Edgar Jarantilla V. Court of Appeals and Jose Kuan Sing (Pau) Facts

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY.
ABAO
EDGAR JARANTILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING (Pau) Facts: Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening in lznart Street, Iloilo City" and sustained physical injuries as a consequence. The said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was driven by Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol. Jarantilla was charged before the City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in a criminal case. Kuan Sing did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. Jarantilla was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt" Kuan Sing then filed a complaint, a civil action that involved the same subject matter and act complained of in the criminal case. 7 Jarantilla alleged as a defense a lack of cause of action on the part of Sing, and bar by prior judgment in the previous criminal case even if there was a cause of action. the trial court issued an order of denial for Jarantillas motion to dismiss, suggesting he take the case to the SC via certiorari. After trial, the court below rendered judgment in favor of Sing and ordered Jarantilla to pay the former the sum for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, other actual expenses, for moral damages, for attorney's fees, and costs. The CA affirmed. Issue/s: 1. whether Kuan Sing could file a separate civil action arising from the criminal complaint filed against Jarantilla when Jarantilla had been acquitted for reasonable doubt. Held: 3B 08-09
Yes. It is a settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence... Another consideration in favor of Kuan Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. The civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. The acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages.
TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO
ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC v CA (Grip) No Double Recovery Rule Facts: Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of the judgment promulgated in this case, contending that (1) private respondents are NOT permitted thereunder to recover damages twice for the same act or omission. Issue: Can the private respondent heirs recover twice? Held: Yes. Petitioner overlooks the fact that private respondents, as plaintiffs in the actions filed in court, specifically alleged as a result of petitioners dredging operations, the soil of their property became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture. They also averred that petitioners used their land to park their heavy equipment without paying rent. It is clear that petitioners are guilty of two culpable transgressions. Consequently, both courts correctly awarded damages both for the destruction of the land and for the unpaid rentals. There is consequently no merit in petitioners objection. * Case only a resolution, not much facts given. CANCIO v ISIP (Irah) Facts: Cancio filed 3 counts of violation of BP 22 against Isip, who had issued 3 bad checks. The case was dismissed. Subsequently, 3 cases for estafa were filed. The cases were dismissed. Cancio then filed a civil case for collection of sum of money to recover the value of the 3 checks from Isip. Isip moved to dismiss on the ground that the action is barred by res judicata and that Cancio was guilty of forum-shopping. 3B 08-09
Is the civil action barred by res judicata? Held: No. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities: 1. Ex delicto under Art. 100 of the RPC; and 2. Independent civil liabilities such as: a. those not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, such as culpa contractual, violations of Articles 31, 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; b. where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action (e.g. Article 33 of the Civil Code) Either may be enforced against the offender, but the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, civil liability ex delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the offended party may file the separate civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence. However, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. In this case, the basis of the complaint is culpa contractual. It is an independent civil action which is based on Isips breach of a contractual obligation. This may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings, regardless of the result of the latter. There is no res judicata because there is no identity of causes of action. CITYTRUST v IAC (Ysan) Facts: Herrero, a businesswoman, made regular deposits Citytrust at its Burgos branch in Calamba, Laguna. Oo one occasion, she deposited with petitioner the amount P31,500.00 in cash, in
order to amply cover 6 postdated checks she issued. When presented for encashment upon maturity, all the checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that it was due to private respondent's fault that her checks were dishonored. It averred that instead of stating her correct account number, i.e., 29000823, in her deposit slip, she inaccurately wrote 2900823. Issue: Whether Herreros mistake absolves Citytrust from liability Held. No. The Court reiterated its ruling in Mundin v. Far East Bank & Trust to wit: Having accepted a deposit in the course of its business transactions, it behooved upon defendant bank to see to it and without recklessness that the depositor was accurately credited therefor. To post a deposit in somebody else's name despite the name of the depositor clearly written on the deposit slip is indeed sheer negligence which could have easily been avoided if defendant bank exercised due diligence and circumspection in the acceptance and posting of plaintiff's deposit. REYES vs. CA (Krissette) FACTS: Reyes and Puyat-Reyes, as Phil. Racing Club representatives, were to attend a racing conference in Sydney. In order to pay for the conference fees, they sent the clubs cashier to FEBTS to apply for a foreign exchange 3B 08-09
demand draft for AU$1610, payable to the conference organizer. The application was denied at first because FEBTC did not have an account in any Sydney Bank. However, a roundabout way was found whereby the remittance of the money could be achieved. FEBTC would draw a demand draft against Westpac-Sydney and the latter would reimburse itself from FEBTSs account in Westpac NY. This arrangement has been resorted to since the 1960s and there has never been a problem. When the conference organizer presented the demand draft, it was dishonored. However, FEBTCs account in Westpac NY had been debited. In response to the organizers complaint of the dishonor, FEBTC informed Westpac Sydney to reimburse itself from FEBTCs Westpac NY account. FEBTC also instructed Westpac NY to honor the claim for reimbursement. Despite this, the draft was dishonored a second time. When the Puyats arrived in Sydney to register, they were denied because the drafts had been dishonored twice. This allegedly caused them much humiliation, shock. However, after agreeing to pay in cash, they were admitted to the conference. Upon getting back to Manila, the Puyats filed a complaint for damages against FEBTC claiming that as a result of the dishonor, they were exposed to unnecessary shock, social humiliation, and deep mental anguish in a foreign country, and in the presence of an international audience. ISSUE: Whether FEBTC is liable for damages. HELD: NOT LIABLE. The degree of diligence required of FEBTC, in this case, is that degree of diligence expected of an ordinary prudent person under the circumstances obtaining. The rule that a
bank, due to the nature of its relationship with the client, must exercise extraordinary diligence applies only when the bank is acting in its fiduciary capacity, as was seen in the Citytrust case. In the present circumstance, the relationship between FEBTC and the PUyats was merely that of seller and buyer, with the subject matter being a demand draft. That ordinary diligence was observed is evident from the numerous follow ups that FEBTC undertook in order to get the demand draft paid. It did all that it could have reasonably done. The reason the demand draft was dishonored was because Westpac Sydney mistakenly read FEBTCs cable message to it (a 1 was read as a 7). As a result, Westpac Sydney did not recognize the cable message as a request for a demand draft. ADZUARA v CA (Alpe) FACTS: Adzuara, then a law student, while driving at an average of 40kph along Quezon ave., collided with the car of Martinez which was making a u-turn at the speed of 5 kph. Both Adzuara and Martinez claimed that their respective sides had a green light, while the investigating officer saw a blinking red and orange traffic light after arriving an hour later. Adzuara was convicted by the trial court and the CA of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries. He posits that there was no factual basis for the existence of negligence. ISSUE: Was there negligence on the part of Adzuara? HELD: Yes. Martinez was consistent in his testimony that the u-turn had a green light, thus implying that Adzuaras lane had a red light. This was corroborated by the testimony of the daughter, Sahlee. Also, the fact that the car was sent flying for 3B 08-09
20 meters says that Adzuara was at a high speed, contrary to the the 40 kph that he said. According to the Court, negligence is that want of care required by the circumstances. It is relative and comparable and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. The diligence required in the circumstances in this case is ordinary care and diligence. At 130 am, it is mandated that drivers keep a watchful eye on the road ahead and observe traffic rules and on speed and right of way. When Martinez was able to take half of the road while making the u-turn, Adzuara should have given him right of way, and stopped. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. v CABILZO (Kristel) 510 SCRA 259 FACTS: Renato Cabilzo was one of Metrobanks clients who maintained a current account with the banks Pasong Tamo Branch. On Nov. 12, 1994, he issued a check payable to cash and postdated on Nov. 24, 1994 for the amount of P1,000. The check was presented to Westmont Bank for payment and the latter indorsed it to Metrobank. Metrobank cleared the check and debited Cabilzos account. It was found out later by Cabilzo that the checks amount was altered to P91,000 and the date changed to Nov. 14. Cabilzo demanded that Metrobank recredit the 90,000 to his account. Metrobank refused. Cabilzo filed a civil action for damages against Metrobank. In its defense, Metrobank said that it exercised due diligence in examining the genuineness of the signature and the technical entries including the amount in figures and in words to see if there were alterations and found that there was none. It further stated that Cabilzo was partly responsible for leaving spaces on the check which made the fraudulent insertion possible. The RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cabilzo saying that Metrobank was liable.
ISSUE: W/N Metrobank should be held liable for damages for its negligence HELD: YES. The degree of diligence required of a reasonable man in the exercise of his tasks and the performance of his duties has been faithfully complied with by Cabilzo. In fact, he was wary enough that he filled with asterisks the space between and after the amounts, not only those stated in words but also those in numerical figures in order to prevent any fraudulent insertion. Metrobank cannot rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel which states that when one of the two innocent persons, each guiltless of any intentional or moral wrong, must suffer a loss, it must be borne by the one whose erroneous conduct, either by omission or commission, was the cause of injury. Metrobank did not prove that Cabilzo was negligent or that this negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. Negligence is not presumed but it must be proven by the one who alleges it. Banking is a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The appropriate degree of diligence required of a bank must a be a high degree of diligence, if not the utmost diligence. Here, the alterations on the check are visible to the naked eye but Metrobank failed to detect the alterations which could not escape the attention of even an ordinary person. This negligence is further exacerbated by the fact that it was the cash custodian who examined the check when his functions do not involve the examining of checks. Obviously, the custodian was not versed and competent in handling such duty. Banks 3B 08-09
are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of employees SABIDO AND LAGUNDA v CUSTODIO, ET AL. (Mayco) August 31, 1966 Negligence as proximate cause. Where the contributory negligence of the petitioner was as much a proximate cause of the accident as the carriers negligence, their liability is solidary. Facts: Two trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Agripino Custodio, a passenger of LTB bus, who was hanging on the left side as truck was filled of passengers was sideswiped by the truck driven by Aser lagunda, as a result Custodio was injured and died. Issue: W/n the LTB bus is solely liable for the injury and death of Agripino Custodio? Held: No. the owners of the two vehicle are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other springs from quasi-delict. The employees of LTB bus were negligent for they should not have allowed Agripino Custodio to ride their truck in that manner. Aser Lagunda was equally negligent. The latter was driving so fast when it met LTB Bus and he could have avoided the mishap if he had been careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. The distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have
avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck was not running at great speed. Lagunda saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away. Clearly he had the last clear chance. RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. v CA (Edz) 286 SCRA 544 (1998) Facts: Ridjo Tape (RTCC) & Ridjo Paper (RPC) received letters from Meralco demanding payment for alleged unregistered electric consumption allegedly due to the defects of the electric meter located in RTCCs and RPCs premises. RTCC and RPC refused to pay, therefore Meralco advised them that their electric service would be disconnected without further notice. provision on Service Agreement regarding payments: In the event of the stoppage or the failure by any meter to register the full amount of energy consumed, the Customer shall be billed for such period on an estimated consumption based upon his use of energy in a similar period of like use. Issue: W/N RTCC and RPC, despite absence of evidence of tampering, are liable to pay for unregistered electrical service. Held: Partly. Production and distribution of electricity is a highly technical business undertaking, and in conducting its operation, it is only logical for public utilities, such as Meralco, to employ mechanical devices and equipment for the orderly pursuit of its business. Parties are expected to be aware that these devices or equipment are susceptible to defects and mechanical failure. RTCC and RPC cant be ignorant of the fact that stoppages in electric meters can also result from inherent defects or flaws, 3B 08-09
not only from tampering or intentional mishandling. The construction of the terms of a contract which would amount to impairment or loss of right is not favored; conservation and preservation, not waiver, abadonment or forfeiture of a right, is the rule. On the other hand, Meralco has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence. Notice of a defect need not be direct and express; it is enough that the same had existed for such a length of time that it is reasonable to presume that it had been detected and the presence of a conspicuous defect which has existed for a considerable length of time will create a presumption of constructive notice thereof. Meralcos failure to discover the defect, if any, considering the length of time, amounts to inexcusable negligence. Meralcos failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter installed within the premises of RTCC and RPC was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute. Therefore, the liability of RTCC & RPC should be limited by Meralcos negligence. RAYNERA v HECETA Facts: At about 2:00 am, Reynaldo Reynera was traveling on the southbound lane of the East Service road on his way home. At some point on the road, Reynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of an Isuzu truck-trailer which was without tail lights. Reynera was brought to the hospital by the driver, but Reynera died already due to the head injuries sustained during the accident.
The heirs of Reynera demanded compensation from Hiceta and Orpilla since they were the owners of the truck, but the owners refused. The heirs then filed a case to the RTC, which found that the proximate cause of the death of Reynera was the lack of tail lights and that the truck was improperly parked. The owners appealed to the CA which set aside the ruling of the RTC, by saying that Reynera was the proximate causeof the accident since he was the one who bumped to the rear end of the trailer-truck. The Heirs filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC. Issue: Whether the CA was correct that Reynera was the proximate cause of his own demise? Held: YES. The proximate cause of the victims death was his own negligence. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traveling the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway. SPOUSES ERMITAO vs. CA AND BPI EXPRESS CARD CORP. (Pau) Luis Ermitao, was a credit card holder from private respondent BPI Express Card Corp. (BECC) with his wife, Manuelita, as extension cardholder. On August 29, 1989, Manuelita lost her BECC supplemental card when her bag was snatched in greenbelt. That same night, she informed BECC of the loss via telephone. This was followed by a letter dated August 30, 1989 stating that she shall not be responsible for any and all charges incurred through the use of the lost card after August 29, 1989. However, when Luis received his 3B 08-09
monthly billing, the charges included amounts for purchases made on August 30, 1989 amounting to P3,197.70 through Manuelitas lost card. The spouses refused to pay. Notwithstanding this, however, BECC continued to include in the spouses billing statements those purchases made through Manuelitas lost card. They protested the billing letter. However, BECC pointed out to Luis the stipulation in the contract that in the event the card is lost or stolen the cardholder continues to be liable for the purchases made through the use of the lost card until after the BECC has communicated such loss to its member establishments. Issue/s 1. is the stipulation in the contract invoked by BECC valid? Held: No. The Court ruled that the resolution of the petition hinged on the validity and fairness of the stipulation in the contract of adhesion being invoked by private respondent in case of loss or theft of a BECC issued credit card. It ruled that the stipulation which still requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card company has notified all its memberestablishments, puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card company which may delay indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize it not to eliminate the possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases. Or, as in this case, the credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly notify its member through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. To require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has given prompt notice of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair and unjust. The Court held that such stipulation clearly runs against public policy. On the matter of the damages petitioners are seeking, the SC deleted the award of exemplary damages, absent any clear showing that BECC acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner, as required by Article 2232 of the Civil Code. They also reduced the amount of moral damages to P50,000.00, considering the circumstances of the parties to the case. BENGUET ELECTRIC v CA (Grip) Negligence as Proximate Cause Facts: Petitioner assails the decision of the CA ordering it to pay Caridad Bernardo, as guardian ad litem of the three minor children of Jose Bernardo P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, with interest thereon at the legal rate, P100,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, another P20,000.00 for attorney's fees, P864,000.00 for net income loss for the remaining thirty (30) years of the life expectancy of the deceased, and to pay the costs of suit. Jose Bernardo was a vendor in the Baguio Market. One day as he was about to leave his stall and board a jeep, he got electrocuted as he held the handle bars of the jeepney because the antenna of the said jeep got entangled with an open electric wire. He died in the hospital. The Cause of death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to massive brain congestion with petheccial hemorrhage, brain bilateral pulmonary edema and congestion and endocardial petecchial hemorrhage and dilation (history of electrocution)." Caridad Bernardo then filed a case against Benguet Electric (BENECO). They subsequently won, hence this petition challenging the award of damages. Issue: Is Benguet Electric the proximate cause of the death of Jose? Held: Yes, the lower courts did not commit any reversible error. Several electrical experts testified that Benguet had several violations in installing the electric wire, in particular it 3B 08-09
was below the 15ft. clearance from the ground mandated by law. There is no question that as an electric cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in supplying electric power to the towns of Benguet province, its primordial concern is not only to distribute electricity to its subscribers but also to ensure the safety of the public by the proper maintenance and upkeep of its facilities. It is clear to us then that BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving unprotected and uninsulated the splicing point between the service drop line and the service entrance conductor, which connection was only eight (8) feet from the ground level. BENECO's contention that the accident happened only on January 14, 1985, around seven (7) years after the open wire was found existing in 1978, far from mitigating its culpability, betrays its gross neglect in performing its duty to the public. By leaving an open live wire unattended for years, BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for the safety of the public. Indeed, Jose Bernardo's death was an accident that was bound to happen in view of the gross negligence of BENECO. BENECO theorizes in its defense that the death of Jose could be attributed to the negligence of the jeepney driver, in parking his so close to the market stall which was neither a parking area nor a loading area, with his antenna so high as to get entangled with an open wire above. But this line of defense must be discarded. The driver was well within his right to park the vehicle in the said area where there was no showing that any law or ordinance was violated nor that there was any foreseeable danger posed by his act. One thing however is sure, no accident would have happened had BENECO installed the connections in accordance with the prescribed vertical clearance of fifteen (15) feet ST. MARYS ACADEMY v CARPITANOS (Irah) Facts:
St. Marys Academy conducted a campaign to solicit enrollment by visiting the public schools. Sherwin Carpitanos, a student of St. Marys was part of the campaigning group. During a trip to Larayan Elementary School, Sherwin, along with other students, met an accident while riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Villenueva and driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and Sherwins schoolmate. Sherwin died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. Thereafter, Sherwins parents filed a complaint for damages for the death of their son against James Daniel and his parents, Villanueva and St. Marys Academy. It was alleged in the complaint that James Daniel drove recklessly which caused the jeep to turn turtle. The RTC held St. Marys liable for the damages and absolved the rest. CA affirmed the decision, but reduced the amount of actual damages. Can St. Marys be held liable for damages? Held: No. Article 218 of the Family Code gives special parental authority over a minor to the school, it administrators and teachers while in their supervision, instruction or custody, which shall apply to all authorized school activities whether inside or outside school premises and Article 219 provides that those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the minor under their supervision. However, for St. Marys to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury. In other words, the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In this case, the Carpitanos failed to show that the negligence of St. Marys was the proximate cause of the death of Sherwin. The Carpitanos, Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the report and the testimony of the traffic investigator that the proximate cause of the death of Sherwin was not the negligence of St. Marys or the reckless driving of James but 3B 08-09
the detachment of the wheel guide of the jeep. There was also no evidence that St. Marys allowed James to drive the jeep. It was Villanueva who had possession and control of the jeep and who allowed James to drive it at the time of the accident. The negligence of St. Marys was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. (With regard to moral damages: Moral damages may be recovered only if they are the proximate result of the wrongful act or omission.) (With regard to grant of attorneys fees: Grant of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule. The power of the Court to award these demands factual, legal and equitable justification.) Since the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not St. Marys, but the registered owner, Villanueva, who should be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. OPERIANO v PEOPLE (Ysan) Facts: Eyewitnesses saw Operiano punch Penales on the face and then kicked him on the abdomen. Alberto fell, such that the back of his head hit the asphalt road. Alberto suffered a fracture at the back of the head. Alberto was discharged from the hospital. Two days later, Alberto was re-admitted to the same hospital. His condition worsened and died thereafter. The immediate cause was that the heart and lungs stopped functioning and that the underlying cause was the head injury.
Issue: Whether kick was the proximate cause of Albertos death Held: Yes. Petitioners kick was the proximate and immediate cause of Albertos head injury, causing his death is beyond cavil. The kicking of the victim by petitioner is the first and immediate act that produced the injury and set the other events in motion, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor in a continuous chain of events leading to Albertos death. FOOD TERMINAL, INC. vs. CA (Krissette) FACTS: Food Terminal Inc. (FTI) is engaged in the business of warehousing storage of goods or merchandise for compensation at its refrigerated warehouse in Taguig, MM. Basic Foods is engaged in the production of food and allied products. In its manufacture of food, Basic Foods uses Red Star compressed yeast, which requires storage in a refrigerated space to avoid spoilage. It deposited 1,770 cartons of yeast with FTI for cold storage. 383 cartons worth P161k were damaged, allegedly because of FTIs failure to maintain the proper temperature. FTI claims that it exercised utmost diligence; that any damage sustained was due to the fault of Basic Foods; that under the contract, FTI would not be liable for damage to goods beyond its reasonable control and that Basic Foods was stopped from filing the action because it acknowledged receipt of the yeast in good order. RTC dismissed. CA held there was negligence.
ISSUE: Whether FTI was guilty of negligence in the storage of Basic Foods yeast. HELD: FTI was NEGLIGENT In the first place, the issue is factual, thus, the ruling of the CA is binding on the parties and may not be reviewed on appeal via certiorari. In the second place, petitioner practically admitted that it failed to maintain the agreed temperature of the cold storage area at 2 to 4 degrees centigrade at all times, and this caused the deterioration of the yeast stored therein. Nonetheless, petitioner claimed that temperature was not the sole cause for the deterioration of respondents goods. Since negligence has been established, petitioners liability for damages is inescapable. MORRIS v CA (Alpe) FACTS: Morris (and Whittier) filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of air carriage against Scandinavian Airlines System when they were bumped off a flight to Tokyo from Manila despite being booked in the first class section of the flight. Morris and Whittier had business meetings in Tokyo at the time, and were picked up by a hired limousine from their homes. All this were arranged by their travel agent. After checking in, they noticed that their papers were not being processed, and were told that that flight could not accommodate them because there were no more seats. Upon their inquiry, their travel agent confirmed their booking. They saw their names crossed off from the top of the first class list. The check-in employee testified that the 1st class seats were given to those from the economy class because the flight manifest was closed 40 minutes prior to the planes departure.
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Morris and Whittier were considered as NOSH (No show). The Trial Court awarded damages to Morris and Whittier. The CA reversed. ISSUE: Did the Airline company wrongfully bump off Morris and Whittier? HELD: No. The SC said that in awarding a moral damages for a breach of contract of carriage, there must be a wanton and injurious breach, or an act of fraud or bad faith. Because Morris and Whittier did not arrive on time, the Airline employee cannot be faulted because she did not act with fraud or bad faith. They did not arrive in time for checking-in. CRISOSTOMO v CA (Kristel) 409 SCRA 525 Facts: Estela Crisostomo contracted the services of Caravan Travel and Tours International to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour Jewels of Europe. Her niece, Menor, worked for the agency and was the one who delivered her travel documents and plane tickets to her. She was also the one who informed her of the day of her flight (a Saturday). She did not check the dates of the tickets given to her and relied on this information. When she went to the airport, she was informed that her planes departure was the previous day. She called the agency to complain. She was offered another tour (the British Pageant) in exchange for the one she missed. When she returned from the tour, she asked for the reimbursement of the difference between the first tour and the second one. However, the agency refused on the ground that it had already remitted the payment to its principal in Singapore, Lotus Travel. Crisostomo then filed a case against the agency for breach of contract of carriage and damages. Crisostomo claims that the agency should be liable because its 3B 08-09
employee Menor was negligent for not informing her correctly of her scheduled flight. Issue: Whether Caravan should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage and damages Held: NO. Respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did not undertake to transport the petitioner from one place to another since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. The nature of contractual relation between petitioner and respondent is determinative of the degree of care required in the performance of the latters obligation under the contract. For reasons of public policy, a common carrier in a contract of carriage is bound by law to carry, passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons and with due regard for all the circumstances. As earlier stated, however, respondent is not a common carrier but a travel agency. It is thus not bound under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation. The standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under 1179 of the Civil Code. This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily connotes reasonable care consistent with that of a prudent person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation. Menors negligence was not sufficiently proved considering that the only evidence presented on this score was petitioners uncorroborated narration of events. Contrary to petitioners claim the evidence on record shows that respondent exercised due diligence in performing its obligations under the contract and followed standard procedure to rendering its services to
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petitioner. The petitioner was the one negligent. She should have at least read the documents given to her. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists of failure to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of his obligation as the nature of the obligation demands. There is no fixed standard of diligence applicable to each contractual obligation and each case must be determined upon its particular facts. In this case,evidence shows that company performed its duty diligently and did not commit any contractual duty diligently and did not commit any contractual breach. Hence, petitioner cannot recover and must bear her own damage. AFRICA, ET AL. v CALTEX (PHIL), INC, ET AL. (Mayco) March 30, 1966 Presumption of negligence Res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself) Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident rose from want of care. Facts: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo Street and Rizal avenue, Manila. It started while the gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses including the personal properties inside them. Both Caltex Phil and Mateo Borquin were sued the latter being in charge of operation. Issue: 3B 08-09
Is the doctrine of presumption of negligence under Res ipsa loquitur applicable in this case? Held: Yes. The gasoline station with all its appliances, equipment and employees was under the control of the defendants. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The people who knew or could have known how the fire started were the defendants and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof. The burden of evidence is shifted in this case to the defendant to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. The Police report given in this case regarding the safety hazards attending the area of the gasoline station such as its crowded area, presence of a garage and repair shop for its fleet of taxi cabs, and nearness to the sidewalks strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The defendant was also negligent in not constructing a higher wall made of concrete that could have prevented the spreading of the fire. BATIQUIN v CA (Edz) G.R. No. 118231, July 5, 1996 Facts: Dr. Batiquin (Dr. B), and others, performed a simple csection on Mrs. Villegas (V). V remained in the hospital for a week after giving birth, was regularly visited by Dr. B. After leaving the hospital, V began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish and of having lost her appetite. Dr. B prescribed meds, but the abdominal pains and fever kept recurring. V consulted another doctor, Dr. Kho (K), who found an ovarian cyst on each of Vs ovaries and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus embedded on the
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ovarian cyst. Rubber material might have been a torn section of a surgeons gloves. Issue: W/N Dr. B can be held liable for fault or negligence Held: Yes. Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in defendants exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence. Doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. It can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. entire proceedings of the c-section were under the exclusive control of Dr. B. V has no direct evidence as to how the foreign object ended up in her body, which does not occur, however, unless through the intervention of negligence. Aside from the c-section, V underwent no other operation which could have caused such appearance of the foreign object in her body. Dr. B failed to overcome the presumption of negligence. REYES v SISTERS OF MERCY (Jon) Res Ipsa Loquitur Facts: On January 8, 1987 Jorge Reyes was taken to the Mercy Community Center since he was suffering from recurring fevers and chills. Dr. Rico the resident and admitting physician, gave Jorge a physical examination and took his medical history. Since the hospital was getting a lot of patients with Typhoid 3B 08-09
Fever, and Jorge was exhibiting similar symptoms, Dr. Rico ordered a widal test, which was a standard test for typhoid fever. Jorge was found positive of typhoid Fever. Dr. Blanes the subsequent attending doctor, gave george a physical examination and took also his medical history. Dr. Blanes ordered compatibility tests with choloromycetin, finding no adverse reactions, she administered the drug in 2 ocassions. At around 1 am of the following day, the temperature of Jorge rose to 41c and exhibited chills and convulsions. Subsequently even after the administration of drugs to cure the ailment, Jorge slipped into cyanosis and died. The heirs of Jorge filed a complaint for medical malpractice against Dr. Rico and Dr. Blanes. Trial court absolved the respondents, and CA subsequently affirmed this decision. The petitioners appealed by saying that Res Ipsa Loquitur was applicable to this case. Issue/s: 1. Whether Res Ipsa Loquitur was applicable? 2. Whether the Dr. Rico and Dr. Blanes were negligent? Held: No to Both. 1. The alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a layman so as to justify application of Res Ipsa Loquitur. The question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of standard of care required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr. Rico. 2. Dr. Rico did not depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the due care required under the circumstances. Though the widal test is not conclusive, it remains a standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and, in the present case, greater accuracy through repeated testing was
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rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. With 15-20 patients with typhoid fever being admitted and considering Jorges condition, any doctor of reasonable skill will get the impression that Jorge had typhoid fever. CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA v IAC (Pau) G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989 Torts & damages - Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. Facts: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of Irene Sto. Domingo and father of the litigating minors, died and was buried in Lot No. 159, Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery. The lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as evidenced by the rental receipt. Apart from the aforementioned receipt, no other document was executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in question. In fact, the burial record for Block No. 194 of Manila North Cemetery in which subject Lot No. 159 is situated does not reflect the term of duration of the lease thereover in favor of the Sto. Domingos. Believing in good faith that the lot was leased to the bereaved family for five (5) years only, subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation by the City Mayor of Manila. On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery headed by Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept them in the bodega of the cemetery. 3B 08-09
the lot in question was rented out to another lessee. When the Sto. Domingos went to the lot on All Souls Day, they discovered to their shock, consternation and dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Irene was also informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased husband in the warehouse of the cemetery where the exhumed remains from the different burial lots of the North Cemetery are being kept until they are retrieved by interested parties. According to her, it was just impossible to locate the remains of her late husband in a depository containing thousands upon thousands of sacks of human bones. She did not want to run the risk of claiming for the wrong set of bones. She was even offered another lot but was never appeased. She filed suit with the RTC, which ordered the North Cemetery and City of Manila to give her the right to make use of another single lot within the North Cemetery for a period corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon; and to search without let up and with the use of all means humanly possible, for the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and thereafter, to bury the same in the substitute lot to be chosen by the plaintiffs pursuant to this decision. Issue/s 1. Were the operations and functions of a public cemetery a governmental or proprietary function of the City of Manila? 2. Is the City of Manila liable for the conduct of its agents? Held 1. It is a proprietary function. The City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. Municipal powers are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. A
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municipal corporation proper has ... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. With respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto. The acts of dominion exercised by the City over the cemetery clearly demonstrates that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. 2. yes. The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which another who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within tile operation of this rule of law, and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... PESTAO & METRO CEBU AUTOBUS v SUMAYANG (Grip) Presumption of Negligence (respondeat superior) Facts: Petitioners assails the decision of the CA denying their appeal and MR. Respondent Sumayang was riding a motorcycle with a friend when they were hit at an intersection by a bus that was driven by Pestano and operated by Metro Cebu. The bus tried to overtake the motorcycle. Both passengers on the 3B 08-09
motorcycle died as a result of the accident. Both criminal and civil cases were filed, which were subsequently consolidated in one action. The trial court found Pestano liable for negligently attempting to overtake the motorcycle at a dangerous speed, and also found Metro Cebu liable as employer of Pestano. The CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court, saying that Pestano as a driver should have taken extra precaution and should not have driven negligently and dangerously; and Metro Cebu was likewise negligent for not properly maintaining its vehicles, since the speedometer of the bus was found to be broken. Issue: Are the petitioners liable? Held: Yes. The SC said that the factual findings of the lower and appellate courts are correct, and that Pestano was negligent. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. The CA said that allowing Pestao to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestao was able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the
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supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law. NOGALES v CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER (Irah) Facts: Corazon Nogales, who was 37 years old and pregnant with her fourth child, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. On her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in blood pressure and development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous complication. When Corazon experienced mild labor pains one night, she was brought to Dr. Estrada, who advised her immediate admission to Capitol Medical Center (CMC). When Corazon was admitted in CMC, her husband, Rogelio, signed the Consent on Admission and Admission Agreement. Later on, Corazon was transferred to the Delivery Room. During her labor, Dr. Estrada applied low forceps to extract the baby but in the process, a piece of cervical tissue was torn, which not only caused vaginal bleeding to Corazon but also left the baby in a weak condition warranting intubation and resuscitation. Due to the profuse vaginal bleeding, Dr. Espinola (head of Obstetrics-Gynecology Department of CMC), after having been informed of Corazons condition, ordered immediate hysterectomy. It took an hour for Dr. Espinola to reach CMC due to typhoon Didang, during which time, Corazon already died due to hemorrhage, post partum. Corazons death prompted Rogelio Nogales to file a complaint for damages with the RTC against CMC, Dr. Estrada, Dr. Espinola, etc. on the ground that the physicians were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazons condition and that CMC was negligent in the selection an supervision of its physicians and staff. The RTC held Dr. Estrada liable and absolved the rest. CA affirmed the decision. It concluded that since Rogelio engaged Dr. Estrada as the attending physician of his wife, any liability for malpractice must be Dr. Estradas 3B 08-09
sole responsibility. The other hospital staff merely became Dr. Estradas temporary servants and agents who are under his supervision and responsibility and not the hospitals. (The case was final with regard to Dr. Estrada since he no longer appealed to the CA.) Can CMC and the other physicians and hospital personnel be held liable? Held: Yes, with regard to CMC. No, with regard to the rest. CMC is liable for Dr. Estradas negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior under Article 2180 which provides that [t]he obligation imposed by Article 2176 [on quasidelict] is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsibleEmployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industryThe responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. For CMCs liability to attach under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it must first be established that an employeremployee relationship existed between CMC and Dr. Estrada. In Ramos v. CA, the SC has already held that the determining factor to establish such a relationship is the exercise of control as to the means of accomplishing a task of the employer over its employee. In this case, the SC finds no evidence of such control. Corazon was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada and the fact that Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges and was allowed to use CMCs facilities during an emergency did not make him an employee of CMC. As such, Dr. Estrada is considered an independent contractor. However, under the doctrine of apparent authority, which is a species of the doctrine of estoppel, CMC may still be held liable
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even if Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor. Under this doctrine, it is essential that: (1) CMC acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital, and (2) Plaintiff (Nograles) acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. With regard to the first factor, CMC need not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is its employee; rather a representation may be general and implied. The following circumstances show that the first factor is present: (1) CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada, (2) CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead, (3) Dr. Estradas referral of Corazons profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr. Espinola, who was then the Head of the Obstetrics-Gynecology Department of CMC, gave the impression that Dr. Estrada as a member of CMCs medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-employed specialists. The second factor is also present since the spouses Nogales specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazons delivery not only because of their friends recommendation, but more importantly because of Dr. Estradas connection with a reputable hospital (CMC). Aside from the foregoing, CMC cannot deny liability merely because of the consent or release forms signed by Rogelio. These are considered contracts of adhesion and are thus construed strictly against hospitals. Moreover, a blanket release in favor of hospitals from any and all claims, which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence, would be contrary to public policy and thus void. MANUEL v CA (Ysan) Facts: Private respondents were passengers of a Scout Car owned by respondent Ramos, which left Manila for Camarines Norte one morning with respondent Fernando Abcede, Sr. as the driver of 3B 08-09
the vehicle. There was a drizzle at about 4:10 P.M. when the Scout car, which was then negotiating the zigzag road of Bo. Paraiso, Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, was hit on its left side by a bus. The bus was owned by petitioner Emiliano Manuel. Due to the impact, the Scout car was thrown backwards against a protective railing. Were it not for the railing, the Scout car would have fallen into a deep ravine. All its ten occupants, which included four children were injured, seven of the victims sustained serious physical injuries. Emiliano Manuel, the driver of the bus, was prosecuted for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence. As he could not be found after he ceased reporting for work a few days following the incident, the private respondents filed the instant action for damages based on quasi-delict. Petitioners (bus and insurance companies) contend that it was Fernando Abcede, Jr., driver of the Scout car, who was at fault. Besides, petitioners claim the Fernando Abcede, Jr., who was only 19-years old at the time of the incident, did not have a driver's license. Issue: Whether the lack of drivers license absolves petitioners Held: No. The evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was not duly licensed, was the one driving the Scout car at the time of the accident, could not simply exempt petitioner's liability because they were parties at fault for encroaching on the Scout car's lane. QC GOVERNMENT vs. DACARA (Krissette) FACTS: At about 1AM, Dacara, Jr. and owner of Toyota Corolla while driving rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings
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found at Matahimik St., Q.C., which was then being repaired by the QC government. Jr. sustained bodily induries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. Dacara, Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the QC govt and prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees. Defendants QC alleged that the said diggings were barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. They claim that they exercised due care by providing the area all necessary measures to avoid accident. RTC ruled QC was negligent. CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether QC government is liable for damages. HELD: QC is LIABLE except for moral damages since no proof Jr. suffered any emotional and mental suffering. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Such is determined from the facts of each case. Since lower court and CA are unanimous in declaring petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars the Court from ruling otherwise. Considering that QC government points out that Jr. was driving at 60 kph which is beyond the maximum speed limit of 30 kph and should then be presumed to be negligent for having violated traffic regulation, such will not hold since these matters were belatedly raised by petitioner QC on appeal. Thus, it is too late for them to raise this new issue. DSR LINES v FEDERAL (Alpe) FACTS: 3B 08-09
Berde Plants contracted with CF Sharp (whose general shipping agent is DSR lines) to deliver artificial trees to Al-mohr Intl Group in Riyadh. Federal Phoenix Assurance insured the the cargo against all risks. The ship carrying the cargo reached the first port, and was then reloaded to a feeder ship. The 2 nd ship, however, caught fired, and burned down. Federal Phoenix paid Berde Plants the amount corresponding to the amount of cargo, and Berde Plants executed a Subrogation receipt in favor of Federal Phoenix. Federal Phoenix is now trying to collect against CF. Sharp. The Trial Court and the CA both decided in favor of Federal Phoenix. ISSUE: Was CF Sharp (DSRLines) liable for the losses? HELD: Yes. The Civil Code provides that common carriers are liable for loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods, unless the cause is listed among the exceptions. Destruction by fire, however, is not among those listed. Thus, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. This diligence is required until the goods are delivered to the person entitled to receive them. Federal Phoenix raised the presumption of negligence against CF. Sharp (DSRLines), but CF Sharp failed to overcome the presumption by sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence. DELSAN V. C & A CONSTRUCTION (Kristel) 412 SCRA 526 Facts: C&A Construction was engaged by the National Housing Authority to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area. The project was completed but was not formally turned over to NHA. M/V Delsan Express, owned by Delsan Transport, anchored in the Navotas Fishport to install a cargo pump and clear its cargo oil tank. It dropped anchor at the vicinity of
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Vitas mouth near a NAPOCOR barge after finding out that a typhoon was to hit Manila and that the North Harbor was congested. In an effort to avoid collision with the NAPOCOR power barge, Captain Jusep ordered that the vessel be brought to a full stop. However, the vessel hit the deflector wall built by C & A. C & A demanded payment for the damage but Delsan refused to pay. Thus, they filed a complaint for damages against Delsan. They claim that the captain was negligent in not transferring the vessel immediately to the North Harbor despite having learned of the coming typhoon 8 hours before. Delsans defense was that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event the typhoon Katring. Issues: Whether Captain Jusep was negligent Whether Delsan should be held solidarily liable for a quasi-delict committed by Jusep Held: Yes, Captain Jusep was negligent. As early as 12 midnight of Oct. 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours. This notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 am the following morning when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor which was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. Capt. Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater chance of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port was very near North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he would still have the time to seek refuge in other ports. 3B 08-09
Yes, Delsan should be held solidarily liable under 2180 of the Civil Code To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed, however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not enough that the employees chosen be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees. Due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. This was not proven by Delsan in this case, making them solidarily liable with Capt. Jusep.
SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING v BORJA (Mayco) June 10, 2002 Petitioners vessel was carrying a chemical cargo alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing
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that their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was therefore negligent. Facts: Smith Bell (petitioner) filed a written request with the Bureau of Customs for the attendance of the Latters inspection team on vessel M/T king family which was due to arrive at the port of manila. Said vessel contained 750 metric tons of alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. On the same day, supervising customs Inspector Manuel Nalgan instructed respondent Catalino Borja to board said vessel and perform his duties as inspector upon the vessels arrival until its departure. While M/T king family was unloading chemical unto 2 barges, a sudden explosion occurred setting the vessels afire. Upon hearing this, Borja who was inside the cabin preparing reports, ran outside to check. Another explosion was again heard. Fearing for his life, Borja jumped overboard to save himself. The water howver was likewise on fire because of the chemicals. Despite this he mange to swam his wasy for an hour until he was rescued and sent to the hospital. He was diagnosed to be permanently disabled due to the incident. Issue: W/n Smith bell is not liable as it claims that the explosion occurred outside of its vessel? Held: No. Smith Bell is liable. The lower court and CA ruled that the fire and explosion had originated from the petitioners vessel. Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals, petitioner was negligent in not taking all the necessary precautions in transporting the cargo. Respondent Borja suffered the following damage and injuries: (1) chemical burns of the face and arm; (2) inhalation of fumes from burning chemicals; (3) exposure to the elements while floating in sea 3B 08-09
water for about three hours; (4) homonymous hemianopsia or blurring of the right eye; and (5) cerebral infract with neovascularization, left occipital region with right sided headache and the blurring of the vision of right eye. The owner or the person in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and property by reason of negligent navigation or management. PHOENIX v IAC (Edz) 148 SCRA 353 (1987) Facts: Dionisio (D), after having had a shot or two of liquor at a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, drove home, and on the way, smashed into a parked dump truck owned by Phoenix. D claimed his headlights suddenly failed and that the truck was parked askew, with no early warning reflector devices. D suffered physical injuries and commenced an action for damages, claiming that the proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which the truck driver, Carbonel (C), had parked. Phoenix countered that it was Ds recklessness, the liquor, his absence of headlights and a curfew pass which caused the accident. Issue: Held: There was no evidence of any curfew pass, which must be why D had no headlights and which makes it probable that he was speeding to avoid detection. D was negligent the night of the accident and was driving faster than he should have been. Nonetheless, the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Ds injuries was the
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wrongful or negligent manner in which the truck was parked. The collision of Ds car with the truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of Cs negligence. The collision probably would not have occurred had the truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or devices. Ds negligence was only contributory, that the immediate and proximate cause of the injury remained the truck drivers lack of due care and that consequently, D may recover damages though such are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Issue/s: 1. Whether Tano was negligent in making a turn while visibility is difficult? 2. Whether There is contributory negligence on the part of Monterola? Held: YES to Both. 1. From every indication the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hostility executed a left turn without waiting for the dust to settle.. it was this negligent act of Tano which had directly placed his vehicle on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction 2. It is true, however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following, We therefore, agree with the appellate court that there indeed was contributory negligence on the victims part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners liability for damages.
LBC AIR CARGO v CA (Jon) Contributory Negligence Facts: In the morning of November Rogelio Monterola was driving his motorcycle along the dusty national road in Bialig, Surigao Del Sur. A Cargo van from LBC was travelling on the opposite direction of Monterola, heading towards Bialig Airport. When the van was approaching the airport vicinity, it stopped for a while since there were two vehicles that are racing. The racing vehicles created dust clouds which made visibility of incoming vehicles very difficult to see but nevertheless, the driver of the can, Tano, decided to make a sharp left towards the airport. When he was at the center of the lane, Monterola emerged from the dust and crashed on the right side of the van. Monterola died due to the sever injuries he sustained in the accident. A civil case against LBC and a criminal case against Tano was instituted, but both were dismissed by saying that Monterola was negligent. The heirs of the deceased appealed the civil case, which overturned the decision in favour of the heirs. 3B 08-09
LAMBERT v HEIRS OF CASTILLON (Pau) G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005 Facts: In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the
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highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio. Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle. On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the Castillon heirs but reduced Lamberts liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. On the claim of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the real owner of the motorcycle. He is not the real party in interest. Accordingly, his complaint is dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue/s: 1. Did the CA err in not applying the doctrine of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident? In other words, was Lambert negligent? 2. Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence? Lambert insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages. Held 3B 08-09
1. No. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision. 2. Yes. The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victims negligence. Article 2179 reads as follows: When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
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The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.[15] The determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.[21] These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner. BUSTAMANTE v CA (Irah) A collision occurred between a cargo truck and a passenger bus. The cargo truck and passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite sides of the highway. The bus driver claimed that from 30 meters away, he could see that the front tires of the truck were wriggling, and that the truck was rapidly headed towards his lane. He thought that the truck driver was a jokester, so despite the circumstances, he downshifted to increase his speed on the ascending road in order to overtake the vehicle in front of him. At this precise moment, the cargo truck and the passenger bus sideswiped each other. Several passengers of the bus were thrown out and five people died as a result of the injuries they sustained. The 3B 08-09
heirs of the victims filed an action for damages against drivers and owners of the truck and bus. The CA held that truck driver and owner were not liable to the heirs because driver of the bus had the last clear chance to avoid accident but failed to do so. Is the doctrine of last clear chance applicable?
the the the the
No. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable only in a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. It does not apply where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. In this case, the action is not between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but is one brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the doctrine is not applicable. The truck driver and owner should be solidarily liable with the bus driver and owner, since the truck driver was found to be negligent as well.
MCKEE v IAC (Ysan) Facts: Between nine and ten o'clock, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. When the car was about 10 away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the
23
road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. Issue: Whether the driver of the truck and its owner are liable Held: Yes. Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on. CANLAS vs. CA (Krisette) 3B 08-09
FACTS: The Canlas spouses agreed to sell two parcels of land to Maosca for which the latter issued two postdated checks. The spouses turned over the certificates of title to Maosca. However, the checks issued by Maosca turned out to be insufficiently funded. Maosca managed to mortgage the two parcels to Atty. Magno with the help of two impostors who introduced themselves as the Spouses Canlas. He again mortgaged the properties to the Asian Savings Bank with the aid of the two impostors. When Maosca defaulted on his loan, the bank foreclosed the mortgage. The real Canlas spouses then informed the bank that the property had been mortgaged without their consent and filed an action for the annulment of the mortgage contract. CA held Sps. Canlas were not entitled to relief since they were negligent and must bear the loss. It also held that the bank exercised due diligence in approving the loan and mortgage applied for by Maosca. ISSUE: Whether the bank was guilty of negligence. HELD: YES. BANK is NEGLIGENT. Therefore, it must bear the loss resulting from the fraudulent acts of Manosca. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family, in keeping with the responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing with registered or titled property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest, holding in trust the money of the depositors, which bank deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence of bad faith. In this case, the bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas. Not even a single identification card was exhibited by said
24
impostors to show their true identity; and yet, the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence certificated bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno, covering the same parcel of land in question. Under the doctrine of last clear chance, the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. IN essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Assuming that Canlas was negligent in giving Manosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting the certificates of title to the parcels of land, it cannot be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud, by the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them. DELOS REYES V. CA (Kristel) 285 SCRA 81 Facts: The Spouses Genaro and Evarista delos Reyes owned a 13,405 sq. meter land in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. They sold 10,000 sq. meters to the Pena spouses. The Penas secured a title not only to the 10,000 sq. meters but also to the remaining unsold portion on June 4, 1943. Eventually, the land was acquired by Rodolfo and Zenaida Caina who exercised full ownership and possession over the property on July 9, 1963. On Oct. 3, 1978, 3B 08-09
the heirs of Evarista delos Reyes filed an action against the Cainas for reconveyance of the 3,405 sq. meters of the property claiming that this portion was invalidly included by the Pena spouses in the titling of the land they bought. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of laches and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioners argue that their cause of action still subsists because it accrued either on 1962 when delos Reyes died or on 1963 when the TCT was issued to the Cainas. Issue: Whether the case was correctly dismissed on the ground of laches Held: YES. A cause of action being an act or omission of one party in violation of the right of another arises at the moment such right is violated. In the instant case, petitioners cause of action accrued on June 4, 1943 when the Pena spouses caused the registration in their name for this was the date when the right of ownership over the remaining 3,405 sq. meters was transgressed. From this very moment sprung the right of the owner, and hence all her successors in interest, to file a suit for reconveyance of the property wrongfully taken from them. Section 44, par. B of RA 296 provides that reinvidicatory actions may be brought by the owner within 30 years after he has been deprived of his property. Under 1140 of the Civil Code, real actions over immovable prescribe after 30 years. Thus, even if we apply the 30 year prescriptive period, petitioners right to recover has already been effectively foreclosed by the lapse of time having been initiated only after 36 years from the accrual of their cause of action. PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) applies in this case. The Cainas were the 4th transferees in the ownership of the land in question and they were not required to go beyond that
25
appeared in the TCT in the name of their transferor. They were innocent purchasers for value having acquired the property in due course and in good faith under a clean title. Reliance on 1409, 1410 and 1422 of the Civil Code, on the imprescriptibility of void and inexistent contracts is misplaced. Moreover, the action for reconveyance has now become stale, being barred as it were by laches. It cannot be disputed that for 36 years, petitioners never raised a restraining arm to the inclusion of the 3,405 sq. meters of land in the titling of the 10,000 bought by the Pena spouses. The property passed through 4 owners successively in a span of more than 20 years before it went into the hands of private respondents. Surely, the rights of the innocent purchasers of real property such as the Cainas cannot be swamped and drowned by the remonstrations of the inert and petulant who took no care in seasonable asserting their rights of ownership over the land alleged wrested from them through fraudulent means. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v COURT OF APPEALS (Mayco) Force Majeure: to constitute as an exemption from liability must be one impossible to avoid or foresee or though foreseen is inevitable. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. Facts: In the early morning of Cotober 27, 1978, at the height of typhoon Kading, a massive flood covered the towns near Angat Dam causing several deaths and the loss and destruction of houses, farms, plants, working animals and other properties of people residing near the dam. The flooding was 3B 08-09
caused by the National Power Corporation (NPC) when thru imprudence opened all the three floodgates of Angat Dam. Without prior notice to the people and at an untimely hour when people where sleeping. NPC defended itself by claiming that they released the water via the floodgates gradually and that written notices where given to the residents near the dam therefore NPC can not be held liable as there is no causal relationship between the damages and the act of NPC. Further, the corp. alleged that it was the victims who took the risk of staying near the dam and that the direct cause, the typhoon which was a fortuitous event was to be blamed. It claims that it is a situation of Damnum absque injuria. (Damages but with no legal liabilities) Issue: W/n NPC was excused from liability via the doctrine of Fortuitous event? Held: No. NPC has a prior knowledge that a typhoon was about to hit its area and yet still maintains the water level a t maximum level. It could have released water earlier in a gradual manner but it did not, a sign of negligence on their part. Also its claim that it sent notices was not properly given to the proper authorities (as it was not properly addressed to them) thats why it did not come to the knowledge of the residents in the affected areas. Although the typhoon was primarily the cause why NPC should release water, it was the corporation negligence not to foresee such event that is to be blamed for the damages. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v COURT OF APPEALS & PANTEJO (Edz) G.R. No. 120262. July 17, 1997 Facts:
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Pantejo (P) boarded a PAL plane from Manila to Cebu, where he was supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled. PAL gave out cash assistance of a total of P300, but P asked instead to be placed in a hotel at PALs expense since he did not have cash with him. PAL refused. P agreed to share a hotel room with his co-passenger Dumlao (D), promising to pay D upon reaching Surigao. P found out that PAL had reimbursed the hotel expenses of a Superintendent Gonzales and a Mrs. Rocha, an auditor of PNB. PALs manager only offered to reimburse P as well when he threatened to sue. Held: A contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees could give ground for an action for damages. Both the TC and the CA found that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to provide hotel accommodations for P or reimburse him for his expenses in contrast to the other passengers who were favored. Assuming that airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure, what makes PAL liable for damages here is its blatant refusal to accord such amenities equally to all its stranded passengers. No compelling or justifying reason was given for such discriminatory and prejudicial conduct. It has been sufficiently established that PALs standard company policy, whenever a flight has been cancelled, to extend to its passengers cash assistance or to provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-ups. PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers and in discriminating against P. It was even oblivious to the fact that P was exposed to humiliation and embarrassment especially because of his govt 3B 08-09
position and social prominence, which altogether necessarily subjected him to ridicule, shame and anguish. WALTER SMITH & CO. v CADWALLADER (Pau) 55 Phil 517 Facts: The steamer Helen C. belonging to [Cadwallader], in the course of its maneuvers to moor at the [Smiths] wharf in the port of Olutanga, Zamboanga, struck [the] wharf, partially demolishing it and throwing the timber piled thereon into the water. The wharf was an old wharf and at the time of the accident was heavily loaded with timber belonger to the [Smith]. [Smith] brought an action for damages against defendant for the damage to the wharf and the loss of the timber piled thereon. Held: "The [Cadwallader] contends in its answer that the captain and all the officers of the steamer Helen C, were duly licensed and authorized to hold their respective positions at the time when the wharf in question collapsed, and that said captain, officers, and all the members of the crew of the steamer had been chosen for their reputed skill in directing and navigating the steamer Helen C safely, carefully and efficiently. The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time th[at] [Smith's] wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F.C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court, in the case cited above, and Cadwallader is, therefore, absolved from all liability."
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SPOUSES THEIS v CA (Irah) Calsons Development owned three lots in Tagaytay - parcels 1, 2 and 3. Adjacent to parcel 3 was parcel 4, which was not owned by Calsons. Calsons built a house on parcel 3. In a subsequent survey, parcel 3 was erroneously indicated to be covered by the title to parcel 1. Parcels 2 and 3 were mistakenly surveyed to be located where parcel 4 was located. Unaware of the mistake by which Calsons appeared to be the owner of parcel 4 as indicated in the erroneous survey, Calsons sold what it thought was part of parcel 4 to the spouses Theis. Upon execution of the Deed of Sale, Calsons delivered the certificates of title to parcels 2 and 3 to the spouses. The spouses then went to Germany. About three years later, they returned to Tagaytay to plan the construction of their house. It was then that they discovered that parcel 4, which was sold to them, was owned by someone else, and that what was actually sold to them were parcels 2 and 3. The real parcel 3, however, could not have been sold to them since a house had already been built thereon by Calsons even before the execution of the contract and its construction cost far exceeded the price paid by the spouses Theis for the two parcels of land. The spouses insisted that they want parcel 4, but this was impossible, since Calsons did not own it. Calsons offered them the real parcels 1 and 2 instead since these were really what it intended to sell to the spouses. The spouses refused and insisted that they wanted parcel 2 and 3 since the TCTs to these lots were the ones that had been issued in their name. Calsons then offered to return double the amount already paid by the spouses. The spouses still refused. Calsons filed an action to annul the contract of sale. Can the contract of sale be annulled? Yes. The contract can be annulled on the ground of mistake. Article 1390 of the Civil Code provides that contracts where the consent was vitiated by mistake are annullable. In order that 3B 08-09
mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract. The concept of error includes: (1) ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge with respect to a thing; and (2) mistake, which is a wrong conception about said thing, or a belief in the existence of some fact, circumstance, or event, which in reality does not exist. In both cases, there is lack of full and correct knowledge about the thing. In this case, Calsons committed an error of the second type. This mistake invalidated its consent, and as such, annulment of the deed of sale is proper. The error was an honest mistake, and the good faith of Calsons is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it immediately offered two other vacant lots to the spouses or to reimburse them with twice the amount paid. The spouses insistence in claiming parcel 3 on which stands a house whose value exceeds the price paid by them is unreasonable. This would constitute unjust enrichment. Moreover, when the witness for the spouses testified, he stated that what was pointed out to the spouses was a vacant lot. Therefore, they could not have intended to purchase the lot on which a house was already built. GATCHALIAN v DELIM (Ysan) Facts: At noon time, Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off
28
the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. Passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign a waiver on filing a complaint. Issue: Whether the waiver was valid Held: No. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent. Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. MARISCAL v. CA (Kristel) 311 SCRA 51 3B 08-09
Facts: Bella Catalan filed a complaint in the RTC Iloilo against Rogelio Mariscal for the annulment of their marriage on the ground that it was void ab initio for having been solemnized without a valid marriage license and for being bigamous. She also sought to recover $32,000 which she allegedly sent him to buy properties as investment for their future life together. Two days later, Rogelio Mariscal also filed a complaint for the annulment of the same marriage on the ground that he was forced to marry Bella at gunpoint and that they had no valid license in the RTC Digos. Mariscal also filed a counterclaim alleging bad faith of Catalan and asked for damages. Catalan moved to dismiss the case on the ground of litis pendentia. The trial court dismissed denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. Mariscal claims that there would be no res judicata notwithstanding judgment that may be rendered in either of the civil cases since there are different grounds for nullification of their marriage respectively invoked by them. According to him, the judgment in one case will not abate the second because the basis for annulment in the former would not have even been passed upon by the latter. Issue: Whether there was litis pendentia so that the complaint filed by Mariscal should be dismissed. Held: Yes. For litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for dismissal of an action, the following requisites are necessary: 1) identity of parties or at leas such as representing the same interest in both actions, 2) identity of rights and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and 3) the identity in the 2 cases should be such that the judgment that may be
29
rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. It is quite evident that the first two requisites are present. The third requisite is the bone of contention. In litis pendentia, what is essential is the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. In his effort to have the case resolved in a different venue, petitioner has resorted to nit-picking and in the process has lost track of the real issue besetting the 2 actions which is simply the nullification of a marriage contracted by the parties. A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in a case. To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person or party would be splitting of actions not sanctioned by the Rules. Indeed the court is puzzled why Mariscal shied away from the RTC of Iloilo where he could have ventilated his defenses and litigated his compulsory counterclaim. Also, the supervening event of the RTC of Iloilo nullifying their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous with the award of moral and exemplary damages and disallowing the $32,000 reimbursement makes the action of Mariscal puerile and needless. LIM v UNI-TAN MARKETING CORPORATION (Mayco) No damages can be awarded when petitioner given a remedy in the rules of court to stay the execution of judgment fails to avail of it even if upon appeal the decision was reversed. The respondent was in the lawful exercise of its right at the time it effected an execution sale pursuant to the judgment. 3B 08-09
Facts: Uni-Tan Filed before MTC of Manila a case for unlawful detainer against spouses Lim. Mtc rendered judgment in favor of Uni-Tan. Spouses Lim filed an appeal to RTC and the latter reversed the decision by dismissing the complaint of Uni-Tan. Spouses also file a motion for Partial reconsideration praying that their properties that were unlawfully levied and sold on execution during the proceeding at the lower court be returned to them. RTC ruled on this motion by ordering that the items not sold be returned to the spouses and with regard to the items sold, the only one to be faulted were the spouses who failed to post a Supersedeas bond to stay the execution. Issue: W/n the spouses Lim can ask for damages for the execution of judgment on their property which was later on reversed on appeal? Held: No. The spouses were given the remedy by the rules of court to prevent such from happening; this is by staying the execution by filing of a supersedeas bond. The spouses failed to avail of it and the court sees no one to blame on their present complaint but the spouses themselves. RAMOS v COURT OF APPEALS (Edz) 380 SCRA 467 Facts: Mrs. Ramos (R) was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder and was referred to Dr. Hosaka (H), who recommended the services of an anesthesiologist, Dr. Gutierrez (G).
30
Mrs. R was admitted to the DLSMC for the operation. However, the operation was delayed because Dr. H arrived more than three hours late. Dr. G had difficulty intubating Mrs. R, and had to be replaced by Dr. Calderon (C), but Mrs. Rs nailbeds remained bluish. Mrs. R. was taken to the ICU, and the doctors alleged that she had bronchospasm. She was released form the hospital four months later, but remained in a comatose condition almost 14 years after the operation until she died. HELD: Dr. G failed to exercise the standards of care in the administration of anesthesia on a patient. She failed to perform a thorough preevaluation for anesthesia (taking patients medical history, reviewing his/her current drug therapy, etc.) and physical examination (examination of the upper airway, central nervous system, cardiovascular system and lungs). Dr. G was unaware of Mrs. Rs physiological make-up and needs. Dr. Gs act of seeing the patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operation was an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physicians Hippocratic Oath. There is no question that Mrs. R became comatose after Dr. Gs performance of the faulty intubation on her. The bluish discoloration and enlargement of Mrs. Rs stomach indicated that the tube was improperly inserted into the esophagus instead of the trachea, diverting the supply of oxygen from the lungs to the gastrointestinal tract, causing a decrease of blood supply to her brain. Injury does not normally occur absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the sue of an endotracheal tube. Dr. H is also liable. That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Dr. H clearly exercised a certain degree of, at the very least, 3B 08-09
supervision over the procedure then being performed on Mrs. R, as he was the one who recommended Dr. G to Mrs. R and was the attending physician of Mrs. R. It was Dr. H who gave instructions to call another anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate Mrs. R. Dr. H was also remiss in his duty of attending to Mrs R promptly, as he was more than 3 hours late, having scheduled 2 procedures on the same day, 30 minutes apart from each other, at different hospitals, in reckless disregard for his patients well being. The unreasonable delay aggravated Mrs. Rs anxiety, which must have adversely affected the administration of anesthesia on her.
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Edgar Jarantilla V. Court of Appeals and Jose Kuan Sing (Pau) Facts

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