06BANGKOK4725 SURAKIART ON THAKSINS SUDDEN VISIT TO BURMA leave a comment 73591,8/3/2006 11:11,06BANGKOK4725, Embassy Bangkok,CONFIDENTIAL,", VZCZCXRO9185 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT

T RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHBK #4725/01 2151111 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 031111Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0672 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2811 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5920 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1159 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8188 RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 2236 RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI, C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 004725

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TH, BM SUBJECT: SURAKIART ON THAKSINS SUDDEN VISIT TO BURMA

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Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Boyce for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary: On August 3, Deputy Prime Minister Surakiart discussed with Ambassador Prime Minister Thaksin\s \sudden and puzzling\ trip to Burma the previous day. Surakiart said that he was \personally appalled\ by the trip and confirmed that there was no advance planning. He claimed to have only learned of the trip on the morning of Tuesday, August 1. He said that Thaksin met privately with Than Shwe and Maung Aye while the rest of the Thai delegation met with their respective counterparts. According to Surakiart, the main message that Thaksin hoped to deliver was that Thailand and ASEAN want to draw Burma out of its self-imposed isolation, and that in order to do so, Burma needs to keep ASEAN informed of what it is doing and be willing to open up more to the international community. End Summary.

Road Trip! -

2.(C) Surakiart told Ambassador that Thaksin proposed the visit in a private discussion with the Burmese representative at a meeting of ASEAN intelligence agencies in Pattaya on July 28. On July 31, Than Shwe reportedly sent word that he would agree to meet Thaksin in the new capital. The following morning (August 1) Thaksin called Surakiart and Foreign Minister Kantathi to inform them about the plan.

Surakiart said that Kantathi then asked if one of them should attend as well. Thaksin replied to Kantathi, \Sure, if you want to come along.\ At this point, Surakiart said that he was \relieved\ that Kantathi would go and that he was not specifically asked to attend. The rest of the Thai delegation included MFA Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, Army Commander Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, National Intelligence Director Pol. Gen. Chumpol Manmai, Agriculture Minister Sudarat Keyuarphan and Natural Resources Minister Yongyut Tiyapairat.

Thaksin and the Generals

3. (C) Surakiart said that Thaksin had a private meeting with Than Shwe, Maung Aye and one notetaker. Surakiart got a readout on the meeting from MFA Permanent Secretary Krit. (Note: Surakiart said that he tried to get a readout on the trip while in the car with Thaksin this morning, but Thaksin got out of the car before he could had time. End note.) According to Surakiart, Thaksin\s purpose in going to Burma was to try to draw Burma out of its self-imposed isolation by \bringing the feeling of the international community and ASEAN directly to Than Shwe.\ The main message that Thaksin hoped to deliver was that Thailand and ASEAN want to be supportive of Burma, but that Burma needed to take certain steps. Specifically, Thaksin suggested that the regime should clearly explain the process and time frame for the drafting of Burma\s new constitution. He also suggested that the regime explain its plan for sharing power with \others\.

Thaksin reportedly told Than Shwe that he should consider attending more international meetings. Lastly, Burma needed to do a better job at keeping ASEAN informed of its plans.

4. (C) Surakiart said that Thaksin attempted to bring up the topic of Aung San Suu Kyi. However, as soon as he did Than Shwe \cut him off\ with the usual litany of complaints, i.e. ASSK is uncooperative, causes trouble whenever she is released, etc.

5. (C) While Thaksin met with Than Shwe and Maung Aye, the other ministers met with their respective counterparts, i.e. Kantathi met with FM Soe Win, General Sonthi met with General Thura Shwe Mann, etc. Surakiart did not have readouts of these meetings. (We have seen some press reports quoting Kantathi as stating that the Thai urged the Burmese to release ASSK.) When Ambassador asked Surakiart about this, he replied: \If Soe Win agreed to that, he\s gone.\

6. (C) Ambassador underscored our disappointment about not being consulted prior to the trip. Ambassador added that even if Thaksin was well intentioned, the trip is not playing well, particularly given its sudden and secretive nature. Surakiart fully agreed and noted that the political opposition in Thailand will \have a field day with this.\ He noted, however, that he was relieved that there was

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apparently no conversation between Thaksin and Than Shwe

about Thaksin\s personal business interests in Burma.

Comment -

7. (C) This trip caught everyone off-guard, including by most accounts the Thai Army Commander (who had to cancel plans to travel to Southern Thailand) and members of Thaksin\s cabinet. Part of the reason cam be ascribed to Thaksin\s impulsive, unpredictable nature. Presumably, Thaksin made some calculation that this was a propitious moment to approach Than Shwe and Maung Aye on behalf of ASEAN (we have unconfirmed reports that Thaksin called President Arroyo shortly before embarking on his visit). Still, it is unclear what led Thaksin to believe that he had something to be gained by making such a trip, shrouded in secrecy. It would be interesting to know other ASEAN capital\s views.