1 PASSAGES TO PAKISTAN: A TALE OF TWO SPEECHES1 Ms Madhavi Ligam Associate to the Hon.

Justice Pagone Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia madhaviligam@gmail.com

As Pakistan undergoes yet another political rebirth, questions about the nature of its future government loom on the minds of its leaders. While the focus has been on Pakistan's immediate future, this has not deterred people from looking into its past. Created after the partition of India on 15 August 1947, the events of partition and independence continue to rouse the emotions of those who live today. They provide a source of national pride and myth making. In June 2005, when Lal Krishna Advani visited the Pakistani city of Karachi and resurrected this bitter, contentious past, Karachi became the unwitting host of a political debate that divided Indian politics. Born in Karachi in 1927, Advani migrated to India after partition and eventually became the leader of the Bharata Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party which strives to revive and promote Hindu culture within India. In 1992, in pursuance of these goals, Advani became embroiled in the Ayodhya temple crisis. He
1

This paper was presented to the 17 Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Melbourne 1-3 July 2008. It has been peer reviewed via a double blind referee process and appears on the Conference Proceedings Website by the permission of the author who retains copyright. This paper may be downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant legislation.

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2 was said to have supported the destruction of a mosque which was believed to be built on a Hindu holy site. The destruction triggered widespread rioting in Mumbai and resulted in the death of thousands of people, but the BJP and other right-wing Hindu parties stood by him. To them, Advani was a hero. Entangled in this controversial past, and immersed in this culture of Hindu pride, Advani visited his hometown of Karachi in June 2005. On 4 June he made a seemingly innocent speech to the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, Economic Affairs and Law. In this speech, he praised Mohammad Ali Jinnah, now known as the father of Pakistan. As the leader of the All India Muslim League during the 1930s and 1940s, Jinnah fought to create a separate homeland for India's Muslims and became Pakistan's first governor-general in August 1947. In his speech, Advani referred to a speech given by Jinnah on 11 August 1947. He quoted Jinnah's speech and said:
What has been stated in this speech namely, equality of all citizens in the eyes of the State and freedom of faith for all citizens is what we in India call a Secular or a NonTheocratic State. There is no place for bigotry, hatred, intolerance and discrimination in the name of religion in such a State. And there can certainly be no place, much less State protection, for religious extremism and terrorism in such a State.2

Advani also said that these ideas should guide those who now have control over the modern, fragmented sub-continent. A furore erupted across India. People protested on the streets, shouting "Advani desh drohi hai" (Advani is anti-national).3 The Hindustan Times described his speech as "unthinkable".4 Right-wing politicians demanded that Advani apologise or resign as BJP leader. Why? According to the Hindu right, Jinnah is responsible for the partition of India. Jinnah used the communal card to create a Muslim homeland, and it is illogical to think that this homeland was supposed to be secular. Advani eventually bowed to pressure and resigned as the BJP President in December 2005. It is mystifying to think that his one speech in Pakistan which
2

L.K. Advani, Speech At a Function Organised by the Karachi Council on Foreign Relation, Economic Affairs and Law, at http://www.bjp.org/Press/june_0505.htm, accessed 25/07/06. 3 Sangh Parivar Furious over Advanis praise of Jinnah, HindustanTimes.com, 5 June 2005, at http://global.factiva.com.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/aa/default.aspx?, accessed 25/07/06. 4 Advani Says Jinnah was a Secularist, HindustanTimes.com, 4 June 2005, at http://global.factiva.com.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/aa/default.aspx?, accessed 25/07/06.

3 ruined nothing and cost no lives ended his career and made him the outcast of Indian politics. One then has to wonder if Jinnah's speech received a similar response in August 1947. Like Advani, Jinnah was born in Karachi on 25 December 1886, and left the city to pursue a political career. Unlike Advani, Jinnah began his career as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity for he was simultaneously a member of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the All India Muslim League (the League). The former was a forum for upper and middle class people which later became a platform for the Indian independence movement, while the latter was an organisation established to safeguard Muslim interests. Jinnah grew disillusioned with Congress and took up leadership of the League in 1936. At the Lahore Resolution of 1940, Jinnah insisted that Hindus and Muslims belonged to two different civilizations and proposed that India be partitioned to create a separate Muslim homeland called Pakistan. By 1947, the British and Congress caved into the Pakistan demand, and 15 August 1947 was set as the date for the transfer of power and the partition of India into India and Pakistan. In preparation for the transfer of power, Jinnah returned to Karachi, his hometown. Jinnah was to become Pakistan's first governor-general and so he delivered a speech in the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. He spoke about building a strong nation, law and order and on the issue of minorities, Jinnah said:
You are free, you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed; that has nothing to do with the business of the State and you will find that in course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.5

Here was Jinnah the man who for almost a decade had pleaded that Hindus and Muslims belonged to two different states claiming that Hindus and Muslims could in fact live peacefully co-exist. It was this very section of Jinnah's speech that Advani

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 11 August 1947, in M.A. Jinnah, Speeches As Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948, Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1963, p. 8.

4 quoted in his 2005 speech. But, unlike the reaction to Advani's speech, the reaction to Jinnah's speech is barely audible. The major newspapers of the time only recorded that Jinnah delivered the speech and journalists found nothing curious about it.6 Jinnah's contemporaries also paid no attention to the speech. In his numerous prayer meetings, Mahatma Gandhi made no reference to the speech, which is surprising given his concern for minorities.7 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime-Minister and long time leader of the Congress party, also left no opinion of Jinnah's speech.8 Viceroy Louis Mountbatten visited Karachi just two days after Jinnah delivered his speech. In his personal report, he made no mention of the speech.9 The speech cannot even be found in the Transfer of Power documents.10 This is indeed a curious tale. Here we have two men who returned to their home town of Karachi and delivered speeches which were very uncharacteristic of them. The reactions to these speeches were also unexpected. In this paper, I firstly hope to uncover why Jinnah's speech received a nonchalant response in 1947 and why Advani's speech received quite the opposite response in 2005. Secondly, by analysing Jinnah's August 1947 speech, together with his other speeches, can we determine if Jinnah wished to create a secular or theocratic state? Academic discussion of these issues is sparse. Various theories have been advanced as to the meaning of Jinnahs speech. One theory, as advanced by Akbar Ahmed, is that the 11 August speech was simply an assurance to protect the minorities and that ultimately, Jinnah did not want a secular Pakistan.11 The opposing

6 7

See for example, Times of India, 12-30 August 1947 and The Statesman, 12 -30 August 1947. See for example, Mahatma Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vols. 89-90, Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1983. 8 See for example, S. Gopal (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, vols. 3-4, New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1986; G. Parthasarathi (ed.), Letters to Chief Ministers 194764, vol. 1, Oxford: Distributed by Oxford University Press, 1985. 9 Louis Mountbatten, Viceroys Personal Report No 17, 16 August 1947, in Nicholas Mansergh (ed. in chief), Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: the Transfer of Power, 1942-47, vol. 12, London: H.M.S.O, 1973, pp. 757-775. 10 Mansergh, The Transfer of Power, vol. 12.
11

Akbar S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan, Islamic Identity: the Search for Saladin, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 177.

5 theory, as argued by Sailesh Bandopadhaya, is that the speech was a clear articulation of Jinnahs intention to create a secular Pakistan.12 These varying meanings or interpretations, though, are highly politicised. On the Pakistani side are those who dismiss a secular interpretation of the speech because they contend that Pakistan was created as an Islamic state. Even the Pakistani government, at various times, adopted the enlightening policy of deleting sections of the speech. On the Indian side are those who view Jinnah as an undevout Muslim who used the communal card in his quest to attain power, and they are more likely to view the speech in a secular light.13 Given Advani's re-interpretation of Jinnah's speech, there are plenty of reasons to analyse this question from a new angle. Of the few writers who pay some attention to the speech, none have examined the reactions of Jinnah's contemporaries to the speech. This paper should provide a fresh analysis of Jinnah's understandings of secularism and how Jinnah's vision continues to be reinvented to validate current political structures.

Past and present presumptions Today, people view the past through the lens of the present; they presume that Pakistan's current Islamisation is something that was always intended. This presumption is often based on a highly politicized and teleological reading of history. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that in Pakistan, Islamic traditions were enshrined in state practices and institutions. Through his speech, Advani attempted to rewrite this history. He softened Jinnahs character and suggested that Jinnahs original vision should be remembered today. It is therefore understandable why such controversy surrounds Advanis speech: Advani had distorted the Hindu rights firmly held myths and creation stories. And, even more importantly, he supported the tainted political ideology of secularism, an ideology which the BJP has sought to replace with
12

Sailesh Bandopadhaya, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1991, p. 335. 13 Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 13.

6 its Hindutva movement. Interestingly, the Hindu right backed Advani during the 1992 Ayodhya temple crisis because he was clearly pushing the Hindu revivalist agenda, whereas in 2005, he was challenging fundamental historical presumptions held by his followers. But perhaps we have been too presumptuous. We have presumed that Pakistan was always supposed to be an Islamic state to be governed by Islamic law. We have presumed that the demand for a separate Muslim homeland was tantamount to a demand for an Islamic state. But what if Jinnah simply wanted to create a secular, democratic state with a Muslim majority? Perhaps Jinnah's contemporaries were unfazed by his speech because they too envisaged a secular Pakistan. They did not know that Pakistan would slowly succumb to the controlling influence of religion, and the knowledge of the present cannot be ascribed to those who lived in the past. Speaking in the Constituent Assembly Debates on 27 August 1947, Mahabir Tyagi quoted Jinnah's 11 August speech and said:
It is very well known that his [Jinnah's] state is a Muhammadan State and they are proud of its being Muhammadan and they proudly call it "Pakistan"; even in that State he says religion will not be taken notice of by the State. Every individual will be an individual and Hindus will lose their Hinduship as far as their political rights and privileges are concerned.14

Tyagi was unsurprised and unmoved by Jinnahs speech because it confirmed his expectation that Pakistan would be a secular state. He held this belief even though Pakistan was specifically created for Muslims, and ultimately believed that religious preferences would not be taken notice of in the political sphere. It is a common misconception that such notions of secularism were not practiced or espoused in colonial India. Under Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1 November 1858, the crown pledged not to impose Christianity upon its subjects. This proclamation also transformed the East India Companys common practice of religious neutrality into a binding undertaking that no-one would be favoured or discriminated against on religious grounds.15 This tradition of religious neutrality
14

Report on Minority Rights, 27 August 1947, in Constituent Assembly India, Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Report, vol. 5, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966, p. 219. 15 Donald Smith, India As a Secular State, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 72.

7 provided an antecedent to the non-communal aspirations of Congress.16 In 1931, Congress, in a resolution on the rights of minorities, said "the state shall observe neutrality in regard to all religions."17 Prominent members of Congress, though, had differing views on the role that religion should have in the state. Thomas Pantham shows that Gandhi believed that while religion and state should remain separate in some respects, there should not be an absolute, "insurmountable wall of separation," between the two.18 As a socialist, Nehru distrusted superstition and mysticism, and T.N. Madan even labels him an agnostic.19 According to Nehru, religion and state were to remain separate as an amalgamation of the two would be dangerous.20 Gandhi believed all religions to be true, and thus the state had to accommodate all religions.21 Nehru believed most religions to be untrue, but nevertheless wanted to provide for their freedom to function peacefully.22 In this respect, at least, both men's notion of secularism converges. It is important to understand how Gandhi and Nehru delineated secularism because while the historical record does not reveal their interpretations of Jinnah's speech, it does provide an insight into the type of Pakistan they thought Jinnah intended to create. In a speech that Gandhi delivered on 29 August 1947, Gandhi said that in India, religion was to remain purely a private matter and that people would be judged on their merits, rather than their religious background.23 This was Gandhis vision of the future India, and he expected that what was true of the [Indian] Union was equally true of Pakistan.24 In November 1947, Gandhi said, has not the Quaid-i16 17

Ibid, p. 88. Ibid., p. 93. 18 Thomas Pantham, Indian Secularism and Its Critics: Some Reflections, The Review of Politics, 59(1997), pp. 523-540, p. 526. 19 T. N. Madan, Secularism in Its Place, The Journal of Asian Studies, 46(1987), pp. 747-759, p. 239. 20 Jawaharlal Nehru, Dangerous Alliance of Religion and Politics, April 3 1948, in Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches 1946-1949, New York: John Day, 1950, p. 47. 21 Smith, India As, p. 154. 22 Ibid. 23 Mahatma Gandhi, Speech at Prayer Meeting, 29 August 1947, in Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. 89, p. 112. 24 Ibid.

8 Azam [Jinnah] proclaimed that Pakistan is not a theocratic State and religion would not be imposed by law?25 Gandhi made a clear distinction between secularism and theocracy, and stressed that Pakistan would not resemble the latter type of government. This presumption was based on Jinnahs prior assurances. Nehru also conveyed a belief that Pakistan would be a secular state. During a speech made on 19 August 1947, Nehru insisted that India would not be a communal state, but a democracy where everyone would enjoy equal rights.26 He went on to state that I have been assured by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan [prime-minister of Pakistan] that this is also the policy of the Pakistan Government.27 Thus, like Gandhi, Nehru also believed that the Pakistani government would provide equal rights to its people. As shown above, the idea of ensuring equal rights to citizens, regardless of their religious background, was a fundamental element of Nehruvian secularism. His belief that such rights would be ensured to Pakistanis suggests that he envisioned Pakistan to be a secular state. But, in September 1947, Gandhi lamented whether Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan assured equal rights to minorities simply to please world opinion.28 In November, Gandhi believed that Jinnahs assurances were not always put into practice.29 Finally, in December, Gandhi felt deeply betrayed that people had dishonoured their promises that anyone could live in Pakistan.30 He felt that what is said is often not implemented.31 Nehru was far more critical of Jinnahs ability to abide by his promises. In February 1948, Nehru felt that Jinnah was unable to fight the forces of reaction and has been talking more and more of an Islamic State based on the laws of the Shariat.32
25

Mahatma Gandhi, Speech at Prayer Meeting, 4 November 1947,in Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. 89, p. 474. 26 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Unhappy Land of the Five Rivers, 19 August 1947, in Nehru, Independence and After, p. 45. 27 Ibid. 28 Mahatma Gandhi, Speech at Prayer Meeting, 10 September 1947, in Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. 89, p. 168. 29 Mahatma Gandhi, Speech at Prayer Meeting, 4 November 1947, in Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. 90, p. 474. 30 Mahatma Gandhi, Speech at Prayer Meeting, 17 December 1947, in Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. 90, pp. 250-1. 31 Ibid. 32 Jawaharlal Nehru, Letter to Chief Ministers, 20 February 1948, in Parthasarathi, Letters to Chief, vol. 1, pp. 66-7.

Thus, the historical record reveals the fragments of a forgotten trend that did not progress. In August 1947, when Jinnah delivered his speech, Gandhi and Nehru thought that Pakistan would be a secular state, but by 1948, they doubted whether this was achievable. Perhaps that is why they did not respond to Jinnah's speech; the speech was simply a confirmation that Pakistan would be a secular state. This popular trend of the times is often overlooked today. Conservatives in Pakistan and India continue to presume that Pakistan was created as an Islamic state.

Jinnahs grand plan Were Jinnah's contemporaries correct in presuming that Jinnah intended to create a secular state? Exactly what type of state did Jinnah intend to create? Jinnah's 11 August 1947 speech provides a good starting point for answering these questions. In his speech, Jinnah certainly gave no indication of wanting to create an Islamic state or a theocratic state, but conversely, Jinnah did not use the word 'secular' in describing his vision of Pakistan. Despite this, I believe that the contents of the speech conform with contemporary understandings of secularism. Donald Smith identifies three fundamental elements of a secular state: it guarantees freedom of religion; ensures citizenship rights regardless of religious background and maintains a separation between state and religion.33 In his speech, Jinnah guaranteed freedom of worship as he convincingly said Pakistanis are free to go to temples and mosques. By proclaiming that "Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims in the political sense as citizens of the state," Jinnah guaranteed equality of citizenship irrespective of religious background. Lastly, in promising that religious matters would not be the business of the state, Jinnah was doing more than simply ensuring freedom of religion. He was stressing that the state would not interfere with religious matters, and conversely, that religious matters would not intrude upon business of the state.
33

Smith, India As a, pp. 4-6.

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Although I have these instinctive reactions to Jinnah's speech, I feel a little uneasy arguing that Jinnah intended to create a secular Pakistan. I do not wish to superimpose my westernised, twenty-first century definition of secularism into the South Asian post-colonial period. Such a teleological reading of history is inconsistent with the purpose or aim of this paper which is to uncover the type of state that Jinnah intended to create. As difficult as it may be, I wish to examine this at the subjective level, rather than at the objective level. That is, rather than asking does this appear to be a secular speech or an Islamic speech according to today's standards I wish to examine how Jinnah, in 1947, delineated secularism. Two speeches which Jinnah delivered in February 1948 provide an insight into what Jinnah deemed to be a theocracy. In his first speech, Jinnah said that East and West Pakistan were united by their faith in God, and that:
We are members of the brotherhood of Islam in which all are equal in right, dignity and self- respect. Consequently, we have a special and a very deep sense of unity. But make no mistake: Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds.34

In his second speech, Jinnah said:

Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims Hindus, Christians, and Parses but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens.35

Thus, Jinnah imagined a theocratic state as a state where the business of governing was carried out by a particular religious group which was guided by an esoteric will. Jinnah strongly opposed the imposition of such a theocratic state in Pakistan. He feared that if this happened, people would be treated unequally and denied citizenship rights. In spite of the fears that he had of theocracies, Jinnah nevertheless admired the former glory and benevolence of Islamic rule in India as it was "replete with those

34

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan and Her People - I, 19 February 1948, in S. M. Burke (ed.), Jinnah Speeches and Statements 1947-48, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 118. 35 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan and Her People II, February 1948, in Burke, Jinnah Speeches, p. 125.

11 humane and great principles which should be followed and practiced."36 This benevolent period could be recreated in Pakistan through some sort of religious renaissance. Pakistan would be different from India and any other country. According to Jinnah's utopian vision, Pakistan would be "a bulwark of Islam"37 and one of the greatest nations in Muslim history. If people put aside their differences and worked together, then Pakistan would add "another chapter of glory"38 to this history. Jinnah believed that Islamic rule was so successful because Islam "taught democracy, equality, justice and fairplay," and it did not distinguish between races, religions or sexes.39 Both Islam and democracy advocated the equality of mankind and for this reason Jinnah believed that "Islamic principles today are as applicable to life as they were 1,300 years ago."40 Jinnah urged Pakistanis to develop and maintain Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and equality.41 Ultimately, Jinnah wanted to "lay the foundation of [Pakistani] democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles.42 This melding of religion and democracy does not fit into current metanarratives of secularism. Today, such an overt religious rhetoric is not a feature of a secular state. This type of rhetoric is more characteristic of a non-secular state as it voices the sentiments of a majority religious group. Also, when viewed from today's objective lens, there appears to be a very weak separation between state and religion because Jinnah wanted to use Islamic teachings to create his state. In today's mind, there is much apprehension towards drawing on religious ethics to create law or a system of government. It is perceived that this may entrench that particular religion into the political system and thus threaten the rights and privileges of people belonging to minority religious groups.

36

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Inauguration of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 14 August 1947, in Burke, Jinnah Speeches, p. 34. 37 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, The Tasks Ahead, 30 October 1947, in Burke, Jinnah Speeches, p. 71. 38 Ibid. 39 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Islam Teaches Equality, Justice and Fairplay, 25 January 1948, in Burke, Jinnah Speeches, p. 97. 40 Ibid. 41 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Selfless Devotion to Duty, 21 February 1948, in Burke, Jinnah Speeches, p. 121. 42 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, New Era of Progress for Baluchistan, 14 February 1947, in Burke, Jinnah Speeches, p. 111.

12 But, examining the issue from Jinnah's point of view provides quite a different answer. At an institutional level, Jinnah wished to maintain a strict separation between state and religion. Equality, justice and fairplay were the guiding principles that he wished to instil into the Pakistani government. These principles embodied the principles of western style democracy, yet they also embodied the principles of a 1,300 year old religious tradition. And maybe this is how Jinnah envisioned a secular Pakistan: a modern nation-state free from divine rule, but infused with universally applicable Islamic ethics and values. This notion of secularism makes more sense if we contextualise it within twentieth-century Indian history. The devolution of British power within India posed a threat to the minority Muslim population because judicial and political power would be placed in Hindu hands. With Hindus comprising the majority of the Indian population, it was perceived that the government would be overrun by self-interested Hindus, and this in turn could adversely affect Muslim rights and culture. Although the higher echelons of government were dominated by reasoned, rational men such as Gandhi and Nehru, the streets were often ruled by Hindu fundamentalists. In the words of R.J. Moore, through the Pakistan demand "Jinnah articulated not the Koran's promise of political power nor memories of the Mughals but the Muslim's sense of persecution at the sudden threat to all that he had achieved in the twentieth-century."43 Thus, Pakistan was needed to protect Muslim rights and interests. It would be a Muslim homeland modelled on secular, Western style democracies.

Conclusion The hushed reaction which followed Jinnahs speech in 1947 can be contrasted with the shock and anger that was incited by Advani's speech in 2005. Sections of Indian and Pakistani society were outraged by Advanis interpretation of Jinnahs speech because they presumed that Pakistan was created as a Muslim homeland to be governed by Islamic law. But, the silence which met Jinnahs speech in August 1947 speaks volumes. His contemporaries were not surprised or puzzled by
43

R. J. Moore, Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand, in Modern Asian Studies, 17(1983), pp. 529-561, p. 559.

13 the speech because they presumed Jinnah would create a secular Pakistan, and his speech was simply a confirmation of that. Jinnahs contemporaries were not wrong in holding such a presumption. Jinnah certainly did not wish to create a theocratic Pakistan, but his idea of a secular Pakistan may not accord with todays definition of secular. Jinnah wished to create a Muslim homeland based on universally applicable Islamic values which were very similar, if not the same as, some democratic principles. Jinnahs vision of Pakistan has not come to fruition. In 1973, the Pakistani Constitution was amended so that Pakistan was referred to as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Ahmadis (a religious group in Pakistan) were declared non-Muslims, and in 1980, the Federal Shariat Court that was vested with the power to examine any law and bring it into accordance with Shariat law. This religious movement is not a phenomenon which is isolated to Pakistan. Indeed, some would regard the BJPs push to revive Hinduism in India as threatening Indias secular beginnings. Past and present understandings of secularism within India and Pakistan have not remained static. Secularism continues to reshape itself and it continues to be met with varying responses. Fundamentalists in both Pakistan and India repudiate it as a political objective. For both groups, secularism presents a threat to their dreams of building a Hindu or Islamic state; a state where their needs, rights and culture are protected. Sixty years after the partition of India, the past continues to bind both India and Pakistan. The events of the past century will be used to validate and reject this century's political institutions, national identities and national myths. Ultimately then, this is a tale of Pakistan's passage from the secular to the religious.

14 BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources S. M. Burke (ed.), Jinnah Speeches and Statements 1947-48, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Constituent Assembly India, Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Report, vol. 5, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966.
M.K. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vols. 89-90, Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1983.

M.A. Jinnah, Speeches As Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948, Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1963.
N. Mansergh (ed. in chief) Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: the Transfer of Power, 1942-47, vol. 12, London: HMSO, 1973.

J. Nehru, Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches 1946-1949, New York: John Day, 1950. G. Parthasarathi (ed.), Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-64, vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. Secondary Sources A. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan, Islamic Identity: the Search for Saladin, London: Routledge, 1997. S. Bandopadhaya, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1991. T. N. Madan, Secularism in Its Place, The Journal of Asian Studies, 46(1987), pp. 747-759. R. J. Moore, Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand, in Modern Asian Studies, 17(1983), pp. 529-561. T. Pantham, Indian Secularism and Its Critics: Some Reflections, The Review of Politics, 59(1997), pp. 523-540. D. Smith, India As a Secular State, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963. T.Y. Tan and G. Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, London: Routledge, 2000.