Imposition of Democracy

Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

Valentina Carlino GLOPEM World Institutions and Policies AY 2010/2011

Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

If one loves democracy, the argument runs, one must crush its enemies by no matter what means. And who are its enemies? It always appears that they are not only those who attack it openly and consciously, but those who objectively endanger it by spreading mistaken doctrines. George Orwell (1945)

Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

Abstract In a brilliant lecture during the sixth Morgenthau Memorial for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Professor Jacques Barzun (1986) wonders: Is Democratic Theory for Export? He argues that a permanent feature of American opinion and action in foreign policy is the wish, the hope, that other nations might turn from the error of their ways and become democracies. [...] A corollary has been, let us help those governments that are democratic, make them our allies, and let us oppose the others - indeed, if necessary, take action to coerce them. But who or which state is to preach the dogma of the democratic theory? It seems like Westphalian states ignore the path that took them at the higher stage, admitting no other to obtain self-determination on their own. Enterline and Greig (2008) have searched the matter and managed to popularize a denition of imposed democracy. Their analysis of 43 sample past cases and the contribution of other notable scholars and practitioners guide us to the conclusion that it is not viable to foresee a long-term survival for contemporary cases of imposition of democratic regimes (specically, Iraq and Afghanistan), predictably performing in the analysis as poorly as the majority of past sample cases.

Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

Introduction Speculations about imposed democracy and hybrid peace More on the imposition of democracy: the blatant case of the USA Colonial imposed democracies Major conditions for democracys grip and durability Conclusions Bibliographical references

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Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

Introduction In a brilliant lecture during the sixth Morgenthau Memorial for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Professor Jacques Barzun (1986) wonders: is democratic theory for export? He takes into consideration what he calls these democratic United States and argues that a permanent feature of American opinion and action in foreign policy is the wish, the hope, that other nations might turn from the error of their ways and become democracies. [...] A corollary has been, let us help those governments that are democratic, make them our allies, and let us oppose the others - indeed, if necessary, take action to coerce them. Professor Barzun wrote this in the hottest years of the Cold War, and almost 25 years later we can conrm the validity of his assertions. A key axiom of current U.S. foreign policy still is that of exporting democracy to other countries (Betts 2007). Barzuns paper brings up vivid images as we witness the attempt of the United States of America and its fellow allies of imposing democracy to the Middle East and the Greater Middle East (the American vision of this area includes all Muslim nations, from countries of North Africa bordering the Mediterranean Sea to Pakistan, including Turkey and Israel, as Safa reports in 2004). Americas footprint spreads across the region and many critics say that Americas aim is to create a pro-American bastion despite the declared goal of leaving a stable, inclusive and democratic government and to protect peoples sovereignty.1 A rst question to ask hence is: who or which state is to preach the dogma of the democratic theory? The international community seems to be assuming that this role is to be seized by the only worlds policeman. But, as Professor Barzun points out, was the United States a democracy when senators were not elected directly by the people? Was it a free government when its citizens held millions in slavery or segregation? Another fundamental question would be: is there a theory of democracy to export at the cost of imposing it? In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed denition but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic we are praising it: consequently the defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one meaning (Orwell 1946). Nowhere in the West has there been a central authority to dene an orthodoxy, even a shifting one, such as there has been on the communist side. We have no writings such as those of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and we have huge problems in dening what exactly is that we want others to copy. Democracy has no theory, Barzun sharply claims. It has only a theorem, that is, a proposition which is generally accepted and which can be stated in a single sentence: for a free mankind, it is best that the people should be sovereign, and this popular sovereignty implies political and social equality. If we take Hitlers example, it is impossible to deny that his role did respect his people sovereignty. Hitler did not seize power but was instead voted in as head of a plurality party by citizens living under a democratic government and with a constitution that combined the best features of all constitutions on record. The strength of Hitlers party and that of the German Communists make it for a large democratic majority voting for totalitarian rule. To generalize from this example, if the people is sovereign, it can do anything it wants, including turn its constitution upside down. It can lose its freedom by
1

The Economist (1 January 2011) Great Sacrices, Small rewards, Cairo, Egypt.

Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

choosing leaders who promise more equality, more prosperity, more national power through dictatorship. The theorem of popular sovereignty is honored in the breach. As if he were the most experienced contemporary advertiser, Hitler induced the German masses to buy themselves a Fhrer, an insane philosophy, and the Second World War (Huxley 1959). What happened in Germany in the years 1933-1945 cannot explain the topics of this paper, though. We want to focus on foreign policies that encompass measures to establish and sustain democratic settings in third countries. Above all, we want to understand if democracy imposed by an outsider may be successful in the long run and bring actual stability to the host countrys governance. Speculations about imposed democracy and hybrid peace We in the West have been supremely fortunate in having been given our fair chance of making the great experiment of self-government. It often happens, though, that Westphalian states ignore the path that took them at the higher stage, admitting no other to obtain selfdetermination on their own. Western countries believe to be the legitimate bringers of democracy and, like wizened monarchs still believing that God has given them the task of ruling over the people (hopefully any people), decide to impose their personal forms of governance holding that it is the one and only possible. They will hardly acknowledge that Barzuns theorem is still difcult to export. Enterline and Greig (2008) have searched the matter and managed to popularize a denition of imposed democracy. They claim that the term imposed is to be considered as synonymous with the terms cultivated and stimulated and they describe imposed democratic regimes as those in which the establishment, promotion, and maintenance of the institutions of government are set up through the actions and decisions of a foreign power. These kinds of polities are mainly the result of post-war and post-colonial circumstances. It is what others had previously discussed - more or less euphemistically - in their discourses on coercive diplomacy (Schultz 1998), democracy by force (von Hippel 2000), democracy promotion (Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi 2000), negotiated settlements (Dixon and Senese 2002), and forced democracy (Vedantam 2007), to name some. Enterline and Greig do not want to proclaim that the concept of imposition is to be entirely rejected or depicted as unfavorable. Nor do they state that powerful democratic countries impose democracy with military force because ideals or utopian visions drive them to spread their belief systems abroad (Pickering and Peceny 2006). The two scholars frame their argument following the understated assumption that democratic governments rarely go to war with each other and that an increase in the number of democratic states would therefore imply, and indeed encourage, a more secure and peaceful world. However, drastic situations can transform long term cultivation into overt imposition. Realists would add that overt imposition is likely to happen when the imposers dispatch soldiers overseas on missions that are pivotal and of political or strategic value to their national interests. Imposed democratic regimes studied by Enterline and Greig are those born following the defeat of a state in a war, such as West Germany and Japan in post-World War II, and those gradually imposed by departing colonizers, such as Indonesia after Dutch colonial rule. The rst class of imposition arises when a foreign power occupies a state with military forces,

Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

then removes the government, and starts the process of democratization. Two present cases, Iraq and Afghanistan, follow into this type of procedure. On the other hand, the second class is the result of a colonial process in which the metropole ofcially establishes the democratic regime to govern a colony after independence, or does that via covert activities, as France did for example by supporting several coups dtat in the Comoros. Nonetheless, the two types of imposed regime share a major characteristic, i.e. imposition is perpetrated by a foreign power. The fortunate denition of imposed democracy meets the concept of hybrid peace described by Mac Ginty (2010). In his study, hybrid peace is grounded in the broad umbrella of liberal peace, the dominant form of internationally supported peacemaking and peacebuilding that is promoted by leading states, leading international organizations and international nancial institutions. The idea of hybridity comes from the necessity to have a more accurate interpretation of peace and development processes that are a composite of exogenous and indigenous forces. This particular shade of peace results from distortions caused by the interplay between local and international actors coming together in peacekeeping contexts. The term has been largely employed in many critical accounts of contemporary peacemaking, peacebuilding, post-war reconstruction and development literature (Chandler 2004, Fanthorpe 2006, Richmond and Franks 2007, Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007, Petersen 2009). Edward Said (1994) outlined the concept of hybrid peace as an unequal relationship between unequal interlocutors, a frank explanation of the power relationships inherent in these intercultural encounters. According to Mac Ginty, peace hybridization has to deal with the ability of actors, networks and structures in host states to resist, ignore, subvert or adapt liberal peace interventions. This factor is important in that it reminds us of the multiple actors involved in the process of democratization through pacication and vice versa. Rather than being mere passive actors (victims, recipients, beneciaries, etc.), local actors may be capable of considerable autonomous action. By pushing back against the echoes of colonialism local actors may have power to hybridize peace (Richmond, 2009). The words promotion and imposition melt in front of our reasoning; the words democracy and peace merge with each other. Ventures to impose democracy share in truth the same core liberal values that are found with regularity in justications of peace interventions. These include the repeated invocation of the primacy of the individual, the belief in the reformability of individuals and institutions, pluralism and toleration, the rule of law, and the protection of property. Therefore liberalism speaks of responsibility, development, common interests and, above all, intervention (Williams 2007). Liberal interventionism, as it is also called, is usually applied by Western states in post-civil war countries. This sounds like nothing but our imposed democracy. In non-postwar environments, these interventions are often covered by the terms good governance, poverty reduction strategy papers and reform (Abrahamsen 2004, Craig and Porter 2003). Again, it is part of the larger imposed democracy theory. Through the democratic peace thesis (or the liberal peace thesis) found in Mac Gintys work, we rediscover, more explicitly than in Enterline and Greigs, the theory afrming that, since liberal (democratic) states do not go to war with each other, the solution to

Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

international aggression is to export liberal forms of state-building, i.e. our most popular iterated imposition of democracy. More on the imposition of democracy: the blatant case of the USA The enforcement of democracy through coercion has been debated by Pickering and Peceny (2006). In their opinion democracy promotion abroad pursued with the use of military power is a self-evident oxymoron. This happens because decision makers in powerful liberal states often relate democracy promotion to their national security. It is the grand strategy of the national security liberalism that U.S. policy makers have pursued over the past century (Smith 2000) claiming that democracy promotion is not just the right thing to do: it [is] the smart thing to do as well (Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi 2000). From this point of view, imposing democracy in other countries is not only morally justied, but suits U.S. interests by creating stable states that may favor their sociopolitical views of the world. Policymakers in the United States have never abandoned the topic of nation-building and even when the presidency stood far from national security liberalism, Congress often pressured him to promote democracy to legitimate foreign military activities to domestic audiences (Peceny 1999). Karin von Hippel (2000) observes that the promotion of democracy by the U.S. government has become an item on the agenda since the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II. Then it stood for demilitarization (and denazication of Germany), establishment of democratic institutions, and reeducation of the entire countrys population. In Vietnam, and later in much of Central America during the Cold War, democratization came to mean challenging communist advances rather than implementing democratic reforms. Only since the end of the Cold War has imposition of democracy gone back to fulll its stated purpose of promotion of democratic standards, with the ultimate aim of the enhancement of international peace and security. Despite this return to the origins, we learn that the alleged ethnocentrism becomes instead the promotion of Western values and its belief in the universalism of liberal goals in its most realist tinges. As we have seen so far, the talks about imposed democratic regimes always single out the United States of America when referring to present times impositions. In reading so, we fairly want to negotiate a conclusion which might tell us if the U.S. has ever sowed the seeds of long-term democracy in the Middle East. This is also the geopolitical area Enterline and Greig are interested in, and it is imperative that we engage in the study of it because of the serious implications that eventual mistakes in the democratization process could give birth to at the world level. Enterline and Greig demonstrate that, if democratic institutions do manage to survive in Afghanistan and Iraq, they are more likely to emulate the political trajectories in cases such as the Philippines or Sri Lanka, a path that is likely to be difcult, fraught with a high probability of failure, and expected to provide few of the regional fruits associated with the West German and Japanese democratic beacons. In their history of imposed democracies, Enterline and Greig identify a sample of 43 countries that have undergone a process of coerced democratization in the interval 1800-1994, acquiring data from the Polity III data set and the Encyclopedia of World History above all. They rely on the Polity IIIs coding of the origin of the polities in that range period to identify those that emerge primarily due to the inuence of foreign states. Specically, they

Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

identify polities that are the products of foreign involvement, such as those polities that are cultivated following war (e.g., the West German polity following World War II), or colonialism (the Indian polity following the grant of independence in 1947 from Britain), but they exclude those polities that are primarily the result of indigenous design (e.g., the postWorld War II Indonesian polity). The 43 imposed democracies they examine are given the Polity IIIs composite regime score, called DEMAUT, that measures the difference between democracy and autocracy ordinal dimensions ranging from -10 (fully democratic) to 10 (fully autocratic). Taking the case of successful democratic impositions present in our contemporary history, West Germany and Japan quickly moved towards the achievement of strong democracy (DEMAUT score > 6). We should now look at the outcome of Enterline and Greigs study to realize how the rest of the world behaved differently (results are reported in Table 1). First thing we can register is that imposed democracy is mainly a phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century. Specically, while the authors identify three cases (7.5%) occurring in the nineteenth century (Yugoslavia in 1838, New Zealand in 1857, and Canada in 1867), the remainder of the imposed democracies in the sample occur in the past century. Furthermore, the cross-temporal distribution of these democratic regimes in the twentieth century is uneven, with 13 of the 43 regimes (30%) occurring before 1940, and the remaining 70% thereafter. The decade reecting the greatest frequency of imposed democratic regimes is the 1960s, with 15 imposed democratic regimes (34.8%) occurring during this period, most of which correspond to the wave of new regimes in post colonial Africa. Speaking of former colonial regimes, it is worth investigating the development of imposed democracies in these peculiar regions. Colonial imposed democracies One of the key changes during the post-World War II period is the transition of states away from colonies to sovereign states. While some colonial powers did little more than abandon their colonies (e.g., Portugal), other colonial metropoles, such as the British in India and the U.S. in the Philippines, played a lengthy role in shaping political institutions in their colonies in the lead up to independence. In these cases, imposer states cultivated democratic institutions before decolonization. In comparing these colonial democratic impositions to other types of democratic impositions, we see clear evidence that the process by which democracies are imposed also appears to inuence the survival rate of such polities. The survival curves reported in Fig. 1 describes the survival rate of those democracies imposed through a colonial process against those imposed in absence of previous colonization. In the earliest years following their establishment, colonially imposed democratic regimes are signicantly more likely to fail compared to their non colonial counterparts. By the tenth year after their imposition, 41% of colonially imposed polities fail. By contrast, the sub sample of non colonially imposed democratic regimes do not approach this failure proportion until the twenty-rst year after imposition, by which time 38% of non colonially imposed democracies have failed. Indeed, non colonially imposed democratic regimes outperform colonially imposed democracies through the rst half-century of their existence. Conditions change beyond this point such that by the fty-second year after

Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

imposition all non colonially imposed democracies fail while 39% of colonially imposed polities persist. This tendency of colonially imposed democracies to fail very early, but upon reaching a certain survival point persist for long periods of time, suggests the presence of two competing forces inuencing the durability of imposed democracy. First, colonially imposed democracies may initially be particularly prone to failure during the early post colonial years as the citizenry of the former colony seek to overthrow what are perceived as the last vestiges of a colonial period. In this sense, in trying to move beyond the colonial experience and establish a regime more effectively deemed as their own, citizens may replace democratic

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seven geographic regions. First, we observe that each region that we identify in Figure 1 experiences at least one imposed democratic regime. The contemporary effort in Iraq is not the rst such effort in the Middle East, as previous demoImposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues cratic impositions occurred in both Lebanon (1941) and Syria (1944). Second, despite the occurrence of imposed democratic regimes in each region, it is clear that most occur in two regions, Africa (16% or 37%) and Asia (9% or 21%). Finally, the distribution of imposed democratic by theiracross the colonial masters in the early years after regimes imposed upon them regimes former regions, as well as the diversity of potentially causal conditions in these regions, reinforces the notion imposition.of the contemporary cases of Afghanistan and Iraq would that analysis In a few words, failure of democracy survival in this case benet from comparisons with cases beyond that of the very limited sample stems from errors of the former including post-World War II West Germany and Japan. the ways of freedom soon enough to their colonial colonial powers. They did not teach Finally, we considerand distribution of imposed democratic regimes in terms the urge to independence swept subjects, the they let go of their colonies too quickly when of the degree, or strength of democratic institutions. To facilitate our discussion, in Figure thewe plot the frequency of imposed democratic regimes by the (and it is not over). Some of the 2, globe. The bloodshed was immediate and extensive nations that emergedinstitutions reected in Polity was datas codstrength, or degree, of democratic tried what they thought IIId democracy, only to succumb to military or ing of theone-partyDEMAUT (in each the name of popular sovereignty, indeed of liberation. The word is variable rule - always in regimes rst year). We consider a DEMAUT score alwaysreect thepretense,of weakis liberation to be rid and a government that cannot govern. not of 1 to a mere presence for it democratic institutions, of a DEMAUT score of 10 to reect the presence of strong democratic institutions. The ancient maxim is true, mundus vult gubernari, the world insists on being governed. In general, the distribution of imposed democratic regimes is skewed toward the higher DEMAUT values, reecting attempts by imposing states to establish stronHowever, rather than nebulous regimes, those that a better ger democratic regimes,colonial metropoles often possessare sometimesunderstanding of the underlying referred topolitical and social dynamics in a colony, of the democratic as anocratic, or mixed, regimes. This said, 17 as well as a deeper commitment to a colony, in regimes in contrast with the qualities that non colonial imposers under- to their targets of imposition. This our sample are associated with DEMAUT scores of 5, which bring 334 The History of Imposed Democracy scores the fact that historicallyTheHistory of Imposed Democracy imposed regimes is the degree of democracy in 334 deeper understanding democraticDemocracy 334 The History Imposed institutions. reective of the range of the degree ofofof the context in which democratic imposition is to be conducted, Our simple descriptive analysis of the sample of 43 imposed democratic c o u p l e d w i t h a g r e a t e r regimes reveals that, while rare, imposed democratic regimes are more frequent commitment of resources by a than one might anticipate, and certainly more than is reected in the very con- colonial imposer, can provide a strained, but often cited, sub sample consisting of the case of post-WWII West Germany and Japan. Indeed, there is considerable variation in both the regional rmer foundation for a lasting distribution of these regimes and the strength of their democratic institutions. imposed democracy. As long as This variation is important, because it suggests that the performance of imposed a colonially imposed democracy

can survive beyond its initial existence when it runs the greatest risk of being deposed with the colonizer, the imposed democratic regime is likely to be more durable than a democracy imposed by a non colonizer.

So far, the historical record suggests a bleak prognosis for the imposed democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan as post-World War II imposition efforts, incremental democratization policies, and non colonial impositions show poor survival Fig 7.7. Survival of Colonial and Non Imposed DemocraticDemocraticRegimes. Fig 1. The Regional Distribution Noncolonial Imposed Democratic Regimes. 7. Survival of Colonial and Non colonial Imposed Democratic Regimes. rates among imposed Fig Fig Survival of Colonial and of colonial Imposed Regimes. democracies. Yet, the timing of This tendency of colonially process democraciesthe fail very early, imposition is conducted only furnishes This imposition colonially imposed by which to democratic but upon This tendency of and the imposed democracies to fail very early, but upon tendency of colonially imposed democracies to fail very early, but upon reaching apartial picture point persist for long periods of time, suggests the failure of efforts to impose reaching aacertain survival point persist for that periods of time, success the a certain survival point persist for long periods of the suggests or reaching certain survival of the forces long inuence time, suggests the presence of two competing another state. Thethedurabilityenvironmentdemocpresence of two competing forces inuencing the durability of imposed democpresence of two competing forces inuencing the durability of imposed democdemocracy upon forces inuencing domestic of imposed in which an imposing power seeks racy. First, colonially imposed democracies may initially be particularly prone to racy. First, colonially imposed democracies may initially be particularly prone to racy. First,foster democratic democracies may also likelyparticularly prone to prospects for the survival of initially be to colonially imposed institutions failure during the early post colonial years as is citizenry of to inuence the failure during the early post colonial years as the citizenry of the former colony failure during the early post colonial years as the citizenry of the former colony the the former colony seek to these institutions.perceived as the last vestiges of aacolonial period. In seek to overthrow what are perceived as the some domesticcolonial period. In seek to overthrow what are Quite simply, last vestiges of a colonial period. In overthrow what are perceived as the last vestiges of environments may be more conducive to the this sense, in trying to move beyond the colonial experience betterestablish aa development move beyond the colonial experience and understand how these contextual this sense, in trying to of democratic institutions. To and establish a this sense, in trying to move beyond the colonial experience and establish regime more effectively deemed as their own, citizens may replace democratic regime conditions are deemed to their own, citizens may replace democratic in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is regime more effectively deemed as inuence the developing democracies more effectively likely as their own, citizens may replace democratic regimes imposed upon them by their former colonial masters in the early years regimesconvenient to turn to an examination of some prominent domestic conditions. regimes imposed upon them by their former colonial masters in the early years imposed upon them by their former colonial masters in the early years after imposition.
after imposition. after imposition. However, colonial metropoles often possess a better understanding of the However, colonial metropoles often possess aa better understanding of the However, colonial metropoles often possess underlying political and social dynamics in a colony, better understanding of the as well as a deeper commitunderlyingcolony, relative to the qualities that non as well asimposers bring to underlying political and social dynamics in aa colony, colonialas aa deeper commitdeeper commitment to a political and social dynamics in colony, as well ment to aa colony, relative This deeper understanding of the context bring to ment to their targetscolony, relative to the qualities that non colonial imposers in which of imposition. to the qualities that non colonial imposers bring to their targets of imposition. be conducted, coupled with of greater commitment their targets of imposition. This deeper understanding a the context in which democratic imposition is to This deeper understanding of the context in which democratic imposition is imposer, can provide a rmer foundation commitment democratic imposition is to be conducted, coupled with greater for a lasting greater commitment of resources by a colonial to be conducted, coupled with aa 11 of resources by aa coloniallong as a can provideimposed foundation for aa lasting of resources by colonial imposer, can provide aa rmer democracy can survive imposer, colonially rmer foundation for lasting imposed democracy. As imposed democracy. As long as runs the greatest risk of being deposed with imposed initial existence when colonially imposed democracy can survive beyond itsdemocracy. As long asitaa colonially imposed democracy can survive beyond its initial imposed when it runs the greatest risk of more deposed with beyond its initial existence when it runs the is likely to of being deposed with the colonizer, the existence democratic regimegreatest risk be being durable than the colonizer, the imposed democratic regime is likely to be more durable than a the colonizer, the imposed democratic regime is likely to be more durable than democracy imposed by a non colonizer.

Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

Enterline and Greig examine, as a matter of fact, the relationship between three key domestic conditions and the persistence of imposed democratic regimes: the degree of democracy, the degree of social divisions, and the level of economic prosperity. They turn to a closer examination of the survival of imposed democratic regimes in several states with comparable historical experiences in order to evaluate the degree to which these general empirical patterns bear out in contemporary cases. They follow this analysis with a discussion of its implications for the future of the imposed democratic regimes in contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan. During the 1960s, colonial powers sought to foster democracy in seven continental African states. For example, France sought to develop democracy in Congo and Benin, while similar efforts were made in Nigeria, Uganda, Botswana, Gambia, and Zimbabwe by Great Britain. Yet, despite the similarities these cases shared in terms of both geographic location and the process by which the foreign power sought to impose democratic institutions, the survival of the democracies imposed within them varies considerably. Democracy survived briey in four of the cases - Benin, Nigeria, Uganda, and Congo - with an average polity persistence of 4.5 years for the group. By contrast, in Botswana, Gambia, and Zimbabwe, democratic institutions proved much more durable, persisting through at least the year 1994, the terminal time point in our sample. Upon closer examination, these cases demonstrate a remarkable consistency with the authors ndings in the broader analysis. One observation that emerges is that imposed democracy tends to survive best when relatively stronger democratic institutions were established early on in the democratization process rather than through incremental movement toward full democracy. Among the seven African cases that Enterline and Greig examine, two of the three cases in which democracy proved most durable, Botswana and the Gambia, were full democracies in the rst year of democratic imposition, holding elections and establishing political institutions prior to transitioning to full self-rule. The Gambian and Botswanan constitutions each established protections for fundamental human rights early on. The Botswanan constitution, for example, guaranteed universal adult suffrage, the right to free expression, and the right opportunity. The initial elections conducted in each state were both highly contested, with elections drawing participation by multiple political parties. The historical record of imposed democratic regimes suggests that the conditions associated with the imposition of democracy in contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan are core to the longterm survival of the contemporary regimes. Not only are Iraq and Afghanistan cases of the post-World War II, non colonial impositions that generally perform poorly in the analysis, but the incremental manner in which democratic institutions are being cultivated in the contemporary cases also corresponds to poor performance historically. As troubling as these qualities may be, the domestic social and economic environments within which democracy is being cultivated suggests an even bleaker picture for durable democratic institutions in each state. Barzun tells us so recalling Rousseaus all-important point that the history, character, habits, religion, economic base, and education of each people must be taken into account before setting up any machinery. No rules or means apply universally. Pickering and Peceny also speak about specic circumstances of colonially imposed democracy, in particular addressing the French experience in Africa. They record that French military intervention was said to be designed to protect French nationals, subdue rebellion (irrespective of its legitimacy), and prop up pro-French rulers, including some of the most
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Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

despotic and murderous individuals in post-colonial African history (Gregory 2000:437; Utley 2002). Indeed, the spread of democracy does not seem to have gured prominently in French policy makers calculations when they dispatched soldiers overseas. Although some (Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz 2002; Williams 2002: 154) argue that both British and French leaders may have been motivated by a normative or cultural sense of family responsibility to care for former colonial children, this did not mean, however, that democracy promotion was one of their priorities. More often than not, the military missions sent to help former colonies were designed to do little more than restore order and ensure fealty to the former colonial metropole. They all used force to further state interests, but only U.S. leaders believed at times that the spread of democracy was important for their countrys security. The strong statistical relationship between hostile U.S. military intervention and political liberalization and democratization seems to be the result of three cases of democracy promotion in the Caribbean Basin. Only one of these resulted in a lasting democracy, the invasion of Panama in 1989. Although one might suggest that three at least partially successful attempts to establish democracy at gunpoint represents a superior record to that of the British (no successful attempts) and French (one successful attempt), the number is too small to condently generalize at this point. U.S. decision makers embrace of national security liberalism may have led them to pursue democratization more vigorously than other liberal state decision makers from 1946 to 1996, but democratization records over this time period do not provide compelling evidence of this. Yet another piece of data to add to our general analysis of possible, durable democratic developments in Middle East. Liberal intervention does not appear to be a prominent explanatory variable in post-1945 democratization. Adding up all the examples where liberal intervention played some role in democratization in the sample, there are eight potential cases (ve cases with the UN, two with the U.S. since the Haiti case involved the U.S. and the UN sequentially, and the single French case in the Comoros). Thus, nearly 84% of the cases of democratization that occurred from 1946 to 1996 involved no liberal military intervention. Ninety-two percent of the cases of democratization in the sample involved no intervention by a liberal state actor. Liberal intervention, therefore, has only very rarely played a role in democratization since 1945. At this point we may wonder if liberal intervention can lead to democracy in these contemporary cases. Clearly, some states have democratized in the wake of military interventions by liberal states and/or the UN. If the past is any guide for the contemporary era, however, we are left with the uncomfortable truth that most liberal interventions have failed to lead to successful democratization. To the extent to which these interventions are undertaken in cooperation with the United Nations, Pickering and Peceny report, the chances for success may improve. On the whole, however, the evidence presented offers a cautionary tale for those determined to forge democracy at gunpoint. Major conditions for democracys grip and durability While both the strength of democracy and the process by which it is imposed inuences the durability of imposed democracies, it makes little sense to expect that all domestic environments will be equally conducive to the successful implementation of democracy by an outside power. When Enterline and Greig examine the historical record of imposed democracies they point to a tremendous diversity of domestic contextual present in these
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Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

regimes, contextual inuences that are apt to inuence the degree to which democratic institutions, once imposed, tend to survive. Of course, the authors warn, the social characteristics of states are not fully determinative of their futures. While signicant social divisions can breed instability in both indigenously and externally developed regimes, prosperity can serve to mitigate these threats and boost the survival of regimes. By expanding the pool of resources available to all, prosperity provides a means of preventing and moderating regime challenges that arise from ethnic and religious divisions, by providing a greater capacity for the government to foster compromise between contending groups and to create incentives for the groups to conne their disputes with one another to within the political system. To the degree to which the imposed democratic regime is considered illegitimate or as a tool of an external power, said regime will be less likely to survive. Furthermore, social cleavages, such as religious and ethnic fractionalization, undercut the survivability of imposed democratic regimes. This said, economic prosperity furnishes one means of insulation from these pressures for imposed democracies as well as a tool for dealing with challenges to the regime. First, to the degree to which a state is more prosperous, there are fewer distributional issues over which competing groups in the society must compete, thereby reducing pressure upon the imposed regime during its nascent existence. Second, when challenges to the regime arise, relatively more prosperous imposed democratic regimes have a greater array of resources with which to satisfy disaffected groups within the state, and in turn to increase their chances of survival. Despite these ndings, economic growth is only one dimension of development; another is the expansion of the administrative capability of the state, the capability that allows governments to affect the course of events by implementing policies and programs. Notables of the Harvard Kennedy School and the World Bank (Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews 2010) document that many countries in the world remain in state capability traps in which the capability of the state to implement is both severely limited and improving (if at all) only very slowly: at their current pace of progress such countries would take hundreds (if not thousands) of years to reach the levels of high capability countries. This is enlightening if we look back at the historical experiences of imposed democracies in Enterline and Greigs study and, above all, cast a bleak outlook for the durability of the current imposed democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not only do nearly 63% of the sample of 43 imposed democratic regimes fail during the period of observation (1800-1994), but the mean durability of imposed democratic regimes is 13.1 years. Collectively, this information suggests that, on average, it is difcult to impose durable democratic regimes. We do not have to feel discouraged, though. Efforts aimed at promoting economic growth and prosperity are similarly vital to the survival of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Enterline and Greig remind us that increasing prosperity expands the resource pie available to competing groups within society, reducing conict between groups, thereby lowering the pressure exerted upon the developing democratic political institutions. As such, efforts to encourage foreign investment, develop and expand a middle class, and promote economic revitalization should be encouraged as quickly as possible. Because democratization and economic development tend to be mutually reinforcing, policy efforts to promote one will tend to positively promote the other. Of course, encouraging political liberalization and economic development is easier said then done in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

Conclusions When Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) spoke of a world striving for many Denmarks (a polite term to indicate any state with a functioning bureaucracy, developed economy and compliant foreign policy), they meant a world to be made up of countries in which the provision of key services such as clean water, education, sanitation, policing, sanitary regulation, roads, and public health is assured by effective, rules based, meritocratic, and politically accountable public agencies. Mac Ginty reports that advocates of the liberal peace are accused of attempting to replicate the Danish case. We also add that this Western enterprise of getting to Denmark, of imposing democracy on any country, not only is evidently utopian, but seems to be the key to interpret all political conducts that purports to administer such a high ideal to the general public. Critics of the liberal peace, in fact, point to a central irony: liberal peace often uses illiberal means in its promotion of liberal values (Williams 2005). It is an essentially conservative and realist approach that reinforces the position of power-holders while doing little to emancipate the general population they claim to assist (Jacoby 2007, Mayall 2006). So what can possibly be the way to ght this aggressive social engineering (Pugh 2006) performed by Western nations? Are current efforts to force democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan the solution? The conditions under which the efforts to develop democracy in Enterline and Greigs two sample cases are not only unfavorable to the long-term maintenance of democracy, but directly hostile to it. This conclusion develops from the non-colonial nature of the imposition process, the two countrys social characteristics, and above all the sharp ethnic and religious differences that divide the Iraqi and Afghani peoples. To such results we need to include Pickering and Pecenys examinations. Analyzing postWorld War II military interventions undertaken by the U.S., U.K., France, and the United Nations, they found little evidence that these actions helped to foster democracy in target countries. All actors - be they states or international organizations - are compelled to operate in an environment shaped in some way by others (Mac Ginty 2010). International interveners may formulate outstanding democratizing strategies, but these will become distorted as they cope with the strategies and reactions of local actors, resulting in hybrid peace arrangements. However, Pickering and Peceny found stronger evidence that supportive interventions by the UNs blue helmets can help to democratize target states. These ndings are also proven by Bellamy and Williams (2009) who conclude that UN peace operations were a useful mechanism for limiting interstate war, furthering regional interests and sharing the costs of decolonization. The positive outcome is not a surprise knowing that the UN tends to be involved in peacekeeping rather than peace imposition. Local organizations and authorities may consequently tend to be more cooperative to start a process of democratization when this is mediated by the UN rather than by liberal state actors. The fact that four of the ve cases of UN-led democratization remain democratic suggests us, nonetheless, that the UN has had more success than liberal states in this endeavor (Mac Ginty 2010). Looking through the glass of extreme realism, we hazard saying that the luck of the UN is that of having built an image of impartiality and universality throughout the years. In the host

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countries, no one seems to remember the failure of its predecessor, and the UN now is invincible to the imagination of the most. No one seems to recall the scandals that hit it in 2003-2004,2 and its failures are just incidents along the path. No one seems aware of its real being, and its spending to maintain thousands of ofcers is justied by few victorious humanitarian missions. Somehow, this turns out for the best.

The Oil-for-Food Programme scandals even involved an alleged link with the Annans.

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Imposition of Democracy - Past Cases and Contemporary Issues

Bibliographical references
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Petersen, Jenny (2009) Rule of Law Initiatives and the Liberal Peace: The Impact of Politicised Reform in Post-Conict States, Disasters 34(1): 1539. Pickering, Jeffrey and Peceny, Mark (2006) Forging Democracy at Gunpoint, International Studies Quarterly (2006) 50, 539-559. Pritchett, Lant and Woolcock, Michael (2004) Solutions when the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development, World Development 32(2), 191-212. Pritchett, Lant, Woolcock, Michael and Andrews, Matt (2010) Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure. Pugh, Michael (2006) Transformation in the Political Economy of Bosnia Since Dayton, in David Chandler, ed., Peace Without Politics? Ten Years of International State-Building in Bosnia, Abingdon: Routledge (142-156). Richmond, Oliver (2009) Liberal Peace Transitions: A Rethink Is Urgent, OpenDemocracy, http:// www.opendemocracy.net/oliver-p-richmond/liberal-peace-transitions-rethink-is-urgent, last consultation 10 March 2011. Richmond, Oliver and Jason Franks (2007) Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia, Security Dialogue 38 (1): 27-48. Safa, Haeri (2004) Concocting a Greater Middle East Brew, Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ Middle_East/FC04Ak06.html, last consultation 10 March 2011. Said, Edward (1994) Culture and Imperialism, London: Vintage. Smith, Tony (2000) National Security Liberalism and American Foreign Policy, American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, New York: Oxford University Press. Utley, Rachel (2002) Not to do less but to do better...: French Military Policy in Africa, International Affairs 78:129. von Hippel, Karin (2000) Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building, The Washington Quarterly 23:1, 95-112. Vedantam, Shankar (2007) Lessons in Forced Democracy, The Washington Post, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/16/AR2007091601359_pf.html, last consultation 11 January 2011. Williams, Andrew (2005) Whats So Peaceful About Liberals?, paper prepared for the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/media/ Williams_what_is_so_peaceful_about_liberals.pdf, last consultation 10 March 2011. Williams, Andrew (2007) Reconstruction: The Bringing of Peace and Plenty or Occult Imperialism?, Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations 21(4): 39-551. Williams, Paul (2002) Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone, Dimensions of Western Military Intervention, London: Frank Cass.

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