The idea of the organisation is so thoroughly ingrained within the fabric of society that its reason for existence

is rarely analysed. What has predominated instead in literature has been the analysis of the purpose of organising . This is natural since to organise is the default attribute of society, itself an organisation, rather than a conscious act of exceptional enterprise. Indeed, for much of history the alternative to organisation was assumed to be chaos, a sentiment famously captured by Livy in his commentary on Gaul. The history of the organisation thus tended to focused on defining its purpose in terms of religious, sociological, political or economic conformity. Why organisations are extant to fulfil such purpose was and continue to be rarely questioned in a methodological manner . Predominantly, o rganisations have been seen through the prism of occupying political, social or economic space that actors must sway or control outright to progress a selective a genda. Thus the definitional distinction between the extant of an organisation and its purpose has mostly been conflated rather than elucidated. This tradition has existed at least since the production of religious texts but continues with modern academic research. One may ask that, despite the proffering of more rationalistic techniques , what separates the premise of the Hebrew bible and some more recent studies examining dynamics of modern organisations? The Cournot Model describes the economic characteristics of the firm in an undifferentiated marketplace , while Institutional Social Theory focuses on explaining how structures govern the sociological aspects between different participants in organisations. Neither, however, attends to why their particular structures are necessary in th e first instance to fulfil these purposes. Clearly, the tradition on organisational theory is primarily concerned with how organisations behave rather than as an existential matter. A justifiable contention is why this should matter if the purpose (as will be the case of this study) of a research is to investigate th e behaviour, or aspect thereof, of an extant organisation . To what purpose is there to question, rather than simply state, the reason for the existence of the organisation? The answer lies in the fact that any set of sociological relationships including economic and sociological power relations, do not existed in a hermetically sealed system. The postulation that such relationships are purely lateral between participating actors,

they are never form with complete freedom by the participants.

Literature Review

Review of Neo-Institutionalism Neo-Institutionalism has become the dominant perspective in macro-organisation theory (Greenwood 1996, Oliver 1991, Sillince and Suddaby 2008 ). Yet, in many ways, this dominance in modern studies has actually left institutionalism in a weaker position to conceptualise problems. Pfeffers (1993) argument that an ecumenical paradigm o ffers profuse advantages (increased access to resources, ease of collaboration and increased productivity) does not seem to have been borne out . The problem with relying solely on an institutionalist approach is undermined by a myr iad of objections. E very theory contains within it implicit assumptions and goals that define its parameters of application. In the case of institutionalism , the variety and complexity of the world of organisations become somewhat fuzzy in its details (micro-operations) as much of our attentions are directed upon the institutional structure itself. At the same time, the belief that the institutional structure is all persuasive has made many practitioners blind to exoge nous forces that are the macro world beyond it. This section will trace this development.

Following on from Weber (1905), organisation s were seen as passive recipients of elements and pressures from their environments. In many ways, institutionalist scholars came to see not only individuals in organisations but or ganisations themselves as prisoners of their environments. They were no longer seen as having agency to change their own destinies which were driven by a relentless rationalistic march towards standardisation by way of efficiency. This view was further reinforced with DiMaggio and Powells (1983) paper about Webers Iron Cage revisited. It was quickly taken to stand for the principle that organisations become isomorphic and that, over time, all organis ations would become identical.

Prior to DiMaggio and Powell, contingency theorists such as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) had evoked isomorphism to propose that evolving environmental differentiation has to be matched by similar evolving patterns of differentiation within organisations. Thompson (1967) and Wood ward (1965) also made similar vice-versa arguments about the circular need to match technology or the task environment to the internal structure of an organisation. DiMaggio and Powells own definition of isomorphism refers to the constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions seem to confirm this (1982, p149).

Each of these definitions of isomorphism highlights particular aspects of its meaning. I n more prosaic language, isomorphism can simply be taken as the observation that organisations in general tend to try and mimic the structure of organisation that seem to be successful in dealing with their own evolving environments. Even simpler, that organisation s that are deemed successful act as role models. This is the case even when the model organisation has in fact little affinity to ones own organisations environment. DiMaggio and Powell advanced the concept by proposing three interlinked drivers of institutional isomorphism; normative, coercive, and mimetic (1983). While mimetic isomorphism is easily identified with the above definitions , normative refers to the tendency that bodies such as professions, trade bodies, or industrial sectors tend to coale sce their operations around common standards , while coercive refer to standardisation that occurs through coercive rather than voluntary actions such as legislation which could in fact itself be driven by higher l evel social or environmental norms. The authors purpose was to argue that isomorphism was no longer driven by concerns with the Weberian idea of efficiency and that continuing precipitation will thus lead to a modified form of iron cage to that envision ed by Weber. DiMaggio and Powell noted two types of isomorphism and that these are manifestations of different agencies . Competitive (Weberian) isomorphism is the type of change proposed by population ecologists i n which optimal forms of organis ations are selected out of a population. T his requires a rational system that emphasises competitive markets and primarily describes organisations which operate in open, competitive environments. For organisations which do no t operate under such conditions but compete for political power and institutional legitimacy as well as for social and economic fitness , the idea of institutional isomorphism is more relevant. The authors noted the institutionalisation of professional bodies for example , will impose standardisation on those practici ng and aspiring to the profession. As such bodies however tend to accrue power (and thus legitimacy) to themselves, they may actually contribute to a distortion and degradation of the efficiency of the environments they operate in. That is the system itself may be caught in a new type of Iron Cage where vested interest s can and will distort t he environment to their benefit . These systems do not optimise efficiency. These ideas proved seminal. They not only broke the final , already tenuous, link of social institutional theory from its economic roots but also pointed to development paths beyond the economic efficiency utility and thus paved the way towards the unfettered exploration of social themes. Institutionalism was to be examined purely in the context of sociological factors.

Ironically, the agency idea developed in this paper was initially and erroneously taken as confirmation that organisations were passive recipients of elements and pressures from their institutional environments a confirmation of the rationalistic imprimatur of old institutionalism. DiMaggio (1988) corrected this misinterpretation by contending the idea of organisations as prisoners of their institutional environments by emphasising how organizations often indepen dently inculcate and reflect their environments in an innovative manner. The next important developme nt was Oliver (1991), who conceptually mapped out how organisations can respo nd in a strategic manner to environmental pressures. Olivers work further developed DiMaggios (1988) idea that organisations were no t only active, but possessed identities that could be by definition separate from any of the organisations composite parts we are forced to treat institutions as sentient actors in its own right rather than simple passive structures. In many ways, the full implications of Olivers work have still not reverberated through institutionalist thinking. Like a new toy, subsequent scholars have made much of the play of institutions as independent actor s manipulating their environments (Fernandez-Alles and Llamas-Sanchez 2008 eg). In lieu of passive cultural structures, institutional theory now presents organisations as active agents (as well as principle) in their efforts to resist institutional pressure, alter environments and institutional logics. The recasting of organisations in the dual role of principle and agent presents many conceptual problems whose resolutions in stitutional scholars have mostly ignored. (quote: some paper

criticised Oliver as only short term predictors look it up)

This emphasis of organisations a s an institutional entrepreneur (DiMaggio 1998) is now so prevalent that scholars have blinded themselves to the possibility that there can be any other agency (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). The admonition of Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott (2002) that institutional research should attend to instances of profound or field level change fall on deaf ears. What has happened subsequent to Oliver is that Institutional theory has been used to the exclusion of others or these have been recast to fit into institutionalist thinking . Contingency theory is now represented in institutional theory with the implicit understanding that the symbolic or institutional world is simp ly another variant of the environment to which the organisation must adapt. Change theory is represented as if change is now the preferred outcome, without any effort to appreciate or understand the complex and often micro processes by which actors work to maintain institutional stability (Suddaby, 2010).

Assaults on neo -institutional primacy re-emergence of exogenous factors as agency.

All this have left neo -institutionalism is in a cul -de-sac. Its over-concentration of the institutional structure to embody both agency and principle have left it exposed on both macro and micro-process levels. On the macro-level, the postulation that institutionalism provide active agency that act in a strategic manner have become inflated to assume that they can always act in a manner that is determinant. Clearly this proposition that institutional structures can absorb exogenous shocks by responding in a strategic manner that can alter the trajectory of the exogenous force will depend on primacy. What has primacy, the institutional structure or the exogenous shock?

This macro-question matters greatly. In Lincoln (1995, p. 1147), the core concept of neoinstitutional theory is the tendency for social structures and processes to acquire meaning and stability in t heir own right rather than as instrumental tools for the a chievement of specialized ends. The key to unlocking this definition lies in what is said about the structures not being for specialized ends - meaning for matters beyond the utility of the organisation. This can crudely be illustrated by the example of a commercial pharmaceutical company. Its utility is to make and sell drugs, everything else pertaining to the organisation beyond these two functions is institutional , be they labour policies (pay, promotion, etc. ), government, public, or investor relations. It should be self-evident that if the utility ceases, that is, if the company cannot make and sell its drugs, then the institutional aspects of the organisation must cease to have meaning.

What this example encapsulates is the tension between competitive and institutional isomorphism. It is at this juncture that economics re-enters the institutional debate. By the beginning of the 1990s , privatisation programs were occurring throughout the develop ed world. These organisations, caught between their institutional isomorphic past and their awaiting competitive isomorphic future became a battleground between social institutional scholars and policy economists. The primary point of contention was not whether exogenous pressure can have any impact. It was widely agreed that exogenous shocks created agency. The contention was path dependency. Accepting path dependency must inevitably mean accepting the pri macy of institutional independence . The economists challenging ins titutional theory were mostly interested in the regulatory frameworks overseeing the transition of former monopolies such as telecoms to a competitive environment (Bartle 2002, Schneider 2001). At stake was whether competitive isomorphism or institutional isomorphism would prevail and thus the type of regulation needed. Can

exogenous exigencies overwhelm institutional preferences? If so, then path dependency indeed will not matter except as an intervenin g variable all paths will eventually lead to a competitive landscape where institutional preferences are overwhelmed. This was the conclusion that these policy economists came to (e.g. Bartle 2002, Schneider 2001, Vogelsang 1999, Hulsink 1999 ). They demonstrate that these organisations were forced to react with increasing urgency to competitive pressures at the expense of institutional preferences. The rationalistic basis of neo-classical economics was seen to have triumph ed. By the time Chan-Lotscher (2004) modified this assessment by showing that institutional distortions were not simply temporal , but permanent variables, both side s have largely disengaged.

Departure from current research - using a three pillar approach (Contextual , institutional a nd interpretive) to understanding change in organisational change.

Neo-Institutionalists have largely ignored the lessons from thi s episode, producing in recent years a litany of works that are at an evolutionary dead end by retreating to where Institutional isomorphism still predominates (e.g. Fernandez-Alles and Llamas -Sanchez 2008), quantitative studies ( e.g. Pouder 1996 ), or most surprisingly, expressing surprise that neo-institutionalism does not w ork in free choice environments (Yamamura and Streeck 2005).

The lesson from this battle should be one that is profoundly uncomfortable for NeoInstitutionalist s: Neo-Institutionalism alone is insufficient to describe the symbolic social world beyond the specialized ends . Not only is it constrained by the technical at the boundary, but it is wholly permeated by it. T here is an inherent blurring of the boundary between categories of what is technical and institution al. Social constructivists have in fact always maintained the distinction is useless because the process by which we categoris e activities as technical or economic is itself, socially determined (Suddaby 2010). Indeed, the battle between neo -institutionalist and neoclassical economists about whether material or social interests occupy the base and superstructure o f organisations and society is generally irrelevant. The reality is that organis ations have always displayed behaviour that is neither wholly economically rational nor wholly in the realm of social legitimacy. This point was captured perfectly in a too -often ignored paper by (Selznick 1996 ), who emphasised that while organisations are formed to fulfil a utility function, they also inevita bly institutionalise. An organisation may organise a workforce to manufacture a drug, a function that enhances utility , but the same process is concurrently institutionalising because issues

such as hierarchy, pay structures, organisa tional culture are social as much as material concerns. Selznick implied that asymmetrical development of one in respect to the other (organising or institutionalising) , will inevitably lead to tensions that will inhibit further development. Put bluntly, the symbolic institutional world of an organisation is intimately tied to its utility aspect. Thus any exogenous threat to the survival of the utility aspect must be satisfied even if institutional preferences are overridden.

If institutional ism defines how social behaviour manifest in macro -organisations and contextualism defines the context of the institutional environment with respect to exogenous contingencies , we are still at a loss as to what drives the creation of the institutional environment in the first place. Why do particular social issues matte r and why do others not? Weber (The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 1905) postulated on the vacuum generated by the Protestant Reformation as a source of economic and social ethics. The question was however, subsequently forgotten for the next seventy years . Following from Veblen (1910), institutionalists adopted rational-actor models that rejected cognitive and cultural as explanations for organisational behaviour. Despite these factors re-entering the institutional debate with neo-intuitionalism, the ideational was still de -emphasised in favour of institutional structures . Suddaby (2010) attributed this to the ease of quantitative study offered by treating organisations as black boxes with defined inputs and outputs as opposed to the inherent difficulty of measuring the interpretive.

The first to attack this a pproach was ironically DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who noted supra-individual units of analysis cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of ind ividuals' attributes or motives, emphasising that these can only be realised through ideational analysis. Selz nick (1996, p 275) makes a similar point by no ting that organisations are conceived not so much as immaculate designs but as coalitions governed by multiple rationalities and negotiated authority . Suddaby (2010) made the pertinent observation that to understand the institutional processes manifested by organisations, institutionalist will have to lea rn to look inside the black box and understand the processes within it.

Interfacing the interpretive with institutional logics.

Zucker (1977) describes the micro -processes by which authority becomes institutionalised in organizations. It is ideational in its focus on how actors use cues from their organisational environment to attribute meaning to events. The second, by Meyer and R owan (1977) also

emphasises the ideational elements of institutionalization in demonstrating how organizations attribute rationality to some activities and not others. The third, by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) extends ideational elements of neo -institutionalism by suggesting that organizations that adopt a similar structural position in an organizational field will become isomorphic with their common institutional environment. Whereas the latter paper premises its argument on ideational assumptions and meani ng systems, it also contains a structural component. Unfortunately, subsequent studies in institutional theory ignored the ideational elements of that argument and, somewhat blindly, pursued the structural implications of isomorphism (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999).