THE MYANMAR ISSUE: TORN BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THAT OF NATIO NAL SOVEREIGNTY

Qasim Ahmad* Institute of Asean & Global Affairs, Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies, UiTM Shah Alam

Paper Delivered at the Regional Conference On The Humanities: Managing ASEANs Fu ture at Universiti Teknologi Petronas Malaysia, 18-19 February 2009. An Abstract This paper looks at the issue of human rights vis--vis the principle of national sovereignty. As human rights are viewed by many to be universal in nature, their advocacy, more often than not, tend to contradict with the concept of national sovereignty as the latter is premised on the right of the independent nation-sta te to formulate and pursue its own policies and actions without influence and cu rtailment from outside authorities. In the immediate post-Cold War, there was a somewhat widely held expectation tha t the concept of human rights would assume a significant and far reaching role i n the conduct of international relations. This is because, amongst others, the d emise of the Cold War was seen as signaling the end of the era of realpolitik. I t was then felt that the conduct of international relations would operate in a m ore open society -- extolling the virtues of democratic and human rights. In the circumstances, the hitherto unassailable principle of state sovereignty (as ins isted especially by authoritarian governments) would be placed under threat. In

other words, there would be a fierce contest for supremacy between the principle and protection of human rights on the one hand and that of national sovereignty on the other. For the purpose of this paper, the above debate is discussed in the context of t he current political turmoil in Myanmar. It is argued in this presentation that despite the constant and vocal championing of the human rights principle, the sa crosanct or quasi-sacrosanct position of state-sovereignty is not going to be ea sily pushed aside let alone dislodged. What implications can then result from su ch an outcome can, of course, be further looked into. A Preamble `During the 1950s, Rangoon was one of the commercial centers of Southeast Asia. A t the time, the World Bank estimated that Burma would become one of the most pro sperous countries of the reg ion. But independence, democracy, and a free market economy failed to produce political stability or economic prosperity. In 1962, a military takeover of the government led to socialism and central economic plan ning. Foreign business people --- especially those from India, China, and Pakist an --- were expelled and foreign investment in Burma stopped. Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2009, Asia and the Pacific: Burma(Myanmar) Overview of economy, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the Pacific/B urma-Myanmar Acc.29th January 2009. `Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Thailand were about the same stage of development twenty-five years ago. But Thailand has opened itself to the global economy and flourished while Myanmar has shut itself off and fallen backward. Its people h ave begun to discover what has happened in Thailand and the rest of the world. S o they resist further stagnation --- even as their government pursues it as a m atter of policy. Kenichi Ohame, 1994, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Mark etplace, London: Harper Collins, p.191. Rich in natural resources and minerals Myanmaris a land of immense economic potent ial. Under international pressure, Myanmar has undertaken some economic liberali zation programs, although reforms have had little impact on most Burmese. Emanuela Sardellitti, 2007, Myanmar Courted by the Asian Players, PINR: Power and Interest News Report, 8th March, http://pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&repor t-id=627&language_id=1 Acc. 29th January, 2009.

Introduction Within ASEAN arguably the most high profile and contentious political issue face d by the organization at present is the one related to the Myanmar question. It

has for the last two decades attracted world-wide attention and concern. It has resulted in uneasiness amongst members of the regional body and caused certain e mbarrassment, if not difficulties, in its dealings with a number of other intern ational actors. At the heart of the Myanmar impasse, at least viewed from an international relat ions perspective, is the clash between the concept of national sovereignty and t hat of human rights. The present government of Myanmar has always insisted that what takes place within its national boundary is Myanmars own business and that o thers should not in any way get involved. This, coincidentally, fits in well wit h ASEANs policy of non-interference in the affairs of its member-states. National sovereignty is a notion and right that all independent nations would want to up hold and protect. In this specific theoretical context few would want to begrudg e the position of the Myanmar junta. However, in the case of Myanmar, when the concept of national sovereignty is jux taposed against the state of human rights prevailing in the country, the picture becomes noticeably more complicated. To many, the human rights situation in Mya nmar is far from satisfactory. That being so, many quarters are ever ready to de liver some harsh criticisms against the government of Myanmar. Others have even called for further stern actions against it. As can be expected, the military re gime in Myanmar is none too happy with the criticisms and advocacy of severe mea sures against it. To the military leaders, these criticisms and call for retribu tion clearly amount to unsolicited interference in the domestic affairs of Myanm ar. They would have nothing of those. This is the unresolved conflict: on the one hand, there are outside parties tha t want the human rights issues in Myanmar to be properly addressed, and on the o ther, there is the Myanmar regime which considers such overtures as tantamount to an infringement on the countrys national sovereignty. This is what ASEAN and t he world is currently faced with. National Sovereignty The principle of national sovereignty is inseparable from the notion of an indep endent nation-state. In theory at least, the government running a nation-state h as the absolute right to frame its own laws, formulate its own policies and impl ement whatever actions it deems best to protect the countrys national interest. W hat constitutes national interest is naturally defined by the government of the day. Other parties within the country as well as quarters in the international a rena would just have to abide by such a political arrangement. The old Westphalian notion of the independence of nation-states has been accorde d a modern recognition by the United Nations which came into being following the end of the Second Word War (1939-1945). Article 2:7 of the Charter of the Unite d Nations spells this out in the following terms: Nothing contained in the presen t Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are e ssentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Me mbers to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter The Charter does empower the United Nations to intervene in the affairs of any member state if the situation existing in the said state endangers world securit y and peace. This is provided for in Article 42 of the Charter which in part say s that the Security Council may take such action by air, sea, or land force as ma y be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Clearly, f or this provision to be operational, the Security Council must be satisfied that a situation that threatens world peace and security has in fact arisen in any p articular state or nation-state. National Interest During The Cold War

During the Cold War (1945/6- 1989/90) the two leading protagonists of the time s eem to have defined their respective national interest in rather unmistakable an d stark terms. For the capitalist world led by the United States (US), its colle ctive national interest lay in the ability and need to undermine the power and i nfluence of its arch enemy: the Communist block. Similarly the Communist countri es, under the aegis of the Union of Soviet Socialist Russia (USSR), had framed t heir collective national interest in broadly the same manner, with the US and th e capitalist countries being their sworn enemies of course. In the above Cold War context, it is not surprising that the issue of human rig hts hardly became a visible agenda. Security, above all, was the primary conside ration of both the superpowers. If the tenets of human rights have to be sacrif iced on its pedestal, so be it. The Post Cold War World However, the Cold War did come to an end eventually. With the dismemberment of t he USSR and the emergence of newly independent states in the former East Europea n block in the 1990s, the international order was transformed. With the US steadily strutting across the globe as the sole remaining superpower , the US and the Western world no longer had the need for strategic allies that had come in various guises. Furthermore, with the flowering of democracy in East ern Europe and the principle of self determination making its unmistakable impac t there, it becomes a source of extreme embarrassment certainly for the champion s of democracy, like the US, to be still associated with the violators of human rights. In other words, the international actors that were once assets to the United Sta tes and her allies had suddenly became liabilities. During the Cold War their ab uses of human rights were tolerated if not abetted by the anti communist Western powers. Later their records of human rights abuses had come back to haunt them. The Western democratic powers had found it convenient to leave these people alo ne to fend for themselves. The Emergence of Human Rights In International Affairs The case of General Augusto Jose Ramon Pinochet Ugarte (1915 - 2006) of Chile, a nd many others of the same ilk, had convinced a number of scholars that the end of the Cold War will herald the dawning of human rights principles in internatio nal affairs. Human rights issues were expected to play a more dominant role in t he post Cold War era because it was thought that security matters would no longe r matter a great deal; at least not in the way that they did during the Cold Wa r period. With the Union of Soviet Socialist Russia already buried as a politica l entity and the passing of the larger East European Communist block into histor y, there was little challenge or threat left facing the United States and her we stern allies. The championing of human rights, it was also believed, would further erode the W estphalian image of a world of territorial sovereign states. State rights would no longer be supreme. Professed adherence to the superior orders of the state woul d cease to be sufficient as a reason for overriding the solemn humanitarian oblig ations of international law. Human Rights Defined Human rights are seen by both scholars and public figures as basic or fundamenta l rights of all men and women. These rights ought to be secured and respected no t only to ensure human dignity but also to make it possible for people to realiz

e their greater potentials. David Forsythe has defined human rights as those fun damental moral rights of the person that are necessary for a life with human dig nity. Human rights are thus means to a greater social end Not surprisingly, the policies and actions of governments that deny their citize ns basic political rights have come under immediate and persistent criticisms fr om human rights advocates the world over. Today, Joshua Goldstein points out, hum an rights efforts center on winning basic political rights in authoritarian coun tries The Continuing Debate Now almost two decades after the end of the Cold War, the expectation that human rights issues would bring about marked, if not drastic, changes to internationa l order is far from being realized. Nation-states are still very much the major actors in international relations despite the ongoing process of globalization a nd its impact on the stature of nation-states. In the meantime, the revived concept of the will of the people has also assumed, i t is said, an increasingly central role in determining the legitimacy, nay the s urvival, of a government. It is often claimed that to remain in power a governme nt has to observe human rights principles. Whether a government is deemed to hav e adhered to human rights principles or not is dependent on some internal or exte rnal report card of compliance with universalist norms. Ignatieff, however, belie ves that this is highly problematic. To him even democratic governments are uneas y about its implications. The problem referred to by Ignatieff can be amply obse rved with regard to the case of Myanmar. The Events In Myanmar The human rights issues in Myanmar surfaced during the same period when human ri ghts principles began to emerge rather significantly in international affairs. T he critical year in Myanmar was 1988. In that year there occurred a widespread protest against the Ne Win regime. Ne Win had ruled Burma since the 1960s. The m ass protest led to the bowing out of Ne Win from power. But thousands had died w hen the army reacted harshly against the demonstrators. To pacify the public di scontent the military regime that succeeded Ne Win promised that general electio ns would be held in 1990. It was in the midst of this flurry of events that Aung San Suu Kyi found herself entangled. She had flown back home from England to look after her ailing mother and arrived in Rangoon (now Yangon) in March 1988. Politics was not on her mind . However, being the daughter of the countrys nationalist hero, Aung San., she wa s fervently courted by the activists. She had been besieged by university student s and others, asking her to join in. Joined them she did. And she had been deeply moved by the sight of thousands carrying her fathers portrait, some as they were gunned down. Explaining the early and formative stage of the political struggle she later said, The democracy movement evolved out of general chaos that was everywhere in Burma . It was this climate of rebellion that caused many political groups to emerge, which eventually coalesced into a democracy movement. The 1990 General Elections In the intervening period between the mass protest of 1988 and the year when the general elections were scheduled, 1990, a number of significant events occurred . In 1989 in China the Tiananmen Square massacre took place when thousands of pr otesters were gunned down by the Chinese army. 1989 was also the year of the fal l of the Berlin Wall. This event later was followed by the historic collapse of

Communism in Eastern Europe. In 1990 democracy was restored in Chile. All this d evelopment fanned the peoples democratic sentiments everywhere. When the general elections were held in Burma in 1990, the expression of the democratic ethos was both clear and remarkable. The National League for Democracy (NLD) under Aung S an Suu Kyi won 392 out of the 485 seats contested. The celebration, however, was truncated. The victory turned sour: the military regime abrogated the result of the elections. This refusal of the military regime to accept the peoples verdict, and the insist ence of the NLD to assume its rightful position, had inevitably resulted in a po litical deadlock. Into this Myanmars domestic political conflict, came foreign or international elements. Sanctions and Constructive Engagement In 1990, the United States government downgraded her diplomatic representation i n Myanmar. She withdrew her Ambassador to register her protest or displeasure at the turn of events in Myanmar. Most aids had been suspended earlier, since 1988 . Throughout the 1990s many American companies had withdrawn their operations fr om Myanmar, partly as a result of pressure from activists. In May 1997 the Unite d States banned new US investment in economic development of resources in the coun try. In 2004 Washington restricted the imports of Myanmar goods into the United States. The already struggling textile industry was virtually crippled. Likewise the European Union (EU) also devised policies against the government in Myanmar. In 1996 the Union promulgated her Common Position on Burma (Myanmar). As a result of this policy senior Myanmar government officials were denied entry visas into the EU. What the EU and the US had instituted virtually was a polic y of economic and political sanctions against Myanmar. When various outside parties waded into the controversy, the military government in Myanmar became infuriated. It vehemently insisted that the issue is a domest ic matter and outside critics are infringing on the countrys national sovereignty . ASEAN also perceived the Myanmar issue as a domestic issue. The regional body a ccepted Myanmar as a member of ASEAN in July 1997 together with Laos and Cambodi a. ASEAN did so despite the objections clearly raised regarding it by both the U S and the EU. ASEAN had also justified the acceptance of Myanmars membership on other grounds a s well. ASEAN was of the opinion that by allowing Myanmar to be a member of ASEA N, the other members of the organization would then have an opportunity to persu ade or influence Myanmar to adopt more liberal and democratic practices. This po licy came to be known as that of constructive engagement. The Contest The military regime ostensibly did what it did while in power so as to preserve what it defined as, and believed to be, the countrys national interest. It matter ed little to them if the NLD and others dissented from their view and stand. Others could well maintain that the military leaders had only been acting in a s elfish manner. It is highhanded of them to discard the views of the electorate a nd proclaim themselves to be, in effect, the sole interpreter and protector of t he countrys national interest. It might be further argued that, if anything, the refusal of the military leaders to step down from power is motivated mainly by t he fear of having to face retributions for whatever misdeeds that they had commi tted in the past.

An Issue Internationalised In the highly globalised post Cold War world, the clamouring for human rights ob servance is hard to ignore. A government in any particular country can of course decide to turn a blind eye to the issue. It can also choose to ignore the ramif ications that the unsolved issues can have within its national boundary and else where. The human rights advocates within the country can be persecuted or emascu lated. However, should the human rights activists in any one country be harassed, the f ight can and will be taken up by others in some other countries. This is exactl y what has happened to the case in Myanmar. Myanmarese dissidents that had fled the country had formed organizations and published journals elsewhere in the wor ld to carry on with their political struggle. Numerous non-governmental organiza tions in both Asia and the West have rendered various forms of support to the My anmarese activists. The United Nations The United Nations has of course given a lot of attention to the Myanmar issue. Myanmar itself has had a long relationship with the United Nations joining the o rganisation in January 1948, soon after achieving independence from the British. Criticisms against Myanmar had been voiced in the United Nations General Assembl y (UNGA), United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) and the Internation al Labour Organisation (ILO). The current Myanmar issue first emerged in the UNG A in 1991, a year after the abrogation of the 1990 general elections result in th e country and in the UNCHR in 1992. Over the years the call had been made for the military government to restore de mocracy and release political prisoners. It had been repeatedly alleged that the Myanmar government had violated human rights through extra-judicial killings, s exual violence perpetrated by members of the armed forces, forced relocations of people, forced labour, denial of freedoms of assembly and the like. The United Nations had also dispatched special rapporteurs and envoys to Myanmma r. The current one is Ibrahim Gambari from Nigeria. Gambari made his first visit to Myanmar in May 2006. He continued with his visits to Myanmar in subsequent y ears. When the monks took part in widespread popular protests in Myanmar in Sept ember 2007, he too went to the country, making efforts to dissuade the military leaders from taking harsh actions against the demonstrators. In February 2009 he was in Myanmar for his seventh visit to the country. Myanmars Response Faced with criticisms at the UN, Myanmars representatives at the international or ganisation had responded by accusing the critics of interfering in the internal affairs of Myanmar. They insisted that Myanmar be left alone to manage her own i nternal process of national reconciliation. In this they fell back on Article 2, Paragaph 7 of the UN Charter. They denied some of the allegations hurled at their country. For their part, the Myanmar military leaders had hosted UN officials delegated to study and assess the situation in Myanmar. However, the co-operation rendered, in the eyes of the UN and other foreign observers, had been less than satisfactory. For instance, in all of his eight visits to Myanmar, Gambari was only once accorded the opport unity to have an audience with Senior General Than Shaw. Similarly only once was he able to confer with Aung San Suu Kyi in a meeting together with her other co lleagues. ASEANS Non Interference Stance There has been no marked success in the efforts of the UN trying to get things t

o change for the better in Myanmar. There was a short-lived euphoria of sort, ho wever, when Gambaris predecessor, Razali Ismail, managed to engineer the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in May 2002. Razali Ismail told the BBC Ne ws at that time that Myanmar was clearly indicating its commitment towards democr acy and reconciliation. He then cautiously predicted that the country would have an elected government in a couple of years. However a year later, in May 2003, fo llowing a civil commotion in a place called Monywa, Aung San Suu Kyi was rearres ted and has been so confined up to this date. A chorus of international criticisms followed the re-arrest, all calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. In June at the at the 36th ASEAN Foreign Ministeri al Meeting In Phnom Penh, the actions of Myanmar was further criticized. In the following month, in July, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, went much further. He even warned that Myanmar could face the prospect of expul sion should the military leaders proved recalcitrant. Razali Ismail welcomed wha t Mahathir said as a progressive statement. However, ASEAN was in not then in any way about to abandon its policy of non-int erference in the affairs of its member states. The statement made by Mahathir wa s duly qualified by his colleagues in the Malaysian Cabinet. The Malaysian Forei gn Minister, Dato A.Hamid Albar, clarified that any decision to expel Myanmar wou ld have to be reached by consensus. After all, he added, the countrys acceptance into Asean was based on the same principle. Malaysias Deputy Defence Minister sai d that expulsion would only be done as a last resort. He said, Malaysia upholds the non-interference concept which has served the region well. Mahathir himself backtracked from his drastic pronouncement. At the October 2003 9th Asean Summit in Bali Indonesia he again laid great importance on the princi ple of non-interference. At that time Mahathir, and the other ASEAN leaders, ca n be said to have been given a little comfort by the Myanmarese governments annou ncement of its roadmap to democracy. A Setback The sense of hope associated with the announced roadmap to democracy was soon to b e dashed. In September 2004, Mynamars Foreign Minister Win Aung and his Deputy, K hin Maung Win, were sacked along with several other ministers in a cabinet reshu ffle. Wing Aung had been Foreign Minister since November 1998. In the following month, on 18th October 2004, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, widely regarded as the more accommodating of the military rulers in Myanmar and the one closely identified with the regimes proclaimed roadmap to democracy, was dismissed from office and put under protective custody. He was the chief of intelligence of the Myanmar Army and Prime Minister since August 2003. Khin Nyunt, also more disposed towards negotiating with Aung San Suu Kyi, had apparently lost out in t he power struggle with Than Shwe and other more inflexible military leaders. Further Calls By Asean In the following year, in November 2005, Aung San Suu Kyis house arrest was exten ded for another sixth month. As if to underline the fact that the role of Aung S an Suu Kyi was no longer an essential element in the process of national reconci liation, the government reconvened the National Convention in the very first wee k of December. A government spokesman said that the continuation of the constitu tional talks would propel the country towards disciplined democracy. All this cam e at the heels of 11th ASEAN Summit scheduled for the second week of December 20 05 in Kuala Lumpur. At the Kuala Lumpur meeting a call was made to Myanmar to release political deta inees and speed up its democratization process. A decision was also made to arra nge for the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Abdul Hamid Albar to visit Myanmar to ov ersee reforms there. For her part Malaysia has conveyed to Myanmar the help us to help you message. Mahathir Mohamed, when asked about the Aseans leaders call to Myanmar to hasten h er democratic process, responded that the call might, in a way, constitute an in

terference in Myanmars internal affairs. However, he added that it was up to the Myanmars government to interpret it in whichever way it wanted. Nevertheless, on her part Myanmar made sure that ASEAN, and others as well, are always reminded of Myanmars distaste for foreign interference in her own national affairs. The military leaders continued to take actions with little regard to t he views and perceptions of the outside world. They kept delaying the date for S yed A. Hamid Albars visit saying that the government was preoccupied with the tas k of shifting the capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw. When the Malaysian Foreign M inister eventually went on the trip to Myanmar in March 2005 he did not have the opportunity to meet Aung San Suu Kyi.. In May 2006, the new Myanmar Foreign Minister, Nyan Win, attending a Non-Alignme nt Movement meeting in Putrajaya reiterated that the re-arrest of Aung San Suu K yi is not an international issue. He told his audience in no uncertain terms: This is a domestic issue. The Myanmar military government also offered its own expla nation with regard to the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi: If the restric tions on her are lifted, the release will pose danger to her as well as to the n ationIn fact for the people of Myanmar, Daw Suu Kyi is just a woman turned alien or a grave danger to the nation. Myanmars Information Minister, Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan repeated the charge t hat Aung San Suu Kyi was a danger to the nation and that this was the basis for her continued detention. Speaking to the Press in Naypyidaw in 2007 he said, We w ill take action against whoever harms the nation and the implementation of democ racy. In the message conveyed at the celebration of the countrys 61st anniversary of independence in January 2009 the tone had hardly changed. Senior General Tha n Shwe urged the people to support his governments effort to realize a peaceful, m odern, and developed nation with flourishing discipline. He accused the neo-colon ialists, a reference reserved normally for the US, of interfering in Myanmars inte rnal affairs. A Test at the Security Council As any interventionist measure against Myanmar would connote a challenge against or an usurpation of the countrys national sovereignty, another strategy would ha ve to be found to unravel the political deadlock in the country. In other words, the problem in Myanmar would have to be cast more than just as one involving th e violations of human rights, however serious they were. This presumably was wha t made the United States turn to the United Nations Security Council. For the Security Council to act against Myanmar, it first has to be convinced th at the situation in the country is deemed to be threatening world peace and secu rity. The United States believed the situation to be so. At the Security Counci l meeting in December 2005. Britain, France and several other Council Members co ncurred with the stand taken by Washington. Others in the Security Council, howe ver, disagreed. Despite meeting opposition from some members of the Security Council the US per sisted with her policy. The United States, together with Britain, again brought the Myanmar issue to the Security Council on the 13th of January 2007. The US-UK move was supported by France, Belgium, Italy, Ghana, Peru, Panama and Slovakia. The draft resolution secured a majority backing of the Council Members. Neverth eless, it was thrown out when, not surprisingly, it was vetoed by both China and Russia. South Africa also voted against it while Qatar, Indonesia and the Repub lic of Congo took a neutral stand. The Myanmar regime was elated at the outcome. An official statement on it was br oadcast over radio and television. It labeled the US-UK sponsored draft resoluti

on as a wrong one-sided action that fell through without success. The defeat of th e draft resolution was welcomed as not only a victory for Myanmar and people of i nternational countries, but also a victory for the reality of Myanmar. With the failure of the move to categorize the situation in Myanmar as posing a danger to world peace and security, the issue inevitably would have to be framed as one of domestic nature. Thus those opposing the US-UK sponsored draft resolu tion had always relied on this platform to justify their action. This was exactl y what the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, did. Regarding the position of China on the issue he said: The situation in Myanmar does not impose any threat to peace and security of the region and world at large. China is firmly opposed to the interference with the question of Myanmar by the UN Security Council. To him all that was left for the international community to do was to make some c onstructive efforts to settle the question and support the ongoing steps already taken by the UN and Asean. Myanmar, he added, ought to be encouraged to further c ooperate with the international community. Malaysia adopted a position not dissimilar to the one taken by China. Commenting on the outcome of the Security Council proceedings the Prime Minister, Dato Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was reported to have said, The situation in Myanmar is not a security issue that will have an impact on the region. It is not a matter for the United Nations Security Council but other for ums. With such a stand taken by the Malaysian government and the earlier neutral posi tion adopted by Indonesia when the Myanmar issue was debated at the Security Cou ncil, it is clear that ASEAN members are not willing or ready to abandon their n on-interference position vis--vis the Myanmar issue. Members of ASEAN may not be happy with Myanmars human rights record, but that does not mean that they are abo ut to set aside their adherence to the principle of national sovereignty as they have defined it. When the Myanmar case was brought to the Security Council, it could well be cons idered as a test case. If indeed it was, then the principle of national sovereig nty had won the day. Thus, in this instance, the expectation of some that the en d of the Cold War would see a new rejuvenation of the influence and role of huma n rights had obviously not come to fruition. The Role and the Position of The Army That the flowering or development of human rights did not take place in Myanmar had, in many ways a lot to do with the role and the position of the army in the country. The army, the Tatmadaw, is a long standing institution in Myanmar. It h as been steadily strengthening itself over the years. The generals had been digg ing in their heels throughout the 1990s following their action in cancelling the election result of 1990. The army had expanded its military arsenal, increased its manpower and improved upon its communication and military-intelligence netwo rk. In 2005 it had been estimated that the rank of the army had swelled to 380, 000, a figure that is more than doubled that of 1988. In 2008 the strength of t he army is said to have reached 450,000. The military up-grading exercise could of course be justified as a normal moder nizing programme to ensure sufficient and reasonable protection of the nation fr om any possible outside threat. However, to Bertil Lintner, the military leaders must have also trained their eyes onto their internal opponents. The build up i s to ensure that the military could never again have to face the kind of massive,

popular outburst of anti government sentiment it did in 1988. The Political Hard-line The military build up, one might want to note, ran parallel to the unstinting po litical hard-line policy adopted by the military government all these years. With all these developments in the last two decades there is little hope that th e military regime will change their colours. The momentous September 2007 saffron revolution (of the monks) and the tragic cyclone Nargis in May 2008 did little to change the Myanmar regime. They came down hard on the protesting monks. Despi te the cyclone Nargis wrecking havoc on the country, the military government wen t ahead with the referendum on the countrys new constitution. Nothing would shake their determination it would seem. It was just as well that the Bangkok Post had already observed in February 2008 that The military leaders in Naypyidaw remain defiant in the face of the UNs call for an inclusive national reconciliation process in Burma. With the ratification of the new constitution the military leaders have more or less fortified their position for years to come. Factoring In The Military Establishment There is little doubt that the military establishment in Myanmar is an important feature of the countrys political landscape. Having ruled the country since the coup detat staged by General Ne Win in 1962, it is certainly difficult for the m ilitary leaders to imagine the country being under the stewardship of anyone els e except themselves. Besides monopolising political power, the military leaders also have extensive economic interests in the country. Shares in military run economic corporations are reserved for the military men alone. These activities constitute a significa nt part of Myanmars economy. Virtually all the top posts in government agencies a re held by military personnel. About forty percent of the countrys annual budget is devoted to the military. Thus, as rightly pointed by Andrew Selth, with its pervasive political influence and increased military strength, the Tatmadaw is still the final arbiter of powe r in Burma. Jurgen Haacke has similarly emphasised this obvious fact saying The Tatmadaw (armed forces) is Myanmars premier institution and it has no serious ins titutional competitors. In the circumtances, Robert Taylor believes that there n eeds to be economic and structural changes first in Myanmar to create the opport unities for new and societal forces to emerge. Such forces are needed to strengt hen the democratic movement. Unless that happens, he argues, the pro-democracy mo vement will remain too weak to be a serious challenge to the military regime an d to force it to begin a meaningful dialogue which might lead to political compr omise and the beginning of political change. It is for this reason that it has been argued that any attempt to resolve the cu rrent impasse in Myanmar at the regional and global level the role and importanc e of the army could never be neglected or ignored. To Dato Sallehudin Abdullah, w ho was Malaysias Ambassador in Yangon from 1988 to 1991, the failure to take real cognizance of the central importance of the military establishment has been the root cause of the failures of many of the past attempts to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. He is of course aware of the shortcomings of the military administr ation in Myanmar. However, the moot point that he would also like to raise is th at the powers that be in the West and elsewhere have not been previously known t o shy away from dealing with military regimes. Why, he asked, made an exception of Myanmar? Naturally, after the popular democratic protests of late 1980s and beyond, the m ilitary leaders have become more concerned about their position, and fate, shoul d a civilian government come to power. Aung San Suu Kyi is said to be conscious of the need to overcome this fear of the army. However, it has also been said t hat buoyed by her election victory in 1990 she was at that time anything but sen sitive to the feelings of the military brass. Whatever it is, this factor doe s help one to understand why the military leaders are not too charitable to thei

r opponents and why they have never been too ready to surrender power to others. One observer has simply concluded that they (the military) have won the battle a gainst the democracy movement and therefore see no reason why they should give up by accepting some kind of compromise with the opposition. The National Interest When Ne Win seized power in 1962 his rationale for doing so was to uphold the nat ional interest. He reasoned that the civilian government under U Nu was incapable of protecting the country from the Communist menace and the Union was in danger of splintering up along ethnic divide. Now his erstwhile military comrades who had inherited power from him also see themselves as the defender of the nationa l interest. There is no more communist threat to talk of now. However, the risk t hat the Union might fall apart is still there. Presumably, the NLD opponents of the regime could well be seen by the military personnel as assuming the role tha t was once reserved for the Communists: as enemies of state. Indeed the military establishment has made it its mission to pursue and uphold w hat it terms as The Three Main National Causes: non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, the perpetuation of the countrys sove reignty. These goals, as summed by Jurgen Haacke, constitutes the core of the m ilitarys domestic political-security imperative. From its position of strength an d as a result of its longstanding hold on power the Tatmadaw has developed an eth os not dissimilar to the Praetorian tradition. It had made it its objective to Op pose foreign nations interfering in the affairs of the State and to Crush all inte rnal and external destructive elements as the common enemy. In the language of realpolitik national interest is of course supreme. With its own sense of purpose and having defeated forces that are regarded as enemies of the state, it is unlikely that the Tatmadaw would want to relinquish power easi ly. The survival of the state (as it sees it) and not the introduction of democr acy is the paramount concern. After the disastrous US mission to introduce democracy in Iraq, the preference o f the Tatmadaw inevitably makes more sense to many. This is clearly the position of Tun Dr Mahathir, a leading voice behind the move to bring Myanmar into ASEAN in 1997. This former Prime Minister of Malaysia has a reputation for being a tr enchant critic of the American involvement in Iraq. There is no doubt that he ha d both these issues, that of Iraq and Myanmar, in mind when on one occasion in 2 003 he remarked, There is a nave belief and insistence that the destruction of a country because o f democracy is better than the stability and prosperity resulting from a non-d emocratic system. And so today war and conquests are considered legitimate if it is to force a country to adopt a democratic system of government. This kind of position contrasts markedly with the kind of expectation that wishe s to see the internal problems within Myanmar resolved first as a pre-requisite for national reconciliation. Tin Maung Maung Than, for instance, suggests that t he problems related to the various ethnic and political groups or dissidents in Myanmar must be resolved before meaningful and lasting democracy can be installed in Myanmar. The above kind of aspiration, noble though it is, seems difficult to be realized . Having detailed the strength, the interest of the Tatmadaw and the strategic p olitical moves it has hitherto undertaken to protect itself, one cannot foresee a political landscape without the Tatmadaw in Myanmar; certainly not in the nea r future. Nehginpao Kigpen, writing for The Jakarta Post in early 2009, reminds policy makers and other interested parties alike of this sanguine point. To him, a post 2010 election scenario in which the military would still dominate is a k ind of reality that everyone should be prepared to live with. He has added anoth er pessimistic, or realistic, angle: One other significant implication is that th e results of the 1990 general elections will become bygone history. Conclusion For the democrats and their sympathizers the near future is not likely to be too

promising. The US and EU backed policy of economic sanctions, like that of cons tructive engagement advocated by ASEAN, has had little impact on the military re gime in Myanmar thus far. The regional powers, like China and India or even Japa n, that some say could be persuaded to lean heavily on Myanmar, to encourage or pressure her to initiate some democratic changes, have their own respective vest ed interests to look after. They are not about to overhaul the nature of their r elations with the military leaders. The Security Council option has been tested and found to be wanting. The military leaders of Myanmar had displayed their ste adfastness in not wanting to change. As seen of late, they have withstood not on ly the force of a fresh civil disobedience triggered by the monks in 2007 but al so that of the catastrophic Nargis of 2008. It is therefore not surprising that some analysts and policy makers seem to be resigned to the belief that change will have to be instituted by the Myanmarese people themselves, including the Tatamadaw. To these observers, this seems to be the only possible option. Writing in 1989, at the outset of the crisis that ha d led to the present deadlock in Myanmar, David I. Steinberg stated that, whatev er would eventually happen in Myanmar would be a Burmese decision taken in a Burm ese manner. He added, Foreign observers could only wish the nation well in the int erests of the Burmese people. About a decade later, Josef Silverstein repeated a n identical view. Putting the ball squarely in the Myanmarese court, he said tha t the predicament that the Myanmarese people are in now is not going to be overc ome, says Silverstein, so long as there is no change in the rulers of the country and in the form of government, and so long as they continue to disregard the ri ghts of the people civil, political, economic and cultural Then in 2006 the Mala ysian Foreign Minister, Syed A.Hamid Albar, speaking on behalf of his counterpar ts attending the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Bali conceded that, Our consen sus is that change must come from Myanmar itself. And at the start of the 12th Asean Summit in Cebu in January 2007 Indonesia pointedly told Myanmar: How are go ing to help you if you are not making progress? In the meantime Myanmars neighbors continue to be inundated with the spillover ef fects of the countrys domestic situation and problems. The issues range from the narcotics trade, human trafficking, refugees to HIV/AIDS. The specter of perilou s sea journeys undertaken by people leaving Myanmar for the neighbouring countri es and the alleged mistreatments that they suffered at the hands of law enforcem ent personnel had hit the world headlines again in January 2009. A graphic, if pitiful, representation of this tragic problem came in the form of a picture of two Myanmarese people who, after their 30 foot wooden boat sank, floated for 25 days in a cool-box before they were rescued in the shark-infested waters off Aus tralia. The problem of the Rohingyas is compounded by the fact that the military governm ent of Myanmar has never recognized them as one of the countrys 130-odd ethnic min orities A law excluding the Rohingyas from Myanmar citizenship was passed in 1982 . The Myanmar military government is adamant that these so-called Rohingyas ar e Bangladeshis. This claim has been dismissed as disingenuous and historically no t justified. There are about 800,000 Rohingyas in Myanmar. They are mainly foun d in the Northern Rakhine State (formerly known as Arakan) of Western Myanmar . As a result alleged discrimination against them, the Rohingyas had been leaving Myanmar in large numbers since the early 1990s. In Bangladesh alone there are a bout 200,000 illegal Rohingya migrants whom the Bangladeshi government treat as economic migrants. Malaysia is another popular destination. In Malaysia they, to gether with the Kachins, constitute most of the 150,00 Myanmarese workers curren tly in Malaysia. When the United States brought the Myanmar issue to the Security Council, she ha d referred to problems facing Asean countries that stem from the internal situat ion in Myanmar. The Security Council had debated the issue. It had decided that

the issue does not merit a UN Security Councils deliberation. But it certainly me rits that of Asean. In this instance, the ramifications of Myanmars domestic prob lems had affected the neighbouring countries. This problem of illegal migration from Myanmar, needs to be tackled just as others like human trafficking, crime a nd haze have to be. Besides the tangible aspect of the Myanmar problem there is also the not so tang ible one, but is in no way less important. As a regional body founded on noble p rinciples, Asean cannot ignore humanitarian problems that are well within its ge ographical domain. Inaction on the basis of the plea of ignorance or being encum bered by such policy of non-interference would risk undermining whatever noble p rinciples upon which Asean was formed and established in the first place. Credib ility is something that Asean has to preserve to ensure its effectiveness and re levance. After all at the 12th Asean Summit in Cebu in 2007 the leaders had appe nded their signatures to the joint statement which among others says We agreed on the need to preserve Aseans credibility as an effective regional organization by demonstrating a capacity to manage important issues in the region. Is not Myanm ar one of the important issues?

* Qasim Ahmad is a fellow at the Institute of ASEAN Studies & Global Affairs, Fa culty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies, Universiti Teknologi Malaysi a (UiTM) Shah Alam. Prior to being at UiTM he had also taught at Universiti Sai ns Malaysia in Penang and Universiti Malaysia Sabah Kota Kinabalu. His area of a cademic specialization is modern European history. Amongst his publications are Eropah Moden: Arus Sosiopolitik dan Pemerintahan, Karya Sejarah: Pendekatan dan Persoalan, Britain, Franco Spain and the Cold War, 1945-1950, Australia Y La Esp ana De Franco, 1945-1950 and Malaysia-Spain Relations: The Impact of a Historica l Past.