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Boys Will Be Boys: 'Radical Semantics' vs. 'Radical Pragmatics' Author(s): Anna Wierzbicka Source: Language, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 95-114 Published by: Linguistic Society of America Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/415385 Accessed: 24/08/2010 16:45
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BOYS WILL BE BOYS: 'RADICAL SEMANTICS' VS. 'RADICAL PRAGMATICS' ANNA WIERZBICKA Australian National University
Colloquial 'tautologies' such as War is war or A promise is a promise have often been adduced in support of a 'Gricean' account of language use. The present article shows, however, that 'tautological constructions' are partly conventional and language-specific, and that each such construction has a specific meaning which cannot be fully predicted in terms of any universal pragmatic maxims. It is argued that the attitudinal meanings conveyed by various tautological constructions and by similar linguistic devices should be stated in rigorous and yet self-explanatory semantic formulae. 'Radical pragmatics' is rejected as a blind alley, and an integrated approach to language structure and language use is proposed, based on a coherent semantic theory which is capable of representing 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects of meaning in a unified framework.

What is the meaningof English sentences like Boys will be boys, Boys are
boys, Kids are kids, or Business is business? One popular answer is that such

sentences (roughly, X is X) are patent tautologies, and so necessarily true. Theirmeaning-which is identifiedwith their 'logicalform'-can be informally stated as follows: 'For every entity of which it is true to say that it is a boy, it is true to say thatit is a boy.' Thatis, it is assumedthatthe syntactic structure N is N is exactly equivalentto the logical formulap = p. In fact, of course, sentences of this kind convey more. As Levinson (1983:125)puts it, the implicationis: 'That'sthe kind of unrulybehaviouryou would expect from boys.' But-so the account goes-this implicationis a conversational implicature, calculablefrom Grice's maximof quantity(1975:45): roughly, 'Makeyour contributionno more, and no less, informativethan required.' I want to argueagainstthis account, andagainstthe whole vision of linguistics which goes with it. The question of how to interpretsentences such as Boys I will be boys may seem minor and unimportant.1 think, however, that the consequences of one's stand on this point are far-reaching;they determine one's entire idea of linguistics, its boundaries, its capacities, and its responsibilities.
GRICEAN MAXIMS: UNIVERSAL OR LANGUAGE-SPECIFIC?

1. My first objection to the Gricean account of 'tautologies,' so-called,2 is that it suggests that the import and use of such constructions should be cal1 In choosing the expression Boys will be boys for my title, I do not wish to imply that this is a paradigm example. It is a frozen expression, whereas the paper is concerned above all with the productive pattern NPi be NPi. Still, the 'proverb' has been frequently discussed in connection with linguistic 'tautologies' and Gricean maxims; it has a greater evocative and mnemonic value than, say, A promise is a promise or A man is a man. 2'A tautology is a symbolic sentence whose truth value is T with respect to every possible assignment. For instance, P-* P is a tautology' (Kalish & Montague 1964:74). In linguistic literature, it is mainly (though not exclusively) sentences of the form X is X which are referred to as 'tautologies'. 95

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culable from some universal, language-independent principles. In fact, however, it is not. For one thing, some English 'tautologicalconstructions' have no literal counterpartswhich can be used or interpretedin many other languages. Again, some Eng. tautologicalconstructionsdo have literal counterparts in other languages, but are used in the latter with a different communicative import. This suggests that, in each case, the communicative importis conventionallyencoded in a given construction,and is not calculable from any language-independent pragmaticmaxims. In saying this, I am not arguingagainst the validity, or the significance, of language-independent pragmaticmaxims, such as those posited by Grice. I am the use to which such maxims have been put in much arguing only against current literatureon linguistic pragmatics,and in particularagainst attempts to explain the use of Eng. 'tautologicalconstructions'exclusively in terms of universal pragmaticprinciples, as 'radical pragmaticists'try to do (cf., e.g., Cole 1981).Instead, I am advocatingwhat mightbe called a 'radicallysemantic' approach to the task: the constructions in question have a language-specific meaning, and this meaning must be spelled out in appropriate semantic representations. For example, sentences of the kind adducedin the title of this articleare not used in French, German, or Russian. In French, sentences like Les garfons
sont les (des?) garfons '(The) boys are (the) boys', or Les garfons seront les

(des) garfons 'The boys will be (the) boys', would be simplyincomprehensible. Conceivably, one could be understoodif one said Les garfons seront toujours les (des) garfons 'Boys will always be boys' (cf. Bally 1952:17);but even this would be puzzling. Similarly,in Germanone would not say Knabensind Knaben 'Boys are boys', or Knaben werden Knaben sein 'Boys will be boys.' If

foreigners did use such sentences, wishing to convey the messages of their literal Eng. counterparts,they might not be understood. The 'implicature'of the tautologicalconstructionsin question would not be worked out. The sentence Knaben bleiben (immer) Knaben 'Boys remain (always) boys' is more

but readily interpretable; here it is doubtfulif its literal Eng. equivalentwould be similarlyinterpreted. Russian has three copula constructions-one with eto, one with est', and one with zero-but none of these would be used to translatethe relevant Eng. sentences:
??Mal'ciki etolest' mal'ciki.

'Boys are boys.*

??Mal'ciki mal'ciki.

'Boys (are) boys.'

??Mal'ciki budut mal'ciki (mal'cikami).

'Boys will be boys.'

??Deti etolest' deti.

'Kids are kids.' To translatethe Eng. sentences, one must use a particle:

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(Cego ty xoces'?) Oni ie mal'ciki. (what you want?) they PRTboys

('What do you expect?) They are boys.'

Oni ze deti. (Cego ty xotel?) (what you wanted?) they PRT children

('What do you want?) They are children.' It should be pointed out, however, that the Russ. particle ie is not used specificallyfor the purposeexpressedby Eng. sentences like Kids are kids. Rather, it appears in a variety of constructions-to indicate, roughly, that something should be obvious to the addressee. It is thus similarto the Ger. particledoch (cf. Rath 1975, Sekiguchi 1977), though the two are by no means fully equivalent. However, 'tautologicalconstructions'with action nouns do exist in Russian. Thus one doesn't say Vojna est' vojna 'Waris war'; but one can say, as Bulat
Okudzava does in a popular song, Rabota est' rabota, rabota est' vsegda 'Work

in is work, there is always work.' Furthermore, French one can hardlysay La guerre est la guerre 'War is war'; to express a similar idea, one would say C'est la guerre 'That's war', just as one says C'est la vie 'That's life.' To widen the sphere of comparison, in Polish one cannot say *Chlopcy to
bedq chlopcy 'Boys will be boys', or ??Chlopcy to (sq) chlopcy 'Boys are boys';

however, one can say (Jednak) co Paryz to Paryz '(However) what (is) Paris this (is) Paris', or (Jednak) co Europato Europa '(However) what (is) Europe this (is) Europe.' I invite the 'radicalpragmaticists'to work out the communicative importof this construction.For those readers who acknowledge that they cannot work it out for themselves, here is an approximateanswer. The co X to X construction ('What is X is X') implies that there is something uniquelygood about X, and that the speakerfeels he must admitit. (No matter what one does to find virtue in other comparablethings, one must admit that X is uniquely good.) The constructionis used with respect to referentswhich are well known, and which are widely regardedas uniquely good. Given traditional Polish attitudes, Paris qualifies par excellence; but any other wellrecognitionof its widelyknown symbolcould also be so mentioned,in grudging acclaimed superiority.Hence, for example, the following contrasts:
(Jednak) ??(Jednak) (Jednak) ??(Jednak) co co co co Wa1esa to Wa1esa! Barbara to Barbara. rodzina to rodzina. (rodzina 'family') kuzyni to kuzyni. (kuzyni 'distant cousins')

The Pol. constructionco X to X can be seen as related, in certain respects, to the Eng. pattern illustratedby the sentence used recently as an opening statement in a television interview by a Ku Klux Klan leader: Whiteis white. In such sentences, the speaker stresses the unique qualityof somethingwhich must be accepted because it cannot be expected to change. But qualities like 'whiteness' are seen as belongingto certain contrastive sets; so, by stressing their uniqueness, the speakeremphasizes the irreducibledifferenceamongthe

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membersof the set. The uniquenessis not interpretedhere as superiority,but contrast,which must be accepted as such. merely as a reasonfor an irreducible encoded in this constructionis highlightedin the familiarpassage The attitude from Kipling's 'Ballad of East and West':
East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.

In the filmA passage to India, based on E. M. Forster'snovel, Kipling'ssaying is used in a reduced version, as East is East; this version seems parallel to White is white (with the second member of the contrastive set being only implied.) In the Pol. construction,no finite sets of comparableelements are implied, and so the notion of uniqueness is not tantamountto one of irreducibledifference; instead, it is tantamountto a notion of irreduciblesuperiority(with respect to any conceivable competitors). It is interestingto note that a differentbut somewhat related 'tautology of admiration'exists in Korean;one can say Apoci-ja apoci ida 'Fatheris father' (where -ja means, roughly, 'certainly'),or Colsu-ja Colsu ida 'Colsu [name of a person] is Colsu', to express one's admirationfor the person referred to. However, Koreanalso has a tautologicalconstructionwhich is used to express disapproval. For example, seeing a person crying without any good reason, one mightsay to him, with a scornfullaugh,No-to no ida 'You are you' (where -to means, roughly, 'also'). In English (or in Polish), in these circumstances, one would have to say somethingquite different;e.g., It's just likeyou (that's you all over)-crying for no reason at all. (I owe the information on Korean to an unpublishedpaper by Gi-hyunShin.) As a final example, consider the following Japanese sentences, which come from an unpublishedpaper by Itsuo Harasawa:
Makeru toki wa makeru yo.

'When (I) lose (a game), (I) lose (a game).'

Kare datte, kekkonsuru toki wa kekkonsuru yo.

'Even he, when (he) marries,(he) marries.' Can native speakersof Englishwork out the 'implicatures'of such sentences? Several speakers of English whom I have asked have offered the following: 'When he loses the game, he loses it badly'; 'When he gets married,he will get marriedin a spectacularway.' Clearly, these guesses are based on the interpretationof Eng. tautologies such as the following:
'Four cakes! Gee!' said Jem. 'When we give a party, we GIVE a party', said Susan grandly.

(Montgomery1980:73) But in fact these guesses turnout to be incorrect.Accordingto Harasawa,the Japaneseconstructionreallymeansthat somethingregardedas quiteimpossible is actually possible. It would seem, that this meaningis language-specific,and cannot be calculated solely on the bases of any Gricean maxims (or 'postGricean' ones, cf. Atlas 1984). Again, I do not wish to deny that the various 'tautologicalconstructions'

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used in differentlanguageshave somethingin common, and that they may be principles such as partly explained in terms of some language-independent Grice's maxim of quantity. I would insist, however, that their use cannot be fully accounted for in such terms. Of course, most facts of grammarcan be PARTLY principles-functional, perexplainedin termsof language-independent ceptual, logical etc. If linguistic descriptions of particularlanguages were to be purged of everything that could be so dealt with, then little would be left for the linguist to write about. When a philosopherwrites about constructionsof his native languageas if their use were fully determinedby the general laws of human reason, or by 'normal'rules of conversationalcooperation,he can perhapsbe excused: it is not the job of a philosopherto compare differentlanguages,or to be aware of both the differences and the similaritiesbetween them. But when reputable linguists eagerly and enthusiasticallyadopt the philosopher'sillusions, the situation begins to look like a historicalaberration.One can understandGivon's exasperationon this score, expressed in the followingoutburst(whetheror not one agrees with his proposed solution):
'Nobody would deny the stimulatingeffect that a first readingof Grice's "Logic and conversation" (1968)may produce. But to base an entire boomlet, indeed a fad, on this rather limited constructionof the pragmatic agendain terms of Grice's "maxims", from which all else is presumably derivedas deus ex machina,is the climaxof in-groupfolly.' (1983:154; cf. also Boguslawski1981)
AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT

2. Accordingto Levinson (124), amongothers, a sentence like Boys are boys is NECESSARILY I dispute the validity of this statement, which reflects a true. mistaken belief that the sentence under discussion is factual. It is clearly not: it expresses a certainattitude,andattitudescan hardlybe called 'true'or 'false'. Roughly speaking, it is a call for tolerance, an injunction;and it is no more 'true' than the Ten Commandments,or than maxims like Time is money or
The early bird gets the worm. Since the attitude in question cannot be
FULLY

worked out on the basis of any language-independent principles, it must be regardedas the language-specific meaningof the sentence in question. It is the responsibilityof the linguist to identify this construction,and to spell out the meaning encoded in it. To the best of my knowledge, neither task has been undertakenby any of the numerouslinguists who have written about tautological sentences in a Griceanvein. A foreigner trying to learn English will have to be taught some rules for correctly using varioustautologicalconstructions.It would be perfidiousin the extreme merely to draw his attentionto the Griceanmaxims, and then to leave it to him to work out for himself the permissible range of use of these constructions. An interpretiveformula like that quoted above-by which Boys are boys implicatessomethinglike 'That'sthe kindof unrulybehavioryou would expect from boys'-says both too much and too little. On the one hand, the epithet unruly is over-specific and arbitrary.On the other hand, the formula is not

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specific enough, in not spellingout the speaker'stolerantandindulgentattitude. Consequently it doesn't predict that the following sentences are odd (the behavior in question being too 'bad' to be treated indulgently):
?Sadists are sadists. ?Rapists are rapists. ?Nazis are Nazis.

The tolerant and indulgentattitude is even more transparentin the pattern with the modal will:
Boys will be boys. Students will be students. *Wars will be wars. *Business will be business.

The pattern with will implies that the natureof the humanbeings in question cannot be repressed;one shouldn'ttry to change boys (etc.) because it won't work, anyway: whatever one may do, boys will still behave like boys, so the wisest course is just to let them be. Levinson's formula is not nearly as unsatisfactoryas many other similar formulaeoffered as statementsof various 'conversationalimplicatures',but it still illustratesthe detrimentaleffect of the 'radicalpragmatics'doctrineupon the analysis: when linguists assume that the communicativeimport of a construction is a matter of implicature,ratherthan meaning, they then seem not to care about how, exactly, this import is to be stated. In a sense, a radical pragmatistcan't afford the luxury of stating the differences in the communicative import between differenttautologicalconstructions, either across language boundaries or within a single language. By assuming an absence of meaning (other than that equivalent to 'logical form'), he is also forced to assume an absence of polysemy; thus he must either posit a single formula which may be too broad to predict the exact range of use, or else must be rather vague about the details of the alleged implicature.If a methodology requiresus to devise a semanticformula(or a few formulae)for each construction, it forces us to be explicit and precise. As a result, differences as well as similaritiescome to light which are otherwise missed-or which are vaguely attributed to differences in 'context', with no precise generalizationsbeing offered or sought. An illustrationof this last failing is providedbelow.
CONTEXT AS AN EXCUSE FOR ANALYTICAL FAILURE

3. It will be useful to take, as our starting point, a longish passage from Levinson (110-11):
'The uttering of simple and obvious tautologies should, in principle, have absolutely no communicative import. However, utterances of (38)-(40) and the like can in fact convey a great deal: (38) War is war. (39) Either John will come or he won't. (40) If he does it, he does it. Note that these, by virtue of their logical forms (respectively: Vx (W(x) -> W(x)); p V ~ p; p -* p) are necessarily true; ergo they share the same truth conditions, and the differences

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we feel to lie between them, as well as their communicative import, must be almost entirely due to their pragmatic implications. An account of how they come to have communicative significance, and different communicative significances, can be given in terms of the flouting of the maxim of quantity. Since this requires that speakers be informative, the asserting of tautologies blatantly violates it. Therefore, if the assumption that the speaker is actually cooperating is to be preserved, some informative inference must be made. Thus in the case of (38) it might be "Terrible things always happen in war, that's its nature and it's no good lamenting that particular disaster"; in the case of (39) it might be "Calm down, there's no point in worrying about whether he's going to come because there's nothing we can do about it"; and in the case of (40) it might be "It's no concern of ours." Clearly these share a dismissive or topic-closing quality, but the details of what is implicated will depend upon the particular context of utterance. (Incidentally, exactly how the appropriate implicatures in these cases are to be predicted remains quite unclear, although the maxim of relevance would presumably play a crucial role.)'

To Levinson's credit, he does point out that 'exactly how the appropriate implicaturesin these cases are to be predictedremainsquite unclear.' He still pins his hopes, however, on the context of the utterance. I believe that such hopes are bound to be disappointed.Utterances like War is war or Boys will be boys are remarkably in context-independent theirforce, as Levinson himself tacitly recognizes by trying to spell out their 'implicatures'without asking the reader to imagine any particularcontext. Grice too (52) discusses the 'conversational implicatures' of such sentences without invoking any particular context. In fact, various dictionariesof 'sayings', proverbs, and idiomatic phraseshave often listed such expressions, and have also explainedtheir meanings, as best they could, without appealing to any particularcontexts (cf. Bartlett 1980, Cowie 1984, Stevenson 1949). The lexical meaningof the word war may indeed influencethe 'implicature' of the saying War is war; but this doesn't mean that the constructionitself is similarin meaningto Boys are (will be) boys. Both constructionssignala 'philosophical' attitude, a kind of acceptance of bad things which cannot be prevented from happening;but the plural-human constructionalso signals an indulgent attitude, while the singular-abstract does not. one The element will, which can show up in the sentence as an alternantof are, is not accidentaleither:it reflects both a referenceto the future(you can predict how boys will behave from their nature) and to a characteristichuman 'obstinacy' or a tendency to persist in behaving in certain ways, no matter how undesirablefrom other people's point of view. This will is relatedto the future; but it is also related (synchronically)to the noun will and to the modal used in sentences referringto habitual'undesirable'(as if 'stubborn')behavior. It is worth recallingin this connectionJespersen's (1931)remarkson the use of will, as well as his examples illustratingthe semantic links between human will, humannature, habitualbehavior,and a tendency to stubbornpersistence in what might seem foolish:
'another connected transition is a consequence of the fact that what one does willingly, one is apt to do frequently. Hence will ... comes to be the expression of a habit, especially a habit which is a consequence of one's character or natural disposition ... In the present tense, it does not seem usual in the first person ..., in the second it is often emotionally colored: "You will smoke all day long-and then complain of a sore throat!"' (p. 240). 'If will is emphasized,

102

LANGUAGE,VOLUME63, NUMBER 1 (1987) obstinacy may be meant:(Gammer102)fooles will be fooles styll! boys will be boys ...' (p. 241).

Once 'human'tautologies, such as Boys are boys, are distinguishedfrom abstract ones like Waris war, the appearanceof will in some 'tautological'sentences, but not others, begins to make sense.
Turning now to sentences like Either John will come or he won't, I would

('Calmdown, there is no point agree with the gist of Levinson's interpretation in worryingabout whetherhe's going to come because there is nothingwe can do about it.') But if it is stated in these words, one can't see how this particular 'implicature'is related to the 'implicatures'of the other tautologicalconstructions considered. If one says that all the different tautological constructions express a certain philosophicalacceptance of undesirableevents, one will be more or less right-but only moreor less. For example,the nuanceof tolerance/
indulgence conveyed by Boys are boys and Boys will be boys is lost. (No such

nuance is conveyed in 'fatalistic sentences' like Either John will come or he

won't).

One might try to defend the claim that the differences between the various 'tautological'constructionscan be predictedfrom the context in the following way. If the sentence refersto futureevents, the implicationis thatfutureevents are unknownand must remainunknown(for the present), so there is no point in speculatingaboutthem. If the sentence refers to past events, the implication is that what has alreadyhappenedcan't be changed, so it is not worth dwelling on. If the reference is not to any past event, but specifically to a past action and by the speakerhimself, the implicationmay be that of determination refusal to change one's position, as in Pilate's famous utterance:WhatI have written I have written.If the sentence has a genericmeaning,and predicatessomething about a 'species', then the implicationwill be that the natureof an individual is determinedin some respects by the natureof the species, and so cannot be changed-and moreover that it should be excused, to the extent that 'bad' behavior of an individualis determinedby the natureof the species. Indeed, the Spanishsentence Que sera, sera conveys not only a philosophical acceptance of what cannot be changed, but also a dismissal of useless speculationsabout the future.The Pol. saying Co bylo to bylo 'Whatwas (has been), this was (has been)' implies that past events cannot be changed, so there is no point in dwelling on them. In fact, this saying has a more explicit version,
which has the status of a proverb: Co bylo a nie jest nie pisze sie w rejestr

'What has been but is not shouldn'tbe put on record.' Nevertheless, and despite appearances, the exact meaning of sentences which express a fatalistic attitude to future events-such as Sp. Que sera, sera-can also varyfromlanguageto language.For example, the best rendering of the Sp. sentence into Polish would be Co ma byc to bedzie 'Whatis to be, that will be', and not Co bedzie to bedzie 'What will be will be.' The latter sentence is used in Polish to express one's determination act, regardlessof to possible negative consequences;thus it can be used by a soldierbefore a battle or by a student before an exam. Characteristically, is often followed by the it

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proverb Raz kozie smierc 'A goat has to die once', or by the saying Co ma wisiec nie utonie 'What is meant to hang will not drown'-which express a similar sentimentof reckless determination.The Sp. sentence can be used by an idle person who doesn't want to worry about the future, but its literal Pol. equivalent would not be so used. Facts of this kind show, it seems to me, that the use of 'tautologicalconstructions' and 'tautologicalsayings' in different languages is partly conventional and language-specific-even though it can also be explained, to a large 'Gricean'principles. extent, by language-independent
A PROPOSED SEMANTIC METALANGUAGE

4. Given that tautologicalconstructions of different languages are at least partly language-specific, and encode language-specific meanings, how can these meaningsbe stated and compared?I submitfor this purpose a technical, semantic metalanguagederived from naturallanguage, language-independent, which I have developed over two decades and which has alreadybeen applied to lexicon, morphological categories, syntacticconstructions,and illocutionary devices (Wierzbicka1972, 1979, 1980a,b, 1982, 1985a,b,c, 1986a,b,c,d).In essence, the proposed method of analysis consists in paraphrasingthe word, expression, or constructionunder considerationin a metalanguagebased on intuitivelyintelligiblenaturallanguage,andcouchedin simpleterms;this makes possible a precise comparisonof both the similaritiesand the differences between differentconcepts. The explications I propose are formulatedin a kind of simplified English. and They can, however, representlanguage-independent culture-independent and culturerealities, because not all Eng. words are equally language-specific specific. Generallyspeaking,the simplera concept is-i.e., the closer it is to the level of semanticprimitives-the less culture-dependent will be, and the it wider the range of languages in which it has been lexicalized. For example, complex concepts like 'bet', 'interrogate',or 'forecast' are highly culture-dependent; and the range of languages in which they have been lexicalized is relatively narrow.But simpleconcepts like 'say', 'want', 'good', and 'bad' are relatively culture-free(not, of course, in the sense that, e.g., the standardsof what is 'good' or 'bad' are the same everywhere, but in that most if not all cultures seem to rely on concepts of 'good' and 'bad'). Consequently,the range of languageswhich have separatewords for such concepts is very wide indeed. If we can assume that such concepts are lexical universals, i.e. that they have been lexicalized in all naturallanguages, then the answer to our methodological dilemma-how can a reduced version of a PARTICULAR languagebe regardedas a LANGUAGE-INDEPENDENT semanticmetalanguage?-is simple:we can represent language-independent meanings by using Eng. words such as say, want, good, and bad, because these words stand for concepts which are not culture-specific.That is, if the Eng. lexicon includes a subset which has isomorphic subsets in the lexicons of all other humanlanguages, then we can use this subset as a language-independent semanticmetalanguage,suitablefor cross-culturalcomparisonsof any semantic domain.

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In a number of publications (cf. Wierzbicka 1972, 1980a,b)I have argued that 'say' and 'want' are indeed universal human concepts, and that they do provide valid examples of lexical universals. However, even if one wanted to remainskepticalor agnostic on particular points, I thinkthis is simplythe best one can do: if we can't rely on demonstratedlexical universals, then the next best solution is to rely on hypotheticaluniversalsand near-universals. Before illustrating proposedmethodof analysiswith specific explications my of 'tautological'constructions,let me stress that paraphrases couched in terms of simple, naive-soundingwords-like something, want, or happen-are not meant to be easy to read, or idiomatic,or stylistically smooth. But I maintain that they are in principleintelligible,and intuitivelyverifiable.Not everything can or should be defined; but as Leibniz pointed out, it is crucial that the ultimate units of analysis, which are not defined, should be intelligibleper se (Couturat1903:430).Concepts like somethingor want cannot and need not be defined; and concepts like happen, do, or because, though definable, are relatively simple and intuitivelyclear.
SEMANTIC REPRESENTATIONS

5. My main claim concerningEng. nominaltautologies is this: English has not one, but many, productivetautologicalpatternsconformingto the formula (ART) N1 be (ART) N1. If we want to state the meaningof these patterns accurately, we must recognize this pluralityof types, and state the meaningof each one separately.In some cases, formalclues enable us to separatethe different types. In other cases, the form of two different tautological patterns is the same, yet they cannot be collapsed under a simple semantic representation because their meaningsdifferin ways which cannot be accounted for in terms of context, lexical differencesetc. For this reason, some tautologicalsentences are ambiguous.Thus A motheris a mothercan mean either that a mothercan always be expected to act in a motherlyway (even if she seems differentfrom other mothers),or else thatone has obligationstowardone's mother. Similarly, A steak is a steak can mean either that there isn't much difference in value between one steak and another (one is neither much better nor much worse than another), or else that all steaks are undeniablyand reliablythings of high value. From a formalpoint of view, the followingtautologicalconstructions(among others) can be distinguishedin English: War is war; *Wars are wars, *Wars will be Nabstris Nabstr.
Npi are Npi. Npi will be Npi. An N is an N. The N is the N. N1 is N1 (and N2 is N2). wars. Kids are kids; *The kids are the kids. Boys will be boys; *A boy will be a boy. A party is a party; *The party is the party. The law is the law; *The war is the war. East is East, and West is West.

From a semanticpoint of view, however, the list of Eng. nominaltautological patterns(which I will call sub-constructions) would present a differentpicture.

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Limitations of space make it impossible for a comprehensive survey to be offered here, but three examples will be adduced below. I should add here that, althoughit seems appropriateand fruitfulto speak of Eng. tautologicalsentences in termsof a set of sub-constructions,we should also note that some such sentences have the statusof moreor less set phrasese.g. Fair is fair; Enough is enough; A deal is a deal; Business is business.

However, it is importantto recognize that they are not idioms, but rather particularly frequenttokens of productivetautologicalpatterns. Even the sentence Boys will be boys, which must be regardedas the focal memberof the class to which it belongs, is not really idiomatic, since its meaningis strictly parallelto that of other sentences based on the same pattern,e.g. Studentswill
be students or Teenagers will be teenagers. Even if such sentences constitute

variationson the theme of Boys will be boys, one cannot indulgein such variation with true idioms, e.g. He kicked the bucket.
5.1. A
'SOBER' ATTITUDE TOWARD COMPLEX HUMAN ACTIVITIES

is expressed

by the following syntactic formula: Nabstr is Nabstr. Examples:

War is war. Politics is politics. Business is business.
*Wind is wind. *Sneezing is sneezing. *Wars are wars.

The sub-constructionin question seems to be restricted to complex human activities, and apparentlyto those which involve human interaction. This is perhapslinked to the complex characterof the activity-which can be seen as a special 'way of life', or as a worldapart-and to 'inevitable'negativeaspects of this activity, which must be understoodand tolerated. From a formalpoint of view, this sub-constructionis markedby an absence of articles (as well as by the singularnumber). One can say A war is a war; but the meaningis differentfrom that of Waris war (see below, ?5.3). The meaningencoded in the present sub-construction be representedin can the formof four interrelated components.First, there is referenceto a supposed truismthat complex activities of the specifiedkindmust have some undesirable consequences. Second, the natureof these consequences is presented as wellknown, so that it would be superfluousfor the speaker to spell it out. Third, there is a call for acceptance of those undesirableconsequences (since they are inevitable, there is no point in getting oneself into a negative emotional state every time one observes them). Fourth, the impossibility of change is stressed (the 'nature'of the activity is such that it necessarily entails the undesirable consequences in question). Formally, all this can be representedas follows: A. Everyone knows that, when people do things of this kind (X), they have to cause some bad things to happento other people. B. I assume that I don't have to say what things. C. Whenone perceives that such bad thingshappen,one shouldnot cause oneself to feel somethingbad because of that. D. One shouldunderstand that it cannotbe different[cannotbe changed?]

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is NATURE expressed by the following syntactic FOR 5.2. TOLERANCE HUMAN

formula:
Nhum.pl

are

Nhum.pl

Examples:
Boys are boys. Kids are kids. Women are women.

'Childrenare children.They are there to be put up with.' (Pascal 1984:20) The meaningof this sub-construction of course very similarto the preceding is one, and one might well be tempted to assign it the same semantic representation. But a semanticformulaobliges one to be explicit, and this need forces one to pay attention to details and to subtleties. When one does so, certain clear differences seem to emerge. First, the component 'bad' seems applicableto the 'human activity' type, but not to the 'humannature' type. Wars are said to be 'horrible';politics is a 'dirty business'; the world of business is 'ruthless'. But when one says that Kids are kids, one doesn't wish to imply anythingtruly 'bad' about children: they may be noisy, boisterous, unruly, tiresome, but not 'bad'. Accordingly, I would differentiatethe relevant componentsof the semanticrepresentations as follows: A'. Everyone knows that, when people do things of this kind (war, business, politics etc.), they have to cause some bad things to happen to other people. A". Everyone knows that people of this kind (boys, kids, women etc.) do some things that one would want people not to do. ComponentsB and C-the predictabilityof the negative aspects, and the call for their acceptance-seem to be the same in both cases: B. I assume that I don't have to say what things.
C. When one perceives that such bad things ..., one should not cause

oneself to feel somethingbad because of that. ComponentD spells out the 'immutability'of the phenomenon;but the basis of this 'immutability'differs between the two cases. In the case of human activity, it is a matterof (so to speak) grim necessity. In the 'humannature' type (Kids are kids), it is rather a matter of an inability to reach 'normal' standardsof behavior. The contrast can be representedas follows: D'. One should understandthat people can't do things of this kind in a differentway. D". One shouldunderstand thatpeople of this kind can't cause themselves to do things in the way that other people know they should. Thus the over-all semantic representationof the 'human nature' tautologies with are can be as follows: A. Everyone knows that people of this kind do some things that one would want people not to do. B. I assume that I don't have to say what things. C. When one perceives that people of this kind do things of this kind, one shouldnot cause oneself to feel somethingbad because of that.

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that D. One shouldunderstand people of this kindcan't cause themselves to do things in the way that other people know they should. [E. This cannot be changed.]
In 'human nature' sentences with will (such as Boys will be boys), the im-

mutabilityof the phenomenonis caused by the wilful and uncontrollablespontaneity of the specified kind of humanbeings. For this type, componentD can be formulatedas follows: that D"'. One shouldunderstand people of this kindcan't cause themselves not to do such things when they want to do them.
OF are 5.3. TAUTOLOGIES OBLIGATION expressed by the syntactic formula: (ART) N is (ART) N.

One use of tautologicalconstructions,particularly widespreadin differentlanguages, is concernedwith obligations-and, more broadly,with rules of human behavior. Generally speaking, if a noun embodies a modal meaning such as 'One should do X', then the pattern (ART) N is (ART) N implies that the obligations in question must be fulfilled,even if one prefersnot to do so. Thus one can say The law is the law, as the Australianjudge Mr. Justice Kirby said recently on the radio program'PM'. Such sentences are extremely common in English. To quote a few characteristic examples which I have recently heard or read:
A rule is a rule. A bet is a bet. A promise is a promise. (Doyle 1981:417, 513) A deal is a deal. A test is a test. An agreement is an agreement. (Doyle, 141)

Usually, this type can be recognized by the presence of a noun referringto such as bet, promise, deal, law etc. But one can also contractualundertakings use human relationalterms such as father to refer to generally accepted obligations. Thus one can say A father is a father, meaningthat one has certain obligationstowardone's fatherwhich shouldbe fulfilled(withoutimplyingthat this father may seem to be differentfrom other fathers). As mentionedearlier, somebody mighteven want to say A war is a war, meaningthat one must carry out one's duty with respect to a war. The two tautologicalexpressions A war is a war and War is war differ in their 'implicatures', and are not interchangeable. However, when the meaning of a noun clearly implies an obligation, then mass nouns without an article can be used in the sense under discussion; e.g. Duty is duty. Such sentences don't imply that promises, bets, the law, or duty 'cause bad things to happen', like wars or politics; rather, they imply that certain rules of human behavior require compliance, regardless of their unpleasant consequences. It is also interestingto note that tautologies of obligation normallyrequire a singularform of the noun. One can hardlysay ?Bets are bets (vs. A bet is a

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bet), or ?Deals are deals (vs. A deal is a deal). A sentence like Promises are

promises seems to imply that 'Promisesare no more than promises, and can't always be reliedon'-which is very differentfromwhat we implyby A promise is a promise. It seems that pluralnouns can be used in the relevant sense only if they refer to items which normallyoccur in sets, ratherthan singly: Rules
are rules; Regulations are regulations. This is parallel to the extensions of the

singularpatternsto fit the other kinds of tautologies which normallypreclude the plural: A girl is a girl. (absolutegeneralization-or indifference) Girls are girls. (tolerancefor humannature) *Girls are girls. (impossibleas an absolute generalization) Twins are twins. (possible as an absolute generalization) A party is a party. (indifference-or absolute generalization) *Parties are parties. (impossibleas an expression of indifference) Beans are beans. (possible as an expression of indifference) However, the ability to co-occur with the definite article (or with a definite possessive) does seem to distinguish'tautologiesof obligation'from the other tautologieswhich normallyrequirethe singular.Thus Neighbors are neighbors can be used as an expression of indifference,in response to the question Do
you like your new neighbors? But the sentence My neighbors are my neighbors

conveys some sense of obligation(perhaps,one must help one's neighbors,or one must be loyal to one's neighbors). Comparealso the following sentences and their possible interpretations:
(a) Fathers are fathers. (b) Yourfather is your father. (c) A husband is a husband.

Ex. (a) has only one possible interpretation: tolerance for humannature. Ex. (b) also seems to have only one interpretation: obligation(one must fulfil one's obligations toward one's father). Ex. (c) has as many as four interpretations: obligation (one must fulfil one's obligationstoward one's husband), appreciation (everyone knows that there is somethinggood about having a husband), indifference (one husband is neither better nor worse than another), and absolute generalization(all husbandsare essentially the same-one knows what to expect from them). I conclude that, for both semantic and syntactic reasons, tautologies of obligation cannot be subsumedunderany other type, and must be recognizedas a separate tautological sub-construction.The meaning encoded in such sentences can be spelled out as follows: A. Everyone knows that there are some things that all people have to do about X. B. Everyone knows that sometimes one would want not to have to do these things. C. One should understandthat we have to do them. D. One should not cause oneself to feel somethingbad because of that. E. One should understandthat this cannot be changed.

BOYS WILL BE BOYS IS THERE A SEMANTIC INVARIANT?

109

6. I have arguedthat tautologicalexpressions do not all have the same inherent value, and that their different 'implications'cannot be fully attributed to context. It goes without saying that the similaritiesbetween different tautological constructionsare no less real. It is much easier, however, to assert that such similaritiesexist, or to hintat theirnatureby means of vague or semimetaphoricalcover terms, than to establish the common components of all 'tautologies' with some rigor. One hypothesiswhich seems to me particularly worthexploringis that 'nominal tautologies', of the type (ART) N be (ART) N, have a semantic invariantof their own. If verbal tautologies insist on the impossibility of change ('This cannot be changed'), nominaltautologies seem to insist on an identity ('An X is not different from other X's'). Perhapsthey combine the claim of identity with that of immutability: An X is not differentfrom other X's (all X's are the same). This cannot change. But of course a formulaof this kindcannotapplydirectlyto sentences referring Another plausiblecandidatefor a semanticinvariantcould be formulatedas follows: This cannot be denied. (Nobody could say that this is not true.) Possibly the restriction on the use of modifiers in tautologicalconstructions could be explained in these terms: if the predicate repeats a bare noun, then the identity of the subject and the predicateis obvious, so it must be obvious to everyone that the claim made by the speaker is valid. The use of a more complex noun phrase could obscure the identity of the subject and the predicate; thus it would no longerbe obvious that what the speakeris sayingcannot be rejected. Be that as it may, I believe the problemof a possible semantic invariantof tautologicalexpressions cannot be seriously studied without a set of tentative semantic representationsof individualsubtypes. The formulaeproposed here can be discussed, criticized, and revised. In the process, the problem of a will hypotheticalsemanticinvariant have a chance to be clarified,if not actually solved. It is important addthat, even if some readerschoose to view these formulae to as pragmaticvariantsof a singleconstruction,ratherthanas separatemeanings, they will still have to recognize them as valid and necessary at the level of pragmaticinterpretation.Some radicalpragmaticists other Griceansstress and the all-importantrole of 'implicatures'in linguistic communication,and deemphasize the role of meanings (often to the extent of denying the very existence of other than propositionalmeanings);but they usually don't bother to spell out the exact content of the supposed implicatures.They have no metalanguage in which such implicaturescan be stated in a non-ad-hocway, and
to unique entities; e.g. East is East; Samantha is Samantha, and you are you.

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throughwhich they can be comparedwith meaningssensu stricto. In my view, my metalanguageis an adequateinstrumentfor all these purposes.
THE DECEPTIVE FORM OF ENGLISH TAUTOLOGICAL PATTERNS

7. One reason why Eng. tautologicalpatternshave been so widely mistaken for universal devices, fully interpretableon the basis of Grice's 'quantity maxim', is that their form is so simple, and is deceptively similar to logical tautologies. Thus Brown & Levinson (1978:225)draw a distinction between what they call 'conventionalizedtautologies'and others (presumablynon-conventionalized). The conventionalized type is illustrated with this Tamil example, said to convey the attitude 'To hell with X':
Avaar-aam avaaru.

'He-they.say [is] he.' By contrast, Eng. tautologies such as War is war or Boys will be boys are treatedas non-conventionalized. Brown& Levinson state that, by utteringsuch tautologies, 'S[peaker]encourages H[earer]to look for an informativeinterutterance.' But aren't these Eng. tautologies pretationof the non-informative in fact just as 'conventionalized'as the Tamil one? Is it not an ethnocentric illusion to regardEng. tautologies as 'natural'or readily interpretable-based on universal maxims of conversationalbehavior, ratherthan on conventions of English? It is indeed remarkable that Eng. nominaltautologiestend to use the simple formal patternN is N (with minor variations),similarto logical formulaelike p is p. Other languages often use more complex patterns which include particles, modal verbs, or adverbsof time like immeror toujours'always'. But is the Eng. formal patternreally more 'natural',less conventionalized,than the complex patternsused by other languages?And isn't it the case that, despite appearances,Englishtoo has a numberof differentformalpatterns,associated
with different interpretations (N is N, An N is an N, N's are N's, N's will be

N's etc.)?
CONCLUSION

8. In describinga specific language(e.g. English) as a system, a line must be drawn somewhere between what is in and what is out, between grammar and 'humannature', between meaningand 'implicature'.Does it mattermuch where, exactly, this line is drawn?Does it matter,for example,if constructions like Kids are kids or War is war are counted as being 'in', i.e. as part of Eng. grammar-so that their meaningis language-specific,and must be includedin the linguisticdescriptionof Englishas an individuallanguage-or 'out', i.e. as free collocations whose use is 'calculable' from general principles of human conversation? In my view, this is a matter of fundamentalimportance,obviously not deriving from the frequency of use or the indispensabilityof 'tautological sentences' as such. It derives from the fact that one's decision on a 'small' point such as this has far-reachingconsequences with respect to one's whole idea of what linguistics is all about, what it is supposed to do, and what it can do.

BOYS WILL BE BOYS

Ill

The basic question is: Should grammarbe autonomous of pragmatics?Or should 'pragmaticmeanings'-matters having to do with speakers' assumptions, intentions, thoughtsand feelings-be accountedfor in the same over-all descriptiveframeworkwhich is used for 'objective' or truth-functional aspects of languageuse? Many contemporarylinguists seem to feel caught here in an insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, it has been repeatedlydemonstratedthat 'pragmatic' (or 'subjective') and 'objective' aspects of languageuse are interrelated,and that grammarinteractswith illocutionaryforce and other 'pragmatic'matters. from 'pragmatic'meanFurthermore,consistent attemptsto separategrammar lead to the paradoxicalconclusion that much conversational English is ings For 'ungrammatical'. example,perfectlyordinaryandperfectlyacceptablesentences like Would you please be quiet? or Why don't you be quiet! have been

classified as 'ungrammatical', simply because 'autonomous'grammarcannot for their use (Bach & Harnish 1979). This outcome would possibly account seem to represent a reductio ad absurdumof autonomous (non-illocutionary) grammar. On the other hand, the most influentialattemptto develop a frameworkfor an integrateddescriptionof grammarwith 'pragmatic'phenomenasuch as illocutionary force, i.e. that associated with the generative semantics school, has ended in self-acknowledgeddefeat. This has resulted in a widespreaddisillusionmentnot only with generativesemantics, but also with any attempt to and pragmaticdescriptionsof language. integrategrammatical What is to be done, then? How can a linguistpass safely between the Scylla of autonomousgrammar, which must condemnthe bulk of conversationalEnglish as 'ungrammatical', the Charybdisof an integrateddescriptionwhich and constraints',and other assumes a 'performative hypothesis', 'transderivational such stratagemswhich even their authorshave by now denounced? To many linguists, the only salvation seems to be offered by a Griceanapproach. Their state of mind can perhapsbe expressed as follows: 'Somebody has to account for languageuse, but we linguists have now come to realize that we cannot do it. Fortunately, we don't have to feel guilty about it any longer. We now see that it is simply not our responsibility. Another science will do it: a science of humanbehaviorin general, and in particularof human behaviorin conversation.We can concentrateon studyinglanguagestructure. In fact, we can now say thatit would be a mistaketo confuse languagestructure with language use. Grammaris one thing, and illocutionaryforce another; another.We neithercan nor should try meaningis one thing, and 'implicature' to account for languageuse. For example, we don't have to try to predict the
communicative import of sentences like Boys are boys or Business is business.

Certainly, such mattersare not devoid of interest, but they will be taken care of by the science of conversationalbehavior.' To quote Sperber & Wilson (1981:296,discussing a slightlydifferentbut related matter), 'Grice's proposal would relieve semantic theory of the problems of defining'-as regardspragmatic meanings. After the self-proclaimedcollapse of generative semantics, which tried to develop a frameworkfor a semantic analysis of illocutionary

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meanings, contemporarysemantics seems to have lost all confidence in itself. A philosopherwho comes and apparently'relieves the linguist' from the obligation of analysing many kinds of troublesomemeanings, and in particular, illocutionarymeanings, tends to be treated like a saviour, and to be accorded total faith. In my view, this faith in the omnipotenceof Griceanmaxims is bound to be disappointed.Neither tautologicalconstructionsnor numerousother matters, left to the postulated new science based on Gricean maxims, will be automatically taken care of. Ultimately, numerous'tautologicalsentences' used in conversational English will simply have to join the ever-growingpile of rejects-i.e. of sentences which are perfectly acceptablebut which are 'ungrammatical', because neither Gricean maxims nor autonomous grammar can account for the limits of their use. Why can one say Boys will be boys, but not
*War will be war? Why can one say Kids are kids, but not ?Bottles are bottles or *Clouds are clouds? Why can one say Enough is enough, but not "Much is much? Why can one say A bet is a bet, but not "Bets are bets?

Of course nobody denies these days that pragmaticinformationis reflected in some aspects of grammar-and that, consequently,some aspects of grammar cannot be fully accounted for without reference to the speaker's and hearer's assumptions, feelings etc. But so long as it seems possible to regard such reflections as minor and isolated, they can be ignored by the grammarian; thus the ideal of autonomousgrammar be upheld, even at the cost of discarding can I some acceptable sentences as 'ungrammatical'. would argue, however, that pragmaticspervadesgrammar,that the two intertwineat countless points; and that the bulk of conversationalEnglish can be explained only on the basis of this interaction(cf. Wierzbicka1986a;see also Bally 1952). Given that 'conversational meanings' (Gazdar's term, 1979:55)cannot be explainedon the basis of universalprinciplesof conversation,can they perhaps be accounted for on the basis of some language-specificscience of language use, separate from grammar(as suggested by Morgan 1978)?If we followed this line of reasoning, we could say that the use of tautologicalconstructions is determined partly by conventions which are specific to English, but that and these conventionsare not 'grammatical', can be kept apartfrom a linguistic description of Eng. structure. To my mind, this programis no more realistic than that advanced by Grice or his linguisticfollowers. As I see it, 'attitudinal'meaningsenter the core of grammar.If we establish any correlationbetween the imperativeDo it! and the meaning 'I want you to do it'-or between the interrogativestructureand the meanings 'I want to know it' or 'I want you to say it'; or between tag questions and meanings such as 'I think X, I assume you think the same, I want you to say it'; or between exclamations and meanings such as 'I feel something'-then we are already 'mixing' grammarand pragmatics.Can any empiricallyadequategrammarignore such correlations? Once it is recognizedthat a semanticmetalanguage,capable of representing both 'objective' and 'subjective'aspects of meaning,constitutes a sine qua non of linguistic description, then subtle 'pragmatic'meanings (such as those en-

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coded in tautologicalconstructions)cease to present a serious problem. The linguist can recognize that such constructionsare at least partlylanguage-specific, and can seek to account for their use without appealingto any deus ex machina in the form of extra-grammatical linguistic conventions: it becomes clear that the relevant meaningscan be modeled in the same semantic metalanguageas all other kinds of meaning, and that 'attitudinal'meaningswhich can be suspectedof beinguniversal(as in ironyand sarcasm)can also be spelled out in this metalanguage.Furthermore,once the language-specificmeanings of various 'tautological'constructionsare spelled out in a rigorousand yet selfexplanatory semantic metalanguage,it becomes possible to study universal tendencies and regularitiesin the use of 'tautological'constructions-which are no less real, and no less accessible to precise semantic analysis, than the language-specificuses to which such constructionscan be put. Theories of conversation(such as Grice's) can then proceed without having unrealistic burdens placed on their shoulders. Theories of language-specific and yet 'extra-grammatical' conventions of language use can be safely diswith. 'Ungrammatical' sentences such as Whydon't you be quiet? or pensed Wouldyou please be quiet?can be rehabilitated fully grammatical as encodings of language-specific'pragmatic'meanings. An integratedtheory of linguistic description can, once more, be set out as a goal of linguistics-and as a responsibility which it can relinquish to no other science.3 REFERENCES JAY.1984. Comparativeadjectives and adverbialsof degree: An introduction ATLAS, to radicallyradicalpragmatics.Linguisticsand Philosophy7.347-77. and ROBERT HARNISH. 1979. Linguisticcommunicationand speech acts. BACH,KENT, Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.
1952. Le langage et la vie. Geneve: Droz. BALLY,CHARLES. JOHN.1980. Familiar quotations. 15th edn. London: Macmillan. BARTLETT, ANDRZEJ. 1981. Semantic and pragmatic aspects of reference-related BOGUStAWSKI, problems. Pragmatische Komponenten der Satzbedeutung, ed. by Frantisek Dane; & Dieter Viehweger, 1-111. Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. and 1978. Universals in language usage: PoliteLEVINSON. BROWN, PENELOPE, STEPHEN ness phenomena. Questions and politeness, ed. by Esther Goody, 56-311. Cambridge: University Press. COLE, PETER.1981 (ed.) Radical pragmatics. New York: Academic Press. Louis. 1903 (ed.) Opuscules et fragments inedits de Leibniz. Paris. [ReCOUTURAT, printed, Hildesheim: Olms, 1961.]
3 Languageis, essentially, a system for conveying meaning;and a fully integratedtheory of can on linguisticdescription only be integrated the basisof meaning.As longas semanticsis thought of as one componentof linguistictheory, alongsidesyntax and linguisticpragmatics,it tends to be interpreted merelylexicalsemantics-and thusas a fieldakinto lexicography, as rathermarginal to linguisticsas strictlydefined.Withsuch a moreor less explicitdemotionof semantics,a possible basis for an integrated I linguistictheoryalso disintegrates. contendthata tripartite divisionwhich is truly valid from a linguistic(ratherthan logical)point of view cuts the study of linguisticsigns not into syntax, semantics, and pragmatics,but ratherinto lexical semantics, the semantics of grammar,and illocutionarysemantics. If these three majorparts of semantics operate with the same semantic metalanguage-as they can, and, I think, should-then the interplayof lexical, grammatical, and illocutionary meanings can be shown in a unified model of linguistic communication.

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DOYLE, ARTHURCONAN. 1981. The complete adventures of Sherlock Holmes. London:

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. 1985a.Lexicographyand conceptualanalysis. Ann Arbor:Karoma. for . 1985b.A semanticmetalanguage a cross-culturalcomparisonof speech acts. Languagein Society 14.491-513. . 1985c. Different cultures, differentlanguages, different speech acts. Journalof Pragmatics9.145-78. for . 1986a. A semantic metalanguage the description and comparisonof illocutionary meanings.Journalof Pragmatics10.313-51. AmericanAnthropologist . 1986b.Humanemotions:Universalor culture-specific? 88.584-94. . 1986c. Does languagereflect culture? Evidence from AustralianEnglish. Language in Society 15.349-74. Journal --. 1986d.Precisionin vagueness:The semanticsof English'approximatives'. of Pragmatics10.597-614. [Received 18 February1985;
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