Who were :;:
10 ,.,tUI'll 10 duty ..-ithin 30 dan afle be .
JUm:! "'e J I" Ing ,n
1'l!("''''''''''lli$(htlY'''ounded IE h'
bit E, Table 8A). :< I
k. f:;ulltpliolt lro.. ...,ita.., "",iu.-F"
men, ae.-.nnta, and subolficen "'el'l! nol
from milItary -.m-ke.. Sixteen hw>dn!d pi
thew _.. men III
... "'ere called 10 actin! dUly. 11Ie)' re-
their: N!gUlar Ill'l! department pa}' in addi_
hon 10 t.hel.r rr9llitary pay while in the anned
forces. t;pon relief from military sen'iet th .
"jere permitted 10 return to !be fil'l! 0)
t.
IC ._JIU"ecl.-1llen! ......na'erage f
3.0:1
3
duty 1or
o..ng 10 SlCkneQ 01" injury. On 18 October
out of a total of 3.030 til'l!men there wel'l! 319
men ab!ent from duty.
3.. AIIriliaf)' flrt:1IfnI (KriIKNlollJ. _ .. 01"-
gut.:atioa._The police department eJtuci8ed
o\'er-al!aupel'\isKm of tho allXilial)'" poliee and
fin! unit&. The POllee department trained these
unila for guard dUI)- and tin! fighting. In actual
oJl\'ration. the poliee or tire sectiOnl of tho police
departmenl CO\Ild call upon thewe units for I'l!i ....
forcine !leI'\ice..ln 19-.13 wei'll! 15,5.56 mem-
bers di\ided inlO unit&. T'ba number ..... in_
creased 10--1O.270 members in 27" unit. in M.rdI
19-.15. There "e,., 13.551 members in li5 units in
October Each unit "ad I luder. 3 ...ist.
allts. 3 IIecli('n leaders and 125 to Ii" members.
b. Dootiu._Thewe units ....eft cbargN with
majntaining order, fumiahing /rUIrds. direrting
Iightirqr fire and pl"O\idiDl" liaUon.
t. Tnrilliltg._ln addition 10 other training
the leaders of each unit weregi\"en 2 hours train.
ing each month by lhe fire departmenl at tho
Dearesl tire ltalions.. They """I'll! suppoaed to
drill all members of their units in tire tigbling
2 houn each month. bul !hill ..... DOt

..
..
TWo-Whl.d. h..dd.-.w . h .
ncar< w" mo'o,.d",on 110_g'!Ion'I"',.mi""," pump.
"
"
Typo oI"wd<n ...... , link ,",'hieh .. from '00_ '0
1,'OO-II.llon c'l"'d,y
G_ Eqf<;p"'.,.Ilt__There ...-ere fOUf IY'PI!I of
pumps USI!d b" thelll! units: A !<mil]] car (nat-
J!On) honepo"-er ,,'ith a 120 pllons IM'r min-
ute pump: a three-wheeled mot(Ircyle..-ith a 120
plloJl$ per minule pump; a '''u-wheeled hand_
dra"'n cart with a motor-drh'en 120 pllonslM'f
minute pump (p. 16)_ Each of the motoriud
pumps ,,-.. equipped ...ith from fOUf to five III!e-
tions of 2
1
fire hOlll!. ThI!Sl! motors "-ere
nOI al"I.,}'S reliable. The fourth type pump "'..
hand-oPl'-rnted and had eapadties of 30 to 50
plloll.!l per minute (p. 17)_ Each unit "'liS
equipped ,,'ith 3to;; motorized pumps depending
on lhe importanoe of its Joeation;" to ...
of fire hose; a 8tnl.ight bamboo L..dder. 18 to U
feet; 20 to 30 pike poles; 30 8ho\-e!s; 10 pleks;
3 wood SllW8; a 6O-foot rope; and a folding
eaRl'u ,,ater tank_
.,.. Affililltu,-There were thousands of men,
women lind children in neighborhood lfl'OUPlI
(1'onan Gumn "'ith an 1I\'erage of 10 to 15 fam_
ilies in each one. The$ll grouI"I were gh-en some
lmining in fire fighting by the h":lIderll of the
lIuxiliar)' firemen, lind they fought fif('" in their
0"'1) neighborhoods.
,- A#/wje t"q>l''''n.t.-ach "";chborbood
gn)Ilp ..... eqUIpped ..-itll. IiIlIaII 30 to 50 pllons
per minute hand pump: an 18 to 2O-foox bamboo
1addeT; 1IO!'\'ft1ll 7ll-pl1oa COllICftte tanh; a
..-oodf,n 300 to I,:>oll-pllon ....ter WllI:; 1 pike
pole: 1aho\'e! : 20 backetll and _-eraJ.
..-h.id> trere6-foot b&mboo poles witllauawmat_
ting rolls I by 2 feet on the eoda. l'be8e 'IIl"n'e
_ked In ...Ier alld Dad 10 beal out IlIlan tins.
,. Printle pI..t ....
were no full-tillll! fll'I!lI'lI!U in illduauial Plants.
but eacl> planl maintaiDed an allIiliar}- fire de--
partml!nt made up of Ita reeular emploJ--. The
Jeaden of theAe auxiliary
drilla in their diotrkt lire station! for a 2--hour
period twke. month, and in lum. dnlled their
auxilial'}' unita for:! month. PL..nt
lire dePllnmenl members extra par
from their emplo)er. Oil" dut)' auxilial'J' fire de-
pllrl.lT1ent members .'110 returDed to their plant
durinlr an air raid .....re re.'arded b" an addi_
tional ,wm of paid by the JlI'l,ernment.
Some of these plant departml!nb _re equipped
wilh a rnotONri\'en 500 pilon! per minute
pump mounted on a {our_"i1eel, hand-<lrawn
..
wagon (p. 19). The fire brigade ad-
"isor stated that !.he private plant fire
ments were the moot eftident of all auxlhsry
fire-fighting ullits. and tlult they directly
respollsible for AA"illl! some of the lmportl\llt
war plan\!!. On numerous occasions: they .lUl-
sisted the Osaka cih fire department In fightlllg
fires outside thl'ir o'wn plant. A mutual-aid fire-
fighting plan among industrial plallt$ opl'rated
effecti,.."l}.
4. stnJWIUl.---4. Number prior fl. /lIld
""riflU ,,'ar.-In December HI.ll. there were 22
battalion headquarters nrs stations. 1 statiol1
in eacb ward. and 46 substations. Prior to 13
March there were 25 batta]i(ln nations. flO
substations. 27 temporary substations and 9 spe-
cisl substations. After the 13 March 1915 air
raid. this number had decreased to 12 battalion
stations. 71 subststionl!. 22 temporary substa-
tions. and 7 special substations (Exhibit E.
Tables 9A. F and G).
b. Tempornrl/ alld special fire 8Ial;on8.-The
temporary and special substations maintained
only skeleton crews. with their primary purpose
10 house resen'e lire apparatus. The 22 existing
temporal"}' substations are manned by skeletun
CreWS and used for housing "'Quipment in re-
serve, mOlit of whicll was saved from fire e"en
though their original quarters (fire stations)
,,'ere de!!troyed by air raids.
5. Fireequipmenl.-<l. M"torizedAI,para!U$.
-At the present time there are 651 pieces of
motorized "'Quipment in tile 6redepartment (Ex-
hibit E, Table flC). Of this number 98 are
American_made ears and trucks; 6 ate Ameri-
can-built motorcJ'cJes and 4 are German-made
ears. Of the tolal of 651 pieees of motorized
equipment, 524 have a rated capacity of 500
gallons per minute; 27 have a rated capacitr
of 350 gallons per minute, and 28 lIave a rated
capacity of 120 gallons per minute. The remain-
ing 73 pieces of equipment are for passenger
service (Reference item No.3, p. 67). No actual
tests were made of the pumping equipment as
120 pounds engine pressul'e is the maximum
used by the departml'nt owing to the condition
and age of fire hOlie. The first American-made
tire truck (LaFrance-750 gallons per minute)
"'as imported in 1918 and it is still in service at
Honmachi substation (Reference item No.4,
Osaka fire department yearbook for 1943.
p.67).
b. MI)/ori",d aJ/paratus 108/ by fire." From 14
Maro;,h to 24 Jul} there were lost by lI1f!
:;7500 gallons ller minute pumpers; 13120 galJOI1ll
per minute midget pumpers; I 1000 gallons per
minute fire boat; and 11 otheT types of ears be-
longing to the fire department (Table 8e of
Exhibit E),
c. Jupllliest-Imill firt lIpparalus. The Nis.o;an,
Hekoku. and Toyodn fire apparatus are Japanese
six-eylinder trucks, each with a pumping capacity
of 500 gallons per minute. The Toyoda was copied
from the Chevrolet and all parts are interchange-
able. The OalSOn, a Nissan-huilt automobile, is
equipped with a small 120 gallons per minute
pump. The prefeeture fire brigade advisor stated
that the American-built lire trucks were far
rior totheJapanese-manulactured trucks. Headd_
ed tllat the average life 01 Japanese fire apparatus
was 3 to 4 years, whereas the American lire tn;cks
are efticicnt after Ii) to 20 years sen ice. He added
that spare parts for American-built trucks were
not available during the war. and. consequently,
some of tlleir best lire-fighting equipment was out
of service.
d. TUPf$ "J Tllereare no ladder,
salvage, light, CO" foam or rescue trucks in the
Osaka lire department. There was one small 25-
gallon foam truck in the department wllich proved
of little value in fire fighting. An attempt was made
during the war to build an aerial truck, but tile
ladder collapsed tile 6rnt time it was tested and
no further effort was made to perfect the equip-
ment. The only 6re boat in the department, I,OQ(.
gallons per minute capacity, Wag destroyed in the
13 March 1945 air raid. There was no 6re boat
tender assigned to the harbor area.
t. Mo;nlenllnU "J firf lIpparalu8.-Prior to the
13 March 1945 air raid, a central repair and main-
tenance shop was used for major overhaul and
repair of lire apparatus. ACCllrding to a senior fire
official, skilled mechanics were not available and
all the fire apparatus was in poor condition. He
further slated that the Japanese are not mechani
cally minded and, (or the most part, firemen are
not capable of doing minor repair jobs. Fire equip-
ment manufacturers mecllanics, when available.
repair lire apparatus at tile file slations. Spare
parts have been difficult to procure. All lire ap-
pMatus except a few pa.s.'\lmger ears are started b)'
hand crank.
J. Fire hose'.-Sections of unlined linen hose,
2)1 inches in diametcr, approximately 65.5 feet
(20 metcT$) in length, are used by the fire depart
)Q'Q ba".hQn ....ion
ll:letlL The hole is leled al random by the
to 300 poul\lb pr8Sure pe!'" meh
before The fire depoartment rnalo:l!S.oo
ttit of bose upon 01' al an)' ume
dll1UllIU lifetime. The a"enge lire of Ihis
ill 3 )-ean- At preeenl thl!re are 9,505 ;;eellOns of
this hole of all a&8 and dl'&lft'l of U5agf! in the fire
departmenL An dart has been ll'.ade to keep the
pIUlIP pI'ei5Ul'f below 120 pounlh 10 p1e,'ent rup-
turina HCtioM of hose. Ko 31 rinch 01' I',.-inch
heR is UIlId in Ihe A large amOllnt of
the best bole WQ taken o"er by the na''Y during
the ....... Seetiom of hose are I'Onnec:led by brass
c:ouplinp ...hich, ...!\en p1.WIed together, firmly
lnap into Tm Hetiom of fire ho5e are
c:oupled together and rolled on a t ..o-whl'O.'led ho$e
earl ...hlCh ill earried on the bed of large pumpers
Ip.21). An addItional 10 Hetiom are rolled!S@pa-
rateli' and ltortd in the bed of the U'Uck. All fll"e
bote in the <naka are Itandardized
indud,ngthe hard l\>Ctionl (drafting).
Dra/li.., nlOd The pumpenl
earI')' from two tofour2).yand 4-inch hartlluction
(rubberl dIalling hole aectionil, each 10 to 15 feet
in length. Sationalltandard h(lae threads are used
on the 4.inch auetionl. hut only on j}ump intake
of the 2' rinch luction.
lnadequaWy traiDId 1&_
Inlent of the llNcbWto _
to the in eta.. of 50 far.,..... z.a..a,
'"'---tolJetr--.rtelat'
hoee 10 .... pwllpa aDd .. taoIL I......
lIOn to md,Wy dnlb" they J'tIeei..-e _e llnc ..
'nlOlrllCtlOl\.
t. lIe\'en! btattailOn and fIlb.tatioM
ere vlWled at various hoora on dill'erenl. ud
no dnlla or "'ere o-"ed duri.... theae
lOll.., eJeeopt thole apeciilly en':lIted at tile
request of the inapeetion))GUt,. p.:$.
7. If'aln ........ o. Sown. of 1I'00n.- The
o.b mumaPl'1 water feM\'"es il&
'Qler from theYodo R,.-er ...1Udl JIoq Woogb
the CIt). The mer baa ,ta -.:lee in Ulte
Bi..... Japan1 lake, ... iI ar proIlm:mly
35 mile:f .nland"rrom Osaka aty.
. of train. Potable..."ter is stored
near the intake in 10 re;enoi,...,..-ith a Iotal
ity 01 4)12.1.000 p.IJona Rfterence itent Xo. 6 .
Thae menGi.. areoal}' a few feel abcn-e seale\'"el
and 1lllter hal to be pwnped into the'Qter mailll..
Oneaddltio<lal tank illocated onaYDail hill in the
tenter of ll.e CIt) and il fW'tlial:ef an emaiWty
aupply b) sra,ity. Thi:o ffteT\'"1lir Joma has a
CIJ*1tyol960.000saUc- P.ef__itentNo.8.
The pump that pplioN it,. IllK -.rurtin;g ill preo.
ent acd the tank is empty.
c. W..... _u.. The f"., the 11
,-ojn to the cit)' an' 60 ttl 26-indl t:ll<t-iron pipe.
The distribution I)'IlmI tJ:e aty is
made liP 01 aloop network 01 to 2O-incheaot_
iron pipe..-ith 'eT}'!_ deracl enob. n:. System is
'IfeI1 II.lpplied with ifo:aUOlll vaI\"'ft Re!erenc:e ill'!nS
Noa.7and9.
tl. PII'_"" Water .. wppbed to the by
S pumping plant...-ith a lOla! 0129 pIUlIJIl$. and a
total P'"Uping eapx;tT 01 335.100 pIions per
nunUle. Sil 01 lbe:!e pwllpS are Slftm turbine-
dri'en a eapac1t)' 0125,600 p11o!l1 minl.lle
evh_ The I'tlIt are eluY..triven Rderelll'e item
So. 6,. AU of the,,;eam-dri"en pump$ "ere In one
alation that .1IIdBU"O}-ed by fir. in the U )Ian:h
1945 air raid. redu61lf the pumpIng eapacit)' by
more lhan one-third. One of the.le pl.lmp$ bas re-
centl)' Moen repatred. A high arlo,;"e bombing
raid in June daU"Oi"ed the PO"'"ff equipment thaI
furnlllhed po'l\"eT to the electrical drhen pumps.
The ehief of .... t.... distribution stated that all
Pl.lrnpina: _topped and no .... ter "... in the fire
main. for o,'er a month. The damage to 19 prinei-
llal mR,ns hat! not been entirely t'eI>aired.
equipment art! pneticaJly the lillie. Hon_hi
luiNIll.tion ia typical. Fifteeo firemen art! aaaigned
to each of the two platoona, bullheftare noclerka:.
There are two pump!l in thia nation. One is a 26-
year-old 750 gallons per minute l...rance and the
other ia a 2-year-<tld 450 gallona per minute Niaan.
The l.OOl! and eql.lipment on lhese apparatua are
the &arne ... thoee found in batl.aJion atations.
<po 67 of item No.4, Fire De))GUtment
Yearbook 1943.,
j. SPff1nJ ,"6caIiQlrl._ Seven lpeeial auh.ta_
were set up in suburban communities adjoon_
ina: Osaka eity. These atatiom "ere equipped the
same III a elt) wbstation, uC1:'Pt lhat they had
more manpower becau."", tbllJo' could rei,"e no
mutual aid. Firt) firemen ..ere <l.9ligned to eaeb
IIp<<ial SUbstation.
1:. Tnflporo,.. fII1.wIG/, ..... - In }larch 194;;.
.ere 30 temporV)' aubstatio... and at the
Preiient time there are 13. These ltationa _ere
f>l,tablished to hou..e fire eql.lipment thaI 'QI ap.-
propriated from remote eomml.lnitiea ..I:ere air
raids ...ere not anticipated. There wee 1&1
1)"Jl'!S of motorized eqwpment brought Into the
city under this plan.
6. T......i"il' oj PranI._. T...,.i., ltooI_
The tire tnining scloooI was destnl)-ed hy the 13
}Iareb 1945 air raid and all tools. appliarleea,
manllals. and chans ...ere burned. A new tTlIlning
'lChool ..... opened on o.,tober 1945 at a tem-
porary location. tlre engineer H. Taniguclli ;" tl:e
principal tr.linin,g instructor. and he is b)'
four ....bofficen.. At pre.ent.. there are ;;0 firemen
..ho are 17 )-ears of age forw.erly j,,11JOI' firemen,
enrofled in tbe oehool p. 24 . The5e men are l:il-
Ieted and fed at the school. Eight hoursof t.l:e cia}'
are de'Oled to dass .."Ork. pnoclieal drillo and mili.
tar). lraining. In fael. the ftre depart,.,ent is run
on a military basis ,..ith and WUI_
ing "en' m\>Ch in evidence. Every mo"emenl of a
fire drill ewlution is precise and Ul!C'Uted on!J' b)'
a command. ,,'hieh deJa).. fiTe..ligllting lad,ja.
Arter these men ha,e eompleto'd their basic
lrainina: in the school Lhe}' ",ill be ...,.;gnt'(lto fire
stalions where tlley recei"e an additional 30
daya prnctical training I.lnder the sUltion olllcen
and suhofficers (Reference item No.5. U'aini,,
ochoo! outlinel.
b. T'/"nl1l9 0('(1 - The prefeeture
lire brigade advisor stated that during the "llr
new reeruita were gi,'en only 1 to 2 da)'s 'lUl.nIC
lion in the training sehool. and. eon.<IlQuently. a
large l>ercentag(l of lhe presenl da)' firemen are
_ of coo>po.n.... <b.pIayon" <qII;p""c....
.............._--
BtJtlJ>IUI_ j.e "41;011.- The Joto fire station
is a typical battalion station in
Eighteen firemen and 7 clerks are &ll5Igned to eadI
of the 2 plal.OOll$l.orking Ihifu 24 hol.ll'll on dUly
and 2-1 hOlllll oIIl. The clerks respond to alatmll d
lire. In this lire station there are pl.lmpen,
t ..o of whieh are 4&0 gallons per mmute and one
500 galJOll$ per minute capacit)' (p. 21). The IloIe
is the same as decrihed in paragraph 6f
addition to the hose and reel camlhe enureequ,p'
menton each pumper is as follo....s:
m Four pike poles. old type.
(2) One chafing (hose friction) bloek.
131 Oneeanva! folding tank 4 b)' 3 by 3fe
.... hieh is used ....ben pumping in l!el'ies. TaM
1iI1ed b)' one pump and auction la lI.kl:ll
from il b)' another pump.
(4j Two hose coupling mallets.
(6) One h)'drant wrench. It
(&} Two circus tnle atakes for use on i/O
roads to shore up bankl. .
(7) One ladder which "'--
the only type used in the fire
(Display of 1lll igll
i. Subswl;Oll. Substatlons are sImIlar In .
to battalion st... liTe ':t
ahly smaller. However, I.mount lind the !,:te
T""....,., ........ _doill; __01"'--_-. ".__..,,1
......~
"
. 'fh<!te ,,'ere 15.9,&S public alld
:J,1S3 Wi"ate llu'lh trpe h)'dran(>l m the CllY All
h)'drln'lJI in l'rl,-alely o":,,ed.
Public and I'ri'"1\t.ely o"'"ed hydranU. have
:!':l inch O\Itle1Jl. l'hl')' located ho!low the :de-
walks and co,'ere<! by a plate about - b)'
3 feet. Tht)' areequlWed ,,'lth a 5nap-on type con-
ntion. The ti>'f'll to all of th_ h)'dron\JI are
inches. Hrdrant.!l are spaced approximately
36ll feet 110 meten' apart throughout the b\L<l'
and man...lacturing Referen..e ,tern
10,. pl'e'ure on tbe hrdran1Jl ,,"35 30
50 pound-. AI preoent the a'-eDge i, less than
:!O pounds.. The mamtenance plan calls for the
nu,.hing of all 1I)'dranu. b)' the fire drpartment
011(1' a )'''''-.
I. 1I",a". There are no ,,-ells used by the ".,.,IE'r
department. HOOI"e'e!'. theN' are many p<i"ate
_Ib in operation.. :'olO5t large buildHlf" plimp
..-atel" frocn a ...ellto a tank. on the roof beo:all.>e of
10.- pre5Ure in the "..ter I113JI1S- 'There is no at-
nuatt on the number or c:aJ:acity of
tbe;e ...ells.
,. Otltn _tTU"'I naJ.tT,- :'olanr and the
ri..er ha,-e lInlirnit.ed ....ter supply for drafting
..-ater ll'Ith fire pumps. but in manr the
banb or bridge.l are too high to permit drafting
and no pumping platforms ",ere pro\"ided. The
city bwlt apprlimately 3.200 cement re:;,er.oirs.
both opeD and <:o\"ertd t)1JC". "itll an a,'enge ca-
parity of plions e.ch. TbeK ,,'eft used for
fire 61l1tin, and were filled from fin hydrnn\JI
p.2'7. and <:ommunity JTOIl]l!l
..._ well SIlpplied with wooden barrels of 300 to
1.500 pilon cap.citiCll. and with lIffillll $llUl.re
cement tano of 7Q.pllon me p. 18,_
8. Fire <lUlr.... <I. /ulrK lIlcI,..,..- The
first electric magneto-t)'pe lire alarm s)"Stem was
in:.tallfd durin, the Taisho era 30 yean ago'.
Tit_ \liere 141 alann boxe;t whieh "'ere located on
l'OlItS and buildings of import.ant stree13 in the
center of the cit) II. 28 . The)' "'ere eonnectfd to
the ntare$t lire ataliOn and not to a centnl! alarm
office. The boxe. we:-e operated by turning a
handle "'hich registered the alarm in the ttalion
by a marker falling out of i13 po!lition on a recorder
panel. The Slreet location Wa!l indieu.ted on the
marker. Whal left of thit I)'$tem it still in use.
hut it ia not considered aceurate or dependable
(p. 28).
0) From 1929 l-O 1938 a ne",er type of
electrie lire alarm 5yttem was installed in the
businesll district. A Wtal of 395 alarm hoKes
"
were p:lid for by businell-' firm" and citizelll
in the ar('all eo"er'l'll. These boxell ...ere llOIlo
nected to tlte lire slation a!ICI
to the battalion slAtion. The OOKClI are tbe
break-glal;li. pre"l.button t)'pe ,,'ilh red llghlt
abo"e each box for locatinll at night ip. 29).
In the hijth ,al ...e di.tricl lheae boxes .,.
abo...t 600 feet IIpart and in other distric-ta
the)' are from 1.500 to 3,000 feet a]XIrt, \\'ben
an alann is lIOunded a bell nnlt' in the fire
,latinn and an electric bulb ll1... minates the
indicator board showing the location of lhe
alarm Ip. 29 . 'fhe lirealann operator 'usually
a junior fireman, pre:;q;e,. a blltton "hich drojll
a ,Jot in the aI;UTIl box. This indicates the
al;UTll has been recorded and lhe lire depart_
ment it on its "'<l)' to the fire. This equipmtnt
...<15 bllilt by a Jal)3rtebe eompan)' ,Akao
:'olaUiumotol. Appro:timately 70 pen:ent of
the electric alarm old and new, "'38
destro)"ed by lire. The new fire alann a)"_ tern.
by American ,tandards, "'ould be <:oMidered
obsolete. au.:rillar)' al;UTll boXlliI ,,'eft <:00-
nected to these twO alarm a)'l;tem&. Some of
the more modem office buildings, hOll'e\CT.
in"ta11ed a\ann OOXllil on each or their fIocn.
They we:-e not <:onnected "iith the fire de-
partmetlt. bUl to an indicator board in lhe
basement "'here a .....tehman tJansrr.ittfd the
a\ann b)' phone to the nearest lire atation.
2 The gonmor or the prefecture pro-
clainu 1 to 10 Der:ember of each year as lire
pre.-enUon .,..eek. During: thit llefioo an effort
i5 made 10 inform the public 01 the method.
and importance of transmitting lire alanna.
FIre pre"ention .,..enk. i5 an empire-"'ide pr0-
gram.
3) Tbere ",ere 9().1 lire alatmll reported in
19-14. Ele\"en of these alal'TM ,,'ere recorded
by lire alarm OOXl!!!. In addition to that num-
ber. 29 false alarms and 36 a!arnu ,,'ere
corded owing to short eircuita in the bous
caused by wet weather. The electric alann
s)"stem is antiquated and not dependable.
b. Tdephollillll plorrllf. The telephone numbfr
119 is used e:<elusively for reporting fires. Tbf
telephone e:<cltanges in the various districts ba,-r
one trunk line to their nearest battalion atation.
The baltalion station, in turn. calb tlte ne:aret
substation by a direct phone. There i$ no central
lire a\;UTIl office for ditpalching lire apparatus.
Each battalion "talion functions in it.ll distritt II
an independent unit. A messenger O... nior
/Il <) .1 ....
-.d Jot tIM ...-
.Ia<- 1:00_, ;ft
t-tal.............,;"...
....,p* .Ia,.. booud Ioaccd t-.
IOJ;"ft "'''Oft.
"
fl.J<) """ ...... tad .. Ill-io< .......
-
(RI,h,) bo".lioD " ..ion "'h.... 20 lirom'D
to" ,h.l, II... ",hoD ...,;0" ""'_ durl"J ai, ",HI.
near uro; and fire companieo. and e'o"ftl fire ...
UoIl5, ft'f1! surnl\I.nded by fire. TtMo tn ebiIf
reported that 60:''9 bombEn came 0" the dtJ
singl)" at minimum intco'als of 45 -Ierondll Uld
in all directions. Fil'l!ll, out of control a1J!1011&
immediately. cau.al tremendous confUllion lUnOlII
the people attempting to find safe IIl'l!llII fpp,
32 341. The auiliar}' finmeII Wen! more -.
eemed in attempting w protect ther own prope.
tieJor in escaping the burning lU'N tban in optrat.
ing as an fire fighting With the
communieatioIUl8)"l>tem out of operatIon and m-.
sengen! unable to get to the lire
51ations, the fire eOmp.lllltl! operated In a hap_
Ilaulrd mann('t'. They lost much of their apJ}llT8.tlll
because they "'ere trapped by fire or were
10 mo"e out of an in"oIved lU'N because their
(2-hooTl j{3.iiOline supply \II'll!! exhausted. En!,),
pieeeof seo'ieeable fireapparatu;; in theeit)'erc:ept
one pump in each battalion headquarters station
Wall in operalion at this fire.
c. WOltr luppJ,...-Fire llUmpers del)tlnded en
lirely for their water supply upon canals and open
or co,-ered releI'\'oirs (ltatic tanks) of 27,500
gal10lll eapaeit) (pp. 35--36). The water main
dropped a1InOf1t to zero aJI residentl
opened faucets to keep fire barreLI and buekeu
filled. In addition, lead pipe water JUers in dwell-
ingll fu$td as homes burned, wtlich wasted much
water in the hurning al't':l!I.
d. Lou of lift.-The 10l!lll of life in thiB raid was
particularly higtl because people were suffocated
while _king ..fety in shelters and panicstricken
penon.s fIOUghl to ellCape in\vlved anu 1'1)' dalIh
ing lhrou,gb IIaml!!l (statillticll table p. 2).
t. Da.,riglu nir ,aid, I h"tU 194Ji.-The da)'light
and incendiary raid on I June 1945
which destroyed practically the entire h...rbor and
industrial area (one-fourth of the city), was con-
sidered 1'1)' the fire chief to represent the second
largest IoslI b)' fire. The fire-6gIIting operatiorw
..we again diaorg:anized with DO directing head.
High_plosi\'e bombseaused the firemen to lean
Iheir equipment and seek shelter all did the ind_
trial plant fire brigadel- By the time the air raid
WjU over. the entire area was in"ol\'ed in f1amf
wbich ultimately burned itself out. Fire mailll
,,"ere broken and pumping equipment affected 10
the ertenl that mains "'en! empty for the 30 da)"
following. ThiB condition did DOt concern the liJf
chiefl as they depended alrtlOlt entirely on storti'
reservoirs and canals for watel'" in Iire-fightillf
Mutual aid, e"en though attempted by adjaetl'l
iI diipatehed by bicycle or afoot to the nearst
llublltation wittl theal:um e'o'en though It been
acknowledged by telephone. During aIr the
telephone s)'lItem did not function and all"
....ere dispatched to the \'arious fire statlolUl br
rneuengen. In 1944 there "'ere 312 fir('S reported
b)' .
c. I..oxated.nthin t!leclly.t.here
S4 to..-lPn and 5 wood to..-en. The totn'R
Ioc:ated al battalion Ital.ioPs are 100 to 125 feet
high p. 311. Other to.. located at !lOme of the'
are iO to 80 feet high. A 24hour fire-
man "'atch ia mainlained on ttle;;e towers and the
....teh change!l e'o-trJ hour. When a fire is spotted
b)' a lOwer ....tehman he reportI it b)' phone to
his fire w.tion. and five pumptn
to the fire. HO'&"e\'w, onb' 3 purnpen are dla-
patehed b)' ll1arms tnUWl\iued b)' alamt tOJt or
tC'lepbolM' unl_ tbe to""C\'" -.ratcher can see lhe
fire from his \'llntage point. Ttle onl)' watch to\O'er
put out of eommi$ion owing to air raida "'lIB that
of the Minami battalionatation, which "'Mburned.
All equipmenl "1l!Ilkstrol"ed and ZO firemen "'ere
burned to dellth fp. 31). TheJapanelet:llJlit d)'ing
at their poi't. but it is diffiallt to undemand "'1'1)'
no attempt "'U made to a"e "'61 and '":Il.luable
equipment under 11'1_ ciraumtances. In 1944
there ""e'e 191 fires dUeo"eo-ed and reported I'll"
to"'C\'" watchmen. During air the watch 10W-
en "'ere the only meanl of spouin/l and reporting
fil"ell as the elecuie alarm and telephone systems
..-eN! turned off.
9.
1U7fI'" pI.a- The original plan aJJed for each
-battalion (bripdel to protect il5O\1marta .nth It.e
of the auxiliary units in ill! district.
Howe'oer. the adjacent battalion ctliefs, at ttleir dis--
cretion. could dispat.eh additional apparatus in
erlreme emeryencil!!l. This plan waR based on the
Arm)' and Na'T intelligence furnished the chief
01 police afJain, whidl-lUlted, in part,lhat ."meri-
can bombers would alwa,YI II)' in formation and
drop their hom! in a particular UJg area. On
thb information it ....-as thOllght that the fire bar-
riers created b)' removing hoUSl!8, pllL'l the a"ail-
able fire.fighting etluipment and llel'llQnnel, could
confine fires to the particular area bombed.
6. AtlualoptrGlio.-The 14 Manh
diu}' air raid did not de-'e!op attwding to the
theory. ComequentJy, 60 percent of the
city ...a1b.me al one time with firea 00 both aidl!!l
of the fire breab: communication 1)'lItem5 ..'tl'e
out of opel1ition; water jlI'\!$Sure in fire mains "1l!I
eiU4.'Jli ...d communities aft molit air raids...,.. of
little since UIIUl.ing unit!l in
small numbers hours afttl" the Iirel< .....eIl under
'Il':Il.y, and many did not anh'e at allowing to
brakdOWllll l'f\I'OUte. The arne '""all tnle of fire
/Wltillfl: appanltl.lll 'fithin the city whic:h "'"all re-
quired to U'&veol anr roMiderable di"l.lInce, The
limited auoline supply of:? houTS, later irJoeTeaS(Od
to 5 hours,. Wall i/UUffieient for tra\'eoI and pump
operation together, E\'en if the fire department
had /uld esceIlent equipment. weoll_trained per-
lIOnnel. an abundance of "'ater and good rommu,
nicatlolU, it rould not ha\'e pm'ellted the 0\'''''.
1_ incurred owillfl: to the e1080!neM
of buildings and the type of col1lltruction.

1O.Or/lp";:Olioll. o. F,rt,uplioll, The-eis
no fire pre"ention bureau with trained fire
tors. There wu a plan, howe\er. for each battalion
IJtation to del.llil two firemen, and for each sub-
station to assign one fireman each day to the job of
fire-pm'ention work. Ther were to visit industrial
plantJ; once a week and business houses once a
month, Their primary job was that of inspecting
fire-fighting efjuipment and applianCe:!!; informing
m.an<lgement on the imporunce of immedialely
rt'pOrting fires; making suggestioIU to impro\'e
housekeeping, handle open fires, and store rom-
bustible materiab; and advising on other eJemen-
tar). fire pre\'ention sub,it4. This plan is no longer
in oper.ation.
11. oj iUplors. The regional lire
chief and rommander of the special lire pm'ention
unit periodieally leeturftl fi,elTen ;n sl.lItion!l on
fire..pre-ention subjecu (Reflllel1Ce Items N.., 10.
11. and 12). lireman with le:!IlI than 3 montlUl
experience in a lire station ill detailed to fire pre-
vention ...ork.
11. E:ll1ormttellloj fire regu/<llioM, Fire illSlJeol:o
tors attempt to sell fire pre\'ent;on u there llft
\'ery few law" or ortlinarICe>I regulating fire pre-
"ention matter1l. However, when management re-
fuses to eooperate with fire in$!leC1or$, thcir namet
are turned over to the district police who ha'"
authority 10 investigate the and take
the neeE':$!S.'1ry legal action. Ilolice are !lot trained
in fire fighting and firc prevention. they I!CldOl1l
enforce a firc dCJl'lr1mcnt complaint. Firemen art
to ]Joliee and they resent the police
control of their departmcnt. The prefeetural
laWJ
o.,..".,iotl ","u>l by ai, raid 14 M.rch Vi ol Sonui,him.c dimi ..k.n f<om
Kabuki , ,c,.
Ic" loy by.,i., 1.4 ..,h 1945. Vi.", of KilO ",.,d. vi,in"y of
Mom,.h, bu,ldon8. f,om [)or'm.
are conwined in one large ,'olume. The few itell1!l
pertaining to the fire department are scattered
through the hook and are diffieultl.O find.
12. BuildinO ron8/ruc/i,m.-ln 1919. the Min-
istry of Home Affairs instituted laws on zoning of
the city. It is divided into class "A" and class "B"
districts.
(I. All new buildingsconstrocted in the class "A"
district (center of business district) must be of
steel frame and roncrete with concrete f1ool"$ and
roof and not more than 100 feet high. Areas of
1.800 square feet must ha"e 6-inch concrete Or
brick fire \Vltlls without openings. Metal frame and
sash windows are required on buildings o\'er three
stories in height. Some of the exterior windo"",.
particularly on the side of buildings. have
wired gla:>'!, others are provided with steel shutters.
1\:0 fire escapes are required. Buildings in
class "A" district o,'er three stories in height ha"e
interior standpipes equipped "'ith Il,.-inch linen
hose. A few of the modern buildings coru;tructed
within the l/3.St 10 years have exterior dry stand
pipes with 2\ rinch fire pump connections. 3 feet
al)()\'e the sidewalk. The ele,ators. electric motors.
plumbing fu<tures and other permanent equipment
in these buildings for the most part.....ell
kno"'71 American
b. The class "B" district covers the industrial
area. The walls fire resistant, mostly COITU-
gated iron. The roofs tile, slate or rorrugated
iron. S:o standard regulations for spacing bet..-een
buildings are in fotee. An informant stated that the
building la...", are not rigidly enforced and that
men of political position and wealth did as the)'
pleased without regard to laws sod regulations.
c. Them _ms to be no regulation on plaet'll of
public as.sembly, except in motion picture home..
Center and side exits.IIOdaac:id
extinguishers. fire-resistant projection booths.
quick-closing. manuall)' oper:lIed co"erings lor
projection port/! are about all that are required in
thOile theateN.
d. Gasolinestornge tanb areaoo,'e- and bflo....-
ground type:! of all sizes.. Aoove-ground tanb an>
concrete and underground tanks steel with
protecti"e tar conerings. The}' are 2 feet belo,,
ground and equipped with standard fill and ,'ent
pipes. ga.wline and oil ha"e ab.OlYS been
items in Japan. fairly modern protective JJ>ea$urt!S
have been the prnctice in handling and storing
them,
"
FI ... h."I... II""......"",,1 otl bod> .,.... 01 '''"' ....... .., b< 01 10,,1< .........
I,.,id fir< <O<I<I;,;c.,<.

1".-
I.'" I ..
1,10' 11 -
IT ,.... ,.........
1..... \',
,.,
".
It"
,.11
,."
lOU
buildings were removed (p. 37). These barriers
were not as effective as planned, Qwing to the
methods employed by American ainnen in drop-
ping incendiaries on both sides of the firebreaks.
However, On one occasion a factory area was saved
from fire by the razed area (p. 37). chief
S. Tijiri said fire department officials recommcnded
that the fire barriel'3 be made not less than 100
yards wide. but they were overruled and the
breaks were made 12 to 40 yards wide.
G"n"... J
13. AnNU(llfirt 1<ls8.-The last published Osak3
prefecture fire dellllrtment year book (1943) listed
number of fires and fire as follows: (Reference
item No.4),
Open _"0" ("""ie ...pply> ... ""'",.
of .....' In figh<inS fi, .. by .i, .,id.
t. The knitting mill is the only industry equip-
ped with an automatic sprinkling A
sprinkler s}st.em was required befol"<' a British fire
insurance oompany would write its fire insurance.
f. Fire doors on buildings in the class "A" dis-
trict are manually Qperated. Some of the large
doors are closed and opened by an electric motQr.
IJ. Electrical requirements are meager. Wiring
in modern buildings is in conduit, but theQld knob
and tube wiring is found in most other
Electrical wires outside of buildings are 2.6 mm.
on d.c. power below 600 volts and a.c, power below
300 volts. On a.C. voltage below 3,500, a 4_mm.
wire is required but it is increased tQ 5 mm. when
3,500 to 15.000 volU! f.:lectrical wires
inside buildings are 1.5 mm. on d,c. below 500
"01U! and a.C. below 250 volts.
h. Fire were remo,ed Qr
demQlished on six different occasions, beginning in
December 1943 and concluding in August 19-15,
fQr the puJ1lOl'l! Qf forming fire barriers in important
sections of the city (Exhibit H). A total of n,586
14 Mutual,..d.-The near b)' cities of Kobe,
Kyoto and the prefecture of HyQgO had a
aid agreement with Osaka to
apparatus and firemen from their wmmumlle> to
aid each other in an emergencJ. Osaka fjr>;t needed
outside aid 14 Mareh 19-15. when Kobe sent W
pumP"'"S and Kyoto dispatched 10 They
did not arri"e until 6 hours after the raId and hy
that time they were of little value to the city. On
I June 19-15, prefecture dispatched 60
pumP"'"S but onl)' 2 reached their destination.
Osaka. disp.1tched to Kobe, 17 March 1945,178
pumP"'"S and 86 reached their destination (Refer-
cnce item Xo. 13).
15. Harbor protediQII.-a. Fire boaI8.-0nesrnaH
1,000 gallons per minute fire bOM "'a., in ser-
vice in the harbor until it was lost in the 26
June 194.5 air raid (Exhibit E:, Table sej. How-
ever, 23 private tugs of all si1.e8 were equipped
,,'ith 500 gallons per n,inute fire pumps of different
types and makes. Most of these boats were
equipped with sea chests with 4-inch intakes,
They ".-ere all equipped with standard 4-inch hard
suCtions for taking draft over the side or for pump-
ing out other boats.. Each boat was equipped with
four to six sections of 2*inch linen hose. The
Japanese standard fire hose noules with Y8- and
one-inch tips were in use. Of the 23 tugs only 19
"'ere usually a"ailable for emergency fire fighting.
Theycould be reached at their berths by telephone
from the district police headquarters or contacted
by one of the three police patrol boats. No twO)-
wa)' radio equipment was used by police or fire
department. in the 1 June 194.5 air 1'3id, 10 of
these tugs were destroyed. The private tugs were
under the direction of the police department and
not the tire department but some fire-fighting
training was gi"en the crews h)' the fire depart-
ment. Even with their scanty equipment and
training, the tug boat crews were credited with
doing Jil!\"<lral commendable fire-fighting jobs. At
one time they sa,'ed the district police head-
quarters building located on the water front.
b. OM lI'kart'e8.-The piers and whan'es
were of concrete, wood and earth tilled. Most of
the berthing spots for ship$ were alongside earth-
filled areas.
c. Fir, prolcclion,-The fire protection in the
harbor, as in all other sections of the city,
would be classed by American standards as poor.
16. Army and NOfY fire prcteeliO'n.-The Army
and Navy maintained fire companies
among their own men, which were trained l:ty the
city fire department, Their WBlI to
rotect thl!ir own premises, but 111 a few 11l8!anee1
rhey assisted the citr in fightin.8' lires which ...
outside but near theIr own statIonS,
17. Fuel8upplVjor fire equipment-Prior to the
14 March air raid, each piece of fire apparatus "-
allocated a maximum of 2-houT$ gasoline supply.
Fire ol1icials constantly re-quested a larger supply
of ga.wline but were refused by the tranSPOrtation
department. During the big fire of 14 March 1945,
48 pierel of fire equipment were destroyed for laet
of fuel which prevl!nted them from moving out of
the path of the name. The transportation depart.
ment allocated the fire department a 5-hour supply
for each pumper after this disastrous experience.
18. Wind caused bV fire.-Wind velocity, before
the 14 !IIareh 1945 Osaka fire, was reported by
the fire chief to be 6.7 miles p(!r hour (3 meters p<!r
second). At the height of the fire, the chief stated,
the wind velocity had increased to typhoon pro-
portion which in some insUlnces blew fl<l('ing pe0-
ple into the path of the flames. This was nOt a
surprising inasmuch as histories of great
fires reoord winds of cyclonic intensity.
19. Large fires olhn Ihan IhQ8e cauud bV ai.
roids.-a. TypJwon.-Thl! typhoon on 17 Sep-
tember 1944 caused the sea to roll inland and start
a fire in a steel plant where large vats of oil used
for tempering steel overflowed and spread burning
oil over a largol! area. Fifty-seven buildings were
destroyed and 69 families made homeless (Refl!r-
ence item No. 14).
b. Charcoalcooku.-Careless handling of a char-
coal cooker in a dwelling on 2 January 194.5 caused
a fire which destroyed 39 buildings and displaced
81 families.
2{l. De}iciencies.-a. The fire chief and his
assistants. were asked the question, "Considering
your experiences in fighting fires caused by air
raids, how do you think your dl!partment could
impro,'e its equipment, training and fire-fighting
technique?" Their combined answers were as
follows;
(1) Provide better and larger fire pumps,
Present equipment old and poorly main-
tained.
(2) Provide a modem, auto repair shop,
well sUllfed with competent auto mechanics.
(S) Provide more modern fire-fighting
training schools with a drill tower. Instruct in
sciencl! of tire control prevl!ntion.
(4) Equip the de]Xlrtment with ladder
trucks for fire fighting in the 756 three-story,
171 four-lltory and 125 the-sto d '-_
buildings. ry lUI a.....I1!
(5) Provide modem tire boats, firat-llld
trucks, Co, and foam (The
MVets and canals are of sufficient width and
depth for fire boat U!le. but Im"e never !><:en
used hy boats.)
(6) Maintain a lire prevention
hureau WIth well trained fire inspectors
(7) Rezone thl! city into fire dis-
to fire ha>:ards and values.
Dlscont'nue the present ward district police
of firl! department. In emergeneies,
dISpatch fire equipment from one brigadl! to
another through brigade headquarters.
(8) l'ro"idl! two_way radio communication
in the department.
(9) Widen streets, Ilro,'ide more large open
areas as parks and plaj'grounds.
(IO) Provide more and larger emergency
reservoirs. Make them large enough to be
used as public Swimming pools. minimum of
125,000 gallons capacity,
(ll) Require that dwellings be more fil't'-
resistant with adequate clearsnce bet"'een
units.
(12) Prohibit police from delegating jobs
and assignments in the fire department. The
police now assign a police official to handle
personnel affairs.
(13) Pro"ide more control of fire depart-
ment annual budget.
b. The abo"e points are well taken, hut e"en
these suggested improvements. would not bring
this city's fire department abo"e the le,el of an
American !!<lCond-grade department.
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES
1. ]"trooutlion.-Included under this heading
are Emergency Medical Service (Okyu
which is divided into first-aid and hospital ser\,-
ices; Mortuary Ser,'ices (Shitai Sbori); and Red
Cross Ser,'ice (S<!kijugi Jigyo). Witb the exception
of the Red Cross acti"ities, the emergency medical
ser"ice;; were fitted into the o"erall plan of organi-
zation (p. 40). At the prefectutalle-'el, the emer-
gency medical senice was set up for technical
management under the health section-. For en-
forcement it was linked with the police dep.1rt-
ment. The mortuary SllrVice was a specific func-
tion of the guard section of the prefectural police.
The 1)OIice districts, plus the auxiliary police and
fire units (Keibodan), assisted in the
aDd III8dicaI illfomaltioll-. to
the IlonI-. In IlddiUon to tile aftIdII
agencll!ll, there __ voIuntuy OI'lIUIiIatioft.....tlle
block u.ociatiOlll, and the ph}'llieal ttaiaiq IIIIit:t
grouPS. through orhleh
medlcalmformatlon and trainillf were ClII'ried into
homl!ll. The organizational slnlcture in many
activities whieh in """ity
not ens!. Th.s report 8trelse8 organization as
actually functioned .atllff tllen tile planned
'deal.
Emergency MftlicaJ Service
2. f'ir8l.-au! urriu.-a.
(I) of tbe police districts was the
headquarters of a first_aid group C(lnsisting
01 doctors, nurses, litter bean;ra. and ambu_
dri,ers. In charge of the group was one
phYlLelan appointed hy tbe prefectural office.
AU other available doctors and nurses in thl!
district also belonged to this group. but were
called into 8el'\ice only for drill purposes or
for acti,'e duty in case of an air raid I!mer.
gency. Upon the llOUnding of the alert signal,
all of the group personnel were supposed to
n:port 1M 10 assigned first_aid stations
within the police district. The doctor in
charge would then lI36igo them SJI"l'ific duties.
(2) The number of doctors, nurses and
others attached to each first-aid unit of the
district police station "aried lrom 4 to 173
doctor>; and from 7 to 318 nurses. Othe.-c1asses
of personnel ,'aried accordingly. In geneno.l,
the size of the first-aid units corresponded
the size of the population to be .sened.
The total number of doctors on call for duty
at the first-aid statioru; "'as 2.473, and the
number of nurse:s "'.... 4.689.
(3) In addition to the doctor>; and regis-
tered nurse:s, an undetennined number of
laymen trained in first-aid prt><:<!dures "'as
used as belpers at the fiM-aid stations. To
Ihis class belongM tbe liller bearers and am
bulancedrivl'r$. Becau5eDfthe scardt)'" am-
bulance:s and m()(or tnlnspon of any kind,
the principal dependence " .... placed upon
line.- bearers for picking up the wounded and
bringing them in to the first-aid station. When
the gas perwnnel, all or whom ...ere
trllined in first_aid, found t.hemsehes with-
out an)' duties at the time of &e\ere lir raids,
they offem1 t.heir services to supplement the
work of the lIardpressed first_aid squads. In
"
to dt6I taMI--. At __.....
--"PIeWI7 ......
-W ...... Ita lib ......
11te ICnod8re _ t " .......
-.. IJII>-proof e.tlaIb' ..
the '-Pital-. It _
-. alld -.0 '-t.. n.. _ a ......,.:
operued .... filler by whidl f..-lt ar a.w
be flUDiolbed throochout thr _ pi
prl:ltUolIlll!n'lle III mollHtGned bo.pitalawitlt
no bMernent faeiliues. ...... r>-.euated
frortl thr upper tIoors. Small '-f>;taIa
onthout buemenll pronded aar-raid proteetioll to
thtir pallenta In Utfltera outltde the buildina:.
4. .\ffJdiml ..ppllft. Suppl ... ""I!re"et'y limited
and there _ a Acarrity of sudlltema as rnorphillOl',
codetnt', and other opiates. turgieal drealin,. and
d,,,mfeetam... ReqUlSitiona ..rre IN!\. filled in the
dl':lin:od quantity and ........ distributed on a pro-
tala ba5is. No blood p/Qma "iu, ",,"ailable for
ci,'ilian use (p, 42l.
o. A",bularatu. At the beginnlllg or the bomb-
ing raid. there "'ere 8 ambulanea o"."ed by the
prefecturnl glI,'emment and 10 prh'ately owned
in Osaka prefecture. The air raid" pl'<lgr'f!5llively
reduced the number of ambula_ until al the
end of the ""ar thl')' were a negligible fll.ClOr in
the transportation or the liek and wounded.
5. f;l(Sn<ol'.' of tIIIlOollu..- When an air_raid
alarm ...... oounded, the medical unit of the police
di.nrieu (Gemba K)"IlgO Tai, NII!lI1bled. This
unit '&'lIlI comJ>Ol'ed of doc:to;ln. nurMS, mich.h....
and litterbt'aren. One ph)-...a, appointed by
the prefectuntl oftice ..... J)1KI In eharge of the
unit. The liuO:'l"-bearers -.OIlkI pick up casualties
and take them 10 thr n.-aici aut.IOll5 'II"be they
nrellerel!lled into the ,-.rioua cattgoriaof injurieo
anrl either uatll!d or tD the bo.pitala. Utter-
bearers ill e.eb auxiliarJ' pohee and 1ft IlDit
Ktibodan abo 1'I!mO\-ed _ paberltA from the
_ of cfu:w;er and took them to the Iir$t-ud
alation!! ,Genba Kf1IO Sbn. The tnmf of
ruWtieo from tbP first-aMI alallOnl tD thr hooipita1a
..... ofter1 diffiallt bec:aU!l! 01 the
aItortage.. An} mode of a\"lI.ilabie UlITll1pOrt1liorl
.... u>eci: uueb. b-. _ can and r>.....
In the harbor ami !here.-ere three
polic:e districll ...ith a nwnber of
/illlt-aid statlom. There .......... no hoipitab in this
area capable of l.l"Ntilli ClIlIuattil!ll and oftfll
th_ ,,'ere transpontd 10 hoap,taIl I'I!nters via
boat through thecanaland n>.... Iy:stemof thecitl'
pitali* __ ....t to '-)lOIVy ""-l*a. n.-
atatION had no lterilizi.. 110
and no blood 1IPti1lta, ..
infeetanu and IlleItiQ.tioa for fII .....
apparenll)' o:oIW.ituted the IlUIl total 01 p-
ment for lhe tlftbneDl 01 oonditioDa.
f. T'OI_IIIf'. '!'ben. were t-o main dlutneb
through whICh d_illllUon of med.... illforma-
I.IOn and lnunlllgln ftIlerpney ......
reached the pmpIe.. The n. rlwtnel wu throuch
tMblork UIIOnation and pb)'BieaI lnUllilll depart_
ments Kerumnbu '. The.-ond dWlnel wu from
the guard seetion of thr prrltutal poI;ee down
through the medieal Dnits 01 thr auxiliu)' polire
and fire UnlU auarhrd to thr 57 polire diBtrirto
,p. 401. In addition, IMmentary fim.aid"''aII
Utught the people by the Red C... _iaYon
butlh,s traimng....,.. skeu:hy. Training
of a superficial study of shclCk, burns. laceratiolll
and fractures, and !!Uch procedures as bandaging
attific.i/ll gloppage 01 hemorrhage:
spllnt,ng of SImple fractures, and transponing 01
....ounded No. 15" FiT>;(,.Aid Manual
Ollllka Prereetural Police Department").
:I, f1Q.l'pitol$.-l'hroughout Osaka prefeeture
there were 231 hnspitals with a toUtI bed capacity
of 22,496. The above figures include both public
and privaw ingtitutions and also those hoaJlitala
o....ned and operated b) large agencil!ll such lllIthe
railroads, poliee. communicatitlllll and Red Croa.
It was the plan and practicl! to utilize all of thr
available be<b in the abo,.. mentioned hotIpitab
lor the trntment of casualtil!ll from air raida. In
the e"ent there " no a'-ailable beds. -.hooIs
and office buildings ere con,erted into hotIpitals.
Thia Ian.... t)"l.e hoIipitai '&'lIlI poorl). fQ,uipllfd.
and, In moat illlltanees, '&'lIlI unable to handle any
type of casualty. There ........ no proriaiona
for colllltnlCUon or .::on,enion of '-IMtals oulllide
of o.ab prefec:lure. A5 a ll'lSUlt of raids within
thia am, 93 hotIPlta1;, with a total bed
of 2.99.1 ...ere tither completfl)' de5tro)-ed or
damaged be)vnd repai,.
II. Ai,.ro,d ,.,Oltd'O'& i. bc-
p,ta". "uch as thOle of The Red C,.., police,
.::ommunlCltiona and railroad .............-ell "lU'pped
for IJrOl.eCtion of patienl.8 and employ qaiTlllI
air raid... A" an aample, the Red C hoapital,
""th a lOlal prewar bed capacity 01 800, had an
undel'lln)und of reinforced roncrfle tunnels
oonnecting the wings 01 the hOllpilai. During air-
nai,l ak<rI.8, ,':ere either carried or "'lI1ked
was insufficient to meet the needs. "TeiIen"e"
hoIipitah ..ere let up in predetermined locatio"".
sueh as IIebool b",ildinp. In the of "Eft
bombinp, a 1lflI-"eWly for "on-lhe-;;pot" or ad-
\':I.need fint-aid Jtatiollll IGemba K)'1IgO SOO,
de-,'eIoped. These a cJ_ of lirshlid statioll5
accotInted for lOW of 628. as follows:
I ........br Jooo,o....
I .. w.-.-....
Ad.-......! ilnIt...ioI ....'_
'"
d. Eqlliplfwd. The equipment of lhe fiTst-"it!
nations was meager. It wall not the pul"JlOSl!
of the;;e slations to gi"e temporary hospitalization
and patients were eJ:pecled to be cleared from thr
station within I hour, either by evacuation to.
hO!!pil.a1 or to their homes. In the absence of homes
those not lII'riously enough wounded to be hOll"

---"""-' --."'-
,
,
,
,
----'-._-
ORGANIZATlON Et.eRGENCY t.eaCAL SERVICE
that Wi"lly firstaid program wu malerially
..med. lSee of gu defen>e
iel'Viee).
l4) The tht' U{etI1 &lid character
of medieal earl' .nibble to Lhe people of this
&1ft is mort eomplete b)'
the fact that were 1.209 dmtdta. 1.764
midwi'"f$ and 4,525 p/w'm.aciSIa.
. C_OIdw...-There no go,"emml'Tllal
lirst-aid staOOlll; specially for that
P\lI'lIO"t. but tllrougtKxlt (haka pnol'ec:ture there
wtft"u Red Cl'05lIslatiolUl for first-aid treatment.
School buildings "'ere princ:ipally used, but an}'
building with large IJoof" space was likely to be
p.-l into seniee. The finn-aid Jtaliol\$ ,..ere
nOl for protection of llatienu against
possible gu attacks.
c. Ckwiji.eatirm lind 'lNmbtr.-AIi hOlll,itals
were used as first.-aid stations. Since the number
..
Tbtno "'ere iii of the ahtn-e type satioas eon-
.suvmd by the Red CrtlfiII throogbDat
Osaka pre(ectllre.
12. C FITIC"'" _ art ....
pI/GlI. lledJeal were hampeftd ill tbftr
open.tioaI by madequate in tbe _-
&"'ley finr.-aid It.atioal aDd by shortage of an types
of _ua1 medil:aI aDd smPeaI suppUes, aDd the
of _, ad &$ pblsma
and pmicillill.. The Ixkof adequate tnmpDrtatioD
aIao added to thftr d1ftkuIUl!lI. Training for lime"-
aen"ire .... nrrielI on by both official and
'"t>!untary but 'as of a Itlperfieial
eharacWl". p&rtieulariy on the of the
public. the greatest disrupting factor ""'"
the delltn>c!JOll of a la1lle proportion 01 the mt
aid ItalioDlSnd hospitals by the bHo'-1fr SIr raids.
Attempu lO repllft facihtieo by lIe'lting liP
the IO-CBlled "reene" lim a,d stationl.nd h0s-
pitals in Il'hooI buildil\g!l fell short !If compeMliting
for IbM! '-- The emergency ..... met. ...-lth
fair of salisfaction during the earl)' minor
raidA, bllt under the PTft5ure of mll!lS
the medical __'ice reached a 10'" ebb.
b. MO,IMII" Inftcr.- When the traditional
method! of di.poIing of the deltd became unequal
b. F,,.,,...id .,oli_.-In Osaka theft
"'ere six firsw.id statiom operated entiray by the
Red CI'OIIlI and S<!par.lte from tho:l6e in the fO'II!l"lI-
mental.set-up. It ..... understood that docton and
nUl'!le5 "-ere assigned by the Red CI'tlIIIa to liW<"e in
these stations, but DO clear C<>IrepUon of detail.
of operation "-as obtainable.
c. HfI<Ipitlil .....nce.-The one ouutandilli ac-
tivity of the Red Cross..-as the Dpl!l'lI.tion of
the Red C... bospital ..hieh had a
capacity of 800 patients. but ...hleb 'WaI later
redllCed by air-raid da.rnagf! 10 a eaPKit) of 600.
Primarily. lhis sen-ice "'"ll.i maintained for the
treatment of military patienta. Ci\"iliaru. hO>l'C'\er,
Wert! eligible for admislion. In the lalter auaon.
those who could pay for their senieell ..ere u-
pecled to do '10. Both lint aid and hOilpitalization
WEft furnished to ,;ctil1Ul of the bombing raidl.
11. Fi,",/Utl. FUnds for hospil.81 eonnruction
and maintenance ",'ere derived from t_ IIOUn:f'>!:
(I) member.lhip fees, and (2) special conuibutions.
[n the latter instance those able to pi)' were ex-
pected 10 make contributions oommensurate wilh
their financial status. funds from go"em-
mental 'IOurees wen) in,ol,ed in finallCing lied
Croas acti"itiCll.
"m...... ' -0
,.... _..
.........u......._
..,,"
,--
Pri\"&te funernll ..ere conducted by memben d
the unden.aker1' assoeiation, but noDe of the t'J;.
pense W'iU home b)' the go,'emment.
Role....
9. Or9""izatio".-This WI'YlCe, a
governmental function, had no organIC
with the other branches of lmlerreney medical
:;;enices. The national leader of the Red CTOIlI"
Prince Tokugawa and at the prefectural level
gO"emor is the titular head. Each
had a local organization rougbl1
to a Red CTl)III chapter in the United
which was under the direetion of a peTlIOn appellDt
ed by the prefectural governor. Indi\"idual citiUOl
became members of the organization through t./lI
payment of annual dUel. .
10. Fun.elion.l, _ a. T,aining. _
pamphlets on various methods of applyIng bl"
aid were prep.'lred lIDd distributed to the pu.
Some fil'llt-aid ill5truetion Will given to the n.W
borhood groups but tmining WIIS not a prom,n
ell
featul'f! 01 the Red Cro!lll program.
,..----
,
,
I
,
"'-' ....... ., _.-. __..
_.. _,,_..
---- .._.._.. -...

6. ..oseparate mQr
tuary __-il:eI operating in Osaka the
IPOIt important oat! funetiontd under tbe guard
oecti<m of the prefectural polit:e the
Other was u inMpendent unden.akln' llS8OCiation,
7. often it
waa a dill'teult problem to identify bodie!l after
air -raids. An tll'ort wraa made to dollO by meana of
their identification tap which ..-e-e llSUall)' sewed
on the individual', clothing llJld by documents
carried on tbe penon. If identilication was made,
eert.if.cation of death w executt'd by ph)"$iciall5
10eated in the firal,id IUltioll5. Relati ....5 01
identified boliia wert! notified and given the choice
either of claiming the lor private funerals
or of them for go'ernment.a\ dispo6al.
8, Optrllli"",-Alw air raida,large numbl!n of
boliia "ere picked up by unpaid workers 01 the
Otaki. mortuary lerVice. 1I no indentif>cation was
made, the boliia were placed in a large common pit
and burned, The burning of bodiell at religious
shrinell waa a ClIllQm not infrequently practiced.
"
..
D
I.... s.-r 1_""
.- .
..
20 iI'lATOOfoI
-"-1 m
cn--,IJ, _"1
10 SQUAD
2HD nAtlON
04lll' Of nAUCN
1-s..--r-I 1'1
AUl5IAH1 CHIU
1--"-1 1'1
-"""'" I--"-J 1'1

IT__,.. ' ..... IHJ
1ST COMPANT
0'Il1 Of COIOJ'......
(__JI'I
ASSISTANT 0tIl1
1'-'_11'1

IT_ ""-' Ill. r_"J
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART-IlESCUE SERVICE
DEFENSE DVISION
0SIl1tA f'UO REPORT
liST I
1ST SQUAD
-- k:t::.:'-'I,l:l
11....'''1
1ST "'"ALION
Gu;ord Rttrue Un., (Keibilai)
2. OrgaRi:aliOlI.-Thil
as the principal rescue servIce UOit dunnr tilt
period of the heavy raidl from March. 194f> u..
e1051 of the "''lU". The guard reaeue UOlt (Ketbitai
was part of the guard service in the police InIiI-
tenaRCe bureau in the prefecture of Osaka. Tbt
chief (Keibitai-Chol of the organiution ..... tbt
chief of police alfainl in the prefecture of Osaka.
The D5l\istant chief "'as a police iOilpector, IoIld
1""0 jllnior officers We!'e aai,,;tant police impeetQn.
Theorganiution wascompoeed of three ba1talron..
each with two companies. Each company had two
platoons and each platoon had threl! aquada. Eao::b
battalion "''8$ commanded by a pollee superin-
tendent ""hile the jllnior olfinl were a police
inspector, an police inspector, two
police sergeantJI. one policeman and one police-
man-driver. Each company had aD ita leader one
poliee inspeetor wbile its junior officers were DII
assistant inspector. one polieeman and one police-
Each platoon "''a$led by an a.slIiatanl
inspector and one policeman while a police Il.Iper-
intendent commanded each lIQuad (organiutiorl
chart. p. 45). The city of iXaka "'-all divided into
three lll'Ctions of appro:rimately equ.aI areas with
one battalion stationed in Neh area. Although tile
orpni.z:a.tioo was eontrolled from the prefectural
le\'e1, it operated principally within tbe city and
its we at incidents in the outlying lllftlI ..-as
limited to e:rtreme emergencies.
3. pl'nlOnnel of the guard
rt'!IClll' unit ...-u reeMlited from individuala who
had applied for enrollment in Ihe city police
Each applicant had to be a graduate of one or the
city's schoo'" and from 20 to 40 yl'lll'll old, The agt
limit, howe\'er, was lowered to 17 hecawe or the
lIhonage of man power. A written teat wall given
each applicant and if he was IUcteWul in passing
he was given general training for f>O At the
end of thill period the applicant was ilJl!!igned 10
either the regular poliee organization or to the
guard Te5Cue unit in attOrdanee with his abilities.
The member!! of the guard re.t:ue unit were
regular pollee employee! of the llrefectural govern-
ment, had regular hours of duty, and were paid I
regular salary.
4. Tabk of orglUli:Wlioll.-Each aquad w:u
composed of 10 men and 1 squad leader, Each
platoon had 2 leaders and 3 aquada. giving it
total complement of 35 men. Each company had
4 leaders and 2 platOOM, making II complement
t(> the task. bcKl'l'lI ",'en! and ?umed in
tile open, While IOmewhat gruesome, th'D
....... elfeclh.e and met the requirementa of d'DJIO'llng
of larflil numbenl of dead,
t, HtdCrott.-
tOntributed comparali"e1y little to the rehef ?f
the emergency be)'ond the fact that PX first-aId
atatiom "'-I'n' !!'I!t up and operllted by Ihe Red
Crosa. and _ ch'ilian patienu ",ere eared for
in the Red CI'O\!I$ boe:pital.
RESCUE SERVICE
I. llllrodW1ioa.- The pllJl108l' of thill report i>;
10 a atudy of the organizations created 10
pftfonn and to portl"D}' the methods
of l"fK1le techn,que employed by lbose organi.
ZlIl1Ona. Pnor 10 193:! Japanese organizations
aimilar to neighborhood grou.-lTonari Gumi} and
U50eiationa lCbokail performed fire fighting
and othft' protl'Clh'e fullClion$ in their respecti"e
areu. 10 1932, the prefectural gonomments. in
order to _ f'fficient operation and to
MaIre more control over auch grouJl8. iSlIued
direeth'es aatinr that the)' should be combined
on a P"'fl'CuuaI le"f! into tbe guard and rescue
unit tBosodanI. This orpniution funo:tioned until
1939 ...ben the Miniwy of HClIM Affairs diTl.'Cted
that all guard and re.eue units should be absorbed
into a """ orpnization under the name of aux
iliary poIiee and fire unit (Keibodan). Thill new
organization. in addition to the f'e$ponsibilitles of
the guard and I'tiCYe unit.a would _me Ibe
."Dried functidmof air raid protectioD.lt W"aJI with-
in the labor and CUide aquads of the guard ann
of this organiution that the first rescue service
was estahlished ("Auxiliary Poliee and F'ire UnitJI
[Keibodanl" IfeCtion of thUt It wall aoon
recognlted that the capabilltiea of the l'l!$eue
sen-ke of thill orpniution "'ere insufficient to
handle map reIC\It! incident.a from air raidi!, so,
in October 1944, the Ministry of Home Affairs
taued a directive to the prefecturaJ government.'!
ordering the eatablWlment of the guard re!Cue
IInit (Keibitai) iIJI a speeial organiution within
the prefectural poliee bureau. The directive speci-
fied the fllnetiom of the organiution ll.'I auxiliary
pollee dlltil!ll. guard dlltiea, road e1eal'1lnee, with
lpeeial emphasis on rescue It'TVice in air raidol. A
dl!ll<:ription of the organiution, control and oper-
ation of thelle grol,lPII il given in the following
plll'1lgraphl in the order of their iml>ortanee a
reJCl,le .e.....ice.
..
, Each battalion had 7

a complement of 155 men. The enure organization
with 41eadel'lland 3 battalioM had a total strength
of 469 men (p. 45),
5. Opcul;on/ll ,onlral and proudNrt.--a. One
platoon of each company was on duty every other
day at the battalion headquartenl. 1I0we"er,
an alert "1lS sounded. all members of the battalion
immediately reported to their headquarters. Wh.en
an incident occurred. it was reported to t,he pollee
station of that art'll whence it was relayed to the
chief of the organization who was located in the
control center in the prefectural government
building. Here the decision was made all to the
size of unit to be dispatched, and the battalion
chief at the battalion headquartenl was given the
order to dispatch tile unit or units. If
communications broke down between the police
stations and the control center. the commander of
the police station would make the direct
to the battalion headquarters and the
assistance would be immediately dispatched. The
battalion cllie! would then notify the eontrol
centers what units lIad been dispatclled to the
incident. The movement of the battalioru; or their
units was direeted from the oon!r(ll center. Com
munication between the battalion headquarters
and the senior officer at the incident wasconstantly
maintained either by telephone or by messenger,
b. In many cases the guard rescue unit would
lIave to ooope1"llte with the auxiliary police and
fire unit (Keibodan) in rescue operations. The
responsibility of tile guard rescue unit at the scene
of the incident was solely to extricate the trapped
,ictims.
6, organization leader was re-
sponsible (or all personnel training. He planned the
training oourses and issued directives. The battal-
ion leaders were oompelled to attend lectures and
demonstrations at a school conducted at the
prefectural government building. Theoe lectures
and demonstrations were usuaHy gi,'en by men
with an engineering background. who had studied
aetual operations and rescue methods employed
in other citiC$. Then the battalion chieh were
respoMible to iMtruct all of the officers and men
who were in their respeetio;e organization. During
1944 each member was given 4 hours of training
every other day. This period included not only
training in rescue technique but also in the other
duties which the guard rescue unit perfonned. All
training ceased wilen the city underwent heavy
..
air attack as the battalions h.ad 1.0 l!Jl8Ild
a"ailable time in actual operatlona. No d
curriculum or !lChedule 01 regular training holU'l"
rescue work was instituted.
Auxiliary Police and Fire Unie
7. OrgMi:rolion.-The auxiliary police and ftrt
unit W:lll divided into the fire IUDI,
emergency medical arm, and the hallIOn ann. 'I'bt
functiollS of rescue service were concentrated'la
the labor and guide squads of the guard U'!Il
("Auxiliary Police and Fire Units" section of
this report).
8. Operal;Ol'lu/ ,onlrol gl'ld prwdure-Eadl
auxiliary police and fire unit had its headquartera
in a school building where it built a miniature con.
trol center to direct operatiollS within its llJlla
Whenever an incident developed which required
rescue units, the leader of the neighborhood gJ'OUp
notified this control center by the fastest available
means of communication. The guard arm leadilr
then determined the units needed and ordered
their dispatch. After they arri,ed at the incident,
the squads operated under the command of the
squad leader who was the senior officer in point of
ser";ee in the auxiliary police and fire unit. When
ever the unit in a particular area needed addi.
tional re;cue services, the request Wall relayed to
the control center of the neighborhood auxiliary
police and fire unit: If such a major incident 0c-
curred that several adjoining units were unable to
cope with it, a for aid forwarded to the
captain of the police station in that area who then
requested aid from the prefectural control center.
where the order to dispatch rescue aid went out
to tile headquarters of guard rescue units (Keibi
tail se."ing that area of Osaka city.
Features Common 10 Both Org.niUlioll$
9. Loi:gtion of ,g$ualtie$,-N'o specific method
or de"ice was used for determining the location of
trapped victims, The general procedure was to
start the removal of debris near the entrance of
the shelters or collapsed buildings. It Wall stated
that due to the generally small size of the buildings
and shelters. this method had been found to be
the most satisfactory for locating victims,
10. lreliCue debris clearance
method of getting at casualties was used entirely
and, speaking generally, the dangers in thi;
method of rescue were understood. If the debris
was piled abo,'e the surface of the ground,
work of removal was started from the sides, but
the building had collapsed inl.o the basement or
into the Bhelten, thefell'loval of detm.
from the top of the pile. The danaer ::.
method 1.0 the eaauaJtieB_ -.......,... ". .
." . ha --." ""t It WlUI
.... mlt..,.. t t.no other method had beetI Ii&-
veloped. Tunnehnll and bl'llC:itlj to prevent t her
collapse were seldom used, un
It. Equipmenl.-The eqlli,m", .
d . . ....a' \ery
crn e. COllSlstlllg principally of hand impl ts
such as saws, small picks. rope, sledge ham
emeT1
crowbars. and shovels. No equipment
moti,'e power was available. During the early
of the .war, a few trucks were available for trans-
portatIon of personnel and equipment 1.0 the inci.
dent, but, during the latler stages of the war. the
only mean$ of transportation were bicycle>! or on
foot.
12. Comme'lt8.-Tlle size and intensity of the
raids on OsakacompleteIYO"erwhelmed there;cue
services because:
a. The drain u!)(tn man power for military pur.
poses made it difficult to keep uni1J;at full strength
and to maintain efficiencv.
b. Lack of equipment'and transportation hin_
dered the effectiveness and speed of tile rescue
service.
c, Too large a part of the training period was
devote<;l to instruction in allxiliary police duties
instead of r/!;;Cue techniques.
POSTRAID CLEARANCE AND REPAIR
I. Jnltool<rlioij.-The subject of post-raid c1ear-
anct! and repair is considered to co'er the manner
in which the Japaneoe planned and executed m"""_
Ure! for clearing streets of debris during and after
air raids; for making emergency repairs to streets
and bridges: for demolition of buildings rendered
dangerous to passing trallic by bombings: for
effecting emergenc)' repairs to public and pri"ate
buildings; for providing emergency housing for
air'r:lid victims; and for collecting and di!;posing
of salvage materials afler bombing.
2. Geijeral divi$ion of r"pon$ibilitV.-<J. A$ bP
Iween 'he p""J,,'ure (OJUlka I'll) and the eilV (o.o.ta
Shi).-Engineering bureaus concerned "'ith post_
raid clearance services were established both in the
prefectural office and city hall. There offices had
parallel functions and approximately the same
relationships with their respective air-defense 0r-
ganizations. ror the arws in tile prefecture outside
of Osaka City. the prefecture took full re.,xmsi
bility for planning, psying for and opernting the
emergency engineering measures. \\ ithin the city.
the prefecture had a large shsre in finsncing the
"'"""""""
_tnlI, but IfIft .a.al <lPIIUka too ..
erty autboritiM.
bo. iU/ldlNnlpablceaood"",,,*,..-. .....-
A rather lhaTp di.linction WlUI made bet_what
the considered its f't!IIPOIIIibility, aDd
what It dId not. For 118long118 a t.otteriDt:
wafl that menaced passing traffic on a
piece of private property. it waa not a rnattl!r of
official concern. Only when it fell into the atreet
did it become an objett of offICial attention, Until
that time the O"'TICf of the ",all was responsible.
Similsrly. no provision for public help to such an
important ill$tallation ali a hOi!pital "'as officially
set up, if that installation were not a publicly
owned and operated institution.
3. tmil borld!1t8.-<J. PrtJuturolltHl.
Il) Preparulioot for lIlr Xo !leli0ll8
thought was gi"en to emergency engineering
matters until early 19.14. The establishment
of the air defense general headquartel'll in
Tok}"O. with subsequent orders to the pre-
Itcture. produced se\'eral results related to
post-raid clearance in Osaka pn'ftcture. One
of these was to place under the police air
defense di,ision (Keimubu) lUI emergency en
gineering oection (Shisetsul. Br onler of the
Ministry of Home Affairs, ;; May 1944, this
engineering section created an auxiliary repair
organization (Kink}... K063.l... Tail Z2 July
A unit of this auxiliary repair organiu-
tion ,,as attached to each poliee ststion. and
although the prefectural engineering office
provided ad\ice. details of
tion, and a quota for each station, these,'ern!
units ,,'ere recruited and commanded by the
indi,;dual police station officials. Memberaof
the units were carpenters. masons. plllSter'!'n.
hricklayers, e:ecuicLsll$. and plumbes. AI,
though engaged in regular emplo}'ment et.e-
where, the}' ,,-ere on caIJ by the police station.
For each call thev Wf!rt" paid a minimllm of
1.30 ren: but for job requiring _-eral hours
of work the,' were Pllid at pre,-ailing "-age
""alea for labor. These men were orderaf
to join the units. and hencecould nothecalled
,-nlunlee<'". A ;,econd rewlt of the Ministry
of HomeArrairaonl.... Yo"," the planning in the
Osala. prefeclure public ,,"Orks bureau (0000-
kubu). Gnder this btI.....u there had been
fonned on 14 Man:h 1944 an emergency pub-
lic works construction group (Ok}... Ooboku
Kosaku Dim). Tbis appears to been
..
hardly more than 11 new name for the.road an.d
bridge creW!! already in existence. wIth 11 umt
in each area (Gun) of the pre.lecture. The
Ministry of Home Affairs pennltted the ad-
dition of ext.ra personnel. hut there was no
. reISI) in the sire 01 the><! units when they
'"' hh . wen
got their ne'" name. althoug t ey "ere g
&(Ime haphawrd training. Wll.'I more
t1'll.ining g;"en in maneuvers desIgned to get
to trouble spoUl quickly and in what was
called "spirituar' training, ealeulated
strengthen determination. than there was In
technical mattel'>l. The Ministry of Home Af-
fairs distributed a pamphlet describing how
Ihe units should be organized. what equip-
mellt Wail needed and wltat reports of training
should be .'lent to Tokyo. The local attitude
was that Ihis pamphlet WM superficial, and
that the local people knew more about their
business than did the national officials. Rep.
resentati"es from Tokyo were sent from time
to time to ad"ise on road and bridge emer-
gency repair, but their asl!istance was con-
sidered unneces"m,,'. Funds were available
from the natiol\lll treasury for the training
progrnm, but the Osaka prefecture put in no
claim (or those (unds because the program was
$0 small and too insignificant not to be sup-
paned locally. Clearance and repair equip-
ment consisted entirely of hand tools. What
rollers, concrete mixers. and trucks the engi-
neering department had were comman
deered by the military and have not been re-
turned. Recommended equipment (or each
unit of the emergency public works ronstruc-
tion units and possessed by each unit in Osaka
prefecture ronsisted of the following: 3
wedges, 9 rakes, ;, picks, ;, shovels, 6 ropes 98
feet long (30 meters), 1 chain block. I winch.
1 log, 3 sets of carpenters tools, I set of ma-
son's tools, I jack. 15 poles, 6 carts. and 1
truck.
(2) Operations during raids.-The magni-
tude of the first large raid on the Osaka area
caught the engineering and public works au-
thorities completely by surprise. Training was
found to have been entirely inadequate. Much
more pe"lOnnel was found to be nlil!ded, and
equipment in use failed to meet the clearanl
and restoration requirements, Steps were
taken to increase a,'ailable pe"lOnne) by ar-
ranging for assistance from the auxiliary p0.-
lice and fire units (Keibodan) and the neigh-
borhood groups (Tonari Gumi). It W&B fOUll4.
however that the aUJ:iliary police and lilt
unit me;"bers "got 90 tired from thei.r Ilict
and shovel work in the streets that thl'lr belp
was discontinued in order that they eould be
fresh for their other work during the neu
roid." As for the help of neighborhood grou.-.
the people were untrained and were not of II
nlUch a,sistance as had been hoped. The
amount of debris clearance during the
was negligible. The reason given for nonclear_
ance of important streets was that thero wa-
no traffic, or at least very little, even of fire
trucks and ambulances, because of the short-
age of gasoline. With telepho.nes commu,
nications necessary for qUick dispatch of
clearance crews were lacking, !!O the central,
i.ed emergency public works construction
units did practically nothing during the raid!!.
In local areas, the police might order out the
emergency repair units to do immediateclear_
ance or road repair. but the evidence shows
that no work of importance was accomplished
while the raids were in progress. It is interest-
ing to note that neither for necessary service
during nor after raids was there any liaison
between the two emergency groups. In the
words of the chief of the prefectural public
works bureau, this situation was "typical 01
the Japanese-too much organization and not
enough coordination and cooperation."
(3) raidi.-Theday lollow-
ing a raid, the work of clearing the streets
began. Since the city of Osaka was unable to
handle its problems alone, the prefectural
forees from outside came in to assist, as did
the army. The organio.ation of this work will
bediscussed under the"CityLevel"section be-
low. Only in the case of the town of Sakai did
the prefectural clearance units have a major
job to do, although Toyonaka and Fuse were
also hit and required considerable work
the engineering and public works forces. The
clearance authorities attempted to get extra
help, but were blocked by the fact that the
factories had drained off skilled workers, as
well as day laborers. The public works de-
partment was authorized to hire additional
personnel, but found it could not compele
with wage:'! paid by other employers. Help
lrom emergency repair units could be orden:c'
by the police but experience that
was not done eJlCept in dire emergency. ThJl
caused C?lUiderable delay in road , _
and repair. e-a1lCe
b. Gilli Ind.
(1) Preporalio" jor air Tlluq Organ'
tionally, much the same g'
d r d
fOJ' lUI"
e eose roo measurea d-'" n__
C
" ".."'0 m .......ka
lty as 111 the SUfTOllndingaJea$, and atabollt
the same tIme. Under th, .'" . .
. D englneenng
sectlon ( obuka) there was t L-
bl
' se up tn., emer
gency pu IC works construction group (Okyu
Dan) and the police statioll!l
of the emergency repair Or_
ganization (Kmkyu Kosaku Tai), Training
for the former llnits was the same as for their
of the city, and for the
!atler no tralnmg was thought necev.ary since
personnel. all experts in their respec.
uI'e Similarly, theequipmental'ailable
and In use was the same as used by the pI'<':-
fectural forees. One variation for the city,
however, was to be found in the pro,'ision for
a readiness hureau (Booi Kyoku)
which had to do with the "readiness of all
facilities for air attack."' Under its cognizance
were many varieties of interest, from ladders
for rescue work l.Q seeing that roads were in
proper condition.
(2) OPfralion8 dnriWJ alld a/ler oil" rOld8.-
lItueh the same story of surprise and unpre-
paredness is to be found in Oiaka City as de-
scribes the operations outside the city. only
the problems were much greater because of
the density of population and the eompleJtity
of the facilities serving the area. The only
street clearance and repair during the raids
were done by orders of the police to the emer
gency repair units. A Ie"" cases of weet clear-
ance ""ere re!)(>rted lIS having been done b}'
the aUJliliary polieeand fire units. If theemer-
gency public works construction group wantod
help, it could call upon members 01 neighbor
hood groups, but only by request to the leader
of the federated block leaders association
(Rengo Cholmi), The hcat and smoke from
the fire raid$. together with the absence of
tramc on the street<!, and the poor means of
]h1ssing information on location of places
needing immediate clearance combined to
paralyze "on-the-spot" street clearance. If a
water main should be hit, the city official.
would tum ofT the water the main.
and. if help Iwailable to the ne.1l''CSt police
station could not be brought to the 8CCne. the
cit)' wwJcI ea111IJlOft die -.y. Ia.,.....
the army MIlt ClQt beIp ...
raUb, and .. well. if
lIut the army .... !lOt to help wtda
street e1eal'aDce on Ihe 1"OUNb. to quote the
chief of the prefectural public worD "-u.
the army "was for lighting, !lOt ror
Ing up the In the street clearanee
operatioll3, Ii",t priority was gi"en to street
lines and second priority to highways lead.
IIIg out of the city, Consideno.ble mutual aid
was evident in tbe dispatching of road "lear-
anee perwnnel from oul$ide the city. Post-
raid street dearing was one problem di8cw;sed
at a meeting the day after a raid at the pre-
fectural office (Par.4on "Post-Raid Repair").
3. DemoIitimt._No i/peelal efl"ort, either in or-
ganization Or training, was made by Oiaka pre-
f\'Cture or Oiaka City "';th respect to buildings
made unsafe for passing traffic by bombings. The
city officials "had no authority" to tear do..", tot-
tering walls. and took no action until a ""all actu-
ally fell into the street. Each building of any size
was presumed l.Q ha,-e a special building guard
(Tokusetsu Bogodan) responsible for the defense
of the building snd also for ita disp08ition, if
demolltion necalIlary tor public safer}'. No
building guard in Oiaka. bowever, "'<IS prepared
either "'ith the skill or equipment to take proper
care of its if demolition became neces-
sary. Sinee fire rather than high-e:rpl,wve bombs
was the ""eapon u..<ed against. them, the need for
demolition was not frequent. Such help as the
building guards were able to get earne from the
auxiliary police and fire unita.. O}.....mite was not
used for demolition pJU1"l"l'S because it would
frightf'll the people, and it was consider...! llnsa/e
to transport. The subject of demolition is related
to ci,;!ian defense in another eonntll:l.ion. that of
the tearing dO"'n of hou5CS and business places for
the pUrpol!e of creating fire breaks..-\>.ide from ita
interest to the fire pro"wtion study, it is Iogieall)'
concerned with the topic of war damage claims;
and the indemnit) feawres of the fire-breaks pro-
gram ""ill be cover...! in the "'aT damage claims
section of too report..
P08I_roid rtpOir, rntorol...... alld trMrlltllq,'
lIorI.riltf'.-o. POflroUf oM rt810r0tiOll.-
The di8cllssion of post-raid repair will be confined
10 that which ",""urred in Osaka Cit), .ineethero
is liltle to say regarding the areas in the pref...,ture
bevond the cit) limits.'or the lauer, such repairs
to'bridge! and roads as were neeessarl' were made
..
by t.he emergenrl' public works
. each area The day after a major ral
a meeti'ng was held at the office
by reprelentlltive;l from the regIonal
ernment the army, the prefecture the cIty.
,\( this n:eeting. informatinn was furmshed
ing the and location of damage requmng
repair. and appropriate were taken. If
the damage was of such :i nature M to call for
specialists. as in thecll5eof a damaged wat.er maln,
underground cables or buildings. the pahc<l were
asked to .upply personnel from the emergency re-
pair organization. Through the federated block
:IS$OCiatiolL. labor could be ea:led up<Jn from the
neighborhood grou])S. Neither the nor
the cit)' engineeri,, offices oonsidered .t thelr.re-
sponsibility la effect repairs to bUIld-
ings u>ed by the public unless the bUlldmg Wll$
publicly owned. Thus. there was no oflicial pro-
"ision for emergency re.storatian e,'en for hos-
pitals. Individual police statinns might call out
the repair arganization to work on an
important building in their di.triclS. but there
was no over-all plan in the city that anticipated
and took care of thi. problem. The reasoning was
that individuals should up their own houses.
speeial building guards shauld repair their own
buildings. and city empJo}"ee:J would take care of
city property when they could get around to il.
The nature of the raids was such thal for most of
the homes no repairs were in order. for lhey had
burned down wmpletely. But there were SCQres
of stone buildings pat'tially burned Qut fQr which
!lOme SQrt of city planning for repair might have
yielded beneficial resulu.. The problem of repair
and restoration ""as intensified by the acute lack
of materials. "last Qf such materials were in the
hands af the army. and nOne of them wuld be ob-
tained from the military authQrities. Finally. the
small amount of repair evident was explained by
one official as due w the fact that "lhe people's
spiriu. art' IQw, and they have nOl risen to the level
Qf doing
b. El'IW"uentv housing.-There was likewise no
city planning for the building of emergency hallS-
ing for burned_out viclim.ll. About 20 percent of
the burned-aut survivol'!l of lhe raids left the city
and are living in the country with friends or rela-
tives. The other 80 percent are still in the city,
crowding in with others and living in cooperative
fa.s}lian. Much hope bUl little faith has been
placed in a national government promise lo pro-
vide 30,000 prefabricated houses before winter for
Osa\ul City. \\ith the exception of
planning, the official eity polley Willi that Qr
man for himself.
r.. The only !IlIlvage worthy of
t after lhe lire raids was that co
=\s. E"':'rything combustible Willi wmp!
consumed. The colleelion of !l8lvageable m
....as in lhe hands of the metal salvage 8E!Ct.iuI.
(Kin7.oku in the gov...
ment. After a raid. any metal that Wll>! Qf val
could bedaimed by the owner of the burned-dOW1l
home or businesa bl.:ilding, but the !IlIlvage 1&'11'
published 1\ July 1945 stipulated that all ma(e;
rials on razed prollerty belonged tQ the go\'emmet'lt
if within 30 days after the deslroying raid the
materials had nllt been dearly marked by the
ownet$. III the case of such marking. the value of
the salvageable materials was deducted from lhe
amount of war damage in.urancc paid lo the
owner. In July 1945, the metals salvage section
conlracted with a private "stock-holding com
pany' la COllecl the melals lying about lhe city
as a result of the fire<. To date, the collection has
amounted to the ",ere piling up of thO'! metal. in
thO'! amount of 10J}OO lons. The company pays the
ga\'ernmellt fQr the metal collected. Obviously
none of the metal collected ever reached plants
th'lt could teprocesa it for military use. II is esti-
mated that 35,000 wns still lie about the city
"uncollected."
6. COllllllfnls. The firslgreat fire raid on Osaka
was 80 much larger and more devastating than
had been thought possible that its elTect jJaralyzed
nOl only lhe actions but al80 the will of
and repair for!S. Recovery plans had not antici-
pated lhc slowing down Qf communications. nOr
the insufficienl restoralion work perforlt.ed by
auxiliary units. with the result that ollCning of
main tramc arterie; through the city was dclared
for several days and it was a matter of weeks
before near normal operations could be resumed.
A large section of downtown Osaka was built up
with modern buildings of hea,'y and
with many narrow streets the street e1earant:t
problem would have been extremely serious had
high-explasive raids been visiled upon it. Despite
the fact that uir-defen!ll! public works leaders
anticipaled attack by high-explosivc bombs. flO
provisions were found for demolition of dange""'"
buildings, and no heavy equipment was a\'ailabil
for dearanCi.!. Nor was there any over-all f(ll"
emergency repair of damaged buildings. On thr
credit aide, the poat-raid eonl'-..ce .
authoritiea, prefectU1&\ and city bl?! P<lllee teIlOVIry f-. Tbn _ ... __
QlIIcials and the army, for mapping o:a from oIItIyiq ClOalIQUIitiea, uti wbiII ..
measures, gave !lOme degree of CO<lrd' . on total amount, _ _ .....
Illation 10 elty by !he A1my
IV. PROTECTION OF FACTORI
BUILDINGS OESEV'UTILITIES, INSTAllATIONS AND PUBUC
OTED TO PUBLIC USE
. fACTORY AIR.RAID PROTECTION
l. JllIrooucll<m._The size and im
Osa\ul. Japan'ssecond largestcily a porta::1 and an identicalael Qf
the industrial activity within I h
Y
W33 by "Osaka Prefeclural Factory
IQCalgovernment the is the dure; n e AalsoellltiOn." This booklet set for1b
governmental force. with the . jl<llicies and regulatiQ!I>i: submilted a
menl playing a minor role. Hence. the f a.lr-defense plan .fQr faetones, describing
this report will be to analyze the' rt pc d t e functIOns of the ''llnQl!t squads and groups
the functions of the prefectural and should be a.petaled alarms.
the control Qf facto . _ 'd' wor Ing QUra. and penods when production
trace the Organi.-.ati?'n lQ were Il(lt working. It further emphasi.ed the
h I I d
Ion rom ImP<lrtance of camQullage' set forth CC<lnornical
t at eve Qwn through the detailed set-Up Qf a methods f' I ' .
l . I ' Q ItS prescnbed the eon_
gO\ ernmen.l oonttQ "" and operated. but struction of "bomb-proof" shelter!<; outlined the
owned, ",dustry. Thousands of small air-raid warning systern; prescribed meth<lds of
lighting control and suggested thOl6 f .
If theIr. product was of critical importance. sach use; methods for Q;;nization
Qr

enterprises were usually operated by the gavern_ operation Qf l"CSCIIe and firsl-aid unit.s; suggested
ment. .. .. C<lmmunity assistance rmutual aid from neigh.
2. Orgomzolwlt,_a. Cl/Nlrm?oo oorhood) during airraid alarms; suggested shelter
at lhe prefectural level rested w'th the gt:>vernor. and the handling Qf emplQ}'ees; pre-
Osaka there .WalI aheadquarters for the protee- scribed ootb "regular" and "auxiliary" fire-
tlOn of productIon with the governor as its chief. fighting uniti:submitted information aDd melhQds
and a specifically charged with for fire figbting and fire-figtuing equipment; pre-
super,.,.,on of mduslrlal protection. The bOllrd scribed the methods of storing static water suppl)';
of go"ernors of: issued inslrllctiQns for first_aid unil$; and pre-
(1) Chief of the labor administrati"e sec scribed methods for gas defen>e; set forth the
tion. conduct of penoonnel during periods
(2) Chief Qf guard section (police). of "blue" and "red" alerts; set forth training
(3) Chief of air-defense section. methods. using the prineiple of subtraining down
(4) Chief of the fire depanment. through the chain of rommand; emphasized
The eQntrQl from this point was down rounter-intelligenee 'and securil)' <If information'
thrQugh the chiefs of lhe district poliee statiQns, and prescribed bonu.se>; for utra time devoted to
the chiefs of fire departments. and senior govern defen,;e work. Heavy empha..sQ was placed Qn all
nlent Qfficials in charge Qf production. Coneerning methods of propaganda. play on patriotism, and
lhe lalter. thcre wall at one time "The Osaka all Qther eIpedients for maintaining pruduetion
Prefectural Factory Construction against all t>dds.
through which !KIme was How- b. Tu otgO"i.at....... fin' a rv",'col large fodln"
ever. lhe deputy llOvernQr headed this organization "'a.;; found in the plant of the Matsushita Elec-
and il was natural for him tQ emplo)' its channels trieal Industrial Company. a pri''lltely Q"'ned
and facilities. lnfatmlllion wall dill8eminated by enterprise operated by tbe go"ernment, and the
this a&I<lCiation. hy the IlOlice. and through trade Steel Works. Ltd. T). (Regu-
journals and daily llased Qn a dire<:- lations of the spec.lal defensoe CQrps
tive received by the govcrnor from the air-defcnse established bl' Mltiubislll \nd\l&-
office of the Ministry of HQme AlTairs. a set of trial Comp;lnj' WIll be found ExhIbIt U,) t:
he
regulations for faemry air.raid defensoe wa.;; Electrical Industnal CQmpany. WIth
published in Nn\'ember 1943 by the prefectul'lll IlIStaHatlall!! throughout Japan. nperated 6 fae
"
e: .....,. (Kl.-u.-
deeiIioo to encuate, IuidII __ dfwpeteW ..
l:ODduet ..-.ve .--.... to the ...........
Ilpotl b.y the director. ReJ-ir _ stood bJ to
Il1IlalIt repaira to teIepboae
10 "'atel'. and g&A eonduib, or to clear _y
that mIght <>bstroet fire Ilghting unib. In
",ork lhey Wf!r'e lllmisted by teeIl_
nlCtaJlll. Security guards stood by 10 dil'llC:t is0-
lation of dangerous areas, unuploded bombs, or
to protect secret inatallations otherwise aba....
doned.
d: TM fire 8I:Cli,m (SkoOO-Han) manned the;r
eqUipment,. consisting of a motorized fire engine.
one gas.dnnn portable pllmp, and numero1l$
hand PU".'IlII. Nozzlemen were equipped with as-
bestos SUIts; axe-men were pro'ided and trained
10 wreck areas in l>Tder to make fire breaks, if
necessary. The fire section had iu Own fillit-ald
foremo;rgency aid separate from the regular
sanitary sectIon. Tbere WlLi a maintenance crew
or eigh.t men tending hose lines during fire fighting
OperatiOns and they "'ere responsihle for post.
emergene)' drying, repairing and restoringof hoses.
t. TM atIl1il<lrt" Md;OII (Ei&ti-Hall) operated a
special resclle and first-aid squad eqllipped with
pick!!, saws, crowbars. first-aid kits and stret.:httll:
and gas rescue squalb were eqllipped with pro-
tecti"e clothing, decontamination kits and a small
supply of Utra gas masks. (OnJ}' about 30 percent
of the special protecti"e personnel ....ere regularly
equipped with gas ma&ks.)
J. aJerla.-ln the main, this faeWl'}' oper-
ated in one long day shifl.. The protection for
nights and holidays was pro>ided as 10110"": All
chiefs 01 sections and di,isions required to
li"e in compan)fumished quarters in the com-
pound or areas immediate1) adjaet'llt to the fat:-
tory, Personnel heading the squads ",ere required
to lh'e near the fat:Ior}', or their trained assistants
were required to sleep "ithin the faetory In tum
by I'OStef. Selected personnel from smong the re-
serves (Yohi-Bu) who li,-ed in the immediate
neighborhood "'-ere notified st the first alarm (by
office telephone .",tensions) and would rush to
their posts of dill)' to fill lip tbe organization of
the special protection Ilnil.. All regular members
were required, Ilpon hearing an alarm, to proceed
st once to the fat:UN')' b)' any means at their dis-
p<>!31. Those who stayed on dUly at tbe (actor)'
.slept in a dormilot). and about 10 of them con
dueted a to>;ng patrol in shifts.
4. SA,/t.....-Ministerial and prefectural regu.
quired by 1'OIIt.er to tab their '
alert duty in tile lpeCjaJized niabt
the other two diviBiollll (ruard di ' .tion of
fire division). VIIIOIl and
This organization is ahown in I . .
'....... orm In dlll-
grams on pages 52 and 54. A spot check
typical industries and
h
d . 'n e ............
area s owa I ent'cal organization w'h ..
I . h I vanauOlll!
on y III t number of specialized divisions and in
the numencal strength 01 the sections and SQWlds.
3. 0permirm.-a. :Air-raUl wculIi"l1._The fac_
tory as af the air-raid Protection
received the airraid warning by
radiO from the Osaka army headquarters and by
from air defense headquarters. By
telephone this alert warning was
transmitted to the factory aiNaid protection
Each leader immediately lL'lSembled
hiS d"'lslon and section leaders and the entire
warning and alarm section (KeihoHan) at his
group control center. The telephone girls spe-
ciaHy trained for emergency duty, manned the
SWitchboards; spotters were dispatched to the
lookout towers; snd messengers stood by for duty.
Upon the.BOunding 01 th,e audihle alarm through.
out the cIty all factory workers were trained to
ignore this alarm, to proceed with their regular
duties and to await instructions or the sounding
of the factory alarm. The spotters were in direct
telephone communication with the group leader
who, in turn, was in direct open line communica-
tion with the factory director. When it was deter.
mined by observation that the factory itself was
in danger, a bell-alarm system throughout the
corridors was sounded and special alarm personnel
witb megaphones were dispatched throughout the
factory, verbally shouting the alarm. This was the
signal for all special duty units of the guard and
fire divisions to rush to their posts of duty and for
all of the organized factory teSet\'e sectiOllB to
proce<:<l rapidly to designated shelters.
b. Sheller policy.-The shelter will be described
in a subsequent llaragraph. However. this factory
had a double shelter polic). If, in the opinion of
the director. based on information secured from
headquarters and from his spotters, the raid ap-
))Cared not to be aimed at the factot), the per.
sonnel was evacuated to shelters within the com
pound. On the other hand, if it appeared that the
factory itself was a target. the personnel was
evacuated to other shelters constructed in the
rice fields some distance from the factQt).
non
.0..0..0
.0..0..0.
p
of a warning section (Keiho-Han) (telephone
girls, watchers, vocal alarm criers and mes-
sengers) and a guard section (Keibi-Han)
(consisting of guides, emergency repair crew
and security guards for maintaining order).
(3) A fire division (Shobo-Bu) (consisting
of fire section [Shobo-Han) with engine and
pumping crew and first_aid squad), and a
!So'lniW\ry section (Eisei.Han) (consisting 01
physiC<l1 rescue, fil"llt-aid and stretcher squads
and gas rescue squads).
(4) A division of reserve (Yobi-Bu) con
sisting of the balance of the employees or
ganized into sections (Han) of 10 to 15 eaeb
for control purposes. Male members of West
reserve sections were given training in fitf
fighting, first aid, rescue, gas protection, air-
craft spotting and guard duty and were
.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.
[[I tI til
p
.0.0.0.0.0.00
il .0 .0
.0.0.0
0.0.0

----------------,--------
i P
I
..
,,"IWoI.. I
I
I
I
wries in the Osaka area, employing 6.000 persons.
The main plantoonsisted of 60 buildings in II com-
pound oo'-ering an area approJimately 700 square
Ylll"ds. It was divided geographically into three
$eCtiOM for the manufacture of different products
and also for the organization of air-raid defense
units (Bogo-Dan). For control and supervision,
the director of the factory WlL'I the air-raid defense
leader and he, in turn, appointed high officials as
leaders or each of the throo grOUJIl;. The factory
director personally commanded both the entire
defense group and the organized group of one unit.
The other two units were commanded by the man-
aging director and the personnel director. The
principle of organization of these factory air-raid
protection unit.s (Bogo-Dan) was as follows:
(1) A leader and a small staff.
(2) A guard division (Keibi-Bu) consisting
I:EJ ,."""" -.-.,.... 11. _".....1lHW ""'00'._"'0,.",
P ...... """- """T IT .., , .. 0111:''''' ' .....' "...-
= ..... ,.. U'
fire flPtiDa: ... _t to die .,
UDabIe quieldJ to atiJlpiU their I.
sJJtem or mutual .ad _ anan,ed with .....
borill( factorieI. If all tA
meuures and voluntary mul.uai aid failed, die
headqllUten 01 the prefeetural lire
was called uPl'n for uQtanee. 1he lire depwt.
ment of the factory was aubject to call by the
Pl'liee-eontrolled fire department for I'O'lt-'-id
duty, il the factory ..as free from lil'llll.
7. for the dispen.al of in.
dustry ...ere discussed beginning with the time of
the Doolittle raid (April 19012). Immediately (01-
lowing the raid 1 June 1945. hasty construction
"'as alaTted to evacuate production lacilities to
outlying districts. mostly along the flato adjacent
to the base of the mountain ranges surrounding
the area. Many 01 the larger factories
construction of to hoWle underground
factorie!. but as far all could he determined. none
was in production. TheShijo-Kadoma plant of the
Matsushita Electrie Co. built hastily on the flal3
at the base of the mountain was in production on
a basi$ of 30 percent of the plant eapacity at the
end of the War. The buildings. of typieal two-story
construetion, were completed and are sufficient in
.me to qlUU't'-'l" an infantry regiment. In the
nea:r-b}' mountainsid... coJU>t.ruction was started
on eight fntranees, 15 feoet wide, as openinp f.....
tunnels. extending 350 leet into the mountain and
connected by two latenr.l shafts. This underground
factor}" was daigned f..... sntIIll parts and
.....y aasembi).
8. Fi"""u.-AIJ coats in"o]>'ed in faetory air-
mid were borne by the factory owner.
for el'pern;ol'$ in,vi\"ed in dispersal and tunnel
constroetion. a promise of go"ernment reimburse-
ment was made, to be sdjUl'ted after the war.
9. Opna,i"" tiM" Mid roMiti<m,.-On 14
March. 7 June. 15 June, snd 10 July 1945. this
factorv """,,,,,bjected to light raids and on numer-
ous other ocrasio"" ""Rl! plaCf!d On air.raid w:onn
At nO tim... ho....n...... did it appear to be a
specific target of attack. In those four raids. how-
e'er. bombs fen on t/le factor) and within the
(actory compound snd the factOI')' perllOnnei were
e,.,..,uated to the shelters in the ri"" 5eIds. The
management reponed that the procedure ILl
plsnned "1lII canied out in detail. In each of the
ab""e raids, of smaillires were started but
most were e>:tintuiahed by the group lire seetion.
In 1"'0 i""tance;" entin! factOI')' buildings were
burned to the ground. Following the 14 March
"
latiolUl required the COlI8tl'Uction 01 "_II-
proof" lJhelta'l. No I!Umple,a 01 IIheI
Wet'll found that could be OOIIIideFed bomb ten
The main at the Mar.uahita
Company col1llisted of a COnerete unclerKrou
abelter I to feet long and 35 feet 'lride. This
IC'llII 6 feet .below the ground level, had battened
walls of 6 Inches of concrete and a COllCrete roof
about 8 inches thick. r.:one of thia
steel reinforced. On wp of the concrete roof :::
piled about 4 feet of earth. The entrances were
blome<!, but had no dool'!5. The ground water leyel
averaged about 6 inehes below the llUrface $0 that
were required 1.0 keep this shelter dry. Its
capacIty was approlumately 200 J)eT'SOIl$. At one
end a rnorecomfortable, electrically lighted shelter
Wll!I provided lor top officials. although ilJl roof
protection consisted only of timber. covered with
8 feet of earth. The shelU!rs construct! for the
rank and file of the faetory employee. "'ere built
above ground (If old wine tubs around which earth
and wd were piled, and weh was c(wen'd with a
flimsy wooden roof, on which 1 foot of earth and
wd was piled. Each shelter was used by a reser...e
squad ranging from 10 to 15 persons. Thisrequired
a literal packing of individuals into one solid,
huddled mass. These shelters "'ere scattered
throughout the factory compound and with o'er.
crowding, were capable of housing the entire fac.
tory personnel. In addition to the abo...e, another
system of similar shelters was built in the rice
fields outside of the factory areas and was used
only when it was evident that the factory itself
was a direct target. Photographs of these crude
shelters are shown on page 56.
5. Inspedlon ond ,eporls.-In;;pections "'ere
made jointly by a representative from the air
defense headquarters and 3 representative from
the prefectural police headquarters. Repom were
made to the factory airraid protection section of
air defenlle headquarters by the director of the
factory. The initial report included a ""mplete
account of plans, organi.ation and preparation
for defenlle. Subooquent reports related changes
and gave an account of all incidents. damage to
factories and number of casualties. together with
a detailed report. of any infringement on actual
protection.
6. MulKol oid.-E.1ch group in the factory air-
raid protection organization
lighting assistance. The director. m3d.e an nnme-
diate post_raid estimate (If the sltuaMn.and
fire-lighting forces of groups not o<:i'UPled WIth
.
-
.
-
.
-

,.
J 1 o.

::;:;
,
i
, _0
1
-.
v
1
I
,0
1
1
,

I
!
,

l
,
i 1
,

, ,
-
raid. 18 buildings of light CO"'tructi
wn'!Cked and rebuilt in other P\l8itione were
fire gaps. Discipline waa good in that em
continued their work until the factory
$Gunded. but, in many inatances, per'llonnel wo::;;
proceed to the outer rice field llhelter when d'll'cted
to go to the shelters within the The
claImed that on only two oceasions
v.:al! assIstance rt'llueste<! and obtained fr(>rn the
cIty fire department.
. 10. ':- great deal of flexibility
IS noted m factory aIr-raId Protection. lnstruc.
the Mini.suy laid down broad policies
10 corunderable detaIl. Government officials at the
pre/returnl le'-el added more details, specified
extent and suggested detailed plans. Factory
managers were allowed to exercise judgment in
the actual fonnation of their protection forces
but were required to satisfy the air-deferu;e head:
quarters of the prefecturo as to the adequacy of
their plan. With minor variations, all principal
industries adopted the suggested plan in that aU
organized a spe<:ially trained "spe<:ial proteeti(>n
group" and formed the halance of the pel'SOnnel
into reser"e unils. The entire organization func_
tioned only in case of emergency. No full-time air-
raid-protection personnel were employed, In
general these unils were well organized and oper.
ated effectively in that they required no outside
aid unless faced with saturation raids. But e"en
then the great Osaka arsenal, operated and de-
fended directly hy the anny, with priorities on
equipment and personnel and with a superior air_
raid protection, was laid in complete ruins by
concentrated air attacks.
b. Policy relati"e to food rationing for factory
airraid victims was $Gund and
helped to stern production)oss due to employee;
absenting themselns to join foraging parties.
c. Disposal of unexploded bombs was carele:sosly
executed. In Ile"eral instances where unexploded
bombs were found, orders were issued to backfill
the craters without I'C)XIrting the dud through
channels for military disposal. Had the American
forces employed delayed action high e:<:plosive8
more frequently this prnctice would h3"e wrought
havoc in the product;"e ability of Osaka plants
and would have materially increased the number
or deaths resulting from the air raids.
d. Basement shelters and refuge points under
blast might have afforded some protec-
tion against small high-explosive bombs: Ho,,:'-
ever, it is felt that, if the planl!! employmg thIS
form of ohelter had '-n...bjtded to a ..,. ...97
r&!d involving iMetldiaJi. &Ild bigh
miud. the!e pointo of rel'uge &Ild obeIten .......
!la"e been more of a trap than a haven. and per-
"Onnel would !lave rruJfocated in great numbfn.
thl. had become evident to factory exeetl-
U,. toward the latWr part of tbe war i. atteoted
by the fact that an effort was being made to build
earth and wood .h,.,lte!'3 in the burned-o"er areas
outBide the plant .
t. Due to the general misconception of the
magnitude and tactiQ of air raids, dispersal Pro-
gramo were tardily begun with the !'\':lult that a
few ca'"C8 were dug and a small number of rna.
chines were dispersed, but few of these installa.
tions were in production before the impact of the
saturation raids eliminated the neeessit) of di,..
persal by destroying the plants.
AJRRAID PROTECTION FOR SCHOOLS
I. School polriolic WRit (GdhJ HohJh Tai).-
a. This organization, under the leadership of the
teacher. was creawd for the PllTJlOS(' of
protection to the school building and of thellChool
children, particularly those under 12 yt'Wll of agt.
It ....as composed of the older pupils and did for
the school those things ....hich the neighborhood
group did for homes.
b. DlItlu.ltsdutiel ....ere:
(1) Passing along the air.rwd warning.
(2) Acting as fire ....ateheB.
(3) Control of traffic.
(4) Fighting fires.
(S) Rescue ....ork.
(6) Antigas measures.
(7) Emergency consuuetion.
(8) Acting as liaison with other groups.
(9) Guidance in matters of light control.
c. Coruitld of PlIpila.-Pupils "-ere instrueted
to take the rollo..ing action "'hen an attack Or
raid signal80unded:
(1) If at home-rush to their pre'iously
assigned posu..
(2) If near home--go home.
(3) If near school-go to the lIChool.
(4) If airplanes ,,'ere in sight. take rerU&"
in designated buildings along the way.
(S) If school "118 in session-
(1I) Act in an fashion and obfor
the teacher.
A'"<lid confusion-be calm.
(e) Go to !!Chool shelter,
(d) If dismis!<ed by teacher. go home,
p
IaadId witb .....,. m 'I I" II
'"'_'
,. IN
tit ........,.. I' "'....
For -aa train . __ 01 _....,. .....
aad, upon --.... 01 ..,.....,.. .....
PJOceed to ,ta poIt 01 daty OBI tblI tniL
Stock.. or of material __ pI-.:I It
1tI'tI\egle pointa t.ltrou,hout the diviUoa 'EXlUbit
h
,- Ewr,nq ....ot&I.trftt.to. A Iuwe ........
"'-eNtal ... mainlalllfd at dinsion hsdqlWW's..
It.s PfnOnnet consiMed of 328, indllding as doe-
tori. Scattered throughout the division were 12
emet1I:eney hoopiull or tint-aid stations,
...t.h from 1 to 3 doctonl in attendance at each,
. Gu/kf_.- LiuJeorooattention ..... pa.id
to PI dlofenoe.. In the entire Osaka orga.niu,tion
only PI masks were to exi.ot.
}. Adl.., /kft'Q<. The anny had ploom lor
addlllg antl-Ctn:raft can to important ll'ai1Ul. hut
.... th the eseeption of one or two esperimental runs
ws pbn ..... DOl- folloorM.
t. TbedeWled plan and reguIationo lorair-taid
del'ense lor the Osalor. railroad division are c0n-
tained in a book ... titled "0et.aiI!I of lhe Handling
of AirRaid Del"_" dated Augu&t 19U,
and publi5Md by the Osaka railroad bureau Ref-
erence iteltl 17 , A tnnalatioa 01 the table of
-.teouoll.his puhiieatinn iamea.:-:laaEshibit K.
6. Opmot_.-.. C","" oraanwntam! salis-
in spite or the damage inftieted III let
forth in panlgJaph one abo...e. Spot break dQ,r,"DS
""en! qnil:ltly and elliciently repaired. Both ......
&nee of and receipt of intelligeDee ..-ere
earned lIII saco:esotll11y.
. An..... .......--1'bl're 11'&11 COII8WII
roDJIeration bet"'"felI t.Ite railrooltb and other
agencies.....,b aa the arm)' slid Ioeat eommurutiell.
The conduct fJl emplor""" in railroad llWa1latlOll!l
aa Sl.atillllll and oll"'" buikIings ..... extlftDe/T
ample.. The male _plo)_ W'en! "'"elI ll'a"lU,g
br lbar immechate IUpft'>OtS for lighw.,- iDeipient
Iirea "';th hooes. if and pumps and
buckets. Some kt')' personnel "'-all g,,-en tnuDlIIB
in tnt aid b)' t.Ite raiIroIld physicians. l"pon the
....th
....rt neept female __ wbo pI'OCftded to
!heItfft, if a,-ailable. ot.beroo_ to \.he baaPmmt or
the lo-.-er center hall4. l"nder actuall'ald eondltiom
all oought t.Ite questionahle sbtIler of
",",,'el" Cl!llter halli, buemft,u Ot alr_...id ahelten..
f'1cepl a few cle5igDalN tin! ten. If Iirea got out
of-.lJ'lIl ..... IUmllOODed from the city
"'_c
clerical fon:e was ausmented IUlIIcien
the .uditional load. tly 10
t. Air-raid l<lO:rllillf' ....... -W .
raids were reee!"ed rroon the 01 air-
quarters at o..u and dispat,:bed by Y'-d-
the sis subdistrict atal.ionl throuJbout 10
.... hose alation ma"ters in tum the 'VISIOn,
to all sUldons in their di8l.riel&. Loeall
. Y t,,,, 1Ub-
.Uluon and 6IllII1n- rt'lied
on olber orgalllzed local W&nIinp.
d. 0.11'1>111:.<11.... of I""Oltdiotl 0tI Irall.... _Thl!
conductor was the or the train T'-
b k d . ,,,,engl'
neer, rn eman an were b-
ordinate 1O him. au
t. Railroad. instaiLationa such III railroad u.-
lions, roundJlou$es, repair!il>op,l
and. rail headqlW'tet$ were eao:b
reqUired to orgamze an air-defense organization
(!logo-Dan). Alt employees were subjtct to thia
dut}'. The organization consisted or:
(I) A If>ader. who was the topolflcia1 01 the
illJltallation.
(2) A planning and rontrul division,
(3) A lire-lighting division.
(4) An emergency repair division.
(5) A sanitary division. The funel.ion or the
included TCllClle, lintaid, and I!\-aeua.
tion.
(6) A re$l'rve division made up of the
balance of the of the illltallation,
f. lAg/aing rtgulatiOlu._ln the event of an air-
raid alarm, trnllie lighu Wen! dimmed b)' euuing
the JlOl'o'ft' rrom 20 to 50 perceIlt at the IOlIrft. All
lighL$ for general illumination were shaded 10 east
direct at angles below lhe horUontal.-'11
trame lighl.l! "'ere shaded hy laminated shades to
keep the !learns on a horizontal and prevent ob-
lII'rVation from abo\"e. Onl)' elllCntiaJ lighl.l "'ere
kept burning duriltJl: the Pfriod or alarm. AU 0Ibfn
were eJttinguished, Tlus procedure constituted
"dimout" than a blackout. Ughtll ..,thin
railway coachel on railroads "'ere dimmed, and
shadel were drawn. Electric railway tnlins. inter-
urban ca... and street. ears "'en! requir@d to rome
to a fult &top during periods of alarm to pt'e'"'elIt
apam from the lrolk-y.
g, Rtpoir aood "'''iNI.... amall
railway cars were kellt loaded and placed at
atrategie poinl.l! throughout thedi"ision, their load
conSsting of new rails. ties, spikes. shovels.
similal" items fOt maki"llll'lla1l rep&l15.
T....o heln.,. repair traim wee malntaint<! fOt
instant I'$Idjnea, t'aCh eomisung or _-en ta1S
'''1''--0' I
to ecores of amall private railway
grIln"" '1 f .
Il
aniell
that operate a mt ell.o
connecting lines. This natIonal raIlway,. d
geognphically into eigbt divisions. The c....
command and cont.rol i. from the MinlllU)'
Tl'llll!lportation, through the governor of the
lecture. to the llrelident of the railway board,
the division, The a.nd fo!
peruin only to the Osaka
2. In thatdi>ision there are 1,/38 mile< of ....
line, 1W2 miles of bmneh lines and ....
connecting lines). 32 pnvate nulroad com.-..-
tot.aling 1,132 mile< of track. The paesenger tl.flIt
dunng the year of 1941 1,150,QOO pw
da)'. Of thi!<. 450.000 "''1''I'e paymg
7oo.000 ...-ere pa;;Il riden made up of r:l.Ilroad
plo)'tel. war plant factOl')' ....orkers. /l"O"emlllftlt
employeea. Army pt!l'&lnnel and studenlll. The
freight trallic within the division during the same
year a,'eraged 50.400 short tons 1)\11' day. Total
number of employees the di,'ision. tRIll-
si\"e of trnin ere'to-s, is 60.793. These statistics ill-
elude the electrified portion of the railway,
referring, however. only to intl'f'City tlsffie.
3. During the lleriod of the war this divisiOll
WlLS subjecled to numerous air-raid attacks whidl
datro)'ed the following equipment: 127 1QC()11lO-
th'es, 156 street ears, 389 railroad pass\1ngtl"
coaches. 1,492 freight cal'$, 33 miles of rail"""
trackage. 12 bridge!, 16H miles of trolley wi""
46 st.ation buildings, 25 signal tOWeTlI. 4 rellll!l
statiolUl.22 miles of telephone line, 517 telephont
posts, 107 miler. of signal cable controlling lighu.
216 milt!!l of PO"'@!' cable. One hundred and fortr'
six emplo)"ees were killed and 297 were seriousl,
wounded.
4. OrlO'lllliuuioll of th roilrood.-The l,residem
of the railroad boal'd_ was responsible for all thr
opentions within the entire district; the stat..
masler was responsible for aliloca.l iR$tallatioll!l iI
the railroad hcadquartera area. The
and administration were organized along lillll
almost i<Jentical with pri"ate management d
American rail ....)' S)!llenlll.
S. Orf1/llliteJli,,1I "f .0;/r<>04 airaid
a. Lmdn-. -The director of air-raid protectill
was the president of the railway bo.1rd lor cjI
district; his fil1lt assist.ant was the divisio;>n
l>ateller.
6. Colllrol U1lttr was inat.aJled in the
the division dispatcher, but no additionall!'l'"
ment was added. This oltice simpl)' the JoclI'
place to dispatch orders and receive rel>DIU I
It wu related thnt at one girls' high lil'hO?l fr
"mately 700 pupibl there ....as not II smg e
appnw .men their buildina "''ll$ completely
=:aimpl)' the children ..._ lI'I'lIl
home when the .,r-raid alarm iOUnded.
<I. nr "AooI ai...."'id-proIttl'"......'I tGoUo
BIllI"d<l .. ). '"d'
1I1 Orpa..imtiool. The lIlr-flll "llrotec Ion
ulI;t 01 the !ld>ooI ,,'as <':!'Sled from among
members of the ...hooI patriOtiC unit.
units ,,'ereorpniud folklWingthe
I 19-1.3 of pert:unmg
to them (EJhibitI lind Reereru.:ellem
It 1Ioasgi.-en the taSk of caJT)"ing out
student train;", as .. a5 tile rtSp()1l$Iblhty
of ha,-ing ....ilable wall"!' reen"oin!and fire..
lighting apparatll$. I't'!!Clle iuipment and all
other materials needed for protection.
(2) /lwr"dion. lUI members were in-
suueted that it ..'UTlIQISt important to guard
and pn)tee:l the impe-ial portrait and all im-
perial l'l'5CIipts. ChemicalJ from the labora-
torY were to be kept ready for removal on
short n<;>tice. Abo.'l' all, preo:autiormry meas-
utell "'ere to be taken to gi'-e protl!Ction to the
children. inc:luding such thinp as illltroetiOll$
in methods /)f l"f!SWe and lighting finos, !Ie-
Io.'<':tion of Afe placa while enroute to school
and while at school. uuk wall to keep
parents informed of all arrangements made
for the children.
2. C...-. Japanelle ps)ocboIOlO\ embrac-
ing the will toobe)eQrl$tit...ted authority from the
empen>ron down had tremendous influenc:e on the
efficiency of air-raid-protection org;lniutioll!l in
public lIChools. Calmnel$, courage. and conformity
with rule!! and plans chanu:terized the conduct of
the children, This spirit of ",iJlingness to obey lID
peo'aded the 01 the nudent.s in the
1IC1looI stl,K1ied tllat whell their b\lilding IIi"3S hit
and burned to the ground during the air mid 17
March 1945, not one of the 700 IItudents was loot.
The diiciplilllllj' training of the studenu was the
moet important featlU'e of the air-mid deferu.e
program. The lack of equipment alone was enough
to j\l.5tify the suCCl!S8ful procedure that wall actu-
all)' followed-that of evacuation and remO"al of
pel'lI(lllS 3ll the prime act"'ity.
RAIUl.OAD AIRRAID PROTICIlON
I. burodlfd,-OfI. The rniJroadt of Japan are 0r-
ganized on the basis of natioll<ll ownefflhip and
operation, with the exception that franchises are
.' II counlry UIX'" oboer,'
t. TraiPUI ,II Ope ked .... ullOn
illfP]anesoron belngattaC. n rs dis-
direction or the
persedtutakeco\'erm . Id roceed
h" lations under alert "'On P
approac 'Rg.8 I such st:ltion were ilctUlllly
into the statIOn un o:s" . had the authority
under fire. The statton master . '"n the
. h toholdortodispmch a tramstand,ng ,
ell I "" em! unlessbomb5wereactuallyfol1.
statton. n , . . ed
in the railroad schedules were mmntaln .
SMlter All small installations. such
&'l .:ailway stations, had trench
The large instal1atidns, such as oA,ce
within the city. had few, if an)", conventLOnall1.1r-
raid shelters. For eJlllmple. the space under
elevaled rall"'ay track platforms of the ma.m
Osaka station wa5 com'crled into make-slll.ft
shelters II)' erecting bame walls of timber filled 10
with earth to create i\Ome blast and splinter y.ro-
tection. Employee; and the thousands.of waltlng
room customers would Hoek into these madequate
shelters upon sounding of the alarm.
,. ,uullUll installations ":'eTl!
recipients only in the matter of fire ProUd)?n.
The municipal fire depanment lent
aid to the railroads whenever needed. aid
was eltensively organized in the matter of emer-
gency repail"$. The repair trains of the division
interchanged asosistance as needed.
7. Co",menu.-The air-raid protection organi-
ution cstablished in this bureau was entirely ade-
quate and was well organized. Regulations were
printed pre:JCribing the air-raid precautions and
the organizations to carry them out. This organi_
zation, though it appeared elaborate, was simple
in operation, for it followed the existing chain of
command. Its effectivenC8i! may be judged by the
fact that, though facilities were about 25
denro}ed. there ""ere only 146 deaths of railroad
employees while on duty (less than one-founh of
one percent) and railroad schedules were main_
tained with few interruptions. The principal
damage suffered in this area was to the Osaka_
Kobe main linein the "kinity of the Osaka arsenal,
on which was restored within 26 hours.
Although the central group of buildings was not
hard hit by raids, the well disciplined and trained
air-raid protection organization functioned well
in handling the huge crowds always found in the
station and vicinity; conducted them to shelters
during airraid alarms and successfully averted
panic and disorder. The extent of the bureau, the
location of material dump!! and repair trains are
"
indicated on a map of the bureau
Wi Exhibit J,
NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AIR.1lAI])
PROTEcnON
I fntradudion.-All communications a
in japan are owned and ,0.
under the direct superVlSlon th.e MinISter
Transportation and ..At till
beginning of the war (1941) a mllllslena! eo-.
mittee was set up known as the Teishl"n-f n. Tbir.
committee, dominat.ed by Army and Na,y
,;entativCll was desIgned to eontrol communlQ.
tions, giving priority to all matters.
to the war elTon, All Japan was dIVIded Into
eight communications distri.cts.. Eaeh of
didrlctll was headed by a dIstrIct bureau, alllli-
lar in organization but subordinate to that at the
national level, and was known as the ]'ritkia
Kyoku. The O$3ka communications
(O$3ka Teishin_Kyoku) included the llrefecture.
of O;;aka, Kyoto, Hyoto, Hyogo, !\lara,
Shiza and Wakayama. Air_raid protectIon mattera
were directly administered by a controlling
bureau at a higher level than that of the pre-
fectural government and acting independently 0(
it. The prefecture, however, was required l<l
furnish aid when needed by communications
facilities and mutual aid was established between
their own installations only.
2. Oooka communiCUlioll8bureou (O.roka Trishi...
Kvoku),-This bureau, with considerable admin.
istrative force, exercised complete control of all
communications within the district, including the
post office, the telephone, and telegraph system",
Each of these three systems in turn operated as a
separate service except that in the small villages
containing third-class post offices, each post office
had a telegraph office and a telephone w:ehange
under postal jurisdiction. The district communica_
tions board disseminated the air-raid protection
regulations to the three subordinate services ss
prescribed by the i\linister of Communicatioll.l.
The president of this board was also charged witb
the organization and leadership of the air.raid
protection unit (Bogo-Dan) of the building whieb
constituted the headquarters of the board. ThP
Osaka communications bureau on 4 June 19+1
established a special air-defense section to oper.ltl
and control air-raid defense matters for the COlll'
{IIunications systems of the dlstriet. The preside,nl
of the bureau prepared a history of this unit, III
plans and operation. (Exhibit L). Each ofthe thl'fC
5ff'Vicea will be tl'eated fI8JlatateIy In tile
parsgTaphs, nil'
Pose Office AuRaid P_ioo
3, and 1I8Col1d-clau
offices throughout the Osaka I/OItaI diatrict'7"t
elsewhere in Japan) are headed by the
of but in Japan the heads of
larger lIIstaHatlOnS are called "presidents.'" Thelle
olficial.s are by the government and
their lIIstallatlons are housed in government-
owned buildings, In small !(lwns and rural com_
munities, there are third'"Class POst offices for
which postmasters are chosen by the citizens of
the community by popular acclaim, then officially
confirmed and subsidized by the government. The
postal president for each prefecture within the
distriet has command OlVer first- and second'"Claas
postmasters within the prefecture but the control
Olver third-class postmastel"$ Olutaide of metropoli_
tan areas is exercised at tbe district leveL
4. Orl/<lniZCllion of postal airroid jlTOIUlwn._
The president or postmaster of each postal
building was required to organize and equip an
air_raid protective foree tor his building (Bogo-
Dan) and further required to gi,'e it his personal
leadership. Discretion in the matter Gf details was
left to those leaders but their plan had to meet the
approval of the postal district board. The typical
organization consisted of:
a. Stoff.-The leader and his stsff, consisting
of a chief of staff and a planning board, a general
affairs section, and a liaison section,
b. Special prO/celio.. group.-A pro-
tection group (Scnin Bogo-Bu) consistingot about
10 pereent of the total number of emplorees.
organized into special squads of fire fighters, fire
watchers and patrol:;, rescue and first.aid, gas
defense, emergency repairs, and supply and main.
tenance of material. .
t. Reuru SUliOll.-A reserve section consisung
of all adult male employees, trained in general air-
defense technique and required by roster \.0
perform night alert duty at the Cllta.blishment.
d. eqUIpment co:>n-
slsted generally of one hand-dra"-o gasohne
PUmper with a capacity of 200 to 400 gallons
per minute numerous hand pumpers, buckets.
emergency' water barrels, and carbon tetra-
chloride bombs. .
e. Emn,enc/f medieal,-Each buildmg had a
fi
.d and e'scu-
first-aid station and a rescue, rst-:ll, fi
ation unit, equipped with light rescue tool$. rat

aid ki141.l\d Iiwn. lIerioIlIIr iD.Itnd ........

ated to a eommllllieatloa. boIpitaL
J. S _F_ sbeIt., U lIlaeb, ... ..-
.tflr employea. At the 8Malert, tJIOIDeB'-
Juverule employee. \IPtft eVK1Ated to the __
ment or \.0 eenter inllf!r halls. Upon the IOIIDdlnc
of the aIann, aU other employees eJ:cept IPfdaI
PTOtective forces -ere evacuated to the buemeat.
At the discretion of the leader, employees could be
required \.0 stay at work until tkreat to the
building itself was imminent, Or until incendiaries
llr bombos \\'ere actually falling in the vicinity.
g. OperO/ioQ.-Protection of postal buildings
light raid conditions was self-sufficient, but
It a fire was not checked at once, the leader called
for asaistanoe from the city fire depanment. In
the large central postal building in Osaka, em_
ploying 1,600 persons, the special protective
organization consisted or 200. At night this organi-
zation was filled to full strength b}' reservea who
were required \.0 perform this duty by roster. Of
this oumber, 60 at all timea were required to
patrol the building while the remaining 140 slept
in the dormitory. Only _tion heads and key
employees were furnished with g:aa masb and
steel helmets. Fire figbters and gas-defenae
personnel bad protective clothing.
5. COIIIllltIU8._Most of the large buildings "'ef"C
only s1igbtly damaged by concus.sion. Fires staned
by iocendian bombs were handled by their 8eIf-
protective measurf!!<. Of the smaller lint cbss
postal buildings, bowe"er, about 10 percent were
!(ll:a1ly dcstro}'ed. Of the still smaller third..eJas.
post offices. almOllt 60 percent were \.Otally de-
stroyOO.
Telephone S)..,em Ai,Raid Pr<><ecrioo
6. flllrool<CliOll.- The telepbone system, an in-
tegral pan Gf the national communications syatem,
came under the jurisdiction of lbe Osaka eom-
municatillllsdistrict bureau (TeishinKl'olru). The
Osaka distriet included the Be"en prefectures
named in paragraph 1 abo\'e. The cit}' of Osaka
constitutes the lllT1"St part of tbe prefecture of
Osaka and tbe responsibility l .... air_mid protec-
tion of telepbone ill!itallatioll!i within this pre-
fecture rested with the Osaka telephone president.
In the other prefectUl'9< that constituted .the eom-
municauollii district. air_mid .was
sUpeI"\'i!!e<l directh' by the district commun?-uons
bureau (Taishin-K)'OIru), This report w'l1l deal
with the local proleCtion. . .
i. Orp...i:ou,-"".-The msin telephone bUlldmg,
"
I fOUN\Ory slructure, housed the general
aliiarge the long distance lines, and several local
'_'C" S'nceal ...... proportionoftheemplo)'eeI
u,;"angea. - .. . .., . L'
..-ere female, thl')' ",ere lnrorporat"" mto.,,,e alT
raid protfCtion unit (Iktgo-Dan) and that Instance
is one of lhe rare examples where women ....ere 1lO
in lhe prote<'tion of l'Ommemal or
tlIlerpnsea. The 3.000
di,idee! into S shifts; a day shift of 800.
ufoe\lti,-e.nd admim.trati,"e) and 2 mght shIfts
of 600 eat'h. Special proleel;"e uni\JI "1!n! or
pniud. of 152 Pf'9OIlB each, broken
d01l'1l i'lIo:
G. FireWlllebers.
II. Fire lighten..
e. First-aid and reseue sqlllld...
fl. GModefeMe unit.
" Emergefte)' repair unit.
All Olber ftPpIo)'1M!5 to be members
of the .iNaid prottion unit and COJl${ituled the
aiT-nid prota-tion raenes. )lemben of tbe apeci;ll
uniu of 1&2 Pat:h M'lected
bftause they within PaS)' of the
buikling" eomplete unit, r.ason dilly
within tbe building 2-l OOI,ll'1l dar. Sin<:e the
majoIity of the nighkhift ftllp\o)ft!\ femU:-
u1ephone operators, they DOt 10
'.e/fproteetion in t'UOI' ol all incident
but to mnain 00 dut} at the
lwitcllbclarlb. the _ pen<lnnel "-en"
to take theiT tum on alert duty ouWde
ol worlring houn. The fOf" utra..-ark
wasin thefonnolbonlUeildi5tributed _i-annuall}'
in proportion to the number of utra hours on
duty. A dormitOl'Y IOU available and onl}' 20 ol
the 152 rotated duty duriog the night.
(Orpnw,tion chart prepared by J)l"eSident[A.R.P.
Jeaderl illCIOIed all E:ohibit M.)
8. OptrotiUIII.-II. fire J,atl.'.-The app3l";l'
tUl fOf" the main telephone buildiog consisted of a
halld-dnlwn portable P!Oline pump of 45 gallons
pel' minute capacity. lUi .tOlU'Cl' was the nWTby
canal but the stlWm could be fon:ed only to the
-.:ond story. Thill equipment wao augmented by
four hand pumpll, a supply of canvlU
buckeUl, and ltatic supplies of water liberall}'
seattl!ll!d throughout the building in bamls and
eoncrete tanks. These were further supplemented
by hand utinguishers: and carbon tetrachloride
bombs.
IVa/clio. patrolled the building and acted as
both fire watchers: and order police. Upon receipt
of an alarm, designated membel'll would alert the
proteeth'e forees, while othen
to the roof to act as ,potten!. All
remained at their poIlt of duty unul bomb.
actuallv falling or the building Wall allre. lit
instandes, key personnel remained on duty."
while olherll were evacualed to
ba$emenl. It "..as staled that morale wU'ueb
mo;;t eS5l'ntial telephone exchange Opet1lto!'l ,..
mained on dul}'.
t. E ...trgf'JltIl lMtdiool.-A fil'llt-aid slIltian ....
manned by speeialisLi trained by doctol'!l from lilt
communications hospital. The te:!lCue and lil'St1lW
$!Iliad evacuated injured to this 'lIltion br
streIchef and we serious!}' injured, in tum, '""
taken to the communications hospital.
d. L"lui., tIllllrol,-Blackout dtadl!$ .....ere pro.
\';ded and at we first alarm all unl'leOe8lla1}' light-
ing""3$ eo:tinguished.
t. PnJonII(IlOU.-This central telephone build-
ing 'lII"3li hit by many incendiary bombs. $e\'l'l"aI
fires oecurred but "-e'e PUl out b}' the local fire,.
pro(ection $!Iuad. Considerable light
resulted from concussion. fi\'e "-e'e injuml, IlOllf
killed, and the SiI'!n';ce wu not inten't.lpted fl'Olll
failure within the building although many failW'!l
Ol'Curred wrough damage to outside wires and
0'....
9. Throughout the city then:! "'-e'e 20 teleplJoo.
eo:changes; 5 of lhe:le "'._ l'OIJlpletely destro)'ed
and 86 employees killed. Repail'lll to ouuide instal-
lation.!;, ootside lines and cahles were the respon-
sibiliW of the regular maintenance departmellt
and ..-ere not a pan or the air-raid prolel':tion func-
tions. PTes.idenUi or direclOl':l of all oeparat.e instal,
lations were allowed to llIT3nge and orpniu their
0 ..... protection, subject to the approval of lhe
communications district bureau.
10. Reponsof all incidenUi were reported to tht
Osaka telephone president who transmitted thelll
in tum direct to the district communicatiOlII
board and to the Osaka prefecture police head. II
the country and rural areas, air-mid protectillll
W3S the responsihility of the local poIItmaster,
11. Mil/Illll lIid was practiced between coil!'
munieation installations. For example, if a telf.
phone building, a telegraph building lind a poIt
office were within rernsonable digl.:tnce of tad
other, they exchanged the mULUal aid of their firI
departments but were not required to e:otend Ul
to outaide agencies. On the other hand, the prt'
fectural fire departments were fC(luired to fumisll
aid to them, if needed.

TIOlegrapb 5y_ Ai'-laid Proaoerir.

12. llItt(O(/lWi...... _'I1Je
district t.elegraph (includi the o.u.
lectures surroundingOllllbj pre.
of the district communiQtiono burau
n'l!ponsibility: . He "-d the
II. For theaiNaid Proteetion f all
lions in e\'en prefectures. or eommunira.
For the local air-raid prot
graph building. eeuon of the
To assist him he had a chief of stafJ .
proleCtion section for the district, and iilr-raid
protection chid' for the bUilding. Asan a'r'faid
e:opected, the air_raid P"Olfttion _nughl he
building constituted a"'a:wnea pig" ..:
Up an e:oample fOf" -Slmi1ar uniUl throughoo the
district to follow, t
13. OrlJ(lllizati". -Thisloealair.raid
COllSisted ol
protection URlt (Serlin Bogo..Bul of 2flO
It was broken do1rn i::":
folloWing 51:0 umta:
". A fire..6ghtiDg section rBoltaHan) ol35
II. A fire watching and patrol seetion
Han) of 35.
c. A rescue, first,.aid, and .-tion
(KrugG-Han) of 35, 20 of whom ..-ere females
tnined in first aid.
d. A ga.s-rlefense section (Borlolru.Han) of 3ii.
e. An emergenc:}' repair and debris renlO\lII
etction (K0!>3-ku_Han) of 35..
j. A auppl}' !leCtinn (llaikyu-Han) forthe51lwh
of food, clothing, and equipment, tollOislrng of 25.
p. All olber personnel constituted I reter\t and
were used in shifts to keep the speeiaI proIe.tion
unit 61led up to full strength of 200 On dUly 21
hn<n per day.
14. Co:n'I!.re.tr.-II. Throughout the in''6tip
tion of air.r;o.id protection for communications. It
W3.'l noted that under the administration of the
district communicatioJ\3 bun!:l.u, and
uniformity of organization were e<;dent. Individ
ual heads or installations made ,'lUiatiol1ll onl)' 10
meet their own particular needs. The 1)"$lem
polier was gimilar to the German self.
protection," although the type of organization
W;l.!j different. The dominating factor was the
organization and thorough training of a special
group, subdivided inlo specialized section$ or
Jl(luads, and the org,mization of the balance of lhe
lJel"5Onnel into a reiler\'e to maintain the Sfleeial-
ized unit at full $trength at all limes.
b, In this di$tricl the protecti"e organi.ation$
..... ---
-- llpInlW ' and ' au.- .. die ....
lnadeq.., equipcneetfl-u.-bd-P....
vum.r.we to "-Ub""
'" ether l-.diary .. _.
,,-
c. t'airlYefficient postaIlIeI'Vlr:e .... fIIlliDtaiDed
but tile ..,red communications WWI! badly m...
ruPted, Three telIOpllorJe offices, the .
builrllng and 90 PI:'f'l,'Ient of the ::
IUbo.cnber telephone oef'Vice "'f'f't
,4. From the above ,t can he Ifll'Il
bon to .... plo)'ft penonnel was much
fIlOn' e/l"eeuye tlwl thaI for the ol du..
roPWd ---. The orpniutoon 01 the repair
fOf" mrnefficient emtIgUl<y
" , .....l ..... 1Ulfl from the lack of
cntic:aJ WU'e to meet the totally
&mount ol rlamaae- This lack of critic:aJ material
P"I!''ellted Il""'1IWIftIt, reotoraticn 01 all daa:I3ge:l
bul the I'epaU' fflCCl!l were able within a
matter of ,,"em days to reotore the l:olwst
_tiaI -.. of land !me .....,m"n... tions fOf"
o/Iicia1 and miliwy -.
HARBOR AlR.IlAJD PRorrcnoN A.'\'D
PORT SEQ,'WJTY
. 1.1""""-.-TheO'bharbor, .... oithe
lmpllf'taflt poru of Japan, W'U capable of banrIlinr
I IfIlOIIIlt oi .... PJIUI Ill' farilities COIIIIis:ttd
of,
5. Ten and ooe-haU mileI of docb IlCtualln.f_
ing and di..ebarp se:-e',
. Three and _hall' -'IIIIn' mileI "2,000,000
T:lUbul ol lPICl! ..thin the bnoahnter
from _hir;h r:arg!1 could be rliscbarged fn:m
ligflters. and &born 22 milaol Ahallow draft r:a.rW
S}"IMm connecu.1lg all oi the indll!lUil1_01 the
cil}' "'tb lbe harbor area.
r. The tonnIge at shipping handled in onlinar)'
peacetime WIll I )'arl!' 1>erlIllI! of 7.000,000 Ioog
tons ol exporu and 2,700,00(1 tona d imporu.
d. The imporu ...ere priDCipall!' rice, coal,
!ugar and chemicllls. and the e:opnru
of ra'" !ilb, Jtton and !ilk textiles IlId
manufactlll"ed goods.
2. The industries silualed ;n the harbor area
COIl.<4ted of shipbuilding and repair, lumber,.ueeI
and iron ...orb,
3, The raids most to the harbor _
began II MlU'Ch 1944. lletween thaI dale and I
June 1945 compaml.hely little damage OCCI1I'I"ed,
but "n I June I he:\\'y raid burned out most of lhe

over 50 pereent of the warehouS'll

one-half of the dock facilities.
a
damage
, combined wi:h plane-droPped
. ndered the harbor so madequate and SO
that it ,.'as useless as a por:.
4 geQrgllRiUlliQR.- The organization for ..alr
of the harbor was an elaborate
paper." However. regardless of the m'n18trles
interested in pha;;es of harbor de.fense
( hieh ,,m be covered in a later report) all hIgher
:helons coordinated their directives through the
governor of the Osaka prefecture. and through
him to the prefectural chief of police.
the prime relponsibilit}' for local of the
harbor relted with the prefectural pohce. the chIef
of which had under his direction (with the glwer-
nor as nominal president) a group of on a
board, the members of which were as follows:
o. Chief of the Osaka police,
b. Superintendent of engineering department
of o.aka.
c. Superintendent of economic department,
d. Chief of staff of Central Army headquarters.
e. Chief of staff of ();;a.ka Jlolice guar<!5.
j. Chief of di"isional staff of Os.1ka.
g. Control chief of Osaka Army munition trans
ponation.
h. Head of (),;aka branch No.1 shipping head-
quarters.
i. Head of engineering branch under the
Minister of Home Affairs.
j. Superintendent of Osaka holl$C.
1". President of the communications dePart-
ment.
I. President of O>aka railway bureau.
1ft: Superintendent of Osaka business and
lumber department.
n. The mayor of Osaka.
o. A liaison member who was the chief of Kobe
maritime atrairs department.
S. The above group of official advisers, J"C(Juired
by the general plan, actually operated in that it
met occasionally to coordinate plans and to pro-
mOle the interelts of the agencies they represented
in the formation of harbor defense plans. In
practice, however, the chief of the Osaka water
police station was placed in charge and given the
responsibility for all air-raid-protection measures
in the harbor area, which included that portiOn of
the harbor and waterfront south of the Tenpozan
Canal eJltending to the end of the peninsula. His
jurisdiction over the water aJ'{!a included all of the
main ehannel3 extending 1
'1 The of h13 JUl'lsdlction over till
areas was due to his oontrol of ... batt
d the auxiliary fire boats lor fire-fightlDl fQ..
Furthermore, the chief thia dia:t"ct "-
senior to the chiefs of the *lid
Taisho police districts and was Jlwen Pl'lOl'lty for
mutual aid. To him was assigned leadership in.n
harbor protection matters. The boundaries of the
harbor area are shown on the chart attached here.
to as Exhibit O. Photographic views of the h.arbe:r
taken from the lookout tower of the harbor police
8tation (C.P.):lre shoWTI on ]l<lge 65.
6. The harbor mastcr had full charge of man.
time matters in the waterside areas of the harbor.
He controlled the conduct of shipping entering and
leaving the harbor, while at anchor, in movement
within the harbor and while moored at dock. He
was responsible for the inspection of arriving
ships to see that they were prepared for the ">ell.
protection" of their ship and to see that the master
understood that an emergency crew mU3t be left
aboard in charge. Further, he established and
enforced regulations for safeguarding harbor
installations by J"C(Juiring ship3 containing dangt!T_
ou!! cargoes to move to safety areas in case of a
threatened air raid.
7. Full regulations for the protection of harbor
facilities and shipping within the harbor are found
on page 5 of a secret pamphlet published by the
Osaka prefecture. (Refel'(!nce item No. 18, with
tnlnslated index.) All other matters of air-raid
protection, both land and water sides, weI'(! under
the direction and supervision of the chief of the
harbor police station. The full_time organization
at his command for this purpose was as follows:
a. The headquarters staff oonsisted of a fire
chief, the commander of the fire boat, a doctor,
and Olbout 20 other persons on duty at all times.
From this station which operated a control
center the defense matters of the harbor "'en'
directed. hI addition, his headquarters compl...
ment oonsi8ted of 130 persons of police rank whi9
constituted the fire and police personnel. The fi .....
fighting organization con3isted of 1 main fire 8U:
tion and 4 sub3tations, manned by a total of 23i
firemen. In addition to those fire stations, one Iitt
engine with a crew of five was maintained at t!"
harbor police headquarters under the poliCt
chief's immediate control and dispo3ition. TIt
fire boat was an eight-ton craft of 1,000 gailOIL'"
per-minute capacity and had a crew of eight mea
It was sunk during the raid 26 June 1945.
"
-
their own sheltI of tlIe Abored and eovered
tn'nch t}'lle.
1. C_...I.Kollo.... -lnitiaIlJ.
c:onsisted of both rwfio and telephone bf'toreen tlIe
police Mations. station and poIW head_
quart_ ill the p"!tural TIle earlv
nids, d.....pted tbe"e eomnlllluea_
principally tlIe ttiepbooe 8}-stftJl. and the Ilea\')"
raid t June 1$15 of the radio
equipment. It "'aa Mated thai the blut of e:rpJo.
aiOI\fi destroyed the tubes. l'w of camer pigeons
bet,,'1.'ell the boat and tlIe harbor poOre Ma_
tioo beeame the _ of tOllIlRwUcatioll
othef than that of nu. -.hod ....
IBed Ift'iously and loft.. art-' lII.ilI mai....
lained 00 the roul of the harbor police station.
whJcll i3 now i30Ialed due to dewoyed bridge!! and
the recent floods.
,. ,lloltl<ll mi.-The knrrer-lwilor area "'all
gi''('II in the .....Iter of mlltua! aid..4.1
time< .,hell other part.< of the ":1,. -oft betq
bombfd, the harbor fumisbed
10 other The med>od of_ur-
109 thi3 ami:llance "'all 10 l'fqlH!St ;1 from air-
defense hMdqlW'tfnl or from the eentr:>t fin!
by private industriel the harbor area witb
an agreement to lend lheir facihtiel to the h..arbor
!lOtice organization whene,'cr required. Evacua-
tion of the .....ounded "'as conducted by t,,'O
methods: one hJ' calling for ambulanee.J from the
citJ' hospitab; and the other throug:!l P,-acuation
hy poI;"e boau using the canals. The o\'erioad can
be estimated when it is considered that in the I
June roid alone there were o\'er 7,000 wounded
and 3,000 killed in the haroor area, including the
Chikko district.
f. SJu.iuu,-ln the 10"'('1' harbor :area, fh'e
reinforced concrete surface ..ttelters were con
atruo:ted. The:se sheltoen: had db of 2h 01
Iteelll'inforced concrete. had open entrane:es .-jth
no gas or blll'lt_proof door:s, and had a capacity of
100 persons each. One built immedialely in front
of the harbor police designed for uoe of
hl'lldquanen lJenOnnel. is sho"'" abo,('.. l'nder
raid conditiuns, "vrkers in nar-bJ' "'eft
permitted to O'O""d into this shelter. four
others of similar eonsuuctiot'l ...- ertl
throughout the district. llesigned mainly for lIlIl! 01
ollieials and industry hl'llds. Throughout the area
individu:Ll cnterpriiiCll and residents constrocted
. h,vi"'" beoen mislled hy a....urance "-
optimism, ..., . d _ .
the militar}' thaI only hghl an lIpan,utc. raidI
could be Cll'ected.
tTglllatiolt.l and the chart hsung the auxdlal'y"
bo.ts"'en! follo"'ed out completely_ I.n Pr,aetiet.
the functiolt.l in\'lanahl)' reqUired for alr-r:Ud ....
ttion camed out ll$ follows: .
Il. By full_time personnel. a., sel forth In
gmph$ 4 to 9 inclusive, . .
b. /{C8tNt.->10 fulltime organIzatIon ...
l'l5pecially tnlined and reserved for rescue work.
This imporuutt function was 12rried by 1rate
police and by au:riliar)' orgamzed lllllOlll
the residents and workel"ll .....thm the harbor lll'l!L
Ther ,,'ere equipped only with light hand tooIa,
such as !I.,\WS and crowhani. When the harbor WlII
hit by the heavy raid 1 June 1945, these rescue
units "..ere entirely ineffectual and were busy with
the protection of their own immediate h01l8l!1Io1d
0If installation. There "'('f'l! no heavy reseue
orpni2.atioTlll "';thin the harbor arm (p. 13.
Reference item No. 18).
c. Salrogt,-S,..lvage procedures are explained
on page 12, Reference item No. 18. ThC$! JlI'Q.
eedures were not followed in actual practice.
When the hea\')' raid stnlck the harbor a hasty
plan was (':$\3hlished and pLaoed into effect by
word of mouth. It consi;;ted of "preventive sal-
vage,'- that is. the removal of ships from the are:&!
that might endanger othen. and the clearance of
all boats from channels, that might obstruct
shipping, if sunk. The only requirement elItalJ..
lished-a !leVel'(' one-....8$ lhat eac.h ship had to
shift fOif iuelf. and the DWIter' of each \'es;;eI,,'ll5
required to _ that hill ship did not sink in
channel. Whell the harbor was bombed. it was
struck SO hard and so far beyond the expectatiON
of the harbor defense pel'$Onnel that no other prOo'
visions could be made. It was only a matter of
accident that mOllI of the ainkinl'l consisted d
5Ill'I1I boau of siu.
d. E.urlf!llq ..tdiaol.-Again the policy ..
influenced by theoptimlstic advice of the mililllr1
The extent of facilities of 6l'!1wid
in each of the police slatioM. one in thl
harbor !lOlice station, and one in the nearby
Chikko and Taisho stations. There Wali a doctol'iI
attendanee at each with assisting pen;ollllll
funher. all of the regular pohceand fire
"'ere given training in fir:sl aid by repre;entau"",
from lhe air defense headquarters oftheprefeetUlt
'1!:lIrly in I!H5, 2 new 20-lJed were
pleled. ThC$! hOSllitals were built and malntal
8 The auxiliary fire boot
of 23 tQmmet'Cial tug>! eqUlPpel
pumper$ till fQikJ",-s:
3 ';th 900 pumper!!
1 860 pl\on._per-mmule pumper!!
4 ..-ith.soo pl\QM-per_minute pumpers
I ..-ith 600 pllom>-per_minute pumper
I with 550 galluns-per-minute pumpl'f'll
I 4500 gallQl"J_per_minute pumpers
and the ranged between 100 and 300
gallon.-'._per_minute pumpen..
9 ..W'd auxiliaries of the fin> ,u.partmenl
of the fire-fighling Sl!Ctillns of indlblries
located in the harbor am. ""!Ioee atVo'5 were
trained by the chief of the harbor lire department.
TheIr equillment. howe"er, consisted not of
motorized pumpers. but of large hand pumps of
!.he "hand ear" tflJe. The abo"e desuiption of
planned organization l'Olllpri$ed .1rn<)61 the total
of:l eon"entional air-raid prouction organiAtion,
altlloutth other iteln$ of au:riliarf organiAtion..-ill
be di:oeussed in par:lgraphs under the
title of "Operations:'
10. Air-raid air-raid warnings
came from aiNaid defense headquarter>!
to tile "''liter poIioe station by telephone and by
radio. The pllblic alldible -.nrninp ..ere
o\-er 20 sireM installed throughout the harbor
are-. Six of th_ sirena ilUtalll un highest poinLs
throughout She harbor were controlled from the
main s"'iteh at a central control station. The bal-
ano!! of the sirens ....ere lIOunded manually by
attendants ...ho "''en! warned and instroeted by
telephone from !.he harbor poIioe Illation. Wben
commlllUcaUolts failed the auendanUl lOunded
the additional sirena upon hearing the si.n!n3 that
,,'ere controlled by the ma.;;ter switch. Visible
signals to shipping b}' daJ' were given in addition
to the audible sirens by hoisting warning fiH.g!l to
the J1ltdarm o,'er the harbor police station. the
office of tbe harbor maiter and the ehannel en-
tnnee ligfnbowe. At night the same sations
hoisted three ml lights. one abo\'e the other,
which remaiDel'J lighted during the period of alert,
and U!lOn the giving of the alarm were blinked on
and off tor a period of 2 minutel and then extin-
guished.
II. Openst'--.-It was freelJ' $l.ated hy the
officiala interriewl that the regulations set forth
in Ref_nee item Ko.18 .... lIM'd extensi\'ely lISa
guide in operating the defense of the harbor. They
referred to it as the "Bible," but admitted wide
variation due to lack of etIuipment and to excess
V. PASSIVE DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND PRECAUTIONS
PROTKTIVE LIGHTING

tilJle d the IIrtst .and warm, tllem 1IIItI ..
eIlC<lun'-l af --raIda. UuIe l2'oabIt ..
public had lei" that. It then tbattIM
-'Ir'I'lIIIed PI'\ftClpla that. 11m "-
lal@ 30' the lIeVerai }'t!VlI. In tIM
at i....... early 4/) a, b1aekGul dril" WeI.
..... ar Interval, (118 decreed b IA-' ..
authoritil$) B 1939 Y ""'" mllltal'J'
insistence . y ,due to police penUMion and
b 'Id' ,backed by the 1938 law almost aU
w:e 1nP: factories and distrietr
with blackout curtai"" '
2: Liglui"ll Ii/tu1lioN In would be
the.lighting standards and tile level$
I umma\lon In Japan ha"e al""" ,.- f
below wha $ """n ar
S t "'as common Pl2Ctice in the United
Store window lighting was practicallv non-
Thae were ..,me neon signs and' other
:"5
p
la>: and ad,ertising lighting. but it was IUed
na minor wasconfined toa much small_
er area.of the CIty than similar tn>es of lighting in
t?e UnIted States. Lighting on a few of the prin-
elpal Sl.l'eeU compared favorably with Ameriean
there,,ss no municipally provided
IIghtlng 00 ..de and residential district SIJ1!eU. In
such areas, the illumirLation "'38 from e.:terlor
lights pro\-ided by each hGweholder or building
0w:'er. Levels of lighting in homes, olfK.,e",
and similar buildings were far below
Amencan standards. There was a gradual reduc-
tion in ligllting le"els beginning in 1937. For ex-
around law 1938 or early 1939, the prolti_
bmon on the use of electricity fllT neon signs IlT
other Il'JlCS of ad,ertising was enforced. (No de-
cree co"ering this could he found; apparentl)' it
was the result Gf a "erba! order from the mHitan'
handed do.m throu.gh the police.) There was a
further drastic reduction in lighting levels par'
ticularly street lighting. in earl)' 1!J.l.2. '
3. POIUI" ';INoliOtl.-Po"-er for the Osaka area
was secured from.a number of interlocked hydro-
electric statiGlliI ItJcaloffi in the near-by mountain
country, the nearest plant located appronmately
20 miles outside the cit)'. There ,,-eresteam gener-
ating stand.by plants in Osaka. The JlO1""er "'38
genernted at 60 cycles. distributed at high poten-
tial, and stepped dOWlt through substations and
transformers to enter tile average hoUllO' or public
building at lOO-"olt potential for lighting Purpoill'll!
and at 2:?0 volts foc po"'er ,,--<e.
4. Ligill CDIOIrOI (Toko (\a_l proudNrt.-
Light contl"Ol ,,'38 di,-ided into four phases (Enll-
bit N). Three of these phases "'ere 10 put into
effect every night. (Thi. is qUlle different rrom
the adoption of proper I1lealIB or '
accommodate safe movernellt8 of fqlllPD\ent to
adoption of practical methodu' (3) the
protect and save lives and Pro UIID&: Iohelp
and (4) the accomplishment raid,
minimum interruption t.o __,"".. e "'th the
.' WInD ,L
mmlmum mterTuption to sti I '... ''''
production. mu ateel wartime
b. Practice blackOlll'.-I'racti .
Osaka and vicinity as early In
Se"eral of these so called "drill " r 1929.
the military, were held in the by
30's, notably around 1%4. Thesed mIddle
f
,
. ,h' n .. were more
es ",e an serIOus in nature a"d .
f
. . corunsted ........
Iy 0 turnmg out the hghts for a 5 0 .-.-
." S. or I mInute
perl....... Irelt!l or other audible '
warOlng $ystems
were not used, the time for the blacko t d'
duration W3.'l published in the an
spread by word of mouth. Public com ,.pers an
r 'ted d r p lance was
Iml po Ice enforcement was indifferent
e. Nauonal low.-The air-defense I (La .
No. 47), 5 April 1937, included
(Toka Kansel) as one of the defense mea.;u
and placed the responsibility for formulating s:
cifie plans and t?eirenforeement (with punishment
by. and pnson sentences) in the hands of the
of Home Affairs, local authorities and
chIefs of police of cities, towns and villages.
d. Osaka regulolion.-In Osaka acomplete setof
regulations governing light control was prepared
by the air defense section (Boku Ka) of the
Osaka prefectural government. and was released
4 April 1938, to be effecth'e 10!\priI1938
N), These regulations were based on suggestiollS
forwarded from the office of the Minister of Home
Affairs. Due to their and technical
nature they were issuoffi only to business establish-
ments. factories. hospitals. newspapers.
and similar establishments, but not to the general
public. These regulations remained unchanged
unW the present time. Thegreaterdegreeof black-
out late in the war was simpl)' enforcement.
e. Blaekot(t enforcement-Soon after the first
release of these regulations. stepS were taken to
educate the general public in their principles and
essential details. Simple tl'pes of pooters. new'"
paper articles, and the like, were stressed at first.
Later, after the Doolittle mid. the emphasis in
educating the public was tllrough the police-
neighborhood group channel. Although the air-
defense law gave the police jlOwer to enforce light
control regulations from 1938 on, there was little
public support and the police lIad difficulty in
security to the populace by (1) adequate
of illuminan\.'! or general
so that sky glow will not be a guiding beacon, (2
out early in the raid and control wall reduced to
the IL'Ie of messengers. On the walei' side of tilt
harbor, police boats patrolled .the IIld
maintainro contact with the statIon. All
driven from the channel and crews were told to
abandon and scuttle their shiP'! if fire got 00J0Dd
control. Fourteen of the fire boats re-
sponded but nine were sunk and others were fight-
ing warehoWle fires. The regular fireboat was a!-.
sunk. On the landward side, the entire harbor at'eI.
district soon caught fire to the elltent that it wa.
beyond the control of the district fire-fighlina
equipment. Aid was supplied by fire departmenb
from the other parts of the city. and on the follow,
ing day, two pumpers from Kobe, five from Osaka
and twO from Hyogo rural communities WeJ'l!
observed in the harbor area. This mid put
Osaka harbor out of commission, but the police
district continued to operate for the
4 months without any telephone communieations.
Floods isolated the area still more go that the
principal means of communication was motor boat
messengers.
12. intcrviews with officiall
concemed with harbor protection. unpreparedne5!5
and weak and sketehy organization were evident.
All blamed this situation largely on thl! fact that
army and navy liaison ollicials a!;$ured them dur-
ing air-delense conferences that they would
ahle to prevent any saturation raids of the type
that was being imposed upon Germany and that
preparations should be based on the theory that
only sporadic raids would be possible. The organ
ization describoffi above was; consideroffi ample to
meet such contingencies, but was totally inade-
quate to meet the raids to which it was subjected.
Their judgment was; wrong on both counts. Heavy
raids did occur and their defense preparations wel1'
insufficient even for medium raids. The auxiliar)'
forcell were inadequate and their plans lacked
foresight. For ellample. the destruction of five
bridges isolated important portions of the harbor
and even emergency water transportation was not
provided with the result that emergency au"iliarj"
units could not be mobilized.
department in the building..
from other sections of tile was d,spatc
available. The harbor police chief that he
had secured aid from all parts of the cltY,and from
neighboring cities. principally from !,01Je and
K,].'oto. but from no point fart.her than
organized auxiliary fire fighlmg cN::-"" In
I>';"aw industries were efficient but m the b,g ra,d
were required to protect thelr own property.
Occasional aid during small raids was secured
from immediately adjacent installation3.
A. Faclories and industrie> in the harbor were
onl)' superficially supervised by the local police
chief. Most of their supervision was by lh pre-
fectural headqu.mer5. During actual raid condi-
tions, however, the harbor police chief in com-
mand of their forces. but very little command was
exercised.
i. Actual operation WM typified in the "erbal
aeeount of the 14 March 19-15 raid made by the
chief. at that time, of the harbor police station.
He stated that upon l1'Ceipt of the alert. he
and his asolistants transmitted it to leadenJ at
the important dock and warehouse installations
in the area and conferred with the harbor master
by telephone. He then dispatched squads of 10
policemen each to strategic sections of the area
to maintain order. to supervise enfwcement of
blackout, to lend assistance if required, and
general!}- to act as "incident oontro1" groups. He
dispatched fh'e motor police boats into the har-
bor to enforce elearance of the channel and to
alert auxiliary fire boats that oould not be reached
h)' telephone. This raid turned out t.o be aimoffi at
the main part. of the city but scattered bombs and
incendiaries fell in the harbor area. Many small
fires were started but all were handled successfully
to the e;ctent that they were prevented from
spreading. Most of them were extinguished or con-
trolled by industrial auxiliary units for the raid
W3.'l light in this district. However, the Chikko
district and the central part of the city were hard
hit and the harbor district's fire departments were
dispatehed to that area. In the 1 June raid, the
harbor W38 the target. At the beginning the same
procedure was followed but communications went
1. InlrodlUlion.-a. PrQitcliu lighting.-The
term "protective lighting" coverll the judicious
use of artificial lighting in wartime to provide
. 'llited States.) AI-
first in
t (lug , ......0 . tllev
A "11988 to be effective at the same time.
lUt j'ntn effect gradually, p:'1rtly as a C?n-
,,!",n measure and partl)' for IlSycholog
1ca1
sen , . h
effect. It wllii not until the m,d",e or I e
fan of 19-14 that the complete program was made
e[eclll"\,. Night :r.eti,;ty in JOplin ne,'cr too
t and by 19-1-1 ,,'as practically nOneXI"Lellt.
f::l0ries 24 hours a dar bd tWO
1:!.hour shifts. ShillS changed 0700 and \900
!iO that the utinction of must hghlS at Z200 and
practicall)' all lights after midnight no
real hard.hip. The four phases of light control
we", a;; {oll(lW';
a. Tht or dimwi period (Jumbi
i\OIlMl).-The dimout period went inw effect at
sunset and lasted until 2200, unles;; modified by
an alert or a raid. During this period an effort was
made to keep sky glow to a minimum, by shielding
street lights. eliminating sign and advertising
lighting. and decreasing wattage, whenlver pos-
!lible. in eJ<terlOr lights.
b. The IlItrl or 1l'1Irning ptriod (Keilai Kanui).
_This period went into effect at 2200 and lasted
until 2400, or it "-ent into effect immediately upon
the oounding of the alert alarm in which case it
nlmained in effect until modified by the raid alarm
or the all-clear s;ignal. During this period lighting
Wll$ drasticall}' reduced. Some street lighting was
permitted at major intersections and traffic signals.
Railroad lighting was as usual. The idea was
to provideoomedegree of safety for the continuing
street traffic and the public seeking and to
maintain uninterrupted production (Exhibit N)_
t, Tht lIlarlll pmod KanariJ_-This
phase be!'ame effecti"e after midnight and lasted
until sunrise Or went into effect when the raid
alarm was oounded. General blatkout rules
applied.
d. Planta period (Kushu Kansel)-
This blackout period went into effect only when
the planes were!ll!l!n o"erhead or when bombs were
dropping. All possible illumination. including in-
dustrial flames. was to be extinguished or dimmed
to the minimum.
5. Sired lighling.-a.
boulevard streets had globe type pedestal units
located on approximately 120-root centel"!l, on
curb line, BOrne staggered, some directly opposite.
Frior to the war thl!:le were 1amped with approxi-
mately 500 watts (or three 200 watts in cases of
cluster type units). The lil"!lt step, a conservation
mo"e. in 1939 or 1940. to dec.- wattaae.
least pen:ent: the seco
n
.
d
step. t9G.
was to or hood the light from View froai.
abo"e the horizon. The hood f.or mOllt J!t!deItII.
units was of thin sheet pamted black..
the hea"y mids started In early street liIbta
were entirely eliminated. .
b. Nigk/-life dis/rid. One street, whIch was_
theatrical or night life district. ha?
ornamental LYpe of lighting um\-. rhls IUlTllllllre
extended in an are over the WIll
extinguished along with advertIsing sIgns 11) late
1939 or early uniL is since
deeornth'e type of lightingisl1Otcommon In Japan.
t. Principal Siree/s.-On streets having street
cars, the lighting was the responsibility of the
street unit (municipal). Here the hghting
units were a dome-trpe metal reflector located on
almost every trolley pole. Units between inter.
sections were lamped with 40-watt lamps and
those at each of the four corners of the larger
intersections with 100 watts. Only one tOO-watt
unit was used at minor intersections. The first
meMure taken around 1940 was the reduction in
wattage. The 4Q-watt lamps were replaced by 5-
watt and the loo-watt br 35_watt. The second
steP. around t942. eliminated all but intersection
lights, which were shielded to confine all the light
to the street immediatelr below. These
were of light_weight metal or' heavy black cloth.
depending on what could be secured.
d. Residenlial Ilree/s.-On residential streets.
lighting wM the responsibilitr of the individual
householder who installed a 40_watl
lamp outside his house or yard. This lighting was
eliminated in the first conservation move.
e. POletr sVslem.-Apparently no reduction in
street lighting WllS accomplished by reducing vol
lage. The street lighting systems for the most part
were IOO-volt lamps operated in parallel.
6. Signal ligll/s.-a. Traffic ligk/s.-Wattages
in traffic lights were reduced approximately 66n
pen:ent early in 1942. and the units were hooded.
not 10uvrel. were used. Tramc light!
were to be invisible heyond 545 yards (500 meWS
(no method 01 measuring gi"en). These 1(lJ
visibility tralfic lights wei'll not generally
during the actual raid allhough some were
to operate.
b. Railrood Sig/lUl ligh/8.-Railroad signab rt-
maine<! on during a mid, but at reduced voltal
(20 to 5(1 percent). All signal units were hooded II
eliminate upward light.
7. 6ktlrn. All .
c&fl!, Interurban can and trai,- wiele:etn.
c
street
were required to stop wilen tile city area.
ed. so that sparking of trolley - ._Iann llOund_
reveal position. Trains or ClUS n.o'-
could proceed. I City hmu.l
b. GaaoIi118. All traffic was .
during the alert period. but to move
mobiles were allowed after th auto-
sounded. On the latter the!lizee alarm
lamp ":lIS reduced. 0; a e headlight
series WIth the headJightlamp tored pUt III
In addition. the headlights of th uce nghtness.
vehicles were covered with a hlank hemergency
"A' . 'hl cot and were
to "" In\'ISI e at distances greater than 328 .
(300 metel"!ll (no method of
'h ....u ..ng spec, ed)
1 ere was an elaborate system of ""I '
__ " h dl' . .ym"" s to be
u""" on ea to mdieate ,oli (R (
. N 19) Ii' ce eerence
, o. ,re, cIty officials. communieati';>ns
tallroads. army, na'y. special units Id '
} . ,,__ oe",rs.
, Presll. rauon ..........rd. mainlenance. fattnry
alr:defense ambll)anee:s. and civilian defense
umts. but hke many other Japanese paper plaM.
the system fell down in practice and these vehicles
were fortunate to have any kind of a cover over
the headlJght. Only the police and some fire units
actually used any 01 the marker co'ers. Tail light.s
were red. but wei'll covered and were barely
,isible.
8. Horbar, 8kipiJIlrd and 8kipligkling.-lI. Lighl-
house.-Lighthouses in the outer harbor were
connected to warning central by wire Or radio link.
Their were extinguished II first alert.
b. Morker llgh/B.-All harbor marker lights were
electriC and controlled from a cenLral point. All
were extinguished at first alarm.
c. Ships.-Shipl; in the harbor were warned of
a.n air raid b}' the mdio "'arning, and by signal
hghts at night or flags b}' day. All Jights ,,-ere to be
obscured Or extinguished upon receipt 01 the raid
signal.
d. Skip lIards.-AlJ floodlights used for night
work in shipyards were extinguished at lirst alarm.
Interior work. with openings protected by black-.
out curtains. proceeded the same ag other latto!)'
work until the raid alamr.
9. F<u;/orieS.--(l. Faclory jirts.-The ci,ilian
defense authorities "'ere quite conC<!fned about
the possibility of industrial lires. such as flames
from blllSt furnaces, oil refineries and the like
giving away the locatitlll of the city. and consider-
ed duplicating such fires somewhenl uut in the
C<luntry. but nothing WlIS done. Il, the time this

lbatelUl8 b:I y the Ibortapolltlllli IDd
curtail lDIIIy of 0- r.ctcn. to
the guiding beaeo' t_indllSU'ies were Dot
.h. Ar-.,/ .I'YT;:Ught have been.
dlctionalthe T . -,",",underthejun..
but in ml ltary. not ci\Oilian defenae oIIieialt..
conformed tu ci''ilian defenae
__..u aIl0"'l.
10. HI>Ifk lig/U'
I'l.'quir.:d th ,ngh' "!,he regulation or 1938
b
at cae rt'Sldent be
lackuut curtains r h proVl "" WIth
prevent the /g t. traps. ur other mean. to
Materials :peof llght. Or else use 1>0 light.
wag not' or meall8 of IleCllring blatkout
ha . The regulation allo Il'quired
t fixtul'\'S (W;Ual1y o"erhead center
r h
room
UM) he shielded IlO 38 to confine the
19 t onto the area below and " h '_"
Black ."t e "'''''0'''"
I
, h paper Or a cloth shield hung around
Ig t was suggested.
I. oj ligh/a.-Color of lighta had 1>0 sig-
III can,,? Ill. the civilian defense lCheme except to
ships III the harbor. During an alert three red
lights arranged in a "mica! pallem ....en. exposed
from promInent locations.
12. Gnleroi COIII"",..u._. toMidmu'
-The April 1938,
the police, indicated astudied and planned program
for the control of lighting, but one based more on
theabseneeolJight rath.... than onedn its judicious
use lor comfort. _urit), and protection of the
populace. For example. there "'all no pn:n'L<jon for
the use of illuminated markCfll to inditate public
sheiter entrances, 00 in shelters. no
for use of flashlights. and the head-
hght CO"cr for "ehicles just blankets to
obscure the light with the hope that lOme \I<01Ild
trickle by to ",arn pedenrians. Searcit}" of ma-
terials. plus the control and use by the mmtary
of what supplies were a,.ilable, might attOunt for
oome of the pro,"isiona of these On the
other hand. it could be suspected that at the time
the regulatiolt!! "'en. published. not C\'en the
militar)' believed that the)' might be raided and.
consequCfltJy. the air-raid drill program W3$ pn'-
pared to secure the maximum psychological erred
on the people with the minimum use of matl'nals.
The emphasis on railroad lighting and r3l1road
signal lighting. important to the milital')" illus
nates how material thillg!! were gi"en far more
con.<ideration than public safety and romfort.
b. Ptlblic coopenu,,,,,.-All imen'IC\\'S IndlC3ted
thM the blackout program W3S not taken seriousf)'
b)' the population until after the major raids
"
ned Il)' that time the enforeed drills a;d
sta . nda ".ork llad taught people what 10 o.
as the light rontTOl PJ'lllr'ln ,,-as, the
rai<b In thespringof 19015
fwther 10 inteusif)o the blaekout. The
p*>n, ha,illl bfen that
,,-a;, BOrne $!!Cunt)' In blackout, haotened to ut.m-
gui$h all lighls at the BOunding of the
which further hampered all aeti.-ities. In SpIte of
tM npi enfCll"temf!llt, in Os:aka pro\"ed
to he an inelJecti\"e mNM of pa!&I,e
against the tJ'Pt saturations 12icb to ..hK':1t thIS
are;, wu sub,;e.,ted.
SHELTERS
1. lHIr"ch<d'OOI,-This report will describe the
sMlter policy and port.ray the typl'il of shelter
COII$U'Ud.Kln pI'O\iding protKtion for the general
public.. The "'ter polX-y 01 the city 01 Osaka
ckMely the poIM:Y set forth by the
Mmistry of Home Altair$. Din'ctins and pam-
phleu, comaining imtructiolL'i and specifications
fwthe construction of shelters, were iosued in 1938
It)' that Ministry and channeled down lltrough
Osaka prefectunl! to the city of Osaka. Few proepa-
rations nre made until the llDl\3U1Iction variola!;
was grsdually aoceIented after 7 Deeember
1941, with a lurJe immediatel)' after the Doolittle
raid in April 19012. HOlJo-e"er, thilJ surge was of a
"ery temporary natunl! and it was not until the
middle of 19014, when the American fOreeA wert!
adnneing rapidly throuah SOl\'eral Pacific areas,
that a fevenm au.emp1 was made to 00Il5tl\K':t
sheltfl' protection for t\"eI'Y iDdiridual in Osaka
city. The program for protection of the public in
the rw-a.l an!llI WlIll not as intel18e lIlI in the city.
This lackadaisical attitude of government and
public toward the de\"elopment of a shelter pro-
gram probabh' WlIS due to the following I"I.'UOns:
1I. The by means of the prtSI and
radio, had the pubfic that no enemy planes
would eo,'ft" be able to penetrate the Japanese
defeme lines and reach tlte homeland.
b. An utter for the 10$ll of human life.
c. The lIcal"city of materials, such as concrete
and steel, needed for the colllitruction of the
betur type of sMIter.
2. In Osa.ka the
pla.n..n.ing program to implement direeth'tlI oras
placed under the diceetion 01 an ill!lpector in the
peaoe pl'ftierVation section of the police bureau,
while the supervision of the shelter construction
was placed under the in the same section.
Tlte location and nllmberof shelterll to PJ'Inidet
was determined by the former. The
ment, was the only IIIW
fon:e directi\"es and regtllaltOns aft'ectlll&
progr-am. The Osaka prefecture .-..
upon the c:ollStruction of family aWte.
::that, along "ith the of tlte JlrQI\"aIa
for public shellen, provided shelter ...
for every inhabitant of the cIty.
Although ofticials claimed that shelter sPIel
was available for all inhabitants, they alllO radii,
admitted that, in general, the d\elt.en: afforded
little <Ji' no protection agaillSt direct hlU; by
cendiary bombs and hits or near by hip
explosive bombs.. The lack of and l.ht
lateness in staning the constructIon program wert
tlte principal reasonl for the IlOOrly constructed

c. The fundi f()l' the constnlctkm program were
taken from those alloeated by the national fO\'_
ment to the prefectUI'l! for general purposes 01
air-raid protection, In some areas. members d.
various organizationl assumed the expense of con
struction by donations of material and labor, hyt
the OOStl of aU family shelters and those built by
manufaeturing and busines&c:onc:ems for
protection ,,ere borne by the respecth'e familifll
and This policy naturally led to bettll
constructed Iheltenl for the IlSe of families and
businesses of the more prosperous group!!.
3. of Jhtlltrs.-a. Homt-The majority
01 these ..ere the trench-type d\elten, During the
early staae of the W'lII", large numbers ....ere __
.trueted under the houses and were simply a hoIr
in the ground witbout any bracing of the side walls.
Early raids demonstrated that they were deau
traps from fire, smoke. and collapse of buildings,
so their location was changed to the yard areas ani
the trenches "''ere braced and c:overed. Tlte numbIJ
in the ramily determined the siu of the shefter
although in IIOme CIllIe!I sevenl families combillli
in theeonstruetion and useol one shelter, GenenIJ
the trenches were about 4 feet deep, 3 feet widl
and 6 feet long. Depth was often limited by wall
"Ileepage. Over-head protection usually consisted;
ordinary 1 inch boardlorcorrugated ferrous
on which were placed about 1 La 1J.i feet of dil
This type usually did not have Door c:overiJW'
or lIeating facilities. The wealthier f.milie --
able to build more .uhstantial shelters as tbll'
were nften able to secure and reinfon:ilf
steel. The better types were 8 feet wide, 10 (Ill
long, 5}ifeet high and 6 to 7 feet below
of thegro.und, Thesidewallswere made of concrete
.1 foot thIck; the ceilings were l'l!infOl'l:ed with 4
Inch and 12 inch wooden beams on which were
placed two layers of corrugated ferroWl meets
oo\'ered with 4 to 6 feet 0( dirt. There were t1l'O
one from the house and one from the
with COncrflestept.Dd heavyW'OCldfll doan;
was provided b)' electricity: and \-efltila.
lion b}' an opening in the roof covering.
b. Stmi-pr,blic MtlUrs,_The basernentl of 10"-
emment and office buildings "'ere used during
danime raids for sheltering of employ""'" and the
publk When ra>ds oceurred st nigbt, the watd>-
man or each building was responsible for opening
the bal@rnent to the public. Since buildings
were of mo!lt recent rolL'itrudion and built to with
stand earthquake shock, they afforded aood
Protection against strafing and incendiary attal':b.
In"estigations sbo'li'ed that none of the!oe hue-
menu were reinforced to withlu.and blase elfflCtl
of high explosive bombs. Building Oll'llerll ..ere not
faVorable to tl.e use of the oo.menLt lL" slIelters
at night and very often the)' ,,'ere not made
available.
f. PMhlif.
(I) IrtlOdI._These s1>eltera ""tI'e
made by removing IeCtiollll of the pa''emeflLt
parallel and contiguous to the eIIl'bin,: and
then _nunr to. cWpth d. about 6 feet and
a width ol "' feet. The side wan. .-..
with liaht timber and had an an'ft"_
ing d.lipt bowda or COCT1Iptf fenuuo sbeeb
0'-"'- ",hJ,:,h was pIaoed 12 to 28 illd>el (30 to
70 of dirt. Tile depth ..... "',"_
l'rned b)' ....ter Each ohelter had t ....
enlnDCell 001 had no sanitary fxi1itie&, 1.1

plaeed at tM ""1J'anres.it.a11q the CIlf*it,..
and tM l:OIluul then!ol ... <tIfJ'Cised by the
/irs( individual 10 ,..,h the oheltft". it
".... impossible 10 const.rlK':t these when on
I!l'\"ements, sections of the I1n!eI roadbed,
parallel to and ",,,bin ffet or Ieos the
rurbinI:, 1'l!IIlO,'ed and the same tnle of
shelter ... built. III IlWIJ' water and
au Ii_..-ere _pletdy <tIpoeed (p. .6).
(21 C.-.-n- ohelters tU!lnN ill
the slopes 01 bills and ..-ere mnf<lr"M:f with
timber. Their size detennined by the
GASPRoncnoN SERVICE
I. Iniro</""IioN.-The opinion III
Japan was that t.he I:nited State! would not use
JXlison gas ex"'pt as a last r'1'SOJt, and that, l<i1lce
it was ...inning the war "ilhout it, lbere ""OOld
no <l<'eaSion to resort to iu use. Moren"cr, !he"
ob5ened that tbe Allies bad oot used gas in the
war against Germany. an d roneluded that, by the
same token. il ""QuId not be used apinst them,
For thooP- reasons it was dillieult to arouse an)"
inlerest in measures designed 10 protect against
gas "-arlaTC,
2. OrplN,:atioN.-The outline of organization
is shown on page SO. The gas-rlel"enso> ser..ke
(BodoL"j was a branch or the pol""" guard office
in the prefectural 8O,emment. It ..1LS und.... the
sUpet"',>\on of an administrath.., direetor who ""lIS
_iste<! by a technical .d,illar. Under the super
.-;,;ion of the latler "'ere thfllC gM-defense areas,
in roch of which wt're three gas..:lel"ense unil.!.
Although the prognlm on the lneal le,"e! was
"
facilities, sidewalls, and roofs of steel reinforced
concrete from 8 to 20 inches thick with the roof
further reinforced with S- hy 12_inch wooden
beams, cap;lcities from 50 to 300 persons.
For a detailed description of shelters constructed
by hospitals, factories, harbor areas, and railroads,
refer to the sections of this report dealing with
those subjects.
5. Comme>l!6.-a. The common family shelter
and the public trench shelter pnl"'ided nO protec-
tion against hits from incendiary and high uplo-
sive bombs. Many persons were suffocated Or
burned to death in them, causing the public 10
shun them and flee to the outer edges of the city
during raids.
b. The tunnel shelters in the sides of loll' ele-
vations of the terrain ga,'e adequate protection
hut they were too few and of insufficient capacity
to aecommodate any appreciable number of per'
sons, This shortage was due 10 delay in beginning
cOnstruction.
1"""""'--
(&) The subways were rather shallow, t!lt
construction work was not heavily reinforced,
and at many spots the line Wa!! very close to
the river and bay areas which would re!!ultil
flooding, if subjected to direct hits or nea:
misses.
(c) The lack of heavy equipment to exlJi,
cate people in the event of collapse.
4. SpecloIShdltTs.-Materials, such as conCrel\
and steel, were'not available to the general
for shelter construction but from b,
officials and by actual observation, it was
that these materials were available to army an:
navy authorities, transportation facilities,
tories engaged in war production, some individ""
pri"ate concerns and government on1cials. 'fhfll'
special shelters were constructed as complltt
underground shelters in park areas (p. 77), or'
the sides of hills (pp. 77-78), or as
shelters in open areas (pp. 78 79), In general,
had the following features: two entrances i'
good protection, electric lights, ventilation,
mechanical means, sanitary facilities, ;ellJ/l
Pi",u<e ,hQ,,;n. ""d.md .hellO' .. in front
"f ,h. Tcmm. pohe< ",,,,,,n. O..k. C"y.
number of persons in the locality
shelter.'\lthough a few of this type were
found within the city limits, they were com-
mon in tile outlying lind rural areas. one
was observed which Wa3 provided with sani-
tary facilities, lights. ventilation. or sellting
facilitietl. and, in addition, a number of them
were not provided with emergency exits.
""(lilt entrances ,,'ere protected by 11 lmffle
wall, 6 to 8 inches thick made of earth-filled
wooden walls (p. 76).
(3) SublloYQ! underground sloliona.-These
,'..ere used as shelt.ers only when the warnings
indicated that the imminent raid was by
fighteTaircraftand would be mainly a st.rafing
attack. Their U'If! as shelter!! during bombing
raids was prohibited lor the following reaS(ln3:
(a) The capacity of t.he stations was lim-
ited and, jf opened to the public, confusion and
overcrowding would result in injuries and
deaths, causing disruption of transportation
service, the maintenance of which of
prime
,
tbw obtained from the eontents of the lube was
compared the odor of the ga.'I Wlder inv...u
gation Chanlcteristie od..... indicated the pre!II'IIOe
of gases. E:i<';h lI'St tube was
with a specific g:u by a sepante eolor up,
e. g., black for phosgeoe. white fOl"
for acetophenone, and red for mU5UU'd p":" .
were used 0ll!J' b)' J>l!r!IOD'l m
gas-defense meao\l1ti, S1;Ich 35 the
personnel and police offioat... . . f
6 Gal at/tdio!l.-There 'It't'f'l! no pfO\"\SlOD5. or
th"- $I'n"ic." oth.er than of
kits delCt1bed ,n the tilln and anal)-si$
labot:alorY facilities for colli'<'. ........,.,.m.
ed I\"CI"I' lllcluded ,n "'" ,.....,.-
of SUSpecl 'iI"lllI planned to u;e
7. GalaolIiG. ,.xhIoritel 10 "IJI"3r the
a chemical hJ ted bj' the upkI$ion of
area which mlg
ht
f", rubbing on the skin
A _...........uon or ..
""'. "','" S. ",-.-- '--I skin IrTU3J!t8.
&- d' ed to coun.... _ .
WI\.'! also e;;l.gIId' the ps-proof air-rJJd shelter
Equipment fOlln mRed Cross hospital pre8l!Pts
(pp. 87-89) at the complete (\eConwnilllltion
the on!)' "! This hosPital w:>$ an
system con:::te with P"'proof
underground.
"
PiClu,e .howin8 ,he en[no '0. 'unntl ,h.I.., i_[,,",Id< 0/. __.... s.r-....t
,<Informenu Of0d",l, of boar<l, .od ["'" braocl>o', (Ikuuma Put., O>ah Gy.l
tomary to receive 10 percent to? 25 percent of the
order. Those who could pay for them were re-
quired to do so, the coot varying from 3 to 8 yen.
To those unable to pay, as judged by the tal
record the masks were furni$hed free. 1here
Ihtre different types employed, \'arying in price ,n
aecordance with the material used and the com'
plexity of construction (pp. Young
children were wholly without protection afforded
by gas masks because the models
did not include sizes to fit them. Evidence mdl-
cates that government officials and group leadeN
. . h "". masks but
were generally prov,ded WIt ":"". Pro-
beyond those gT(lUJlll the record IS ,ague.
rubber clothing .....as al!!O lor gas-
defense squads. . --Samples
b. IIfUieriol8 for g(l$ deuellon (p. 8?). f ases
of testing outfil.$ for four different kmds 0 g de
The test kits were designed for c"'nd
d
. . cetophenone a
election of phosgene, leWls,te, a .
conullnt',. In
IIIUStard g:l$. were h test the
tubes sealed at both ends. To make t e h'"
d was auac
ends WCI'(l olf and to one en h the tube by
a rubber bulb. A,r was drawn throU: lb The odor
COmpression and rel:uation of the u .
item No. 2{l) "'ra prep, red lor the use of the per_
!!Onnel of the ga$-defense units and police ofticial$.
It was al!!O distributed on a limited scale to the
neighborhood group (Tonari Gumi) leaders. Dis-
trict police were given formal training in method$
of protection against ga$, but it does not appear
that this type of training ever extended all far
down all the family group. Althuugh gas ma$k$
were acquired by the public in limited numbers,
nothing other than printed instruction$ in the
U.ie of these devices Wll!i given to the population
generally.
5. t.'quipmrnl.-a. Gas mash.-According to
the administrative director, every adult in
(),;aka prefecture provided with a gll!i mask.
(n this area the total number distributed was
placed at 1,6H;,OOO. This statement seems in-
credible, particularly in view of the plan by which
they WeN.' acquired. Di$tribution was through the
national supply headquarters in Tokyo to the
prefectural government, and thence through either
the police system or tbe block as5OCiatillll5
(Chokai), upon requisition from either of those
agencies, Due to shortage of supply, it was CUS-
clooely allied with the police $}.-,;tem. the gaJ>-
defeme area offices and the local gas-defen$e .. nit$
were not nec:el$ll"il}' located in di$trict poliee sla
tiOl1!l. In fact. such was the exception rather
the rule. In addition to the 9 gas-deferu;e units
actually organized, plans were made for 25 more
units in the city of (),;aka with a total strength of
1,250, which, however, "'ere to he
within the various chemical indu$tries for the
protection of their own personnel and plant.!.
3. P.....".""I.-With the exception of the ad-
mini.!ltrati'e direclor in the prefectural police
guard offiCl!, all of the leaders and other peTllOnnel
of the g<LHIefelllie were phannacist.!. Since
each local unit consisted 01 about 2lJ
there were 180 peJ"SOlLi enrolled in
lhe service, The g<LHIeleru;e unita planned for the
chemical industries did not contemplate a unilorm
Dumber in each unit. nor WllS it intended that they
should all be phannaeistaa.'l in the case of Ihe nine
unita described in the preceding parngraph.
4. T,ai"ing._A pamphlet giving
in ways and meaJlll to combat effects of polson
ga!l!S ("Gas Deferu;e Unit Manual" Reference
Pi"",,,, ""''';08 0<>< (0'0 J"30, tunnel.,h.""d 'heloer. Moond on ,h. show.
6 f.... of din c<> ,t.< ltor and wi'h 'rff' and ,h... bbery. Con..... ,hick
..... i. appro.im.,eJ, 20 ;nch... C.pod'y per$(m. llu,h lor and u..d by ,II ""'y.
(Ogl"'.' P.,k, O..k. C",.)
J>ie<ur. ,howing ,h. {r"o, .n.....OCO '0' ,1><1<., dOl io,o "'" Ji<leol. _nuia bM:b.. had
an 'o<""n.,," "n lOp "r a bjJJ ludioKin'o ,h. "-"O(""'abel..., eon.m. -'::""U
,nil, ...<><>d,n dOOr>. c.p.a.", .pp"mm...', )00 (rk......... Park, Oub ' .... j
steel doors for the ace<lmmodation of 100 persons.
It was equipped with a hand-operated ventilating
system by which outside air was drnwn in through
a filtering device to reman noxious gases. and by
whieh all within the chamber WlL'I discharg! to
the Qutside. The installation :lIso included a room
for decontamination or clothing, a room fitted
with 12 shower heads for bathing, an emergency
operating room, and toilet facilities. Light, water,
and steam were deri"ed from fhl! hospital supply
(i. e., Il(lt independent), whereas the venti.
lating "Y"lem was independent of outside power.
There "'ere two,uygen cylinders in the main room
for augmenting the oxygen in the shelter
if necelSary. Although this installation was o[
ad,anced it would have been only a very
factor In the protection of the mass popula.
tlOn !n the e'ent of a gas atlack. For the g(!neral
publ\ the plans for decontamination were limited
to body bathing and washing of clothing. No
broad seale plans for decontamination were oon_
wmplated. In fact, when the offldals became con
,'inced that gas wouid not be u-'Cd against them:
even the meager protective measures that hale
been outlined were abandoned.
i. OperolioDs,-8ince there were no gag attacks.
the gas..<lefense units perfonned no service in this
field. During scIere bombing mids, however,
which owrtaxed the resources of the first-aid
groups, the gas-defense units were sent into action
to assist them.
9. Commm/s,_A fair degree of organization for
gas defense was effected but it gradually disinte-
grated. Emphasis was placed upon equipping the
public with gas masks, of which 1,615,000 were
acqui!'OO by the adult population at their own
e"pensc. There were no gag masks provided for
children. Had gas attack.'! been made the protec-
tion afforded by gas masks would have been
negligible 11$ few persons knew how to use them.
CAMOUFLAGE
. 1:./n/rvdtu:/ion._The use of camouOage as a
c,,,han defenge measure was covered by the air..
defense law No. 47) passed in Tokyo, April
(later reVised in 1942, Law No. 91). Respon
Slblllty for the dissemination of infonnation on,
and regulations covering, camouflage was that of
tne Ministry of Home Affairs, and respon
;inility 11'11$ passed on to the-prefectural police or
other local authorities,
2. Local on information re
ceiled from the office of the Ministry of Home
Alfairs, a bulletin was prepared and released by
the Osaka prefectural police in 1941 gidng rules
and principles of camouflage (Exhibit S). ThIS
dOCument was "secret" and distribured
onl)" to the police stations within the city. 118
p.urpose WM to equip the chiefs with essen-
tial information so that Lhey would be in a pos!t!on
loSUPply advice and infonnation to those desmng
or needing it. Camouflage IVa:! noL encournged for
the building or location owing to the
,Of. materials. Police notified owners
. ose bUlldmgs that the milirary or other authon
t'l!lI. felt should be camouflaged and furnished
and help. Owners of the buildings
the COSts. Most of the calDouflaged facto
nes
were working for rhe military and the milirary
. h '-reerly or
th "" to the camouflage elt cr ,
rOUgh the factory management. camou
f\age wa.<; adopted in 1941 aod un-
changed.
3. oj co_ft""".--Qn!y tor<) 1,l'f!S of
camouflage ,,ere found in u>c: one, the use of
either paint or oeulngs to ehanl/l' lhe <llkJr or to
break up plane 01 large surfaces; and IWO, the lISe
of hamboo poJeli indio.;d at an aogle to oil storage
tanb to break up thei1 cbanleleristic shape and
shadow. Atlempts 10 mole factories undergrmlnd
"we made hut the nr ended before any under
ground s(rUctum were finished. we QS made
of natural C3mout\agl', that is. uees, shrub<
the like, on the roofs of existing wuctures. Tbil;
fact", surprising a> thaI l,l'f of o:amou!lage QS
suggESted in lhe 1941 police deparImefIt <lllDOIl.
fl bulletin, use ,,-as made 1000.I'\:en sug-
agiled in the police bulletin\ "f aru5cial.
f
<lg'l.
:;ke screens, simulaled k?tion, deroj' lights,
glare conluslon br SI'lIl'Chll,ghts, .
JIll f, Due to Ita IDeI-
4..TopogNlp/l, of the Yodo
tion 10 the mud d r ()sab Bay and to tbe high
Ril"i!r at the hPa o.d t ,,"OUld be relati,eQ'
,_ the eastern 51 e. I ke
nil", on , "--ka,,;thartificialfoggorsmo
difficult 10 hide ""'"
"
adl'ised OWlll.'r! reqlle!lting help to USI' a b1acl<
asphalt type pain! which W3S
Some Ol\'ll(':r.l, not requesting ad,iee from the
police and having llat, reddish-brown paint.
applied it 10 the eneriors of the bwldinp ;q solid
eoIOl'!! or in irftglliar patterns.
i. 1-.dfl3/ri;d as_I.-The only iridusuia1
camou11age found. otM lhan the painting 01
factories memioned prP\iousI}'. oras hamboo
pole!; inclined at an angle along the side< of oil
tanks. and the use of a mat IMde by IIcing bam-
boo together acres.> lOP to hide c:hat-
acteristic shape and shado....
S. 1l'I<Itn'OI'h ",-.._An ambitious
ollflage imullation was found .. the Osaka 61trll
tiOn I'!ant. a ""lIt.el'W01"b Ioc:ated 011 the
nonh bank 01 the Yodo Ri\W alld 00 the out
skirts of the do",uO\\ll area. Thi< Ott"Upied
an extensin' am and had .I fil-
. po"" "'" "prlWmalely ;9 rards 172
tratlo
n
------".. t
meters) iquareJllOcetlto form., re<"UU'lI ...... JII'
Since this _"lIS a \'er}' ronsptCUOll!;
r.em. .rorked out and installed In 19011.
InS llagood ...-itb /ish netllng
The firsl pond "'as.can::: Jared (ogether. This
-"upported hJ' l!oattng "'f;>
h. Tokoahimoyu Department Slore.-flsh nets
hung vertically from the roof.
i, ffonkyu Departmenl Store.-Fish net hung
'"fl1.ically from the roof.
PrefWllrot Building (Polia olld gorn-m,mll
blIl/dmg.-Fish net hung vertically from roof.
k, Net/ing impraclieo/.-It is interesting to note
that although the use of netting inclined at an
angle was suggested in the police bulletin as a
means of breaking up shadows these laHer three
bUildings used the netting onil' to decrease the
of the building. The Police did not feel
hat thiS camouflage was satisfacoory as two of the
three nets caught fire from the fire bombs. Burning
of the net on Qne of the department sHIre;; caused
?O damage. but the one on the prefectural build-
fi.re to the wood shutters on the outside
e Wtndows and prompt action by the
OJteuPants pren:mted gr(':lt damage.
i I. Other addition to the 10 prom'
bUilllings listed above, some of.
th ' mgs were camQuflaged on the Imuat,l'e or
nu
eJt
ownotll. Tho police kept no record of the
b hut stated that the j)ercenlage of such
u, <hngs C:llnouHaged Wll$ quite smaiL Police
jurisdietiQn or the supervision of the military
authorities.
6. Downlown bui/di"fJ caffloujlage.-Only 10
out of the 50 larger and mOil! prominent buildings
in O>.aka had any type of camouflage and they
were treated as follows:
a. IJ6ilelirn Deparlmenl Store.-Painted irregu-
larly with black and dark brown paint, with
natural cement color showing through the pattern.
b. Uj(den Bui/ding (e/edrie /Jui/ding).-Matte
black with some patterns.
OBaka Bui/ding (office building).-Newl)
pa:ts of this building bad matte black paint
applied Irregularly over portiQns.
d. OBako Goa Supply Sui/ding.-Painted solid
matte black.
e. A!I(lhi Neu.'spaper Bui/ding.-Painted solid
matU' black.
1. O!l(lka Broodcoalillg Stolion.-Mouled irregu'
lar colored pattern.
g. Gunjinkaikcn (el>,b for retired offitua).-
Painted irregular black. green, and neutral colors.
I';crun: ,he,open'",n<e ,o,he .helle. ;nlO ,he .ide of
'M monn,';. \'ery ....,p "'p' Ind;n" ;nlO ,he .hel,... Concrete
,hick.e.. app,o,im..<l. lO ,nche. U..d hf ,he .,my. (Iku,hm.
l'1<k. Ok> C;'y.)
sereem. or to lLChieve deception with deeoy lights.
The Japanese made no attempt 10 camouflage
300 year old (Aaka castle. Located almost in the
dt}....s geometric center the lOOfoot pagoda-like
structure wa. a prominent landmark. especially
sinet! it was cenU'red in a cleared area the size of
a dty block and sulT\lunded by a pt'ntagonal moat.
It Willi bounded on the north by an industrial
area, by the a"""nal Qn the f'a.'lt, by a troop area
on the !IOulh and on the west b}' the prefectural
go\'ernment building. The Japanese had left it
delibel1ltel) exJXi'led so that the Americana could
recognize it 3lI a ""'orthless historical monument"
and it they did) while the Japanese
It safely"" an airraid control center.
5. FaciOI'll Cu-.JfOfle.-Of 100 faeoories in
approximately 5(1 had some Or all Qf their
They were camouflaged
by parntmg, eIther !IOlld, neutrn.l, blending colQI"S.
::tlYdark. brown or black, or by irregular pat.-
ed oolonng. of them well! under the
other than il:! emplo)'te!I.) Warleen '11'8'1! 10 ....._
tinue on the job sounding of the air-nid
alarm, and ..'ere!lOt actually 10 lII'l.'1l: Meltl'r
until the "er)' last minuu!. When tbe pbnes were
o"erhead and dropping bombl. e'"t'r}body, includ-
ing fire watehm and police, were to tili CO'"8",
Fire watchers, and other air-defellSl!
workers were to emerge from the shelters bellrftD
"",'es of boml.>o:>n to rendl!' what aid tho'y could.
(0 actual practice, due to the unpleasant_of tJ:'e
-helter. women, children, the liek and theaged did
enter the shelleTll at the time of the first alum;
- .. 01 the shelter
they onl> to the "ICIll1t,J If
ther prop<-! to [I;;e. $0 that lM>' could ell1ft'
neeessan . . wu DO
6. RtgtdotioJ18 ,..11 to.el! that
,.. of an)" of the publIC $bel
po ICIng . ..-ere first. that the sbelten
women and that then' ..... DO o,-er-
",ere used to or
crowding. _Air-rWd s/>flt.n in the
7. {;tNtNi l'O.. f""'hole\. Tbey ..-ere JCI
(han area ..l'l'l' CO'
"
DEFEftU
""IT' ""If)
NINE REGIONAL GAS oHEItSE UHITS lIlTH 20 'ERSOItS UCH
with whatever paint was available to indicate
that it was a sbelt.er and giving the capacitr.
were no lights for night illumination. The
only type of marker to guide one at night was the
Il:lE of a strip of white paper tacked vertically onto
the two sides of the entrance. Sometimes these
"ete tacked on as horizontal blocks on each side of
lbe entrance at appro>;imately what ...lluld be
doorknob height. Private residential shelters were
required to be marked and many were not.
Sinee most shelters were readily available at curb
hiles (}( the major streets, and since at night the
veater portion of the IIe'Jl/le were in their own
hoJlll.'is, the lack of uniformity in marking the
and the absence of illuminated marke", at
night II'
ere not too Important.
S. Jltol'eme>1l oj /0 she/lert.-At the alert.
::d
ren
, the sick, and the aged were to seek
ter. All thealers and similar places of assembly
!ll to he cleared immediately 80 that people
uld Proceed to shelters. (This type of establish
was not J"ftquired to provide shelters for
did not seem to take the possibility of raids too
seriously. In addition, they wanted to witness the
eltCitement, but after the liTllt few bomhs fell,
there was no further trouble in getting people to
seek shelter.
3. Traffic.-All lraRic was allowed to proceed
e>;cept that at night, electric trains, interurban
street ca", and electric trams were stopped within
the elty. Electric trains outside the city limit!!
could proceed in a normal manner. Since the gen-
eral public was encouraged to use the sheltel'!> at
their homes as much as possible. there was an
increase in street traffic immediately after the
alert was ilOunded, Street traffic could continue
through the alarm period up to the lime tJ,e
planes were actually overhe-"d and subway trains
ran throughout the raid.
4. Guiding /he public /0 Ihe/ur.-No one was
detailed to the duty of guiding the public to
sheltel'!>. Each puhlic shelter was supposed to be
marked with a painted sign stating that it was an
air-raid shelter and giving its capacity, but there
was no regulation governing the size of the sign,
its wording or legibility. The average sign, hoW
ever, was of wood, about 20 by 16 inches, painted
method pro"ed to be too cumbersome. Light
,,-eight bamboo rafts were then u.ed to the
netl! in tbe second pond clwell!d. The practical
solution was found in using ropes stretched ac""",
the ponds and then laying the neu. across the
ropes. E>;eept for the fi",t two, all ponds were
co,'ered in this manner (p. 90). The nets varied
considerably in size of rope and mesh, since fish
neu of all t)"peS and used.
9. CO'!d.....oru and as
worked out in Osaka, was judged to be practically
worthless as "the Americans seemed to know
where all the factories and important installations
were located and bombed them at wiH.'
CONDUer OF THE PUBUC DURING AN
AIR RAID
1. general regulation gov_
emed the conduct of the public during an air raid.
Although shelters were provided no one was
required to lUll! them. '
2. Publil rmetion._lt was almO!lt impossible
people to use the shelters during practice
aIr_raId dnlls and even during the lil"lt raid, as the
shelters were far from pleasant. Probably because
of the favorable military propaganda, the people

&In'cy, two general classifications of e''lIeneE'S

considered, namely;
Precautionary e"acuation to outlying, rela-
til'e1y safe areas of those whose presence in the
was not considered nece:ssary or ,,"ould
UUerfere with air defense acti"itie:;.
b. The evacuation of persons made horr.eless as
result or an air raid or whose homes had
de:;troyed to create fire breaks within the
Itt,-,
The plan as de,'eloped by the
of Home Affairs and used in urged
0( Oluntary c"acu3tion of the followmg group;;
Per$ons from the t<lrget areas;
Children in the beginning courses in the
. allonal School.
who had not entered the National
L
(. Pl'Opl bo
</. Til e a '-c 64 years old. .
lII(j ose Who were suffering from long Illness
those Who required nursing ami care.
In making the field
e'-en had mate,ial been a'ailable. and it wa;;
largely a ""alter 01 the pE'Ople shifting for them-
seh'\!::!. These rr.ajor raids CrEatt'\1 panic and chaos
among the pE'Ople as they had not been prepared
for any such mass attacks or widespread use of
incendiaries_ Civilian defense organization and
direction broke down and it bec3me a case of
e"el"}'one for himself. with the scarcity of safe
shelters adding 10 the panic.
unpleasant that minimum ",e was made or them,
and regulations governing public conduct were
practieallr nonexistent. It should l1e remembered
that the situation in Japan ":as different from
that in In Gern-an}'. people spent night
after night in shelter!! and. conseqcently. it was
ne<:essary to make them reasonabiy habitable.
while in Ja):an it was n(ce&ar}' to eSC the shelters
onl}- a few tile\!::!_ When the n:ajor raid carne. early
in 19-15. it Wall too lale (0 prt!-,-ide decent shelters,
VI. EVACUATION AND WELFARE
EVACUATION
L (I. The purpo6e of the evacca- intense bombings of Omka whkh began the 131h
tion program "'as tll !:ave lire and prevent injury and 14th of March 1945. These raids were almo:>l
w th(lS(' pentlns not essential to the war effort. entirely incendiary in character and the resultanl
\\"3l! aceomp!i'lhed by urging their voluntary fires completely destroyed a large part of the cit)',
rernu,-al w places not likely to be subject to air Evacuation was intensified subsequent to this
,. time; howe"er, except for the evacuation of
atlacA. The basic plan outlinin, the national
,. cenain sch.ool groups, which had become manda'
po ocy with the Ministrv of Home
Aff . -, tory during the latter part of 1944, theevacualio
n
aIrs at Tokyo and "'as US(d with. '-er, iii"'
of persona remained on a voluntar,
C'lange by the Osaka prefecture. end of the war.
b. The plan W3$ not dzn,ed e"en afl'. Ih,
, 2. EeOCllee rloniJU;olion.
S,mpl... 'fpo .. ",.ok. f. p,oaud rr,npall of rubboc. C.rrridg. of J. m"..ial
a<laeb! ."<tly '0 ,b. ",a>ll. No d,.., fo, draining of mo;""," f,om <)-b,<!J a"d no ba.,.,
,-.h-._
"
T ~ " " . "f"" ,.".,ial fo, ~ " , d . d.,.",ion or ""i",nou, ,.>e. T ~
bl.ck, ..hit<, hlue and rod. 0 culo," of ,h. cuI.< ,ip r.
"
c. Elprun Gild rtlbIidia:
(1) The "oIunWy e"Il,,>ee .,ho bd
place to go paid all eJCpensl'S 01. tnmpOIU-
tion. which included movemenl Irom lID
home to train. a redueed railroad fare. 11K!
mO"emenl at destination station to lID refuge.
Additional subsidies were paid to this group,
200 yeo fer a family group of foUT pl'rSODS and
300 yen for families iaIler lban four
Thjg subsidy \\"lLS paid b)' the cit)" al the mae
the cErtificate "'as .
(?) For reliel Octims -..ith friends or lIi"Itb
an ;ncestral home lor refuge, only the nil-
road faN! ..-as pro,ided. .
(8) Relief ,ietims -..ith no place to go paid
f the tnnsportation COSl- Tbe
no 'dtheco:<\.Sfromhon>eto the
mUOlClplI II} p8.I ;ide<! free tnl\$"
nilroa.d. the into .,hich tbe
portatlO
n
an . lhe eost of
e"aenee wen.t,,,:d station to the ultimate
from the rat
destination.

(2) Those with no friends or relatives. The

Kinki headquarters organization designated
where these would go.
O. Cerlificales JOT changing di5lricts.-ln all
<:a.ses, a cenificate for changing districts had to be
seturerl before the transportation authoritiei
lIOuld issue a railroad ticket authorizing mo"e-
Illent. These certificates were printed by the city
and prefecture on authority of the illinistry of
Affairs and were issued by the prefectural
POlice, and block association leaders. There were
:: type$ of certificates; one (Ellhibit Rand
'01 erence item No. 23, pts. I, 11. and III) for the
untary evacuee who had a place to go, and the
:;er (EXhibit Qand Reference item No. 22) issued
requiring help. In t.he latter ease the
bo cate entitled the holder to free transporta-
On the railroad. (Japan's railroads are almost
.., ltely
government owned and operated).
made by the general headquarters of the Kinki
district (Kinki Chiho Sokan Fu), one of the eight
regional areas into which the empiro was divided.
This headquarters organi7.ation consisted of rep-
resentatives from. the following metropolit.a!l
areas and prefectures: Osaka Fu, Kyoto Fu,
Hyogo Ken. Nara Ken, Shiga Ken, and Wakaj"'
ama Ken, and, in general, covered territorially tbt
military district for this area. It maintained at all
times a listing of space available to receirr
evacuees.
c. RelieJ Did.-lnsofar as possible. the evacuet
was expected to pay the owner to whose home bt
was assigned. This could take the form of mone)'
or labor. In the event the evacuee was not abletl
payor to work out his keep, arrangements
he made through the Kinki headquarters orga!'"
z.ation for financial aid.
7. Trall.lpolTlalion oj Eoocuees.-D. TransportJ:
tion authorities divided evacuees into twO grou))l'
(1) Those who had a place to go and maill
their oWn arrangements voluntarily;

S.od door '" '0(""<0 of g..proof .b.oh.r. All door> ...... of

.imilIr <;<>"""....OR.
Department of Information (In 11. March 1944. It
was advisor)" in character and, although evacua-
tion was encouraged, it was n(lt made mandatory
except in the ease of certain 'lChool groups (par. 8
bek>w "School Children"'). MllSI e"acuation was
not considered because of laek of funds, of ade-
quate transportation faeilities. and the feeling
among prefectural officials that it was not needed
because of the assurances from the anny that
Japan had ample protection and there would be
very few bombing incidents.
6. Rtuplicm aTWf.-a. Evacuatian reception
areall were deiignated for the school children group
and for air-raid victims who had no relatives or
friends in outlying area$ to whom they could go.
All other evacuees went as individuals seeking
shelter with friends and relatives. many returning
to their old homesteads located in other parta of
the empire far removed frIJm the principal target
_.
oj aTWf.-The deiignation of
areas for reception of air-raid victilllll who had no
relatives nor places to which they could go was
.....
.....
.....
.....
'...
""

,,,..
.....
"..
....
.-
I.:..
lltll'f'ltIU of mJ<:llm.-No eztra
t provided for the mOVement of .L.
..
... h' . ...... \'OlUJI.
evacueetl or t ose VlcllRlll who had pJaee.
Jf/1Hotre"er, for the othl!r victirna it
P to make IIp('l:ial aJTanil'lneDta for
...-rr . d. ....
:;;. 'on tralnll an In some CUI!lI to .
-__I tnliM when the number of
:;;destination jUlltilied sucb action. Th:.:
enl4 were by the PrefectunJ Ill"',
workin,g with the. wan!. Detaila
such all of illI$emhty and
{or vanous desLmatJons.
HI)Pl1lold g0006.-Tl'llnsportation 01 houw-
JOOd5 was limited in all eases to _hat could
bfarried . .
J. DfsIi.lJ1iolU.-The dMinatioll5
Ibt Osab cneuees In following Ilft-
ildlIJfS: W.byama. Mlye, Shiga, Kyoto.
&. EracwGliOfl of dod dtiUlra.-(l.
_IIl5t1Uction.1 the compulsory
lilII of JCbool children ""en' tim issued 30 JWle
1," and twice again dwing July 1944, by the
Osaka prefecture. Such instruetions {Erllibit P,
ptl..1. JI and III and RefE'l"el'lCe item Xo. 21, pta.
I to IV} ..we based upon fElJUlatiollll Jft\'iouJJ)'
-.ed by the Ministry of Home Mairs and the
Xiailter of Education, liUpplernented by sudl
additiona.I illlltl'uctiol1S as ,,-ere needed to fit the
kal tituation. An advisor}- oouncil on e-oacuatioD
"dIool clIildren "'3!l established in September
1M.(, with the gm'erJlO/" as chainnan and tM
0I!II:ials eoncerned with e\"aCU3tion as members
RtfMilCe item No, 21, pt. IV}. Actual
" the IIChool groups started in 1944,
loIId wu practically completed by the end of
S!pten,ber 1944.
l Rep(i01l Orta6.-The reeeption areas for
tbe.
lIC
hool groups ....ere suggested by the gol'l'\'"-
.. and the general headquarter'll of the Kinki
6striet. Existing schools, public buildings, inns,
lIld temples in the reception areas were used as
of instruction for these new school groups.
IlIIofar as llO$sible, sufficient space was selected in
!llc:h bUilding to provide complete housing, feed-
lIIR'tt'l:realional and instructional areas. In
Where sui'table and ample school housing
t:ls DOt available the in.truction was placed on a
'''h''
the .. 1ft basis. The reception areas select"" an
'" number of children evacuated to each wert' II.!
"""
t

"I ,he ',h n.. uud ", <oy., ,h. fill,.,ion pond. 0' ,he O..k.
....ac., l1l'<>rk No,. ,.,y;nk .i,. of nO" beeo".., oil 'YP" ""'f. "..,d.
the a.ir...-.id victim
The FeIIlai WiD ,., a
'. nlnll IIw:b 'I --
I'Ictifl1l at a Price ... be IIOld to the rQI
5tICh houees can of :i,OOO 1!IlCh. 'fbt, buye- 01
ll'ea&ury up to a loan ftom thf, national
of in1.tl'est (u lIltIOIUllof Y'l,OOO at. a low
b. P'iruu flel"cent per annum).
.......:_ . calaa
--.....1.IOn il etlnti '. . tro...",
Iting witb a f d nUIna: Ita rehef lDeaIurea, oper
un of YIOlOOOO .
public, ' . '. etlntrlbuted by
IndlVlduah. Th' and
loeations alld baa uffiees in Va.OoUll
sites. It has ute needed relief requi_
hotels to &ool apartment boUlel Ind
for 200 .;:odalt 1,.500 It also eaI'l!lI
250 of the au r&ld!. and gives aid to
7. COl1l __The ........ ,__ -
raid e '. "':'" p"",runa: or the puo.t-
b mergency stl"I'lel:'$ mOsaka is elidenced b
t e fact that, in Iplte of repeated raids on this
and knowledge by officials of the atent of raid!
u? cities of Japan, no prl:'arranged welfare
aId stations were Bet up 10 care lor air-raid suI-
fneTs. However, 5UCb stations were de5igbated 3.1
emergency arose. but "''etC insufficient and
Adding to the confusion W3lI the
to temporary areas as reeep-
(lon centers lIlId tempurary reeeiling stationl for
tbe airraid sufferers. In spite of 5llCb poor plan-
mng, hOlll",,'"er, the national food storage depots
were tapped for emergenC)- supplies, 8Dd 1,200,000
sulfems from tbe 6 major air raids on Osaka
recei'oo some form of emergenq' welfare
WAR DAMAGE a.AJ.MS
1. Sropll of IN GnIoalIl-.ol 01
gorfflllllllll reapuuibilitr
(I) TrJ>l!l of illkloRU, o...r ...... lu....
The Japaneoe g<l'-ernmeut respon-
sibility to prIl\-ide persons! injll1)" llr deatII
illSurance to it'! nationals, as well as
of property damage resulting from aa'l of
,,111". The principal destruetion anticipated
was from aerial attack. although dantllge from
nIl"sl or laDd attack was included in
of the natiunalla"': The fulloWing
are the major Dltional wv IaWl
enaeted:
War risk insnranee
Hoken Rinji Sodll Ho)_ Enacto<!
1941 ta take elI"e<:t 25 JSDlW)'
1942.. ided reimbur!ll'lllnt lor
This tlCt pro' . COI...red by
kind of propertl
"
.-dquarter'll Willi in Tokyo and IOOdI
the nation on the baWi of "wt 1It0l'ed
'I1I'()eaka portion of this fund waa
r depol.8.-Osaka had aPPtoJ:,6,OOO,OOO_
where the food 8tOCka of this
.".e stored- Schools and baseml!llts
t/lI city were used as the prineipal d t toulhout
tbliraid! became more severe, many l=:tl! Af!@r
lDO'ed to the outskir.ts of the city_ ODS
d. Caw8trophe rehe] anocia/ioli (S .

. tIl"', E,,_
KOl)'- nlS was a prwate welfare . ':'W
fipanced by civilian contributions 3.l;$O(',,_
.. d" ,,,,rehef
w.ivIUes were a mmlstered through th
eunnels as the official welfare program e same
3. Action taken bV air-taid ridi- . A .
"'0._ Ir-rald
,<ictims would apply to. the block ll.'iSOCiation for
emergency. food. clothmg or medicine welfare
stampS, whIch would be honored upon Presentation
to .the storage de.pot. This emergency
rehef was furlllShed for a period of .
5 to 10 days, depending upon
Iftel" which the air-raid sufferer would be u:
pected to seek his own arrangement.<; with
friends and relatives, either in the city or in out-
lying areas. The food available for distribution
from these consisted of cookies, bmds,
rice balls, mfants' crackers, condensed milk,
canned food, pickles, pickled plums, Miso (bean
cheese), Shoyu (sauce), sake wine, sugar candy,
candles, matches, toilet paper, footwear, towels,
1lOlIps, mosquito sticks, newspapers, home rem-
edies, and fuel. Blankets were available on loan.
Sufficient provisions were available for three
meals per day and it was reported that there was
plenty of food for this purpose. These emergency
$Upplies were free.
4. Number of ait-raid ticlims.-Figures furn
ished by the prefectural government indicated
lhat more than 1,200,000 air-raid sufferers in
Osaka sought relief.
5. victims who lost their
received I,ooo per family; for loss of
fllrll.lture, clothing and other properlY, 500 per
amlly; and for each member of a family lost,
Y-iiOO. These sums were j><1id from the national
treasur}-.
6. Prolonged relie] work.-Il.
r-For air-raid victims who are still compelled to
in a program prov!din
g
. temporary
th nshacks IS now in progress. It Isesumated thaI
.. will be 30,000 such houses eonstructoo and
of has already started. It is planned thaI
these shacks will be publicly owned for whIch
t. The evacuation of school children by lP'OUPl,
which was finally made a
was the one element of el'acuat,on planmng whieb
reasonably successful. APproXimately 63 per.
::t of the indicated porulatiOn waa
removed from the city un er t .IS pan.
]. MasII evncuatlon of a specified was not
considered because of lack of funds,
transportation facilities, and the feehng

officials that it was not needed LD VIew

pre '1 h' lh
of assurances from the m, itary. aut 011 lei at
Japan had ample protection agamst enemy plane
attacks.
POST.RAID EMERGENcY WELfARE
1. Plan_-a. Emergency welfare or.
stations were established under the dIrection of
the prefectural police in primary schools: temples.
and public halls in the outskirts o.f the city. These
stations provided emergency subSistence and hous-
ing for a few days for those made home-
less during an air raid. After recelvmg emergency
treatment, these persons would seek shelter in the
homes of relatives and friends in the rural areas.
No particular area had been set up or designated
in advance to function as reception stations for
these air-raid sufferers (par. 7 of e,-acuation sec
tion). First-aid treatment was given in these
stations.
2. Fefding-a. Dlslribution.-The nation's food
supply waseontrolled by the national government.
Part of this control resulted in the establishment of
reserve depots throughout the empire. which were
ultimately used as points for distribution of sup-
plies, mostiy staples, exclusive of rice, fruits, and
vegetables, to air raid sufferers. The governor (If
the prefecture, through the economic preservation
and the food and preseC"ation control sections ol
the prefectural government directed the distribu,
tion of these supplies. He was authorized to dis-
tribute through these media u!) to one-third of tbe
supplies; anything in excess of that was done only
with permission of the national government.
b. Control organizalion.-The organization cre-
ated to control the food supply and dislributil)ll
was the central food and provisions corporation
(Chu Shokuryo Eidan). This corporation was
started 1 September 1942 and was established
under the ministerial department of agricultull'
and forestry. It was supported by a national
of IOO,OOO,OOO, one-half of which wl\ll supp\l
by the national government and one half
merchants of the various prefectures. The nali
O
H Office setuall)' left the city. Many ree<J
rd
;
"'ere destroyed in the fire aD
an are an e;;timate.
these figUres Th figures given by the
b Sdlool groupl.- e ..' f h
seetinn of the or .t, e
h 1 h
ldren a--7 to 12,
number of !It 00 e 1 , ..- (1944
evacuated on a "olunWY basis up to July 0 _
116950 The number cI'aeuated on 11 eompul
of I October 1944 ,,'as 68,600. 'fhe
!lOUn'le stated that in the saml! age group
there were 109,200 children who ,,:"ere .not e\'llCU'
ated either ,-oluntarily or by dll'eCtlOll of the
$Chool authorities. These ligures III'<! based upon
reports made from theschool,:"aster of each sc,hoo!
direct to the roucational sectIon of the mUnicIpal-
ity. It upected by 30 October 19-15 that all of
these students will hilI'/! retumed. .
Qthn figures are avaIlable
the number of school children who left
the school system of (),;aka because of the re1oe.a-
lion 01 famH}" ",-ar workers in other industrial

10. The evacuation plan was
designed primarily as a pre-raid to
evacuate nonessential from heaVily con-
gested areas, so that those remaining were free to
devote maximum efforts 10 protect the city and
carry on the war. Pre-raid evacuation was volun-
tary, and le;s than 15 of the estimated
population was evacuated under there conditions.
If the evacuation plan had contained mandatory
provisions, more per$OOS would ha"e been lorced
lrom the city and the loss of life would ha'-e been
considen.bly le;s.
h. The same ,-oluntary evacuation procedure
..-as 10110"'00 to evacuate after raids, but
the provisions of this plan were not elastic enough
to meet the sudden and continued demands 01
victims seeking transportation following major air
raids, and CtInditions soon became chaotic.
c. In general, there were no predeterminoo
reception areas eJ.cept those arranged for pre-raid
"OIUDtar}- evacuee school group!!. Voluntary pre-
raid evacuation to relatives and friends worked
well and eliminated maladjustments among dif-
ferent groUPI which might have been caused by
differenoes of religious sects and social status.
rI. The 13-14 March 1!l4f> raid was much more
intense aDd 01 longer duration than expected, but
even aft:er thig raid. there Wall no change in the
eVleuatlOn plan-all eVleuation WlUl still volun-
tary. There Wall, however, a larger follow-
ing this raid than had occurred previously.
Lbe rtPt.
Uld witb tbI
IlUllI .....
_b injury tbeU::;lIat
COIllJlWiaon .... vacly
S lJItb IImllw 0fIft'ati0na .
1--.. or Geman aD the
...... C>;1lenee y, Doct'. bilL.,
CJi:PCnies that l101lvalesa.nt &lid other
Paid by the have been illeUn'ed wwe
For their trouble' from.the sum paid bim
the government
commission t 00ln1ll\ZUfls 'II'erl! given a
50 sen lor ea: I 0( the PTmtium
lar below tb polICY. Tm.IlIlOWlt_
the. :uaI
the
oo:m
of

their IO!IS q '. p.!1ll!I reprded
go"ernment.. contribulJnn to the
t. POP\tlll 01 doi-. _
(1) N _.
tttaoI1J Ik". for _ .... _,-
ants were .. .... '-1iI1II\-
re<l ..... "'" to bring to the insuranet
IXImpanpritbin30da)"loI'deatb . - the
following doculllCl!u: OTlOlury
(0) Certificate of death or" .
the police. Eacil lice . lIIJury, ilI5IICd by
. . po ltat>on had an organ-
of ph}1Iicians ..ho Wl:'I1' alJed upon to
eertifr death or injury.
(b) Certi6alt 01' family be.-
tween the claimant and the II!SlIf'IId in ease 01
death. This _ obtained from the <:en5llI
registry at the district (Ku) ofliee.
(t) The il15\lTllllCl! poIiey.
(d) CetI$IlS registry eenificalt rl death.
Only the following dainwlu oouId t:<:>IIM
death hene6ts: spouse, brothel's. sisters, c0u-
sins, relativ('!l h}' 01 the first degtet
and thoiie dependent upoo the asswtd for
support.
(2) MtlMd oj the ease Ii
death of an assured, the eWllWlt wu obIi&fJd
to appear with the abo,'t rwntd documtJlti
at the main city ollioe of the ilsUilli
tbe policy. The eonlPQUlY then ,'trifled the
documenu and within 30 dal"l QI requir!
to pay lhe In the case cI injury fOf
whicll benefits wert daimed. tither the as-
sured or his papers had to he prt!leI\!t!d to tbe
main office IIld lhe same procedure ...... 101-
IO'/l-ed as in tbe CIge of c1aimant< for death

(3) Ap""u.-Only if the doc\ItOCllUl wert
_....1 or it the tame of death ni pO!
MtlO"'" . did the
Ie:u!Y attributed 10 tnelI\y aoUOO. .
tolllpall.v ref_ to pal' 1aiIa
"
inftlrance control a.ssociation
ikaiJ. In June 1945 the T.
its name to cenlrlUbon
(Jlokell ChUOkal). a..oclation
(2) InsurallCuontroh"oeia( .
.. committee of members selec:-ThliW/UI
insurance company. The head frorn each
association was in Tokyo b
quarten
, M ,'"
. h ,Uthere
br1lnches m eac region. One f hese were
l).Iaka, and like the branch of was in
isU'Y served the Osaka-Kobe-K to
nance
min_
association decided on rate % The
. . premiums f
pn
vate
msurance anp the earn '. or
_"_., h' . mISSIon to ...
accow"'-' t e ,!!.Sumg company Th
. . e war cas
a1ty law was so SImple that the !Woe' .
its capacity as intennediary In
insurance companies and the fin"" '. the
_" r d" ml","'"
enCilunter...... ew lfficultlCli. On th, -,
I
. ., _-, payment
of calms, 1 aet"", as the court of a
,_. ._ h P,,,,,,, for
C"'lman.... w 0 were not sati6fied 'tb d.
decision of the private company ha:
handled the wIlr casualty ......Ii,y "
3 I
."'" nsurance.
() 7l8ILrallCtcompantt. -Theactualwork
and with the public on the war casu_
alty was turned over lo the private
.. In Osaka City the.... were 25 com_
war casualty insurance. In ad-
dition to their main offices, there were some
60 branches scattered throughout the city. In
all 01 these Qffices it was possible to apply lor a
casualty poliey, which required a "cry
SImple form calling only for name, address,
age, amount of the policy, premium, benefici-
ary and signature of the applicant. The actual
writing of the poliey was done at the main cit}'
offices and mailed to the applicant. Collection
01 e1aims could be made only at the main of-
fices of the companies. Factories or business
offices could take out group war casualty in
.urance, entering the names of its members on
one In this case, tbe compan)' paid the
PTe':llums as a welfare measure. Many com
panms in Osaka applied for this type 01 insur-
ance. The insurance com""niCli had no choice
of de . ,--
nymg or accepting the war casualty in-
applications. Claimants were paid
It draft on a local bank against funds de-
POsll.ed to the company's credit for this pur-
POse. Since no claims were paid without
certification, the insurance companj'
::e71.lICd no discretion in the reimbuT$Cmen
t
a c a'manls. It was only concerned with the
IVeemenl of a death claim with flgUl'C!! from
local repl"C!ICntative of the government was in the
bl'llnch of the Finance Ministry whic.h had p-
el'lll supervision of There
WllS one such oflice in the Kmkl dlstnct coverina
Q8a,ka. Kobe. Kyoto, and areas in between.
The lIctu",,1 work at illSuing policies, settling clairtla
and dealing with the puhlic was in the hands oft.be
Ilri"ate insurance the contn:ll
and by the authonty of the Mmistry,
Acting as liaison between the finance office and the
individual insurance companies was an associatiOll
of the insurance companie;.
2, Gasually immranct.-a. Basic provisiOIll._
War casualty insurance was availahle to any
Japanese national in good standing. Citizenship
pri,'ileges were denied to certain types of prisoners,
and their rights to take out war casualty policies
were denied, but policies already issued remained
in force. While the basic policy issued to an
indi"idua! allowed for a payment of
5,000 yen, a person might insure his life for a
lCSi!Cr amount. It was possible to take out war
casualty insurance only. If a person should app\j'
lor war casualty insurance in sc,'eral companies,
and should take out war insurance to a totsl
5,000 yen, the law provided that only
this total amount should bl< paid. It, is the
rience in Osaka that theenlorcementof this law has
been difficult, because, according to one insuranct
ollicial 'the business is SO complicated." For dis-
ability, loss of one or both eyes, one or both arms
or legs, war-caused impediment of speech, or di..
figuring scars on the face of the female, a schedule
of partial payments was set up. For total disab;lity
defined as the loss of both eyes, both arms, or both
legs the full amount of the policy was paid. But for
one arm or one leg lost, one-half of the principal
amount would be paid,
b. Administrative orgoniMlion in 080.1:0 Prt-
ftc/ure and O.aka Cily.
(1) Finaru:e Mini.try branclt.-The one
branch office of the national finance m;nIStl')
scrdng the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto area, located
in the city of Osaka, had the final authorit;'
over matters pertaining to the administratiOll
of the wartime loss of life and per80
nal
injuries law. Its functions, specifically,
to authorize the issuance of pol;cies, to intel'
pret the law and lo act as a liaison a&:t
nl
between the eompanies and the Fina
nct
Ministry in Tokyo. It received reports fr(l11\
the insurance companies through a ce
nual
coordinating insurance office known all" thl
regular fiTl! insurance policiel such liS
, busine5!5 office:; and homes. factorIes,
automobiles. airel"llft o.n land, harbor
in.tallations and railway It also
co,-ered goods in traMit.. A In the law
i. discuso.ed in section;; of thIS report:. .
Wartime lOllS of 1ie and personal InjUries
act (Scroo Shibo Shogai Hoken Ho).
3 March 19-13 to take effect immediate!)'.
This act covered parments to be made to
thOile injured by aetsof war and to lIulhorized
SUrV1\'ors of the dead.
(2) and Sptcinll'roois
iolUl
, The
application of the above laws pllY-
ment for death during practice blackouts, and
did not CO"cr foreigners. TheTl! was no special
provi.ion for wido"" and orphans aside from
the flat payment of the amount for which the
deceased ""lIS insured. In case of injury, the
government's re;;ponsibility ended with the
payment of partial benefit for disability.
There ",eTl! no unemployment or training
pro,.jsiol1!l in the casualty la"'. Perwns injured
in connection with civilian defense duties were
not co"ared by the law unless their death or
injury occurred during an airraid or as a
result of direct. though delayed, enemy action
such as by mines. Every person had to take
out insurance, if he wished to be covered.
SQmetimes the auxiliary police and fire units
(Keibodan) ""Quid pay for those 01 its memo
bers who could not alford to pay the premium
of 3 yen per thousand yen of insurance; but
that was entirely a local matter and was not
provided for by law. There was no ....lation-
ship between the issuance of war casualty
insurance and the regular life insurance of
private companies. If a person had both a
go"emment and a pri"ate poliey his bene-
liciariCli would collect both from the govern-
ment and from the private oompan}' in ea5e of
death. On war damage a slightly different
amangement prevailed. In order to take out
fire insurance with a private company, it was
that government war damage
msurance be taken out in tile same amount,
Tllere no limit to the principal amount of
pohCles. Howe'cr. if one's home or build-
rng were dClilroyed by fire, he could collect
only the amount of go,'ernment war insur-
ance, and not on his policy also. as in
the case of casualty rnsurance.
b. of IaI. The

- -
..., .
..... "." ..
.- _ "
.,tt _ .
.... ....-..
II. or. to< .... 11.. " ... m 0:
1....". <uu....u,
(3) "'PHal
PaYn>enbJ IlOt ..... 1rita
eornPally eouid -.II the -.-.
the ill$Wance the QIe for oet''-_.
had 1-__ control -. ....."""', 10
""""-llre8ented Xo -

. lctlJtlQll <law
lllThe
intel\>st was taken . &how that ""'Y
for war damage. 'n the llational prmi!iol\l
provided. The 'lI4Urancl;.-beD it """ first
Tokyo after the poUd in
amounted to only HI April 19-12
"cry slight and there O<er'f
applicatio as ItiIected by DeW
1!l45, .. Xot. until 10 MaJd
. _,0 recet\"ed ,ta firat . .
ra,d did applications in Osaka . all"
numben. The reo.ision
: 9e April 1944 law, Iow-ering it ftom 3}-eD
w yen per thousand r61ec....
ment' deWe the &<I"em-
to enrotlJ'aie applicalioll.l for
Insurance.
Tab" of ""pIflI/J '" o....t...-Tbe fol-
....ng table sb(nl,'S the mune or orar damage
msurance parmenta in Osaka frwn 191 to
September 19.15.
._--.. _....-
-.... "'.... ,...
.

.-
--
_-d through examination by the .
of the value of Such Pl'OPen lllaUluee
jlll"'"ebe establ i1\hment's books. Such
....v had fire insurance anyway and th on:li.
of assessment for war dalltage. III the
:if-did not arise. The insurance COlli IlISUrance
to collect 1.50 yen for each were
2 per<:Cnt of the premium. The :c
y

called for the following infOrmati P.ph
catlOn
location, the kind of n;-me of
facwry). tile business address o/'"h& home,
' ,.,. I' eowner
,.lIouse, estlm3 "" va uatlon
b h . ' "'" amOUnt
co,-cr"" y t e pohcy Premium '
,.- d " name of
ad :ess, names and amounta of other
-J"ies camed on the property. The f I
".- . . onn or
tr'JISportatlOn carried the followin
ilefJlS: method of Lransportation, name of . &
f
',fd' camer
jotStion 0 poln 0 Ispatch and of de:stina' '
fd d
' lion,
urne () sen er an receIVer, estimated v I
f
. a ue,
aPlQllnt 0 premIUm.
(. Paymtnl of claims.
(1) Necessory sleps by rlaimont._Only
damage due to fire or other destruction result.-
ing. from. acts of war would bring the damage
pohc'es Into f01'<:e. Witllin 30 days after the
loss was incurred, the claimant was required
to present to the main office of the insurance
company the policy and a certificate of 10&'1
which was Obtained from one of tllreeaoureel;
the ncarelt police station, the city hall, or
from the leader of tile block association
(Chokai).
. (2) !1ft/hod of paymenl.-Upon presenta
t'on of tile above documents to the insurance
compan}', claims of less than 1,000,000 ren
,,:ould be paid without nny further im-estiga-
lion beyond careful inspection of the papers
presented. For claims above 1,000,000 yen
on. anyone contract resulting from anyone
raId or bombardment the claim was presented
through local branch to the finance minis-
try in Tokyo for approval. As an aid to
det.ennining extent of damage witllout actual
\1s't to the destroyed property, the insurance
control association kept an up_to-date map of
'
r Clly showing burned-out areas, and
P'ed COPIes of tllis to the !!C,'eral compame:s.
in cash up to 5,000 yen ,,'ere made
;"mediatel y once the claim was appro,ed.
he balance was placed in the bank in the
of a "blocked bank deposit" {Tokushu
. Okin) to be paid after 5 years and to draw
Interest at 3.8 percent per annum.
1945, increasing the for war damap in-
surance to the folloWlOg; 4 yen per thoUllllnd IMI"
on warehOUses and faetories.8 yen on Pri-
vate property up to 50.000 yen and .16 yen 011
private property exceeding 50.000 yen III value. In
each of the tllree versions of the war damage I",
there was contained provision for coverage oi
property in transit. If a family was required to
move out of a city likely to be bombed. or beeauae
its h<:Hlse lIad been damaged or destroyed by enemy
action, tile national war damage law provided for
transportation insurance to cover property during
its shipment by train, sllip or any other means of
transportation. The rates for this insurance in the
original law of 1940 were 0.05 percent, or 50 lIeIl
per 1,000 yen for a single transit. No limitation
was placed on the disttlO! to be traveled within
Japan proper. Tllis rate was maintained in the
revision of the law in 1944, but was incroasW to
0.10 pereent, or 1 yen per 1,000 in July 1945.
b. Ortr-{lll vrgani:alion in Osaka Prefte/ure and
o.oko CiIV.-The same arrangement for admin.
istering war damage insurance was in effect as for
war casualty insurance. Tile branch of tile finance
ministry gave counsel and represented the go,-ern.
ment. tile insurance control association acted lIS an
intermediary between tile private insurance c<lm-
panies and tile finance office, and the private com
panies did tile work. Only companies alreadJ'
issuing property insurance were used for issuing
war damage insurance. There were 10 such com-
panies in Osaka. Tlleir agents throughout the
city could receive applications but the Issuing of
policies and collection of claims was done at the
main offices. If a person wislled to take out a
private fire insurance policy, which in Osaka auto-
matically required the taking out of war damage
inBurance also from 1940 onwards. the company
sent out its representative to a.'lSCSlI the property.
However, if a person wished war damage insur
ance only on a home. no investigation of the
property was made because of tile lack of time.
The company insured a wooden home on the basi>
of the owner's word as to its size, and estimated
the valuation on the basis of 500 yen per \Su
bOl
(36 square feet). There was some latitude hQwe,'er
on this figure, particularly if a home were known to
belong to a wealthy individual. In thnt ca>C,'
investigation was made by the compa
n
)'
and a lIigher valuation might be allowed. n.e
owner was obliged to accept the valuation fignre
ol
the company. On war insurance for factories and
business establishments, the valuation Wlls de-
Actually the companies look the word?f the
. .' . ......lice authorities. If a clmm:ml
Investtgatlng "" . . f h
was 111)1 i;lItisfted with the decisIOn 0 t e
police authorities, he had further appeal as
r as provisions of the national casualty law
:re concerned. He did. re-
UnIl! 10 the ei"jl coUJ'1.S, hut tIllS pnvllege
:. not exercised by any claimant in Osaka.
as of Z1 (ktober 19-15. Theoretically,. such II
ease could be carried through the city and
district courts \0 the supreme court in Tokyo,
but lor all practical puJ1lO"t'5. the word of the
local police slation was final. . .
3. insuroJiCt.-Il. B(I3IC IllSllr-
/Il1U p.oruioMI._National insurance for property
damage was enacted by 2 years bel?Te
easualty insurance. The ongillallaw, published In
19-11 providing lor inexpensi,'e coverage of prop-
eny damaged by acts of war, has been de!!Crit>e?
as covering property insurable under regular pn-
vate insuranN. Property could he insurro up to
90 of its value:lt the rate of 0.35 percent
per annum. to items cowaed were oon-
tained in the provision th:lt, if a peroon wished to
insure such things as precious met.als, jewelry or
art objects under the w:lr d:lmage law, he must
al$O have these articles covered by policies with
pri,-ate companies. Anim:lls and pl:lnts ",ere ex-
cluded from coverage entirely, as were cllSh, secu-
rities :lnd stamps. in een.ain citie;;, the local insur-
anN \'Ontrol associations could rule that any fire
insurance policy issued should require the llSSured
to take out war damage insurance :11$0. These were
citie&thought to be possible air-raid targets. Osaka
"'lIS one of these. On 25 April 1944, the original
War Risk Insurance Emergency lI!ellSuresAct "'as
repealed and a new act came into force. This was
entitled Wartime Special Property Insurance Act
{Senj\ TokUlShu Sonpi Hoken Hol. The new law
provided for iTlSurance \'Overage for damage due
to earthqnake and tidal wavCll (Tsunami) during
wartime. Thenew lawalso provided for an increase
in the \'Ovenge from 9lJ percent of value to 100
percent of value. and the premium W:lll redueed
from 3 yen per thousand to 2 yen per thousand.
addition, the 1:11" stated that all private fire
UlSurance policies i",ued throughout the C(luntry
require tbe assured to takeout war damage
Berore this law there "'lIS no insur-
ance, national Or private. for damage from earth-
Penons wishing 1.0 take out war damage
'nsurance aloneeould continue 1.0 do 90. There wa:;
an amendment to the basic law, i"'ued in July

.Md to conduct the llChOOI _hil the

provided the balan.ee
e
JlI'eI'eetllral
".- (1) lllllrueforr.-The il1$tIuetora
on .the b.asis of back&tou ....
.,.d v:penenC! In medical and lid,
jdS, fire fightmg, engineering .....
don (fOl' services), gas
1m-raId protection infonna and
d these men, through friendly .oi
n
. Somt,
.-ociation5, had received air'raid
IIl'ter1als from Great Britain andPMleetion
tnd attempted 1.0 adapt llIem to
JitUlltion!l. All instructors, Il(It regu:lllln
l
in civilian job$ by llIe pre( Y@Ill_
ernment, ....ere eompensated for
2) T",illffS.-The only qualifira;'
quiJe;l attendance at llIis se::.:
leadershIp m an organizatio, ",.
. IS xhool
tnined only the top leaden of alUiliary po/ice
and fireunitll (Keibodan), factor}, fire 6gb .
bripdes (Shubo Bu). police leaden ulI&
sible for aidraid protection Sl'J"\.
JeadeB of othel'" Ol'g3.nizalioll5 a
c1lilian defense responsibilities. Iny
(a) CIIITTlc.flllllt.-XO formal
planned or de,-e/opeO'. The Slibjecu
ISSlgned for presentation 1Iere. lIS pmiousI
lUted. in field.'! of tim. aid, fire fighm:,
lK'fVJCegas .protection, and r-nJ
lJl"-naid protectIOn mfonnation which dealt
with showing the effect!! 01. diffl'l"ellt
lIlCflIdtary and high-explosh1! bombs. There
no specified number of hours of instn:e-
Uon de;ignated to a real 1I'OI"killi
knowledge of each subject. The proceduru-as
to !Il'hedule a lecture and demonstnltKm of
one. subject for a Cl:lnain date and then to
notify all leaden to attend. AttendaJll't .-as
in the strict sen;;e of 1M
ut SInce the police made ina.-tiolUl at 1'aIi-
0111 t" ..-
tb' .Imes to check upon the tralWllitting of
lIlfonnation to the individual members of
..... organizations, there were seldom any
a"""nt.ees
Prlj, .
'-t h U/urol police and firt ",hooh.-ThfSl'
trai l e e;tablished schools for the peacetime
-:gdof. POlice a.nd fire personnel which.
d wartime to train personnel In the
ut!es of air-raid protection. Here again no
:"'l7!I; eu . 1
'Il.e c mcu um or schedule was carried out.
ac"ool wI! c . .
iIIlir'raid Ie" Wa!I operated mainly for trallllllg
Pll:caulions was thatof the guard te!Cue
1""--'1_.
--"'--
demonstratioll!i. The school continued to o(lCfSu
at this location unlil deatroyed in March
when it!! acth'itit'!! well' transferred to the prefec-
tural government building. The twO principsl
organizations interested in this school were tilt
Great Japan Air Defense AllSOCiation (Dai Nippon
Baku Kyokai) which concerned itself with
air-raid protection servict'!! and the Keibo KyokJ,'
which speeiali7.ed in fire training. Both.cI
these associations were ronnected with the MinU-
trr of Home AlTairs. The Grl.'at Japan Air
AS!lO<:iatlon provided the greater part 01 the fund!
were foreed out before the f1l'tit raids on the dt,
occurred but thi, died out as the fire-bombi", 01
cities _umed major propol'liona.
d. Loss oj !luintu.-The fire-break law pro.
vide<! also for compensation to those whose pa..-
of business lI'ere tom do...n for lou of profit fl'Olll
their busines&el. and there "..as a further proviliort
for paring penollll for movina
amounting to 200-300 yen per
t. r;mpoilitrll of l,ulltriah.-The go"emmeDt
beeaIIle the OIl"I\er of lumber, tile, blurts &Ild
other materials produced by the demolition. II
!OOld these materials to pri"ate "'stoCkholdinr'"
companil'$ and in tIlrn controlled lheir dispolition
lI.hen lhese rompanil'$ 1lOId the materials..
5. CtrllI.".u.-Officials of the _
ing the war casually insurance and war damart
insurance that paymenUl to ...... victinta
had been made and were being completed despit.e
the disnlption eaused by the c10ile1). sptod air
raids.. The ..-.u simplified by the abaerw:e
of appeal problems. but lhe work of ,elifyinl
elaima was eompli.eated by losa of records, dlllltil
of ward and poIw distriet officials who could
<:tify claims. and the loss of efficieney eauwd by
the peJ'3Onal diflieu\tie15 of imurance company
"..orken.. The eompanit'!! were !llItiafied with the
pro,isjOIlll of the war insurance la"''5, and whill'
there had been one time when they were momBllt
ani)' apprebenaive lest the government be unablt
to stand the financial strain of the 1I'aI' insunmee
programa. they were fully eonfidenl by mid-
October that all clainu would be fully and
equitably settled. The negligible eft'ect on war
ill5\ll"3.nce interest in Osaka of the Doolittle rUI
on Tokyo gave weight 10 the opinion that OsaD
citizens felt no it'!lS secure after news of the raid
than before it.
..
VII. TRAINING OF aVILIAN DEFENSE PERS0NNEL AND GENERAL PUBLIC
Traill;"I 01 Ci.ilian Oef_ hnonlWl
1. treats lIith the
aeItion the of airraidprotection
WIlli partlC1llaremphaaia upon the train-
lnl leaden; of the "ar\oua groups and
orpnlZlltlOlUl concerned.
2. T ..
(Bob Air.dt}ellu .cltool
\
"'3 ,,,",,4-0).-Th.. I('hool establiahed in
,... un er the' .:.... .
o.a jU"... lCtlon and maintenance of
. prefeduTe. It WlU 10000ted in the T. ..
IMtnct 01. Osaka C. nnOjl
willi ad' . . It)' and had lacilitiea
j01ll1nK open :tr'U luitsble for actual
bet,,"f!eIl the \.lIw pro,'idiTll for inlluraJlC(! on war
damage to propfrty and thaI pro"jdillll
lion (or lOIII of propert)' rall!fJ(\ by prm"ent"'e
dMlOlition. _..
b. Pia" of plI,.,.,._At the ...me of
owner ,,'as entitled b}' law to up to
3,000 in Although the df:'l[lohtlOlI pro-
gfSIll bfpn in January of 19, onl)' about one-
half of t.ho!lt to rompemauon ha'"e
ret'fi\"ed lbar mitial It is said that Ute
_1Ider "m J'lI'I'ft"l-" T'he chief of the cit)
plannilli ition under ..hom the prognm oper.
ated in ()go laud that all of 1M daims..-ill be
pOl. 'The mmpftli&uon O"e\'" and abo"\! tbe first
paytPftlt 01 3,000 )'fIl ..-u Jl''fIl 10 O'l"lle"ll in the
fonn 01 .. bank to be paid off in 5
TM &mOU1I1 10 o:Wpo&ited dra.... Inten'Al at the
rate 01 Monie pro"ided b)' Ute
natiDRal aDd prel'tt:lural ...Ift handle:!
1Jr the city... or abo tbe deI._ination 01 the
_III duf, tbt ()tI'lleQ. The bMis for determining
the amount 01 lIIlptmaOon for gi"en blllldilll
_ tw'O-foki. T'he first _ lIoor
spcf'. U. tenDs of 36-(oot "1- tTsvbo); the
5ftIClIId OIl the buI5 01 quality of the pnmi5ea.
'ftft U aa- III quality. Bd'ore the
opentioD b:amt too bia. city ofticiaIs in
tioD with raJ eatate men inspected oondemned
buildin&s aDd .. eompenoation fig-
Uft.. on it bec:ame llftftSal"}'. bteause of t.ht
pISillft 01 tiIM. to use property tu I'eCOr'lb for
... ..-
to AJIIINl.-City officia1I stated thaI the-e "'U
DCl appeal from the l.lllOOot of compensation
decided upon by llIe aAeAOn in case ownl'n ..--
DOt .tis6ed. This may _nt for lhe fact that
therIl were no complainu. There .-as $OIlle com-
pIainin; o'w tile program it.lelf by people ...1>0
pense'! witll funds donal.ed by the Great ".....
Air Defense A!jlI(IC1.alion. In other of un-..
ment, skits "'ere to the d'Pll:t-
ing ususlly in a faTl:leal manner, what hapPllll4
to tl.ose who .did nol comply
air_raid_proteCtlon IMlTUetlonl.
d. PlIlllphld.s.-The Greal Japan Air Del....
AssOciation and the prefectural
published and made available pamphlets OIl tilt
dutie!l of the air_raid_proleCtion services. Some fI
these were disuibuted free, but others "tire ...
at a \'('I'"y low price. In addition, the
and magaz.ines printed similar booklets which ...
genenlly !!Old at ...ery reasonable Ilf'kta. n!lCirIt
from 3 to 5 sen.
t. COlIIIOIVlUI.
(I) The bask for traini.., tilt
public .. centered III the neighborboocl
gro<lp6 where all indi\'KIuals recei...ed ....
insuuction in civilian deferule ltiponsibtliu.
and duties.
(2) The go..-emment-controlled Pf"e!I' aDd
radio directed their energies ebiefly to urgilll
supreme efforts in war production and em-
tinued faith in tbe emperor lUld the annift,
although at times, editorials and radio pro.
grams were direel.ed to",-anl. funhering intl'r.
est in the civilian deferule prognun.
(3) The entire program for infonnin, tilt
public wa;; hindered by the false sell5l!of_
rity engendered by lhe altitude of milita:r
authorities in &i>'iuring lhe public of .safftJ
from large seale raid. and,laler, in withhold
ing information of enemy 'Ue:teS5eS.
(4) Reference items Nos. 24, 25, 26, 2'1,
and 28 show publieatiol1.'l used in instruction
of public.
t Sot '" b/uepU>t11 of Oab _
I. 5de-...... b1",print 01 IP""Ddo .....'--
-..>or (JOfIia). OIab ...teI' I).....
"l'iloermaia .....p 01 o...b mUDicipal tt,_.w.
ua.I:&tioa of lepad.
.. 0riPaI .... documeat (untrarl5latM). T-.baoIE
_ pta<tiooJ fire preorentioD.
n. Ja_ du-..t (UIl1.taJlOlacm" SWcl1_
oiIllre prew:nt""'.
It 0fitinaJ d......-. (WltraDllued.. f'WMla.
_tala of fj,.. p'eftllt.... l&OIit.....
II, 0ricinaI ch.rt and .nma!al..... '" _
IMd;e by fire truck> duriq air rai'" and ",uuW all!
'-nd nd furniabed by o...lta.
U. Orip,."
In I J.pa.rI_ document rivi"f data "" Iarfo -
o..b. "'"... th.n t"- eallMd by air raida.
Il Japa_ document (IIntranslacm). I'ilOI Aid
11. lnual. Police OsOn pno!ectu....
0.:..1 document (untranolattd). Sulnlll&'1'
tbo rnObillution 01 Ooalu..,hoo/ ai.....,.- unit
l'fterWa. Publisbed by ()oak. prol....u....
II ..' tblt I, for tahle 01 tents).
. J.pan... doeument ith , ...nall'ion of tobla
eIl<I\entll. Regulati...o and d"t.ils ropr<!tnE .1It
Ilf ..il,...)" .i,.....id-del"...........u...
lsl>ed by the Osaka rail.',)" bureau.
:i. 0rlpaI "-__,---..r_-.-
..-I_... .--.aot- _ .... e;,.-
J.... "" Dol-. _ I o.-loor IJI&.
".,.,..-
!6. (lnc:lIIlJ_--I.......... ..-.
oir __,.,..... lor co-. s.,. 10:


!t.
__ I'IIl8bI<I Gtao< lui Iw- -
cIotioa. hblUod l"odit-..Jri:/IN1;1iI ....
1$ AapoIlt. [)ooIrilooboo "'"-
U 0riEiJI&I J.....---I.........l--'
alr-dtI_ pia ,...... K....dii
{DolI1 S.nl, """"" It. e-<: 71_
OriJinolJ....- ..tnMbt""'"*"'_......
,. "......I4-prI*'d__ ,.po_ f..... .w- ..
fanorila III (loolra
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FIIll-l'llOCf' elUlNG
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= ST/IEI'T$IQIIIEmt$
.....~ ~
",..
- - - FIlE""'OOF!U..OING
lIJHES UClEJI EI..VI.T1lI
- R.....l' snlIJCTUI!S.
B

o _ " " : , ~ _

o
L,
FIRE RESISTANT ZONES DESIGNATED BY f'flEWAR ZONING LAW,
OSAKA, JAPAN
CITY PLAN OF OSAKA-
radar beam _ .......i'll (YO BIbr -u...;
lights iDdicate iDdhiduai BIbr 1Ilatiarb; _ l!II'
green lights inctieal.eairMlds. EaclI pCIIIlmi '-J.
quarters of the air defeme
ahoO\'n on the map.
The amall blackboard
the panels to the left of the opentiaas IIlIjl iI_
to irKiieate ('(InUDlIlIDtialI IiD!5 dit:II
ha"t! bon desttorM, 1M enem. of tht de!u'1le-
tion. and time 1M COIIIIfI:tioll fti first bmbD.
The o)l@J'llionl ma.p abotrs a .... rq
around O>aka. This n.5 I'Ol 1l!Ied ... lille
for 1M .!Quading of an air-raid aIwt, but ... .-l
by the commander 10 makt a time oIl!II'
arrin.l of planel. l'\aneo eIIlfl'llll tlW nn,-""'"
- ' ny from
appnlIimateir 30 mlnules IlJUli ume.
();:aka.
,.
k:XlllOJT C
De.niption of WarnIng .. Cenor.1 Ar"'J Iludqu'''un 0 ......
Picture :-.'0. I is a view or the ....aming otntral
headquarters showing operations map and. on
both sides or the map, panels on ....hich are IIashed
reporuof enemy planes ree:el\'ed from ob.!ervation
t:OI1lS posts. The panel in the upper left hand
mmer of the operati.lms map indie:ates lhe gi\"ing
01 air-raid warnings in Ann)" disll'ictll of the Jap-
anese mainland in Korea. Font'\QSa. Chichi Jima.
Haha .lima and Okina....a. To indicate the alert
warning, a rello.... light is sho....n, and a red light
iIldieat.es the air-raid alarm. The smaller panel in
lbe top cenl.ef" of the operations IDaII sho....s the
'vious within the warning area of the
Cmt.r.t1 Anny Headquarter>l in which air-raid
have been gi\"en. Here. too, yellow lighUl
Indlellte the "alert" and red lightll the "alarm."'
Small lights on the operat.ions map mark (I
-.: .,
PietllN: 2 a typical panel 011 ",hich
worma
tion
reeei"ed from lhe air defen'll! obsen-a
tioo corp posu is anllOuneed. Each panel
di'rided intO lour vertieal Jertiollli representing
four:
oteerVer
postlI in each
lftatioo ..e,ed from the tnlfour posts reportmg
frOIll a particIIbr btadquanen is rfl\Kted on
tbete lour "n-Ucal pantU.. The chan to lhe \eft of
the panel u the indicaling lhe open.tion of
the panel. The nllIllbt'r appeannl\: over lhe lop of
each 01 the four vertical panels indicates the name
of die po&l reponinC. The linl
of each panel indicale!! the minuta of lhe hour the
enemy fliCht is reported. (Minutes only are ahown
_the hour is assllIlled to be the present hour.) The
next IlaI'1VIII' space shOW6 direction from the ob-
.,.-er po&l from which lhe planes were spotted.
The third panel from the top shows types of
planet. wbetber large. small, medium. friendly.
_Y. inwible becalM 01 douds, Of' invisible fOf'
other reallOnll. The fourth panel from the top indio
cates the number of planes spotted. The fifth
5IIlall pallel from lhe top shows direction in whicb
the flight is proceeding. The bottom portion of tbr
panel indicates flight altitude.
The small white panel 10 the right of the mail
right panel p,'es the name of the observe" bead-
quarters sending the reporu. Under that nallle I
red light is flashed when information is recei....
from anr poI!It in that particular beadqualU'l1- AI
the !lame lime the light is flashed. a bell u .-
rUllg, Bolh are shown to the right of the pantL
The bell and Hght then go olt and the informatiOll
shown 011 the panel remains there apprmtimattlr
IWO millutes,
Above the upper right hand lOP of the
panel is .. llUIail panel. If communications to tbt
particular observer headquarters are disrUpled.
this panel is lighted.
Picture No, 3 slto
d
'1. 1' ws the sa
('lSCTI """ III picture l'.: ') , me paneb 1Ii
. O. w Wltlt the face of the
Picture No 4 . , IS the Sl\me as No, 3. but is printed in re\'erse 80 that eharatlens can
,.
P'itt'lll'1':\"0. S"bon. set of panels on the right
hand 01 the room on ....hich information
.-.-ed from radar itations is flashed. The
l':OL>t line il co\wed by a Ilerie; of radar
sut.ioll!l. !101M operating indi\idually and othl.'r.!
in paUs C'OlllleCted br urin radar beams.
The lWO bottom pr.llek npresent moons con
IIl.'Cud b)' a radar lint. TIle Uppl'l'" of fOUT panek
iDdi\idual radar i!l.ations. The column of
six paneb to the right indieatel radar information
nui\"ed from otati0n5 to tbe east of and
thecal1lmQ 01 sixpaneb totht left indieatl!ll radar
illformatiorl nuived from wtiom; to the ..-tst of
"""'-
The Jonr paMb which relleet infonnation
lftItived from wtions connected b}' radar lines
p" the follotring information: Readin.rrom
to the first paM! shows the Dumber
deiiplilUOll 01 the Ddar line IIbown on the opera.
<
'M
dOIl!l map; the ilfCODd panel indicat.es the time the
enemy plane crossed the radar line; the third, I
general statement of the size of the enemy flight IS,
"many", "few", "questionable"; the fourth shoW$
the direction in which the enemy flight is headed;
the panel not to the bottom n!f1eeta the estimated
speed of the planes. This is detennilWd by c0m-
puting the time the planes take to travel bet...el'll
the parallel !>e",lms projected between the statiol\3.
The bottom panel indicates that the particu1at
nadar line is in operation even though no inf(llllla-
tion hll!l been from it for some time. Thi>
panel al;;o includes a question mark ....hich i>
flashed on in the event an object break!! the radar
line and is not definitely identified as enemy ai;'
craft. For purposes of checking operation>. III
some instances friendly planes were sent
the radar line to test its oller3tion.
Picture 7 is the same shot as N'o. 6,
tItrpt thattt has been printed backwards 10
.can be read.
_ room, DOtlbown in
lit . there 1$ a blackboard on \\'hich
data. timeofsunriS(',
. moonnse.
Picture 8 is a vie.... of the leftside of
the operations room. The
shown is used w give enemy informallon
reeej"ed from l1Idio inteJ'l'l1ltion units
which detect con"ersation between enemy
aircraft and ground installations. This is
UJlualiv the first tJepe of information of
enemy activit} which is received. This
blackboard aloo reReets enemy plane in-
formation received from radar stations at
Chichi Jima and Haha Jima.
Immediately above the blackboard panel is a
ehan listing the names of all the prefectures in the
warning area. AIoo indicated are places where
speciaJ raid warnings were sent, e. go, fighter head
quarten and antiaircraft batteries. Yellow lights
indicate the "alert" and red lights indicate
"alarm."
The row of six little lights at the top of the
chan indicates present time.
. is a blackboard to the lelt of the room
(not mown in the pictures) which gives informa-
tion of friendly Rights, Le., the assigned number
n! the flight, the time of the Right, the type of
in the flight, the number of planes, the
dll'ectlOn of flight, altitude, designation of eom-
to which planes are attached. This informa_
nf friendly flights is used as a means of filter-
lIlg. informatinn received on flights of aireraft
",hieh ha"e not been positively identified.
RESUME Of OPERATION OF AIR.RAID
WARNING CONTROL ROOM
AOgh
t of enemy planes i8 fifllt detected over
,.
the radio interception devices. This information is
flashed to this control room and is reflected nn the
blackboard to the left of the panels (see picture
No.8). As the planes move toward the Japanese
mainland, they are next detected by radarinstalla
tioJU; on Chichi Jima and Haha Jima. Information
from these stations is also shown on this black
board. As the planes near the mainland, they are
detected by naval craft. Such information ill sent
to the naval headquarters in Osaka and relaytd
immediately to this operations room. It is also
put on the blackboard. The planes are nell
picked up by mainland radar stations. This
information is reflected on the panels to the right
of the room (see pictures NOlI. 5, 6 and 7). 'I'/le
planell moving toward Osaka are next detected
observer posts of the air defense observation unll.l
and, as the information reachell this
it is shown on the panels shown in pictures
1,2,3 and 4. When the decision to authOnzeall'"
. '''' raid alerts and alarms is made, such SIgna k
shown in the small lighted panel above the blac -
board (flee picture No.8).
D
OFFICiAlS INTER
IN OF fIRE VlE\va)
SERVICEs
IT"'S' "-<PORT
aJIn, ., regtonal polite sUIle .
director of lire training IICh ,nntendl'Jlt, thief of m. d
2 H d E
00.
on e, ., lecturer at Osaka u .
. flI"el'!!ltYand rei
3. Akat, J., senior official (fireman). P ecturem.briPdeadvieor.
4. Hasequwa, r., senior official (firem )
5. Otsuka, J., regional fire chief and an.
6 A
J ,.. eommanderohpecia)fire..
ut:, ., po tee mspector (sgt.) officer' h llm'1mllOnuDit
7 M . .. Inc argeofgenenJaI!"'
atsushlta, T., Junior official )
8 T ".
aniguchi, H., training instructor
9 T
. . ,un: epartmenl.
Okl, G., mechamcal engineer municiM' d
10 M . . . ' ..... 'Ii'lIler epartlllelli
atsuS.hlla, S.,. tlVlI engineer, municipal water departlnent.
11. Nogamt, chIef of water distribution.
,.
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CONTENTS
EXHIBIT E
AIR.RAlD LOSSES (Osab F..)
flU DEPAJ.TNUo'T
fiocall' .... I9'lS
I
ill Osaka tTable I}.
I. :\llllIber 0 ,..........
2. \ictims of air raid tTable 2).
._ I -'I k-hwn buildings destroyed (Table 3A).
3. Num"",o w... .....
4 Government and public buildings destroyed (Table 38).
5: :\umber of !!Chools destroyed (Table 4A).
6. Kames of schools deltr'O)ed (Table 4B).
i. Number of factories destro)'ed (Table 5A).
8. Names of principal factories destroyed (Table 5B).
9. Number of hospitals destroyed (Table GA).
10. :\ames of principal hospitals destroyed (Table 6B),
11. Number of military establishmenu destroyed (Table 7A).
12. Names 01 principal military establishments destroyed (Table 78).
13. Casualties iUOOlIll personnel or the fire depart.ment (Table SA).
14. XlllDber of fire brigade st.alKlns and $ubstatioll.$ destroyed (Table 8B).
15. Xumber of pIllllp-aB destro)'ed (Table 8C).
16. XIIIIl.ber of auxiliary firemen's pumpll destroyed (Table 80).
Ii. Numilel" of fin! brigade stationl before 13 Man::h 1945 and of the pn>sen
t
(Tule 9.-\).
18. Kum.ber of oII'an :lIId firemen before 13 March 1945 and of the pl'ftent
{Table 9B}.
19. Numilel" of pumll"C&l" before 13 March 1945 and at present (Table ge).
u.
"
'- .....
.-

"
"
"
"
"
"
"
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,
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FIRE STATIONS
CrTY
OSAKA

LOCATIONS OF FIRE HEADOUARTERS, BATTALION STATIONS, SUB STATIONS, TEMPORARY SUB STATIONS
OSAKA CITY AND SUBURBS
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""RE: STATIONS
CITY
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OSAKA
(.OCATIONSO".
LOCATIONS OF FIRE HEADOUARTERS. BATTALION STATIONS. SUB STATIONS. TEMPORARY SUB STATIONS
OSAKA CITY AND SUBURBS
,
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and dis-
CRIlED
1. We, UDder the lUlIIIIt illlhNaee of the
EmPtror. eva.ider it to be our ....Jby to be
aiven the daty 01 deleDcIiuc the llll"" ......
one wiJII ill lbe IlOIDJlkltiDa 01 tile c,... :lit
.uia .....
2. W. bold tlnaly a betiet ill ultimate vietory,
and look forward to the DaUoaaJ dilIcW-
tie. 01 the IlIIperW realm with aD adunutine
OfIUization.
C0NnNn;
G. Gnm.J ...
(I) Dut)' Ilnd rniaioa.
(2) Buie rulei for InObilbatiorl.
II. 0Tsra1Q":at;0lI alld
(S) Standard for IUPPOl'ting
-..... .
(oil Selection of $UPjl(IJ1ing lllenJben WIth
special sicilia.
(5) SuPPllrting members'
(6) Areas for allocation.
(7) Tie-up with police offia!s..
(8) Table of OI"ganization.
c. of air PToItd;ott.
(9) Different tyPes. .
(10) Sphere of guard
(11) Sphere of protection..
(12) Sphere of medical PI'Ot8:tion..
(13) Sphere of emergency restoratlon pr0-
tection. .
(14) Sphere of rescue .
(15) Sphere of other all' !'aid protectIOn.
d. Edw:an"on (md lrainillg.
(16) Training of offict!rS and members.
#.............. -....
2{lJ TUne for aetioIl and ol __
-,
(21) Settina Up 01 COIIcJtote ... for aIJoc..

(22) Plan lor ao:tion dun,. .tdaoaI .--.
"-
(23. actiotl.
,24
1t5)
126 Ordtn..
27) Order. lor tiIDft; 01 li'iIIa aid.
281 Dilpatchjlll 01 lItbool and
"""----
J.
129) Outline 01 methods 01. labor.
'301 Rulel 01 moouet.. .
/311 of air dothing.
(32) L'. of ann banda.
,. "'''----.
(33) Respoll$ibilily
(34) of rnatllriel.
(35) ylftlt of aid.
1. ApPoilllMtlot olld dinr.,.
(36) Method. of appoillUnmt
missal. .
(S7) Certifieates of actJon.
(88) What to do whtD at home.
m
-
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a.-I- .......
a...4-Pz
- ....u-.." _ ca.
- '3.
StnioD '-M-b......
.............._.
Sertioa I--e-.J .....
Seetioa at
Seetion 3-PIoteetio.. at pm. ....
Section and fIl
.....
Seetion It-G.. defenw.
Section 6-Re.eue and firwt1id.
Sectioll 7-5erunty ruard.
Paragnph 6--Euabliahment of fim-aid Ita-

Section I-Emergeney 1'WICUe.
Section 2-Sheltlft.
Paragrnph Tt'paira.
Chapter 3-Ma:illlDrdll of
Chapter 4----RoilTOCltl oi,..Jt/tIfM, troi"'lIj1.
Charts:
1. Railroad a.il'-detmae Jurildietion llJ'll;l&.
2. Light control.
3. Light control trainilll.
4.
s. Control ol coIated aignaJ ti&htL
6. Air-detenae I)'Uem ehain of \'.Om-
"""".
7.
o. Air rtruIatioDa ror national
.........
6. Pb}'Sieal appbeatioa of air defl!DSe
regulations ror national
e. Polite eontroDed prB'turaI raibvad.
Cbapw 1 PriJll:i_
Pan,npb J ee..r.J aDd
2 -RaiIn:.d ......
.-
Seetioo I-Air del..
Seetioa 2- Ail' del..
Seetioa 3-Air defenw iWliItary unig.
C"-pter 2-Raiboad ai,-ikfnue opmuiorr.
Pancr.ph I-Gft>etal and re,uJations.
"""""ph 2-AiT defe1lJle c:ornmunie.tionl.,
Seetion l-General rull!l!;.
Seo:tion 2-Btue alert s)'lItem.
Section 3-Red alert system.
Section 4-Air defense intelligenee.
Se.:tion 6-Command liai!!On.
Pamgraph 3-Llght control.
Parngrnph 4-Movement of traina and vehicll!l!;
and tmnaportation with re-
gard to ail" defense.
Section I-General r-egulatiollll.
Section 2-Handling of '.ehicles.
ClaU3e I-Handling of trains.
Clause 2-Loading and unloading of
.........
Clause 3-Maintenanee and equipping or
vehicles.
CIaU3e 4-Diapersion of velticleL
Clause 5-Driving n!gUlationa.
Seelio"
ClaU3e l-Genera1 rules.
Clause 2-Blue alert sYStem.
Clause 3-Red alert l5y!iteln.
Clause 4-Emergeney alert. 8)"Sttml.
Clause 5-PO$t-rnid measures.
_.-
--
EXHIBIT I
i'.._T1<U<
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"
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EXHIBIT I.
1'1 OF OSAKA
PLAN FOR PROTECTIO, REAU
COMMUNICATIONS au
. d organ,ution
I. Me<;:han15m In ',nuned
i
-
. After 1.",1
1 Condud of bMSlnt&ll.- . "I" was put
. "d protectIon
alely after the air-raJ . led by the finance
into effect), all the bureaus "ere
$Eclion. r establishing the
After 27 XO"ember 19-10 leT'3.3 unified under
- 1 protectlon \\ . r
department system. hl" sen<ice section 0
the planning office of the pu Ie
the busine>s department. "section was 'newly
On 5 June 19-14. a.defense, -ment and busi-
- hA..: the bu.>ml'SS epa." ,
estabhs ...... In .......... separatel)'.
d censorship ,,'ere '"
nes>; an _ the defen$e section was IS"
On 23 August 19-1:>. -as entire!}'
banded, and defense busmess"
bniBm ill proI/;lm of communi-
2: pial the Communications Bureau a
tailO"'.---"iI and the
headquarters was e;;ta IN''''''', .......l
"",ense . h" h bureau was
defense bw;iness \\11 In t e-
by it. . b defense units
b In the ...anous b\lSlne:>& ureaus
established and the defense of the bureau
dormitories was entrusted to them. .
" , unit was established
e. ..... specla w.... .. C tru r
. the Electrical Communlcatlons ons cion
and entrusted v;ith recon-
struction of electrical commUnications mstalla-
tions.
d. The communication's hospital and d.ispen-
wy were united, and a special rescue umt was
l!l!tabli$hed for emergency relief of personal
injuries.
II. lnsllllla,ion
I. Anli.iJolllb i/l.llaUll/iOlU.-<l. Shell elldurauce
(Imllh-rtmialll) ilWalll>ti01u.
On top of the Osaka Centr.ll Telegraph Bureau
and the Telephone Bureau, and the Electrical
Communications Construction Bureau, reinforced
concrete (30-40 cm. thick) u.ellimdurance in.
was pro\ided.
SheU raistance installations of reinforeed con_
c:rete were made for the basement3 of the Osaka
Centr.ll Telegraph Bureau' and the Electrical
Communications Construction Bureau.
. jant installations of
) were made for the cable tlulDei ..
crete (f Central Bureau.
front 0 .proltction (spliJlltNUlMaIU) __II.
b Bom<r - '" "-b'--
.' Wooden antlfragrnenla Ion uum ....
/lODs'
laced
on the important telegraPh ...
were p. ,rument and exchange rooms.
Phone. Ins 'hB '
h Osaka Centrol Te egrap ureau. f.ObI,.
In. t ,e. room and in the Central
mumca Ion . "'"
h
bulkheads were HlSta to lIhut 01
exc ange,
damage.
I each Bureau shelters were construeted to
IlCrsonal. inju'!'. .
2. AIl/;_illcendlary .._a: Evae:u-
" r ",m""rtant electrical commUD]CatlOn eqUiP.
auono ,,-
ment. d
b Installation of water tanks an storage of
for fire lighting. .
Installation of one or several gasoline or hand
pu%ps in each Bureau (gasoline pumps in
the large offices and one four-man pump 10 tbe
small offices). _
d. Some buckets, fire beaters, sand and mala In
each place.
3. Anli-gas bomb i'18taUatioml.-a. '!' smal! num_
ber of masks and gas-proof clothing 10 the Impor
tant offices.
b. One sample gas mask for person. .
4. Rescue instal/ations.-a. levers. sho\
els in each office to dig out bUried persons..
b. Litters, tourniquets and medical supphes far
first-aid.
5. Other anti-air-raid inSlallatioml.-a. Black or
dark green color on buildings.
b Light control installation. .
c: Clothing for rescue squads. Helmets, clothmg
distributed to each defense squad.
6. Maintaining commullicatillll8.-a. Manage-
ment office and substitute office. h nd
Management office set up in c:m-
telephone office to deal with mamtammg aged
munications when the main offices ar:
(construction carried out beforeh::m) Kobe
Central Telephone and Telegraph East
Telephone and Telegroph, Kyoto, an
1IIaizuru). maintain
Substitute offices in other places to
communications. . order ra
b. Evacuation of instruments. etc.. work.
have a supply for emergency re:storatlo
JII. J:lrefeNe Penonllei. DiuriburiOQ IIQ(f
Mobilizing
I. The office force in each plaee.
2. DUtrtbuJIOll._O. Unit leader (theoffieechief)
will command the personnel.
b. GenCl'llI business f1quad. Entrust! with
plans for protection of building5, distribution and
other bWllness, and liaison reports.
c. Fire-Fighting Squad. To tight tire when
incendiaries tirst fall.
d. Rescue Squad. First--aid to victims.
e. Guard Squads. Watchers (only for special
emergency). Reporting warning signals guard
work inside and out<Jide of buildings. '
3. Mobilin"u.-Defense personnel. whether in
the ollice or away, meet on signal and act accord
ing to their allotted work. However since the
American planes came too quickly to those
at home to come, this year the number of night
workers was to fight the fjrst fires and
carTJ' off important articles.
a. Organization of defense headquarters of
Communications Bureau.
Chi4-(Head of Communications Bureau)
Over-all Supervisor.
Comm;/Iee----(All department and attached
-
feDll! ia the .oan.a.:
0JIn-(AJJ
mittee and ..up
....
lkl_Offiu-rnet..,
to bllllinCllll of the Del..
direct guidance of deleDII! ill aD omc..
b. Spreading the air-raid alarm.
The alarm sent out by Military
uses the Home Ministry's network as it. maiD
line, and the telephone and telegraph Irire8 of the
\:arious .communications offlcl!!I as its .9Ubrddiary
Jines. It IS the respoltl;ibility of these JinE'll tospnad
the alarm.
. ReguJatioll.'l Wen! in force also for disseminating
mformation on air defense and orders.
The alarm had priority over all other com.
munications on communication linesof the Central
Army headquarters and of Osaka central tele-
graph office, all telephone and telegraph offices
under control of Central Army headquarters, and
at POSt offices and all other installations which
were reo::ipients of the alarm.
have priority over ordinary
commumcatlOItl; but apart from this there are no
rules (or special handling.
-
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"""BIT 11
ION ORGANIZATION
AUt RAID PROTECT (PHONE aUllOlN&
CENTIIAL OS...... TtL
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Ooan ol.,,taid o,...in,ioto lor 1M cuual Osak. ,d.ploo.......ildi,,'.
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MAP OF OSAKA HARBOR DISTRICT
. OM eraeuatioll liNd iltratigo-
1. EneollJ"lI9
l
l1D {Jr p art! leaden and
riolI of illknl._(I. !hrough the w to be taken
tehool principals sUItable mea!lures I .'K:hool
thoroughly to acquaint the 0 d to
tbildren with the purport 01 the regulatIons an
Ret them voluntarily to evacua.
h. When investigatinglntent for group
EXHIBIT ,.
1'ruII8do1l of iOOlftlnioa. to, lad ,.",.. 01 ......,. <loiIdt.a of Ooo.b ......
PloblJo.bed '" 0Mb illJ'''IIldJ.Jr 1, ........
PART uad EYacu;otion 01 Sdaool Child..... o.u. ""-
Ploblllloed 30 J_
'Ibe.e are to be.C:aITied OUt as lollow:a: __
I, The evacuatIon 01 children ill to be based 3. FonhOlle who do notqua.)ify fOl' fttheroftbe
flmdamentll/lyon e'o'a<:uation to and the above PllIIibilitia, tlllolla: or l'ef1l2' if to becanied
enc:u.tion in whore 01' in pan of households havilla: ouL
ehiIdren, and the individual e'o1lCUation of children 4. On the Il&rt of evacu_ and o-e ..110 tUe
baving relati...", or connectiona are to be urged ref. and abo people of the IllCeivina: &rflaI, Wli-
6ed cooperation ba-.l on the IpUit or to<nmon
2. For nuden13 for whOfJ1 e"acuation to reIa- defenAe ia to be canied llIIt.
PART lI---Qpentional Summary foc "'"' of Sdoooi O'ild....
....hIisMd >-II' 1,.4
1. Ag,!' li...i,- of IhIdnoti for groo,p c/. 1'beu.ehenrromthecil)'areto havea
It ia for from third to ainh grades in o.u. ill ruidill( the rife 01 the stude:lta ill the lodcU>lla.
primary sebools, for thoee ...ho find it difficult to ,. (..... lIotritia<lal :aad
evacuate to relat.ives 01" COIlIlflCti<ms; and is III be ill the Iod,iDp ill to be 10 that.
determined in a planned 'li3y on applieatioll by wiD be 110 difllntlt: IIittlaUoa..
the ruardian (parent 01" othe- PI"SOn). S. of app/ia.-Tbe aotboritia
2. EructUJlioll cle#illlJtioll,-For tile C'OIICemed are to the '-of lUI ac!eqllate
thbl bI to be the Kinki regioll (euludiDg H)'OgO pl'DlisioD 01 fDod, &lld other neo:-itils and
pref"eeture) or nearby tenitory. . live Iplleial alU'lltioa to their diwibutioa.
3, Lodgi"9f al naeaatiolI d,.nllatioa.-a, 6. ri&btaare to beli.-en ill
able plaeea aueh u inns with eJ:tr.I rooms, tneetulg traDaporting the above artids.
pIaeea. temples, churches. rnilh, etc., are to be 7 I\WdianI Hora-ha) are to
rented and group living carried Oil thln.. be rill' 10)_ pet _th r-ard pan.
60, Teachers are to live the st1Idenb. of the liviq 01 the IUIdmlL:'1I the n;st
c. A minimum or beddmg, food uten&b, and ill the teIpOIlIjbilitr 01 pnlectlll1! and al)'.
personal effeets is to be ta.
ken
. aIIlIidention ill to be liven the goanlians
4, Edllaltion /II ft'Q(1lmloOll dal,_Kl1l.......... cannot _ tMir Wwt.
IIlll;:tllISaI' teachers are to be taken to 1I"e &. 0lAfr --.-. 10 additioD, of
inItnIetion in the scboohs of the rl!Cemng area 01' the retnainillg III the aly io to be =ried
at the lodgings. - . to Ii..e llIIL the
60. The lIChoob in tlIe reeelVlng area are 60 III the malterof .
necessary help, .. and aIr authoritieo .,., to mamtalll
C
lose oonuet is to be maintamed the _,__ ,..... with the b:aI prel'turaI, city, towll
e. 10: pan In labor c:oD_.
kaJity and students are to ta e and village authoritieL
.-vice. . Dis <siD<> 01 Sd>ool Child,.,a OAb Prd"mun
PART Ill-Opet'ltiollil for Ihe
P.bliobod 1 Jod, .
. a1Io the inltnt fo< l'\'8CIIa.uon
tiDn. to illl"ell.lpte 10 urge this.
10 relatilw bofrleI and .. and !lOlld
k
\lift 10 ,,,,.-.e unu.
r. To ta e lllllll$ . robust hf:aIth e\"aCIIated
gnule and pupihs not In
too relath'e.. , . diaturbances by
C/. Pm'ent
takingeat'eo(w....tlll ...
117
t. Set 10.000 roughly a.- the number rOl'
r,_tion. and apportion thi$ number IUlltably
UDOIlg wank and lIChools.
2. Ddnwillillg t.\e mJ<:1I6tlOlI dn/illOl'_.-
o. The reeehing area will ooMider liaison f?,"
purpooe of gi\'ing refuge to sufferers, allP0rtlOnlng
the number roughly to the recei\ing prefecturell,
and haBtening planned prepal'lItioM.
b. The authoritiell of the recei\;ng prdectUl'elS
and schools will respectiveh' confer and make
prelimillal')' and linal decision ",ilh regard to
housing.
S. HOtUillgillllltr8ftllgarfG.-a. Thestand-
ard number in one donnitory will be 25 or over
(u man)' ali one O\en;eet' can handle), "';Ih a total
of 100 or O\'K in one area.
b. The one I"e!ponsible for making the contnld.
for renting lodging space i'l the ma)'or of (),;aka
city. but the aUlhoritiell of (),;aka prefecture and
of the recei\oing area are to gi\'e suong .lUpport.
e. Support is to be gh'al abo in the following
malt.er.l;
(I) The renting of .luit:,ble bedding,
kitcheD equipment and tabla
(2) The of propel" matrollll and
...-stanla.
(S) Arranging for equipment and altern-

01. CompemaUon to be made at the end of the
period of IDe for broken equipment.
c. Amount of bedding, dishes, clothing to be
taken b)' the indi\oidual win be limited to imme-
diate 1Ut. and other things ",ill be rOl"'Ol'3l'l!ed later.
f. The meals in the kMlging ma)' be contr.lcted
for through the or by the city
with cooperation from the receiving area.
4. EdllCOlioli alld 1I1l1ri"-.u al t.\e fflIOUIlioll
Hitioeotw..-o. Educ::ation may be eanied on llli
a branch of the city school, or llli a trust to the
local lIChool, on COMultation "ith the
arm.. In the latter ea9l! the evacuated school
IbouId so far llli p.:lIlIlible be sepante from the
b::alllebooL
b. If it is carried on as a lIeparale school, the
expenses will be defra)'ed by the cit},. If it is
entrusted to the IoeaI an!&, the expmseII of the
tnI3t will be defrayed by the cit)', and tbe teaeller!l
5ent with the group will have additional posUi in
the loc:aI lIC.hool$.
t. So far u mnditioM penn.it. the evac:uated
1dlooI'. aeeommodatioo will be planned for b)-
having two instruetion .-iol1ll.
4. WI.- it dIIkuIt. to ClIIT1 out. the .....
arranaemenu.llI&f'obypabtic hal'" .. trail!-
iDJ q1l&l't", Jarp: larmIDI or tb.
lodginp III&Y be Ia.t. lor pi..- 01
and tables and I;Jend.- ," to be -=and 10edJ
and abo lIeIIt (rom the
t Promotion to llCbook In o.bPld'eetlhWill
be and abo. if the iDdhiduai ,....,
promotion in the klcaI ... will be
far M aceommodationa trill permit.
f. Labor service lrill be eanied out aeeordina: to
the pupirs background, and .fo: the P\lI'PO.e of
encouraging the local tranqUillity and
self.sufficiency in food.stulf!S.
a. Cooperation with Ule local iUl!a lrill be
obsen'ed in the securing of doctors and nlll'll$.
11. medical supplies are to be c:arntd
from the sending schoo\.
i. The cooperation of local women's societies is
to be secured in matt.el'!l of clothing and laundry.
5. Tile ..pplNillfl of fOOthluJIlI and OIhn Ihillgl
Men",,", for linIIf1.---o. Rationing of and
condimenu, etc., i8 to be transferred from Osaka
city's to the area'$ allowance
and de$ignaled for the e.-aeualed pupils.
b. The same in the case of fuel and other
rationed articles.
c. Vegt!ubles, fresh lish, sea. food, and such sup-
plementar) articles of diet are to be secured with
Ioealll$$istance!lO far as poaible.
d. Where it is difficult to secure the above (c)
locally, the use of dried produeUi is to he considered.
e. Rationing for the individual is to follow the
.standard or Osaka city so far as possible.
f. Coopenation with local authoritil'll is to be
secured so far lIlI in the securing and
transportation of living necesaities such as food
and fuel.
,. Preparatiol1ll for securing such commodities
is to be begun before e\'3cuation. so l\$ to
nothing to be dl'llired in the program.
11. The distribution of commodities
to the pupils is to be assigned to nspoll5ible pl"'-
.I011lI or conference with the local prefectures,
suitable measures encouraged. Along with thIS,
hannony with the local I)upils should be kept
in mind.
6. TrGuportotiml.---o. In tn.nsportation. COII-
tact should be made with the authorities con-
cemed. and full use made of facilities. f II
b. Notification of the day of depart.ure 0
l!\'aeueuhouId begi\'en the transportation au
ities as ellrly a.- poISiible.
e. Each PUpil is a]10Wl!d to .
pIeee of .... __ "'....... can-y II'Ith him 0',

""lI\g not more 1.._

bedding, in .. . t, ...., 20 kilo-
an1ed Ilito the ear. .......11Ion to .,hat r.
d. In addition to ref
ofticiaI. for the baggage ;ane:e on lrall5POrtation
through to the lodging the Il('nding .llation
III1alI \-ehieles '$UCh' to be made of
cooperation of blCYCll!I) 1rith the
1. Ez "'..nes.
L_ Ca.se. of I'l'dtt .
.""Ie or part for indi erpeDaell in
lett/ed by the city, gent lI'\IardllUl1I to be
b. In other eases, _
indicated separately. I!rPt'l1selln detail are to be
o .10 the ci'l/; MUfillg ,clati__
. en re:l8OlLI call for a relUJ1\' to
CIty, the pnnc,pal may give perm'-ion.
/. Oecupation, place of work, IlIIlll! of
aehool attended:
g. Notes:
4. Rea.idenee:
/I. DisJlOQl of hoUlll! after IrIOving:
b. Conditian 0{ hotllle, renter or_,
name and addrsa of owner:
c. One OJ' two ltorits, rent, to or not
"'
d. Kumber of rooma, number of ma13:
5. Amount of tul'll to city:
6. Serviees requirOO:
o. Baggage transPOl't:
(1) e:tpr\'&I, (2) trnin, (3) truck,
(4) boat.
b. Packing
(1) Materials (mata. rope, naib:,
"""'"
(2) Packing:
c. Destination:
(1) Residence:
(2) Oceupation at new addreu:
(3) Sehool at new addl'elS8:
(4) Plan for starting business:
(5) Other matten:
7. Other matter.! fOJ'refereno:e;
There is no objection to granting tbe abo"e eertifi_

Chief of police (seal) Date.
To" " .. ... .... .. Ward Head.
EXHIBIT R
..... 1O _Ii!kd _ "" .01....... _
A1'PLJCATION FOR
CERTIFICATE FOR CHANGING
DISTRICTS

(Atru&lation of questionnaire to be filled out by
fthmtary evaelleE!llmaking application for a Ot:r-
dleate tor changing districl$. One of two fonna
of eertl&ata was issued, one to thOlle to whom
approval was given for moving Ollt of the and
different fonn to newly appoinll!d gov_
ernment officials to move into a city. Reference
item No. 23, II and III).
Report on evacuation:
Premlt addn>sa in City:
Rea:ilItration (place of):
Head of hOIl/ll!hold:
Waahing to move away, 3.8 recorded, from my
pn!lIlffit address in order to evacuate from the city,
I herewith make my report,
Date:
Addressed to the Osaka Prefectural Headqllal't.ln
lor carrying out evacllation from city.
1. Dl!Stination:
2, Intended date for moving:
3. Family, number of peJ'!lQns:
0, Individllal's name:
b. '""
c. Relation to head of hOllSehold:
d, Date of birth:
e. Age (Japanese count):
Date.
Osaka Prefecture
.... bearer is a victim of
This eertifie; that ""e
di:aster.
Victim's Idelltification Certificate
EXHIBIT f2 4111fka."

T............. oI ..
Name.
Kesidellee ..
FOR CHANGING DISTRICTS
CERTIFICATE
(11ISUtd 10 oir_..1d
'"
,.
""

. e-,
....
-.

.... .-...
..............
CftltnJ diotri<u Tobl

Xorthon diolriot -ut
f1'oaI Sorth J(&II!O, ucl
HoturiR diocM .
c..... _
-- --
-
".

--
-,
-' (....
-"

--
-,
-,
,.
-,
-"
Sud-eeG_
J. Covering ffi4 .
than "'ou tertals should be
6' y. matte
2. GIOlllly materials ..
qailt!lt Ilortht'ftl e_' WIlen laed, should be "......
urea. -.;u
TAnu; Xo. a-.a.....
1'<". """,,,.. .._ __
'-,... ..... "-,, .....
1',,- c..,
0-.. -- ,,_ r_..
-.... '''- - - '- _L" _ ,,,_ ,;:;;-
' ..... L _ _ _ ,._
.....L.. , _ _ _ .. _
.........- - - :.::
, _- "'-"'- ... - , .....
.... - .:::::::,- - .. p- .. _ ..
........... -.... ---......_-....
... -.._-.:::-..... --. -
....._' .... " -.. _-_.. --
... _-- -"'-- .... --- _ _---
,....... -..-..::... - _"
""--- - _-
-. - .. _" .. _......-- I<l>_ -.
..._' ... -
M"hod o( CamouOage
1. Painting_lI. Bnght .
- . Ilt&'l and IlTegular
tern pamtmg. The principle o( thO pat
Rage is painting in ilTt'gU1 .. type of eamou
lines should OOtTtspond to Any straia:ht
land and any curved r straight lines of the
the land. Ines to the eun'ed Jines of
6. Any unit section of i lar"
be performed 3.'i follows: rregu painting Mould
{U The width of a bright oolored .
be betll'eell 10 and 20 meten wide a:r::
t
should
darker eolored section Mould he bet of tlK!
.j(} meters wide. ween 20 and
(2) The ratio of one to t9;() must be ob;;er.'ed
two eontl1l$ting 00101'5 are used in _ b"
Iron. wm lila
(3) Irregular painting in camouflage should be
Ptrlormed to bIde the natural edge of an object,
aIao 10 mlL'lk the lI'all to roof line.
. (4) lndil'idual sections of camouflage Mould be
and the pattern should not be repealed.
_TuLENo. S-T.W. ........... ..no....r ..
e,.,. .. e-.., r_

for FQodial New
1. l:niformity and repJarity of
should be avoided as mueh as pollIlible.
2. Large oolleo::tiolUl of new bUildinp are !lOt
desirable.
3. Readil)' recognizable shapes, sueh as I.Il oil
tank, should be a,oided.
4. Disunees or spacing between objects shouJd
be at least four times their heiiht.
S,runure
1. The SIEe of an object should be limited to
4,000 square meters of V. A. (V. A. means l'isibJe
area and will be explained below.)
2. Objectsmeasuringlt8llthan l00squaremeter.s
of V. A. need not be camouflaged units!! highly
important.
,,"ou: V. A.;' ,be ....blo UN c1eftMd u r<>bows: il II tho
heichl of the buildinc pi'" t"" \enzlh of tM .boner
.Ide Ii...... the leneth of tbe lonJ"l" aide. or it it the ra<!i .. 01
cyIilOdrical object pi the hel&bt of tM objed.
br 1.7 tim. tbotadi ..-It io _half of the 0<tU1I ... 01
the "'I....,.., objed. OD the vound. "'hen wildinp ,hot oro
,imilar to _h other "'t .paM .1_ tocethe" bfto, ,.
.pacinc it _ Umo f..... r tl ...... the hoil;h'. tho V 10 deter-
'IIiMd by tNati"'l: the VOUp u ...... unit. The V. A. 01 --..
JNWld or ope ,_not dilll.mila. in IPpeo.raaoe willi ""
objec\ m...t be.-d.
form of Obj"".
An object of O\'tr 10,000 square meters of V..,.
should not be in a geometric form or pattern.
Color
1. An object Mould match its background in
both eolor and brightness.
2. The brightnt8ll of an object of over 400
square meters of V. A. should not be greater than
1H times the bright1le!llll of adjacent area.'!- Whell
it is necessary to use COI'ering materials having a
brighlneilll higher than the background, it is de-
sirable that this covering material have a V. A. not
gre;ttel'" than 100 square mel.er!;.
3. CoI'ering materials for roofs or similar sur-
faces should have low brightness and be arranged
to break up stnight lint'$ or flat surfaces or other'
"Rise change original curved appeanmce.
TABLr. No. I-ToU. of brig/li...... of./iltffll/ - _
'-' ,,--'
r
7
Cireumferenoo of, eity
Country

RUUS Of AIR DEfENSE CAMOUfLAGE
!letdown by o.hpmfC'lu..llOft"l...... t;" ... 1t41
INDEX
1. General rem:uks.
Camouflage of objects to be newly built.
3. Camouflage of objects already buill.
Rema.rks
I. Deliniuon of eamouflage.
Objects to be camouflaged are installations
'wble at distances greater' lhan 10 kilometers
....hen seen from an angle of 30 degrte$ abo,'e the
horizon.
3. Brightnl'll8, form. oolor. etc. of an object
with to its baekground should be uken
into oorl$ideration.
4. Location of an object-for example. whether
it is in a tit)'. at the edge of a citro in the country,
in a fOl'$. should be gil'l'Il due oonsider.ltion in
"""""'""'"
5. Primar)' oonsideration of camouflage is to
hide from oltrhead obse!'"alion.
6. In the ereetion of new suuctura. due eon-
sideration should be gil'en to surroundings. ron-
1oUI'$, and oolor.
i. Camouflage is a paWI'e defense mea.--ure and
should not be relied upon to the l!I:c1l15ion of other
defl"tlSe mell3ures.
<:a.moullaging of New Objccts
On constr\l(';tion work it is desirable to
eliminate all JlDl'l'ible U'aeeS of tbe ooll5lrUetion
work and 10 bal'e a minimum change made in the
ground and a minimum change made in the
o:oIorina:.
1. It is desirable to avoid prominent locatiom
on a river, coast. and lake. It is preferable to locale
ne'I.' in a "a1ley, at the fool of moun
tains. in the foresu. or in rolling countryside.
2. It j" desirable to a,"Oid reclaill1f!d land or
hillhly uniform countr)"Side. Choice of location
should depend to. large l!I:tent on c:haracler and
brighu- of SWT'OUndings eompand to that of the
proposed slrUeture.
3. Roads and other boundaries Mould be given
eonsideratioD with due regard to thelUlTOundinp..
It is desirable to .\'Did regular or reetangular pat_
terns. Natural ilTtgUlaritiesfound in a oountry or
f01'e!lt Mould be followed.
of 0bfecD .u-d1 BWlt
...........d.....
1. Loca1ity of ?b)eetl-G. P8I'IllaIlt!lt ....
standing in prornlneat locatiOns on eoaat. !b*.
rivers, IakeB, or rnarsh8I mould be c:a
m
...,,"'-4
with eJ,treIlle care.
b. Tbe aamc thing appli. to buildi. located
in elpollCd areas
? SteP" should be taken to charlie
of those havina; '-.
which are charaCtenStic. (Presumably thia ___
railroad yards and the like1
3. The necessity ror eamouftaging an obieet.
determined b}' the table below:
,.
a,po" of i"...."';o" of' . EXHIBIT T
,,,..d P......io" O'.uiuti
O" ..d lacili" of.i>< '
AIR RAID PROTECTION So..., w"'*........ Ooob.
T IlEI'ORT ..
NAKAYAM ,lm"'tryofHomeAffa;1'l! lUIWlUI
A STEEL WORKS LTD development of their.' 'd C"'den.:edbythe
, . deseribed . aIN;" protel:tion
I Locot. 2 NOVEMBER 1945 a Jlt<lIt Annex 1'-2 attached. (lI'OIlP
1/10.-3 Funamach' T. . . '1"ortua"""if The h I
Owntr8hip.-Princi ) . i, aishoku, Osaka. of five principall und:: stall'
NakaYllrna and hisfa:y Mr. El.wji Ando, chief of air.raid Protecti:: of
were sold on the ,a ough own for administratil'e pl1l"pCloles' ,Wll.! roken
p" .open market, known llIl the eastern . mtothreegroupll
Mr. Elluji Naira. assistantl and and t,,o
"am glng D,rector, Naka. lil'l!t and .eoond r,.,.,...... " PO}llCI 0( the
a. with --', UnltI, the oenUlil group
Em-' a """,er and one usista
, 1"0l/i'fl.-Oflice force and engineen-887. eml>lo}'eesofthehead nt eomprising the
foremen and workerll_4ooo em "'""'u, .',b I
Sh'J ' . .- ., .
. I ls.-Normally three 8-hour wartime' prising the emplorees ot awstant, oom
m.the machine shop, rolling mills and h Shifts The total air....id thll',j faetory Wlit.
mills, with two 12-hour shirts in th .1 s eet plate plant during wan' you
p
within thf
__, b b leastfurnace Hnl! num""",,, 5&1
v,,_ eart aD( coke departments . employees, divided' 5 . snu
Cap 'Im C . . scribed f Into major paru and de-
J '-:-. apltal subscribed, Y19,OOOOOO as OUO"lI: A1ll>Clt T21.
Capital paul m 58,QOO,QOO. ,. b. Guq.rd diM"" (K .
acres. (l) A/Q.rM .
. prOOJUII-lCarlimt._l'ig iron steel IiClected to paIi throu." awe
ingOt<>, stee plates wire __ . ' h __ .... p...m WIth mega...
b l'zed .' 'vus, Iron and stefl mill p,,,,,,,,,, announCIlla; an raid aJen
Jrs.', ga vam' Iron sheets lor the Army and alarm, supplerrtfllting announ or an
a\}: _ madeo"erthepublieaddrea :stem cmtent
PnllCipol prOOll(ll-peacflime._l'ig iron steel control Cl!nter in the f\'ent ':;m the
ingots, rolled steel, east steel ing machinC!')- "'Duld b' mov...
T J

'e' e" t 15 announce-

upe 0 Ul""Og cOll$/rmlion._Steel frame and ment not tn be heanl.
corrugated iron sheeting (32 buildings). Wood (2) lValthn. _At the !IOund ot the first
framC.'!, covered With corrugated iron (8 buildings) slert. 20 watcllmo manned their obser....uon
Plant is divided into three mill areas as E' posts at thetopo(the main ollke blJildingand
Central. and This plant ranks t,,o of the factory ?uildingll. The}' an_
productive capacIty in this industry in the J _ r.heapproacltof air<:ralt and rf'porttd
empire, producing 20 percent of the ::1 l:nmediatelY by wphone from the.oblen-.._
national production of pig iron and rolled in ts tlOn posts UI eontrnl staung num-
2 0 .. go . her of planes lD the formauon w d- t"
of plaul air-raid p,oltetioM of night and estimated speed' lree ton
JOTces.-1 StC('1 Works. Ltd. (Osaka (3) Ligll.ll:OlllrOllm.-Each dil' .
plant), whIle privately owned has been controlled '0 ._ .. . '1S>01I
. 19 b I '. . emp",rees """"'" uuty It 1<1lI,
. 43 Ythe the Ministry of Muni- upon instrlK:uons recei,-ed from the eontrol
in ma.tters concerning productIon and air- cemer, to pull tlw tran5fnrmer switches and
PaId mcasures. The director of air.raid effl'l't a panial or complete blackoOut of the
prateetlOn was Santa Kakajima, one of the direc entire plant. The)'1Il'n' aI!Io a-itb the
of corporation, with lIlr, S.-\ndo as as- responsibility of shutting oIf powe-
81ltant III charge of training and operation of the from the to mo';ng maebin-ery.
force!. The management of this plant (4) M_IIgm.-Each guard division pol-
high interest and concern in matters 5CSSCl!IO di\;ded among 3 guard
o plant protection and spared no expense to carry houses, llocatedat theea;;t plsnt,l each&tthe
the llOUcy enunciated by tlte Nal'y Depart- central and the,,'est ...hOSl'dut! it II"llI
ent and the ?Iunit.ions Ministry through the to earn' mf:S.."llges to snd from the control
C!a5Si/ica,ion of Camouftage
I. The type of camouflage to be used is decided
by the characteristic of the structure, its form and
location in accordance with table No.2. The fol,
lowing are considered more important snd
should move up one ela!ll!ification in No.2.
a. Objects that are located in the VICllllty of a
permanent landmark.
b. Objects that art! conspicuous.
c, Objects of peculiar fonn. I A.
2. Objects under 400 square metel"$ of \.
needing to be camouflaged should be regarded as
railing in elass 5. _ ' police
(Revision of translatIon supphed by relee'
Guard Section of Police Bureau 3d floor, P
ture building.)
4. Factories having large, flat roof areas or
roofs of characteristic forms should be camouftaged
by irregular painting camouflage.
N._" ........... ,ho .."'.."" of lmJ>O'Uo" ...,...... .. .-
_tool In 'ho _tot of d "'" iy " ...
Tobit No. s-Slnl"l<>,d lI>bk 0/ li",a V. A. 'or "-'r
t,Ill,..>Ij1ag<
IU..

Cl....ml......
.....-
CO"
.".
c....... r_
.

"bi..
""',

-
ilO ;
'.
..... Ui<

l!O-C_oI .....'...--
- -\ * ".......::_01 ......... ..- '.-
I ......
,--et- 011._ ,".-
iO.OOO ..-
....11 u-
...-ei_oI_"",
10,000
'.-
I ........
Coocea!lntn< of Surfaces
1. Concealment for the surface of water must be
such that the camouflage itself does not leave a
clear or regular outline. It must be well planned
and must harmonize with the surroundings.
2. \Vat.ercan be covered by ha\'ing logslaeed to-
getber supporting bamboo blinds. Anotber metbod
would be to streteb steel cables over tbe water and
bang neta or curt.ains between these cables.
3. Another method of concealing dikes or ponds
would be to have plants growing on rafta on the
wate!".
Coneealmt'" Camouflage sed
1. Concealment camoulL'Ige should be as
for concealing an object of pecuhar form. sue
an oil tank. water tank. etc.
1I. The net should be dyed . ed "thin [)
b One mesh of a net be lmll WI d
or 10 centimeters square an
5 or 10 times as wide as the thickne$ 01 the net
thrE'ad. the
c. The net must be arranged $0 as to coI'er
object and eltumd over it '-2 to I meter. ,
d The lighter colored the object (0 be hIdden.
the'denser the net must be.
(plants) is suggested to supplement the ne.ts. Nets
should be thicker at the center of the object and
can feather off to the edge.
t. Shadov;s of re\'ealing objects can be coneealed
by a net e:<tending from the northern half of the
roof at an angle to the ground.
2 Nets or curt.ains should be used when an
cannot be concealed by paint. .
3. or curtains should be used for an object
tbat is shiny, sucb as glass.
f h meet part. de-
In Hokkaido there or trefll
ciduous tree! and II rnmonl)' 0
EI.ergreen trees are not to found. wind or _
Those planl!! durable sea
spray aN! lL'l follows:
1. Evergreen broadlea
f
trees.
2. Needle-leaf tree>. rf
3 Z
,,'sill tSpecIes of tu }. ".
, ...,- I So"'- u","u'
:-lOTI:: ,.......,.. not fire proo. u.e.
\I""" winl.... 1..- .,..Iuh.ble ""ough 101 ram""
. . - of l.be aif-raid
center and olber dlVlSlOflll tek'P1loM colD-
protection forces in the event
_The fire division
o..fin dlrls,on pIll!! lire
consIsted of II leader an h annet! three
engine crews of SO em.plo)ees w 0 mmounted on
450 g.p.m. was localed
banrl..drawn ca.rrillge;l. This headquarters
at a central fire sUltion near t e alert was
office building. HO"'e\-er, when an,I"oMtched
. 1 "paratUS wllS 0 .....
sounded, one pIece 0 . the lant. Sup-
to each of the three mmn area.'! of P 166
. . t the plant own""
plementing thIS eqlllpmen, . . enl was
hand fire extinguishers. whIch of the 3
handled by crews of 20 awgned
plant !;l!Clion5. A resoerve group (I h nd-drawn
W1l!l held in readiness to transport II d 200
water tank>!. of which th(!fe "',ere 60 large an
small. When the water supplies thus lranspo h
bv the reser....es "'ere e;.;hausted. ther :-vere t en
e%pected to organize bucket luigades all
of tke plant and utilize the 4.'<> lire
on kand for purpose. Other equIpment con
of fiftv 25-foot ladders and other small lire-
lighting tOOls. such as picks, scoops and
rope!. This di\;sion alSll had assigned to It .10
mC8!ll'nger.l on duty with tke 3 leaders and asslst-
.,nt leaders of the lire department.
d. din"ri(nl (Kyugo-bu).
(I) RUOIl squad.-The oanitary division
rescue squad was organized under a leader and
tWO assistanu. Composed of 45 employees,
the squad ....as trained in first-aid and pro-
vided with light rescue equipment and
oxygen masks.
(2) Carr" 1Ij1UId.-Supporting the rescue
squad was a earr}' squad of 90 men equipped
with 70 litters and 3 ambulances whick were
little more than converted eargQ-tnle body

ta) Trtllllllmt 8q1LOd.-A treatment squad
of 20 employees assisted by 6 doctors and 30
nunes, comprised the complement of
division. Tbe medical personnel and nurses
were stationed at the company's own hospital
loeated 1 mile kilometers) from the
plant, who responded on call of the control
center and immediately joined the treatment
""".
t. Rtpair diriaWn (KoatItll-bu).-lt was the
responsibility of tkis division immediately to
make post raid repair and replaeement of machine
,.
toOl- for which a D'lllllbiDe aquad of 26
..... The' of
(1) ElfTit ::rthe electrie_
rawn. uad of 26 plant
of an electn
t
II(( buiki'
(2) Bllildiq BqIIGd,-A 1111, liqUid or 21
I
....... diretted by construction ....
emp oftI I... C_
from the plant te, P1aIlI1Dd
directed the restoration of dlllllllged pllll1t _
EngiYltciflll the ..
sonnel of the repalr dlvllIlon, an
d 1
'5 men under the dlrectlon of ctvil ....
Squao- , '
trielll and from ttK! _
ffi
Th,y made an Imme<hale assessment oIu.e
oce. tf'
damage, estimated. the cos 0 P!'OClIftd
replacement matertals, and supervIsed the Wort
program d' .. (K .L..
f food and w.pply 1l:l18'1o:m
management of the Nakayama Steel Worb
stored large quantities of commodities at tilt
lant to feed employees In the event they were
to the air_raid shelters for an extended
'00 Such an emergency did not arise durillt
but the management did issue supplies of
.ce to the families of employees whose homes W!'I'E
out in the nearb)' 'Taishoku Area, when-
most employees lived. ."
3. Fire prttenlio:m.-When the mIll was. bU1II1J1
'1935 little precaution was taken to provlde,..s a
fire-prevention consi.deration, a propef
!\l.'Paration of buildings housmg hazardous. pro-
cesses and con<:(!ntmting high values of
products. fire
4. Fire proleClion training.-The plant
brigade was composed of regular of Ihe
P
lant who were required 10 take training
. . 'Ih Osaka CIll'
tion montkly under the dIrectIon 0 . e . d 'il
fire department. They a practlce ",
at least once a month but received no extra
. fi en's unl'
for this duty. They were not gwen rem. d
forms or protective clothing. The
morale of tke plant fire department was ex t 01
throughout the war, according to the not
plant management. the
receive incendiary bomb hits, large and
in neighboring factories during llir and
threatened its safety. Through the e?r lQllS
. 1 t serIOUS
elftclency of the plant fire depar men, h' !lL3k,
. . red lnt IS
to the plant bUlldmgs was . mmunit)'
the plant fire brigade merged WIth the co. ted of
fire department of Taishoku, the
pumperll of 500 g-,l.llons capacity. and
I
blue during the raid of 1July 1945 h ... h
........ or 6 haun bet" !lei "'''Ie
eontrol. ore ng brought under
6. Tftt air dtjnl4t ltd'lm 1
ftre d' . . I .- n addition to th
the aize
repa" d' . . guard diVISIon, sal1Jlary division
IT IVl!llon and food supply appeall!d Ita'
,the size of th:
. , .. ....,,- 0 men employed. These
0l'CelI retell cd trallllng and practice at lean
heac\month acoording to the speeialit} to
w IC eac. man was assWtcd. While the equip-
ment prol'lded was not adequate, by American
for the protEction of a plant of this
Importance, it was oollllidered by lhe plant man_
agement sufficient to fill the needs.
,6. lIurnlli,'!1 of unnp/OOtd Ixnbll.-Ouring the
l1l.ld o( 1 July, high-explOllive bombs. reputed
to be [iSO-pound (2SO kilo) weight, fell upon this
plant, two of which were duds. This incident"'1\6
reported to the Osaka polia! ....ho
V,lSlted plant and, afte.- 811r1'eying the silua.
tlon, advl'ied that the bomb craters be
back-filled and no attempt be made 10 remO\'e or
defuse the bombB. This procedure was follOl"ed
and apparently no further incident oceum!d.
7. !Valer 8"pplies,-The presence of the Yodo
River on three sides of the plant alforued ample
"'awl' supplies for fire-fighting PllT"pOl;eS. Wate!'
was made available to yard hydranll; through
mains connected with suction pipes. In addition
to this inexhaustible supply, there was a
gallon elevated storage tank normally used (or
heat processing of finished stE'l!l, which "-as al!iO
available in case of emcrgency. At first it was
tkought that this tank was intended to supplr an
automatic sprinkler system, but examination
revealed that this type of protection ""M not
installed in the plant.
8. Air-raid _rning syslPIII,-u. The onl)' in-
formation received by the offiee and
control center of this plant concerning air raids
was by means of the public radio which announced
alerts or alarms as the case might be. Occasionally,
ilCtording to th.e plant manager, the Osaka poliee
WOuld call the day before an air raid announcing
the imminent danger, The plant was equipped
with two 5-horsepower electric sirens. SO
bells of the large outdoor type. dlstl1buted
thmughout all mill buildings. These devices ....
ere
by a powerful public addre'!8
controlled and operated from the unde.--
ground control center beneath the keadquarters
building, which gne adequate
or the factQry and}'Vt!ll 18
further fUpplernented by the
prel<louijly de.cribed. "' ...
b. The flrsl alarm was a warning to all
over the sYSIem. At the.e:
tIme, the alen. was lOunded on the electric .
belli .for I minute. Employees remai::;:
theu- and ...ork continued. The Il!OOlId
alarm, which announced O\'er the Public
Ind.icaUod that raiders 'n're near b
and in the direetion 01 the plant.
&rel18 and bells IOUnded 6\'e COI1$llc\Itive
notel of ;; Iil!OOndi each. t:pon receipt. of
thlll aI.arm. all. emplo)_ "'ere ordered ttl take
cover In the atr-raJ,d obeIterls PI'O\'ided for them
!he all clear "'3S not OlOIlnded by the electric .......:
109 1)'IItern, but merely anl>OllllCl!d in the 1heltel'8
and the mill m'er the loud-5Pflilker
systelI1. The matte!' of when and bow ttl.c>Und the
a.1en or the alarm was Wt em..irel) to the diBcre-
tlOn of the chief of air-raid PfOlI'Ction fon:ell of the
plant.
9. l.:.....QtIICJ' ...oml -..a.-In 1937 the
Steel Worb built iu O'&'ll tItree-Aor).
hospital within I mile of the main,plant buiklinp,
with 72() square (eet. 0tI each IIoor and $.bed
capacity, 1n addition to these facilities, ..-hich
were free to employees and memberi of their
families, a casualty 8tation lor first-aid treatment
was located adjacent to the main otIice bw1ding
and staffed 24 hoW'll,.;th , dOClOl' and 10 nur;;es.
10. Air_rtIid sItdltr ,.,.-ao.._\\lthia the plant
yard were IWO large C!OIlCI'l!le air-raid sbelttrI
built 12 feel uno:\ergrowld, with a 001>-
crete deck S9 inches (l me'I") lhick. wb.ic:b was
alllO the foundation of bWt IUl'l\ICIe. Tbege
Meltl'l'8 well ligbted, reuonably well \'enti-
lated, but were not psproof, AI*J througbout the
plant yard were numerous lIlIla11 sbelterlI 01 15
penon capacity.;; feet 0 J.i meun) high by 4(<<f-
ainches (1If"met.en) wide and :..'Off- (6 meters)
long. They were -.rooclen fTVrll!l ]lI'Otlfd by
earth outside, with \"l!Ij' light b&f!Ies ol'er the
entranee At the lermination of the war the
plant had under COIll\I.TlII:ti a 01
approximately three-fifthl5 of a mile (1 kilomeUr)
from the plant, a number of O\IlSide shelterll
designed to houge 1.1 \eIlst 50 escb, These
were located on \-aeant ground in the city Ilrea of
Taishoku which had been densuted bl' an
incendiar)' air raid. This program,
nel'e!' completed. In thee
'"
10.;:;:..";,,,
=::
-
teet orne.: bUildings and sev
members not included - h era.
l
planta with IJle
tion group All om III t e said air-raid PJ'Oteo.
all engineers U well ...
follows: In It and the chm i. lIII
K..oIT...
,.
2. ond l>Cliri1w 01 ai'-,ald .
l/I"""p.- MemberB called prOl<clwn
alarm. This h""'e\'er on each a!r-raid
to oontinue since air raids found d'fficult
About 50 members ....ere COm
the in tum III
cope WIth new situations. Workers drilled
were also engaged in . "",,,,,,,y
turn. Air raid alarm::lOn for all night in
qUlirters office through
80 loud-speakers ha"e cau,ht' .
faetory. It III OUT ..hole
.3. Plan rmdl._Every drill hitherto
proved fliZ" from elfti"e again:':
temble Illr The ooly way left for lIS has been
to take refuge In shelters with nothing to do ..hle
enemy pllines raging O\'C!" our heads. '
Era"'pk.-AIH"'d al=n issued through
radiO at 0900 1 June 1945. T'll'Cflty-siJl minU!ell
later, more than 400 big-sized planes
Osaka from "'est or nortb""$t passiog away to
east or northeast. and about 100 planes pa8iIE!d
mlide bombardment just over our plants, dropping
many hurning bombs. Fortunate enough, no
our plants; Fire, "".."ver, brokto out jUSl.
nClghboring factOl"lCS. !\o lldual actintv 01
extinguishing fire bowe\w. """" made air
raid l'Ontinued. We had a narm" I'llCllpe from
being burned. With our OUtmost efforts aWsted b)'
neighbaring fire brigade alter the air raid ""uove!".
5..4-ir dtftMe """,il7W* 1Ol! i.p/tlIItloI&-a
1I'1II1 dtftMt.-lmportant electric tmnsf0rmer8
telephone exchange room, and headquarters 01
groups were equipped with heavy wooden nil 10
protect against bomh presslUt'. Around air "':ltch
stand at the top 01 our office building "113 aha
covered with the same wall.
b. Lighl ((IIIlrol. for ligln control, ..'e had no
alternati"e but to eo,'er the whale plants "ith
black turtains. Sometimes light W3l! COJItrolled by
electric delhet)' room either h!, cutting oil" the
or the light.

. Apart from air_raid protection group, another

Illr defen!le groul) was organized in order to pro--
ANNEX 1.'.2
DEVELOPMENT OF AIR.RAlD
PROTECTION GROUP
(Nakayama Stool WOl"lca. Ltd a Fu h'
TaiohOku, noma. "
i. air raid prot.eetion group
was founded 'n 1939 according to the
o.f Department of Home AltaiI'!;. !\1embel'!; at that
time were.about200 in and the anti air raid drill
was practiced several times in order to gi"e them
fundamental knowledge of liir defense. With the
outbreak of Great E:astern Asia War, Our group
ref<:>rmed and strengthened according to the
IIIstruellOnS of the liforCSliid department, and the
chart or the same at the time of Japanese sur-
render is as follows:
O'jlCoiml;"".1 c"",p
Inquiry Was made of th
their plans for ooneerning
of gTellter safety They d t 18 IIIdUStry to POinlll
that they had voiuntar/. the information
element;; of th I } decIded to mO"e ...... ".
e pant eng ed'
manufactured products the of
advice of the Nav n_ to ayzletu, Kyotoru on
'
.'5' I' '-"'IJartment . '
.... . Dismantling of . receIVed 2 July
but because ofe;h:a,n machine toots had
and Iron ore thO, S4!vere shortage of coal
, program was t .
pended and finally ablind ed . emPOranly sua-
of the cessation of h .. ?n With the approaeh
The fuel shorta follOWing month.
earl ge apllCared to be quite J;f!vere as
bee y as August 1944, but after the stan.of 1945 it
ame very acute, and, on many occasions there
was 1.day's supply of coal on hand to carry
on pwuuctlon.
shuttel'll. to wbieb the and of the
companY -would go dunna: an alert. They
referred to be in e10l18 toueh mtb the WIItro1
p nler and COrtUllunieations a)'Stem rather than
:'k the protection or one of the heavily eon
structed sheltel'll in the
of the plant. From detailed exarlll!"l'tion, it
IJelieved that this .contrOl center, ita stalJ,
protection lind eqUipment, Wall entirely adequate
to serve the purposes of thi.>l type of industry.
13. Trai'ling.-As early a;s 1988, on adviee of
the )Iinistry of Home Affaln, plans and policy
were created for an liir-raid protection organiza_
tion for this plant. Mr. S. Ando, previously
referred to, designated to undertake the
organizational duties of the which he
prep.,red himself by aUendlllg lIIstructlOnal oon
ferenees at the air defense school operlited by
Osaka prefecture. While knowledge impart.ed bl'
that school was not ext.ensive at that time, Mr.
Ando devoted a totlil or 1 week during the summer
of the year 1943 to the task of learning the rulli
ments of air raid factory protection. Subsequently,
there was created a peacetime operating protec
tion foree of 200 members in all categories who
were given seveTli\ drills in fundamental knowledge
of air defense. With the outbreak of the Greater
East Asia War, this group was reformed and
strengthened, pursuant to advice received from
the !\linistr)' of Home Affairs, to the number
df!!!Cribed in chart shown in Annex T-2, and
carried through the war period until the Japanese
surrender. It is reported that the personnel were
considered to be reasonably well trained and quite
well informed as to their partieullir during
an air-raid emergency and they carried out the
task without the confusion or panic thlit resulted
elsewhere during heavy raids. It was not uncom
mon for the plant employee. to be alerted and
required to take shelter as many as 10 times a day,
Aa raids became heavier in intensity and were
delivered by' greater numbers of planes, there were
many days in this plant when only 2 hOUni of
production were IIOSilib\e. and that. intermittently.
During 1942 and 1943, it was the policy not to
stop production or even to sound an
lilarm, if there were three Or less bombing planes
o,'er the areli of the pllint, but, after the atomic
bomb attack on Iliroshima, the appearance of one
plane approaching the plant are,1 would be suf-
ficient reason to sound the alarm and order all
factory employees to the air-raid
14, Dispers(ll pi",IS before end of IU!sli/i!ies.-
th" common design reeommended by Osaka
prefectuf@.and followed the national pollc)' of the
01 Home Affairs. The employee:< were
divided into grouf'l;. each in charge of the'
foreman under whom they ,,'orked. and tile
shelters themseh'e!\ were designated by the name
of the foreman inscribed o"er the entrance.
II. (blotk-olll).-Despite the
efforts made by management to effect the com-
plete black-out of the operating of
plant, dimculty was expenenced w,th
such facilities as the open hearth and forge fum-
aoos. Wherever possible. black-out and
protecti"e lighting shields were installed through-
out e"ery department, with illumination extin-
guishable by meaM of contrOl switches in those
portions of the plant where manufacturing proc-
esses would not be affected by blacking out the
area. In other portions of the plant, such liS the
rolling mill and shoot plMe mill, lighting intensity
was reduced to the minimum required for operli-
tion. Several plans for preventing sky glow from
blast fu.nlice and open hearth departments, such
as the erection of wood co,'ers lind haflles, were
considered b)' mlinligement only to be ultimlitely
discarded as impractical. The promineut glow
caused by tbe;;e two a !!Ource of
great concern to the manligement liS well as the
Navy Deplirtment, for its loclition on the Yodo
River made the plant a beacon to raiding aircraft.
After having e:<hausted every means lit their com
mlind to install protective lighting devices, they
appeared to be prepared to accept the inevitable
result of their inability to control light sources.
12. Can/rll<! center.-This plant maintained an
excellent control center, 15 by 20 foot in size,
located in a heavily constructed basement 20 feet
below the main office building. It was connected
by telephone lines laid to the guard stations of
each of the three main sections of the mill. During
an air-raid alarm, the personnel on duty at the
control center comiBted of the director of air-raid
protection, and the assistant chief of the air-raid
protection services, with their prineipalli5Sistant;;,
and usually a representative of the production
department mlinagement. Maps and chartll show-
ing the lay-out of the pllint, location of hazardous
proce5SC!l, vulnerable point;;,location of fire mliins,
fire hydrants, and other intelligence information
were properly plotted, This subteITanean control
center was also connected with one on the second
Roor of the office building, the windows of which
were protected by specially built heavy wooden
Article 7 of the oorps, chiefs of the
di,-i.sions and submlinata ohaIl be
by the ebief.
for the prot:tion of llUr Mikuni fa.:tory.
Artlde 2 The C<IrJ" IhWl shall here-
after he caJled the Special
Mitsubi!lhi Kei-Gokin Kogyo Mikuni Factory.
CHAPTER 2
Article I) The liud number of Pl!nOnnel of the
special air-defense lrps shall be wit.bin 1.000,
composed of the organization shown in the
attached lists, :-10. 1.
Article 6 Although the chief of the <':Ol1lS should
be nominated by the Osaka prefectural gover-
nor, the head of t.be Milruni faetory shall lake
&eat as chief.
CHAPTER 1
air-tMense corps, establisb" b, 'J
illiubishi Light,.Alloy Industrial Co.
T...w.rioa
Regulations of :speeial
Mikuni Factory
Gene..1Rule
Article I special air-defense corps regula-
tIOns. Artlde No.2, Osaka prefectural ordi_
nance, we shall establish a special air-defen'le
Synem and Organiu.,i(H]
Artiele3 Five !leCtionscomposed of H. Q., Guard,
Brigade, Working and Relief shall be estab-
lished for the protection of the whole grounds
which shall be divided into four divisions. as per
sketeh attached, placing them under their
respective !leCtional jurisdiction.
Article 4 For H. Q., we shall nominate one chief
and three suJH:,hiefs and for each section, one
chief and one sub-ehief, and some other chiefs
not belonging to any section shall also be
nominated,

ro.
" ...
U,
".
" ...

seoopo . """'. , ..
Poolo (10 ""nlOoin SOO kUohten).
1>0 report hu been in
NotE: Th."...... red br the
EnglWl u prep8
_1DIide 01 pI:IDU: 160 to Ilel:loal.
,. paona. OutIfde 01 plante: 101) to
160 (DOt yet completed). eoner.;
:::: 2 to accommodate 2110 penona.
eqaiplllllll.-
_.... ,.,
.....

smaIl ter W1P..
Tooll to poll the ftre.
Bud<et& .
"'''"
elJoI't in prevent-
PTeftntion of blou. - EW'I'Y and open he.fth
jog the blaze of Operations have
furnac:el has proved .nelfect.l" "d oJ"",, _
Iuln lUN'81
been compelled to stop W nt and lIt!\-eFe.
. 'd became freque .
illSUed after all' fa' t proteet casting
ihe only procWure taken was II hearth fumaee,
field with black sheet'!. f.orOrenneighboring raW
some barrackJ! ",ere bUllt prevented the
materials re:Jerved area
b\lI2.e of furnaces to $Orne air roid,-A
d AccO>IlI,,,xlaliollS oj I r ."""_
. hea.dquarters (>
microphone set at . _ clions to whole
casted the air-raid or lTl.>trU through about
workers to take refug(l if offices and
d
ker:l scatte"", tn w
eight lou spell. . !lells as "'\111 as two
plant'!. Some thirty telling alarms.
sirena also plal'ed t e ac
CHAPTER 3
,..
DUlies
Article 9 The chief of the corps shall gi"e orders
to the personnel and manage the corps busil\elS.
SuiH:hief shall aid the chief and take his place
in case of the chief's absence.
Article 10 The division chiefs, on rw:ipt of
orders from the corps chiefs, shaH take respon-
sibility in having their p('l'8Onnel e.xecute self.
protection in their respective divisions.
Article 11 All chiefs shall l"ereive orders from
their seniors, and direct their subordinate p('r
sonnel.
Article 12 Duties which each seetion of the COrJlS
are to assume shall be as foHllws, but in normal
time it shall be carried on by the men in charge
of air-defense business belonging to the factory.
(1) Guard unit: MatteTl' per.
taining to the enforcement of air defense and
direction of air-defense exercises.
b. Working unit: Matters pertaining plan
d k d ,,-U""!lon of
an gUIdance of wor an I ""
damages.
c, General alTairs: Combination of matters per.
taining to sections and supplies to personnel.
(2) Cwtlrd UJdiQfl.----<I. Guide unit: Mattei'!: pe-.
taining to signal. light control, messenger 0!'!'Tiee
and guidance of relC:ue uniL
b, Guard inspection unit: Matttn pertaining to
guard insption and "'3tehing.
f, Supply unit: Matters pertaining to mpplifos.
d. Guard unit: pertaining to the
3mIngement of sheltt!l's.
(3) rift In-igadt 8tdi0ll......... Matttn perU.ining
to fire brigade.
(4) Htlit! ItdlOll.-Il. Medical Unil
and spiail'l!lief unit: mailers to
prompt treatment of ..-ounded and SICk llnelll5t'"e
of poison.gas ;;uffere'S) and dispc;u.l of dead.
b. Anti.poison unit: Mattl'l"!5 pelUining 10
"wning and of deeontam
illltlion and epidemic' prf-\'ent>on.. ..
(
'J Workillll ltdiOll--Il. t'f\Jlneenng
,. 0 pro\fll:UQn and recon-
unit: Matters t and gas facilities.
stroction ....ork of maclllne.....ter
b Elect.rie unit: Matters
.. d ....ork of electrIC WI
uon an
'"
",
Article 29 TL
"0IIe who r'l .
assemble in spite of hal WIthout to
defense alarm shall be t e.sounding of the'
facto,." _., pun'shed aeeord ....
A' lnglot!>e
rtlcle 30 Allow
th allCl.'a and pri
e personnel shall be fi ed u.s to be gil'en to
x 5e!larately.
",
I!U:. CHAPTER 7
Article27 A
anti POCket as 1
I
-gas mask shall L: tee helmet and an
onger ..... returned L
Art' I h"". . w"en no
lee 28 Ever
with an be provided
Suppl.rnenlory Ual I teo
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unit shall be inspected and repaired as often as
possible.
Article 24 The material lent a member shall be
used with care and at the time of his retirement
or transfer to other factory it shall be returned
to the jWard section.
CHAPTER G

Culture Training
....rticle 25 It is desirous that in order to execute
complete air-defense for the factory, the corps
wellll5self-prot.e<::tion persons,shall
air-defense training to gel high fighting
,pint for air-defense !SO that they may have
in victory.
Article 26 Air-defense training shall be carried
out as follows:
Equipmeo, aod Materials
Article 22 Air-defense materials belonging to the
corps shall be kept in custody with the respon-
sible personnel.
Artiele 23 Air-defense material supplied to each
. . -.-.defense p1ll'JlOlM'l and the teIeUe of .......L.
c. Engineering WQl'k unit: MatteI'S perullntIli &I U...-.el]
to engineering work. work 101" the persons.
cHAPTER 4
Calliog.nd SralioBins .' W'hen. or other cireu.....
Anicle 14 The personnel of the specIal alT' sranees \nterV ,pee gement shall be
defense corps, in case or the sounding of air- "/" oj tid -Do .
defen;;e alann or in rec<lIr'ition of tM (I).pum d Uptntm _. I/h!llt'.-For
OCCUJT('nce of emergt'ner in the (actory shall working In ay me, penonn"" the
immediately report to we factory. perwnne1 duty of and. me!$l!llgeI'll Bhall COhtinlU! to
who happen to be present shall assemble in work as In normal
their respective units in the ab,we mentioned Nightti",e.-.
At
mghttlme penonne! nOI on duty
cases shall take statIOns.
Article 'It> On amval at the factory. the l)erson- (2) The first For working hOlm
llel shall ahow their identification tag to the in daytime, one-thIrd of the .whole penonnel ilball
watchman in front of the gate and attend to be posted as the rest shall eon
their duties at their respectil'e posts. tinue to work as In normal ume.
Artide 16 Each chief of unit shall take im- At nighttime or on holidays, one-third of the
mediate steps to put the aSlCmbled personnel whole personnel ofT duty sha\1 be posted and the
into prompt action. rest shall be permitted to remain at home or
Artiele 17 Each chief of seetion shall report the continue their work.
number of workmen present at the factory as (3) The second diapmlitioR.-a. At daytime it
1;OOn as he receives the warning alano and shall be arranged for H. Q. to bestationed with one
within ZO minutes after the ....'Srning alarm. he sub-chief and some representatives and for the
shall report the number of the corps men and seetions or units to be furnished with one chief
operators respectively. and twO messengers re>pectively.
Article 18 Chief or el'elj' unit shall report the Article 20 During the warning alarm the entire
status of Ilt""nnel arrangement at interl'als of personnel shaH be posted as shown in the sup.
10 minutes for 30 minutes after the warning plementary list, No.3. (Not translated.)
alarm. and ror the follo.... 2 houl'$ at intervals Article 21. For working hours of workmen
of 20 minutes. excepting the corps personnel self_guard unit
Article 19 The personnel shall generally be shall be stationed in the factory in order to
stationed as follows during the warning alarm. exert elforts for the beginning air defense.
CHAPTER 5
LEGEND
=CAH,t,L
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on_.- CITY lIOltfOoI,RY.
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CIVILIAN OEHNst: DMSlOfiI
OSAKA ,'ELD ItPOltT
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';;> H"lMDFIIOll EU.DING
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-RoI.II.1iU.Y STRllCTUlES.

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OF OSAKA-
I
fiRE RESISTANT ZONES DESIGNATED BY PREWAR ZONING LAW,
OSAKA, JAPAN
CITY PLAN
........
OSAKA
_.
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LEGEND
o _ '1IISl 0&""-0 'S_IO "MOO
,_
ID 0 '_0 G."aGUl f ....IIE
@D !'WOl'" D.t....
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Q'oIUIoN DIVISIII
...... ..... -
7 JUNE. 15 JUNE 1945
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14 MARCH. I JUNE.
AREAS
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MAP OF OSAKA CITY SHOWING LOCATIONS OF
FIREBREAKS CLEARED BY DEMOLITION OF BUILDINGS
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